Hegel’s “Science” and *Capital*

When we examine *Capital* from the unique perspective of what Hegel understood as “science” (Wissenschaft), we find that debates over its disciplinary affiliation are largely meaningless. By thoroughly elucidating the special connotations of the concept of “science” in Hegel’s philosophy, we can not only accurately grasp the essential characteristics of *Capital* as a work of “science,” but also fundamentally dissolve those superficial disciplinary disputes. More importantly, this research perspective provides a new entry point for understanding the complex intellectual inheritance between Marx and Hegel, revealing the intrinsic and profound influence of Hegel’s philosophy on the development of Marx’s thought.

当我们立足于黑格尔所理解的“科学”（Wissenschaft）这一独特视角来审视《资本论》时，就会发现关于其学科归属的争论在很大程度上是没有意义的。通过深入阐释黑格尔哲学中“科学”概念的特殊内涵，我们不仅能够准确把握《资本论》作为“科学”著作的本质特征，而且能从根本上消解那些流于表面的学科之争。更重要的是，这一研究视角为我们理解马克思与黑格尔之间复杂的思想传承关系提供了新的切入点，展现出黑格尔哲学对马克思思想发展的内在而深刻的影响。

The concept of “science” in Hegel’s philosophical system possesses unique and profound connotations, fundamentally distinct from the concept of empirical science that has dominated since the modern era. In the famous preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel states at the outset: “Truth is not a minted coin that can be taken up and used ready-made.” [1]1 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 22. This means that science, as absolute knowledge, is by no means a static object of cognition, but rather a process of the dialectical movement of subject and object. In the *Encyclopedia Logic*, he also explicitly states: “Philosophy without a system cannot become a science,” [2]2 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §14, p. 36. emphasizing that philosophy as science must present itself as an organic whole of the self-development of concepts.

黑格尔哲学体系中的“科学”概念具有独特而深刻的内涵，这一概念与近代以来占据主导地位的经验科学观念存在根本的区别。在《精神现象学》的著名序言中，黑格尔开宗明义地指出：“真理不是一块铸成了的硬币，可以现成地拿过来就用。”这是说，作为绝对知识的科学绝非静态的认知对象，而是主体与客体辩证运动的过程。他在《小逻辑》中也明确表述：“哲学若没有体系，就不能成为科学”，强调作为科学的哲学必须呈现为概念自我发展的有机整体。

Within Hegel’s philosophical horizon, “science” must possess two interrelated essential characteristics: first, a comprehensive systematicity, and second, the grasp of the Absolute (das Absolute). Regarding systematicity, Hegel points out that spirit produces from itself the other (das andere) of itself, then develops itself, knows itself, and returns to itself. In other words, spirit produces its own other, and then returns to itself within that other. Spirit constitutes a system that is in and for itself, self-sustaining and self-sufficient, a totality. This is the meaning of Hegel’s famous proposition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “The truth is the whole.” [3]3 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 11. This circular movement of spirit, setting out from itself, passing through the mediation of the other, and finally returning to itself, constitutes an independent and self-sufficient theoretical system, and only such a system deserves the title of “science.” Hegel strictly distinguishes “science” from the accumulation of ordinary knowledge, pointing out that not every branch of learning can be called a “science.” In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel refers to knowledge lacking systematicity as the “supersensible world” and the “observation of nature” grasped through common sense and the understanding, considering them merely scattered, external “laws” not yet grasped by concepts. [4]4 The “supersensible world” and “observation of nature” are stages in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where consciousness takes its objects as given and external, failing to grasp them as self-determining concepts. True science must be capable of grasping the Absolute; in this sense, “science” enjoys the same high theoretical dignity as “philosophy” or “metaphysics.” In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel explicitly states: “We Germans seldom count general scientific knowledge as philosophy.” [5]5 G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, trans. E.S. Haldane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), p. xxi. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he critiques disciplines such as Newtonian mechanics, modern mathematics, and history, pointing out that they are mere “tautologies” and piles of materials, lacking an inner connection with the Absolute and failing to systematically constitute the necessary moments for grasping the Absolute. Hence, they are essentially fragmented and lack true scientificity. It is worth noting that Hegel deliberately uses the concept of “science” in the titles of his major works for emphasis. For example, the subtitle of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is “Part One of the System of Science,” the full title of the *Science of Logic* is “The Science of Logic,” and the full title of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* is “Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline.” All of this fully demonstrates the central position of the concept of “science” within his philosophical system.

在黑格尔的哲学视域中，“科学”必须具备两个相互关联的本质特征：一是整全的体系性，二是对“绝对者”（das absolute）的把握。就体系性而言，黑格尔指出，精神从自己产生出作为他者（das andere）的自己，然后自己发展自己，自己认识自己，自己回到自己。换言之，精神自己产生出自己的他者，然后在他者中返回自身。精神构成一个自在自为、持存自足的体系，一个总体。黑格尔在《精神现象学》中提出的著名命题“真理是全体”即是此意。精神的这种从自身出发、经过他者中介、最终又返回自身的圆圈运动，构成了一个独立自足的理论体系，而只有这样的体系才配得上“科学”的称号。黑格尔严格区分了“科学”与普通知识的堆积，指出并非任何一门学问都能被称为“科学”。在《精神现象学》中，黑格尔将那些缺乏系统性的知识称为通过常识和知性把握的“超感官世界”和“对自然的观察”，认为它们只是零散的、外在的、未经概念把握的所谓“规律”。真正的科学必须能够把握绝对者，在这个意义上，“科学”与“哲学”或“形而上学”享有同等高度的理论尊严。黑格尔在《哲学史讲演录》中明确表示：“我们德国人很少把一般的科学知识算作哲学。”在《精神现象学》中，他对牛顿力学、近代数学以及历史学等学科作出了批判，指出它们只是“同义反复”和材料的堆砌，没有与绝对者建立起内在联系，未能体系性地构成把握绝对者的诸必要环节，因而在本质上都是支离破碎的，缺乏真正的科学性。值得注意的是，黑格尔在其主要著作的命名中都刻意使用了“科学”概念以示强调。例如，《精神现象学》的副标题是“科学体系的第一部分”，《逻辑学》的全称是“逻辑科学”，《哲学全书》的全称则是“哲学科学百科全书纲要”，这些都充分体现了“科学”概念在其哲学体系中的核心地位。

So, what kind of scientificity does *Capital*, as the pinnacle of Marx’s lifelong theoretical research, possess in terms of methodology? Marx’s famous assertion in the “Afterword” to the second edition of *Capital* provides us with an important clue: “The dialectic is mystified in Hegel, but this does not at all prevent him from being the first to consciously present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive manner.” [6]6 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 103. This formulation clearly reveals the Hegelian origin of the methodology of *Capital*, and also provides a basis for us to draw an analogy between capital and the Absolute or Absolute Spirit. The circulatory movement of capital realized through the “general formula for capital” (M—C—M') [7]7 The general formula for capital, M—C—M' (Money—Commodity—Money plus surplus), describes the circulation of capital as an end in itself, in contrast to simple commodity circulation C—M—C. largely borrows from the dialectical movement pattern of Hegel’s Absolute Spirit—constantly returning to itself in self-alienation. In the process of its movement, capital displays a remarkable capacity for absorption; it not only subordinates various social elements to itself, but can also “create from society the organs it still lacks,” [8]8 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 278. thereby forming an independent self-organizing system. Capital, as such a self-moving, self-developing entity-subject, indeed bears a structural similarity to Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. But we must understand that this is merely for Marx’s convenience of exposition. Comparing capital to the Absolute Spirit helps us vividly understand the systematicity and absoluteness of capital, just as Marx says in the “Afterword” to the second edition of *Capital*: “I even flirted with the mode of expression peculiar to Hegel.” [9]9 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 103.

那么，《资本论》作为马克思毕生理论研究的巅峰之作，在方法论上具有怎样的科学性呢？马克思在《资本论》第二版“跋”中的著名论断为我们提供了重要线索：“辩证法在黑格尔手中神秘化了，但这决没有妨碍他第一个全面地有意识地叙述了辩证法的一般运动形式。”这一表述清晰地揭示了《资本论》方法论的黑格尔渊源，也为我们将资本与绝对者或绝对精神加以类比提供了依据。资本通过“资本总公式”（G—W—G'）实现的循环运动，在很大程度上借鉴了黑格尔绝对精神的辩证运动模式——在自我异化中不断返回自身。资本在运动过程中展现出惊人的吸附能力，它不仅使各种社会要素从属于自己，而且能够“把自己还缺乏的器官从社会中创造出来”，从而形成一个独立的自组织系统。资本作为这样一个自我运动、自我发展的实体—主体，确实与黑格尔的绝对精神有着结构上的相似性。但我们要知道，这不过是马克思为了叙述的方便。将资本类比于绝对精神，有助于我们形象生动地理解资本的系统性和绝对性，正如马克思在《资本论》第二版“跋”中说道：“我甚至卖弄起黑格尔特有的表达方式。”

Understanding *Capital* solely from the perspective of Hegel’s concept of “science” entails serious theoretical limitations. This limitation is mainly manifested in the fact that when capital operates smoothly within its own boundaries, it superficially appears to exhibit the self-movement characteristics of the Absolute Spirit. The school of systematic dialectics, represented by Arthur, is precisely based on this appearance, emphasizing the explanatory power of Hegel’s logic for *Capital*. [10]10 Christopher J. Arthur, *The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), argues that the logical categories of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* directly structure the exposition of *Capital*. However, once capital oversteps its own boundaries or encounters a crisis, this interpretive model immediately falls into difficulty. In the actual development of capitalism, capital constantly breaks through its own boundaries, leading to periodic economic crises. In Volume III of *Capital*, Marx analyzes and points out: “The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself.” [11]11 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 358. This assertion reveals the essential difference between capital and the Absolute Spirit: capital cannot achieve the eternal self-reconciliation of the Absolute Spirit, but inevitably moves toward crisis amidst its own contradictions. As Marx further points out, the capitalist mode of production “at a certain stage of development comes into conflict with the productive forces it itself has created.” [12]12 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, p. 359. This irreconcilable contradiction is the concentrated expression of the transitory and transitional nature of the capitalist system. Therefore, based on a profound understanding of the contradictory movement of capitalism, Marx methodologically introduces the perspective of historical materialism into the analysis of capital’s movement. Hegel focuses on “what is rational is actual,” [13]13 G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 20. and does not deeply investigate social reality itself and its problems of alienation. Starting from concrete socio-historical conditions, Marx reveals the internal contradictions and crisis tendencies of capital’s operation. The dialectical method of *Capital* is built on the solid foundation of actual historical development. Although in its “appearance” (Schein) it conforms to Hegel’s requirements for “science,” it actually achieves a fundamental transformation of Hegel’s idealist dialectics through the narrative of historical materialism. That is to say, Marx fundamentally views the movement of capital and its laws from a historical perspective; he uses the narrative of historical materialism to sublate Hegel’s logical narrative, incorporating the logical narrative as a moment within the historical narrative. Although when capital operates smoothly and stably, in its “appearance” it seems as if the capital-subject follows its own logic in movement, and history achieves consistency with logic, in fact, the mode of production is the truly decisive factor in the historical process. When capitalist economic crises occur, the logic of capital in the Hegelian sense sheds its “appearance.” Perhaps it can be said that “the unity of history and logic” in Hegel manifests as the essence of history being logic, and logic necessarily manifesting as history, the two being equivalent to each other; whereas in Marx, logic is subordinate to history, being merely a “post festum” [14]14 Latin: “after the feast,” meaning after the fact; Marx uses this term to describe how categories of political economy are abstractions from already developed historical reality. summary and generalization of historical facts, not something in and for itself in the Hegelian sense.

单纯从黑格尔“科学”概念出发来理解《资本论》，存在严重的理论局限性。这种局限性主要表现在：当资本在自身界限内平稳运行时，表面上确实呈现出类似于绝对精神的自我运动特征，以阿瑟为代表的体系辩证法学派正是基于这一表象，强调黑格尔逻辑学对《资本论》的解释力。然而，一旦资本逾越自身界限或遭遇危机时，这种解释模式就立即陷入了困境。在现实的资本主义发展中，资本总是不断突破自身界限，从而导致周期性的经济危机。马克思在《资本论》第三卷中分析指出：“资本主义生产的真正限制是资本自身。”这一论断揭示了资本与绝对精神的本质区别：资本无法像绝对精神那样实现永恒的自我和解，而是必然在自身矛盾中走向危机。正如马克思进一步指出的，资本主义生产方式“在发展到一定高度时，就同它自身所创造的生产力发生矛盾”。这种不可调和的矛盾正是资本主义制度的暂时性和过渡性的集中体现。因此，基于对资本主义矛盾运动的深刻认识，马克思在方法论上将历史唯物主义视角引入对资本运动的分析之中。黑格尔关注的是“凡是现实的东西都是合乎理性的”，并未深入考察社会现实本身及其异化问题。马克思从具体的社会历史条件出发，揭示资本运行的内在矛盾和危机趋势。《资本论》的辩证方法是建立在现实历史发展的坚实基础之上的，虽然在“外观”（Schein）上符合黑格尔的“科学”要求，但实际上通过历史唯物主义的叙事实现了对黑格尔唯心主义辩证法的根本改造。也就是说，马克思在根本上是从历史的视角看待资本运动及其规律的，他用历史唯物主义的叙事扬弃了黑格尔的逻辑叙事，将逻辑叙事作为一个环节纳入历史叙事中来。尽管在资本顺利平稳地运行时，在“外观”上好像资本主体遵循着自身的逻辑在运动，历史达成与逻辑的一致，但事实上，生产方式才是历史进程的真正决定性因素。在资本主义经济危机出现时，资本具有的黑格尔意义上的逻辑就褪去了它的“外观”。或许可以这样说，“历史与逻辑的一致”，在黑格尔那里表现为历史的本质是逻辑，逻辑必定表现为历史，二者是彼此等同的；而在马克思那里，逻辑则是从属于历史的，不过是“事后”对历史事实的概括和总结，并非黑格尔意义上自在自为的东西。

Through the theoretical lens of Hegel’s concept of “science,” we can grasp more deeply the methodological characteristics of *Capital*. This great work both inherits Hegelian philosophy’s demand for systematicity and for science that is “in and for itself,” and, through the narrative of historical materialism, transcends the idealist limitations of Hegelian philosophy. This important methodology of Marx makes *Capital* a genuine science for analyzing the capitalist mode of production, and also provides methodological inspiration for our understanding of the laws of development of contemporary capitalism.

通过黑格尔“科学”概念的理论透镜，我们得以更深入地把握《资本论》的方法论特征。这部巨著既继承了黑格尔哲学对体系性和“自在自为”的科学要求，又通过历史唯物主义的叙事超越了黑格尔哲学的唯心主义局限。马克思的这种重要方法论，使《资本论》成为分析资本主义生产方式的真正科学，也为我们理解当代资本主义的发展规律提供了方法论启示。

(The authors are, respectively, a professor at the School of Marxism, Fudan University, and a doctoral student at the School of Marxism, Fudan University.)

（作者系复旦大学马克思主义学院教授；复旦大学马克思主义学院博士生）

Online editor: Tongxin

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