Digital Capital or Digitalized Monopoly Finance Capital? — An Understanding Based on the Complexity of Contemporary Capitalism

In contemporary capitalism, what is the dominant form of capital? This is a key theoretical question worthy of in-depth exploration. The dominant form of capital refers to the form that plays a leading and decisive role among the various forms of capital and holds a dominant position. Accurately identifying the dominant form of capital at a specific stage of development helps to clarify the specific operational mode of capitalism at that stage. In recent years, some scholars have proposed that digital capital has already replaced finance capital as the new dominant form, even the general form. “In today’s world capital market, those who ride the whirlwind are no longer industrial capitalists engaged in physical production; even finance capital is in a relatively marginal position, while companies such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft, which place greater emphasis on digital capital, have become the dominant force in this world trend.” [1]1 See, for example, Lan Tianji, “Digital Capital, Data Commodities and the Digital Market,” *Marxism and Reality*, no. 6 (2020). [Note: This is a representative citation; the original text does not provide a specific source for this quote.] Information/data “is a baton that dominates industrial layout, investment, and operations, becoming digital capital (data capital) that extracts profit. Digital capital is not a special form of capital, but the general form of capital in digital capitalism.” [2]2 See, for example, Lan Tianji, “Digital Capital, Data Commodities and the Digital Market.” [Note: Same as above.] This view has gained increasingly widespread recognition. I agree with their view that digital capital has sharply emerged and occupies an increasingly important position, but I do not believe that digital capital can directly replace finance capital and be identified as the current dominant form of capital. Given the importance of this issue, I venture to offer an immature viewpoint here, hoping to stimulate further discussion in the academic community and advance the philosophical understanding of the current dominant form of capital in a public manner.

在当代资本主义中，资本的主导形态是什么？这是一个值得深入探讨的、关键的理论问题。资本主导形态，即资本众形态中起主导性、决定性作用，拥有支配地位的形态。准确勘认特定发展阶段的资本主导形态，有助于辨明资本主义在该阶段的具体运行模式。近年来，一些学者提出，数字资本业已取代金融资本，成为新的主导形态乃至一般形态。“在今天的世界资本市场上，叱咤风云的不再是那些从事实体生产的产业资本家，甚至金融资本也处于比较边缘的地位，而Google、苹果、Facebook、Twitter、微软等更重视数字资本的公司成为这个世界潮流的主导”。信息／数据“是一种支配产业布局、投入、运营的指挥棒，成为攫取利润的数字资本（data capital）。数字资本并非是一种特殊形态的资本，而是数字资本主义中资本的一般形态”。这一见解得到日渐广泛的认可。笔者同意他们关于数字资本急剧凸显、占据愈发重要地位的观点，但不认为可以直接以数字资本替代金融资本，将数字资本认定为当前资本的主导形态。鉴于这个问题的重要性，在此冒昧提出不成熟的观点，期冀引发学界进一步的探讨，以公共性的方式推进对当前资本主导形态的哲学理解。

I. Digital Capital Is Not the Dominant Form

一、数字资本并非主导形态

To prove that digital capital has become the current dominant form of capital, one must fully analyze and demonstrate how it controls total social capital, including finance capital, and thereby dominates capitalist society. Finance capital constitutes the “universal light” and “special ether” of the contemporary capitalist world, a consensus among many Marxists represented by Hilferding and Lenin. [3]3 Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941) was an Austrian Marxist economist and politician; his work *Finance Capital* (1910) analyzed the fusion of industrial and banking capital. Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) developed this analysis in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), arguing that finance capital dominates monopoly capitalism. Starting from the 1970s, finance capital thoroughly became the dominant form of capital, powerfully dominating functional capital and thereby controlling the entire real capitalist world. To this day, the vast majority of researchers across various social sciences in the international academic community still regard finance capital as the dominant form of capital, but this does not constitute a valid basis for finance capital still being the dominant form of capital. A new king’s enthronement presupposes the old king’s abdication, which suggests to us: to determine whether digital capital has become the new dominant form of capital, we must consider whether it has already dominated finance capital — this is the key to judging whether digital capital has replaced finance capital.

要证成数字资本已经成为当前资本的主导形态，就不能不充分分析和论证其如何控制包括金融资本在内的社会总资本，进而如何支配资本主义社会。金融资本构成当代资本主义世界“普照的光”和“特殊的以太”，这是以希法亭和列宁为代表的诸多马克思主义者的共识。从20世纪70年代开始，金融资本彻底成为资本的主导形态，强力地支配职能资本，从而宰制整个现实的资本主义世界。至今，国际学界诸种社会科学的绝大多数研究者仍然认为金融资本是资本的主导形态，但这并不构成金融资本仍为资本主导形态的有效依据。新王登基以旧王退位为前提，这提示我们：判定数字资本是否成为资本新的主导形态，必须考量其是否已经支配金融资本——判断数字资本是否取代金融资本的关键。

In my view, digital capital has not yet controlled finance capital in a fundamental sense. Scholars have proposed that digital capital can effectively guide industrial capital and finance capital. This guidance is key to the operation and development of industrial capital and finance capital. If traditional industries cannot effectively join a few large platforms with highly concentrated general data, they face the risk of being eliminated by the market. There is no doubt that digital capital has indeed guided industrial capital to a considerable extent, and has also guided the formation of finance capital to a certain extent, but this role is closer to creating new conditions or forms for the development of finance capital. More importantly, from the opposite perspective, finance capital also deeply controls and guides digital capital.

在笔者看来，数字资本尚未在根本的意义上掌控金融资本。学者们提出，数字资本可以有效地引导产业资本和金融资本。这种引导是产业资本和金融资本运行与发展的关键。传统产业如果不能有效地加入一般数据高度聚集的某几个大平台，便会面临被市场淘汰的风险。毫无疑问，数字资本的确在相当程度上引导了产业资本，也在一定程度上引导了金融资本的形成，但这种作用更接近于为金融资本的发展创造新的条件或形式。更为重要的是，从相反的视角看，金融资本也深层地掌控和引导着数字资本。

Scholars further argue that digital capital effectively guides industrial capital and finance capital to escape blindness. This is one of the main arguments for regarding digital capital as the dominant form of capital. “The demand for commodities is derived through cloud computing… If producers learn which styles are more profitable and favored by the market, they will adjust production direction in a timely manner… To a certain extent, this avoids… the blindness of capitalist production, thereby reducing the risk of relative overproduction.” [4]4 See, for example, Lan Tianji, “Digital Capital, Data Commodities and the Digital Market.” [Note: Same as above.] Financial investment has also been effectively guided by data monitoring. “Digital capital eliminates blindness in financial investment… achieving more effective capital allocation on the internet than finance capital.” [5]5 See, for example, Lan Tianji, “Digital Capital, Data Commodities and the Digital Market.” [Note: Same as above.] In short, digital capital has largely eliminated the blindness of the totality of capital, including itself.

学者们进一步认为，数字资本有效引导产业资本和金融资本摆脱盲目性。这是将数字资本视为资本主导形态的主要论据之一。“商品的需要是通过云计算得出来的……如果生产商获知哪一种款式更赚钱，更受市场青睐，他们会及时调整生产方向……在一定程度上，避免了……资本主义生产的盲目性，从而降低了相对生产过剩的风险。”金融投资也受到了数据监控的有效引导。“数字资本消除了金融投资上的盲目性……在互联网上实现比金融资本更为有效的资本配置”。总之，数字资本在很大程度上消除了包括自身在内的资本总体的盲目性。

However, I believe that, in the era of rapid development of digital capital, industrial capital and finance capital still exhibit obvious blindness. Not to mention the irrationality (blindness or even frenzy) of individual production entities and links, even if every production unit possesses developed rationality, the entire capitalist production will exhibit strong irrationality or even anti-rationality. Especially after entering finance capitalism, to obtain maximum returns, rational individuals must rationally follow irrational individuals, ultimately resulting in social-level anti-rationality. Although “data monitoring” provides new conveniences and possibilities for the operation of industrial capital and finance capital, it cannot play a role in eradicating blindness. The enhancement of capital’s consciousness requires many more critical factors.

但笔者认为，在数字资本迅猛发展的今天，产业资本和金融资本仍然存在明显的盲目性。且不论单个生产主体和环节的不理性（盲目性以至疯狂性），纵使每个生产单元都拥有发达的理性，整个资本主义生产也会出现强烈的不理性乃至反理性。尤其进入金融资本主义后，为获取最大化收益，理性人必须理性地跟着不理性的人行动，最终造成社会整体的反理性。“数据监控”尽管为产业资本和金融资本的运作提供了新的便利与可能，但无法起到根除盲目性的作用。资本自觉性的提升需要诸多更为关键的因素。

In fact, the blindness of industrial capital and finance capital is something digital capital can never eliminate. Under the premise that other factors (such as profit-seeking nature and private nature) have not fundamentally changed, industrial capital, especially finance capital, cannot completely remove its own “gene” of blindness. Contemporary capitalist production not only still has insurmountable phenomena of relative overproduction but has also exhibited certain phenomena of absolute overproduction. For example, in many places, the quantity of clothing production has absolutely exceeded the scope of actual demand. Within the scope of private ownership, capital can never eradicate blindness and achieve complete consciousness. The occurrence of capitalist economic crises presupposes the blindness of capital. If digital capital could eliminate the blindness of the totality of capital, then economic crises would no longer occur. However, in fact, even with big data and cloud computing, capital will inevitably create bubbles and crises by rushing into industries and sectors that are easier to profit from.

事实上，产业资本和金融资本的盲目性是数字资本永远消除不了的。在其他因素（如逐利性与私人性）没有根本转变的前提下，产业资本尤其金融资本不可能完全剔除自己的盲目性“基因”。当代资本主义生产不仅仍旧存有无法克服的相对过剩现象，而且出现了某些绝对过剩现象。譬如，在许多地方，服装生产在数量上已经绝对超出了实际需要的范围。在私有制范围内，资本永远都不可能根除盲目性，实现完全的自觉。资本主义经济危机的发生以资本的盲目性为条件。如果数字资本能够消除资本总体的盲目性，那么，经济危机就不会再发生。然而，事实上，纵使有大数据和云计算，资本亦必定由于纷纷涌入更容易获利的产业和部门而产生泡沫与危机。

More critically, digital capital has not only failed to eliminate the blindness of industrial production and financial investment but itself possesses significant blindness (which is also one reason it cannot eliminate the blindness of other capitals). Indeed, the data obtained by digital capital is much richer than before, which helps to enhance the consciousness of its operations. However, enhancing consciousness does not equal eliminating blindness. Not to mention the limitations of data and its acquisition themselves, as far as capital and its personifications are concerned, their grasp and application of data are also bound to have problems. Capital cannot be without blindness, and digital capital is no exception. The blindness of digital capital is rooted in capital’s profit-seeking nature, a “fate” from which capital cannot escape. Under the control of this nature, digital capital cannot fully rationally grasp and apply the data it obtains. It always proceeds from a specific standpoint (valorization) and treats “general data” in a specific way (algorithms). In fact, the vast majority of digital capital lacks an overall and long-term perspective. Therefore, without decisive changes in other key factors, the consciousness of digital capital can hardly be fundamentally enhanced. Digital capital can also cause overproduction. For example, when different digital capitals see the same business opportunity, they will simultaneously move in. At this point, they find it difficult to accurately predict and correctly foresee the actions of competitors and the direction of the market, easily leading to overproduction.

更为关键的是，数字资本非但没有消除产业生产和金融投资的盲目性，反而自身就存有很大的盲目性（这也是它无法消除其他资本盲目性的原因之一）。的确，数字资本获得的数据比以往丰富得多，这有助于提高运作的自觉性。然而，提高自觉性并不等于消除盲目性。且不说数据及其获取本身存在局限性，就资本及其人格化身而言，其对数据的把握和运用也不可能不出问题。资本不可能没有盲目性，数字资本亦如是。数字资本的盲目性根源于资本的逐利本性，这一本性是资本无法摆脱的“宿命”。数字资本在这种本性的控制下，无法完全理性地把握和运用其获得的数据。它总是从特定的立场（增殖）出发，以特定的方式（算法）对待“一般数据”。事实上，绝大多数数字资本都欠缺总体与长远的眼光。因而，在其他关键因素没有决定性改变的情况下，数字资本的自觉性难以得到根本性提升。数字资本同样可能造成生产过剩。例如，不同的数字资本看到同样的商机，便会同时跟进。此时，它们难以对竞争者的行动和市场的走向作出准确预测、正确前瞻，极易导致生产过剩。

Therefore, one should not overestimate the consciousness of digital capital, nor should one overestimate the effectiveness of digital capital in guiding industrial capital and finance capital. Digital capital may even exacerbate the blindness of the capitalist world from specific dimensions. Dan Schiller argues that after the 2007–2008 financial crisis, finance capital continuously adopted new digital technologies to stimulate economic growth, with the consequence that the risk level in this field increased even more dramatically, “it can catalyze a global recession and depression more comprehensive and larger than the financial crisis.” [6]6 Dan Schiller is a critical media scholar; the reference is to his work on digital capitalism and the financial crisis. In fact, scholars who emphasize the consciousness of digital capital have also realized that “digital capital may also experience crises; we can foresee a data crisis after data flooding and the hollowing out of subjects.” [7]7 See, for example, Lan Tianji, “Digital Capital, Data Commodities and the Digital Market.” [Note: Same as above.]

因此，不应过高估计数字资本的自觉性，亦不宜过高估计数字资本引导产业资本和金融资本的有效性。数字资本甚至可能从特定的向度加剧资本主义世界的盲目性。丹·席勒认为，2007—2008年金融危机之后，金融资本不断采纳新的数字技术，以刺激经济增长，其后果是该领域的风险度更为戏剧性地增加了，“它可以催化一场比金融危机更大、更为全面的全球性衰退与萧条”。事实上，重视数字资本自觉性的学者也已经意识到，“数字资本也可能会发生危机，我们可以预见到数据泛滥和主体架空之后面对的数据危机”。

Apart from its domination over capital as a whole and the capitalist world, for a form of capital to become the dominant form, it must either make the greatest “contribution” to the overall valorization of capital or appropriate the largest share of the “fruits” of valorization. This is because the nature of capital is valorization, and the logic of valorization constitutes the core logic of capital. It should be said that on both these points, digital capital has not yet achieved this. On the one hand, although digital capital can make the production and realization of value and wealth more efficient, the real economy remains the main field for producing and realizing value and wealth. On the other hand, although digital capital obtains an increasing share of profits, it is compelled to cede a large portion of the profits it creates to finance capital, which still seizes the largest proportion of profits. Even the digital capital research specialist Nick Srnicek acknowledges that the technology sector, including digital technology, “remains a relatively small part of the economy”; moreover, only a few large corporations monopolize general data. If this is the case, then the possibility of digital capital becoming the dominant form of capital is greatly diminished.

除了对资本总体和资本主义世界的支配外，一种资本形态要成为主导形态，要么为资本的总体增殖作最大“贡献”，要么占有最多增殖“成果”。因为，资本的本性是增殖，增殖逻辑构成资本的核心逻辑。应该说，在这两点上，数字资本目前都还没有达到。一方面，虽然数字资本能够让价值与财富的生产与实现更为有效，但是实体经济仍然是生产和实现价值与财富的主要领域。另一方面，数字资本尽管得到利润的份额日渐增大，但是不得不将自己创造的大量利润让渡给金融资本，金融资本仍旧攫取了最大比例的利润。数字资本研究专家斯尔尼塞克也承认，包括数字技术在内的技术行业“仍然是经济中相对较小的一部分”；而且，垄断一般数据的大公司只有少数几家。既然如此，那么，数字资本成为资本主导形态的可能性就大打折扣了。

Correctly understanding the relationship between the digital and information helps to accurately grasp the status of digital capital. “The digital encoding of information and electronic operations render the previous spatiotemporal constraints of communication ineffective; the copying, transmission, and storage of information become effortless… Current information capitalism is precisely digital capitalism.” [8]8 Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System*, trans. Yang Lijun (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2001), p. 15. Data means information; the digital is a convenient carrier or form of expression of information, while information is the ontology or content of the digital. Digitalization makes the dissemination of information exceptionally broad and rapid. The reason the masses value digitalization is that it can transmit vast amounts of information more conveniently. In other words, what people hope to obtain is information, not the digital. The profit of capitalists who own digital platforms does not come from dry numbers, but from the massive amounts of information conveniently transmitted by the digital. This is because information makes capital profitable. Digitalization “makes the world informational,” “makes things subservient to information.” [9]9 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, trans. Yang Jianguo and Fan Yiting (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2003), p. 30.

正确理解数字与信息的关系，有助于准确把握数字资本的地位。“对信息的数字编码及电子操作使得以往交流的时空限制失效了，信息的复制、传输、储存都变得轻而易举……当前的信息资本主义确切而言就是数字资本主义。”数据意味着信息，数字是信息的便利载体或表现形式，而信息是数字的本体或内容，数字化让信息的传播变得异常广泛和快速。大众之所以看重数字化，是由于它能够更为便捷地传递巨量信息。换言之，人们希望得到的是信息，而非数字。拥有数字平台的资本家的利润也不是来自干巴巴的数字，而是数字所便捷传递的海量信息。因为，信息让资本有利可图。数字化“让世界变得信息化”，“让物臣服于信息”。

From this perspective, whether in theory or in reality, the claim that “digital capital has become the dominant form of capital in the contemporary capitalist world” requires further consideration. Of course, these two levels are internally consistent. The reason the theoretical argument is insufficient is that digital capital lacks sufficient power of domination in reality. The following text will further elaborate and substantiate this point in conjunction with finance capital and its dominance.

由是观之，无论在理论上还是在现实中，“数字资本成为当代资本主义世界资本主导形态”的说法都需要进一步考量。当然，这两个层面又内在一致。理论之所以论证得不够充分，是因为数字资本在现实中的支配力量不足。下文将结合金融资本及其支配性，进一步展开和论证这一点。

II. The Contemporary Meaning of Finance Capital

二、金融资本的当代意涵

Whether judging the relationship between finance capital and digital capital, or determining whether finance capital has become the dominant form of capital in the contemporary capitalist world, both require a reasonable grasp of the conceptual meaning or essential determination of finance capital as a prerequisite. Currently, the academic understanding of the contemporary meaning of finance capital is not sufficiently adequate or clear. This has become a significant source of several cognitive deviations regarding finance capital and an important reason why it is not easy to accurately grasp the relationship between finance capital and digital capital.

无论是判定金融资本与数字资本的关系，还是判断金融资本是否成为当代资本主义世界的资本主导形态，皆需以对金融资本的概念意涵或本质规定的合理把握为前提。目前，学界对金融资本的当代意涵的理解还不够充分清晰。这成为关于金融资本若干认识偏差形成的重要源头，也成为不易准确把握金融资本与数字资本关系的重要原因。

Rudolf Hilferding proposed that finance capital is bank capital in the form of money that has been transformed into industrial capital. “An ever-increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the industrialists who use it. They are able to dispose of capital only through the banks… The banks are forced to invest an ever-increasing part of their capital in industry… This portion of bank capital in the form of money has thus been transformed into industrial capital, and I call this bank capital ‘finance capital’.” [10]10 Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, trans. Fu Ding (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1994), p. 252. In short, finance capital is money capital controlled by banks and used by industrial capitalists. In this sense, finance capital is a positive sublation of industrial capital — it both preserves industrial capital and overcomes it. More precisely, finance capital is a form of capital that “transforms itself” into industrial capital.

希法亭提出，金融资本是转化为产业资本的货币形式的银行资本。“产业资本中那个不断增长的部分，并不属于使用它的产业资本家。产业资本家只能通过银行来支配这些资本……银行不得不把它不断增长的这一部分资本投资在产业上……这一部分货币形式的银行资本，实际上已经由这种方式转化为了产业资本，我把这种银行资本称为金融资本。”简言之，金融资本是由银行支配并被产业资本家使用的货币资本。在这个意义上，金融资本是对产业资本内在的积极扬弃——既保留产业资本，又克服产业资本。更确切地说，金融资本是一种“变身”为产业资本的资本形态。

Lenin’s view of finance capital in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* shows significant consistency with Hilferding, though it also contains several breakthroughs based on Marx’s and Hilferding’s thought. In his view, finance capital is the fusion of bank capital and industrial capital: “The concentration of production; the monopolies arising from concentration; the merging or growing together of banks with industry — this is the history of the rise of finance capital and the content of this concept.” [11]11 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in *Selected Works of Lenin*, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012), p. 613. Lenin argued that finance capital “obtains huge and ever-increasing profits from the promotion of enterprises, the issue of securities, state loans, etc., and consolidates the domination of the financial oligarchy.” [12]12 Ibid., p. 614. This discussion prompts us to pay attention to the fusion of finance capital with industrial capital, more precisely, the transformation of finance capital into industrial capital. Beneath the “flesh” of industrial capital, it is the “soul” of finance capital that operates. In other words, finance capital constitutes the “true body” behind industrial capital. In Marx’s time, following the process of capitalist production, he divided capital (industrial capital) into three forms: money capital, productive capital, and commodity capital. In that era of smaller capital scale, many industrial capitalists possessed their own money capital. However, with the increasing advancement and deepening of monopoly, more and more industrial capital became unable to possess independent huge amounts of capital and had to turn to finance capital, allowing finance capital to invade and even control itself to varying degrees. And when finance capital no longer supports industrial capital, the latter’s operation and even existence may fall into serious difficulties.

列宁在《帝国主义论》中对金融资本的看法同希法亭具有显著的一致性，当然亦有若干基于马克思和希法亭思想的突破。在他看来，金融资本是银行资本和产业资本的融合：“生产的集中；从集中生长起来的垄断；银行和工业日益融合或者说长合在一起，——这就是金融资本产生的历史和这一概念的内容。”列宁提出，金融资本“由于创办企业、发行有价证券、办理公债等等而获得大量的、愈来愈多的利润，巩固了金融寡头的统治”。这一论述启示我们注意金融资本同产业资本的融合，更确切地说，是金融资本向产业资本的转化。在产业资本的“肉身”之下，是金融资本的“灵魂”在运作。易言之，金融资本构成产业资本背后的“真身”。马克思当年依循资本主义生产的过程，将资本（产业资本）划分为货币资本、生产资本和商品资本三种形态。在那个资本规模较小的年代，许多产业资本家拥有自己的货币资本。然而，随着垄断的愈益推进和深入，众多产业资本越来越无力拥有独立的巨额资本，只能转而求助于金融资本，从而让金融资本不同程度地侵入以至控制自身。而当金融资本不再支持产业资本时，后者的运作乃至存在就可能陷入严重困境。

In summary, in the views of Hilferding and Lenin, finance capital, formed by the organic combination of bank capital and industrial capital, is in essence bank capital (mainly money capital) appearing as industrial capital. This classical Marxist thought on finance capital establishes the basic direction for grasping the meaning of finance capital in the capitalist world today. However, the contemporary understanding of finance capital cannot be limited to their insights but must be changed and advanced based on its contemporary developments. Although Hilferding’s view is highly representative, it is only one among many understandings of finance capital. More importantly, Hilferding’s thought was formed over a hundred years ago, in an era when the development of finance capital was still insufficient. This capital, through profound changes over more than a century, has generated even greater power, absorbing other forms of capital, including industrial capital, and fusing into a new capital “Leviathan,” constituting the core of the “capital community” in reality. [13]13 “Leviathan” is a biblical sea monster, famously used by Thomas Hobbes as a metaphor for the sovereign state in his 1651 work *Leviathan*. Here it is used figuratively to describe an all-powerful, dominating entity. Therefore, only by understanding the meaning of finance capital based on the contemporary landscape can we more clearly see its immense power in the present, and also more clearly see its deep regulation of other forms of capital, including digital capital.

概而言之，在希法亭和列宁那里，由银行资本和产业资本有机结合形成的金融资本，其实质是作为产业资本出现的银行资本（主要为货币资本）。这一马克思主义金融资本的经典思想为今天把握资本主义世界金融资本的意涵确定了基本方向。不过，对金融资本的当代理解不能局限于他们的认识，而需依据其当代进展有所改变和推进。希法亭的见解尽管具有很强的代表性，但只是众多关于金融资本理解中的一种。更为重要的是，希法亭的思想形成于一百多年前金融资本发展还不充分的时代。这种资本在百多年的深刻变化中已经生成了更为强大的力量，吸纳了包括产业资本在内的其他资本形态，融合成新的资本“利维坦”，构成现实中“资本共同体”的内核。因而，唯有立足当代景象理解金融资本之意涵，方能更加清楚地看到金融资本在当下的巨大力量，也才能更加明晰地看到它对其余资本形态包括数字资本的深层规制。

Based on the reality of contemporary capitalism and its changes relative to the past, and drawing on the theoretical approaches of Hilferding and Lenin, finance capital can be understood in both a narrow and a broad sense. Narrowly defined finance capital is what people now commonly refer to as financial-sector capital, including but not limited to banking, securities, insurance, trusts, and funds. Contemporary finance capital extends far beyond the narrow scope of the banking industry, although bank capital still constitutes the basic form of contemporary finance capital. In the era of Hilferding and Lenin, bank capital stood out alone among financial-sector capital, but today financial-sector capital has blossomed in a hundred flowers. Therefore, although their basic line of thought is worth absorbing, the understanding of finance capital cannot be confined to bank capital; other forms of capital must also be included. Of course, the various forms of financial-sector capital share a common essence: capital that is mobilized and invested out (with investment companies constituting their typical form). In the most popular and simplified terms, capital is “principal capital,” i.e., assets used as principal to obtain returns; finance capital is “fused capital,” i.e., capital that fuses different principals (capitals). Liu Jipeng holds that “finance, in essence, is the various tools and means for solving the problem of fund mobilization, with people’s financing and investment activities running through it.” In other words, in a direct sense, the essence of finance capital is precisely “principal capital” that is fused together and then invested out to obtain returns, and this is precisely the essence that capital generated and established from the moment of its birth. It can be seen that finance capital in this sense most “accurately” inherits the nature of capital. Marx repeatedly called interest-bearing capital the most perfect fetish, constituting the extreme form of the fetishism of capital. Today’s finance capital is also the most perfect fetish of this era, further strengthening the fetish form and fetish concept of capital, and strengthening the fetishism of capital.

立足当代资本主义现实及其相对于过往的变化，借鉴希法亭和列宁的理路，可以对金融资本作狭义和广义两种理解。狭义金融资本即人们现在常说的金融业资本，包括但不限于银行、证券、保险、信托、基金等。当代金融资本远远越出银行业的狭窄范围，尽管银行资本仍然构成当代金融资本的基本形态。在希法亭和列宁的年代，银行资本在金融业资本中一枝独秀，但如今金融业资本百花齐放。因此，虽然他们的基本思路值得吸收，但对金融资本的理解不能拘泥于银行资本，而须将其他资本形态也含括进来。当然，金融业资本诸形态有着共同的实质——融通起来并投资出去的资本（投资公司构成其典型形式）。最通俗和简化地说，资本就是“本资”，即作为本金获取收益的资财；金融资本就是“融金资本”，即融合了不同本金（资本）的资本。刘纪鹏认为，“金融从本质上说是解决资金融通的各种工具手段，贯穿其中的是人们的融资和投资活动”。换言之，在直接意义上，金融资本的本质就是融合起来进而投资出去以获取收益的“本资”，而这正是资本诞生伊始就生成和确立的本质。可见，此种意义的金融资本最为“精准”地继承了资本的本性。马克思当年多次称生息资本是最完善的物神，构成资本拜物教的极端形式。如今的金融资本亦为这个时代最完善的物神，进一步强化了资本的物神形态与物神观念，强化了资本拜物教。

As a fetish, finance capital has not and cannot confine itself to the financial sector; its goal must be the entire capitalist world. Finance capital spares no effort to penetrate itself into all things, affairs, relations, activities, and processes of the contemporary capitalist world, financializing them, making them exist in a way favorable to itself, thereby expanding itself to the greatest extent. Fred Magdoff and Foster have even proposed the concept of a “pan-financial sector” encompassing finance, insurance, and real estate. The real estate industry was originally a real industry, but due to the powerful domination and profound shaping by finance capital, it has already generated a significant financial nature, becoming a financialized industry. This includes both financial-sector capital and industrial capital that is subordinate to financial-sector capital or transformed from financial-sector capital, i.e., a fusion of financial-sector capital and industrial capital, which is finance capital in a broad sense. “The boundary between financial assets and non-financial assets may not be clear.” In fact, the blurring of the boundary between the two is inevitable. Hilferding long ago pointed out that finance capital constitutes the “pure form” of capital, “the special character of capital is erased in finance capital, and capital now appears as a unified force, a force dominating all social production processes.” In this sense, in the era of finance capitalism, capital, regardless of its specific form, possesses the nature of finance capital to varying degrees.

作为物神，金融资本没有也不可能将自己局限于金融业范围内，它的目标一定是整个资本主义世界。金融资本竭尽全力地将自己渗透进当代资本主义世界的一切物、事、关系、活动和过程中，将它们金融化，使之按照有利于自身的方式存在，从而最大程度地扩张自身。弗雷德·马格多夫（Fred Magdoff）和福斯特甚至提出了含括金融、保险和房地产等的“泛金融部门”概念。房地产业本是实体产业，但由于受到金融资本的强力支配和深刻型塑，已然生成显著的金融性质，成为一种金融化产业。这种既包括金融业资本，也包括从属于金融业资本或者说由金融业资本变化而来的产业资本，即金融业资本和产业资本的融合体，是广泛意义上的金融资本。“金融资产与非金融资产的界限可能并不清晰。”其实，二者界限的模糊是势所必然。希法亭早就指出，金融资本构成资本的“纯粹形式”，“资本的特殊性质在金融资本中被抹去了，资本现在表现为了一个统一的力量、一个统治一切社会生产过程的力量”。在此意义上，金融资本主义时代的资本不论其具体形式如何，都不同程度地具有金融资本的性质。

It should be said that the narrow meaning of finance capital and the broad meaning of finance capital each have their own value. The narrow meaning highlights the “pure” and typical inner nature of finance capital, while the broad meaning highlights the epochal characteristic of finance capital striving to achieve better valorization and domination through combination with other capitals. It is not difficult to see that the connection between narrow finance capital and broad finance capital is very close. There is no insurmountable gap between financial-sector capital as narrow finance capital and functional capital. When financial-sector capital circulates and transforms into functional capital, it converts into broad finance capital. This close connection stems from capital’s nature of valorization, its instinct for domination, and its powerful force. Due to its inseparable “quality,” financial-sector capital must transform itself into functional capital; otherwise, it cannot effectively valorize, dominate, and expand. Just as bank capital once fused with industrial capital to generate finance capital, today’s financial-sector capital also couples with various functional capitals to generate broad finance capital.

应该说，狭义金融资本意涵和广义金融资本意涵各有价值。狭义金融资本意涵凸显了金融资本“纯正”而典型的内在本性，广义金融资本意涵则彰显了金融资本力图通过同其他资本结合实现更好增殖与统治的时代特征。不难看出，狭义金融资本与广义金融资本之间的联系十分密切。作为狭义金融资本的金融业资本同职能资本之间不存在无法逾越的鸿沟。金融业资本流转和变形为职能资本时，就转换成广义金融资本。这种密切关联源于资本的增殖本性、统治本能与强大力量。出于其无法割离开来的“质”，金融业资本必然要将自己变成职能资本，否则就无法有效地增殖、统治与扩张。正如当年银行资本与工业资本相融合生成金融资本一般，今天的金融业资本亦同诸职能资本相耦合生成广义金融资本。

Thinkers such as Harry Magdoff, Sweezy, and Foster more often juxtapose finance capital or interest-bearing capital with industrial capital or functional capital, real capital. The “production and finance” paradigm proposed by Harry Magdoff, Sweezy, and others remains the main paradigm of Marxist theoretical analysis to this day. This “finance capital” juxtaposed with “productive capital” is close to narrow finance capital. The “production and finance” paradigm indeed has its theoretical value, reminding us to pay attention to the difference between functional capital and narrow finance capital or financial-sector capital. In contrast, Hilferding and Lenin more often regard finance capital as a new capital form that contains industrial capital. This finance capital fused with industrial capital is broad. In the author’s view, although the approach of Hilferding and Lenin is a minority view, it also has its own rationality. Because, in contemporary capitalism, finance capital exerts a powerful shaping and transformation on industrial capital, and industrial capital submits to finance capital. Finance capital is not outside industrial capital, but within industrial capital. It transforms itself into industrial capital, or more precisely, incorporates industrial capital into itself, making it an internal component. As Hilferding said, finance capital and industrial capital are the same capital. “Interest-bearing capital and profit-providing capital (industrial capital — author’s note) — these are not two different kinds of capital, but the same capital.” When finance capital is invested into the real economy and applied to production, it transforms into industrial capital. In this regard, the two are essentially the same capital, only with different functions.

哈里·马格多夫（Harry Magdoff）、斯威齐和福斯特等思想家，更多地将金融资本或生息资本同产业资本或职能资本、实体资本相对应。哈里·马格多夫和斯威齐等人提出的“生产与金融”范式，至今仍为马克思主义理论分析的主要范式。这种与“生产资本”相对应的“金融资本”，接近于狭义金融资本。“生产与金融”范式的确有其理论价值，提醒我们注意职能资本与狭义金融资本或金融业资本的区别。与之不同，希法亭和列宁更多地把金融资本看作内含产业资本的新资本形态。此种与产业资本相融合的金融资本是广义的。在笔者看来，希法亭和列宁的思路虽属少数，却同样具有自身的合理性。因为，在当代资本主义中，金融资本对产业资本施加了有力的型塑、改造，产业资本服膺于金融资本。金融资本不在产业资本之外，而在产业资本之中。它将自己转化为产业资本，更准确地说，将产业资本纳入自身之中，使之成为自己的内在构件。诚如希法亭所言，金融资本和产业资本是同一个资本。“生息资本和提供利润的资本（产业资本——引者注）——这并不是两种不同的资本，而是同一个资本”。金融资本被投入至实体产业、运用于生产时，就转变为产业资本。就此而言，两者实质上是同一个资本，只是职能不同而已。

It is noteworthy that between finance capital (narrow) and functional capital, the former holds an advantage and even dominance. Finance capital actively “transforms” itself into functional capital, making functional capital grow from small to large, from weak to strong, even from nothing to something; while functional capital is controlled by finance capital to varying degrees, obeying it in fundamental direction and core interests. In contemporary capitalism, finance capital is often the main “owner” or “master” of functional capital, and ownership ensures the dominant position of finance capital. Therefore, within broad finance capital, narrow finance capital or financial-sector capital is the more powerful, more proactive, and dominant side. This is the main reason why the real economy in the capitalist world serves finance capital. In this sense, narrow finance capital becomes the core of the broad finance capital formed by its fusion with functional capital.

值得注意的是，在金融资本（狭义）与职能资本之间，前者具有优势乃至主导性。金融资本积极主动地“变身”为职能资本，使职能资本由小到大、由弱到强，甚至从无到有；而职能资本则不同程度地受金融资本的控制，在根本方向与核心利益上听命于它。在当代资本主义中，金融资本往往是职能资本的主要“拥有者”或“主人”，所有权确保了金融资本的优势地位。因此，在广义金融资本中，狭义金融资本或金融业资本是更具力量、更为积极主动、处于主导地位的一方。这正是资本主义世界实体经济为金融资本服务的主要原因。在此意义上，狭义金融资本成为由它和职能资本融合成的广义金融资本的内核。

III. Finance Capital Still Possesses Powerful Force

三、金融资本仍拥有强大力量

The contemporary concept of finance capital implies and represents its powerful or even dominant force. Keynes once believed that the existence of a rentier class in the capitalist system was only a transitional phenomenon, and that when its task was completed, the “rentier class” would disappear. However, judging from the development of capitalism over the past century, Keynes’s expectation has been disappointed. The force of the “rentier class” has not diminished but has grown larger and larger. Finance capital has become increasingly assertive, and capital, people, and society have all become increasingly financialized. This is an inevitable trend in the development of capitalism, which will not undergo fundamental change due to individual subjective wishes. In its relationship with other capitals, the powerful dominance of narrow finance capital is clearly revealed.

金融资本的当代概念蕴含并表征其强大乃至支配性的力量。凯恩斯曾认为，资本主义体系存在坐收利息阶级只是一种过渡时期的现象，任务完毕时“生息阶级”就会消灭。然而，从资本主义近百年的发展状况看，凯恩斯的这一期盼落空了。“生息阶级”的力量不是越来越小，而是越来越大。金融资本变得愈加强势，资本、人与社会皆日益金融化。这是资本主义发展的必然趋势，不会因个人的主观愿望而发生根本改变。在同其他资本的关系中，狭义金融资本强大的支配性显明地呈现出来。

In the contemporary era, numerous “capitals” such as “social capital,” “cultural capital,” “political capital,” “moral capital,” and “ecological capital” have sprung up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. However, the rise of these new types of “capital” has not substantially shaken the core position of finance capital; rather, it has confirmed from many new dimensions the comprehensive dominance and powerful force of finance capital. These “capitals” and finance capital are closely intertwined and linked, forming a “community of interests,” but overall, finance capital remains the most fundamental dimension, possessing an ontological significance and existential effect that other “capitals” lack. In Marx’s theoretical perspective, these “capitals” are more components or factors of capital, and non-core ones at that.

在当代，众多“资本”如“社会资本”“文化资本”“政治资本”“道德资本”“生态资本”等雨后春笋般冒出。但这些新型“资本”的崛起，并没有实质性地动摇金融资本的核心地位，而是从诸多新的向度确证了金融资本的全面统摄与强大力量。这些“资本”和金融资本之间存在密切的交叉与联动，结成“利益共同体”，但在总体上，金融资本仍是最为根本的向度，具有其他“资本”所没有的本体性意义和生存论效应。在马克思的理论视野中，这些“资本”更多地是资本的构件或因素，且是非核心的构件或因素。

The situation of digital capital is similar. Researchers have characterized “companies that control general data,” such as Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, as digital capital. From the perspective of the triple determination of capital (material appearance, value form, and relations of production), especially self-valorization, digital capital achieves valorization by appropriating data without compensation to obtain “surplus data,” and to a certain extent possesses the determination of capital. However, the “producers” of data are often not wage laborers. In other words, digital capital often involves the exploitation of non-wage labor, meaning that certain “capitals” that do not have an employment relationship are also regarded as digital capital. This type of capital is not capital in the strict sense.

数字资本的状况与之相似。研究者将“掌握了一般数据的公司”，如微软、谷歌、脸书等，概括为数字资本。从资本的三重规定（物质外观、价值形态和生产关系）特别是自行增殖的视角看，数字资本通过无偿占有数据获取“剩余数据”实现增殖，一定程度地具有资本的规定性。但数据“生产者”往往不是受雇佣者。换言之，数字资本往往存在对非雇佣劳动的剥削，亦即某些不具有雇佣关系的“资本”也被视为数字资本。此种资本并非严格意义上的资本。

More importantly, finance capital provides the necessary foundation and powerful driving force for the survival and development of digital capital—huge sums of money—thereby controlling digital capital to a considerable extent. Without the strong impetus of finance capital, the rapid development of digital capital would be unimaginable. The development and application of digital technologies such as big data, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, blockchain, and artificial intelligence, and thus the entire digital transformation and expansion of capital, are driven and controlled to a considerable extent by finance capital. The digitalization of capital not only aligns with the interests of finance capital but can also directly strengthen the expansion and power of finance capital. Of course, finance capital inevitably controls the direction of digital technology and digital capital’s operations, making them conform to its own requirements. It can be said that behind the operation and development of digital capital lurks the “invisible hand” of finance capital. Even the operation and profitability of monopolistic digital capital must rely on powerful finance capital as its “backing” and support. Moreover, as digital capital develops further, its need for finance capital increases, thereby allowing finance capital to penetrate its interior ever more deeply.

更重要的是，金融资本为数字资本提供了生存发展的必要基础与强大动力——巨额资金，从而在相当程度上控制着数字资本。离开金融资本的强力推动，数字资本的高速发展是不可想象的。大数据、云计算、物联网、区块链、人工智能等数字技术的发展与运用，进而整个资本的数字化转型与扩张，在相当程度上由金融资本驱动与控制。资本的数字化不仅符合金融资本的利益，而且能够直接强化金融资本的扩张和力量。当然，金融资本必然把控数字技术与数字资本的运行方向，使之契合自己的要求。可以说，数字资本的运作与发展背后隐藏着金融资本这只“无形之手”。即便垄断性数字资本的运作与盈利，也必须以强大的金融资本为“后台”与依托。而且，数字资本愈益发展，对金融资本的需要就愈益增加，从而就愈益让金融资本进入其内部。

Digital platforms constitute the main and typical form of current digital capital. Researchers emphasize that digital platforms controlling data are very important and possess extremely powerful control, which is undoubtedly correct. What is worth asking is: to whom do these digital platforms belong? The answer is finance capital. In the late 1990s, “expectations of huge returns drove a wave of speculative investment in new digital companies.” “These companies have been asset purchasers and developers in multiple industries, enabling them to expand their capacity to acquire information. … A large amount of surplus idle capital has allowed these companies to build and expand the infrastructure for data extraction.” This idle capital is precisely finance capital, which is everywhere seeking investment opportunities. This capital fundamentally owns the digital platforms. “Yet despite these advantages, these companies remain unprofitable, surviving only on the welfare of venture capital. Capital from Silicon Valley (and elsewhere) flows into these companies, allowing them to continue operating despite years of losses, with each round of funding.” Seeing that digital platforms are profitable, finance capital advances into them and invests heavily, becoming the “boss behind the scenes” of digital capital. In this sense, finance capital constitutes the life source of digital platforms, giving digital platforms a new and more resilient life. Of course, finance capital will not do unprofitable things for long. When it becomes truly difficult to extract (sufficient) profits from digital platforms, finance capital will resolutely abandon them. In the fundamental direction, digital platforms must obey and serve the instinctive demand of finance capital for profit, especially huge profits. All operations conducive to this can be retained and strengthened; all operations detrimental to this must be reduced or even eliminated. Digital capital, relying on massive data and specific algorithms, controls the flow of goods and services, but ultimately it will not violate the instinct and demands of the finance capital within it.

数字平台构成当前数字资本主要而典型的形式。研究者们强调掌控数据的数字平台十分重要，其具有极为强大的控制力，这无疑是正确的。值得追问的是，这些数字平台归谁所有？答案是金融资本。20世纪90年代后期，“巨额收益的预期推动了对新数字公司投机性投资的热潮”。“这些公司一直是多种产业的资产购买者和开发者，这使它们能够扩大获取信息的能力。……大量过剩的闲置资本，使这些公司得以建立和扩大数据提取的基础设施。”这些闲置资本正是到处寻觅投资良机的金融资本。这种资本从根本上占有数字平台。“然而尽管有这些优势，这些公司仍然无利可图，仅仅靠风险投资福利的支撑才能生存下去。硅谷（和其他地方）的资金流入这些公司，使它们尽管亏损多年但每次仍能得到注资而继续经营。”看到数字平台有利可图，金融资本就对它大举进军和投资，成为数字资本的“后台老板”。在此意义上，金融资本构成数字平台的生命之源，给予数字平台新的、更为强韧的生命。当然，金融资本不会长时间做无利可图的事情。实在难以从数字平台身上获取（足够的）利润时，金融资本会毅然决然地将其放弃。在根本方向上，数字平台必须服从和服务于金融资本盈利尤其巨额盈利的本能要求。一切有利于此的运作都可以保留与加强，一切不利于此的运作都必须削减乃至取消。数字资本凭借海量数据和特定算法支配货物与服务的流向，但终究不会违背其内里金融资本的本能与要求。

Numerous facts show that behind digital capital, different finance capitals engage in the final, decisive competition. The model of digital platforms—“develop first, profit later” (first occupy the market at all costs, then extract high monopoly profits)—must be conditioned on huge amounts of capital, and today’s huge amounts of capital are all finance capital. Without the massive investment of finance capital as a guarantee, the “develop first, profit later” model of digital platforms cannot be unfolded and sustained. The needs and operations of the finance capital behind digital capital determine the key “life activities” of digital capital, thereby regulating its “life course.”

众多事实显示，在数字资本背后，不同金融资本进行着最后的、决定性的竞争。数字平台“先发展再盈利”（先不惜代价地占领市场，再获取高额垄断利润）的模式不得不以巨量资本为条件，而当今的巨量资本无一不是金融资本。没有金融资本的海量投入作为保障，数字平台“先发展再盈利”的模式不可能得到展开和维持。处于数字资本背后的金融资本的需要与运作，决定了数字资本关键性的“生命活动”，从而规约其“生命历程”。

The finance capital that controls digital capital, both naturally and inevitably, extracts a large portion of the “fruits of labor” from digital capital. Under the control of finance capital, a large part of the profits “painstakingly” created by digital capital is taken away “for nothing” by finance capital. Although digital capital is not “willing,” it must comply with the “laws of the market”; otherwise, it will lose the strong support of finance capital, or even suffer severe blows from finance capital, making it impossible to survive and operate. Here, the division of surplus value “produced” by industrial capital by interest-bearing capital, as depicted in Volume III of *Capital*, plays out in a contemporary drama—industrial capital is the capital that “creates” surplus value, while interest-bearing capital merely appropriates a portion of the surplus value from industrial capital; in the contemporary era, finance capital takes the majority of the income from functional capital (digital capital). In this sense, digital capital becomes an important channel or means for the valorization of finance capital.

掌控数字资本的金融资本，既理所当然又势所必然地抽取了数字资本大量的“劳动果实”。在金融资本的掌控下，数字资本“辛苦”创造的利润中的一大部分被金融资本“白白”拿走。尽管数字资本不“心甘情愿”，但它必须遵从“市场法则”，否则就会失去金融资本的强大支持，甚至遭受金融资本的剧烈打击，从而无法生存与运作。在这里，《资本论》第三卷所描绘的生息资本对产业资本“生产”出的剩余价值的分割上演了当代剧目——产业资本才是“创造”剩余价值的资本，生息资本不过是从产业资本那里分割走剩余价值而已；在当代，金融资本从职能资本（数字资本）手中拿走了大部分的收益。在这个意义上，数字资本成为金融资本增殖的重要渠道或手段。

Srnicek emphasizes: “Platforms are entirely dependent on a large amount of surplus capital. Today, investment in tech startups is no longer a substitute for the centrality of the financial industry, but rather a manifestation of it. Just like the initial tech boom, it was initiated and sustained by loose monetary policy and large amounts of capital seeking higher returns”; “When competition over data fails, money and destruction remain the options for lean platforms.” The rise of digital platforms does not signify the decline of finance capital; rather, it is a new expansion of finance capital. Clearly, just as with finance capital and industrial capital, there is an intrinsic and extensive linkage between digital capital and finance capital: the financialization of digital capital, meaning that digital capital bears the deep imprint of finance capital; of course, finance capital is also moving toward digitalization, showing a tendency toward digitalization. These two trends coexist and arise together. Therefore, there is ample reason to believe that finance capital and digital capital are undergoing deep integration.

斯尔尼塞克强调：“平台完全依赖于大量的过剩资本。如今，对科技初创企业的投资，不再是金融业中心地位的替代品，而是金融业的一种表现。就像最初的科技热潮一样，它是由宽松的货币政策和大量资本寻求更高的回报而启动和维持的”；“当数据的竞争不起作用时，金钱和破坏仍然是精益平台的选择”。数字平台的崛起并不意味着金融资本的衰落，反而是金融资本新的扩张。明显地，正如金融资本和产业资本那样，数字资本和金融资本之间具有内在而广泛的联动：数字资本金融化，即数字资本打上了金融资本的深刻烙印；当然，金融资本也走向数字化，呈现出数字化倾向。这两种趋势共在并生。因此，有充足理由认为，金融资本和数字资本进行着深度融合。

Scholars have also observed this: “Digital technology and finance capital have also achieved integration. Digital technology can not only provide direction for financial investment, but also the apps on smartphones make small-scale credit, which large banks cannot accomplish, possible in the digital age. The personal credit mechanism is more complete than in the era of financial capitalism, and finance capital, with the assistance of digital capital, has gained greater room for expansion.” [16]16 The author is quoting a Chinese scholar’s observation on the integration of digital technology and finance capital; the original source is not specified in the text. Its intention is to emphasize the significant role of digital capital, but from the opposite perspective, it is also an indisputable fact that finance capital has become increasingly powerful with the support of digital technology. Digital technology providing direction for financial investment is a requirement of finance capital; the apps on smartphones making small-scale credit possible strengthens the returns and power of finance capital. Digital technology has become a powerful means for the multiplication and domination of contemporary finance capital. It can be seen that digital capital and finance capital mutually reinforce each other. It is noteworthy that finance capital has not been completely controlled by digital capital. In this interaction, finance capital occupies the dominant position, transforms itself into digital capital, and causes digital capital to strengthen its own dominant position. In fact, this relationship between digital capital and finance capital is similar to the relationship between technology and capital in modern capitalism. Many believe that technology controls capital; but Marx believed that capital controls technology. As the ruler and true subject of the modern capitalist world, capital incorporates science and technology into its entire operational structure and logic of operation, making them its own internal links.

学者们也看到了这一点：“数字技术与金融资本也实现了融合。数字技术不仅可以为金融投资提供方向，同时智能手机上的APP让大银行无法完成的小额信贷在数字时代成为可能，个人信用机制比金融资本主义时代更完善，而金融资本在数字资本的助力下获得了更大的发挥空间。”其意在强调数字资本的重大作用，但从相反的角度看，金融资本在数字技术的支持下变得愈加强盛也是不争的事实。数字技术为金融投资提供方向，是金融资本的要求；智能手机上的APP使小额信贷成为可能，强化了金融资本的收益与力量。数字技术成为当代金融资本增殖和统治的强有力手段。可见，数字资本与金融资本相互强化。值得注意的是，金融资本并没有完全被数字资本掌控。在相互作用中，金融资本处于主体地位，变身为数字资本，并令数字资本强化自己的主体地位。其实，数字资本与金融资本的这种关系近似于科技与资本在现代资本主义中的关系。许多人认为，科技掌控资本；而马克思认为，资本掌控科技。作为现代资本主义世界的统治者与真正主体，资本将科学技术纳入自身的整个运作结构与运行逻辑中，使之成为自己的内在环节。

The influence of digital capital is growing increasingly strong, representing a direction of capital’s development. Srnicek’s assertion is pertinent: “Digital technologies are becoming increasingly important, just like the financial industry.” [17]17 Nick Srnicek, a Canadian political theorist known for his work on platform capitalism. Nevertheless, as of now, the control and influence of finance capital over capital as a whole and the capitalist world remain very powerful. Therefore, I believe it is not yet appropriate to conclude that digital capital has become the dominant form of capital, let alone its general form. It should be said that the strong rise of digital capital has not fundamentally exceeded the scope of finance capital. More critically, as mentioned above, digital capital has to a large extent “transformed” from finance capital, and thus shares an inherent homogeneity with it. In this sense, the operation of capital is still, on the whole, in the era of finance capital. Alternatively, it can be considered that finance capital (in the narrow sense) constitutes the deep core of contemporary capital, industrial capital constitutes its manifest form, while digital capital, information capital, technological capital, etc., constitute its changing forms. In the contemporary capitalist world, capital is like a “triune” [18]18 A reference to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, used here as a metaphor for capital’s multiple manifestations with a single essence. “deity,” presenting different faces and means from different perspectives, while the same soul moves within.

数字资本的影响日渐强烈，代表资本的一种发展方向。斯尔尼塞克的说法是中肯的：“数字技术越来越重要，就像金融业。”尽管如此，但到目前为止，金融资本对资本总体和资本主义世界的控制与影响依然十分强劲。因此，笔者认为，目前尚不宜下结论说数字资本已经成为资本的主导形态，更遑论一般形态。应该说，数字资本的强势崛起还没有根本性地越出金融资本的范围。更为关键的是，如前所述，数字资本在很大程度上由金融资本“变身”而来，因而与金融资本具有内在的同质性。在此意义上，资本的运行仍然在总体上处于金融资本时代。或可认为，金融资本（狭义）构成当代资本的深层内核，产业资本构成其表现形态，而数字资本、信息资本、技术资本等则构成其变化形态。在当代资本主义世界中，资本犹如“三位一体”的“神灵”一般，从不同的角度看，有不同的面孔与手段，而内里活动的是同一种灵魂。

IV. Finance Capital Constitutes the Core of Digital Capital

四、金融资本构成数字资本的内核

Although finance capital possesses powerful dominance and evident steering capacity, the reflective character of philosophy requires that we cannot directly and simply judge it as the dominant form of current capital; we must engage in deeper reflection. Accurately determining the status of various forms of capital and thereby judging the dominant form of capital naturally requires first reasonably grasping the classification of capital forms. However, currently, people seem to pay insufficient attention to this basic premise, and thus cannot reasonably identify the relationship between digital capital and finance capital. The rise in the power and status of digital capital is undeniable, but this rise in power and status, to be precise, is not relative to finance capital, but relative to non-digital capital, especially pre-digital capital. In the strict sense, digital capital and finance capital do not constitute a genuine opposition.

虽然金融资本拥有强大的统治力与显明的导控性，但哲学的反思品格要求我们不能直接而简单地将其判定为当前资本的主导形态，而必须进行更加深入的思索。准确勘定诸资本形态的地位进而判定资本的主导形态，当然需要先行合理地把握资本形态的划分。然而，目前人们似乎对这一基本前提不够重视，因而不能合理地指认数字资本与金融资本的关系。数字资本力量和地位的上升无可置疑，但这种力量和地位的上升，准确而言，并非相对于金融资本，而是相对于非数字资本，尤其前数字资本。在严格意义上，数字资本和金融资本并不构成真正的对立。

The perspectives and criteria for dividing digital capital and finance capital are different. Finance capital is more often divided from an industrial perspective; in early times it mainly corresponded to industrial capital, commercial capital, etc., and later mainly to functional capital or productive capital. Digital capital corresponds to non-digital capital, i.e., capital that is primarily presented in non-digital forms. Therefore, digital capital can be either functional capital, finance capital, or a combination of the two. From another perspective, certain capital can be both finance capital and digital capital.

数字资本和金融资本划分的角度与标准不同。金融资本更多地从产业角度划分，早期主要对应于工业资本、商业资本等，后来主要对应于职能资本或生产资本。数字资本则对应于非数字资本，即主要以非数字方式呈现的资本。因此，数字资本既可能是职能资本，也可能是金融资本，还可能是二者的结合体。从另一角度说，某些资本既可以是金融资本也可以是数字资本。

The more critical point is that finance capital and digital capital are not only mutually linked and integrated, but may themselves be one and the same. As mentioned above, the deep coupling of narrow-sense finance capital with digital technology has become a certainty. And the result of this coupling is precisely broad-sense finance capital with narrow-sense finance capital as its core. In other words, much digital capital is itself a “variant” of finance capital, i.e., another form of finance capital. With the increasing development of digital technology and its growing profitability, finance capital is increasingly and enthusiastically throwing itself into the digital domain, gradually transforming into digital capital. In the digital age, finance capital cannot but incorporate digital technology for its own use. Finance capital that does not connect with different digital capitals and does not transform into digital capital can easily be eliminated by fierce competition. Marx pointed out that only capitalist society incorporates science and technology into the entire process of production. [19]19 A reference to Marx’s argument in *Capital* and the *Grundrisse* that capitalism is the first mode of production to systematically harness science and technology for production. In the contemporary era, capital’s absorption and application of science and technology have reached a high degree of sophistication, to the point where it can even be regarded as capital’s “unique skill.” Therefore, astute finance capital will inevitably make every effort to “march into” digital technology, “arm” itself with digital technology, and “digitalize” itself.

更为关键之处在于，金融资本和数字资本不仅相互联动、相互融合，而且可能本身就是一体的。如前所述，狭义金融资本与数字技术的深度耦合已经成为确定性的事实。而此种耦合的结果正是以狭义金融资本为内核的广义金融资本。换言之，众多数字资本本身就是金融资本的“变体”，即另一种形态的金融资本。随着数字技术的日渐发展和愈发有利可图，金融资本日趋踊跃投身于数字领域，日益转化为数字资本。在数字化时代，金融资本不能不将数字技术纳为己用。不同数字资本发生关联，不化身为数字资本的金融资本极易被激烈的竞争淘汰出局。马克思曾指出，只有资本主义社会才将科学技术纳入整个生产之中。而在当代，资本对科学技术的吸纳与运用已经炉火纯青，甚至可以将其看作资本的“独门绝技”。因此，精明的金融资本必然倾力“进军”数字技术，以数字技术“武装”自己，将自己“数字化”。

Similarly, digital technology also requires the powerful force of finance capital to further operate and develop. Under the behind-the-scenes manipulation of finance capital, digital technology extends its tentacles throughout the entire capitalist society, turning it into a “transparent society” under capital’s domination. In this sense, digital capital and finance capital share many common or identical existences and essences. In other words, digital capital and finance capital are often the same capital, not two different kinds of capital. In this regard, Marx’s thought on interest-bearing capital transforming into industrial capital still provides us with inspiration today. [20]20 A reference to Marx’s analysis in *Capital* Volume 3, where he discusses how interest-bearing capital (e.g., loan capital) is transformed into industrial capital when it is used for productive investment. In the digital age, finance capital inevitably “transforms” into digital capital to expand itself; much finance capital appears and operates in the form of digital capital. In the digital finance capital formed by the fusion of finance capital and digital capital, the soul of finance capital is hidden beneath the increasingly powerful shell of digital capital. In other words, digital capital is often finance capital presented in digital form. Moreover, the more capital advances, the more this is the case.

同样，数字技术亦需金融资本的强大力量才能进一步运行与发展。在金融资本的幕后操控中，数字技术将触手伸向整个资本主义社会，使之成为资本宰制下的“透明社会”。在这个意义上，数字资本和金融资本有着诸多共同或一致的存在与本质。换言之，数字资本和金融资本往往就是同一种资本，而非两种不同的资本。就此而言，马克思关于生息资本转化为产业资本的思想至今仍然给予我们启迪。在数字时代，金融资本势所必然地“变身”为数字资本以扩张自己，诸多金融资本以数字资本的形态出现和运作。在金融资本与数字资本融合成的数字金融资本中，日渐壮大的数字资本的外壳下隐藏着金融资本的灵魂。换言之，数字资本往往是以数字方式呈现的金融资本。而且，资本越是向前推进，就越是如此。

“Viewed horizontally, it becomes a range; viewed from the side, a peak. Far, near, high, low — each gives a different view.” [21]21 A famous line from the poem “Written on the Wall of Xilin Temple” by the Song Dynasty poet Su Shi (苏轼), used here to illustrate how different perspectives yield different views of the same object. From the perspective of the relationship with pre-digital capital and non-digital capital, digital capital is indeed increasingly becoming the dominant form of capital in the capitalist world. Therefore, to examine the current dominant form of capital, one cannot but incorporate the dimension of digital capital. However, from the perspective of industrial capital, commercial capital, and other functional capitals, finance capital remains the dominant form of capital. It is not difficult to see that capital forms can be demarcated from different perspectives and criteria, and thus the conclusions drawn regarding the dominant form of capital also differ. These conclusions are not necessarily opposed to each other; they can all be valid and all have value. In this sense, saying that digital capital has replaced finance capital as the new dominant form of capital, and furthermore, the approach of choosing one or the other between digital capital and finance capital as the dominant form of capital, may itself be problematic. Adorno once criticized the “either/or” problem of defining existing society as either capitalist society or industrial society. [22]22 Theodor Adorno, a critical theorist of the Frankfurt School, criticized the binary choice between defining society as “capitalist” or “industrial” in his later works, arguing that such categories obscure the specific dynamics of late capitalism. On the issue of the dominant form of capital, finance capital and digital capital are also not an “either/or” “single-choice question.” Even if one must identify digital capital as the dominant form of capital, it should not be understood as a form of capital parallel to industrial capital, finance capital, etc., but rather as an upgraded version of finance capital, i.e., a form of capital that is both based on finance capital and possesses new modes of multiplication.

“横看成岭侧成峰，远近高低各不同。”从与前数字资本、非数字资本的关系角度看，数字资本的确日趋成为资本主义世界中资本的主导形态。因此，要考察当前资本的主导形态，就不能不将数字资本向度纳入其中。然而，从工业资本、商业资本等职能资本的角度看，金融资本仍旧是资本的主导形态。不难看出，可以从不同的视角和标准界划资本形态，因而得出的对于资本主导形态的结论也不相同。这些结论并不必然相互对立，而是均可成立且皆有价值。在此意义上，说数字资本已经取代金融资本成为新的资本主导形态，进而言之，在数字资本和金融资本中非此即彼地挑出一个作为资本主导形态的思路，本身就可能存在问题。阿多诺曾批评将现存社会界定为资本主义社会或工业社会的“二选一”问题。在资本的主导形态问题上，金融资本与数字资本亦非“二选一”的“单项选择题”。即使一定要把数字资本认定为资本的主导形态，也不应将其理解为同产业资本、金融资本等相并列的资本形态，而应将其理解为金融资本的升级版，即既建基于金融资本又具有新的增殖方式的资本形态。

A more reasonable path is to understand the transformation and interconnection among capital forms through dialectical thinking. Just as Hilferding and Lenin argued, finance capital inherently sublates industrial capital. Similarly, digital capital is not external to finance capital but develops on its foundation; it both retains the core of finance capital in the narrow sense and adds new appearances and means. More precisely, it is finance capital possessing “general data” as a new efficient mode of valorization, i.e., digitalized finance capital. In fact, as long as finance capital is understood in the broad sense of a “fusion,” it is impossible simply to separate and oppose finance capital and digital capital. On the contrary, finance capital and digital capital must be combined in a highly close manner.

更为合理的道路是，以辩证思维理解资本形态间的转换与关联。正如希法亭和列宁所认为的那样，金融资本内在地扬弃了产业资本。同样，数字资本亦不外在于金融资本，而是在金融资本的基础上发展起来的，既保留了狭义金融资本的内核，又增添了新的外观与手段。更准确地说，它是拥有“一般数据”这一新的高效增殖方式的金融资本，即数字化金融资本。事实上，只要在广义“融合体”的意义上理解金融资本，就无法简单地将金融资本与数字资本剥离开来、对立起来。相反，必须将金融资本与数字资本高度紧密地结合起来。

It is also possible (and necessary) to understand the contemporary forms of capital from the perspective of monopoly versus non-monopoly, thereby enriching and concretizing the understanding of the dominant form of capital. Compared with non-monopoly capital, monopoly capital, especially super-monopoly capital, indisputably occupies the throne of the dominant form of capital. As capitalism “advances,” monopoly capital transforms into super-monopoly capital or monopoly oligarchs, whose advantages over non-monopoly capital become more pronounced and whose dominance swells further. Monopoly capital, especially monopoly oligarchs and monopoly capital alliances, powerfully dominates non-monopoly capital, operating with increasing force while causing non-monopoly capital to decline more sharply. In the era of monopoly capitalism, not only is labor in a difficult situation, but the circumstances of small and medium capital (including some capital of considerable scale) are also far from easy; they can hardly escape the grasp of monopoly oligarchs. Everywhere there are “chain stores” of big capital, small capital increasingly disappears, and monopoly becomes the basic state and even the law of capital’s “survival.” Only monopoly capital is the “ruler” of monopoly capitalism; small and medium capital in the capitalist world is like “a drop in the ocean,” [23]23 “A drop in the ocean” (沧海一粟) is a Chinese idiom meaning an extremely tiny or insignificant part of a vast whole. hardly able to avoid sinking in the vast sea of monopoly capital, or rather, becoming the food of the “big fish” of monopoly capital.

还可以（且应当）从垄断与非垄断的角度理解资本的当代形态，使对资本主导形态问题的理解更为丰富和具体。较之非垄断资本，垄断资本特别是超级垄断资本，无可置疑地占据资本主导形态的宝座。随着资本主义的“前行”，垄断资本转变为超级垄断资本或垄断寡头，相对于非垄断资本的优势更为明显，统治力更加膨胀。垄断资本尤其垄断寡头和垄断资本联盟，强有力地支配着非垄断资本，在愈加强劲地运作的同时，使得非垄断资本加剧式微。在垄断资本主义时代，不仅劳动处境艰难，中小资本（包括一些相当体量的资本）的境遇也谈不上轻松，几乎都无法逃出垄断寡头的掌心。到处都是大资本的“连锁店”，小资本愈益消失，垄断成为资本“生存”的基本状态乃至法则。唯有垄断资本才是垄断资本主义的“统治者”，中小资本在资本主义世界犹如“沧海一粟”，很难不在垄断资本的汪洋大海中沉没，或者说，成为垄断资本这条“大鱼”的食物。

In the stage of finance capitalism, monopoly remains the most fundamental characteristic of capitalism. The powerful dominance of finance capital in the contemporary capitalist world is inseparable from its monopoly capacity. According to Lenin’s view, the birth of finance capital itself is based on monopoly. In an abstract sense, finance capital is in a superior position relative to industrial capital. But in reality, capital appears in the form of specific capital or individual capital. Different individual capitals compete or even conflict due to “identical” goals. Within the same capital, especially monopoly capital, finance capital and industrial capital are clearly “comrades fighting side by side”; they sometimes transform into each other, sometimes cooperate with each other, although finance capital may be more powerful and dominant than its industrial capital brother. Conversely, the finance capital of “other families” becomes a formidable opponent. Each finance capital “serves its own master,” engaging in fierce厮杀. [24]24 “Serves its own master” (各为其主) is a Chinese idiom meaning each party acts in the interest of its own master or principal. This is the internal law of monopoly capital.

在金融资本主义阶段，垄断依然是资本主义最基本的特征。金融资本在当代资本主义世界仍然具有强大的支配性，离不开其垄断能力。按照列宁的看法，金融资本的诞生本身就建基于垄断。在抽象的意义上，相对于产业资本，金融资本处于优势。但在现实中，资本以具体资本或资本个体的形式出现。不同资本个体由于“相同”的目标发生竞争乃至冲突。在同一个资本尤其垄断资本内部，金融资本和产业资本显然是“并肩战斗”的好兄弟，它们时而相互转换，时而相互协作，尽管金融资本可能较它的产业资本兄弟更有力量和支配性。相反，“别人家”的金融资本则成为强劲的对手。每个金融资本“各为其主”，展开激烈厮杀。这是垄断资本的内部法则。

There is reason to believe that the logic of monopoly is the foundational logic of contemporary capitalism; the operation and transformation of various forms of capital are all based on it. No matter how contemporary capitalism changes, monopoly must be its “essential dimension,” a dimension that originates from the inherent nature of capital. To better facilitate its own valorization and domination, every capital inevitably instinctively desires to become the “king” of the market. Therefore, although it is no longer “fashionable,” monopoly remains something capital cannot ignore or forget. It can even be said that, under the current circumstances where many capital forms stand out and attract attention, while the monopoly capital as the ruling totality and its monopolistic nature have been somewhat diluted, it is necessary to re-emphasize the dominance of monopoly capital and its logic.

有理由认为，垄断逻辑是当代资本主义的基础性逻辑，各种形态资本的运作与变迁均建基于它。不管当代资本主义如何变幻，垄断都一定是其“本质性的维度”，这一维度源于资本的内在本性。为了更有利于自己的增殖与统治，每个资本都必然本能地渴望成为市场的“王者”。因此，尽管不再“时髦”，但垄断始终是资本不可忽视和淡忘的。甚至可以说，在当前众多资本形态脱颖而出、引人瞩目，而作为统治总体的垄断资本及其垄断性被一定程度冲淡的情势下，有必要再度强调垄断资本及其逻辑的支配性。

Overall and in the long run, under the control of monopoly capital, non-digital small and medium capital and small and medium digital capital can hardly survive, let alone develop. Being acquired by large monopoly capital and becoming its component part may be their best归宿. [25]25 “归宿” (guīsù) means a final destination or resting place, often used metaphorically. Competitive digital capital can hardly become the dominant form of capital; only monopolistic digital capital can possibly do so. Digital platforms are either controlled by large monopoly capital (often monopoly finance capital) or are themselves large monopoly capital, especially monopoly finance capital, inherently generating the nature and power of monopoly finance capital (for example, they also frequently invest abroad and acquire large amounts of equity). Srnicek is quite right: “Platforms have a natural tendency toward monopoly.” [26]26 Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), p. 96. Capital that does not enter advantageous platforms finds it difficult to compete with capital that does, and moreover, “capital investment is insufficient to overturn monopoly; acquiring data, network effects, and path dependence pose greater obstacles on the road to suppressing monopolies like Google.” [27]27 Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism*, p. 97. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to and consider the monopolistic tendency of digital platforms. The inherent monopolistic nature of digital capital enables it to form strong monopoly capacity both in guiding data and in possessing data.

就总体和长远来看，在垄断资本的掌控下，非数字的中小资本和中小数字资本皆难以生存，更遑论发展。被大型垄断资本收购，成为其组成部分，或许是它们最好的归宿。竞争性数字资本难以成为资本的主导形态，只有垄断性数字资本才有可能。数字平台要么受到大型垄断资本（往往是垄断金融资本）的掌控，要么本身就是大型垄断资本尤其垄断金融资本，内在地生成了垄断金融资本的性质与力量（譬如，它们也经常对外投资，购取大量股权）。斯尔尼塞克说得很对，“平台具有垄断的自然倾向”。不进入优势平台的资本难以同进入的资本竞争，而且，“资本投资不足以推翻垄断；获取数据、网络效应和路径依赖，在压制像谷歌这样的垄断企业的道路上，面临着更大的障碍”。因此，有必要对数字平台的垄断倾向给予重视和考虑。数字资本的内在垄断性，使得其既能在数据的引导上又能在数据的占有上形成强大的垄断能力。

Thus, the key issue is not only whether capital is digital capital or other capital, but also (more precisely, even more so) whether capital is monopoly capital. Currently, the subject that interacts with and imposes domination on other capital and even the entire capitalist world is neither only industrial capital, nor only finance capital or digital capital, but monopoly capital that integrates several of these: monopolistic industrial capital, finance capital, or digital capital. Whether people regard finance capital as the dominant form of capital or digital capital as the dominant form of capital, they cannot ignore its monopolistic nature, i.e., they are all monopolistic capital—monopoly finance capital or monopoly digital capital. This is not simply reducing finance capital and digital capital to monopoly capital, but merely emphasizing that under monopoly capitalism, the dominant form of capital cannot be non-monopolistic; it must possess a monopolistic nature. Otherwise, it could not have such powerful dominating force. Current monopoly capital may not only appear in the forms of finance capital and digital capital, but often simultaneously in both forms. Monopoly capital is very clear that finance capital and digital capital are the capital forms most capable of valorization, domination, and expansion at present. From another perspective, most monopoly capital often takes the form of finance capital and uses finance capital as its core. Of course, monopoly capital containing finance capital also clearly sees the digitalization trend of contemporary capitalism, operating and strengthening itself in the form of digital capital. In other words, monopoly finance capital “digitalizes” itself.

可见，问题的关键不仅在于资本是数字资本还是其他资本，而且在于（准确地说更在于）资本是否是垄断资本。当前，同其他资本以至整个资本主义世界打交道并施加统治的主体，既不只是产业资本，也不只是金融资本或数字资本，而是集数者于一身的垄断资本：垄断性的产业资本、金融资本或数字资本。无论人们是将金融资本当作资本的主导形态还是将数字资本当作资本的主导形态，都不能忽视其垄断性，即它们都是垄断性的资本——垄断金融资本或垄断数字资本。这并非简单地将金融资本和数字资本还原为垄断资本，而只是强调：垄断资本主义条件下资本的主导形态不可能是非垄断的，一定具有垄断的性质。否则，它就不可能具有强大的支配力量。当前的垄断资本不但可能以金融资本和数字资本的形态出现，而且往往同时以这两种形态出现。垄断资本非常清楚，金融资本和数字资本是当前最能增殖、统治和扩张的资本形态。从另一向度看，大多数垄断资本往往具有金融资本的形态，且以金融资本作为内核。当然，内含金融资本的垄断资本也明晰地看到当代资本主义的数字化趋势，以数字资本的方式运行和强化自身。易言之，垄断金融资本“数字化”自身。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

The investigation of the dominant form of capital in the contemporary capitalist world must transcend what Edgar Morin calls the “simplifying paradigm”: [28]28 Edgar Morin, *On Complexity* (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2008). not judging a particular capital form as the dominant form of capital from a specific perspective, but exploring the dominant form of capital with more complex thinking, reflecting on it from multiple perspectives and dimensions, thereby clarifying it more three-dimensionally and accurately. Otherwise, information capital, cognitive capital, technological capital, social capital, cultural capital, etc., could also be directly identified as contemporary forms of capital, but this would merely be adding labels to capital and making one’s own label louder. Within the complexity paradigm, the three key determinations of current capital—monopolistic nature, financial nature, and digitalization—can be concentrated and integrated. Just as monopoly finance capital internally fused industrial capital over a hundred years ago, today’s monopoly finance capital also inherently possesses and vigorously unfolds its digital dimension. As mentioned earlier, finance capital still has powerful dominating force in the contemporary era, and this capital necessarily possesses a monopolistic nature (only monopoly finance capital has sufficiently powerful dominating force). This monopoly finance capital currently “transforms” into digital capital, manifests itself in digital ways, and profits through “general data.” The digital capital often discussed by researchers all possesses, to varying degrees, a monopolistic and financial nature, exhibiting the character of monopoly finance capital, and is a digitalized monopoly finance capital.

对当代资本主义世界资本主导形态的勘察，有必要超越埃德加·莫兰所言的“简化范式”：不是从特定的视角将某种特定的资本形态判定为资本的主导形态，而是以更具复杂性的思维展开探讨，多视角、多向度地思索资本的主导形态，从而更为立体和准确地澄明之。否则，信息资本、认知资本、技术资本、社会资本、文化资本等，也都有理由被直接认定为资本的当代形态，但其实不过是各自给资本加上名号，并让自己所加的名号更为响亮。在复杂性范式中，可以将当前资本的三种关键规定，即垄断性、金融性与数字化，集中和综合起来。正如一百多年前垄断金融资本内在融合了产业资本一般，如今的垄断金融资本亦内在地具有并有力地展开自己的数字向度。如前所述，金融资本在当代仍然具有强大的支配力量，而这种资本又必然性地具有垄断性（唯有垄断金融资本才具有足够强大的支配力量）。此垄断金融资本在当前“变身”为数字资本，以数字方式展现，通过“一般数据”获利。研究者们常说的数字资本，均不同程度地具有垄断性与金融性，呈现出垄断金融资本的性质，是一种数字化的垄断金融资本。

Drawing on Foster’s approach of using “monopoly-finance capital” to denote the dominant form of capital at present, we may likewise denote it with digitalized “monopoly-finance capital” or “digital-finance capital.” Specifically, monopoly is the foundational nature, finance is the principal characteristic, and digitalization constitutes the epochal or new trait; together, these three constitute the “qualitative determination” of the dominant form of contemporary capital. Thus, digitalized monopoly finance capital may be a more appropriate understanding and expression of the current dominant form of capital. Of course, from different perspectives, the dominant form of capital may appear in different guises on the surface, but in essence it is internally “the same capital.” Finance capital, which inherently possesses a monopoly nature, uses rapidly developing digital technology to valorize itself, “transforming” into digital capital. This is the dominant form of capital in the current capitalist world — digitalized monopoly finance capital. (Author’s affiliation: Renmin University of China)

借鉴福斯特以“垄断-金融资本”标示当下资本主导形态的思路，我们亦可以数字化“垄断-金融资本”或“数字-金融资本”进行标示。具体而言，垄断性为基础性质，金融性是主体特征，数字化则构成时代特质或新特质，三者共同构成当代资本主导形态“质的规定性”。由此，数字化垄断金融资本，或许是对当前资本主导形态更恰切的理解与表述。当然，从不同视角看，资本的主导形态会在表面上呈现出不同的景象，但内里实质上是“同一个资本”。内在地具有垄断性质的金融资本，利用迅捷发展的数字技术增殖，“变身”为数字资本。这就是当前资本主义世界的资本主导形态——数字化垄断金融资本。（作者单位：中国人民大学）

Online editor: Paul

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