The Confirmation of the Essence of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of Historical Materialism and Its Significance

Marx’s thought on technology provides the fundamental guidance for scientifically understanding the essential attributes and socio-historical effects of artificial intelligence, and for correctly handling the relationship between artificial intelligence and ideological and political education. As a key driving force and strategic technology of the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, artificial intelligence profoundly affects the threefold socio-historical relationships between humans and nature, between humans and humans, and between humans and themselves, and has gradually evolved into a unity of “technical means,” “infrastructure,” and “civilizational marker.” For ideological and political education, artificial intelligence, as an endogenous force, is embedded in and influences its foundational basis, fundamental contradictions, and practical forms. Promoting the deep integration of artificial intelligence and ideological and political education is an inherent requirement and rational choice that follows the laws of technological change and extricates itself from the paradox of technological tools and the worry of technological domination. This integration deeply contains the symbiotic relationship and interactive logic of “technology–ideological and political education,” which is centrally manifested in two interconnected and mutually reinforcing processes and mechanisms: “the ideological and political education-ization of artificial intelligence” and “the artificial intelligence-ization of ideological and political education.”

马克思工艺学思想为科学认识人工智能的本质属性和社会历史效应，正确处理人工智能与思想政治教育关系提供了根本遵循。人工智能作为新一轮科技革命和产业变革的重要驱动力和战略性技术，深刻影响人和自然、人和人、人和自身三重社会历史关系，并逐步演化为“技术手段”“基础设施”“文明标识”的统一体。对思想政治教育来说，人工智能作为一种内生性力量嵌入并影响思想政治教育的发生基础、基本矛盾和实践形态。推动人工智能与思想政治教育深度融合，是遵循工艺学变革规律，摆脱技术工具悖论与技术宰制之虞的内在要求和理性选择。这种融合深层蕴含着“技术—思政”的共生关系和互动逻辑，集中表现为“人工智能思政化”与“思政人工智能化”两个相互连接、相辅相成的过程和机制。

General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized during the 20th collective study session of the

习近平总书记在中共中央政治局第二十次集体学习时强调：“人工智能作为引领新一轮科技革命和产业变革的战略性技术，深刻改变人类生产生活方式。”推动人工智能技术的高质量发展已经成为世界各国的重大发展战略，并深刻影响世界格局和区域社会的未来前景，对人工智能技术及其社会运用的反思也日益成为社会科学研究的重点。国内学者从马克思主义视域下对人工智能是否创造价值、是否具有主体性地位、能否最终超越人类智能，以及如何影响唯物史观的理论发展和人类解放的现实前景等问题进行了多维度研究，其研究成果有利于我们从不同方面思考人工智能的当代发展及其所带来的“人机关系”疑难。对“人机关系”疑难的思考需要建基于对人与机器间差异性与共同性的追问，因此，有必要在当前研究的基础上给予作为新事物的人工智能以哲学高度的关怀，进行确证其内在本质的前提性思考。对人工智能本质的确证可以借鉴马克思对事物本质尤其是人的本质的唯物史观思考方式，进一步确证人工智能作为“类人”存在物的独特属性，促使我们辩证看待人工智能的历史定位与社会效应，从而更好发挥其对社会发展的积极作用。

I. Marx’s Dialectical Reflection on the Essence of Humanity

一、马克思关于人的本质的辩证思考

An inquiry into the essence of artificial intelligence involves the question of the mode of thinking. As a “new thing” brought about by the development of modern technology, AI shares both commonalities and differences with other natural objects and artifacts. It is necessary to return to the history of thought, especially historical materialism, to seek references and insights for questioning its essence. Reflection on the essence of things is not only a core issue of traditional rational metaphysics but also profoundly influences the emergence and development of later natural sciences. It is a “natural tendency” inevitably arising from humanity’s use of reason to pursue truth and to understand the world in the most thorough and profound sense. In the history of thought, many thinkers have approached the essence of things in different ways, and the revelations of the essence of the same thing often present different or even opposite answers. From focusing on the universal attributes of similar things, to attending to the special attributes that distinguish one thing from others, and then to historically understanding the generation of these special attributes, ultimately penetrating into the attribute differences among similar things—this constitutes the evolutionary thread of the “view of essence” within the entire history of Western thought. Marx’s new materialist worldview brought about a major transformative significance in the mode of thinking about the essence of things in modern Western intellectual history. It demonstrates powerful explanatory and transformative force in addressing practical issues. To reflect on the essence of AI, it is necessary to transcend the theoretical shackles of idealism and old materialism and fundamentally draw on Marx’s historical and concrete way of thinking about the essence of things.

对人工智能的本质进行探讨涉及思考方式的问题。作为现代技术的发展所造就的“新事物”，人工智能与其他自然物、人工物既存在共性又存在差异，有必要回到思想史，特别是唯物史观中寻找对其本质追问的参照与借鉴。对事物本质的思考不仅是传统理性形而上学的核心议题，也深刻影响后世自然科学的产生与发展，是人类运用理性追求真理，试图在最彻底、最深刻的意义上去理解世界所必然导致的“自然倾向”。在思想史上，众多思想家思考事物本质的方式不同，对同一事物的本质揭示往往呈现出不同甚至相反的答案。从聚焦同类事物的普遍属性，到关注一事物区别于其他事物的特殊属性，再到历史性理解这些特殊属性的生成最终深入到同类事物之间的属性差别，构成了整个西方思想史内部“本质观”的演进脉络。马克思新唯物主义世界观对事物本质的思考方式在近代西方思想史中具有重大的变革意义，其在观照现实问题方面显现出强有力的解释力与改造力，对人工智能本质的思考，需要超越唯心主义与旧唯物主义的理论桎梏，从根本上借鉴马克思历史地、具体地思考事物本质的方式。

In the development of the history of Western philosophy, thinkers generally grasped essence from the level of substance, holding that essence is the absolute existence hidden behind phenomena, pointing to the internal basis by which a thing becomes itself. Some thinkers, dissatisfied with merely describing external phenomena, delved more deeply into what “is” behind the ever-changing appearances of things. This impulse of questioning initiated humanity’s understanding of the essence of things. There are clear divergences in the paths by which thinkers have questioned the “essence” of things. In Plato’s scheme dividing the supersensible world from the sensible world, the Ideas in the supersensible world are regarded as “the true and only reality,” while individual things in the sensible world obtain their basis for existence only by “participating” in the Ideas. This means that the essence of things lies outside the things themselves. Aristotle defined essence as “what it was to be,” affirming the essential existence of concrete things and attributing the differences between things to the “what it is” of concrete things. Following Plato and Aristotle’s reflections on essence and substance, later Western philosophers’ understanding of essence can generally be divided into two schools: first, the universal view of essence, which tends to reduce essence to the common attributes shared by similar things. For example, in the political philosophy and theories of human nature of Hobbes and Spinoza, the “actual essence” of humanity is located in the natural tendency to preserve oneself, which is common to all individuals, including humans. Second, the special view of essence, which tends to regard the special attributes of one thing relative to other things as its essence. For instance, when Feuerbach understood the essence of humanity, he reflected on “what, after all, is the essential difference between humans and animals? The simplest, most general, and most popular answer to this question is: consciousness,” proposing that “reason, love, and willpower” are the highest powers, the absolute essence of humanity, and the purpose of human existence. The shift in perspective from emphasizing commonality to focusing on individuality reflects philosophy’s deepening inquiry into the essence of things, moving toward their internal connections.

在西方哲学史发展过程中，思想家一般从实体的层面把握本质，认为本质是隐藏在现象背后的绝对存在，是指向事物成为自身的内在根据。一些不满足于对外在现象描述的思想家更深入地追问了事物变动不居的背后究竟“是什么”，这种追问的冲动开启了人类对事物本质的理解。思想家们对事物“本质”的追问存在明显的路径分歧。在柏拉图分割超感性世界与感性世界的筹划中，超感性世界中的理念被视作“真实和唯一的实在”，感性世界中的个别事物只是由于“分有”理念才获得自身的存在根据，这意味着事物的本质在事物之外；亚里士多德把本质界定为“是其所是”，肯定了具体事物的本质性存在，并将事物间的区别归结为具体事物的“其所是”。因袭柏拉图与亚里士多德关于本质、实体问题的思考，之后的西方哲学家们对本质的理解总体可以分为两个派别：一是普遍本质观，即倾向将本质归结为同类事物之间的共同属性，比如在霍布斯与斯宾诺莎的政治哲学与人性论学说中，就将人的“现实本质”定位到包括人在内的一切个体所具有的保存自身的自然倾向；二是特殊本质观，倾向于把一事物相对于其他事物的特殊属性视作该事物的本质，比如费尔巴哈在理解人的本质时，思考的是“究竟什么是人跟动物的本质区别呢？对这个问题的最简单、最一般、最通俗的回答是：意识”，提出“理性、爱、意志力”就是最高的力，是人的绝对本质，是人生存的目的。从注重共性到着眼个性的视角差异，体现了哲学对事物本质的思考逐渐深入到事物的内在联系中。

Marx’s reflection on the essence of things, especially the essence of humanity, has a profound basis in the history of thought, integrating the explorations of traditional thinkers concerning universal essence and special essence. In *Capital*, when criticizing the principle of utility of Bentham and others, Marx points out: “If we want to apply this principle to humans, and to evaluate all human actions, movements, relations, etc., according to the principle of utility, we must first study human nature in general, and then study the human nature that has historically changed in each epoch.” Marx’s reflection on the essence of humanity has two aspects: first, it points to the nature common to all humans, i.e., the general essence of humanity; second, it points to the essence shaped by the social environment of different historical periods, i.e., the special essence of humanity. These two modes of thinking originate from Marx’s critical inheritance of the theoretical achievements of German classical philosophy on the issue of essence, manifesting as Marx’s process of seeking the essence of humanity from abstract generality to concrete reality.

马克思对事物本质尤其是人的本质的思考有深厚的思想史基础，整合了传统思想家对普遍性本质与特殊性本质的探索。马克思在《资本论》中批判边沁等人的效用原则时指出，“如果我们想把这一原则运用到人身上来，想根据效用原则来评价人的一切行为、运动和关系等等，就首先要研究人的一般本性，然后要研究在每个时代历史地发生了变化的人的本性”。马克思关于人的本质有两方面思考：一是指向一切人共有的本性，即人的一般本质；二是指向由不同历史时期的社会环境所塑造的本质，即人的特殊本质。这两种思考方式，源于马克思对德国古典哲学关于本质问题理论成果的批判继承，体现为马克思对人的本质的追问从抽象一般上升到现实具体的求解过程。

In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx focuses on the generic “species” difference between humans and animals to locate the “species-essence” of humans, and further inquires into the question of the genesis of this “species-essence.” Marx affirms and accepts Feuerbach’s view that the uniqueness of human existence lies precisely in its “freedom” and “consciousness,” holding that “free, conscious activity is precisely the species-characteristic of human beings,” and considers the question of the human species-essence or species-characteristic from two aspects: first, “man treats himself as a universal, and therefore a free being,” turning nature into his own inorganic body, unlike animals which merely cling to nature within a narrow sphere; second, he proposes that “conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity,” where “conscious” means “making his life-activity itself an object of his will and of his consciousness.” Unlike Feuerbach, Marx realizes that the species-characteristic of “freedom” and “consciousness” is still a superficial distinction perceived through “sensuous intuition,” and that Feuerbach’s doctrine of “species-essence” remains at the level of general reflection. Marx “inverts” Feuerbachian thinking: on the basis of regarding “free, conscious life-activity” as the fundamental characteristic of human activity and as the essential distinction between humans and animals, he proposes that “it is precisely because man is a species-being that he is a conscious being,” and that “it is in his practical creation of an objective world, in his working-over of inorganic nature, that man proves himself a conscious species-being.” As a “species,” humans are not merely a biological classification; this concept further constitutes a mode of existence that distinguishes humans from other animals. It is precisely through production and life within the “species” that humans differentiate themselves from other animals. This further raises the theoretical question of how the human “species-essence” is generated in “species-life.”

在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思着眼于一般意义上人与动物的“类”差别以定位人的“类本质”，并进一步追问“类本质”的生成性问题。马克思肯定并接受费尔巴哈关于人的存在的独特之处就在于其“自由”和“有意识”的观点，认为“自由的有意识的活动恰恰就是人的类特性”，并且从两个方面思考了人的类本质或类特性的问题：一是“人把自身当做普遍的因而也是自由的存在物来对待”，把自然界变成自身无机的身体，而不像动物在狭小的范围内仅仅依附于自然；二是提出“有意识的生命活动把人同动物的生命活动直接区别开来”，所谓“有意识”就是指“使自己的生命活动本身变成自己意志的和自己意识的对象”。与费尔巴哈不同，马克思意识到“自由”“有意识”的类特性仍然是一种用“感性直观”认识到的表面差别，费尔巴哈“类本质”学说仍然停留在一般性思考的层面。马克思对费尔巴哈式思维进行了“颠倒”，在把“自由的有意识的生命活动”看作人的活动的基本特征、看作人与动物根本区别的基础上，提出“正是因为人是类存在物，他才是有意识的存在物”，正是“通过实践创造对象世界，改造无机界，人证明自己是有意识的类存在物”。人作为“类”不只是一种生物学意义上的划分，其更构成人区别于其他动物的生存方式。正是在“类”之中的生产生活使得人与其他动物区别开来。这进一步提出了如何理解人的“类本质”在“类生活”中生成的理论问题。

Marx’s dialectical critique of the idealist conception of history opened up a socio-historical perspective for answering the question of the genesis of the human “species-essence.” On the basis of grasping, through horizontal comparative thinking, that “freedom” and “consciousness” constitute the two major characteristics of activity that distinguish humans from animals, Hegel’s mode of thinking, with “historical sense” as its core, provided Marx with “a starting point for his logical method.” [1]1 This refers to Hegel’s dialectical method, which emphasizes process, development, and contradiction, and which Marx critically appropriated while rejecting its idealist framework. Marx critically utilized Hegel’s theoretical resource of “conceiving the self-creation of man as a process… conceiving objective man, true man because real man, as the result of his own labor,” and, with a processual perspective, fully grasped that the “species-essence” difference between humans and animals is produced by human historical labor. However, unlike Hegel, who could only abstractly understand the processual and historical nature of labor, Marx took material productive labor as the foundation for the emergence, existence, and development of humanity and its history. Through attention to actual labor, Marx established a specific perspective for grasping the essence of humans through the historical changes in the form of labor. “As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production—both with what they produce and with how they produce.” Actual productive activity, in the dimension of “how they produce,” inherently contains genuine historical change, which is manifested in humans’ manufacture and use of tools of production. Animals can only directly use their own physiological organs to obtain ready-made material resources from nature, whereas humans can use tools they themselves manufacture to alter the material form of nature, and through the continuous improvement of tools, they accomplish the historical reconstruction of their own life and their own essence.

马克思对唯心史观的辩证批判开创了回答人的“类本质”生成问题的社会历史性视野。在通过横向比较的思考方式把握到“自由”与“有意识”构成人区别于动物的两大活动特性的基础上，黑格尔以“历史感”为内核的思维方式为马克思的“逻辑方法提供了一个出发点”。马克思批判地利用了黑格尔“把人的自我产生看做一个过程……把对象性的人、现实的因而是真正的人理解为人自己的劳动的结果”的理论资源，以一种过程性视野充分把握到人与动物的“类本质”差异由人的历史性劳动所造就。但与黑格尔只能抽象地理解劳动的过程性与历史性不同，马克思把物质生产劳动作为人类及其历史产生、存在和发展的基础。通过对现实劳动的关注，马克思确立以劳动的历史形式变化把握人的本质的特殊视野。“个人怎样表现自己的生命，他们自己就是怎样。因此，他们是什么样的，这同他们的生产是一致的——既和他们生产什么一致，又和他们怎样生产一致。”现实的生产活动在“怎样生产”的维度上内蕴真正的历史性变化，这体现在人对生产工具的制造和使用上。动物只能直接使用自身的生理器官获取自然界现成的物质资料，而人能够凭借自己制造的工具改变自然界的物质形态，并且通过不断改进工具完成对自身生活与自身本质的历史重构。

The establishment of Marx’s new materialist worldview opened up a concrete way of understanding the essence of humans, advancing the judgment of the essence of humans to the analysis of individual differences among “real individuals.” Marx points out that the merit of Feuerbach’s materialism lies in “resolving the religious world into its secular basis” and “resolving the essence of religion into the essence of man.” However, because Feuerbach failed to penetrate the contradictions and divisions within secular society itself, he could only mistakenly regard “religious sentiment” as something common and inherent to all humans, could only understand humans in the sense of abstract, isolated individuals, and could only understand the essence of humans in the sense of a “species” that is an “internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.” [2]2 This is a direct quotation from Marx’s *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), where he critiques Feuerbach’s abstract and ahistorical conception of human nature. This critique of Feuerbach enabled Marx to establish a concrete mode of thinking that further explores individual differences among things of the same kind: the essence of humans is manifested not only in the comparison of differences between humans and animals, but also in the differences between real humans themselves, and in the ways different individuals produce their own material life. “The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” [3]3 This is the famous sixth thesis on Feuerbach, which defines human essence as the ensemble of social relations, a cornerstone of historical materialism. This is the inevitable conclusion Marx drew from examining the sociality and historicity of human productive labor through the lens of historical materialism.

马克思新唯物主义世界观的确立开辟了理解人的本质的具体化方式，将对人的本质的判断推进至对“现实的人”之间的个体化差别的分析。马克思指出，费尔巴哈的唯物主义的功绩在于“把宗教世界归结于它的世俗基础”与“把宗教的本质归结于人的本质”，但由于费尔巴哈未能深入世俗社会本身的矛盾与分裂中，他就只能错误地将“宗教感情”看作人所共有且固有的东西，只能从抽象的、孤立的个体的意义上理解人，只能从“内在的、无声的、把许多个人自然地联系起来的普遍性”的“类”的意义上理解人的本质。对费尔巴哈的批判使马克思确立起进一步探索同类事物之间的个体差别的具体化思考方式，人的本质不仅在对人与动物的差别比较中显现出来，而且在现实的人与人之间的差别中显现出来，在不同的个人生产自己物质生活的方式中显现出来。“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，在其现实性上，它是一切社会关系的总和”，这是马克思以唯物史观审视人类生产劳动的社会性与历史性所得出的必然结论。

By moving from a general, species-level distinction between humans and animals to a historical understanding of the causes of the differences between humans and animals, and to a concrete understanding of the differences between real individuals, Marx inquires into the question of the essence of humans from the perspective of the unity of universality and particularity, forming a dialectical mode of thinking for grasping the essence of humans. This provides a scientific and rational theoretical tool for reflecting on and examining the essence of things. Faced with the rapidly developing technology of artificial intelligence, contemporary Chinese philosophical and social science workers should absorb Marx’s methodological approach to contemplating the essence of humans from the height of historical materialism. They must grasp the “species-essence” of this “human-like” entity [4]4 The Chinese term “类人存在物” (lèirén cúnzàiwù) literally means “human-like being” or “humanoid entity,” used here to describe AI as an entity that resembles humans in certain functions but is fundamentally different in essence. both from the differences between AI and humans and other beings, and understand the historical genesis and social effects of AI from the perspective of actual productive activity.

通过概括人与动物的一般的、类的差别到历史地看待人与动物之间差异的生成原因，以及具体地理解现实个体之间的差别，马克思从普遍性和特殊性相统一的视角对人的本质问题进行追问，形成把握人的本质的辩证思考方式，这为反思与审视事物本质提供了科学合理的理论工具。面对迅猛发展的人工智能技术，当代中国哲学社会科学工作者应当吸收马克思从唯物史观的高度思索人的本质的方法理路，既要从人工智能与人及其他存在物的差别中把握这一“类人”存在物的“类本质”，也要从现实的生产活动中理解人工智能的历史生成与社会效应。

II. The Confirmation of the Essential Attributes of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of Historical Materialism

二、唯物史观视域下人工智能本质属性的确证

Marx’s reflection on the essence of humans from the perspective of the unity of universality and particularity provides a theoretical reference for grasping the “species-essence” and actual essence of artificial intelligence. To consider the essence of AI based on historical materialism, one cannot presuppose that AI possesses the same subject status and essence as humans. Instead, one must adopt a dialectical and historical perspective to conduct a premise-based examination and comprehensive analysis. Specifically, it is necessary to answer the following three questions: First, what is the internal basis that distinguishes AI from other beings, i.e., the question of the essential difference between AI and humans and other beings? Second, how does this basis make AI what it is, i.e., the question of the historical genesis of the essence of AI? Third, what are the qualitative manifestations of the existing essence of AI and its genesis in actual material productive life, i.e., the question of the actual attributes of AI?

马克思从普遍性与特殊性相统一的视角对人的本质的思考，为把握人工智能的“类本质”与现实本质提供了理论参照。基于唯物史观思考人工智能的本质问题，不能预先假设人工智能拥有与人同等的主体地位与本质，而是应当以辩证视角与历史视角，进行前提思考和综合研判。具体而言，需要回答以下三个问题：一是使人工智能与其他存在物区别开来的内在根据是什么，即人工智能与人及其他存在物的本质差异问题；二是这一根据如何使得人工智能成为其自身，即人工智能本质的历史生成问题；三是人工智能的存在本质及其生成在现实的物质生产生活中有何性质表现，即人工智能的现实属性问题。

First, in the sense of “species-essence,” artificial intelligence, as the “brain” of the automated machine system, is the externalization of human knowledge and rational capacity. Drawing on Marx’s reflections on the “species-essence” of humanity, the inquiry into the “species-essence” of artificial intelligence can be divided into two steps: first, answering the question “what is artificial intelligence,” and second, pursuing the inner basis that makes this determination and definition valid. Artificial intelligence developed in the latter half of the 20th century, built on the foundation of computer science and related technologies. As one of the crystallizations of computer science, artificial intelligence’s simulation of human intelligence has undergone three stages—“formalization,” “empiricization,” and “rationalization”—that is, simulating respectively the forms of human thought, human experience, and human reason. “Artificial” is the core characteristic of artificial intelligence compared with other natural existents; whereas other non-human existents in nature are the “absolute other” of humanity, artificial intelligence is the “objectified other.” It can be said that artificial intelligence is precisely “a ‘personified operational procedure’ and ‘technical artifact’ that is ‘data-based and system-oriented,’” [5]5 Sun Wei, “The Essence of Artificial Intelligence and the ‘Humanization’ of Its Development,” *Social Science Front*, no. 3 (2023): 27. a technical tool of intelligence created artificially. Starting from the theoretical implications of artificial intelligence, we can see that artificial intelligence “first concerns the relationship between ‘artificial’ and ‘intelligence.’ ‘Artificial’ is relative to ‘natural,’ while ‘intelligence’ is related to rational capacity; taken together, artificial intelligence involves non-natural rational capacity.” [6]6 Sun Wei, “The Essence of Artificial Intelligence and the ‘Humanization’ of Its Development,” 27. Artificial intelligence points not only to the “artificiality” of the intelligent thing but also to the “intelligence” of the artifact. The technical artifact only describes the “species-essence” of artificial intelligence in the sense of an entity-like result; we must further investigate the question of the essence of artificial intelligence’s “intelligence.” Just as Heidegger pointed out: “Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology… Similarly, the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.” [7]7 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in *Selected Works of Martin Heidegger*, vol. 2, trans. Sun Zhouxing (Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Press, 1996), 924. This path of external inquiry means that one cannot stop at a judgment of “species-essence” defined by genus and specific difference; one must continue to inquire into the “enframing” [Gestell] support behind it, and this precisely aligns with Marx’s mode of thinking that pursues the historical genesis of “species-essence”—that is, the essence of humanity lies not in humans being primates, nor even merely in humans being purposeful and conscious animals, but in human practical activity achieving the unity of changing the natural environment and changing oneself. Marx pointed out: “Nature does not construct any machines… They are the products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified.” [8]8 Karl Marx, “The Fragment on Machines,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 31 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998), 102. The “intelligence” of artificial intelligence is rooted in the imitation of human rational capacity. If traditional automated machines are, for humans, “organs of the human will over nature” that act according to human commands, then artificial intelligence is precisely the command system on which the functioning of these organs depends—the externalization of human knowledge and rational capacity. If traditional computers are an extension of the human brain organ, then artificial intelligence is an extension of human “brainpower.” Marx once called the automated machine system “value existing for itself.” [9]9 Karl Marx, “The Fragment on Machines,” 102. If the traditional machine system is the automated operation of human objectified labor, then the emergence of artificial intelligence provides a “self-organizing program” for this “value existing for itself.” Thus it can be seen that artificial intelligence, at the level of “imitation,” “partakes of” the implications of the human “species-essence.”

第一，在“类”的意义上，人工智能作为自动化机器体系的“大脑”，是人的知识与理性能力的外化。参照马克思对人的“类本质”问题的思索，关于人工智能“类本质”的探究可以分为两步：首先是回答“人工智能是什么”的问题，其次是追问使得这一规定和定义得以成立的内在根据。人工智能在20世纪后半叶发展起来，建立在计算机科学与相关技术的基础上。作为计算机科学的结晶之一，人工智能对人类智能的模拟经历了“形式化”“经验化”和“理性化”三个阶段，即分别对人类思维形式、人类经验和人类理性进行了仿真。“人工”是人工智能相比于其他自然存在物的核心特征，与自然界中的其他非人存在物是人类的“绝对化他者”相比，人工智能是“对象化的他者”。可以说人工智能就是“一种以‘数据为本’和‘系统为王’的‘拟人化操作程式’和‘技术人工物’”，是人工创造的智能技术工具。从人工智能的理论涵义出发，可以看到人工智能“首先关乎‘人工’与‘智能’的关系。‘人工’相对于‘自然’而言，‘智能’则与理性能力相关，合起来，人工智能涉及非自然的理性能力”。人工智能不仅指向智能物的“人工性”，而且还在于人工物的“智能性”。技术人工物只是从实体性结果的意义上描述人工智能的“类本质”，还需要进一步探究人工智能的“智能”本质问题。正如海德格尔指出：“技术不同于技术的本质……同样地，技术之本质也完全不是什么技术因素。”这种外在追问路径意味着不能停留于以属加种差的方式下定义的“类本质”判断，必须继续追问其背后的“座架”支撑，而这正契合了马克思追问“类本质”历史生成的思考方式，即人的本质不在于人是灵长类动物，甚至不只在于人是有目的有意识的动物，而在于人的实践活动实现了自然环境的改变与自我改变的一致。马克思指出：“自然界没有造出任何机器……它们是人的产业劳动的产物，是转化为人的意志驾驭自然界的器官或者说在自然界实现人的意志的器官的自然物质。它们是人的手创造出来的人脑的器官；是对象化的知识力量。”人工智能的“智能性”根源于对人类理性能力的模仿，如果传统自动化机器对人来说是“在自然界实现人的意志的器官”，按照人的指令来行动，那么人工智能则正是这一器官发挥功能所依赖的指令系统，是人类知识与理性能力的外化。如果传统的计算机是人的大脑器官的延伸，那么人工智能就是人的“脑力”的延伸。马克思曾把自动化机器体系称作“自为存在的价值”，如果说传统的机器体系是人的对象化劳动的自动化运转，那么人工智能的出现就是为这种“自为存在的价值”提供了“自组织程序”。由此可见，人工智能在“模仿”层面“分有”了人的“类本质”意蕴。

Second, the historical genesis of artificial intelligence represents both the inevitable trend of the development of productive forces and a tool for the automation of contemporary human mental labor. From a broad historical perspective, the progression of human production activities from handicraft to mechanization to automation is the inevitable evolution of productive forces, especially of the means of production. Although in Marx’s historical era the automation of the production process was only beginning to emerge, Marx already engaged in profound reflection on the development of the machine system, providing a “key” and methodological guidance for penetrating the historical genesis of artificial intelligence. Marx pointed out: “Simple tools; accumulation of tools; composite tools; tools driven solely by human power, i.e., tools driven by humans; tools driven by natural forces; machines; a machine system with a single motor; a machine system with an automatic motor—this is the process of the development of machines.” [10]10 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 44 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001), 429. Artificial intelligence is precisely a further development of the automated machine system that Marx observed; it arises from the two-way interaction between humans and the world realized through human practical activity, and is the newest component of the “humanized world.” The process of the emergence and development of artificial intelligence is a process in which the essential powers of humanity are continuously and newly confirmed through externalization, proving that in transforming nature, humans not only obtain means of subsistence and physical tools for production but also obtain mental tools for further production activities. Just as the development from traditional hand tools to automated machines realized the automation of human physical labor, the development from traditional computers to artificial intelligence has, to a certain extent, realized the automation of part of human mental labor. The emergence of artificial intelligence is not a purely technological phenomenon but is rooted in human material practical activity; it is a necessary link in the sequence of the development of productive forces. It marks a epoch-making node in the process of objectified labor where humans systematically externalize and instrumentalize their own subjective cognitive structures and functions, and is the inevitable extension and profound qualitative change in the logic of the evolution of the machine system toward a “machine system with an automatic motor” as revealed by Marx. As an objectified and objectified means of production, artificial intelligence confirms Marx’s profound insight that the essential powers of humanity are continuously confirmed and expanded through objectification. Humans not only create material tools to extend their physical strength in transforming nature but also, in the process of understanding and transforming their own cognitive structures, create intelligent tools that partially replace mental labor. The philosophical implication of the automation of mental labor lies in its truly touching upon the transformation of the essence of labor and the reshaping of human subjectivity. The emergence of artificial intelligence is not only a push forward in the liberation of human physical labor but also a potential historical sublation of the alienated forms of cognitive labor. When repetitive, routinized, and primary cognitive activities based on massive information processing are undertaken or replaced by automated tools, the human subject achieves a considerable degree of liberation. Marx’s profound critique of the application of the machine system under capitalism shows that there is a complex tension between the progressiveness of technological forms and the social relational forms in which they are embedded. The revolutionary significance of artificial intelligence far exceeds the enhancement of tool efficiency; as a confirmation of the essential powers of humanity at the level of cognition and conception, it is a new milestone in the process of the “humanized world.” The historical value of artificial intelligence lies not only in its instrumental implication of liberating human physical labor but also in its serving the fundamental value-oriented purpose of the comprehensive development and free liberation of human subjectivity. Examining the genesis and development of artificial intelligence from the perspective of productive forces embodies the unity of “conformity to laws” and “conformity to purposes,” pointing to the evolution of the mental tools on which human production activities depend. In the era of artificial intelligence, humanity should deeply contemplate the dialectical relationship between technology and humans, instrumental rationality and value rationality, and the logic of efficiency and the logic of liberation, and, entering the critical theoretical horizon provided by historical materialism, continuously engage in the active shaping and value guidance of artificial intelligence technology.

第二，人工智能的历史生成既代表生产力发展的必然趋势，是当代人进行脑力劳动的自动化工具。从广阔的历史维度看，人类生产活动从手工到机器化再到自动化，是生产力尤其是生产工具进化的必然。在马克思所处的历史时代，尽管生产过程的自动化只是初见端倪，但马克思对机器体系的发展已然进行深刻思考，为透视人工智能的历史生成提供了一把“钥匙”和方法论指导。马克思指出：“简单的工具，工具的积累，合成的工具；仅仅由人作为动力，即由人推动合成的工具，由自然力推动这些工具；机器；有一个发动机的机器体系；有自动发动机的机器体系——这就是机器发展的进程。”人工智能正是对马克思所见的自动化机器体系的进一步发展，其产生于人的实践活动所实现的人与世界的双向互动中，是“人化世界”的最新组成部分。人工智能的产生和发展过程，是人的本质力量在外化中不断得到新的确证的过程，证明人在改造自然的过程中不仅获得生活资料以及进行生产的体力工具，而且获得了进一步进行生产活动的脑力工具。与从传统手工工具到自动化机器的发展实现了人的体力劳动的自动化类似，从传统计算机到人工智能的发展，在一定程度上实现了人部分脑力劳动的自动化。人工智能的出现，不是纯粹的技术现象，而是植根人类物质性实践活动，是生产力发展序列的必然性环节，它标志着人类在对象化劳动进程中对自身主观认知结构与功能进行系统性外化和工具化的划时代节点，是马克思所揭示的机器体系向“有自动发动机的机器体系”演进逻辑在当今时代的必然延伸与深刻质变。人工智能作为对象化、客体化的生产工具，印证了马克思关于人的本质力量通过对象化不断确证与拓展的深刻洞见。人类不仅在改造自然中创造物质工具以延伸自身体力，而且在认识与改造自身思维认知结构的进程中，创造了部分替代脑力的智能工具。脑力劳动自动化的哲学意蕴在于，真正触及劳动本质的嬗变与人类主体性的重塑。人工智能的出现不仅是对人类体力劳动解放的推进，更是对认知劳动异化形态潜在的历史性扬弃。当重复性、程式化、基于海量信息处理的初级认知活动被自动化工具所承担或替代，人类主体获得相当程度的解放。马克思对机器体系在资本主义应用中的深刻批判表明，技术形态的进步性与其嵌入的社会关系形态之间存在复杂张力。人工智能的革命性意义远超工具效率的提升，它作为人类本质力量在认知观念层面的确证，是“人化世界”进程中的新的里程碑。人工智能的历史价值不仅在于解放人的体力劳动的工具性意蕴，而且在于其服务于人类主体性的全面发展与自由解放这一根本价值性目的。从生产力视角审视人工智能的生成与发展，体现了“合规律性”与“合目的性”的统一，指向人类生产活动所依赖的脑力工具的进化。人工智能时代，人类应该深刻思考技术与人、工具理性与价值理性、效率逻辑与解放逻辑之间的辩证关系，深入唯物史观提供的批判性理论视域，不断展开对人工智能技术的主动塑造与价值引导。

Third, compared with human beings who are engaged in actual material production and life, artificial intelligence embodies a unity of transcendence and non-transcendence; it can never be completely equated with human intelligence and can only be defined as a “human-like” entity lacking perceptual capacity and practical purpose. Whether artificial intelligence can acquire self-consciousness and ultimately surpass human intelligence has long been a concern of both academia and the general public. Artificial intelligence exhibits transcendence over individual human intelligence in specialized and data-driven fields—a conclusion drawn from empirical phenomena such as human-machine competitions—but this does not indicate that AI surpasses humans in all dimensions. When comparing the relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence, the individual human and humanity as a whole constitute two distinct dimensions. AI is transcendent compared with individuals in some areas, but it is non-transcendent compared with humanity as a whole. AI itself is an information storage and integrated invocation of the overall knowledge of humanity. This means that even if an AI robot has an individual appearance, it contains human information existing as a whole. All seemingly individual competitions between a single person and a single robot are, in essence, competitions between an individual human and “humanity as a whole.” Although contemporary AI is evolving in a so-called “generative” direction, seemingly possessing a certain capacity for autonomous learning and improvement, and exhibiting computational and decision-making abilities highly similar to human intelligence, these abilities are ultimately an imitation and one-sided enhancement of human rational thinking capacity. In the following two senses, AI and human intelligence are fundamentally different, revealing AI’s non-transcendence: First, as an “extension of human brainpower” and an externalization of human rational capacity, AI lacks the irrational factors rooted in the life activities of human intelligence. The generation of human intelligence takes complex physical survival needs as its real premise. It is precisely in the perceptual activities of satisfying their own needs that humans consciously and purposefully realize material and information exchanges with nature, further promoting the development of human physical strength and intelligence. Human reflection on the laws of the world and related knowledge production are inevitably constrained by their own life experiences, but these constraints themselves constitute the prerequisite conditions for the emergence of human intelligence. Lacking such life experience, AI’s imitation of human intelligence is limited to a powerful deduction of human concepts, judgments, and reasoning abilities, and cannot give rise to a “self” centered on survival needs. Second, AI does not possess practicality, and therefore cannot have the possibility of generating true intelligence. From the perspective of historical materialism, consciousness itself has no mysterious internal mechanism; it arises only through the objectifying relationship between humans and the perceptual world. “The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.” [11]11 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Afterword to the Second Edition. [Translator’s note: This is a standard Marx citation; the English rendering follows the standard translation.] Although some argue that, compared with traditional automated machines, intelligent robots have a tactile sense of environmental objects like natural persons, and can even temporarily and autonomously adjust based on changes in environmental data, as if possessing self-consciousness independent of human control, strictly speaking, practical activity is perceptual activity, but not all perceptual activity can be regarded as practice. The most fundamental hallmark of practice lies in “revolutionarily” changing the environment to meet the needs of the subject. In the case of real human subjects, this is manifested as “men, producing their means of subsistence, indirectly produce their actual material life itself.” [12]12 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*. [Translator’s note: Standard Marx citation.] For AI such as autonomous driving and other systems that recognize the state of the physical world, although they simultaneously simulate human sensory capacities, process logical relationships between pieces of information, and respond to external perceptual facts, this ability is ultimately a reduction of perceptual information. It cannot, like human practical activity, verify the truth or falsity of factual propositions, nor does it involve a purposeful, bidirectional interactive relationship based on the subject’s own needs.

第三，与处在现实的物质生产生活中的人相比，人工智能内蕴超越性与非超越性的统一，其与人类智能始终不能完全等同，仅仅能够定义为缺乏感性能力与实践目的的“类人”。人工智能是否能够获得自我意识并最终超越人类智能，一直为学界乃至社会大众共同关注。人工智能对单一个体智力在专业化和数据驱动等领域具有超越性，这是通过诸如人机对弈之类的经验表象得出的结论，但这并不能表明人工智能在全部维度上超越人类。在比较人工智能与人类智能的关系时，人类个体与人类整体是两个不同的维度，人工智能在一些领域与个人相比具有超越性，但与人类整体相比又具有非超越性。人工智能本身是对人类整体知识的信息储存与贯通式调用，这使得人工智能机器人即使具有个体的外观，但内蕴作为整体存在的人类信息，所有看似单个人与单个机器人之间的竞赛，在本质上都是作为个体的人与作为“整体的人类”之间的竞争。尽管当代人工智能逐渐朝着所谓“生成性”的方向演化，仿佛拥有一定的自主学习和提高的能力，展现出与人类智能高度相似的计算能力与决策能力等，但这些能力归根结底是对人的理性思维能力的模仿和片面增强。在以下两个意义上，人工智能与人类智能存在本质不同并彰显出其非超越性：其一，人工智能作为人的“脑力的延伸”，作为人的理性能力的外化，缺乏人类智能根植于生命运动的非理性因素。人类智能的生成以复杂的肉体生存需要作为现实前提，正是在满足自身需要的感性活动中，人类不断有意识、有目的地实现与自然的物质交换和信息交换，进一步促进人的体力与智力的发展。人类对世界规律的思考以及相关的知识生产不可避免地受到自身生命体验的限制，但这些限制本身构成了人类智能诞生的前提条件，缺乏这种生命体验，人工智能对人类智能的模仿也仅限于对人类的概念、判断和推理能力的强效演绎，而不能催生出以生存需要为核心的“自我”。其二，人工智能不具有实践性，也就不具备产生真正智能的可能。在唯物史观视域下，意识本身没有任何神秘的内在机制，只是通过人与感性世界的对象性关系产生的，“观念的东西不外是移入人的头脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已”。尽管有观点认为相比于传统自动化机器，智能机器人具有像自然人一样对环境对象的触感，甚至可以根据环境数据的变化临时自主进行相应调整，仿佛拥有了独立于人类控制的自我意识。但严格来讲，实践活动是感性活动，但不等于一切感性活动都可以被视作实践。实践最根本的标志在于“革命地”改变环境以满足主体的需要，在现实的人类主体那里，表现为“人们生产自己的生活资料，同时间接地生产着自己的物质生活本身”。像自动驾驶以及其他对物理世界的状况进行识别的人工智能，尽管其同时拥有着对人类感官能力的模拟，能够同时处理信息与信息之间的逻辑关系并对外界感性事实作出反应，但这种能力归根结底表现为对感性信息的还原，无法如同人的实践活动一样能够验证事实命题的真假，也不存在基于主体自身需要的有目的的双向互动关系。

To think historically and concretely about the essence of artificial intelligence within the practical relationship between real humans and the world is an important way to grasp the contemporary era through historical materialism. As a “technical artifact” created by humans, AI belongs to the “organs through which humans realize their will in nature.” [13]13 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry.” [Translator’s note: Standard Marx citation; the phrase “organs of the human will in nature” appears in this context.] But this “organ” has not gained independence from humans; rather, it is born from the revolutionary practical activity of humans transforming nature, fundamentally pointing to the objectified labor of human labor power, and is a confirmation of the essential power of humans. As a collection of the overall knowledge system of humanity, AI exhibits a powerful transcendence compared with individual rationality, but it lacks the most basic life experience and practical capacity on which human intelligence depends for its generation. Therefore, it is always only a one-sided enhancement of human rational capacity, cannot fundamentally surpass human intelligence, and is essentially distinct from human intelligence.

在现实的人与世界的实践关系中历史地、具体地思考人工智能的本质，是以唯物史观把握当今时代的重要方式。人工智能作为人所创造的“技术人工物”，从属于人“在自然界实现人的意志的器官”。但这个“器官”并没有获得相对于人的独立性，而只是诞生于人改造自然的革命实践活动之中，从根本上指向人的劳动力的对象化劳动，是对人的本质力量的确证。作为人类整体知识体系集合的人工智能相比于个人理性展现出强大超越性，但其缺乏人类智能赖以产生的最基本的生命体验与实践能力，因而始终只是对人类理性能力的片面增强，无法从根本上超越人类智能，并本质性地区别于人类智能。

III. The Contemporary Significance of Confirming the Essential Attributes of Artificial Intelligence

三、人工智能本质属性确证的时代意义

As the core of a new round of technological revolution, artificial intelligence not only challenges traditional social norms and ethical rules but also continuously challenges human self-cognition, shaping a new era of artificial intelligence. Faced with such profound technological change and the accompanying great social transformation, “it is necessary to deeply understand the great significance of accelerating the development of a new generation of artificial intelligence, strengthen leadership, make good plans, clarify tasks, consolidate the foundation, promote its deep integration with economic and social development, and promote the healthy development of China’s new generation of artificial intelligence.” [14]14 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Collective Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee on the Development Status and Trends of Artificial Intelligence,” October 31, 2018. [Translator’s note: This is a standard citation of a speech by Xi Jinping.] Historical materialism still provides a level of thought that penetrates the essence of history for understanding the contemporary world; it is the theoretical basis for discerning the essence of artificial intelligence and even the “spirit of the times” of the entire era of artificial intelligence. Grasping the essence of artificial intelligence with reference to the mode of thinking of historical materialism helps to comprehensively grasp the practical significance and historical limitations of AI, and to dialectically respond to the contemporary challenges of AI.

作为新一轮技术革命的核心，人工智能不仅挑战传统的社会规范与伦理规则，甚至还在不断挑战人类的自我认知，正在塑造着新的人工智能时代。面对如此深刻的技术变革以及与之相适应的社会大变局，“要深刻认识加快发展新一代人工智能的重大意义，加强领导，做好规划，明确任务，夯实基础，促进其同经济社会发展深度融合，推动我国新一代人工智能健康发展”。唯物史观依然在为理解当今世界提供着深入历史本质的思维高度，是洞察人工智能的本质乃至整个人工智能时代的“时代精神”的理论依据。以唯物史观的思考方式为参照把握人工智能的本质，有助于全面把握人工智能的现实意义和历史局限，辩证应对人工智能的当代挑战。

Grasping the essence of artificial intelligence in its general distinction from humans and other existing things is conducive to a dialectical view of the alienating effects and liberating potential of AI. The development of AI and its application in the field of social production not only has positive significance for improving production efficiency and upgrading industrial structure, but may also revolutionarily influence and change the mode of human labor. Marx’s judgment on the difference between the system of machinery and traditional tools provides a reference for understanding the revolutionary significance of AI. Marx proposed: “The worker makes use of the tool as an organ, endowing it with a soul through his own skill and activity, so that the ability to master the tool depends on the worker’s craftsmanship. In contrast, the machine replaces the worker in possessing skill and strength; it is itself the skilled craftsman, possessing its own soul through the mechanical laws that operate within it.” [15]15 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1, Chapter 13, Section 1. [Translator’s note: The quotation is a paraphrase of Marx’s discussion of the difference between tools and machines.] The system of machinery does not, like traditional labor tools, play an intermediary role in the worker’s labor; on the contrary, it is the worker who plays an intermediary role in the self-operation of the system of machinery. This reversal of relations brings about two consequences: First, in a realistic sense, the intervention of AI in the field of social production does not automatically bring about the realization of the liberation of labor. Marx pointed out that under the conditions of capitalist society, due to the alienation of the worker from labor, the object of labor, and the labor process, the automated system of machinery, as both the result of labor and the tool on which further labor depends, transforms from a confirmation of the essential power of the human into something that excludes humans, “aggregated into a material force that rules over us, is beyond our control, frustrates our wishes, and nullifies our plans,” [16]16 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, Part I. [Translator’s note: This is a paraphrase of Marx and Engels’ description of the alienated social power of the division of labor.] as if this force were alien, external to humans, possessing its own “stage of development that not only does not depend on the will and actions of people but instead dominates their will and actions.” [17]17 Ibid. This process is reinforced by the spread of the great division of labor in capitalist society: “Owing to the extension of machinery and the division of labor, the labor of the proletarians has lost all independent character and, consequently, all attraction for the workers. The worker becomes a mere appendage of the machine, and is required only to perform the simplest, most monotonous, and most easily learned operations,” [18]18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Chapter 1. with the worker merely treated as a conscious limb or tool of the system of machinery. As a more advanced automated system of machinery, AI applied within the capitalist mode of production likewise follows the logic of capital valorization, leading to the squeezing out and replacement of humans in the production process, giving rise to the emergence of a large so-called “useless class.” Second, in an essential sense, the species-essence of AI points to the externalization of the essential power realized by humans in the process of practical activity; it is generated in human practical activity and confirms and realizes the essence of human intelligence, serving as proof of humanity’s gradual realization of the liberation of labor. AI’s intervention in the field of social production and its promotion of higher-level automation and unmanned operation can free people from heavy socially necessary labor, granting them more free time and creating objective material conditions for humanity’s leap from the “realm of necessity” to the “realm of freedom.” This means that people spend less and less time on labor to obtain the necessities of life, and instead engage more in creative labor that develops their own essence. Labor increasingly loses its character as a “means of livelihood,” achieving a unity between freedom in the sense of human self-realization and necessity in the sense of human survival and living. The liberating potential and alienating effects inherent in AI are not mutually exclusive or opposed but have an intrinsic necessary connection: that is, the social movement of AI objectively shortens socially necessary labor time, but under the dominance of the logic of capital, this “saving” is not transformed into leisure time and free time for members of society; instead, it prolongs relative surplus labor time, deepens capitalist exploitation, and, due to the generation of a relative surplus population, is transformed into workers’ “unemployment time” and “useless time.” AI itself does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of humans; its negative effects stem from the capital control and application of AI.

在人工智能与人及其他存在物的一般差别中把握人工智能的本质，有利于辩证看待人工智能的异化效应与解放潜能。人工智能的发展及其在社会生产领域的运用，不仅对生产效率提高和产业结构升级具有积极意义，还可能革命性地影响和改变人类的劳动方式。马克思对机器体系和传统工具差异的论断，为理解人工智能的革命性意义提供了借鉴。马克思提出：“工人把工具当作器官，通过自己的技能和活动赋予它以灵魂，因此，掌握工具的能力取决于工人的技艺。相反，机器则代替工人而具有技能和力量，它本身就是能工巧匠，它通过在自身中发生作用的力学规律而具有自己的灵魂。”机器体系不像传统劳动工具那样在工人劳动中起到中介作用，相反，是工人在机器体系的自我运转中发挥中介作用。这一关系调转带来两方面后果：一是在现实意义上，人工智能介入社会生产领域并不能自动带来劳动解放的实现。马克思指出，在资本主义社会条件下，由于劳动者与劳动、劳动对象和劳动过程相异化，作为劳动结果与进一步劳动所依赖的工具的自动化机器体系也就从人的本质力量的确证变为排斥人的东西，“聚合为一种统治我们、不受我们控制、使我们的愿望不能实现并使我们的打算落空的物质力量”，好像这种力量是异己的、在人之外的，有着自己“不仅不依赖于人们的意志和行为反而支配着人们的意志和行为的发展阶段”。这一过程伴随资本主义社会大分工的推广而得到强化，“由于推广机器和分工，无产者的劳动已经失去了任何独立的性质，因而对工人也失去了任何吸引力。工人变成了机器的单纯附属品，要求他做的只是极其简单、极其单调和极容易学会的操作”，工人只是被当作机器体系有意识的肢体或工具。人工智能作为更高级的自动机器体系，在资本主义生产方式中的运用同样遵循资本增殖逻辑，导致生产过程中人的挤压与替代，造就大量所谓“无用阶级”的诞生。二是在本质意义上，人工智能的类本质指向人在实践活动过程中所实现的本质力量的外化，是在人的实践活动中生成并对人的智力本质的确证和实现，是人类逐渐实现劳动解放的证明。人工智能介入社会生产领域并推动其更高水平的自动化、无人化，能够使人们从繁重的社会必要劳动中解放出来，获得更多自由时间，为人类从“必然王国”向“自由王国”的飞跃创造客观物质条件。这意味着人们在获取自身生活必需品的劳动上花费的时间越来越少，而更多地从事发展自身本质的创造性劳动。劳动越来越失去其“谋生”性质，达到人的自我实现意义上的自由性与人的生存生活意义上的必然性的统一。人工智能所蕴含的解放潜能与异化效应并不相互排斥和对立，而是有其内在必然联系，即人工智能的社会运动客观上缩短了社会必要劳动时间，但在资本逻辑主导下，这种“节约”并未转化为社会成员的闲暇时间和自由时间，而是延长了相对剩余劳动时间，深化了资本主义的剥削，并因相对过剩人口的产生而转化为工人的“失业时间”和“无用时间”。人工智能本身并不必然导致对人的排斥，其消极负面作用来自人工智能的资本控制和运用。

A dialectical view of the social effects of AI helps to move beyond the opposition between radical progressivism and conservative romanticism. Since modern times, in the face of the rapid development of science and technology, two opposing tendencies have existed: first, the progressivism inaugurated by the Enlightenment, which regards science and technology as tools for humans to understand, transform, and control the world, optimistically believing that with the progress of science and technology and the continuous deciphering of nature’s secrets, humanity can continuously avoid the disasters caused by past ignorance, thereby providing a foundation for more perfect moral consciousness and political organization. Second, romanticism, which has survived from older social traditions, seeks to judge historical things by appealing to moral factors such as conscience and compassion; through criticism and suspicion of new things, it offers solutions to the crisis of modernity in a “return to the past” of traditional ways of life. Today, people’s attitudes toward AI are exactly the same: some celebrate technological progress as a victory over nature that promotes human freedom; others worry about the threat of AI to human civilization and call for a halt to the development of higher-level AI systems. In Marx, we can also see an interweaving of two attitudes. On the one hand, Marx’s doctrine contains a strong belief in historical progress, holding that the evolution of human society from lower to higher stages is an inevitable trend of history, with the basis for this belief lying in Marx’s view of constantly developing productive forces as the foundation of the entire society. On the other hand, Marx acknowledged that “the victory of technology seems to be bought at the cost of moral decay… All our inventions and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, while human life is reduced to a dull material force.” [19]19 Karl Marx, “Speech at the Anniversary of the *People’s Paper*,” 1856. [Translator’s note: This is a paraphrase of Marx’s well-known passage on the contradictory effects of technological progress.] But these two attitudes are not contradictory in Marx; the possibility of their dialectical unity lies in: first, Marx’s description of technological progress and moral decay has a specific context, pointing to the “antinomy” phenomenon that occurs only in societies with private ownership, especially capitalist society; this phenomenon is not eternal, and its social root lies in the institutional design centered on private property. Second, Marx once proposed the classic proposition that “the supersession of self-alienation follows the same path as self-alienation,” [20]20 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, “Private Property and Communism.” meaning that in capitalist society, although technological progress leads to the universal occurrence of human alienation, the supersession of alienation cannot be achieved by rejecting and eliminating technological progress; on the contrary, the development of advanced productive forces represented by technological progress is the necessary path for superseding alienation, “for without this development, there would only be poverty, the generalization of extreme destitution; and in conditions of extreme destitution, the struggle for necessities would have to begin anew, and all the old filthy things would revive.” [21]21 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, Part I. Marx’s dialectical handling of the relationship between these two attitudes provides an effective reference for understanding and evaluating AI, namely, adhering to the unity of the standard of productive forces progress and the standard of moral progress, and establishing a historical consciousness of solving social value problems through the transformation of the mode of production.

辩证看待人工智能的社会效应，有助于走出激进的进步主义与保守的浪漫主义的对立。近代以来，面对科学技术的飞速发展，存在两种相互对立的倾向：一是由启蒙运动所开辟的进步主义，将科学技术视为人们认识、改造与控制世界的工具，乐观地相信随着科学技术的进步及其对自然秘密的不断破解，能够帮助人类不断避免过往因为愚昧导致的灾祸，从而为更加完善的道德意识和政治组织提供基础。二是从更久远的社会传统中遗留至今的浪漫主义，力图诉诸良知、爱心等道德因素评判历史事物，通过对新事物的批判和怀疑，在对传统生活方式的“复古还乡”中提供现代性危机的解决之道。当今社会人们面对人工智能的态度也如出一辙，有人欢呼技术的进步带来了对自然的胜利，促进了人的自由；也有人忧心人工智能对人类文明的威胁，呼吁暂停对更高水平的人工智能系统的开发。在马克思那里，我们同样可以看到两种态度的交织。一方面，马克思的学说内蕴强烈的历史进步信念，认为人类社会从低级到高级的演进是历史的必然趋势，进步信念的根据在于马克思将不断发展的生产力视作整个社会的基础；另一方面，马克思承认“技术的胜利，似乎是以道德的败坏为代价换来的……我们的一切发明和进步，似乎结果是使物质力量成为有智慧的生命，而人的生命则化为愚钝的物质力量”。但这两种态度在马克思那里并不矛盾，二者辩证统一的可能性在于：一是马克思关于技术进步与道德败坏的描述具有特定语境，指向的是在私有制社会尤其是资本主义社会中才会出现的“二律背反”现象，这一现象不是永恒存在的，其社会根源在于以私有财产为核心的制度设计；二是马克思曾提出“自我异化的扬弃同自我异化走的是同一条道路” 的经典命题，即在资本主义社会当中，虽然技术进步导致了普遍的人的异化的发生，但异化的扬弃并不能靠拒绝与消灭技术进步来进行，相反，技术进步所代表的先进生产力的发展是扬弃异化的必经之路，“如果没有这种发展，那就只会有贫穷、极端贫困的普遍化；而在极端贫困的情况下，必须重新开始争取必需品的斗争，全部陈腐污浊的东西又要死灰复燃”。马克思对两种态度关系的辩证处理，为理解与评价人工智能提供了有效借鉴，即坚持以生产力进步标准与道德进步标准的统一，树立以生产方式变革解决社会价值问题的历史自觉。

Faced with the development of artificial intelligence and the epochal transformations it has triggered, the correct attitude is not to fabricate new utopian myths or disaster fantasies, but to conduct a sober and calm examination from a historical and progressive perspective, grasping the real premises and historical limitations of its existence and development. Proceeding from the theoretical perspective of historical materialism, artificial intelligence fundamentally points to the extension and externalization of human mental capacity; it is the “brain” of other automated machine systems created by humanity, and together with them constitutes an external confirmation of humanity’s essential powers. It provides the material basis for humanity to further liberate itself from heavy social necessary labor and move toward free and comprehensive development. However, artificial intelligence only enhances human rational capacity; it itself does not possess the life experience and practical ability brought by the human body. The deep imprint of instrumentality means that artificial intelligence cannot be a “divine” existence surpassing humanity, but is merely a foundational material existence for humanity’s further liberation. Grasping the essential attributes of artificial intelligence on the basis of historical materialism can dispel the intellectual fantasy that regards human liberation as a “natural historical process” of AI development. It will, on the foundation of fully promoting the development of artificial intelligence and relying on the proletariat’s practice of “abolishing the existing state of affairs,” realize the practical advancement of the historical activity of human liberation. (Author’s affiliation: Zhejiang University)

面对人工智能的发展及其引发的时代变革，正确的态度不是制造新的乌托邦神话或灾难幻想，而是以历史性、进步性视野予以清醒和冷静的审视，把握其存在与发展的现实前提和历史局限。从唯物史观理论视野出发，人工智能从根本意义上指向人的脑力的延伸与外化，是人类所创造的其他自动化机器体系的“大脑”，并与之一起构成人的本质力量的身外确证，并为人进一步从繁重的社会必要劳动中解放出来，走向自由而全面的发展提供物质基础，但是人工智能只是对人的理性能力的增强，其本身并不具有人类躯体所带来的生命体验与实践能力。工具性的深刻烙印使得人工智能不可能是超越人类的“神性”存在，而只是人类进一步解放的基础性物质存在。基于唯物史观把握人工智能的本质属性，能够驱散视人类解放为人工智能发展“自然历史过程”的思维幻想，将在充分推动人工智能发展并依赖无产阶级“消灭现存状况”实践的基础上，实现人类解放历史活动的现实推进。（作者单位：浙江大学）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗