Time and Systemic Surplus: Schelling’s “World Ages” Philosophy

After Kant, following the “pantheism” controversy provoked by Jacobi, the core question of philosophy had shifted, in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, to how to construct a system of the “all-in-one” (hen kai pan). But as the Greek word “all-in-one” indicates, there is a “and” (kai) between the “all” (pan) and the “one” (hen) to express their connection; that is, the “all” and the “one” are not in a direct relation of being one, but rather possess a tension in their linkage. On the one hand, this tension is embodied in the question of how a single principle can construct a “whole” with internal multiplicity, i.e., the problem of the intrinsic unity of the “one” and the “many” that has existed since ancient Greece. In a certain sense, it can be said that this question constituted an important driving force for the development of a system in the early post-Kantian classical German philosophy, i.e., in the course from Fichte’s “Doctrine of Science,” through Schelling’s “Philosophy of Identity,” to Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit.” In this phase, no matter how the philosophers debated, they shared a basic consensus: that the principle of the system as the “one” and the “all” must be intrinsic to each other; otherwise, they would fall either into the mysticism preached by Jacobi, which they all criticized, or into Romanticism. As Hegel said, this unity of principle and whole is “science,” and science “is actual only as a system… a so-called principle or ground of philosophy… as long as it remains merely a principle or ground, it is already an error”; the “concrete development of the system must be regarded as an indication that the ground or principle of the system is in fact only its beginning.” [1]1 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Preface. That is, if the “one” does not unfold into the “all,” and the “all” is not a process of unfolding that takes the “one” as its beginning, if the two are not intrinsic to each other, then the system cannot become science. But on the other hand, why must the “one” necessarily be the beginning of the “all”? Why must the “all” necessarily be the unfolding of the “one”? Why does the “one” possess an inner necessity to unfold into the “all”? These are also not self-evident. It is precisely these demands to necessarily unify the “one” and the “all” and to construct a system as “science” that constitute a basic problematic of Schelling’s late philosophy. The pursuit of this question is concentrated in Schelling’s “World Ages” philosophy, which he developed in response to Hegel’s critique of him, and it ultimately received a clear articulation in Schelling’s 1827 Munich lectures, “The System of the World Ages.”

在康德之后，经过由雅各比挑起的“泛神论”之争，在费希特、谢林和黑格尔那里，哲学的核心问题已经转为了如何建构一个“大全一体”（hen kai pan）的体系。但正如“大全一体”这个词的希腊语所表明的，“大全”（pan）与“一”（hen）之间有一个“与”（kai）来表明其联系，也就是说，“大全”与“一”并不是一种直接为一的关系，而是具有一种联结上的张力。一方面，这个张力体现在某个“单一”的本原如何构造出具有内在复多性的“整体”的问题上，也就是自古希腊以来就一直存在的“一”与“多”的内在统一性问题。在某种意义上可以说，这个问题构成了早期后康德德国古典哲学中，也就是从费希特的“知识学”，经过谢林的“同一哲学”，再到黑格尔的“精神现象学”的历程中，一个体系发展的重要推动力。在这一阶段，不论哲学家怎样争论，他们都有一个基本的共识：即作为“一”的体系本原和“大全”必须彼此内在，否则要么陷入他们共同批判的雅各比所宣扬的那种神秘主义，要么陷入浪漫主义。正如黑格尔所说，这种本原和大全的统一体就是“科学”，而科学“作为体系才是现实的……哲学的某个所谓的原理或本原……只要仅仅保持为一个原理或本原，就已经是错误了”，一定要把“体系的具体展开过程看作一个标示，它表明，体系的基础或本原实际上仅仅是体系的开端”。也就是说，倘若“一”不展开为“全”，“全”也不是以“一”为开端的展开过程，倘若两者不彼此内在，那就无法让体系成为科学。但另一方面，“一”何以就一定是“全”的开端？“全”为何就一定是“一”的展开？“一”为什么具有一种一定要展开为“全”的内在必然性？这些也都是非自明的，正是这些一定要让“一”与“全”必然统一、构造作为“科学”的体系的要求，构成了谢林晚期哲学的一个基本问题意识。对这一问题的追问，集中表现在谢林为了回应黑格尔对他的批判而着力思考的“世界时代”哲学中，并最终在谢林1827年的慕尼黑讲座“世界时代体系”中得到了清晰的阐述。

I. The System and the Question of the Immediacy of Its Beginning

一、体系与其开端的直接性问题

From Hegel’s requirement, if the system as “science” demands that the “one” as its beginning must unfold into the “all,” and that the two possess internality, then three conditions must be simultaneously satisfied: (1) The “one” must be something immediate, otherwise it would fall into an infinite regress; (2) The completion of the “all” is precisely the completion of the “one,” and the “one” also possesses an inner necessity to unfold into the “all”; (3) The unity of the systematic whole that the “all” ultimately constitutes, containing a multiplicity of structures within itself, is structurally the same unity as that possessed by the “one” as its beginning; that is, the system must be like an “ouroboros,” with its head (the beginning) biting its own tail (the result).

从黑格尔的要求来看，如果说体系作为“科学”，要求作为其开端的“一”必定要展开为“全”，并且两者具有内在性，那就需要同时满足三个要求：（1）“一”必须是一个直接的东西，否则就会陷入无穷后退；（2）“全”本身的完成即为“一”的完成，“一”也具有一定要展开为“全”的内在必然性；（3）“全”最后所构成的那个自身包含复多结构的体系整体的统一性，与作为其开端的“一”具有的那种统一性，在结构上是同一种统一性，也就是说，体系必须像一条“衔尾蛇”一样，让自己的头（开端）咬住自己的尾巴（结果）。

Considered separately, if the “one” is something immediate, then it must first be something self-evident, i.e., it possesses, in and of itself, a being that can be understood by itself, and in this self-understandability, it grounds its own being. From the perspective of the course of post-Kantian systematic philosophy, the first link in establishing this “self-grounding self-evident being” is the “deed-act” (Tathandlung) established by Fichte in the “Doctrine of Science,” i.e., “the I posits itself,” meaning that the self-evidence of self-consciousness simultaneously grounds its own being. From the tradition of transcendental philosophy since Descartes, when one can say “I am I,” it signifies the establishment of self-consciousness; self-consciousness also means that the self’s consciousness of itself is simultaneously its own being. Therefore, in this sense, the fact of the self’s existence and the activity of the self’s existence, i.e., the self’s grasp of itself (which is self-consciousness), are the same thing, or the same “act.” It is in this sense that Fichte established the self as the principle of the “Doctrine of Science,” i.e., the “one” that serves as the “beginning” of the “Doctrine of Science.”

分别来看，如果“一”是一个直接的东西，那么它首先就需要是一个自明的东西，即就其自身而言拥有一种自身可被理解的存在，并且在这种自身的可被理解性中奠定自己的存在。从后康德体系哲学的历程来看，对于这种“自身—奠基—的自明存在”的确立的第一个环节，是费希特在“知识学”中确立的“本原行动”（Tathandlung），即“自我设定自我”，也就是自我意识的自明性同时为自身的存在进行了奠基。从笛卡尔以来的先验哲学传统来看，当能够说出“我是我”的时候就意味着自我意识的确立，自我意识也同样意味着自我对自身的意识同时就是自身的存在。因此在这个意义上，自我存在的事实和自我存在的活动，即自我对自身的把握（也就是自我意识）是同一回事，或者说同一个“行动”。费希特也是在这个意义上把自我确立为了“知识学”的本原，即作为“知识学”之“开端”的那个“一”。

But Schelling raised a counterargument to this scheme: “I absolutely isolate myself from everything else; I am I, and precisely in this case I distinguish myself from everything else,” so “selfhood… means separation from the all, isolation.” [2]2 F.W.J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), Introduction. That is, while the self-evidence of self-consciousness can indeed “ground itself” within self-consciousness, the ontological presupposition of self-consciousness itself is not given by its self-evidence. Or, to put it differently, the being that self-consciousness produces when it becomes conscious of itself and thereby gives itself self-evidently is merely the being of self-consciousness within itself, not the being of the fact “that there is self-consciousness” itself. This is analogous to assuming that human thinking activity originates from the nervous system; as long as a person is thinking, one can consider their nervous system as “existing,” but the fact of the nervous system’s own existence is not given by the thinking function it produces. Therefore, the being posited by the “deed-act” of self-consciousness is not its being in the full sense of itself.

但谢林对这种方案提出了一个反驳，即“我把我自己从所有别的东西那里绝对地孤立出来；我是我，而恰恰在这种情况下，我把我自己与所有别的东西区分开”，所以“自我性……意味着脱离大全，孤立化”。也就是说，自我意识的自明性固然在自我意识之内能够“自行奠基”，但自我意识自身的存在论前提并不由其自明性给出。或者说，自我意识到自身，随即通过这种自明的自身给予而产生的那个存在，仅仅是自我意识在其自身之中的存在，而非“有自我意识”这件事情本身的存在。这就好比假设人的思维活动来自神经系统，只要人在思维，那就可以认为其神经系统正“存在着”，但神经系统自身存在的事实，并不由其产生的思维功能给出。因此，自我意识的“本原行动”所设定那个存在并非它自身整全意义上的存在。

According to Schelling’s counterargument, only if there are many “other things” can self-consciousness “distinguish” itself from everything else that is not itself. That is, the presupposition of the existence of self-evident self-consciousness lies precisely outside its self-evidence; it is merely that the self-evidence of self-consciousness cannot grasp these presuppositions. Therefore, “the I posits itself” is not only not the “one,” but also not truly self-evident. Even if it is self-evident within itself, the “all” contained in this self-evidence is not the “all” in the true sense, because those other things that are presuppositions of the “self” will not be included in the “all” that unfolds with the “self” as its beginning. And this also means that the “self” as the “one” is not a truly immediate thing, but rather presupposes conditions that are not touched by its self-evidence.

按照谢林的反驳，唯有还存在许多“其他东西”，自我意识才能把自己与其他一切不是它自身的东西“区分开”。也就是说，自明的自我意识的存在前提恰恰在它的自明性之外，只不过自我意识的自明性无法把握这些前提罢了。所以“自我设定自我”不仅不是“一”，而且也不是真正自明的。就算它在自身中是自明的，这种自明性所包含的那种“全”也不是真正意义上的“全”，因为作为“自我”之前提的那些其他东西并不会包含在以“自我”为开端所展开的那种“全”中。而这也意味着，作为“一”的“自我”也不是一个真正的直接的东西，而是要以未被其自明性所触及的条件为前提。

Therefore, in the later Schelling and Hegel, in order to avoid the problem that arises here in Fichte, they adopt a new plan that takes a basic structure of being as the “One” that is the beginning of the system. Broadly speaking, in Schelling this plan is the so-called “absolute identity,” and in Hegel it is “substance is subject.” Especially in Hegel’s plan, the aforementioned requirements (2) and (3) can be fully satisfied. To put it simply, Hegel completely correlates the beginning of the system with the “subject” in predication: “The beginning, the principle … when first uttered, is merely a universal … Anything richer than these words, even if only a transition into a sentence, contains a self-transformation that must be taken back again.” [3]3 G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 21 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985), p. 56. [Translator’s note: This is a paraphrase of Hegel’s text; the English rendering follows the sense of the Chinese citation.] Therefore, the “whole” is precisely the result of the beginning “releasing” the inner richness it contains, thereby constructing a necessity that the system must develop out of the beginning. That is to say, the subject (subject) must unfold its own richness and be able, as subject, to dominate the predicates unfolded by itself. Such a structure is consistent with “substance is subject”: “Substance itself is a subject, and the entire content is the subject’s own inherent self-reflection.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 17. And the subject’s self-reflection requires the subject to unfold itself, to “mediate” itself through “predicating” itself. Although Schelling did not express the relationship between the “One” and the “whole” as clearly as Hegel did during this period, judging from his later retrospective on his thought of this period, the core dynamic structure of his system—whether it be the philosophy of nature or transcendental philosophy, as well as the philosophy of identity that contains both within itself—lies in: “The subject has a necessary tendency toward the object, and this tendency must exhaust itself.” [5]5 F. W. J. Schelling, *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, in *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1858), p. 394. From this perspective, Schelling’s plan is not essentially different from Hegel’s plan.

所以在之后的谢林和黑格尔那里，为了避免费希特这里出现的问题，他们会采取把一种基本的存在结构视为体系开端之“一”的新方案。笼统来看，这种方案在谢林那里，就是所谓的“绝对同一性”，在黑格尔那里则是“实体即主体”。尤其在黑格尔的方案中，前述的要求（2）和（3）能得到完全的满足。简单来说，黑格尔把体系的开端完全与谓述中的“主词”对应起来：“开端、本原……最初说出来的时候，仅仅是一个普遍者……比这些词语更丰富的东西，即便只是过渡为一句话，也包含着一种必须被重新收回的自身转变。”因此，“全”也就是开端把自身包含的内在丰富性“释放”出来的结果，如此也就构造出了一种体系必须从开端中发展出来的必然性。也就是说，主词（主体）必须展开自己的丰富性，并能作为主体支配由自己所展开的谓词。这样的结构与“主体就是实体”是一致的，“实体本身就是一个主体，全部内容都是主体的一个固有的自身反映”。而主体的自身反映，则需要主体把自身展开，需要主体通过“谓述”自己进而对自身进行“中介”。尽管谢林在这一时期对于“一”和“全”的关系没有黑格尔表述得这么清楚，但从他后来对自己这一时期思想的回顾来看，他的体系——不管是自然哲学还是先验哲学，以及同时把两者包含在自身中的同一哲学——的核心动力学结构在于：“主体有一个走向客体的必然趋势，而这个趋势必须穷尽自身。”从这一点上看，谢林的方案与黑格尔的方案并没有本质性的不同。

In summary, after Fichte, the construction of the unity of the “One” and the “whole” exhibits three basic principles: (1) The beginning of the system, that is, the “One,” must be a single law that runs through every link of the system; (2) The beginning is always “lacking”—for example, the subject has not yet been predicated, the subject has not yet obtained its object, thereby generating the inner necessity for the “One” to unfold into the “whole”; (3) The unfolding of the “whole” is essentially the continuous “recurrence” of the “One” as law at each level of its unfolding—the specific laws at each level are all presentations of the general law of the same system at different levels—hence the beginning of the system and the result of the system, i.e., the final product of the system’s law, will possess the same unity. In this way, the entire “ouroboros” structure is completed. Within such a framework, the immediacy of the system’s own beginning transforms from a self-evident and self-given immediate being in Fichte into an immediate “law,” and thereby the difficulty brought by the self-evident “something” as beginning is dissolved. In the system, there no longer exists any “immediate thing” like a bare entity; everything immediate is essentially derivative. In the system, there is only the “semblance” (Schein) of immediacy, no genuine immediacy. Everything that appears immediate at first glance can be demonstrated as the “imprint” of some link left in the process of the system’s construction. When these “imprints” are understood more deeply, their immediacy is immediately sublated. In this process of “sublation” or “ascent,” the form of the system’s “progress” is generated, and each link of progress is like the “time” or “stage” through which the system passes, thereby also generating the “time” and “history” of the system’s movement.

总而言之，“一”与“全”的统一性建构在费希特之后呈现出三个基本原则：（1）体系的开端，也就是那个“一”必须是一个唯一的，贯穿在体系任何一个环节中的法则；（2）开端总是有所“缺乏”——比如主体尚未得到谓述，主体尚未得到其客体，进而产生了“一”要展开为“全”的内在必然性；（3）“全”的展开本质上就是作为法则的“一”在其展开的各个层次上的不断“复现”——各个层次上的具体法则都是同一个体系的总体法则在不同层次上的呈现——因而体系的开端与体系的结果，即体系法则的最终产物，会具有一样的统一性。这样一来，整个“衔尾蛇”结构就完成了。在这样的构架中，体系自身的开端的直接性，从费希特那里某个自明且自己给予自身的直接性的存在物，转变为了某个直接性的“法则”，进而自明的作为开端的“某物”自身所带来的疑难也就被消解了。在体系中，不再存在任何一个仿佛赤裸实体一般的“直接性的东西”，一切直接性之物本质上都是衍生物，在体系中只有直接性的“假象”（Schein），没有真正意义上的直接性的东西，一切乍看起来直接性的东西都可以被论证为体系构造过程中所留下的某一环节的“印记”，当这些“印记”得到了更深入的理解时，它们的直接性就会即刻被扬弃。在这样的“扬弃”或者“上升”的过程中，也就产生了体系“进展”的形态，而进展的每一个环节，也仿佛体系经过的“时间”或者说“阶段”，从而也产生了体系运动的“时间”和“历史”。

But what is precisely problematic is the “One” as beginning that has already been elevated to law. Although it is no longer a “something,” such a law always possesses a certain opacity and also presupposes some ready-made “script.” For example, Hegel’s “substance is subject” already presupposes a certain “a priori perfect tense” of “the subject is already substance,” presupposing that the subject is always able to “sublate” substance. Schelling also reflected on this. In his late work *Presentation of the Empiricism of Philosophy*, he explicitly stated, “Philosophy must explain facts,” but the greatest fact among all facts is that all existing things are based on “a gradually obtained advantage of the subject relative to the object.” [6]6 F. W. J. Schelling, *Darstellung der empirischen Philosophie*, in *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 10 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1861), p. 236. Or we always believe that our thought (subject) can always penetrate and grasp the being (substance/object) directly before our eyes. This is a “fact” rather than a “law” precisely because it is precisely the premise for our understanding the world, understanding being, thereby explaining the world and being, and constructing a system about them. But the system constructed from this starting point, as its own result, cannot in turn explain this fact. Therefore, whether it is Hegel’s plan or Schelling’s plan, they only construct a system that starts from a certain fact and unfolds it as a law into a “whole,” without truly constructing a mechanism that can incorporate the beginning, which is both fact and law, into the system. In other words, the system is actually blind to the law that constitutes its own beginning. On the one hand, it is precisely the operation of this beginning that enables the system to unfold from the “One” into the “whole”; but on the other hand, this beginning, as a fact, cannot be reabsorbed into the system itself by the system’s mechanism. In other words, as long as this beginning as law is a “presupposition” or “fact,” it means that the system as the unity of the “One” and the “whole” can never be completed.

但成问题的恰恰是已经上升为法则的作为开端的“一”，尽管它现在已经不再是“某物”，但这样的法则始终都具有某种不透明性，而且也预设了某种现成的“剧本”。比如黑格尔的“主体即实体”，其实已经预设了“主体已经是实体”的某种“先天完成时”，预设了主体总是能够“扬弃”实体。谢林对此也有所反思，在晚期的《哲学经验论述要》中他就明确说过，“哲学必须解释事实”，但一切事实中最大的事实是，全部存在的事物都基于“主体相对于客体而逐步获得的一个优势地位”。或者说我们总是相信，我们的思想（主体）总是能够穿透并把握直接摆在我们眼前的存在（实体/客体）。这之所以是一个“事实”而非一个“法则”是因为，它恰恰是我们理解世界、理解存在，进而解释世界和存在，并构造关于其体系的前提。但由此出发所构造的体系自身作为其结果，并不能回过头来解释这个事实。因此不管是黑格尔的方案，还是谢林的方案，都只建构了一种从某一事实出发，并将之作为法则而展开为“全”的体系，并未真正构造能够把这一既是事实也是法则的开端纳入体系的机制。换句话说，体系对于构成自身开端的法则其实是盲目的。一方面，正是这一开端的运作使得体系从“一”展开为“全”；但另一方面，这一开端作为事实并不能被体系机制再次吸纳到其自身中，换句话说，只要这一作为法则的开端是一个“预设”或者说“事实”，那就意味着体系作为“一”和“全”的统一体永远无法完成。

If we use a famous distinction from the late Schelling, namely “that it is so” (Dass) and “what it is” (Was), to describe the situation here, then it can be said that the beginning of the system as the system’s law is for the system itself merely a “that it is so”; without it, the system cannot operate. The system constructs the “what it is” within itself through the law provided by this beginning, but the “what it is” it constructs cannot reincorporate the “that it is so” that serves as its beginning and law back into itself. Therefore, from this perspective, the beginning of the system and the “whole” of the system itself are broken, or it is impossible to achieve a “closed loop” from the logic of the system’s own unfolding. This leads to a very awkward situation: to avoid the difficulty Fichte fell into, the beginning of the system must be elevated to a “law,” but as long as this “law” as beginning is ultimate, it cannot re-enter the system itself in the process of the system’s unfolding triggered by it. This causes the “ouroboros” structure of the system to be uncompletable. It can also be said that, in order to complete the system, the beginning of the system becomes the “surplus” of the system itself, a “fact” that makes the “whole” possible but itself never enters the “whole.”

如果用谢林晚期的一个著名的区分，即“如此实情”（Dass）和“所是/是什么”（Was）来描述这里的情况，那么可以说，作为体系法则的体系开端自身对于体系来说只是一个“如此实情”，如果没有它，体系就无法运作。体系通过这一开端提供的法则构造出自身中的“所是”，但其构造出来的“所是”无法再把作为其开端和法则的“如此实情”重新纳入自身中。因此从这个角度来看，体系的开端和体系自身的“全”是断裂的，或者说无法从体系自身的展开逻辑出发得到“闭环”。这就导致了一个非常尴尬的局面：为了避免费希特所陷入的疑难，体系的开端要上升为“法则”，但只要这个“法则”作为开端是终极性的，它就不能重新在由它所引发的体系展开过程中再次进入体系自身。这就导致体系的“衔尾蛇”结构无法完成。也可以说，为了完成体系，体系的开端成了体系自身的“剩余”，成为了让“全”得以可能而自身永不进入“全”的“事实”。

II. Schelling’s Critique of Time and the Reconstruction of the System’s Beginning

二、谢林的时间批判与体系开端重构

In order to truly construct a system of the “great unity of the all,” to truly construct the unity of the “One” and the “whole,” it is necessary to re-examine the beginning itself as law. This constitutes the core problematic of Schelling’s late philosophy, beginning with the philosophy of the “World Ages.” Although this problematic has many entry points, centered on the philosophy of the “World Ages,” it is mainly manifested as a critique of the problem of time.

为了真正构造“大全一体”的体系，为了真正构造“一”与“全”的统一体，就必须对作为法则的开端自身重新进行考察。这一点构成了谢林在其晚期哲学中，从“世界时代”哲学开始的核心问题意识，尽管这一问题意识有诸多切入点，但围绕着“世界时代”哲学，其主要体现为对时间问题的批判。

As discussed above, whether in the early Schelling or Hegel, once the law is taken as the beginning, the unfolding of the system is its continuous “recurrence.” In this way, although different links appear within the system, and the successive appearance of these links presents “history” and “development” within the system, in reality such “history” is only a semblance—after all, the “recurrence” of the same law essentially makes everything a “now.” In the 1827 lecture manuscript on the “System of the World Ages,” Schelling explicitly indicates this “de-temporalizing” consequence of previous systems:

如前文所述，不管是早期谢林还是黑格尔，一旦以法则为开端，体系的展开就是其不断的“复现”。这样一来，尽管体系之内会出现不同的环节，这些环节之间的次第出现会在体系之内呈现出“历史”和“发展”。但实际上这样的“历史”也只是一种假象——毕竟相同法则的“复现”本质上让一切都成了“现在”，在1827年的“世界时代体系”讲稿中，谢林明确表明了以往体系的这种“去时间化”后果：

Here, the past, the present and the future are one and the same. The present thing is no different from the past, and what is about to happen is precisely what is happening now. If there is only one time and only one world, then what this world seeks is what it has already buried; in the same way that it struggles, it dies; such a world cannot go out of itself or beyond itself.

在这里，过去、当下和未来是同一个东西。当下的事物跟过去的并无区别，而将要发生的就是现在正发生的。倘若只有唯一的时间和唯一一个世界，那么这个世界所寻觅的，就是它已经埋葬的，它以怎样的方式在奋争，就以怎样的方式在死去，这样的世界不会走出自己、超出自己。

Therefore, essentially nothing new appears in such a world. Even if some unprecedented and entirely new things emerge, they will be regarded as a “reproduction” of the established mode of being, and thus in essence only produce an illusion of occurrence; there is absolutely no real process. In fact, from the perspective of the development of the history of philosophy, any system that has already been completed faces such a problem. The establishment of a system means that its law has been fixed, and thus the understanding and explanation of the whole are already internal to this law. In this sense, such a system will refuse to understand certain new things—for example, Pythagoras did not accept the existence of irrational numbers—or cannot understand certain new things, instead forcibly interpreting some new things as a repetition of the established law. Therefore, from Schelling’s diagnosis of previous systems, although elevating the principle of the system to a law is an urgent requirement, it not only triggers a split between the system and its beginning, but also causes the whole of existence to be “de-temporalized.” From this diagnosis, Schelling’s work at this point is no longer a “patch-up” proceeding from the line of thought before him and Hegel, but a thorough “re-creation” of the “all-in-one.” [7]7 “All-in-one” (大全一体) is a term Schelling uses for the absolute or the totality of being. Furthermore, it can also be seen that the split between the system and its own beginning and the problem of the system’s own “de-temporalization” are essentially the same problem: precisely because the law is accepted as an established “fact,” and this fact cannot be understood from the perspective of the process of the system’s construction, it naturally becomes an ever-persisting, unshakable “now”; this is the fundamental reason why there is no real time within the system. If this law constitutes the premise of the explanatory mechanism for the world as a whole, then in order to regain time, in order to re-establish the system, one cannot simply abandon that law which allows us to fundamentally understand and construct the world; rather, one must perform a “Möbius strip”-style “folding” of the law itself as the beginning. That is to say, one must conduct a temporal inquiry into the law itself, which always presents itself as “now” with respect to the unfolding of the system, asking how it came to be “now.” From this, the basic problematic and method of the entire *World Ages* philosophy can be clearly seen in the following passage:

因此，这样的世界在本质上并没有出现任何东西，即便有一些前所未有的全新之物出现，也会被视为既定存在模式的“再现”，进而在本质上只会产生一种发生的假象，绝不存在真实的历程。事实上，从哲学史的发展来看，任何一个已然完结的体系都会面对这样的问题。一个体系的确立就意味着其法则已经得到了固定，进而对整体的理解和说明也已经内在于这一法则。在这个意义上，这样的体系就会拒绝理解某些新的东西——比如，毕达哥拉斯不接受无理数的存在——或者不能理解某些新的东西，反而把某些新的东西强行解释为既定法则的再次重复。所以，从谢林对先前体系的诊断来看，把体系本原上升为法则尽管是一个迫切的要求，但它不仅引发了体系与其开端的分裂，而且也让存在整体被“去时间化”了。从这一诊断来看，此时谢林的工作不再是从他和黑格尔之前的思路出发进行的“修补”，而是一种彻底的对“大全一体”的“再造”。此外，还可以看到，体系与自身开端的分裂与体系自身的“去时间化”问题实质上是同一个问题：正因为法则作为既定的“事实”被接纳，并且对这一事实无法从体系构造过程出发去理解，所以它就自然而然地成了一个始终持存、不可动摇的“现在”，这也正是体系中并不存在真正时间的根本原因。如果说这一法则构成了对世界整体的解释机制的前提，那么为了重新获得时间，为了重新奠定体系，就不能简单放弃那个能让我们对世界进行基本理解和建构的法则，而是必须对作为开端的法则自身进行一种“莫比乌斯环”式的“折叠”。也就是说，要对那个就体系展开而言总是呈现为“现在”的法则自身，进行一种围绕其何以成为“现在”的时间性追问。由此，可以从下面这段话里清晰地看到整个“世界时代”哲学的基本问题意识和方法：

But if there is only one time, if it has nothing outside itself on which it could measure its own past, then it itself would not enter into time; that is, it would be equivalent to eternity, or even such time itself would be eternity. If the time of this present world is the only time, then the world can only be regarded as an eternal emanation of the highest idea, because there is nothing outside this world that could delimit it.

但倘若只有唯一的时间，倘若它没有任何在自己之外、能让它在其上衡量自己过去的时间，那么它自身也就不会踏入时间，也就是说，它会等同于永恒，甚至这样的时间自身就是永恒。倘若这个当下在场的世界的时间就是唯一的时间，那么世界也就只能被认为是最高理念的一种永恒流溢了，因为不存在任何在这个世界之外能为之划定界限的东西。

If the law whose temporality manifests as “now” is the “only time,” and “now” also means “always present,” then this means that such time is essentially “non-time,” i.e., “eternity.” Understanding the law as “now” as “eternity” entails two consequences: First, “eternity” means no “before” and “after,” and thus also means it is directly given without reason, which leads to the absurdity of the entire system. As Schelling famously criticized Hegel: “The whole world seems to be caught within the interwoven net of understanding or reason, but the question always remains: how did the world get into this net?” [8]8 This is a paraphrase of Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s system, often cited from Schelling’s *On the History of Modern Philosophy*. In other words, if the system is constructed precisely from what is here called understanding or reason, and these two are the “law” discussed earlier, then if this “law” is eternal, it means that reason itself is the most irrational. Because reason, as something directly given to itself, no longer has any reason itself; although its internal operation may proceed according to some rational principle, the fact of its existence itself cannot be further explained, and is thus absurd. Second, if the law is eternal, then it means the world is merely a product of its “emanation,” and from the context of Western philosophy, “emanation” means the world is not the result of an action, but exists “naturally” as such. If the world is obtained through “emanation,” it means the world has no meaning for its existence, no goal, no future; everything simply exists as such. In the basic concerns of Schelling’s late philosophy, restoring historical teleology is also a fundamental focus: “In all of humanity’s own actions, activities, and labors, there is nothing but vanity; everything is vain, because everything lacking a true purpose is vain.” [9]9 This is a paraphrase of a sentiment found in Schelling’s *The Ages of the World* (1811 draft). In other words, even if “emanation” means the fullness of existence, it must point to the nothingness of meaning.

如果说其时间性表现为“现在”的法则就是“唯一的时间”，而“现在”也意味着“始终在场”，那就意味着这样的时间在本质上是“非—时间”，也就是“永恒”。把作为“现在”的法则理解为“永恒”意味着两重后果：第一，“永恒”意味着没有“之前”和“之后”，因而也意味着它毫无理由地被直接给予，进而会导致整个体系存在荒谬。正如谢林对黑格尔的著名批判：“整个世界仿佛都是置身于知性或理性编织的重重网络之内，但问题始终在于，世界是如何进入到这些网络之内的。”换言之，如果体系就是以这里所说的知性或者理性构造而成，两者也就是之前讨论的“法则”，那么倘若这一“法则”是永恒的，就意味着理性自身恰恰是最非理性的。因为作为自身直接被给予者的理性，自身不再有任何理由，尽管其内部运作会依照某种理性原则展开，但其存在这件事本身却不能再行说明，因而也就是荒诞的。第二，如果法则是永恒的，那么意味着世界仅仅是其“流溢”的产物，而从西方哲学的语境来看，“流溢”意味着世界并非一桩行动的结果，而是“自然而然”就如此存在了。倘若世界是“流溢”而得的，那就意味着世界并没有其存在的意义，没有目标，也没有未来，一切都是这么存在而已。在谢林晚期哲学的基本问题关切中，重新恢复历史目的论也是一个基本着眼点：“在人类自己的一切行动、忙碌和劳作中除了虚妄，什么都没有；一切都是虚妄的，因为缺乏真正目的的一切都是虚妄的。”换言之，“流溢”即便意味着存在的充实，也一定会指向意义的虚无。

It can be seen that understanding and discussing the temporality of the beginning itself not only means tracing the meaning of the beginning itself, but also means tracing the meaning of the world itself, i.e., the “whole.” In this “Möbius strip”-style discussion, what is actually to be done is to open up the space for discussing meaning. Only by re-temporalizing the law itself, which presents itself as “now” with respect to the world, or with respect to the whole unfolded by the system—that is, discussing its “past” and “future”—does it have meaning as “now,” and thereby also give meaning to the system as a whole. From this point of view, the founding activity of the system cannot be completed by dissolving the concept of “ground” as Hegel did, but precisely by investigating the occurrence of a more primordial temporal structure. From this perspective, the earlier questions of how the system is constructed and how the “one” and the “whole” are unified shift their focus to the problem of time:

可以看到，理解并讨论开端自身的时间性，不仅意味着对开端自身进行意义追溯，同样也意味着对世界本身，也就是“全”进行意义追溯。在这一“莫比乌斯环”化的讨论中，实际上要做的就是打开对于意义进行讨论的空间。唯有对那个就世界而言，或者说就体系所展开的整体而言，表现为“现在”的法则自身再次进行时间化，也就是讨论其“过去”和“未来”，它作为“现在”才有意义，进而也让体系整体获得意义。从这一点来看，对于体系的奠基活动本身无法像黑格尔那样通过消解“根据”概念来完成，而恰恰是要通过对某种更加本源的时间性结构的发生进行探究来完成。在这个视角下，之前关于体系如何建构、“一”与“全”如何统一的问题，其重点也就转移到了时间问题上：

The problem of time is the starting point of all inquiry in philosophy, so without a clear explanation of time, philosophy can never be unfolded in an intelligible way. Without this clear explanation, the past cannot be grasped. Until the pulse of time begins to beat again with vitality, even science cannot find its own life. [10]10 This is a paraphrase of a passage from Schelling’s *The Ages of the World* (1815 draft).

时间问题是哲学中全部探索的起点，所以若无对时间的明确解释，哲学绝不可能以可理解的方式得到展开。若没有这种明确解释，过去就无法得到把握。在时间的脉搏再次充满生机地跳动起来以前，甚至科学也不可能找到自己的生命。

Comparing this with another passage from Schelling’s early period (1806), when he was “working in parallel” with Hegel, in the *Aphorisms for the Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, we can find a contrast that seems like self-irony, as well as a clear shift in problematic:

比照谢林在与黑格尔“平行工作”的早期（1806年），在《自然哲学导论箴言录》中的另一段话，我们可以发现一种仿佛自我反讽一般的对比，以及问题意识的明确转变：

Within the whole, the beginning is also the end; that is, within the whole there is no beginning and no end at all. From the perspective of the whole, endless duration and a single moment are no different; whether in a single moment or in endless duration, the whole is equally infinite; that is, the whole is not within time at all. [11]11 This is a paraphrase of a passage from Schelling’s *Aphorisms for the Introduction to Natural Philosophy* (1806).

在大全里面，开端同时也是终点，也就是说，大全里面根本没有开端和终点。从大全的角度看，无尽的绵延和一个瞬间没有区别，无论在一个瞬间还是在无尽的绵延里面，大全都是同样无限的，也就是说，大全根本不在时间之内。

From this we can see that, as long as one does not investigate the problem of time in the beginning itself, the beginning of the system, as the law from which the whole is generated, can completely achieve the “de-temporalization” of the system as a whole. Moreover, this “de-temporalization” can instead construct an eternal illusion in which the system is entirely free from time, a single moment and endless duration are identical, and the beginning and the end are no different. However, this passage from 1827 can be said to have completely transformed the problematic. The reason why time is the starting point of all activity in philosophy is precisely that time itself involves the question of the rationality of the system’s law; and as long as the law itself, as “now,” is unintelligible, then the entire system unfolded from it is also unintelligible. And grasping “now” actually means thinking about what is “above” the whole given and constructed by a certain law. After all, even if the whole thus constructed is rational, the premise of this rationality is still irrational. Therefore:

从这里我们可以看出，只要不去追究开端自身的时间问题，体系的开端作为其整体得以产生的法则，就完完全全可以做到对体系整体的“去时间化”。而且这种“去时间化”反倒能够构造出一种体系完全摆脱于时间、瞬间和无尽的绵延，开端与终点毫无差别的永恒假象。然而，1827年的这段话可以说彻底地转变了问题意识，哲学中所有活动的起点之所以是时间，恰恰在于时间自身涉及体系法则的合理性问题，而只要法则自身作为“现在”不可理解，那么连带着整个由此展开的体系就都无从理解。而把握“现在”，实际上意味着要去思考在某一法则所给予并构造出来的那个整体“之上”的东西。毕竟即便这样所构造出来的整体是合理的，这种合理的前提也仍然是不合理的，所以：

To transcend the world—this is precisely the horizon, the desire, and the goal of philosophy. But if we merely regard what is already at hand as necessary, we will never derive from it any legitimate conclusion that is gratifying. Everything is merely the work of time; what we see is not thoroughly and completely real; on the contrary, what we see is merely what time permits us to see; we are confined within time, existing in it.

超越世界，这正是哲学的视野、欲求和目标。但如果我们仅仅把现成的事物视为必然的，那么我们绝不会从中得出任何令人欢欣的正当结论。一切都不过是时间的作品，我们所见的并非彻彻底底的真实，相反，我们所见的只是时间允许我们见到的东西，我们被限制在时间中，在它之中存在。

The reason why the “everything” we cognize is merely “the work of time” is not, as a common maxim expresses it, that everything grows and decays within the time that belongs to the determinacy of finite beings; rather, the “time” spoken of here always refers to the time of the law itself. The law, as the “present,” determines the ready-made things we encounter; without “transcending the world,” they are blind and necessary. And the reason why “what we see is not thoroughly and completely real,” why “we are confined within time,” lies precisely in the fact that the result of the activity of a higher time constitutes the law of the world in which we find ourselves. If there were no “transcending the world,” then not only would it be impossible to understand the higher constitutive mechanism of the world that exists in this way, but it would also be impossible to understand the meaning of the world’s being constituted in this way. Therefore, the world-law as the “present” is for philosophy both a limitation and a barrier that must be broken through. It is a limitation because it constitutes the lawful premise for understanding the world; it is a barrier because, if it is not broken through, a genuinely integral philosophy is out of the question. Hence:

之所以我们所认识的“一切”不过是“时间的作品”，并不像一种日常箴言所表达的那样，一切都在属于有限者之规定性的时间中成长和衰朽，是因为这里所说的“时间”指的始终是法则自身的时间。作为“现在”的法则规定着我们所接触的现成事物，如果没有“超越世界”，它们就是盲目且必然的。而之所以我们“所见的并非彻彻底底的真实”，之所以我们“被限制在时间中”，恰恰在于某一更高时间活动的结果构成了我们所处世界的法则。倘若没有“超越世界”，那不仅无法理解如此存在的世界的更高构成机制，也无法理解如此存在的世界如此构成的意义。因此，作为“现在”的世界法则，对哲学而言既是限制，也是必须冲破的屏障。它之所以是限制，是因为它构成了理解世界的法则性前提，它之所以是屏障，是因为如果不突破它，真正意义上整全的哲学就无从谈起，因此：

Therefore, philosophy is truly philosophy only when it can deduce the whole organic relational totality of things from different world-times (Weltzeiten). Now, as soon as I replace “different world-times” with the synonymous expression “world-ages” (Weltalter), you will understand what the title of this lecture series I am giving for you, “The System of World-Ages,” means.

所以只有当哲学能从不同世界时间（Weltzeiten）演绎出事物的完整有机关系整体，它才是真正意义上的哲学。现在，只要我用“世界时代”（Weltalter）这个含义相同的表达来替换“不同世界时间”，诸位就能明白，我为你们做的这个系列讲座，“世界时代体系”的题目是什么意思了。

In this way, what “world-ages” means becomes clear. First, “world-ages” means that the whole cannot be understood solely from the “present” as the result of a higher temporal mechanism, even though the whole in which we find ourselves must be understood from this starting point; rather, we must pursue an understanding of this mechanism of understanding. Second, “world-ages” likewise means “world-time,” and time in this sense is precisely the time of the law itself. If the law means “the ideal is higher than the real,” then this time points to different possibilities, such as “the ideal is not higher than the real” or “the ideal is lower than the real,” and thus points to the modality of so-called “possible worlds.” And why, among “possible worlds,” the world we inhabit happens to be the “present” world in which “the ideal is higher than the real” points to the possibility of discussing the meaning of the world before us. Finally, from this transformation of the problematic, it can be seen that the “all-and-one” system of the “great whole,” insofar as it wishes to be a system, must be a system of “world-ages.” For only by discussing the “world-ages” of different times can we provide a determination for the “present” world in which we find ourselves, or, in other words, can we provide a higher explanation for the law that constitutes the present world. In this way, the discussion of the construction of the system in post-Kantian idealism is, through Schelling’s critique of himself and Hegel, led to a discussion of the temporality of the origin of the system itself.

这样一来，何为“世界时代”也就清楚了。首先，“世界时代”意味着，不能单单从作为某一更高时间机制结果的“现在”出发来理解整体，尽管我们处于其中的整体要由此出发来理解，但我们必须去追寻对这一理解机制的理解。其次，“世界时代”同样意味着“世界时间”，而这种意义上的时间恰恰就是法则自身的时间。如果法则意味着“观念高于实在”，那么这一时间就会指向“观念并不高于实在”或者“观念低于实在”等不同的可能性，从而也就指向了所谓的“可能世界”的模态，而在“可能世界”中为什么我们所处的恰好是“观念高于实在”的“现在”世界，则指向了对眼下世界意义的讨论的可能性。最后，从这一问题意识的转化可以看到，“全且一”的“大全一体”体系只要希望自己是体系，就必须是“世界时代”体系。因为只有讨论不同时间的“世界时代”，才能为我们所处的“现在”世界进行规定，或者说才能为构成现在世界的法则提供更高的说明。如此一来，后康德唯心论关于体系构造的讨论，也就经由谢林对于自己和黑格尔的批判，被引向了关于体系本原自身的时间性问题的讨论。

Here a genuinely speculative irony arises: in order to understand the stable law of the system, in order to understand the “present” that is always present like eternity, one must transcend the “present” and enter into a higher temporality. In his later lectures on the “Philosophy of Revelation,” Schelling also calls the “world-ages” in this sense, as “world-time,” a “higher history.” It is “higher” because what it concerns is not the history of finite beings occurring within this world of ours—a world governed by the origin that has already transformed itself into the “present” and is always present—but rather the history of how this origin is able to become the “present” as origin. In this sense, Xian Gang’s view that the core of the “world-ages” philosophy lies in “time being the absolute necessary condition for eternity to tend toward ultimate perfection,” and Markus Gabriel’s claim that Schelling’s philosophy beginning with the “world-ages” is a “historical philosophy,” both have their one-sidedness. On the one hand, as stated above, through Schelling’s temporal critique of the beginning of the system, the conception of the system as the “great whole” must now be completed in the form of a system of time, i.e., the “world-ages.” The semantics of “eternity” and “time” can be said to undergo an inversion here, opposed to traditional philosophy. On the other hand, this philosophy is not a “historical” philosophy—i.e., not, as Gabriel holds, that Schelling’s late philosophy is a philosophy of the “contingency” of the world—but rather emphasizes that if one does not transcend the world and its “present,” one remains stuck at the level of having to acknowledge its “contingency.” On the contrary, the “world-ages” philosophy is precisely meant to overcome this “contingency”; this “contingency” is precisely the consequence of not inquiring into the temporal structure of the “present.”

这里产生了一种真正意义上的思辨性反讽：为了理解体系的稳定法则，为了理解宛如永恒一般始终在场的“现在”，就不得不超越“现在”，进入某种更高的时间性中。在后来的“启示哲学”讲座中，谢林也把这种意义上作为“世界时间”的“世界时代”称为“更高的历史”。它之所以是“更高的”，是因为它所涉及的并非是我们所处的这个世界——这个世界是由已经转变为“现在”而始终在场的本原支配的——中发生的有限者的历史，而是那个让此本原能够作为本原而成为“现在”的历史。在这种意义上，先刚认为的“世界时代”哲学的核心在于“时间是永恒趋向最终完满的绝对必要条件”，以及马库斯·加布里尔（Markus Gabriel）认为的谢林从“世界时代”开始的哲学都是一种“历史性的哲学”的说法，都有其片面性。这一方面在于，正如前文所说的，通过谢林对体系开端的时间批判，“大全一体”的体系构想现在必须以时间体系，亦即“世界时代”的方式得到完成。“永恒”与“时间”的语义可以说在这里发生了与传统哲学相对立的颠倒。另一方面在于，这种哲学并非“历史性”的哲学，亦即并非如加布里尔所认为的谢林晚期哲学是关于世界之“偶在”的哲学，而是强调倘若不去超越世界及其“现在”，就会仅仅停留在不得不承认其“偶在”层次上的哲学。相反，“世界时代”哲学恰恰是要去克服这种“偶在”，这种“偶在”恰恰是不去追问“现在”的时间性结构的后果。

III. The Reconstruction of the “Metaphysics of Time” and Its Unsolvable Problems

三、对“时间形而上学”的重建和难以解决的问题

If the “present” means the fact of the “higher weight” of “the ideal is higher than the real,” then the temporal inquiry into the “present” actually means an inquiry into this fact:

如果说“现在”意味着“观念高于实在”这一“更高比重”的事实，那么对于“现在”的时间性追问，实际上就意味着对于这个事实的追问：

It is precisely this facticity of the higher weight that shapes this fact. But no one can prove that the existence of this fact in this way is necessary. It exists only because the ideal side has a higher weight; but precisely because the so-called weight must be based on one of the two sides, if the two principles were in a state of equilibrium, then no movement would be possible at all, and consequently no transition would be possible either. But one must never think that this state must persist in this way, that the ideal side must always have the higher weight.

正是这一更高比重的实际性才塑造了这一事实。但没有人能证明，这一事实的如此实存是必然的。它之所以实存，不过是因为观念性一面具有更高比重，但正因为所谓的比重必定基于两个方面中的某一面，所以倘若两重本原处在均衡状态中，那就根本不可能存在运动，进而也不可能存在任何过渡了。但绝不能以为，这样的情况就必定如此持存，观念性一面就必定具有更高比重。

If one does not transcend the “present,” one cannot understand the present; but if one does transcend the “present” and inquires into the cause of the fact of the “higher weight” that constitutes the law of the “present,” one falls into a groundless situation. This is, on the one hand, because the existence of this weight can no longer be grasped through the subsequent results it triggers, i.e., through the structure of the world. That is, it is precisely this weight that makes us believe that, in the world we inhabit, an idea (a reason) can always be found for any reality. But the law itself that allows the “idea” to “grasp” reality cannot explain itself by the law it itself establishes. If it could explain itself, that would mean it is directly itself; in that case, it would again become the “present” or “eternity,” and the temporal inquiry into this law would be canceled. Therefore, one cannot hold that this law can explain itself; and once one cannot hold this, it means that the fact of its existence exceeds its own scope of explanation. So how does such a fact come about?

倘若不超越“现在”，就无法理解现在，但倘若超越了“现在”，去追问构成“现在”之法则的“更高比重”这一事实的原因，又陷入了毫无根据的境地。这一方面是因为，这一比重的存在自身已经无法再通过由它所引发的后续结果，或者说世界结构出发去把握。也就是说，正是这一比重让我们相信，在我们所处的世界中，总能为某一实在找到其观念（理由）。但这一让观念能够“把握”实在的法则自身，不可能还会以它自身所奠定的法则来解释自身。倘若它能够解释自身，那么意味着它直接是其自身，这样一来，它又成了“现在”或者说“永恒”，进而对这一法则的时间性追问也就取消了。所以不能认为这一法则能够解释自身，而一旦不能如此认为，就意味着它存在的事实超出了自己的解释范围。那这样的事实究竟是如何发生的呢？

This assumed relation between the two principles—namely, that the ideal side has a greater weight—is not a relation that can be understood in itself and from itself, but rather a relation that is posited in fact and in actuality; that is, this relation is a willed relation, a being-able-to-be; since it is a being-able-to-be, it is also absolutely a being-able-not-to-be; in this sense, this relation is a contingent relation, because it still presupposes some true cause. This relation is not a consequence of necessity, but rather the result of a positive act of will. In this way, we arrive at a third concept beyond the first two; this concept is “cause,” and the cause itself no longer acts as a principle, i.e., no longer acts with the necessity of some natural nature.

这两个本原间被假定的这种关系，也就是观念性一面具有更大比重，并非一种在自身中且出于自身就能理解的关系，而是一种在事实上和实际上被设定而得的关系；也就是说，这种关系是一种被意愿的关系，是一个能在者，既然是能在者，那也绝对地是一个能不在者，在这个意义上，这种关系乃是一种偶然的关系，因为它还须以某个真正的原因为前提。这一关系并非必然性的后果，而是肯定性的意志设定的结果。如此一来，我们也就来到了处在前两者之外的第三个概念上，这个概念就是“原因”，原因自身不再作为本原，也就是不再作为以某种自然本性的必然性而行事的东西。

Here, Schelling introduces the concept of “cause.” From the German word *Ursache*, the “cause” in question refers to: a more original (prefix *Ur*) fact that gives rise to a fact (*Sache*). From this it can be seen that neither the ideal nor the real (or subject and object) can obtain an advantage over the other from themselves, so this advantage is a “willed relation,” a willed possibility. As long as it is a possibility, it is “contingent.” If the law of the “present” is merely one among many possible contingencies, only accidentally realized, then the “present” likewise remains unexplained. This is like the fact that even if a thousand monkeys typing on typewriters for a thousand years could produce *Hamlet*, it would still not be regarded as a literary work. Random chance events may themselves produce the same results as willed activity, but they do not produce meaningful results.

在这里，谢林引入了“原因”概念，从这个词的德语Ursache来看，这里所说的“原因”指的是：引发了某一事实（Sache）的更原初的（前缀Ur）的事实。由此可以看到，不管是观念还是实在（或者说主体与客体）都无法从自身出发获得自身对于另一方的优势，所以这一优势是一种“被意愿的关系”，是一种被意愿了的可能性。只要这是一种可能性，那么它就是“偶然的”。如果“现在”的法则只是诸多可能偶然性中的一种，只不过是恰巧被实现了，那同样意味着“现在”没有得到解释。这就好比即便一千只猴子在打字机上乱按一千年可以打出《哈姆雷特》，但它仍然不会被认为是文学作品。随机的偶然事件本身可能会产生与有意愿的活动一样的结果，但不会产生有意义的结果。

Furthermore, attention must also be paid here to Schelling’s emphatic distinction between “cause” and “principle.” In the context of Schelling’s philosophy, “principle” specifically refers to the immediate constitutive elements of being, such as ideal-real, subject-object, etc.; but “cause” specifically refers to the element that makes being thus constituted meaningful. In this distinction, a certain transcendence of traditional metaphysics can be seen: metaphysics cannot be merely “ontology,” cannot merely focus on the constitution of being; the principles that constitute being do not themselves provide meaning for being thus constituted. At the time when post-Kantian idealism focused on constructing a system of the “all-in-one,” the debate over “principle” can be said to have been ongoing. When the early Schelling and Hegel elevated principle to law, the situation in which the beginning of the system became its “surplus” was thereby exposed. Now it can be seen more clearly that to solve this problem, the construction of a system of the “all-in-one” must first be transformed into the construction of a “system of the world-ages,” and to construct a “system of the world-ages,” it is necessary to distinguish between “principle” and “cause.” “Cause” is precisely the higher element that makes “principle” become “principle,” become the “present,” and is thus also the temporal element through which principle itself becomes principle. Therefore, while opening up space for discussion of the temporality of principle itself, the introduction of the concept of “cause” also opens up space for discussion of ontology. The problem of being is now transformed from the previous structure of principle-being into a triple structure of cause-principle-being. In the structure of cause-principle, what occurs is the temporality of “higher history,” i.e., the activity that makes principle become principle. In the structure of principle-being, what occurs is the activity of establishing a principle of the “present” and thereby constructing a system. In the discussion of cause, Schelling introduces the concept of “God,” the theme of his late “Philosophy of Revelation”:

此外这里也要注意，谢林着重区分了“原因”和“本原”，在谢林哲学的语境里，“本原”特指存在的直接构成要素，比如观念—实在、主体—客体等；但“原因”特指让如此被构成的存在有意义的要素。在这一区分中，可以看到某种对于传统形而上学的超越：形而上学不能仅仅是“存在论”，不能仅仅关注存在的构成，构成存在的本原自身并不为如此构成的存在提供意义。在后康德唯心论着眼于“大全一体”的体系建构之际，围绕“本原”的争论可以说是一直持续的。当早期谢林和黑格尔把本原提升为法则之际，产生的体系开端成为其“剩余”的情况也就随之暴露了。而现在可以更为清晰地看到，如果要解决这个问题，就必须先把对于“大全一体”体系的建构转变为对“世界时代体系”的建构，而为了建构“世界时代体系”，就需要区分“本原”和“原因”。“原因”恰恰是让“本原”成为“本原”，成为“现在”的更高要素，进而也是本原自身得以成为本原的时间要素。因此，在对本原自身的时间性开辟讨论空间的同时，对“原因”概念的引入也同样为存在论的讨论开辟了空间。存在问题现在就从以往的本原—存在结构，转变为了原因—本原—存在的三重结构，在原因—本原的结构中，发生的是“更高历史”的时间性，亦即让本原成为本原的活动。而在本原—存在的结构中，发生的则是确立一个“现在”的本原，并以此建构体系的活动。在对原因的讨论中，谢林引入了作为他晚期“启示哲学”主题的“神”的概念：

We purely and simply recognize God as the cause that gives the ideal a higher specific weight than the real, the very cause that brings about the victory of the subjective over the objective. In this determination, we again encounter Plato unexpectedly, and this determination may be superior to all other determinations of God. We can say with Plato: God is not the cause of the “good,” but the cause of the “better.”

我们只是纯然把神认作给予观念性之物具有超出实在性之物更高比重的原因，正是这一原因，造就了主体性之物对于客体性之物的胜利。在这一规定中，我们又与柏拉图不期而遇了，而且这个规定或许要优于其他所有关于神的规定。我们可以与柏拉图一道说：神并非“好”的原因，而是“更好”的原因。

From here, it can finally be seen how, in the temporal construction of principle itself, through the introduction of the concept of “cause,” the element of teleology re-enters the system. That is, if the “higher specific weight” of the ideal over the real is the result of intentional positing, and God as its “cause” posits it in this way for the sake of the “better,” then this means that the law of our present world, as the “present,” is itself a link in some purpose that precedes the existence of the present world in this way, a purpose oriented toward the “better.” The “better” not only signifies a transcendence of the perspective that is confined within the world and examines the world from its law as the “present,” but also signifies that although the law of the world itself is the “present,” its operation is not the maintenance of the status quo but points toward some continuously perfecting goal. The “justice” of the world also lies in the “better,” not merely the “good.” To go further, if “ontology,” which examines being solely from principle, points toward the “good,” then the triple structure of being—cause-principle-being—points toward the “better.” In this sense, the “system of the world-ages” is actually a “history-ontology-teleology.” From this point of view, we cannot consider that Schelling has retreated into some kind of “mysticism” or “theology,” for, as he himself emphasizes, this is an “unexpected encounter” with Plato. In Plato’s “theology,” his introduction of God always occurs when the explanation of the principle of being fails, for example, in the *Laws*, when he needs to explain why justice must necessarily become actual, he invokes a discussion of God—starting solely from the elements of being or principle, it is impossible to prove that justice will necessarily be realized. This realization requires some higher will; therefore, the realization of ideas such as justice points not only to a purpose beyond the principle of this world but also to a will that cannot be explained solely from the operational mechanism of this world. If we examine Schelling’s discussion here from the perspective of Gabriel’s emphasis on “contingentism,” then without introducing “God” as “cause,” the existence of the world is indeed “contingent.” But overcoming this “contingency” does not involve invoking a higher necessity; rather, it must invoke a higher will. It is precisely this will that gives rise to the world’s law, allowing the world to transcend this law and point toward the purpose of the “better.” Although Schelling’s late “theological” discussion cannot be developed here, we can still cite a concise summary from the editor of the 1827 *System of the World-Ages* to review the progression of Schelling’s entire problematic:

从这里，最终可以看到在对本原自身的时间性建构中，通过对“原因”概念的引入，目的论的要素如何再次进入体系。也就是说，如果观念之于实在的“更高比重”是有意设定的结果，而神作为其“原因”之所以如此设定，是为了“更好”；那就意味着，我们当下世界的那个作为“现在”的法则自身，实际上是某种在当下世界如此存在之先的某个目的的环节，这个目的朝向的是“更好”。“更好”不仅意味着对仅仅囿于世界之内，从其作为“现在”的法则出发对世界的考察视角的超越，也意味着世界自身的法则虽然是“现在”，但它的运作并不是维系现状，而是指向某个不断完善的目标。世界的“正义”也在于“更好”，而不仅仅是“好”。进一步来说，如果说仅仅从本原出发而考察的“存在论”指向的是“好”，那么原因—本原—存在这三重存在结构指向的就是“更好”。在这个意义上说，“世界时代体系”实际上是一种“历史—存在—目的论”。从这一点来看，我们不能认为谢林遁入了某种“神秘主义”或者“神学”，正如他自己强调的，这里是与柏拉图“不期而遇”。在柏拉图的“神学”中，其对神的引入总是出现在对存在本原的说明失效时，比如《法律篇》中要说明正义为什么一定会是现实的时候，他就会援引关于神的讨论——仅仅从存在要素或者本原出发，无法证明正义一定会实现。这种实现需要某个更高的意愿，因此诸如正义这样的理念的实现不仅指向某个超越于此世界的本原的目的，也指向一个单就从此世界的运作机制出发无法解释的意愿。如果从加布里尔强调的“偶在论”出发来看谢林这里的讨论，那么可以说不引入作为“原因”的“神”，世界的存在就确确实实是“偶在”的。但克服这种“偶在”的并非援引更高的必然性，而是必须去援引更高的意愿，恰恰是这一意愿所引发的世界法则让世界超越这一法则，指向作为“更好”的目的。虽然谢林晚期的“神学”讨论在此无法展开，但还是可以援引1827年《世界时代体系》的编者的一段精辟总结来回顾谢林的整个问题意识进展：

The system of identity philosophy already possessed the insight into the fact that the limited has a higher specific weight than the unlimited, but it was not capable of explaining it. Only positive philosophy can fill this gap by means of a framework that grasps the duality of the Absolute, a framework that also includes historicity, i.e., the possibility of creation, as a structural moment within itself. The historicity of the Absolute is the final conclusion of the “world-ages.” The Absolute is also the master of this historicity—this is the final conclusion of the “system of the world-ages.” The “system of the world-ages,” as a theory of “primary being,” is no longer logic, but metaphysics in the true sense as “that which comes after physics.”

同一哲学体系已经有了对受限制存在之于不受限制存在有更高比重这一事实的洞见，但它并没有能力说明。只有肯定哲学才能凭着对绝对者之二重性的把握框架来弥补这个缺漏，这一框架同时也把历史性，亦即创世的可能性作为一个结构性的环节包含在自身中。绝对者的历史性就是“世界时代”的最终结论。绝对者同时也是这一历史性的主宰，这正是“世界时代体系”的最终结论。“世界时代体系”作为关于“第一位的存在”的理论不再是逻辑学，而是真正意义上作为“物理学之后”的形而上学。

Although “physics” and “metaphysics” are terms first seen in Aristotle, if “physics” is understood as the discussion of the generation and existence mechanisms of things within an already established world mechanism, then “metaphysics” as “that which comes after physics” naturally points to some higher element that can ground physics. In the post-Kantian construction of systems, it can be considered that “Wissenschaftslehre,” “identity philosophy,” and “logic” all count as a kind of new “physics,” i.e., an investigation of the constitutive principles of the whole of being starting from a given law of being. From Schelling’s perspective, what such system-construction lacks is precisely a genuine metaphysics that meets the demands of the age, i.e., a temporal metaphysics as the “system of the world-ages.” Although Schelling’s further discussion of this temporal metaphysics ultimately focuses on concepts like “God” and “creation,” from the foregoing it should be clear that these seemingly rather “mystical” terms possess a seriousness and urgency in thought. In sum, precisely because the beginning of the system becomes the “surplus” of the system itself, it is necessary to trace back the temporality of the beginning itself, i.e., to investigate why the beginning is the beginning; otherwise, the “ouroboros” structure of the system cannot be completed.

尽管“物理学”和“形而上学”是最早见诸亚里士多德的术语，但如果把“物理学”理解为讨论已然既定的世界机制中事物的产生与存在机制，那么“形而上学”作为“物理学之后”当然也就指向某种能为物理学奠基的更高要素。在后康德的体系建构中，可以认为“知识学”“同一哲学”和“逻辑学”都算是一种新的“物理学”，也就是都从某一既定的存在法则出发对存在整体的构成原理的考察。而从谢林的角度来看，这样的体系建构所缺乏的恰恰是一种真正的、符合时代要求的形而上学，也就是作为“世界时代体系”的时间形而上学。尽管谢林对这种时间形而上学的进一步讨论最终着眼于“神”“创世”这样的概念，但从前述应该可以看到，这些看起来颇为“神神叨叨”的术语在思想上的严肃性和急迫性。总而言之，正因为体系的开端成了体系自身的“剩余”，所以必须去追溯开端自身的时间性问题，也就是去考察开端为何是开端，否则无法完成体系的“衔尾蛇”结构。

Schelling’s solution—whether it is an encounter with Plato or an entry into mythological-religious discussion—we may not adopt, but we must still face a question: where lies the reason for a given highest reason itself? If the world we inhabit, together with its laws, is given, and thus “contingent,” then the principle of existence and the meaning of existence split apart, and the fact of existence itself replaces the inquiry into the meaning of existence. Perhaps the historical teleology Schelling wished to restore is not a “good” theory of meaning, but if we hope the world will be “better,” then which narrative should provide the deeper ontological impetus for this “better”? Moreover, if one day we can indeed once again construct a system capable of comprehending the “whole,” will the problem of the foundation of the system that Schelling and Hegel once encountered repeat itself? In the past century, “philosophy of history” seems to have become a disreputable term; it is always bound up with accusations it should not bear, and this seems to have become a kind of “academic correctness.” Yet, regarding this “academic correctness,” one might say, as Schelling criticized Fichte: the self-evident is blind to the presupposition of its own existence. But the more crucial question is: can the world we inhabit truly bestow “meaning” upon itself from within itself? If the bestowal of meaning must transcend the world, then where should we transcend to today? (Author’s affiliation: Shandong University)

谢林的方案——不管是与柏拉图相会还是进入神话—宗教的讨论——我们可以不采纳，但我们仍然必须直面一个问题：某个被给予的最高理由自身的理由又在哪里？倘若我们所处的世界连同其法则都是被给予的，进而是“偶在”的，那么存在的原理和存在的意义就会分裂，进而存在的事实自身会取代对存在的意义的追问。或许谢林希望恢复的历史目的论并非一种“好”的意义理论，但如果我们希望世界“更好”，那么“更好”的更深层次的存在论动力又究竟该由哪一种叙事来提供？此外，如果有朝一日我们果真能再次构造一种能理解“全”的体系，那么谢林和黑格尔曾经遭遇的体系奠基问题，是否又会重演？近百年来，“历史哲学”似乎已经成了一个声名狼藉的字眼，它总是与一些本不该由它承担的指责捆绑在一起，这似乎已经成了一种“学术正确”。然而，对于这种“学术正确”，或许也可以像谢林批判费希特时所说的那样：自明者自身对其存在之前提是盲目的。但更为关键的问题是，我们所处的世界是否真能从自身之中为自身赋予“意义”？倘若意义的赋予必须超越世界，那么如今又该向何处超越？（作者单位：山东大学）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗