What Is Marx’s Intellectual Transformation?

Recently, Liu Enzhi of Tsinghua University originally proposed a new viewpoint in the study of Marx’s intellectual history, arguing that Marx underwent an important intellectual transformation in 1847, which he calls the mature starting point of Marx’s conception of capital, i.e., a new Marxian “theory of rupture.” This “new” thesis summons a series of “old” questions in the study of Marx’s intellectual history: Does a rupture exist in Marx’s thought? At what time, for what reason, and in what form did Marx undergo a transformation? What is the criterion for Marx’s intellectual transformation? These have always been theoretical issues of ongoing debate in academia. The answers to this series of questions involve not only whether Marx experienced a rupture in his conception of capital from immaturity to maturity in 1847, but also profoundly concern the historical question of how to write Marx’s intellectual history, as well as the philosophical question of how to understand the heterogeneous connotations of the same theoretical category of Marx in different periods. It can be said that how we grasp Marx’s intellectual transformation will directly determine the image in which Marx “exists” before us, and thereby decide in what way we “return” to Marx in the present.

近日，清华大学的刘恩至原创性地提出了一个马克思思想史研究的新观点，认为马克思在1847年发生了一次重要的思想转变，将其称之为马克思资本观的成熟起点，即一种新的马克思“断裂论”。这一“新”论断呼唤了一系列马克思思想史研究的“老”问题：马克思的思想是否存在断裂?马克思在何时以何种原因发生了何种转变?马克思思想转变的标准究竟是什么?这始终是学术界争论未休的理论问题。对于这一系列问题的解答不仅仅涉及马克思在1847年是否发生了一次从幼稚到成熟的资本观断裂，还深刻地关涉如何书写马克思思想史的历史问题，以及如何理解马克思同一理论范畴在不同时期的异质性内涵的哲学问题。可以说，如何把握马克思的思想转变将直接关联马克思以何种形象“存在”于我们面前，进而决定了我们在当下以何种方式“回到”马克思。

I. Reflections on the Maturity/Rupture of Marx’s Conception of Capital in 1847

一、关于1847年马克思资本观成熟/断裂的思考

In his article “The 1847 Textual Cluster and the Birth of Marx’s ‘Conception of Capital as Relations of Production’—A Defense of ‘the Mature Starting Point of Marx’s Conception of Capital’,” Liu Enzhi points out that the 1847 textual cluster, represented by *Wage Labour and Capital* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*, marks the birth of Marx’s “conception of capital as relations of production,” and that Marx thereby entered the mature period of his critical theory of capital. This is a completely new viewpoint for the study of Marx’s intellectual history, and it also merits our rethinking of what exactly Marx’s intellectual change in this period consisted of.

刘恩至在《1847年文本群与马克思“生产关系资本观”的诞生——对“马克思资本观的成熟起点”的辩护》一文中指出，以《雇佣劳动与资本》《哲学的贫困》为代表的1847年文本群标志着马克思“生产关系资本观”的诞生，马克思由此进入了资本批判理论的成熟时期。这对于马克思思想史的研究来说是一个全新的观点，也值得我们重新反思马克思在这一时期的思想变化究竟为何。

First, Liu Enzhi distinguishes between Marx’s philosophical outlook and his conception of capital. He argues that past academic research on Marx’s intellectual history has placed more emphasis on changes in Marx’s philosophical outlook, neglecting the important achievements of Marx’s intellectual revolution in other fields. This has led to a narrowing of the academic interpretation of Marx’s thought, underestimating other important achievements of Marx’s intellectual revolution, as if Marx’s original and revolutionary theoretical achievements consisted solely in creating a completely new philosophical outlook, while the rest of his thought was merely a byproduct of the philosophical revolution. Indeed, Liu Enzhi has keenly identified an important problem in the field of Marx studies: Marx often appears before us merely as a pure philosopher, while his research on economics, socialist theory, technology, statistics, anthropology, and other fields is like the stars in the moonlight, slightly dimmed by the dazzling light of philosophy. However, through the texts we can find that Marx, from around 1845, seems to have deliberately kept his distance from “philosophy.” In the “Theses on Feuerbach,” which contain the “genius-like germ of the new world outlook,” he drew a clear line of demarcation from past philosophers: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” [1]1 This is a direct quotation from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Thesis 11. The English translation follows the standard version. And later, in *The German Ideology*, co-authored with Engels, Marx, in the process of revising the original manuscript, deleted almost all discourse related to philosophy (such as Hegelian dialectics, alienation, etc.). Moreover, looking at Marx’s notebook-style texts, we can hardly find any excerpts from philosophical works; 80% of the excerpts and comments are on economics. On the one hand, this may be because Marx was very familiar with philosophical works and ideas and did not need to excerpt them; on the other hand, it also reflects the crucial role that economics and other content played in Marx’s intellectual transformation. Therefore, if we overemphasize Marx’s philosophical thought and neglect research in other areas, it will lead to a lack of completeness in our observation of Marx’s thought. To this extent, I agree with Liu Enzhi’s viewpoint.

第一，刘恩至区分了马克思哲学观与资本观的不同。他认为，过去学术界对马克思思想史的研究更多地偏重马克思哲学观的变化，忽略了马克思在其他领域思想革命的重要成果。这导致了学术界对马克思思想解读的窄化，低估了马克思思想革命的其他重要成果，仿佛马克思具有原创性、革命性的理论成果仅仅在于创建一套全新的哲学观，而其余思想不过是哲学革命的副产品而已。的确，刘恩至敏锐地发现了马克思思想研究领域的一个重要问题：马克思往往只是以一名纯粹哲学家的形象出现在我们面前，而马克思关于经济学、社会主义学说、工艺学、国势学、人类学等方面的研究则如月明星稀一般，在哲学的耀眼光亮下略显暗淡。然而通过文本我们可以发现，马克思似乎从1845年开始，就在刻意与“哲学”保持距离。他曾在“天才般世界观萌芽”的《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中旗帜鲜明地与过去的哲学家们划清界限：“哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界，问题在于改变世界。”而在这之后与恩格斯合著的《德意志意识形态》中，马克思也在原始手稿的修改过程中将所有涉及哲学的话语(如黑格尔辩证法、异化等)几乎全部删除。不仅如此，纵观马克思的笔记性文本，我们也几乎找不到有关哲学著作的摘录，80%的摘录与评论都是经济学方面的。一方面，这有可能是由于马克思本身对于哲学著作与思想非常熟悉、无须摘录，另一方面也体现了经济学等内容在马克思思想转变中发挥着至关重要的作用。因此，如果我们因为过度重视马克思的哲学思想而忽略了其他方面的研究，则会导致我们对马克思思想的观察缺乏完整性，笔者在这一程度上同意刘恩至的观点。

However, can Marx’s intellectual revolution concerning his conception of capital fully reveal the complete change in Marx’s thought? In other words, can we really set aside Marx’s philosophical thought and purely discuss Marx’s intellectual contributions in a certain field? Common sense tells us: the thought of every mentally normal person has a holistic character; although there may be polyphonic theoretical conflicts in a certain period, there must be one logic that plays a dominant role, otherwise it would lead to a state of personality split. However, under traditional disciplinary divisions, our research on Marx’s thought has formed a fragmented state: it seems that philosophy departments only study Marx’s philosophical thought, economics departments only study Marx’s economic thought, and political science departments only study Marx’s scientific socialist thought. One Marx has been divided into three or even more independent thoughts, which may create barriers between disciplines and even conflicts in research results, leading to the emergence of “multiple Marxes.” I believe that if we do not grasp Marx’s methodology and its intellectual changes as a whole, then research on a certain field of Marx may also be illegitimate. And we must also admit that Marx was indeed a philosopher and a revolutionary, not an economist, but his philosophy is a new world outlook formed by sublating itself after a critical study of the capitalist world and its laws of operation (economics). It lies neither in a pure philosophical outlook nor in a pure conception of capital, but in the world outlook itself. Whatever world outlook Marx possessed, he would see a corresponding philosophy and a corresponding capital. Therefore, judging the transformation or rupture of his thought solely from the change in a single viewpoint is relatively one-sided.

然而，马克思关于资本观的思想革命能展现马克思的完整思想变化吗?换言之，我们真的能够抛开马克思的哲学思想去纯粹地讨论马克思关于某个领域的思想贡献吗?常识就能回答我们：每个精神正常的人的思想都是具有整体性的，尽管在某个时期可能存在复调式的理论冲突，但是必然有一个逻辑占据主导性，否则就会进入人格分裂的状态。不过在传统的学科划分下，我们对马克思思想的研究形成了一种分裂的状态：似乎哲学系只研究马克思的哲学思想，经济学系只研究马克思的经济思想，政治学系只研究马克思的科学社会主义思想。一个马克思被分成了三个乃至更多独立的思想，这可能会造成学科间的壁垒乃至研究成果的冲突，导致“多个马克思”的出现。笔者认为，如果没有从整体上把握马克思的方法论及其思想变化，那么对马克思某个领域的研究可能也具有非法性。而我们也必须承认的是，马克思的确是一名哲学家、革命者，而非经济学家，但是他的哲学是经历了对资本主义世界及其运行规律(经济学)的批判性研究后，扬弃自身而形成的崭新世界观。其既不在于单纯的哲学观，也不在于资本观，而是世界观本身。马克思拥有何种的世界观，就会看到何种的哲学、何种的资本。因此，仅仅从某一观点的变化来判断其思想的转变或断裂，是相对片面的。

Second, Liu Enzhi re-divides the period of Marx’s intellectual transformation/rupture. He argues that if viewed from the perspective of the conception of capital rather than the philosophical outlook, Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology* both belong to the period of the “reified perspective,” while the 1847 textual cluster, represented by *Wage Labour and Capital* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*, opens the way to the “conception of capital as relations of production” in *Capital*. This judgment greatly challenges the previous periodization of Marx’s intellectual history in Chinese academia.

第二，刘恩至重新划分了马克思思想转变/断裂的时期。他认为如果从资本观而非哲学观的角度来看，马克思的《1844年经济学哲学手稿》与《德意志意识形态》同属于“物化视角”时期，而以《雇佣劳动与资本》《哲学的贫困》为代表的1847年文本群则开启了通向《资本论》的“生产关系资本观”。这一判断极大地挑战了国内学术界以往对马克思思想史的时期划分。

At the beginning of the 21st century, the issue of Marx’s intellectual transformation sparked great attention and debate in Chinese academia. The discussions on Marx’s transformation were mainly divided into two major camps.

21世纪初，马克思的思想转变问题曾在中国学术界引起巨大关注和争论，关于马克思思想的转变主要划分为两大阵营。

The “one-transformation theory.” The judgment on Marx’s “one-transformation theory” can be traced back to some of Lenin’s formulations, and was further elaborated in the works of Bagaturia, [2]2 Georgi Bagaturia (1929–2021) was a Soviet Marxist scholar and specialist in Marx’s intellectual history, known for his work on the formation of historical materialism. which expounded Marx’s transformation from idealism to materialism, and from materialism step by step to historical materialism, in terms of quantitative change and gradual progress. Many Chinese scholars, mainly based on this tradition, have put forward different viewpoints on Marx’s “one-transformation theory”: Wang Dong of Peking University believes that in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx had already formed the basic framework of historical materialism centered on labor practice, and surpassed Feuerbach’s humanist materialism. Zhao Jiaxiang of Peking University believes that this transformation began with *The Holy Family* and was completed in *The German Ideology*, transforming from idealism to materialism, while texts before *The Holy Family* all had idealist tendencies. Han Lixin of Tsinghua University and Lai Jinliang of Zhejiang University believe that the core of the “one-transformation theory” lies in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*; they argue that the concept of civil society in this text is not only the key to Marx’s critique of Hegel, but also the core of his creation of a new world outlook, and that the shift from the state to civil society initiated Marx’s turn to historical materialism, thereby denying that Marx had a “Feuerbachian stage.”

“一次转变论”。关于马克思“一次转变论”的判断最早可以追溯到列宁的部分说法，后在巴加图利亚的著作中被进一步阐释，以量变和渐进的方式来阐述马克思从唯心主义到唯物主义的转变、从唯物主义一步步渐进为历史唯物主义的过程。而我国众多学者主要基于这一传统，围绕马克思的“一次转变论”提出了不同的观点：北京大学王东认为，马克思在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中已经形成了以劳动实践为核心的唯物史观的基本架构，并超越了费尔巴哈的人本主义唯物主义。北京大学赵家祥认为这一次转变是从《神圣家族》开始，并在《德意志意识形态》中完成了从唯心主义向唯物主义转变，而《神圣家族》之前的文本都是具有唯心主义倾向的。清华大学韩立新和浙江大学赖金良认为“一次转变论”的核心就在于《黑格尔法哲学批判》,他们认为这一文本中的市民社会概念不仅是马克思批判黑格尔的关键，而且也是其创立新世界观的核心，从国家向市民社会的转变开启了马克思的唯物史观转向，从而否认了马克思存在一个“费尔巴哈阶段”。

The “theory of two transformations.” Sun Boren of Nanjing University was the first in China to propose Marx’s “theory of two transformations,” exploring the process of Marx’s intellectual change from idealism to general materialism and from general materialism to historical materialism. He argues that during his university years Marx was an idealist with the coloration of the Young Hegelians; the problem of material interests during his time at the *Rheinische Zeitung* shook his idealism; the *Kreuznach Notebooks* and the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* represent Marx’s first attempt to study the state and law from a materialist standpoint, but his view of history remained idealist; later, in the *Introduction to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, he shifted to the standpoint of materialism and communism—that is, the first transformation—but this was not a turn to historical materialism and scientific communism; rather, it was a humanist materialism and humanitarian communism strongly colored by Feuerbach; the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* more thoroughly carried through this humanism, actively reworking Feuerbach and beginning to move step by step toward historical materialism; *The Holy Family* more broadly reworked Feuerbach, for the first time calling itself materialist, and in some judgments already approached historical materialism; the *Theses on Feuerbach* marked the germination of a world outlook of genius, while *The German Ideology* started from real individuals, took material production as its foundation, historically expounded the dialectical relationship between productive forces and forms of intercourse, explained the general laws of social-historical development, resolved the problem of private property that had perplexed Marx from 1843 to 1844, formally founded historical materialism, and completed the second transformation from philosophical materialism to historical materialism. Subsequently, scholars such as Zhang Yibing, Yao Shunliang, Tang Zhengdong, and Zhou Jiaxin conducted in-depth explorations of Marx’s “theory of two transformations,” refining the concrete process of Marx’s two transformations and the changes in the “two logics.” At the same time, scholars such as Zhang Shigu, Wang Jinfu, and Yang Geng deepened the “theory of two transformations” from the perspectives of the division of specific stages and the motives for transformation. Overall, the debate surrounding Marx’s intellectual transformation has mainly focused on the period 1843–1845, producing a series of fruitful academic discussions. Liu Enzhi’s proposal of a new “rupture” in Marx’s 1847 text group, however, breaks away from previous research paradigms, advancing a new judgment on the maturity of Marx’s thought from the angles of “reification” and “capital.” But whether this “reification perspective” and “relations-of-production perspective” are valid will be discussed below.

“两次转变论”。南京大学孙伯鍨首次在我国提出了马克思思想的“两次转变论”,探讨了马克思从唯心主义向一般唯物主义、从一般唯物主义向历史唯物主义转变的思想变化过程。他认为，马克思在大学期间是一名具有青年黑格尔派色彩的唯心主义者；《莱茵报》期间的物质利益难题动摇了马克思的唯心主义；《克罗伊茨纳赫笔记》和《黑格尔法哲学批判》是马克思初次尝试运用唯物主义观点研究国家和法，但在历史观上是唯心主义的；后在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中转变到了唯物主义和共产主义的立场，即第一次转变，但是并非转向了历史唯物主义和科学的共产主义，而是带有强烈的费尔巴哈色彩的人本主义唯物主义和人道主义共产主义；《1844年经济学哲学手稿》更彻底地贯彻了人本主义，并积极改造费尔巴哈，开始一步步走向历史唯物主义；《神圣家族》更广泛地改造费尔巴哈，并首次自称唯物主义，在一些论断上已经接近历史唯物主义了；《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》标志着天才般世界观的萌芽，《德意志意识形态》从现实的人出发，以物质生产为基础，历史性地阐述了生产力与交往形式的辩证关系，解释了社会历史发展的一般规律，解答了马克思从1843—1844年所困惑的私有财产问题，正式创立了历史唯物主义，完成了从哲学唯物主义向历史唯物主义的第二次转变。随后，张一兵、姚顺良、唐正东、周嘉昕等学者对马克思的“两次转变论”进行了深入探讨，细化了马克思两次转变及“两条逻辑”变化的具体过程。同时，张式谷、王金福、杨耕等学者从具体阶段划分、转变动因等方面深化了马克思的“两次转变论”。总的来看，围绕马克思思想转变的争论主要聚焦在1843—1845年时期，形成了一系列富有成效的学术探讨。而刘恩至提出的马克思1847年文本群的思想新“断裂”则跳脱出了以往的研究范式，从“物化”和“资本”的角度提出了马克思思想成熟的新的论断。但是，这种“物化视角”和“生产关系视角”是否成立，我们将在下文讨论。

Third, Liu Enzhi argues that Marx completed a conscious intellectual rupture in 1847, deliberately reflecting on and criticizing his own earlier thinking. Liu Enzhi points out: “The principled opposition between Marx’s view of capital in 1847 and his view of capital in the preceding period was not only an actual occurrence but was also consciously recognized by Marx himself; Marx’s thought indeed underwent some major turning point.” He offers two grounds: first, in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and *Wage Labour and Capital*, Marx employs a “phenomenological” method—understanding capital through the augmentation of living labour—to consciously transcend the view in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology* that understood capital as “accumulated labour” in the manner of traditional economics; second, in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and *Wage Labour and Capital*, Marx distinguishes the capital relation as heterogeneous to guild relations, differing from the view in *The German Ideology* that treated feudal wage relations as estate-based capital.

第三，刘恩至认为马克思在1847年完成了一次自觉性的思想断裂，有意识地反思与批判了自己之前的思考。刘恩至指出：“1847年马克思的资本观同前一时期资本观的原则性对立不仅是实际发生的，而且也是马克思本人所自觉意识到了的，马克思的思想确实发生了某种重大转折。”他的根据有二：一是马克思在《哲学的贫困》和《雇佣劳动与资本》中运用一种“现象学式”的方式——以活劳动的增殖来理解资本——来自觉性超越《1844年经济学哲学手稿》和《德意志意识形态》中从传统经济学般“积累起来的劳动”出发去理解资本的观点；二是马克思在《哲学的贫困》和《雇佣劳动与资本》中区分了资本关系是异质于行会关系的，与《德意志意识形态》中将封建的雇佣关系视为等级资本的观点不同。

In fact, the core of both grounds is the question of how Marx understood “capital.” From the perspective of the mode of understanding, Marx’s “phenomenological” mode of thinking did not suddenly appear in 1847 but had already emerged in 1844 or even earlier. From his university years, Marx was deeply influenced by Hegel’s philosophy, especially the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which had a major impact on him. Thus, in the 1844 *Paris Notebooks*, when Marx first encountered political economy and fell into a kind of “speechlessness,” he copied out verbatim the final chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and then constructed a theory of alienated labour in a phenomenological discourse, penetrating the already-vanishing labour activity and alienated relations behind visible products. And in *The German Ideology*, although Marx and Engels deliberately deleted phrases related to Hegel’s philosophy in the manuscript, they nevertheless penetrated the invisible material production activity and relations of intercourse among people behind their real life through a philosophical discourse that surpassed Hegel. Therefore, the “phenomenological” mode of thinking did not first appear in 1847.

其实这两点根据的核心都是马克思如何理解“资本”的问题。从理解方式来看，马克思的“现象学式”的思考方式绝不是在1847年突然出现的，而是从1844年或者更早以前就出现了。马克思从大学时期就深受黑格尔哲学的影响，特别是《精神现象学》对马克思影响重大。所以在1844年的《巴黎笔记》中，当马克思首次遭遇到政治经济学而“失语”的时候，他会去逐字逐句地摘录《精神现象学》的最后一章，进而以一种现象学式的话语建构异化劳动理论，透视了可见产品背后已经转瞬即逝的劳动活动和异化关系。而在《德意志意识形态》之中，尽管马克思恩格斯在手稿中有意地删除了与黑格尔哲学有关的词句，但却以一种超越黑格尔的哲学话语透视了人们现实生活背后不可见的物质生产活动和人与人之间的交往关系。所以，“现象学式”的思考方式不是在1847年才出现的。

Then, from the perspective of the content of his understanding of “capital,” Marx’s thought certainly underwent change, because no one’s thought is fixed. Moreover, Marx did indeed, in *Wage Labour and Capital*, for the first time penetrate capital as “given” (gegebenen) social conditions and “definite relations” (bestimmten Verhältnissen), achieving a completely new historical understanding of “capital.” This view mainly originated from Marx’s realization in 1846–1847 of his own inadequacy in the study of empirical historical-economic materials, leading him to write the voluminous economic history study — the *Excerpts from Gustav von Gülich*. First, in these excerpts Marx extensively transcribed the history and statistical data of Black people as slaves. He saw that the Black people of Brazil were originally indigenous inhabitants, and only in the world market relations established by bourgeois society through bloody colonization did the Black people of Brazil become slaves for the first time. The direct cause of Black people becoming slaves was their cheap labor power; their wages were only 200 grains of rice a day, and large amounts of profit went into the pockets of slave owners and capitalists. It was precisely under these circumstances that Marx discovered that although feudal society had abolished slave society, bourgeois society, after abolishing feudal society, reconstructed a completely new form of slavery, one that might be even more brutal. Hence Marx would keenly point out in *Wage Labour and Capital*: “A Negro is a Negro. He becomes a slave only in definite relations.” Second, in these same excerpts Marx comprehensively transcribed the economic history of the development of bourgeois society. He sorted out the historical process of how commerce and trade went from being completely dominated by politics to promoting political domination, and even to reversing the relationship and dominating politics, becoming the foundation of political power. Especially after the Industrial Revolution, bourgeois society, through the constant transformation of relations of production and exchange, leveled the fixity, sacredness, and regionality of feudal society with an irresistible, sweeping force. For the first time, he gave an objective evaluation of the positive role bourgeois society played in history, forming a historical and dialectical understanding of bourgeois society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft). This dialectical understanding of bourgeois society surpassed the view in *The German Ideology* that understood “civil society” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) only from the perspective of general historical description; the new understanding of “capital” was a micro-level manifestation built upon this. In *The Communist Manifesto* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx clearly divided the historical development of bourgeois society according to three levels: formative factors, political relations, and exchange relations — namely, the initial factors of bourgeois society’s formation from the Middle Ages to the 15th century; the impending arrival of bourgeois society from the 15th to the 18th century; and the formal emergence of bourgeois society after the 18th century. The basis for this division of historical stages was Marx’s historical investigation and distillation of bourgeois society in the *Excerpts from Gustav von Gülich*. This point is precisely what Liu Enzhi overlooked. Nevertheless, although Marx at this time had a new understanding of bourgeois society and capital, he did not methodologically break through the historical materialism established in *The German Ideology*. Instead, he applied the methodology of historical materialism to the minute observation of the development of bourgeois society, forming a series of new views. This was a deepening of historical materialism, not a rupture.

那么，从对“资本”理解的内容来看，马克思的思想当然发生了变化，因为每个人的思想都不是凝固的。而且，马克思的确在《雇佣劳动与资本》中首次将资本透视为“既定的”(gegebenen)社会条件和“一定的关系”(bestimmten Verhältnissen),对“资本”有了全新的历史性理解。这一观点主要来源于马克思在1846—1847年间意识到自身对历史经济经验性材料研究的不足而写下篇幅宏大的经济史研究——《居利希笔记(Exzerpte aus Gustav von Gülich)》。首先，马克思在这一笔记中大量摘录了黑人作为奴隶的历史和统计数据，他看到巴西的黑人原本只是土著居民，而只有在资产阶级社会通过血腥殖民建立的世界性市场关系中，巴西的黑人才第一次成为奴隶。而黑人成为奴隶的直接原因就是其廉价的劳动力，他们的工资只是一天200粒大米，大量的利润进入奴隶主和资本家的腰包。也正是在这种情况下，马克思发现尽管封建社会消灭了奴隶社会，但资产阶级社会却在消灭封建社会后重建了一种全新的奴隶制，这种奴隶制可能更加残暴。所以马克思会在《雇佣劳动与资本》中敏锐地指出：“黑人就是黑人。只有在一定的关系下，他才成为奴隶。”其次，马克思还在该笔记中全面摘录了资产阶级社会发展的经济史，他梳理了商业和贸易如何从被政治完全统治到促进政治统治，甚至反过来统治政治并成为政治权力基础的历史过程，特别是在工业革命之后，资产阶级社会通过生产和交换关系的不断变更，以势不可挡的裹挟性力量夷平了封建社会的固定性、神圣性和区域性，首次对资产阶级社会在历史上发挥的积极作用给予了客观评价，形成了对资产阶级社会(bügerliche Gesellschaft)的历史性辩证认识。这一关于资产阶级社会的辩证性认识超越了在《德意志意识形态》中仅仅从一般历史描述角度理解“市民社会”(bügerliche Gesellschaft)的观点，对“资本”的全新理解则是建立在此之上的微观体现。在《共产党宣言》和《哲学的贫困》中，马克思依据形成因素、政治关系和交换关系三个层面对资产阶级社会历史发展进行了明确的划分，即中世纪至15世纪的资产阶级社会形成的最初因素；15世纪至18世纪的资产阶级社会即将到来；18世纪后的资产阶级社会正式出场。而这种历史阶段的划分依据是马克思在《居利希笔记》中对资产阶级社会的历史考察与提炼。这一点恰恰被刘恩至忽略了。不过，尽管此时的马克思对资产阶级社会、资本有了全新的理解，但并没有从方法论上突破《德意志意识形态》所建立的历史唯物主义，而是将历史唯物主义的方法论运用到对资产阶级社会发展的细微观察之中，形成了一系列新的观点，这是对历史唯物主义的深化，并非断裂。

II. International Academic Debates on Marx’s Intellectual Transformation/Rupture

二、国际学术界围绕马克思思想转变/断裂的争论

In fact, scholars attempting to re-evaluate Marx’s intellectual history are not limited to Liu Enzhi. Research on Marx’s intellectual transformation has always been one of the focal points of debate in academic circles both domestically and internationally. Especially in recent years, with the orderly compilation of Marx and Engels’ original manuscripts and the successive publication of the *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA²), the theoretical writing and contemporary interpretation of Marx and Engels’ intellectual history have been greatly promoted. It is no exaggeration to say that there are different ways of “returning” to the same Marx. Different scholars, through the “lenses” of different methodologies, see different Marxes and also write stories of Marx’s intellectual transformation with vastly different content. The sparks generated by the collision of heterogeneous views on Marx’s intellectual history have made the issue of “Marx’s intellectual transformation/rupture” even more striking.

其实，试图对马克思思想史进行重新判断的学者并非刘恩至一人。围绕马克思思想转变的研究始终是国内外学术界争论的焦点之一。尤其是近年来，随着马克思恩格斯原始手稿的有序整理与《马克思恩格斯全集》(历史考证版)(Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe),即MEGA2的陆续出版，极大促进了马克思恩格斯思想史的理论书写与当代阐释。毫不夸张地说，对同一个马克思的“回到”存在着不同的方式。不同的学者透过不同的方法论的“眼镜”看到了不同的马克思，也书写了内容迥异的马克思思想转变的故事。而对马克思思想史的异质性观点间碰撞的火花也使得“马克思思想转变/断裂”这一问题变得更加引人注目。

In contemporary international academia, the “rupture thesis” and the “continuity thesis” regarding Marx are locked in irreconcilable conflict. The famous French Marxist philosopher Louis Pierre Althusser was the first to propose that Marx underwent an important “epistemological break” in 1845, namely that the content of *Theses on Feuerbach* and the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* were diametrically opposed. He emphasized that this was a “rupture” rather than a “transformation,” thereby constructing “two Marxes” before and after 1845. The Japanese neo-Marxist representative Hiromatsu Wataru agreed with Althusser’s “rupture thesis.” However, he believed that the leading figure in this rupture was Engels, because in his view not only was Engels the main author of *The German Ideology*, but at that time Engels far surpassed Marx in economics and the theory of communism. Therefore, Engels was the “first violinist” of historical materialism, thereby constructing a “Marx-Engels rupture thesis.”

在当今国际学术界，马克思的“断裂说”和“整体说”势同水火。著名法国马克思主义哲学家阿尔都塞(Louis Pierre Althusser)率先提出，马克思在1845年发生了一次重要的“认识论断裂”,即《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》与《1844年经济学哲学手稿》两者的内涵是截然相反的，并强调这是一次“断裂”而非“转变”,从而建构了1845年前后的“两个马克思”。日本新马克思主义代表人物广松涉(ひろまつ わたる,Hiromatsu Wataru)同意了阿尔都塞的“断裂说”,然而他却认为这次断裂的主导人物是恩格斯，因为在他看来不仅《形态》的主笔人是恩格斯，而且此时恩格斯在经济学和共产主义学说方面都远超马克思，所以恩格斯是历史唯物主义的“第一小提琴手”,从而建构了“马恩断裂说”。

In recent years, an increasing number of international scholars have resolutely opposed the “rupture thesis,” proposing a “continuity thesis” for understanding Marx’s thought. This view is gradually becoming the mainstream and consensus in contemporary international academia. Michael Quante, current chair of the International Marx-Engels-Stiftung and professor at the University of Münster in Germany, by comparing the theoretical relationship between the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *Capital*, argues that the former is a research draft for the writing of the latter. He demonstrates the consistency of the early and late Marx’s thought, severely criticizes Althusser’s “rupture thesis,” and defends the continuity of Marx’s intellectual development. Marcello Musto, a representative of contemporary Marxology and professor at York University in Canada, by sorting through Marx’s theory of alienation, bridges the gap between the “young Marx” and the “old Marx.” Although this “continuity thesis” defends the integrity of Marx’s thought, it also implicitly leads to a tendency toward over-interpretation of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the homogenization of Marx’s thought. This may thereby obscure the polyphonic nature of Marx’s intellectual changes, the progressive nature of the support from many other thinkers, and the theoretical revolutionary character of Marx’s constant sublation and self-transcendence.

而近年来，愈来愈多的国际学者对“断裂说”持坚决的反对态度，提出了对马克思思想理解的“整体说”,这种观点在当今国际学术界逐渐成为主流和共识。现任国际马克思恩格斯基金会(Internationale Marx-Engels-Stiftung)主席、德国明斯特大学的米夏埃尔·宽特(Michael Quante)通过对比《1844年经济学哲学手稿》和《资本论》的理论关系，认为前者是后者写作的研究草稿，论证了早期马克思和晚期马克思思想的一致性，严厉批判了阿尔都塞的“断裂说”,维护了马克思思想发展的整体性。当代马克思学代表人物、加拿大约克大学的马塞洛·穆斯托(Marcello Musto)通过对马克思异化理论的梳理，弥合了“青年马克思”与“老年马克思”之间的裂痕。尽管这种“整体说”捍卫了马克思思想的整体性，但是也隐在地导致了对马克思《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的过度解读和将马克思思想同质化的研究倾向，从而可能掩盖了马克思思想变化的复调性、诸多他者思想支援的进步性以及马克思不断扬弃和超越自身的理论革命性。

Yet those researchers of Marxist literature abroad who pride themselves on a “de-ideologized” stance attempt to delegitimize historical materialism within this framework of “holistic interpretation.” The editors, represented by Gerald Hubmann, Secretary General of the International Marx-Engels Foundation, not only treat *The German Ideology*, in which historical materialism was founded, as an abandoned quarterly journal rather than a work, thereby nullifying the originality and legitimacy of historical materialism, but even openly assert that Chinese scholars cannot understand this editorial approach to *The German Ideology*: “The Chinese cannot accept the fact that *The German Ideology* does not exist; they regard this as a denial of the core of Marxism.” This so-called “de-ideologized” “neutral” stance precisely violates the original intention of Marx and Engels, and observing Marx from a non-Marxist perspective while delegitimizing his theoretical stance is itself a covert bourgeois ideology. The texts of Marx and Engels possess a strong reality and subject-object interaction; they are a methodology guiding us in how to observe the world. When they are merely regarded as external, objective historical documents, the ideas contained within them may lose the living soul of Marxism. Therefore, in the face of the diverse opinions on Marx’s thought in foreign academia, it is necessary to use scientific methods to clarify the source and reinterpret the development and transformation of Marx’s intellectual history. The way in which one “returns to Marx” will directly determine the contemporary interpretation of “what Marxism is.”

而以“去意识形态化”立场自诩的国外马克思主义文献研究者们试图在这种“整体说”的框架中将历史唯物主义非法化。以国际马克思恩格斯基金会秘书长格哈尔特·胡布曼(Gerald Hubmann)为代表的编纂者不仅将历史唯物主义创立的《德意志意识形态》视作一本被放弃的季刊而非著作，从而取消了历史唯物主义的原创性与合法性，甚至公开认为中国的学者无法理解《德意志意识形态》的这一编纂方式：“中国人无法接受《德意志意识形态》不存在这一事实，他们认为这是对马克思主义核心的否定。”而这种所谓“去意识形态”的“中立”立场恰恰违背了马克思恩格斯的初衷，以非马克思主义的视角观察马克思并将其理论立场非法化恰恰是一种隐性的资产阶级意识形态。马克思恩格斯的文本带有强烈的现实性和主客体交互性，是指导我们如何观察世界的方法论。而当它们仅仅被视为一种外部客体性的历史文献，那么其内含的思想可能会失去马克思主义活的灵魂。因此，面对国外学术界对马克思思想的众说纷纭，有必要以科学的方法正本清源，重新阐释马克思思想史的发展和转变过程。以何种方式“回到马克思”将直接决定马克思主义“是什么”的当代阐释。

In fact, whether it is the Soviet textbook system or the “de-ideologized” “Marxology” that stands as its rebellious opposite, both are, in methodological essence, a research method of “idea-first.” Marx once publicly executed this idealist method in the preface to *The German Ideology*: “A certain fellow got the idea that people drown because they are possessed by the idea of gravity.” In German, *Schwere* has both the physical meaning of gravity and the everyday meaning of difficulty or constraint. The “idea of gravity” that Marx points to here as constraining the Germans is precisely Hegelian philosophy; its constraining nature lies in the fact that “ideas, thoughts, concepts have hitherto dominated and determined real people.” This is the core of idealist thought, which manifests as idealism in the philosophical realm, as religious and authority worship in the political realm, and as theory preceding practice in the economic and scientific realms. The subtlety of Marx’s characterization of it as “gravity” (*Schwere*) lies in the fact that people in reality often find it difficult to escape the effect of gravity; the “idea-first” gravity of thought often rules over those who claim to be materialists in an invisible way. If we cannot constantly remind ourselves to “throw this idea out of our heads,” we may drown in false ideology.

其实，不论是苏联的教科书体系，还是作为其反叛性对立面的“去意识形态化”的“马克思学”,在方法论本质上都是一种“观念优先”的研究方法。马克思曾在《德意志意识形态》的序言中对这种唯心主义的方法公开处刑：“有一个好汉忽然想到，人们之所以溺死，是因为他们被重力的思想迷住了。”在德语中，Schwere既有物理上重力的含义，也有日常用语中困难、束缚的意思。马克思在这里指出的束缚德国人的“重力的思想”正是黑格尔哲学，其束缚性就在于“观念、想法、概念迄今一直支配、决定着现实的人”,这是唯心主义思想的核心，其在哲学领域表现为观念论，在政治领域表现为宗教与权威崇拜，在经济和科学领域则表现为理论先于实践。而马克思将其形容为“重力”(Schwere)的精妙之处就在于，现实中的人们往往很难逃离重力的作用，“观念优先”的思想重力常常以无形的方法统治着声称自己是唯物主义的人们。如果我们不能时时地警醒自己“从头脑中抛掉这个观念”,就有可能溺死在虚假的意识形态之中。

However, the rule of “idea-first” thought was not completely discarded in reality with the founding of historical materialism. In the field of research on Marx’s intellectual history, this hidden methodology still dominates many researchers and has taken different paths within different theoretical paradigms, with two extreme manifestations:

但是，“观念优先”的思想统治并没有随着历史唯物主义的创立而在现实中被彻底抛弃。在马克思思想史的研究领域，这一隐性的方法论仍然支配着众多的研究者，并在不同的理论范式中走出了不同的道路，其中有两个极端的表现：

The first is the Soviet textbook system, which treats the basic principles summarized by later generations as biblical maxims, instead treating the texts of Marx and Engels as annotations serving these principles. This inversion of ends and means is concentrated in the interpretation of Lenin’s words through the “theory of Marx’s single transformation.” Based on the Marx literature available to him at the time, Lenin pointed out in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in 1908: “In fact, as early as 1843, when Marx had only just become Marx—that is, when he had only just become the founder of scientific socialism, the founder of modern materialism, which is incomparably richer and more thorough than all previous forms of materialism—he had already outlined the fundamental philosophical line with exceptional clarity.” [14]14 V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1908), Chapter 4, Section 6. The passage is often cited in Soviet and Chinese Marxist scholarship to argue for an early completion of Marx’s materialist turn. In Lenin’s view at that time, Marx had already become the founder of scientific socialism and modern materialism in 1843, and this formulation was also understood to some extent as Marx having initially founded historical materialism in 1843. Consequently, Soviet Marxist research expert N. Lapin (Н. Лапин) took the completeness of Marx’s thought as his theoretical goal and used it to annotate the writing of intellectual history in reverse, defending Lenin’s high evaluation of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* and *The Holy Family*. He argued that there was only a transformation from idealism to materialism, and that the intellectual changes after the materialist transformation were merely different stages of a complete process. Consistent with this, Marx literature research expert B. B. Adoratsky (Б. Б. Адоратский), [15]15 B. B. Adoratsky (1878–1945) was a Soviet Marxist historian and editor of Marx-Engels works, known for his role in the early Soviet compilation of the Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA¹). based on Lenin’s single transformation, used quantitative and gradual methods to interpret Marx’s intellectual transformation. He regarded the public critique of Hegel’s theory of the state in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* as the sign of the beginning of the historical materialist conception. Although he acknowledged that Marx had not transformed into a historical materialist in 1843, he believed that Marx after 1843 would advance toward historical materialism in a quantitative manner.

一是苏联的教科书体系将后人总结的基本原理奉为圣经般的箴言，反而将马克思恩格斯的文本视为原理服务的注解，这种目的与手段的颠倒集中表现在以“马克思一次转变论”来解读列宁的词句上。列宁曾基于他当时看到的马克思文献，于1908年在《唯物主义和经验批判主义》中指出：“其实早在1843年，当马克思刚刚成为马克思，即刚刚成为科学社会主义的创始人，成为比以往一切形式的唯物主义无比丰富和彻底的现代唯物主义的创始人的时候，他就已经异常明确地指出了哲学上的根本路线。”在当时的列宁看来，马克思在1843年就已经成为科学社会主义和现代唯物主义的创始人，这一表述也被一定程度上理解为马克思在1843年就初步创立了历史唯物主义。由此，苏联马克思主义研究专家尼·拉宾(Н.Лапин)将马克思思想的完成性作为其理论目标，并以其反注思想史书写，捍卫列宁对《德法年鉴》和《神圣家族》的高度评价，认为只存在唯心主义向唯物主义的转变，而唯物主义转变之后的思想变化只不过是完整过程的不同阶段。与此一致的是，马克思文献研究专家巴加图利亚(B.B·AДOPATCКИЙ)基于列宁的一次转变，用量变、渐进的方法来阐释马克思的思想转变。他认为《黑格尔法哲学批判》中对黑格尔国家观进行的公开批判是唯物史观发端的标志。虽然他承认马克思在1843年并没有转变为历史唯物主义，但是1843年后的马克思将以量变的方式向历史唯物主义迈进。

However, they failed to notice that Lenin’s understanding of Marx was also developmental, changing with the advancement of his research, rather than being fixed. Lenin later, in his article “Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)” published in November 1914, argued that “from the time of the formation of his views in 1844-1845, Marx was a materialist.” He also pointed out that during this period Marx “was, first and foremost, a follower of Ludwig Feuerbach.” [16]16 V. I. Lenin, “Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)” (1914), first published in the *Granat Encyclopedic Dictionary*. Here Lenin revises his earlier 1908 position, acknowledging Feuerbach’s influence on Marx in 1844-1845. It can be seen that although Lenin had not seen *The German Ideology*, he keenly detected in Marx’s “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” “On the Jewish Question,” and *The Holy Family* that the Marx of this period differed somewhat from the Marx of the *Communist Manifesto* and *Capital* periods, mainly reflected in his attitude toward Feuerbach in philosophy. Although Feuerbach materialistically inverted Hegel’s metaphysics, Feuerbach’s materialism was “not thorough or comprehensive enough.” Therefore, it is difficult to find direct evidence from Lenin’s works that the young Marx directly transformed from idealism to historical materialism and dialectical materialism. Treating Lenin’s personal understanding of Marx as an “idea-first” principle elevated above intellectual history is an illegitimate interpretation of Marx’s thought. This may not only obliterate the brilliance of Lenin’s interpretation of Marx’s thought but even dissolve the potential for the future development of Marx’s philosophy.

然而他们并没有注意到的是，列宁对马克思的理解也是具有发展性的，是伴随着其研究的推进而变化的，而非凝固的。列宁后来在1914年11月发表的《卡尔· 马克思(传略和马克思主义概述)》一文中认为，“从1844—1845年马克思的观点形成时起，他就是一个唯物主义者。”他同时指出，这一时期的马克思“首先是路·费尔巴哈的信奉者”。可见，列宁虽然没有看到《德意志意识形态》,但是他敏锐地在马克思《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》《论犹太人问题》《神圣家族》中察觉到此时的马克思与《共产党宣言》和《资本论》时期的马克思有着一定的不同，其在哲学上主要体现为对费尔巴哈的态度上。尽管费尔巴哈唯物地颠倒了黑格尔的形而上学，但是费尔巴哈的唯物主义是“不够彻底和全面”的。所以我们很难从列宁的著作中看到所谓青年马克思直接从唯心主义转变为历史唯物主义和辩证唯物主义的直接证据，而将列宁个人对马克思的理解奉为凌驾于思想史之上的“观念优先”则是一种对马克思思想的非法性解读。这可能不仅泯灭了列宁对马克思思想解读的闪光点，甚至会消解马克思哲学未来发展的潜力。

Second, within the traditional Western “Marxology” camp that opposes “using principles to retroactively annotate texts,” there has emerged another extreme manifestation: a theoretical research method that prioritizes the text as the primary given, and on this basis has produced a series of assertions such as “the Engels-Marx opposition,” “two Marxes,” and “historical materialism does not exist.” Under the banner of “de-ideologization,” these scholars preemptively nullify the legitimacy of Marxism as a theoretical standpoint and, in an objectivist worship, veer toward the opposite extreme, namely text fetishism (Textfetischismus). Since the French scholar Maximilien Rubel proposed “Marxology” (Marxologie/Marxology) in 1959, the theoretical camp within it has undergone multiple stages of self-sublation, giving rise to various theoretical currents and numerous different interpretations of Marx’s thought and texts. Consequently, the understanding and reflection on the concept of “Marxology” have also become diverse. In the field of editing Marx and Engels’s works, since the establishment of the International Marx-Engels Foundation in the 1990s, “de-ideologization” has become a new principle for Western editing of Marx and Engels’s writings. Of course, the establishment of this principle has its practical reasons. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Marxism became a political “red line” in many Western countries, so research on Marxism shifted from philosophy and political science to philology and history. Behind the seemingly objective philology, however, lies a subjective theoretical connotation and practical orientation. Taking *The German Ideology* as an example, three editing methods represent three ideological positions: (1) Editors represented by V. Adoratskij followed the method of using principles to retroactively annotate the original text, that is, using the textbook system of the time to disrupt and rearrange the textual order of *The German Ideology* to conform to the editor’s own ideas. This is precisely the embodiment of “using principles to retroactively annotate texts” within the “idea-first” approach mentioned above. (2) Editors represented by D. Ryazanov, G.A. Bagaturija, and Hiromatsu Wataru followed the Marxist editing method, that is, forming an editorial team of believers with a certain theoretical understanding of Marxism, striving to restore the complete picture of historical materialism through strict historical editing. (3) Editors represented by Inge Taubert (2004), Terrell Carver, and Sun Shanhao, including the 2017 MEGA² edition of *The German Ideology*, all follow the “Marxological” editing method, that is, a pure philology detached from the thought and history of Marx and Engels.

二是在传统西方“马克思学”反对“原理反注文本”的阵营中逐渐出离的另一种极端化表现，即以文本为观念优先的理论研究方法，并在此基础上形成了“马恩对立说”“两个马克思”“历史唯物主义不存在”等一系列论断。他们以“去意识形态化”为名，预先地取消了作为理论立场的马克思主义合法性，并在客体性崇拜中走向另一个极端，即文本拜物教(Textfetischismus)。自法国学者吕贝尔(Maximilien Rubel)于1959年提出“马克思学(Marxologie/Marxology)”以来，其理论阵营内部也经历了多次扬弃自身的发展阶段，分化出了诸多理论思潮，亦产生了众多马克思思想与文本的不同解读。因此对“马克思学”这一概念的理解与反思也呈现出多样化的趋势。在马克思恩格斯文献编辑领域，自20世纪90年代国际马恩基金会成立以来，“去意识形态化”就成了西方马克思恩格斯文献编撰的新原则。当然，这一原则的确立有其现实原因。苏联解体后，马克思主义在很多西方国家成了政治上的“红线”,因此对马克思主义的研究从哲学与政治学转向文献学和历史学。看似客观的文献学背后却隐含了具有主观性的理论内涵与现实指向。以《德意志意识形态》为例，三种编纂方法代表了三种意识形态立场：(1)以阿多拉茨基(V.Adoratskij)为代表的编纂者遵循原理反注原著的编辑方法，即用当时的教科书体系重新打乱和编排《形态》的文本顺序，使之符合编者的思想。这正是上文提到的“观念优先”中“原理反注文本”的体现。(2)以梁赞诺夫(D.Ryazanov)、巴加图利亚(G.A.Bagaturija)、广松涉等人为代表的编纂者遵循马克思主义的编辑方法，即由对马克思主义有着一定理论研究的信仰者组成编辑队伍，以严格的历史编纂努力还原历史唯物主义的完整面貌。(3)以陶伯特(2004)、卡弗(Terrell Carver)、孙善豪等人为代表的编纂者，包括MEGA2于2017年出版的《形态》,都遵循“马克思学”的编辑方法，即脱离马克思恩格斯的思想和历史的纯粹文献学。

We must affirm the enormous contributions made by “Marxological” scholars to the collation, editing, and research of Marxist literature. Without their efforts, a large body of primary sources such as MEGA² would not be available to us. However, we must also maintain a critical and cautious attitude when using these materials. This critical nature of research is something Marx adhered to throughout his life. Regarding the basic method of “excluding subjectivity” and “de-ideologization” in “Marxology,” my question is: Are Marx’s texts truly dead, pure objects? Researchers standing on different theoretical positions will naturally give different answers. Theorists standing on the bourgeois ideological position (such as Ernst Mach, Richard Avenarius, etc.) believe that there is nothing beyond phenomena, defining things as pure objects external to human beings, thereby opening the path of empirio-criticism. Rigidly suspending Marx’s writings outside of “human beings” is precisely a result of this methodology. Marx, however, severely criticized this kind of intuitive materialism, which contains a hidden idealist conception of history. They “comprehend objects, reality, sensuousness only in the form of the object or of contemplation, not as sensuous human activity, as practice, not subjectively.” [17]17 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” Thesis 1. The original German reads: “Der Hauptmangel alles bisherigen Materialismus (den Feuerbachschen mit eingerechnet) ist, daß der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit nur unter der Form des Objekts oder der Anschauung gefaßt wird; nicht aber als sinnlich menschliche Tätigkeit, Praxis, nicht subjektiv.” In short, apart from coral reefs in the Atlantic Ocean, everything in modern society cannot erase the traces of “human beings.” Pure objects no longer exist, let alone the writings left by people. Therefore, the so-called “exclusion of subjectivity” and “de-ideologization” research in “Marxology” is nothing more than an interpretation conducted within a certain ideology. Every researcher encounters Marx with an existing theoretical position and a pre-accumulated structure of knowledge. “Innocent reading” does not exist in reality. Hence, we all inevitably wear a pair of “spectacles” to look at Marx, and what exactly these “spectacles” are becomes crucial.

我们必须肯定“马克思学”的学者们对马克思主义文献整理、编辑和研究作出的巨大贡献，没有他们的努力，MEGA2等大量一手文献就不可能呈现在我们的面前。然而，我们也必须始终保持一种批判的审慎态度来使用这些材料，这种研究的批判性是马克思一生所坚持的。针对“马克思学”的“排除主观”“去意识形态”的基本方法，笔者的问题是：马克思的文本真的是死去的纯粹客体吗?站在不同理论立场的研究者们当然会给出不一样的答案。站在布尔乔亚意识形态立场的理论家们(如恩斯特·马赫、阿芬那留斯等)认为现象之外无他物，将事物规定为外在于人的纯粹客体，开启了经验批判主义之路，将马克思的文献僵化地悬设于“人”之外正是这一方法论的结果。而马克思曾对这种包含着隐性唯心史观的直观唯物主义进行过严厉批判，他们“对对象、现实、感性，只是从客体的或者直观的形式去理解，而不是把它们当做感性的人的活动，当做实践去理解，不是从主体方面去理解”。概言之，除了大西洋里的珊瑚礁，现代社会的一切事物都无法抹去“人”的痕迹，纯粹的客体已经不存在了，更不用说人们留下的文献了。所以所谓“马克思学”的“排除主观”与“去意识形态”的研究，也不过是在某种意识形态中进行解读。每位研究者都带着既有的理论立场与过去积累的知识结构遭遇马克思，“无罪阅读”在现实中并不存在。因此，我们都无可避免地戴着一副“眼镜”来看马克思，而这副“眼镜”究竟为何，就显得至关重要了。

III. Reflections on the Criteria for Marx’s Intellectual Transformation

三、关于马克思思想转变标准的思考

Faced with numerous academic debates on the development of Marx’s intellectual history, it is necessary for us to reconsider a fundamental question: What exactly are the criteria for Marx’s intellectual transformation? If this fundamental question is not pursued and answered, then each scholar can, based on their own research direction, propose a new formulation on a certain point, and these new views may not even be debatable with each other, merely being suspended in a “parallel” manner. I believe that research on Marx’s intellectual transformation must be grounded in the Marxist standpoint and revisit the question of the criteria for Marx’s intellectual transformation.

面对诸多关于马克思思想史发展的学术争论，我们有必要重新思考一个根本性问题：马克思思想转变的标准究竟为何?如果不对这一根本问题进行追问和解答，那么每位学者都能够基于自己的研究方向在某一观点上提出一种新的表述，甚至这些新观点之间可能并不存在可争论之处，只是以“平行”的方式被悬置。笔者认为，对马克思思想转变的研究必须立足于马克思主义的立场，重提马克思思想转变的标准问题。

First, how do we study Marx’s intellectual transformation in a Marxist way? Marx and Engels tell us at the beginning of *The German Ideology*: “All historiography must set out from these natural foundations and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.” [18]18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845-46), from the opening of Chapter 1, “Feuerbach.” The English translation here follows the standard version; the German original cited by the author is: “Alle Geschichtsschreibung muß von diesen natürlichen Grundlagen und ihrer Modifikation im Lauf der Geschichte durch die Aktion der Menschen ausgehn.” Here, Marx and Engels point out the two most important characteristics that should be present in the study of historical texts: First, it must have a natural foundation of history. For the writings of Marx and Engels, this natural foundation is the historical and practical ruthless exposure and severe critique of capitalism. It not only reveals the general laws of the development of human social history but also aims to sublimate and transcend capitalism to achieve the great practical ideal of communism. Therefore, if one does not apply and develop Marxism with an attitude of conviction, it is to dismantle Marxism. Because the texts of Marx and Engels are not merely documents; they contain a living soul of a genius worldview and methodology. Second, it is to discover changes in form through the action of men. Marx and Engels were not gods but living human beings. Hence, their thought was not immutable but was continuously enriched and perfected in theoretical research and practical activity. The many thinkers they encountered at different periods could all have influenced their intellectual transformation, and Marxism itself is a great transcendence standing on the shoulders of giants. Therefore, exploring the sources of Marx’s thought from Marx’s own subjective perspective will help us enter the real situation of Marx’s thinking from the perspective of essence and action, returning to a living Marx.

首先，我们如何以马克思主义的方式研究马克思思想转变?马克思恩格斯在《德意志意识形态》开篇中告诉我们：“任何历史记载(Geschichtsschreibung)都应当从这些≠整个历史的≠本质基础(natürlichen Grundlagen)≠出发，那在…… ≠以及它们在历史进程(Lauf der Geschichte)中由于人们的行动(Aktion der Menschen)而发生的形态变化(Modifikation)出发。”马克思恩格斯在这里指出了历史文本研究中应有的两个最重要特征：一是具有历史的本质基础。对于马克思恩格斯的文献来说，其本质基础就是具有历史性与实践性的对资本主义的无情揭露与严厉批判，它不仅揭示了人类社会历史发展的一般规律，更在于要扬弃和超越资本主义进而达到共产主义的伟大现实理想。因此，如果不以信仰的态度去运用和发展马克思主义，那么就是瓦解马克思主义。因为马克思恩格斯的文本不仅仅是文献，更是蕴含着天才般世界观与方法论的活的灵魂。二是在人们的行动中发现形态的变化。马克思恩格斯不是神，而是活生生的人。因此他们的思想并不是一成不变的，而是在理论研究与现实实践中不断地丰富和完善的。他们在不同时期所遭遇的诸多思想家都有可能对其思想转变产生影响，马克思主义也正是站在巨人肩膀上的伟大超越。所以，从马克思的主体视角出发探寻马克思的思想来源，将有助于我们从本质和行动上进入马克思思考的真实情境，回到一个鲜活的马克思。

In my view, there are three criteria for judging an intellectual transformation as a qualitative change in methodology.

在笔者看来，作为一种方法论质变的思想转变判定标准有三个。

First, intellectual transformation is not a visible concept or symbolic isolated phrases, but a methodology that is embedded between the lines, as invisible as a skilled butcher cutting up an ox. This methodology does not speak for itself but is applied in reading and writing. This is also why, when faced with the same book, people from different disciplines or with different academic training may see entirely different content. And for the same concept, scholars with different intellectual paradigms may use it with completely different connotations, just as the term “ideology” in the writings of Marx and Engels is entirely different from that in Lenin and contemporary political discourse. If strict boundaries are not drawn before using a concept, then academic discussions and interdisciplinary cooperation based on it may be invalid. This means that the study of Marx’s intellectual transformation must be placed within specific texts and concrete examples for analysis. In other words, the paradigm of historical materialism is not an isolated rule that can be clearly elucidated and universally applied by the single phrase “social being determines social consciousness,” but rather the holistic method by which Marx and Engels narrated their worldview and conception of history. Grasping this methodology cannot be separated from in-depth analysis of texts such as *The German Ideology*, the *Grundrisse*, and *Capital*. To discuss the development of intellectual history apart from the texts is illegitimate.

第一，思想转变不是可见的概念和象征性的个别语句，而是一种蕴含在字里行间如庖丁解牛般看不见的方法论。这种方法论并不会自己言说，而是被运用到阅读与写作之中。这也是为什么面对同一本书，不同学科或者具有不同学术训练的人看到的内容可能是迥异的。而对于同一个概念，具有不同思想范式的学者使用这一概念的内涵可能也是完全不同的，正如“意识形态”一词在马克思恩格斯的笔下与列宁及其当代政治话语中是完全不同的一样，如果在对一个概念的使用之前不进行严格的边界划分，那么在此基础上的学术探讨与跨学科合作可能就是无效的。这就导致对马克思思想转变的研究必须放在具体的文本与实例中进行分析。换言之，历史唯物主义的范式并不是孤立的一句“社会存在决定社会意识”就能明晰阐述并被普遍运用的规则，而是马克思恩格斯叙述自己世界观和历史观的整体性方法。对该方法论的把握离不开对《德意志意识形态》《1857—1858年经济学手稿》《资本论》等文本的深入剖析，离开文本去谈论思想史的发展是非法的。

Therefore, although in Liu Enzhi’s view, Marx seems to have formed two different perspectives in *The German Ideology* and the 1847 text group—one from a “reification perspective” and the other from a “relations of production perspective”—these are merely different fruits growing from the same soil of historical materialism. The dominant methodology did not undergo a qualitative change but only exploration and deepening to varying degrees. From this, we can also make a preliminary judgment on Marx’s writing from 1847 onward up to *Capital*. Although we can clearly see that Marx used different narrative methods and phrasing in *Capital* and its manuscripts compared with *The German Ideology*, and formed seemingly different thoughts and critiques of capitalist society—even the concept of “alienation,” which was largely deleted in *The German Ideology*, was revived in the *Grundrisse*—and although domestic scholars have accordingly proposed distinctions such as “broad historical materialism” versus “narrow historical materialism,” or “logic of production” versus “logic of capital” as stages of intellectual division, we must acknowledge that since 1845, Marx and Engels never abandoned the basic viewpoints of historical materialism. They have continuously explored within this methodology the contradictions of capitalist society and the laws of its development, as well as the path of its sublation. To give an inappropriate example: contemporary Western capitalist society has also undergone major changes relative to Marx and Engels’ era. The Fourth Industrial Revolution has shaped a completely new picture of humanity and the world, and Western scholars have successively proposed new theses such as digital capitalism and techno-feudalism. But at root, only the forms of expression of capitalist society have changed; its essence—the domination of people by things and the exploitation of people by people—has not disappeared, but only plays a dominant role in a more concealed way. Capital remains the “illuminating light” [19]19 An allusion to Marx’s metaphor in the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858) that capital is the “illuminating light” (*das alles bescheinende Licht*) that dominates all other forms of production and social relations.. Similarly, historical materialism is the essential methodology that Marx explored from 1847 until his later years. As long as this methodology is not overturned, there is no “rupture” or transformation in Marx’s thought. I would prefer to describe it as the deepening of historical materialism in different fields.

因此，尽管在刘恩至的观点中，马克思似乎在《德意志意识形态》和1847年文本群中形成了从“物化视角”出发和从“生产关系视角”出发的两种不同观点，但这都只是在同一片历史唯物主义的土壤中生长出的不同果实，其占据统治地位的方法论并没有发生质变，而只是在不同程度上进行的探索和深化。由此我们也可以对马克思1847年之后直至《资本论》的写作进行一个初步的判断，虽然我们可以明显看到马克思在《资本论》及其手稿和《德意志意识形态》中使用了不一样的叙述方式和词句，对资本主义社会也形成了似乎不一样的思考和批判，甚至在《德意志意识形态》中被集中删除的“异化”概念也在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中重启，国内学者也由此提出了“广义历史唯物主义”与“狭义历史唯物主义”之分、“生产逻辑”与“资本逻辑”之分等思想阶段划分。但是我们必须承认的是，马克思恩格斯自1845年后，始终没有放弃历史唯物主义的基本观点，他们一直在这一方法论中持续探索资本主义社会及其发展规律的矛盾与扬弃的道路。举个不恰当的例子，当今西方资本主义社会相对于马克思恩格斯的时代也发生了重大变化，第四次工业革命塑造了全新的人与世界的图景，西方学者也相继提出了数字资本主义、技术封建主义等新论断。但究其根本，资本主义社会变化的仅仅是表现形式，其本质性的物对人的统治、人对人的剥削并没有消失，只是以更隐秘的方式发挥着主导作用，资本仍然是“普照的光”。同理，历史唯物主义亦是马克思在1847年直至晚年探索的本质性方法论。只要这一方法论不被颠覆，马克思的思想就不存在一种“断裂”或者转变，笔者更愿意将其形容为历史唯物主义在不同领域的深化。

Second, intellectual transformation is often closely related to a crisis in one’s own theory. Intellectual transformation cannot arise out of thin air; it requires a bottleneck period in one’s own development and the help of other stones to polish the jade [20]20 A classical Chinese idiom from the *Book of Songs* (*Shijing*), “It grinds a stone from another mountain, which can polish jade,” meaning that the strengths of others can be used to improve oneself.. Just as the contingency and rebelliousness of “new discoveries” in scientific experiments are often accompanied by bottlenecks in the original scientific theory and the persistent failures they bring, prompting scientists to seek new theoretical paradigms, so too is it the case with changes in new modes of production in the industrial field. A qualitative transformation of an intellectual paradigm is difficult to achieve through breakthroughs within its own laws of development; it requires the new thought of otherness to re-study the difficulties that the original paradigm cannot resolve. Therefore, the beginning of an intellectual transformation is not a predetermined goal. For example, Marx’s intellectual transformation was not his purposeful, direct development toward historical materialism, but a continuous search for new theoretical support amid difficulties to help him solve difficulties he could not resolve before. From this perspective, notebook texts are very important in the study of intellectual transformation. Notebook texts are the intellectual scene where Marx, amid the various thoughts of otherness, became aware of his own inadequacies and further explored new theoretical paradigms. Therefore, the investigation of the formation of historical materialism must be combined with studies of the *Kreuznach Notebooks*, the *Paris Notebooks*, the *1844–1847 Notebooks*, the *Brussels Notebooks*, the *Manchester Notebooks*, and other content. And the understanding of the 1847 text group cannot be separated from the interpretation of the exploration of economic history in the *Gustav von Gülich Notebooks*. This part of the textual content will help us understand the question of “what” Marx’s thought is from the perspective of “where it came from.”

第二，思想转变往往与自身理论的危机密切相关。思想的转变并不能凭空产生，其需要自身发展的瓶颈期与他山之石的攻玉之助。正如科学实验中的“新发现”之偶然性与反叛性一样，其往往伴随着原科学理论的瓶颈及其带来的持续性失败，促使科学家去寻找新的理论范式。而在工业生产领域新的生产方式的改变亦是如此。思想范式的质性转变很难在其自身的发展规律中进行突破，而需要他性的新思想对原范式解决不了的困难进行重新研究。所以，思想转变的开始并不是预先设定的目的。譬如马克思的思想转变不是他有目的地直接向历史唯物主义发展，而是不断地在困难中寻找新的理论支援，帮助他解决过去解决不了的困难。从这个角度来看，笔记性文本在思想转变研究中就显得十分重要。笔记性文本是马克思在他性的诸思想中意识到自身的不足，并进一步探索新的理论范式的思想现场。所以，对历史唯物主义形成的考察必须结合《克罗伊茨纳赫笔记》《巴黎笔记》《1844—1847年笔记》《布鲁塞尔笔记》《曼彻斯特笔记》等内容的研究，而对1847年文本群的理解也离不开对《居利希笔记》经济史探索的解读。这部分文本内容将从“从哪来”的角度帮助我们理解马克思思想“是什么”的问题。

Moreover, intellectual transformation is neither a simple accumulation of quantitative change nor an instantaneous leap of qualitative change, but a tortuous process from quantitative to qualitative change. No matter how profound an economist, they cannot step outside the field of economics to create historical materialism, and Marx could not overnight transform from an idealist into the founder of historical materialism. From this perspective, looking at Liu Enzhi’s proposal of the maturity/rupture of Marx’s conception of capital in 1847, we can see that at this time Marx’s theoretical support was mainly the *Gustav von Gülich Notebooks*. A mere one to two years of research into economic history is insufficient to support Marx in making a holistic transcendence of his own methodology; Marx’s thought could not have undergone a rupture at this time. But we must also affirm Liu Enzhi’s point about the change in Marx’s conception of capital in 1847. Indeed, through his economic studies, Marx endowed capital with new connotations, providing theoretical support for deepening historical materialism and for more profoundly penetrating and exposing the fundamental contradictions of capitalist society. This will help us more carefully clarify the development path of Marx’s understanding and critique of the concept of capital, and deepen our contemporary interpretation of the latest changes in capital and its laws.

并且，思想转变既不是单纯的量变积累，也不是瞬间的质变跳跃，而是从量变到质变的曲折过程。再精深的经济学家也不可能跳出经济学领域创立历史唯物主义，而马克思也不可能一夜之间从唯心主义者摇身变为历史唯物主义的创始人。从这一角度去看刘恩至提出的1847年马克思资本观的成熟/断裂，就可以看到此时马克思的理论支援主要是《居利希笔记》,短短1—2年时间的经济史研究不足以支撑马克思对自身方法论进行整体的超越，马克思的思想不可能在此时发生一次断裂。但我们也必须肯定刘恩至提出的1847年马克思资本观变化的观点。的确，马克思通过经济学研究赋予了资本新的内涵，为之后深化历史唯物主义以及更深刻地透视和揭露资本主义社会的根本矛盾提供了理论支撑，这将有助于我们更细致地厘清马克思对资本概念理解及其批判的发展路径，深化我们对资本最新变化及其规律的当代阐释。

Third, the paradigm that results from an intellectual transformation is not merely a conclusion but a new worldview. The young Heidegger once gave an example in his 1919 essay “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview” (“Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem”): when we face the same lectern in a classroom, an educated modern person will unhesitatingly experience it as a “lectern” for teaching; a peasant from the Black Forest in Germany might “see” only a wooden box; while a Black person from Senegal might “see” something far more complex—perhaps a shelter against stones, perhaps an altar connected with magic and witchcraft, or simply a colored object. Heidegger said: “My seeing is fundamentally different from the seeing of the Senegalese person.” Why does this difference in “seeing” arise? From an epistemological perspective, the education they have received and the environments surrounding them in the past are different, leading to fundamental differences in the Gestalt of the knowledge structures long formed in their minds, so that they see different “worlds.” For Marx, the criterion for whether an intellectual transformation has occurred is a change in worldview, i.e., a shift in holistic discourse. After such a transformation, the discourse Marx uses changes: for example, the world constituted by alienated labor is transformed into a world shaped by material production, and many of the concepts in his writings are endowed with new theoretical foundations, such as *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* shifting from “civil society” to “bourgeois society.” Of course, this qualitative change in discourse is not a “rupture” but an endowment derived from the support of an other’s theory; it is not a complete break like one wave overturning the previous one, but rather a surpassing sublation [21]21 *Aufhebung* (sublation), a Hegelian term meaning to simultaneously cancel, preserve, and elevate. like a new mountain range covering and elevating the original peaks.

第三，作为思想转变结果的范式不仅仅是一个结论，更是一种新的世界观。青年海德格尔曾在1919年《哲学观念与世界观问题(“Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem”)》一文中举了一个例子：当我们面对同一个教室里的讲台时，一位受过教育的现代人会毫不犹豫地将其体验为一个授课的“讲台”,一位来自德国黑森林的农民可能“看”到的只是一个木制的箱子，而一位来自塞内加尔的黑人“看”到的可能就十分复杂了，也许是一个抵挡石头的掩体，也许是与魔法巫术有关的祭台，或者就是一个简单的具有色彩的物体。海德格尔说：“我的看与塞内加尔人的看是根本不同的。”为什么会产生这种“看”的不同?从认识论的角度来看，他们过去所接受的教育与周遭的环境是不同的，这导致他们头脑中长期形成的知识结构格式塔(Gestalt)具有根本性的差异，从而看到了不一样的“世界”。对马克思来说，思想是否转变的标准就是世界观的变化，即一种整体性话语的转变。在这种转变过后，马克思使用的话语不一样了，如异化劳动构成的世界转变为了物质生产塑造的世界，其笔下的诸多概念也被赋予了新的理论基础，如bürgerliche Gesellschaft从“市民社会”变成了“资产阶级社会”。当然，这种话语的质性变化并非一种“断裂”,而是来自他性理论支援的赋予，不是如后浪推翻前浪般的彻底决裂，而是如新的山峦在原有山峰上覆盖与拔高的超越式扬弃。

Overall, if we combine the notebook texts with Marx’s classical texts, we can clearly see that Marx’s thought underwent two transformations. The first philosophical transformation of the young Marx sprouted from the “problem of material interests” during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, formally began with the historical research in the *Kreuznach Notebooks* and the simultaneous attempt at subject-predicate inversion in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, and landed with the first systematic economic study in the *Paris Notebooks* and the polyphonic critical theory in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. The second philosophical transformation began with the reflection on humanism and the germination of the discourse of production in the *Brussels Notebooks*, as well as the germination of a new worldview in the *Theses on Feuerbach*; it was founded on the in-depth investigation of the relationship between production and intercourse in the *Manchester Notebooks* and the first systematic study of socialist doctrines; it landed with historical materialism as a new worldview in *The German Ideology*, and was further elaborated in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, laying a general foundation for the subsequent deepening of historical materialism.

总的来看，如果我们将笔记性文本与马克思经典文本相结合，就可以明显发现马克思的思想发生了两次转变。青年马克思的第一次哲学思想转变萌芽于《莱茵报》时期的“物质利益难题”,正式开始于《克罗伊茨纳赫笔记》的历史研究和同时期《黑格尔法哲学批判》中的主谓颠倒尝试，落地于《巴黎笔记》的首次经济学系统研究和《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的复调式批判理论。第二次哲学思想转变开始于《布鲁塞尔笔记》对人本主义反思和生产话语的萌芽，以及《关于费尔巴哈提纲》的新世界观萌芽，奠基于《曼彻斯特笔记》对生产与交往之间关系的深入考察，以及对社会主义学说的首次系统性研究，落地于《德意志意识形态》中作为一种新世界观的历史唯物主义，并在《共产党宣言》之中被进一步阐发，为之后历史唯物主义的深化奠定了一般性基础。

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑