Lukács’s Misreading of Marx in *The Ontology of Social Being*

*The Ontology of Social Being* (hereafter *Social Ontology*) is a representative text of Lukács’s later years. In this text, Lukács, taking the ontology of labour as his foundation and drawing on Marx’s *Capital* and the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), undertakes a new exploration of Marx’s philosophy, constituting an important attempt systematically to reconstruct Marx’s philosophical thought. Compared with *History and Class Consciousness*, this text explores three important dimensions at the level of basic theory. First, it acknowledges the priority of nature, a retreat from Lukács’s earlier negation of Engels’s dialectics of nature, and from this he derives the principle of causality. Second, it reflects critically on Hegel’s theory of the identity of subject and object. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács’s theoretical logic was in fact that of Hegelian subject-object identity; this logic not only formed the basis for his critique of the antinomies in bourgeois thought, but also served as the hidden framework from which he argued the possibility of proletarian class consciousness on the basis of practice. In *Social Ontology*, however, Lukács criticises Hegel’s dialectics, arguing that the logical framework centred on the development of the identical subject-object both degrades the position of nature and embodies a teleology with a transcendental character: “With such a presupposition, the whole of nature and the whole of society become a unified teleological process, in which everything that the logical development of the Idea attains in the form of categories becomes actuality, and, as actuality, is enriched through the Idea’s own actuality, once again traversing the path already indicated in logic.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 264. Third, he makes full use of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* to reconstruct Marx’s philosophy, replacing the ontology of practice in *History and Class Consciousness* with an ontology of labour, and taking the ontology of labour as the logical basis for superseding alienation. In the discussion of this article, the main focus is on the third issue, namely Lukács’s reconstruction of Marx’s philosophy and, within this reconstruction, his misreading of Marx. This misreading is manifested in two aspects. First, at the logical level, taking the ontology of labour as the foundation of Marx’s philosophy is an interpretation of Marx through Hegel’s ontology. Second, at the textual level, Lukács fails to see the logical difference between the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, interpreting the latter through the former. The cause of this textual misreading lies in a misreading at the level of theoretical logic, and at a deeper level involves the question of how to understand the development of Marx’s thought from *The German Ideology* to *Capital*, and especially the difference in intellectual logic between the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*.

《关于社会存在的本体论》(以下简称《社会存在本体论》)是卢卡奇晚年的代表性文本。在这一文本中，卢卡奇以劳动本体论为基础，结合马克思的《资本论》与《1857—1858年经济学手稿》,对马克思的哲学进行了新的探索，成为系统重构马克思哲学思想的重要尝试。相比于《历史与阶级意识》,这一文本在基本理论上有三个重要维度的探索：一是承认自然界的先在性，这是对卢卡奇早年否定恩格斯的自然辩证法的回撤，并从这里引申出因果性原则。二是反思黑格尔的主体-客体同一理论。在《历史与阶级意识》中，卢卡奇的理论逻辑实际上是黑格尔主体-客体同一的逻辑，这一逻辑不仅构成了他反思资产阶级思想中的二律背反的基础，也是他从实践出发论证无产阶级阶级意识何以可能的隐性构架，但在《社会存在本体论》中，卢卡奇对黑格尔的辩证法提出批判，认为以同一的主体-客体发展为内核的逻辑构架，既贬低了自然的位置，又体现为一种带有先验性的目的论，“由于这样一种设定，整个自然界、整个社会都成为一个统一的目的论过程，在这个过程中，凡是由理念的逻辑发展过程以范畴的形式达到的，都成为现实，而且作为现实，通过理念自己的现实而得到丰富，再一次走过逻辑中已经指出的道路”。三是充分利用《1857—1858年经济学手稿》与《资本论》重构马克思的哲学，以劳动本体论取代了《历史与阶级意识》的实践本体论，并以劳动本体论作为扬弃异化的逻辑基础。在本文的讨论中，主要关注的是第三个问题，即卢卡奇对马克思哲学的重构以及在这一重构中对马克思的错位阅读。这种错位阅读体现在两个方面：一是在逻辑上，以劳动本体论为马克思哲学的基础，这是以黑格尔的本体论来解释马克思。二是在文本上，卢卡奇没能看到《1857—1858年经济学手稿》与《资本论》的逻辑差异，是以前者解释后者，产生这种文本错位的原因，在于理论逻辑上的错位，而在深层上，则涉及如何理解马克思自《德意志意识形态》到《资本论》的思想发展问题，特别是《1857—1858年经济学手稿》与《资本论》在思想逻辑上的差异问题。

I. The Major Intellectual Shift from *The German Ideology* to *Capital*

一、从《德意志意识形态》到《资本论》的重大思想转变

To discuss the problem of Lukács’s misreading of Marx in *Social Ontology*, and especially the intellectual difference between the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, it is necessary to re-examine the major intellectual shift in Marx’s thought from *The German Ideology* to *Capital*.

要讨论卢卡奇在《社会存在本体论》中对马克思的错位阅读问题，特别是《1857—1858年经济学手稿》与《资本论》的思想差异问题，需要重新理解马克思自《德意志意识形态》到《资本论》的重大思想转变。

In the study of the development of Marx’s philosophical thought, although there is considerable controversy over the division between his early and later thought marked by the “Theses on Feuerbach” and *The German Ideology*, there is broad consensus on the continuity of Marx’s thought after 1845. For the study of Marx’s thought after 1845, several approaches exist logically. One approach emphasises the humanist底色 [2]2 James Mill, *Elements of Political Economy*, 3rd ed. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1844), p. 5. of Marx’s philosophy, arguing that the discussions in *Capital* of the critique of alienation and commodity fetishism, and of the free and all-round development of the individual, manifest precisely this humanist spirit. In *Marx’s Concept of Man*, Erich Fromm states that Marx’s socialist thought inherits the Western humanist tradition: “Marx’s aim was that of the emancipation of man from the chains of economic determinism, of restoring him to his wholeness, of enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature.” [3]3 Ibid., p. 6. Therefore, Marx was concerned with the problem of human alienation and its overcoming, and his socialism was founded on a theory of man. Fromm argues that the development of Marx’s thought is continuous; from the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* to *Capital*, the theory of man is always the foundation of Marx’s thought. Although the later Marx underwent changes in concepts, language, and mood, “the core of the philosophy developed by the young Marx was never changed, and it is impossible to understand his later concept of socialism and his critique of capitalism except on the basis of his concept of man developed in his early writings.” [4]4 John Ramsay McCulloch, *The Principles of Political Economy*, 5th ed. (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1864), p. 1. Fromm’s view represents the basic position of interpreting Marx from a humanist standpoint.

在对马克思哲学思想发展的探讨中，虽然对于以《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》与《德意志意识形态》为分界线的前后期思想争议较多，但对1845年之后马克思思想的连贯性有着较大的共识。对于马克思1845年之后的思想的研究，在逻辑上存在着以下几种思路：一种思路强调马克思哲学的人本主义底色，认为《资本论》中关于异化与拜物教批判、关于人的自由而全面发展的论述，展现的就是这种人本主义精神。弗洛姆在《马克思关于人的概念》中就指出：马克思的社会主义思想继承了西方的人本主义传统，“马克思的目标是使人在精神上得到解放，使人摆脱经济决定论的枷锁，使人的完整的人性得到恢复，使人与其伙伴们以及与自然界处于统一而且和谐的关系之中”,因此，马克思关心的是人的异化及其克服问题，他的社会主义是建立在人的学说之上的。弗洛姆认为，马克思的思想发展具有连贯性，自《1844年经济学哲学手稿》到《资本论》,人的学说始终是马克思思想的基础，虽然晚年马克思在概念、语言与心境上存在着变化，但“由青年马克思发展起来的哲学的核心决没有改变，并且除非以他在其早期著作中所发展起来的关于人的概念为基础，就不可能理解他后来所发展的关于社会主义的概念，以及对资本主义的批判”。弗洛姆的观点代表了从人本主义出发解读马克思的基本立场。

Opposed to this is another approach, represented by Althusser. In *For Marx*, Althusser emphasises an epistemological break between the young Marx and the later Marx, arguing that the Marx before 1845–1846 was a Marx still under the influence of bourgeois ideology, and that his theory of the human species-essence and alienation was a manifestation of this ideology. This approach emphasises human subjectivity, and the construction of the human being as a subject is precisely a characteristic of capitalist ideology. The Marx after 1846, by contrast, freed himself from this ideological influence, discovered the new continent of history, and thereby founded the science of history, expressing it theoretically with entirely different concepts and categories, such as productive forces, relations of production, economic base, superstructure, ideology, and so on. Although Althusser believed that Marx’s later thought could be further divided into a developmental stage from 1846 to 1858 and a mature stage after 1858, the thought of these two stages is continuous, with no fundamental difference.

与之对立的是另一种思路，以阿尔都塞为代表。在《保卫马克思》中，阿尔都塞强调青年马克思与晚年马克思的思想断裂，认为1845—1846年之前的马克思是处于资产阶级意识形态影响下的马克思，其关于人的类本质与异化的学说就是这种意识形态的表征。这一思路强调的是人的主体性，而把人作为主体建构出来正是资本主义意识形态的特点。1846年之后的马克思则摆脱了这种意识形态的影响，发现了历史这片新大陆，从而创立了历史科学，并以完全不一样的概念与范畴，如生产力、生产关系、经济基础、上层建筑、意识形态等范畴实现不同的理论表达。虽然阿尔都塞认为马克思后来的思想还可以划分为1846—1858年的发展阶段与1858年之后的成熟阶段，但这两个阶段的思想是连贯的，并无根本的差别。

Such an approach to the continuity of Marx’s later thought is also reflected in Soviet textbooks. In this textbook system, Marx is often described as having become a Marxist from the time of his *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* onward, and the continuity of Marx’s thought is taken as self-evident. In domestic discussions of the history of Marxist philosophy, although most scholars do not endorse the approach of Soviet textbooks, the majority hold that Marx’s thought after *The German Ideology* is continuous. *The German Ideology* for the first time systematically expounded historical materialism and applied it to the critical analysis of capitalist society; in this sense, *Capital* is a proof of the scientificity of historical materialism.

关于马克思后期思想连贯性的这样一种思路也体现在苏联教科书中。在这一教科书体系中，马克思常被描述为自《黑格尔法哲学批判》起就开始成为马克思主义者，马克思思想的连贯性是不言自明的。在国内马克思主义哲学史的讨论中，虽然大多数学者并不认可苏联教科书的思路，但大多认为自《德意志意识形态》之后，马克思的思想具有连贯性。《德意志意识形态》第一次系统阐述了历史唯物主义，并把历史唯物主义运用于对资本主义社会的批判分析，在这个意义上，《资本论》是对历史唯物主义科学性的证明。

From the above introduction it can be seen that, although these several approaches differ in their theoretical logic regarding Marx’s later thought, they share a consensus on its continuity. Yet this consensus is problematic. From *The German Ideology* to *Capital*, there is a more fundamental change in Marx’s thought, a change more fundamental than the shift from humanism to historical materialism.

从上面的介绍中可以看出，这几种思路虽然对马克思后期思想在理论逻辑上存在一些分歧，但在其思想的连贯性上却有共识。然而这种共识是有问题的。自《德意志意识形态》到《资本论》,马克思的思想存在更为根本的变化，这种变化比起自人本主义到历史唯物主义的转变更为根本。

The logic of production established in *The German Ideology* can be explicated from two aspects: first, the objective dimension, unfolding through categories such as productive forces, relations of production, economic base, and superstructure, thereby taking the economy as the ultimate determining factor. This is also the classical interpretive approach of traditional Marxism. Within this approach, because it easily leads to economic determinism, voices emerged during the period of the Second International calling for the supplementation of Marxism with Neo-Kantianism. Based on a reflection on this, Lukács and others opened a second line of inquiry, namely reinterpreting Marx from the subjective dimension. In this interpretation, the concept of practice becomes the foundational concept of Marxist philosophy, and when this concept is applied to works such as the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Grundrisse*, it gives rise to the ontology of labour. In Marx’s own thinking, both of these lines of inquiry existed after *The German Ideology*. In the objectified dimension, by the time of the 1859 “Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,” Marx had described the general framework and internal logic of his conception of history. But immediately after completing this description, Marx pointed out: a society characterised by the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, especially capitalist society, because it creates the material means for resolving this antagonism, will provide the material foundation for a future society, “and with this social formation the prehistory of human society comes to an end.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 264. Here, a subjective dimension is manifested through the expression “prehistory of human society.” It can be said that, beginning with the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, this subjective line of thinking had always existed; however, after *The German Ideology*, this subjectivity was expressed on the premise of objective material conditions. But by the time of the *Grundrisse*, this subjectivity was confirmed on the basis of the ontology of labour.

《德意志意识形态》确立的生产逻辑，可以从两方面展开解释：一是客体的层面，即从生产力、生产关系、经济基础、上层建筑等维度展开，从而将经济作为最终决定因素，这也是传统马克思主义的经典解释思路。在这一思路中，由于易导致经济决定论，所以在第二国际时期出现了以新康德主义来补充马克思主义的呼声。基于对此的反思，卢卡奇等人开启了第二条思路，即从主体层面重新理解马克思。在这一解释中，实践概念成为马克思哲学的基础性概念，这一概念落实到《1844年经济学哲学手稿》《1857—1858年经济学手稿》等著作后就是劳动本体论的出现。在马克思本人的思路中，这两条思路在《德意志意识形态》之后都存在。在客体化的维度，到1859年《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》时，马克思描述了他的历史观的一般构架和内在逻辑。但做完这一描述后，马克思紧接着指出：以生产力与生产关系的矛盾为基本特征的社会，特别是到资本主义社会，由于其创造着解决这种对抗的物质，将为未来社会提供物质基础，“因此，人类社会的史前时期就以这种社会形态而告终”。在这里，一种主体性的维度通过人类“史前时期”的表述而展现出来。可以说，自《1844年经济学哲学手稿》开始，这种主体性的思路一直存在，不过自《德意志意识形态》之后，这种主体性是以客观的物质条件为前提而得以表达的。但到《1857—1858年经济学手稿》,这种主体性以劳动本体论为基础得以确证。

Below, taking these two lines of inquiry after *The German Ideology* as our guide, let us see whether we can use them to understand the logic of *Capital*.

下面我们就以《德意志意识形态》之后这两条思路为指引，看看能否以之来理解《资本论》的逻辑。

If the logic of production established in *The German Ideology* is extended to the explanation of capitalist society, the following points require attention: First, it emphasises that the purpose of production is to satisfy needs, which is also a characteristic of the logic of production in its general sense. As long as humanity exists, it must solve the problems of food, clothing, shelter, and transportation—that is, the problem of satisfying needs. It can be said that the logic of production is a logic in the anthropological sense, meaning that as long as humanity exists, it cannot but engage in the production and reproduction of the material means of subsistence. In fact, this is also the logic of classical political economy. At the beginning of *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith emphasises that the division of labour can increase productivity, thereby producing more products capable of satisfying people’s needs. James Mill states that political economy has two great objectives, “namely, the consumption of society and the supply for that consumption.” [2]2 James Mill, *Elements of Political Economy*, 3rd ed. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1844), p. 5. This supply comes from production; therefore, the study of political economy “is to be considered in two principal points of view; namely, the inquiry relating to production, and the inquiry relating to consumption.” [3]3 Ibid., p. 6. McCulloch similarly holds: “The object of Political Economy is to point out the means by which the industry of man may be rendered most productive of those necessaries, comforts, and enjoyments which constitute wealth; to ascertain the proportions in which this wealth is distributed among the different classes of society; and the mode in which it may be most advantageously consumed.” [4]4 John Ramsay McCulloch, *The Principles of Political Economy*, 5th ed. (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1864), p. 1. On this point, when we proceed from the satisfaction of material life needs, we fundamentally have not broken out of the logic of classical economics; rather, we have extended this logic from the domain of political economy to the domain of human history.

如果将《德意志意识形态》所确立的生产逻辑推广到资本主义社会的解释上，有以下几点需要注意：第一，强调生产的目的是满足需要，这也是一般意义上生产逻辑的特点。人类只要存在，就需要解决吃穿住行的问题，也就是需要的满足问题。可以说生产逻辑是人类学意义上的逻辑，即只要人类存在，就不得不进行物质生活资料的生产与再生产。实际上，这也是古典政治经济学的逻辑。斯密在《国富论》一开始就强调，分工能够促进生产率的提高，从而生产出更多能够满足人们需要的产品。詹姆斯·穆勒指出：政治经济学有两大目的，“即社会的消费和满足消费的供给”。这种供给来自生产，因此政治经济学的研究“主要从两个方面进行探究，即有关生产的探究和有关消费的探究”。麦克库洛赫同样认为：“政治经济学的目的在于指出一些方法使人类的劳动可用之于最有效地生产那些构成财富的必需品、舒适品和享乐品方面，说明这些财富在社会各阶级间分配的比例以及它最有利地消费的方式。”在这一点上，当我们从物质生活需要的满足出发时，从根本上来说并没有跳出古典经济学的逻辑，而是将这一逻辑从政治经济学的领域推广到了人类历史领域。

Second, proceeding from general material production, when discussing production in capitalist society, one easily reduces this production process to a process of combining material conditions. Material production cannot be separated from the labourer, the means of production, and the object of production; these are all concrete material existences. When the logic of production in this sense is applied to capitalist society, capital will be understood from the perspective of material existence, thereby reducing capital to material existence. Mill holds that the tools and machinery people use for labour “are called capital, when they are considered as a supply for the purpose of production.” [5]5 Mill, *Elements of Political Economy*, p. 96. Furthermore, “the raw materials used in labour, when they are the products of prior labour, are also called capital.” [6]6 Ibid., p. 97. Proceeding from such an understanding, capitalist production is inseparable from capital; the Ricardian socialists and others confronted the problems of capitalist society based on this logic. According to this logic, as long as production is carried out, factories, machinery, and raw materials are indispensable; these are all capital, and therefore, without capital, production simply cannot unfold. The problem of capitalist society does not lie in capital itself, nor in the production link, but in the capitalists, in the distribution link. From this, they draw the conclusion: want capital, but not capitalists. To be rid of capitalists, the problem of exploitation must be solved at the level of distribution. Thompson’s *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness* unfolds according to this logic. Similarly, Proudhon and his follower Darimon proceed in the same way.

第二，从一般的物质生产出发，在讨论资本主义社会的生产时，就易将这一生产过程还原为物质条件的结合过程。物质生产离不开劳动者、生产资料和生产对象，这些都是具体的物质性存在，当将这种意义上的生产逻辑运用于资本主义社会时，就会从物质存在出发来理解资本，从而将资本还原为物质存在。穆勒认为，人们用于劳动的工具与机器，“由这些工具组成的供应品称作资本” 。另外，“劳动使用的原料，当它们是先前劳动的产物时，也称为资本”。从这样的理解出发，资本主义生产就离不开资本，李嘉图等社会主义者们就是根据这个逻辑来面对资本主义社会问题的。按照这一逻辑，只要进行生产，就离不开厂房、机器和原料，这些都是资本，因此离开资本，生产根本无法展开。资本主义社会的问题不是出在资本上，也不是出在生产的环节上，而是出在资本家身上，出在分配环节上，由此他们得出要资本不要资本家的结论。不要资本家，就需要在分配层面来解决剥削问题，汤普逊的《最能促进人类幸福的财富分配原理的研究》就是按这样的逻辑展开的。同样，蒲鲁东及其跟随者达里蒙也是如此。

In *Capital*, Marx reverses the above logic. First, the logic of capital, which pursues the valorisation of value, subsumes the logic of production. Compared with the earlier logic proceeding from material production, in the section on “The Production of Absolute Surplus-Value,” after discussing the significance and conditions of material production, Marx points out that it would be mistaken to think that understanding the logic of material production suffices to understand capitalist production. In capitalist society, because the purpose of production is precisely the pursuit of surplus-value, the material production process is merely the bearer of the valorisation process. This means that within the capitalist production process, although the material production process still exists, this process is set according to the purpose of valorisation; the former is subsumed by the latter. If the production process cannot valorise, then the existence of the material production process loses its meaning. Therefore, this is not a production process of material means of subsistence in the general sense, but a production process of valorisation. “As a unity of the labour process and the process of forming value, the production process is a commodity production process; as a unity of the labour process and the process of valorisation, the production process is a capitalist production process, the capitalist form of commodity production.” [7]7 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 304. This is a logic of capital different from the logic of production; it is a new logic of social being. The purpose of this logic is to extract surplus-value to the greatest possible extent. This nature of the logic of capital determines that it is a logic of expanded reproduction, breaking with the logic of simple reproduction aimed at satisfying needs in traditional societies.

在《资本论》中，马克思颠倒了上述逻辑。第一，追求价值增殖的资本逻辑统摄生产逻辑。相比于过去从物质生产出发的逻辑，在关于“绝对剩余价值的生产”部分，马克思在讨论完物质生产的意义及其条件之后指出，如果认为理解了物质生产的逻辑就可以理解资本主义生产，那就错了。在资本主义社会，由于生产的目的就是为了追求剩余价值，因此物质生产过程只是价值增殖过程的载体，这意味着在资本主义生产过程中，虽然物质生产过程仍然存在，但这个过程是根据价值增殖的目的来设定的，前者受后者统摄。如果生产过程不能增殖，那么物质生产过程的存在也就没有了意义。因此，这不是一般意义上的物质生活资料的生产过程，而是价值增殖的生产过程。“作为劳动过程和价值形成过程的统一，生产过程是商品生产过程；作为劳动过程和价值增殖过程的统一，生产过程是资本主义生产过程，是商品生产的资本主义形式。”这是不同于生产逻辑的资本逻辑，这是一种新的社会存在的逻辑。这种逻辑的目的是最大限度地获取剩余价值。资本逻辑的这一本性决定了它是一种扩大再生产的逻辑，是对传统社会满足需要的简单再生产逻辑的破除。

Second, the purpose of production in capitalist society is not, as classical economists claim, to satisfy material life needs, nor, as the anthropological logic of production expresses it, to satisfy human needs; rather, it is to satisfy desire, which is different from need. This is an inversion of the purpose of production. The original purpose of production is to satisfy people’s needs, but the purpose of capitalist production is to obtain the greatest possible surplus-value. This has nothing to do with human needs; it targets insatiable desire, and need becomes the bearer of desire. The original purpose is inverted into a means. Weber’s later discussion of the inversion of instrumental rationality and value rationality reveals this problem from another level.

第二，资本主义社会生产的目的不像古典经济学家所说的是满足物质生活需要，同样也不像人类学意义上的生产逻辑所表达的是满足人类的需要，而是满足不同于需要的欲望，这是生产目的的颠倒。生产的原本目的是满足人们的需要，但资本主义生产的目的是获得更大限度的剩余价值，这与人的需要无关，它针对的是无法满足的欲望，需要成为欲望的载体。原来的目的颠倒为手段，韦伯后来所讲的工具理性与价值理性的颠倒，从另一个层面揭示了这一问题。

Third, and most importantly, the above shift is a fundamental transformation of thought. Although the logic of production has always been present in Marx’s later thought, after *Capital* the fundamental logic for confronting capitalist society underwent an important shift, namely from a dominance of the logic of production to a dominance of the logic of capital. This is a major transformation in Marx’s thought. Starting from the logic of production, which emphasizes the satisfaction of people’s material needs, this logic is fundamentally consistent with the logic of classical economics. Based on the logic of material production, Heidegger’s later critique of historical materialism — that Marx did not escape the “enframing” of technology — has its own justification. Similarly, Baudrillard’s view of this historical materialism as the ideology of capitalist production is logically tenable. For when this logic is extended to capitalist society, the logic of production and classical economics are in fact unified. It is Marx’s subsumption of the logic of production under the logic of capital that constitutes a fundamental inversion of traditional philosophy and classical economics, enabling Marx to stand on the logic of capital and reveal its inherent problems. This is a fundamental transformation in Marx’s thought, and also a problem that traditional research has failed to penetrate. The same is true of Lukács. He failed to see this fundamental transformation in Marx’s later thought, which led to a double misreading of the ideas in *Capital* in his discussion of the ontology of social being.

第三，最为重要的一点在于，上述转变是思想的根本性转变。虽然生产逻辑一直存在于马克思后来的思想中，但自《资本论》后，面对资本主义社会的根本逻辑发生了重要转变，即从以生产逻辑为主导转向了以资本逻辑为主导，这是马克思思想的重大转变。从生产逻辑出发，强调满足人的物质需要，这一逻辑从根本上来说与古典经济学的逻辑是一致的。立足于物质生产逻辑，海德格尔晚年对历史唯物主义的批评，即认为马克思没有跳出技术的座架，有其自身的道理。同样，鲍德里亚将这种历史唯物主义看作资本主义生产意识形态，在逻辑上也是能成立的。因为将这一逻辑推广到资本主义社会时，生产逻辑与古典经济学实际上就统一起来了。马克思以资本逻辑来统摄生产逻辑，才是对传统哲学与古典经济学的根本性颠倒，这才能使马克思立足于资本逻辑来揭示其内在的问题。这是马克思思想上的根本转变，也是传统研究中没能深入的问题。卢卡奇同样如此。他没能看到马克思后来思想的这一根本性转变，这使得他在关于社会存在本体论的讨论中，对《资本论》的思想存在双重的错位阅读。

II. The Ontology of Labor: Lukács’s Theoretical Logical Misalignment

二、劳动本体论：卢卡奇的理论逻辑错位

The content of *The Ontology of Social Being* is divided into two major parts. The first part is an introduction to the ontology of social being, beginning with a lengthy essay that systematically expresses the ideas of the entire work. This is followed by a discussion structured as a complete treatise, including an introduction, neo-positivism and existentialism, Nicolai Hartmann’s breakthrough to a genuine ontology, Hegel’s true and false ontology, and then an exposition of the basic principles of Marx’s ontology. In his discussion of the principles of Marx’s ontology, Lukács particularly emphasizes the unity of Marx’s philosophy and political economy, the basis of this unity being social existence, and he constructs an ontology of social being on the foundation of labor. Lukács argues: “Marx’s economics is permeated by a scientific spirit that never abandons this more conscious and more critical process in the ontological sense; rather, it applies the ontological meaning as a persistent and effective critical standard to the determination of every fact or every relation.” The second part is a concrete unfolding of Marx’s philosophical ontology, comprising four chapters: labor, reproduction, the ideal and ideology, and alienation. These are also the core concepts and content of Marx’s ontology of social being, reflecting Lukács’s thinking on Marx’s ontology of social being.

《社会存在本体论》的内容分为两大部分：第一部分是对社会存在本体论的引论，这由一个长篇的论文开始，这篇论文对整本著作的思想进行了系统性的表达。接着是按照完整著作的方式展开的讨论，包括导论、新实证主义与存在主义、尼古拉·哈特曼向真本体论的突进、黑格尔的真假本体论，然后是对马克思本体论的基本原则的表述。在关于马克思本体论原则的论述中，卢卡奇特别强调了马克思的哲学与政治经济学的一体性，这种一体性的基础就是社会存在，并以劳动为基础建构出社会存在本体论。卢卡奇认为：“马克思的经济学贯穿着一种科学精神，这种精神从未放弃在本体论的意义上的这种更为自觉和更为批判性的变化过程，不如说，他把本体论的意义作为一种持久、有效的批判性标准，把它运用于对每一种事实或每一种关系的确定中。”第二部分是对马克思哲学本体论的具体展开，包含四章内容，即劳动、再生产、观念的东西与意识形态、异化，这也是马克思的社会存在本体论的核心概念与内容，体现了卢卡奇关于马克思的社会存在本体论的思考。

Among the above important categories, labor is undoubtedly the most fundamental category and the ontological determination of social being. Lukács says: “In Marx, labor is everywhere the central category, in which all other determinations are already summarily expressed.” This centrality of labor represents a shift from Lukács’s earlier category of practice. As we know, in *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács, proceeding from Hegel’s logic of the unity of subject and object, emphasized the transcendence of reified society and reified consciousness through the totality of class consciousness. Lukács believed that the basis of this historical transcendence is practice. First, the transcendence of intuitive reified consciousness fundamentally lies in returning to practice. “The dialectical essence of proletarian consciousness can only lie in the tendency oriented toward practice, toward the action of the proletariat; it can only lie in its critical awareness of the immediacy inherent in any of its own non-practical attitudes, and in its constant critical mediation of the relation to the totality as process, to the action of the proletariat as class.” Second, the self-criticism of proletarian class consciousness is also feasible only when rooted in practice. Consciousness that returns to historical practice is itself historical and dialectical; only when intellectual critique returns to historical critique can it be understood to what extent intellectual practice has already advanced and how much of objective possibility has actually become reality. Only in such self-criticism can proletarian practice become theoretical practice, and its theory become the practical theory of transforming the world. Third, only in historical practice does history truly become human history. Only in practice, when people can see the tendency to create the future through dialectical opposition, is there a generative present, and can people grasp themselves as beings in the process of generation. In *The Ontology of Social Being*, Lukács further establishes this ontological significance of the category of practice. Lukács says: “The epoch-making achievement of Marx’s doctrine lies in his revelation of the priority of practice, of practice’s guiding and constraining role over cognition.” Returning to concrete social life, Lukács believes that Marx takes the production and reproduction of human life as the central problem, which determines that economics becomes an important foundation of Marx’s ontology: “Marx’s economics always proceeds from the totality of social being and always returns again to this totality.” Returning to the context of Marx’s economics, labor naturally becomes the core category of Marx’s ontology. From practice to material production, from material production to labor, this reflects in Lukács a deepening of the understanding of social being and also a concretization of his understanding of social being.

在上述几个重要范畴中，劳动无疑是最具根本性的范畴，也是社会存在的本体性规定。卢卡奇说：“在马克思那里，劳动到处都处于中心范畴，在劳动中所有其他规定都已经概括地表现出来。”劳动的这种中心地位，是卢卡奇早年实践范畴的一种转变。我们知道，在《历史与阶级意识》中，卢卡奇从黑格尔的主体-客体相统一的逻辑出发，强调以总体性的阶级意识实现对物化社会及物化意识的超越。卢卡奇认为，这种历史性超越的基础是实践。第一，超越直观的物化意识的根本在于回到实践。无产阶级意识的“辩证的本质只能在于以实践，以无产阶级的行动为目标的倾向中，只能在于它批判地意识到这种自己的任何一种非实践态度固有的直接性倾向，并力求始终批判地说明同作为过程的总体、同作为阶级的无产阶级行动的中介，即关系”。第二，无产阶级阶级意识的自我批判也只有植根于实践之中，才是切实可行的。回到历史实践的意识同样是历史的、辩证的，思想的批判只有回到历史的批判之中，才能明了思想的实践已经达到了何种程度，客观的可能性实际有多少已经变成了现实。只有在这样的自我批判中，无产阶级的实践才能变成理论的实践，其理论才能变成改造世界的实践的理论。第三，只有在历史的实践中，历史才真正地变为人的历史。只有在实践中，当人们看出能够通过辩证的对立创造出将来的倾向时，才有生成性的现在，人才能把自己把握为生成中的人。在《社会存在本体论》中，卢卡奇进一步确立了实践范畴的这种本体论意义。卢卡奇说：“马克思的学说的划时代功绩就在于，他揭示了实践的优先地位，实践对认识的引导和制约作用。”回到具体的社会生活，卢卡奇认为马克思把人类生活的生产与再生产作为中心问题，这决定了经济学成为马克思本体论的重要基础：“马克思的经济学总是从社会存在的总体出发，并且总是再次返回到这种总体性之中。”回到马克思的经济学语境，劳动自然成为马克思本体论的核心范畴。从实践到物质生产、从物质生产到劳动，在卢卡奇这里体现出对社会存在认识的深化，也体现了他对社会存在的认识的具体化。

Why begin with labor? In *Capital*, Marx points out: “Labor is first of all a process between man and nature, a process in which man mediates, regulates, and controls the material exchange between himself and nature through his own activity.” For Marx, labor is the most fundamental mediating activity between man and nature. In Lukács’s view: “All the determinations that constitute the new essence of social being are summarily contained in labor. Therefore, we can examine labor as an original phenomenon, as a mode of social being; clarifying these determinations will give us a clear picture of the basic characteristics of social being, so beginning with the analysis of labor is methodologically advantageous.” At the same time, labor drives the self-generation of human beings. Although unlike his youth, when he rejected the dialectics of nature, Lukács here emphasizes the foundational significance of nature for social being, yet a major ontological leap in human society is realized in labor.

为什么要从劳动开始?在《资本论》中，马克思指出：“劳动首先是人和自然之间的过程，是人以自身的活动来中介、调整和控制人和自然之间的物质变换的过程。”在马克思这里，劳动是人和自然之间最为基本的中介活动。在卢卡奇看来：“构成社会存在新本质的所有规定性，都总括地包含在劳动之中了。因此，我们可以把劳动当作一种原始现象，当作社会存在模式加以考察；澄清这些规定性会使我们获得关于社会存在基本特征的清楚图像，所以从分析劳动开始，在方法论上显得是有利的。”同时，劳动推动着人的自我生成。虽然与其青年时期排斥自然辩证法不同，卢卡奇这时强调自然界对于社会存在的基础性意义，但人类社会在本体论上的一个重大飞跃是在劳动中实现的。

The foundational status of labour in the ontological sense is manifested in the following aspects: First, labour embodies the unity of teleology and causality. In Lukács’s view, in the transition from the natural world to the human world, labour alters the mode of being of the world. In the labour process, at the outset objects are processed according to their natural form; gradually, objects are created according to one’s own conception. The transition from stone-tool processing to the pottery industry exemplifies the progressive retreat of nature. “With labour, there appears in the ontology of social being a category that is qualitatively new compared with the prior inorganic and organic forms of being. This new quality is the realisation of the corresponding, conceived and willed result of a teleological positing.” [12]12 Georg Lukács, *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins*, vol. 2, quoted in the Chinese text. The English translation follows the Chinese rendering. Human consciousness is no longer a mere accompanying phenomenon but a teleological positing. In this process of positing, there is both the utilisation of natural objects and creation on that basis; of course, such creation becomes increasingly abstract. In this creative process, the purposive individual encounters a world external to itself — this is the separation of human being from the world, and it is precisely this separation that distinguishes human beings from animals. The external world has its own internal connections, i.e., causal necessity. In the purposive labour process, human beings make choices, thereby transforming the causal chain of nature into a causally posited chain on the basis of teleology, and in the labour process they unify teleology and causality. Although in this process natural causality is subordinated to teleological positing, this does not mean that natural causality ceases to function; it is merely a retreat of the boundary of nature, not the disappearance of nature. Therefore, labour, in the fundamental sense, is the construction of the relationship between human being and nature, the material exchange between human being and nature. In this sense, Lukács regards labour as the model of social practice in the general sense, and this determines the dual aspect of labour in ontology: “On the one hand, this universality of labour means that practice is possible only through the subject’s teleological positing, and this positing itself includes, as an act of positing, the positing of many processes of natural causality; on the other hand, labour is primarily the reciprocal relation between human being and nature, so that when analysing positing one is justified in considering only those categories that arise from this.” All other categories for analysing social being are based on the category of labour. The unity of teleology and causality is precisely realised in the labour process.

劳动在本体论意义上的基础性地位体现在以下方面：第一，劳动体现了目的性与因果性的统一。在卢卡奇看来，从自然界向人类世界的转变中，劳动改变了世界的存在样态。在劳动过程中，一开始是依照自然物的样子来加工，渐渐地就按照自身的设想来创造对象，从石器加工到制陶业的转变就体现了自然的逐渐退却问题。“随着劳动，在社会存在本体论中就出现了一个同先前的无机的和有机的存在形式相比是具有新的质的范畴。这种新质性就是目的论设定的相应的、想出来的和所意愿的结果的实现。”人的意识不再是伴随现象，而是一种目的性的设定，在这个设定过程中，既有对自然物的利用，也有在此基础上的创造，当然这种创造会日益抽象。在这个创造过程中，有目的的个体碰到外在于自身的世界，这是人与世界的分离，正是这种分离将人与动物区别开来。外部世界有其自身的内在联系，即因果必然性。人在有目的的劳动过程中进行选择，从而将自然界的因果链变成目的论基础上被设定的因果链，并在劳动过程中将目的性与因果性统一起来。虽然在这个过程中，自然因果性受制于目的论设定，但并不意味着自然因果性停止发生作用，这只是自然界限的退却，并不意味着自然的消失。因此，劳动从根本的意义上来说是人与自然的关系建构，是人与自然之间的物质变换。卢卡奇在这个意义上认为劳动是一般意义上的社会实践的模式，这决定了劳动在本体论上的双重外貌：“一方面，它的这种普遍性说明，只是由于主体的目的论设定，才有可能进行实践，而且这种设定本身又包含了作为设定行为的对于诸多自然因果性过程的设定；另一方面，劳动主要是人与自然之间的相互关系，所以人们在对设定进行分析时有理由只考虑那些由此产生的范畴。”其他有关社会存在分析的范畴，都是以劳动范畴为基础的。目的性与因果性的统一，正是在劳动过程中实现的。

Second, labour and the construction of society. In the labour process, human beings do not confront nature as isolated individuals; they often engage in division of labour and cooperation in groups. Hence, when confronting nature with teleology, there is also another kind of teleology, namely, the promotion of collective harmony — this is the second kind of teleology, based on the first kind of teleology directed at nature. Although this second kind of teleology ultimately still points to nature, its immediate target is human beings. When labour is carried out on the basis of multi-person coordinated cooperation, this labour already possesses sociality; the labour process is simultaneously a process of social construction. Therefore, there is labour in a dual sense: one is the process between human being and nature, the ontological basis of material exchange between human being and nature; the other is social labour based on cooperation among human beings. Corresponding to the teleology posited by this subject is a second nature, i.e., the “nature” composed of human society together with the transformed natural world.

第二，劳动与社会的建构。人们在劳动的过程中，并不是个体面对自然，常常是以群体的方式进行分工合作，所以在以目的性来面对自然时，还存在着另一种目的性，即推进集体合和，这是在自然目的性基础上的第二种目的性，这种目的性虽然最终指向还是自然，但其直接指向则是人类。当劳动在多人协调合作基础上进行时，这种劳动已经具有社会性，劳动的过程同时也是社会性建构的过程。因此，存在着双重意义上的劳动，一种是人与自然之间发生的过程，是人与自然进行物质交换的本体论基础；另一种是以人与人之间的合作为基础的社会劳动，与这种主体所设定的目的相对应的是第二自然，即人类社会与所改变了的自然界共同组成的“自然”。

In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács discusses second nature. There, first nature refers to the original nature external to human beings; second nature refers to the reality created by human beings, surrounding them, with inexorable laws — i.e., the reified society external to human beings themselves, a “nature” like the nature that constrains human existence. “Capitalist society is related to a ‘natural law’ of this kind, a natural law ‘based on the unconsciousness of the parties involved.’ Industry — insofar as it sets goals — is, in the fundamental sense, in the dialectical and historical sense, merely the object of the natural laws of society, not their subject.” [13]13 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 131, adapted to the Chinese quotation. This emphasises the reified essence of second nature. In *The Ontology of Social Being*, this meaning of nature still exists and is manifested in the later discussion of “alienation,” i.e., capitalist society is an alienated society. Although in second nature there is teleology, this is a teleology posited on the basis of the first kind of teleology (the teleology directed at nature). Although individuals are teleological, due to contradictions among individuals, society as a whole is in a state of purposelessness; this posited teleology is more like causality: “All the actions of human beings, who through their mutual interaction cause the turbulence of social being, are indeed teleological positing by human beings, but their totality does not necessarily retain any teleological determinacy; rather, it possesses pure causality.” In *The Ontology of Social Being*, Lukács returns to first nature, rather than rejecting first nature as in *History and Class Consciousness*. This is more from the perspective of the connection between causality and teleology: he holds that what constitutes the ontological structure of labour remains teleological positing and the causal chain it sets in motion. Although every teleological action has its own result, the realisation of this teleology gives rise to a series of movements and the interaction of various elements within these movements, forming a processual totality. This process is precisely the movement process of social being. In this sense, labour constructs social being.

在《历史与阶级意识》中，卢卡奇谈到第二自然。在那里，第一自然指的是人之外的原初自然界，第二自然指的是人创造出来的，围绕自身、有着无情的规律性的现实，即外在于人本身的物化社会，这是像制约人的存在的自然那样的“自然”。“资本主义社会是和这样一条‘自然规律’有关的，这条自然规律‘是以当事人的无意识为根据的’。工业——只要它是制定了目标的——在根本的意义上，在辩证的和历史的意义上，仅仅是社会的自然规律的客体，而不是其主体。”这是强调第二自然的物化本质。在《社会存在本体论》中，这一自然的含义仍然存在，并在后面关于“异化”的讨论中表现出来，即资本主义社会是一个异化的社会。虽然在第二自然中，存在着目的性，但这是在第一种目的性即面对自然的目的性基础上设定的目的性，虽然个体是有目的性的，但由于个体之间的矛盾，社会整体却处于无目的的状态中，这种被设定的目的性更像因果性，“以自己的相互作用而造成了社会存在的动荡性的人的全部行为，它们虽然都是人的目的论设定，但是它们的总体却不是必然地保持着任何目的论的确定性，而是具有纯粹的因果性”。卢卡奇在《社会存在本体论》中重新回到第一自然，而不是像在《历史与阶级意识》中拒斥第一自然，更多是从因果性与目的性的关联出发的，认为构成劳动的本体论结构的，仍然是目的论设定及其所发动的被设定的因果链。虽然每一个目的的行动都有其自身的结果，但这个目的的实现所产生的一系列运动以及运动中各要素之间的相互作用，形成一个过程性的总体，这个过程正是社会存在的运动过程，劳动在这个意义上建构了社会存在。

Third, labour and the free development of human beings. Labour initially manifests as the exchange between human being and nature. In its most primitive form, the subjective dimension of human beings has not yet developed. As the form of labour changes and nature gradually retreats, the distance between human being and nature gradually widens; labour rises from its original natural form to a social form — this is an important qualitative change in the form of labour. It is precisely in such a qualitative change that labour promotes the development of human beings. First, labour promotes the formation and development of consciousness. Labour manifests as teleological positing, which is embodied in two aspects: one is the cognition of nature formed when confronting nature; the other is language and social consciousness formed within social relations — this is an important qualitative change that elevates human beings from the natural world. The subject-object relationship discussed in traditional philosophy is formed precisely on this basis. Second, labour promotes the formation of value consciousness. This value is first manifested in the needs of the individual when confronting nature; Lukács uses use-value to illustrate this point. At the social level, social needs constitute the basis of value in a more general sense. Value here embodies a social relationship among ends, means, and individuals. Although in social action, on the surface, it is based on individual choice, this choice manifests as two different results: either it directly embodies the purpose of the individual at the time of choice, or it runs counter to it. Nevertheless, from an overall perspective, both have value significance, embodying the continuity and species-being [14]14 “Species-being” (Gattungswesen) is a term from Ludwig Feuerbach, adopted and transformed by Marx, referring to the universal, self-conscious essence of humanity as a species. of human development. Finally, and more importantly, labour makes human beings human: “From the earliest labour to purely social production, every economic activity simultaneously contains, in the most extensive ontological sense (i.e., in the sense of the formation of human beings up to their all-round development), the intention to make human beings human.” It is precisely in the labour process that human beings, starting from concrete conditions and in the realisation of the unity of teleology and causality, promote the realisation of freedom.

第三，劳动与人的自由发展。劳动最初体现为人与自然的交换，在最为原始的形式中，人的主体维度并没有发展出来。随着劳动形式的变化以及自然的逐渐退却，人与自然的距离逐渐拉开，劳动从原初的自然形式跃升到社会形式，这是劳动形式的重要质变。也正是在这样的质变中，劳动推动着人的发展。首先，劳动推动着意识的形成与发展。劳动体现为目的性设定，这种设定体现在两个方面：一是面对自然时形成的对自然的认识，一是处于社会关系中形成的语言以及社会意识，这是将人从自然界提升出来的重要质变。传统哲学所讨论的主体-客体关系正是在这样的基础上才得以形成。其次，劳动推动着价值意识的形成。这种价值最先表现在个体面对自然时的需要上，卢卡奇以使用价值来说明这一点。从社会层面来说，社会需要构成了更为一般意义上的价值的基础。这里的价值，体现的是目的、手段以及个人之间的一种社会关系。虽然在社会行动中，表面看来以个人的选择为基础，但这种选择表现为两种不同的结果，或者直接体现了个人选择时的目的，或者与之相悖，但从总体上来看，都有着价值性的意义，体现了人的发展的连续性与合类性。最后，也是更为重要的，劳动使人成为人，“从最初的劳动直到纯粹的社会生产，任何经济活动都同时深蕴着一种它们在本体论上最广泛固有的(即从人的形成直到他获得全面的发展的)意义上使人变成人的意图”。正是在劳动过程中，人从具体的条件出发，在实现目的性与因果性的统一中，推动着自由的实现。

For Lukács, the relationship between freedom and necessity is not an external unity of mutual correspondence. Starting from labour, he emphasises that freedom is realised in the labour process through the congruence of human choice with the concrete situation. He stresses the major differences between his own view of freedom and the idealist view: first, if freedom is discussed from the standpoint of actuality, then the basis of freedom lies in the concrete choice made in the face of many different possibilities, and this concrete choice cannot be detached from the concrete situation. Second, freedom is, in the final analysis, the will to transform reality, but this is a transformation achieved under specific conditions. Hence, the more adequately the subject understands the relevant nature and society, the greater his freedom; the setting of a purpose is an act of freedom, but this freedom is always connected with nature and society. Finally, freedom is expressed not only in the purposive setting of the external world, but even more in the control of and struggle against one’s own instincts and emotions. “It is in this struggle against his own natural, given qualities that man becomes man, and his further development and perfection can be achieved only on this path and by the same method.” It is precisely in the labour process, in facing nature and facing man himself, that man can become a species-like being. In this sense, Lukács further develops the idea that labour creates man himself.

在卢卡奇这里，自由与必然的关系并不是一种外在的相互统一关系。他从劳动出发，强调自由是在劳动过程中，通过人的选择与具体情境的契合而实现的。他强调自己的自由观与唯心主义自由观的重大差异：首先，如果从现实性出发来讨论自由的话，那么自由的基础在于面对众多不同的可能性所作出的具体选择之中，不能将这种具体的选择从具体情境中脱离出来。其次，自由说到底是改造现实的意愿，但这是在特定的条件下实现的改造。因此，主体对相关的自然与社会的认识越恰当，其自由也就越大，目的设定是一种自由的行动，但这种自由总与自然、社会相关联。最后，自由不仅体现为对外部世界的目的设定，更体现为对自身本能、情感的控制与斗争。“在这种同他自己的自然给定的性质的斗争中，人才成之为人，而且他的进一步发展和完善，也只能在这条道路上并且用同样的方法才能实现。”正是在面对自然与面对人本身的劳动过程中，人才能成为合类性的存在。在这个意义上，卢卡奇进一步发挥了劳动创造人本身的思想。

From the discussion above it can be seen that the basis of Lukács’s discussion of the ontology of social being is a labour ontology. In the first part of this article, in the discussion of the development of Marx’s thought, it has already been pointed out that this ontology is an extension of the logic of production and becomes a foundational logic in the *Grundrisse*. In this sense, when *The Ontology of Social Being* proceeds from ontology, it connects with the line of thought of the labour ontology of the *Grundrisse*, rather than with the other line of thought in that manuscript, namely the logic of capital, which constitutes the basis of *Capital*. If we consider it from the perspective of the history of thought, the labour ontology is actually what Hegelian philosophy demonstrated. In the *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, Hegel introduced labour into philosophical discussion, and in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he used it as the basis for demonstrating self-consciousness; it is precisely at the point of self-consciousness that reason truly becomes reason from understanding. Hegel regarded self-consciousness as human consciousness; self-consciousness is man, and self-consciousness is formed in the labour process – this is an inverted way of saying that labour drives the emergence of man. Lukács’s interpretation of the logic of *Capital* from the standpoint of a labour ontology is a theoretical misplacement. This misplacement is a logical problem that past discussions of Lukács have failed to point out.

从上面的讨论中可以看出，卢卡奇关于社会存在本体论的讨论，基础是劳动本体论。在本文第一部分关于马克思思想发展过程的讨论中已经指出，这种本体论是生产逻辑的延伸，并成为《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中的一个基础性逻辑。在这个意义上，《社会存在本体论》从本体论出发时，对接的是《1857—1858年经济学手稿》的劳动本体论的思路，而不是这一手稿中的另一条思路，即资本逻辑的思路，后一逻辑构成了《资本论》的基础。如果从思想史的视角来说，劳动本体论实际上是黑格尔哲学所论证的。在《耶拿时期的实证手稿》中，黑格尔将劳动引入哲学讨论中，并在《精神现象学》中将之作为论证自我意识的基础，也正是到自我意识时，理性才从知性真正成为理性。黑格尔将自我意识看作人的意识，自我意识即人，在劳动过程中形成自我意识，这是以颠倒的方式说出了劳动推动着人的产生。卢卡奇从劳动本体论出发来解释《资本论》的逻辑，这是一种理论上的错位。这种错位是过去讨论卢卡奇时没能指出的逻辑问题。

III. The *Grundrisse* and *Capital*: Lukács’s Textual Misplacement

三、《1857—1858年经济学手稿》与《资本论》:卢卡奇的文本错位

It has already been pointed out above that Lukács’s line of thought proceeding from a labour ontology draws more on the *Grundrisse*; this is a misplacement in theoretical logic, and directly related to this misplacement is a misplacement in texts. When Lukács argues for a labour ontology, the textual basis, on the surface, appears to be *Capital*, but is in fact the *Grundrisse* – this is determined by his theoretical logic.

上面已经指出，卢卡奇从劳动本体论出发的思路更多承接的是《1857—1858年经济学手稿》,这是一种理论逻辑上的错位，与这一错位直接相关的就是文本上的错位。当卢卡奇论证劳动本体论时，其文本的依据表面上来看是《资本论》,实际上是《1857—1858年经济学手稿》,这是由其理论逻辑决定的。

In Marx’s texts, the confirmation of a labour ontology is mainly manifested in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Grundrisse*. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx’s labour ontology is expressed in the following aspects.

在马克思的文本中，对劳动本体论的确证主要体现在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》与《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思的劳动本体论体现在以下方面。

First, labour embodies the essential determination of man. In his critique of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Marx, through the mediation of the study of political economy, became aware of the important significance of Hegel’s proceeding from labour to demonstrate self-consciousness. This significance is expressed in the following: first, labour drives the generation of man. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, self-consciousness is formed and developed in labour; Hegel regards self-consciousness as the essential determination of man, or rather regards man as self-consciousness – inverted, this means that man is generated in labour. “The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* … is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; and that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and comprehends objective man – true, because real man – as the result of his own labour.” Second, labour confirms man’s species-being. The young Marx borrowed Feuerbach’s concept of species, regarding man as a species-like being, i.e., a free and conscious being, and this species-being confirms itself in the process of transforming nature. “It is precisely in his work upon the objective world that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as his work and his reality.” It is precisely in the labour process that man achieves a double confirmation: one is the confirmation of the self, the other is the confirmation of the species; the confirmation of the self and the confirmation of the species occur simultaneously – this is precisely the ontological significance of labour for human existence.

第一，劳动体现了人的本质规定性。在对黑格尔《精神现象学》的批判中，马克思通过经济学研究这一中介，意识到黑格尔从劳动出发来论证自我意识的重要意义。这种意义体现在：首先，劳动推动着人的生成。在《精神现象学》中，自我意识在劳动中形成与发展，黑格尔把自我意识看作人的本质的规定性，或者说把人看作自我意识，颠倒过来说就意味着人是在劳动中生成的。“黑格尔把人的自我产生看做一个过程，把对象化看做非对象化，看做外化和这种外化的扬弃；可见，他抓住了劳动的本质，把对象性的人、现实的因而是真正的人理解为人自己的劳动的结果。”其次，劳动确证着人的类本质。青年马克思借鉴了费尔巴哈的类哲学理念，将人看作合类的存在，即一种自由自觉的存在，这种类存在是在改造自然的过程中确证自身的。“通过实践创造对象世界，改造无机界，人证明自己是有意识的类存在物，就是说是这样一种存在物，它把类看做自己的本质，或者说把自身看做类存在物。”正是在劳动过程中，人实现了双重确认，一是对自我的确证，一是对类的确认，对自我的确证与对类的确认是同时进行的，这正是劳动对于人的存在的本体论意义。

Second, labour drives the construction of society. In the process of criticising Hegel’s theory of the state, the young Marx realised that the basis of the state is civil society, and the critical analysis of civil society drove him to study political economy. It is precisely in this process that Marx, on the one hand, confirms the generation of labour and human essence, and on the other hand, confirms the construction of labour and civil society, but this construction is unfolded in a critical sense, i.e., alienated labour constructs civil society. Although Marx’s discussion of the four determinations of alienated labour is fundamentally grounded in man’s species-being and its alienation, it precisely concerns the process of alienated labour and its results; the process of alienated labour is precisely the process of the construction of civil society, and the “alienated” nature of this process is precisely the critique of civil society. This constitutes the basis for the critique of the rationality of the state.

第二，劳动推动着社会的建构。青年马克思在批判黑格尔国家学说的过程中意识到国家的基础是市民社会，对市民社会的批判分析推动着他研究政治经济学。正是在这个过程中，马克思一方面确证了劳动与人的本质的生成，另一方面确证了劳动与市民社会的建构，但这种建构是在批判的意义上展开的，即异化劳动建构出市民社会。马克思关于异化劳动的四重规定性的讨论，虽然根本的立足点是人的类本质及其异化，但它涉及的恰恰是异化劳动过程及其结果，异化劳动过程正是市民社会的建构过程，这一过程的“异化”本性恰恰是对市民社会的批判。这构成了批判国家理性的基础。

Third, labour drives the emancipation of man. The young Marx believed that labour has the dual character of alienation and objectification; if alienation estranges man from his essence and existence, then objectification drives the realisation of man’s essential powers. Corresponding to alienation is civil society and the alienation of man; corresponding to objectification is “society” and the realisation of man’s essence. “Society is the accomplished union of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism of nature.” “Society” is the critique and correction of “civil society”; here “society” constitutes the core of what Marx at this time called “communism”.

第三，劳动推动着人的解放。青年马克思认为，劳动具有异化与对象化双重特性，如果说异化使人与其本质、存在相疏离，那对象化则推动着人的本质力量的实现。与异化相对应的是市民社会与人的异化，与对象化相对应的是“社会”与人的本质的实现。“社会是人同自然界的完成了的本质的统一，是自然界的真正复活，是人的实现了的自然主义和自然界的实现了的人道主义。”“社会”是对“市民社会”的批判与校正，这里的“社会”构成了此时马克思所讲的“共产主义”的内核。

This labour ontology of Marx, proceeding from the presupposition of man’s species-being, can be said to have fully absorbed Hegel’s thought of proceeding from labour to demonstrate self-consciousness, and on this basis to have re-founded Feuerbach’s humanism. This line of thought of a labour ontology is not displayed in *The German Ideology*, but is re-discussed in the *Grundrisse*. In this text there exists a dual logic: on the one hand, the logic of a labour ontology, and on the other hand, the logic of capital; the former is displayed through the objectification and alienation of labour, and through labour and human subjectivity.

马克思的这一从人的类本质设定出发的劳动本体论，可以说充分吸纳了黑格尔哲学从劳动出发论证自我意识的思想，并以此对费尔巴哈的人本主义进行了重新奠基。这样一种劳动本体论的思路在《德意志意识形态》中并没有展现出来，但在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中得到了重新讨论。在这一文本中存在着双重逻辑，即一方面是劳动本体论的逻辑，另一方面是资本逻辑，前者通过劳动对象化与异化、劳动与人的主体性而展现出来。

First, labour confirms subjectivity. Labour is the possibility of wealth; the premise of this possibility is labour as subject; it is living labour that shapes the world and becomes the precondition for the existence of capital. “Labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transience of things, their temporality, which is the process of their being formed by living time. In the simple production process – leaving the valorisation process aside – the transience of the form of things is used to create their usefulness.” Labour embodies the objectification of man’s essence.

第一，劳动确证主体性。劳动是财富的可能性，这种可能性的前提是劳动作为主体，正是活劳动塑造着世界，并成为资本得以存在的前提。“劳动是活的、造形的火；是物的易逝性，物的暂时性，这种易逝性和暂时性表现为这些物通过活的时间而被赋予形式。在简单生产过程中——撇开价值增殖过程不谈——物的形式的易逝性被用来造成物的有用性。”劳动体现了人的本质的对象化。

Second, capital is the transformation of labour. “All the productive forces of capital are the inversion of the productive forces of labour,” but in this process, “the power of labour itself becomes an alien power confronting the worker” (29). [16]16 The parenthetical number (29) refers to a page in the Chinese edition of the *Grundrisse* being cited. Here, Marx does not distinguish between the objectification and the alienation of labour, as he does in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Marx in fact saw that this distinction is not very meaningful. In capitalist society, both the objectification and the alienation of labour are realised under conditions presupposed by capital. Yet Marx still emphasises the state of alienation here; this is a critique of capitalist society, a critique that takes capitalist society as its premise, analogous to the critique of fetishism in *Capital*.

第二，资本是劳动的转化。“资本的一切生产力是劳动生产力的倒置”,但在这个过程中，“劳动本身的力量变成对工人来说的异己力量”(29)。在这里，马克思并没有区分劳动的对象化与异化，就像在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中那样。马克思实际上看到，这种区分没有太大的意义。在资本主义社会，劳动的对象化与异化都是在以资本为前提的条件下实现的。但马克思这里仍然强调异化状态，这是一种对资本主义社会的批判，这个批判以资本主义社会为前提，类似于《资本论》中的拜物教批判。

Third, labour and free time. In the general sense, labour time corresponds to the existence of the commodity, but this time is not time corresponding to the subject. “Labour time as such exists only as subject, only in the form of activity. Insofar as labour time itself is exchangeable (is itself a commodity), it is not only determined quantitatively but also qualitatively, and it is not only unequal quantitatively but also unequal qualitatively; it is by no means general, self-identical labour time; labour time as subject does not coincide with the general labour time that determines exchange value, just as a particular commodity and product do not coincide with labour time as object.” Here, Marx links free time, or the time of the subject, with labour, regarding free time as the horizon within which the subject unfolds. Even in capitalist production, the saving of time is likewise a condition for the subject’s self-realisation.

第三，劳动与自由时间。在一般的意义上，劳动时间与商品的存在相对应，但这种时间并不是与主体相对应的时间。“劳动时间本身只是作为主体存在着，只是以活动的形式存在着。从劳动时间本身可以交换(本身是商品)来说，它不仅在量上被规定了，而且在质上也被规定了，并且，不仅在量上不相同，而且在质上也不相同；它决不是一般的、自我等同的劳动时间；作为主体的劳动时间同决定交换价值的一般劳动时间不相符合，正像特殊的商品和产品同作为客体的劳动时间不相符合一样。”在这里，马克思将自由时间或者说主体的时间与劳动联系起来，把自由时间看作主体展开的境域。即使是在资本主义生产中，对时间的节约同样是主体自我实现的条件。

It can be said that through the above links, Marx confirms the ontology of labour within a new logic, and it is precisely this ontology of labour that Lukács unfolds in *The Ontology of Social Being*. But we must note that by this point Marx had already seen that starting from material production, or from the distinction between the objectification and alienation of labour, makes it impossible to understand capital. Starting from material production in the general sense easily leads to understanding capital as a thing, or as the objectified existence of labour, and thus to regarding capital as a transhistorical entity: “If capital is said to be ‘accumulated (realised) labour (properly speaking, objectified labour), which serves as the means for new labour (production),’ then one sees only the material of capital and overlooks the formal determination that makes capital capital. This is nothing other than saying that capital is an instrument of production … According to this view, capital exists in all forms of society and becomes something entirely unhistorical. According to this view, the limbs of the human body are also capital, because in order for them to function as organs they must … be developed through labour, and must obtain nourishment and be reproduced. Thus arms, and especially hands, are capital. Capital would then be merely a new name for something as old as the human race.” On such an understanding, not only human limbs but any real instrument, including the bow and arrow used in hunting, would be capital. This is how Ricardo understood capital. It is precisely on the basis of this reflection that Marx points out that capital is a relation, and that in capitalist society any labour is in fact labour under the domination of capital. In this sense, Marx sets forth a logic different from the logic of production. Some scholars, such as Postone and Arthur, have summarised this logic with the term “value,” and have thereby proposed interpretations that differ from traditional ones; Lukács’s *The Ontology of Social Being* also contains such reflections. This is in fact problematic. Marx clearly states: “In theory, the concept of value precedes the concept of capital, while, on the other hand, the pure unfolding of the concept of value presupposes a mode of production based on capital, and the same is true in practice … Pure and general value existence presupposes a mode of production in which the individual product is no longer a product for the producer himself, and still less for the individual worker … Therefore, the determination of value itself presupposes a definite historical stage of the social mode of production, and it is itself a relation that arises together with this historical stage, hence a historical relation.” In capitalist society, value is determined by capital; therefore, value cannot be used to analyse capital; rather, capital should be used to analyse value. This is precisely the logic established in *Capital*.

可以说，通过上述环节，马克思在新的逻辑中确证了劳动本体论，这种劳动本体论正是卢卡奇在《社会存在本体论》中所展开的。但我们需要注意，此时的马克思已经看到，从物质生产出发，或者从劳动的对象化与异化的区分出发是无法理解资本的。从一般意义上的物质生产出发，容易将资本理解为一种物，或者是劳动的对象化存在，从而会把资本看作一种超历史的存在：“如果说资本是‘作为手段被用于新劳动〈生产〉的那种积累的〈已实现的〉劳动〈确切地说，对象化劳动〉’,那就只看到了资本的物质，而忽视了使资本成为资本的形式规定。这无非是说，资本就是生产工具……按照这种说法，资本存在于一切社会形式中，成了某种完全非历史的东西。按照这种说法，人体的四肢也是资本，因为要使它们能发挥器官的作用，就必须……通过劳动来使它们发育，以及使它们取得营养，把它们再生产出来。这样，臂，尤其是手，都是资本。资本也就只是一个同人类一样古老的事物的新名称了”。在这样的理解中，不只是人的四肢，任何现实工具都是资本，包括打猎中的弓、箭。李嘉图就是这样理解资本的。正是基于对此的反思，马克思指出资本是一种关系，并指出在资本主义社会，任何劳动实际上都是资本支配下的劳动。在这个意义上，马克思提出了一种不同于生产逻辑的另一种逻辑。对于这种逻辑，一些学者如普殊同、阿瑟等以“价值”来概括，并由此提出了不同于传统的解释思路，卢卡奇的《社会存在本体论》也有这样的思考。这实际上是有问题的。马克思明确指出：“在理论上，价值概念先于资本概念，而另一方面，价值概念的纯粹的展开又要以建立在资本上的生产方式为前提，同样，在实践上也是这种情况……纯粹的和一般的价值存在要以这样一种生产方式为前提，在这种生产方式下，单个的产品对生产者本身来说已经不是产品，对单个劳动者来说更是如此……因此，价值规定本身要以社会生产方式的一定的历史阶段为前提，而它本身就是和这种历史阶段一起产生的关系，从而是历史的关系。”在资本主义社会，价值是由资本来规定的，因此并不能通过价值来分析资本，而应该从资本来分析价值，这正是《资本论》所确立的逻辑。

Now, from the above logic, let us examine the discussion in *The Ontology of Social Being*. According to an incomplete count, in the second volume of *The Ontology of Social Being*, where Lukács positively presents his own line of thought, he cites many original passages from Marx, demonstrating a comprehensive understanding of Marx’s works. The most frequent citations are as follows: approximately 81 citations of *Capital*, mainly from Volume I and more closely related to the themes of production, labour, and reproduction. In addition, there are approximately 35 citations of the *Grundrisse*, approximately 31 citations of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, approximately 25 citations of *The German Ideology*, and approximately 16 citations of *The Poverty of Philosophy*, among others. These citations often intersect, revolving respectively around the four themes of “labour,” “reproduction,” “the ideal and ideology,” and “alienation.” Although in terms of direct textual citation Lukács relies mainly on *Capital*, if we consider the unfolding of the themes, the relevant citations and discussions all pertain to the ontology of labour and related theoretical content; these concepts in fact constitute a theoretical framework and basic categories for re-understanding Marx from the standpoint of the ontology of labour, and the initial argumentative framework for this is precisely unfolded in the *Grundrisse*. From the perspective of theoretical themes, there is likewise a displacement in Lukács’s use of texts: he in fact uses the content of *Capital* to unfold the content of the *Grundrisse*, or, alternatively, uses the *Grundrisse* to frame *Capital*. This is a textual displacement, and this displacement is consistent with the earlier displacement in which he explains *Capital* through the ontology of labour. From this perspective, we can understand why Gould, deeply influenced by Lukács, constructs Marx’s philosophical thought from the *Grundrisse* in her *Marx’s Social Ontology*.

从上述的逻辑再看《社会存在本体论》的讨论。据不完全统计，在正面展现自己思路的《社会存在本体论》下卷中，卢卡奇引用了马克思的诸多原文，体现了对马克思著作的全面理解。引用原文较多的次数如下：对《资本论》的引用约81次，这些引用主要是第一卷，与生产、劳动、再生产的主题更为相关。除此之外，引用《1857—1858年经济学手稿》约35次，引用《1844年经济学哲学手稿》约31次，引用《德意志意识形态》约25次，引用《哲学的贫困》约16次等。这些引用常常是交叉进行的，分别围绕着“劳动”“再生产”“观念的东西和意识形态”“异化”四个主题展开。虽然在直接的文本引用上，卢卡奇主要依据的是《资本论》,但如果从主题的展开来说，相关的引用与讨论都关涉劳动本体论及相关理论内容，这些概念实际上构成了从劳动本体论出发来重新理解马克思的理论构架与基本范畴，而其最初的论证构架恰恰是在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中展开的。从理论主题的视角来说，卢卡奇在文本的运用上同样存在一种错位，实际上是以《资本论》的内容来展开《1857—1858年经济学手稿》的内容，或者说是以《1857—1858年经济学手稿》来架构《资本论》,这是一种文本上的错位，而这一错位与前面他以劳动本体论来解释《资本论》的错位是一致的。从这一视角出发，我们就可以理解深受卢卡奇影响的古尔德在《马克思的社会本体论》中从《1857—1858年经济学手稿》出发对马克思哲学思想的建构了。

Lukács’s misplaced reading of Marx, although it creatively understood and reconstructed Marx’s philosophical theory, did not escape the “trap” of Marx scholarship at the time, namely, it failed to see the major intellectual shift in Marx’s thought from *The German Ideology* to *Capital*. Without understanding this intellectual shift, it is in fact impossible to truly resolve the difficulties posed by the “ontology of labour” in Marx scholarship, including for Postone, who was aware of the theoretical defects of the ontology of labour. In *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, Postone saw the problems in traditional research proceeding from the ontology of labour, but he did not resolve them well. The above discussion also shows that to deeply analyse Lukács, on the one hand we must indeed penetrate his own intellectual logic, and on the other hand we need even more to re-understand Marx, so as to obtain a theoretical coordinate for confronting Western scholars such as Lukács. (References omitted.)

卢卡奇对马克思的错位阅读，虽然创造性地理解与重构了马克思的哲学理论，但他并没有跳出当时马克思哲学研究的“陷阱”,即没有看到马克思自《德意志意识形态》到《资本论》的重大思想转变，理解不了这一思想转变，实际上就无法真正地解决马克思哲学研究中由“劳动本体论”带来的难题，包括意识到了劳动本体论的理论缺陷的普殊同。在《时间、劳动与社会统治》中，普殊同看到了从劳动本体论出发的传统研究中存在的问题，但他并没有很好地解决这一问题。上述的讨论也表明，要深层透析卢卡奇，一方面固然要深入其自身的思想逻辑中，另一方面更需要重新理解马克思，从而获得面对卢卡奇等西方学者的理论坐标。（参考文献略）

(The author is a professor in the Department of Philosophy and a professor in the School of Marxism at Peking University.)

（作者系北京大学哲学系教授、马克思主义学院教授）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑