Marx’s Transcendence of Feuerbach’s Doctrine of “Perceptual Intuition” and the Formation of Historical Materialism

As the intellectual crystallization that scientifically resolves the riddle of human history and freedom, the creation of historical materialism underwent a complex process. Engels emphatically pointed out that, in the process of creating historical materialism, Feuerbach “in many respects forms a middle link between Hegelian philosophy and our own view.” This indicates that the transcendence of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” constitutes an important link in the formation of historical materialism. In this regard, current academic research exploring the formation of historical materialism based on Marx’s transcendence of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine is mainly carried out from the following two perspectives: First, summarizing Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine as a doctrine of “species-essence” [Gattungswesen] based on nature, pointing out that Marx and Engels believed that the human beings understood by Feuerbach were abstract, isolated individuals lacking the dimension of social relations, and thus they achieved a transcendence of Feuerbach’s “species-essence” doctrine through the theory of “real individuals”; second, summarizing Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine as a doctrine based on “perception” [Sinnlichkeit], pointing out that Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach regarded only the mental activity of “intuition” as genuinely human activity, and thus they achieved a transcendence of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine through the theory of comprehensive production. The above research undoubtedly highlights the important characteristic of Marx and Engels’ critical transcendence of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine, thereby promoting the formation of historical materialism. However, although the former points out the abstract character of Feuerbach’s “species-essence” doctrine, it does not further emphasize the status of the perceptual dimension in Feuerbach’s transcendence of previous idealist philosophy. In fact, the main contribution of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine lies in its emphatic emphasis that the perceptual subject is different from the intellectual subject of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, holding that the perceptual subject must grasp the essence of perceptual objects based on human perceptual needs. The latter, although accurately summarizing the theoretical essence of Feuerbach’s philosophy with the concept of “perceptual intuition” and pointing out that its logical premise is embodied in concrete perceptual things, often obscures the important status of species-thinking [Gattungsdenken] in the “perceptual intuition” doctrine, because another main contribution of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine lies in its emphatic emphasis that the perceptual subject is different from the conceptual subject of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, pointing out that perceptual objects are not the externalization of an independent concept, but rather that grasping perceptual objects through the perceptual subject must resort to the thought abstraction of “species-thinking.”

作为科学解答人类历史—自由之谜的思想结晶，历史唯物主义的创立经历了一个复杂的过程。恩格斯曾着重指出，在历史唯物主义创立过程中，费尔巴哈“在好些方面是黑格尔哲学和我们的观点之间的中间环节”。这表明，对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的超越构成历史唯物主义生成的重要环节。就此而言，当前学术界基于马克思对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的超越来探讨历史唯物主义生成的研究，主要从以下两个视角展开：其一，将费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说概括为以自然为基础的“类本质”学说，指出马克思和恩格斯认为费尔巴哈所理解的人是缺少社会关系维度的抽象的、孤立的个体，进而以“现实的个人”理论实现了对费尔巴哈“类本质”学说的超越；其二，将费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说概括为以“感性”为基础的学说，指出马克思和恩格斯认为费尔巴哈只把“直观”这一思维活动视为真正人的活动，进而以全面生产理论实现了对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的超越。上述研究，无疑彰显了马克思和恩格斯批判性超越费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说、进而推动历史唯物主义生成的重要特征。不过，前者尽管指出费尔巴哈“类本质”学说的抽象性特征，却未进一步强调感性维度在费尔巴哈超越以往观念论哲学中的地位。实际上，费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的主要贡献在于着重强调了感性主体不同于费希特知识学的理智主体，认为感性主体必须基于人的感性需要才能把握感性对象的本质。后者尽管用“感性直观”这一概念准确概括了费尔巴哈哲学的理论实质，指出其逻辑前提体现为感性的具体事物，却时常遮蔽类思维在“感性直观”学说中的重要地位，因为费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的另一主要贡献在于着重强调了不同于黑格尔精神哲学概念主体的感性主体，指出感性对象不是独立自主的概念的外化，而认为通过感性主体把握感性对象必须诉诸“类思维”这一思维抽象。

Precisely because of this, academic research on issues such as the status of Marx and Engels’ transcendence of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine in the process of the formation of historical materialism has also shown a tendency toward oversimplification. Re-examining, from the perspective of intellectual history, the logical path of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine formed in his transcendence of Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” and Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, how Marx’s early philosophical reflections were profoundly influenced by Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine, and especially the complete logic by which Marx and Engels transcended Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine through the theory of comprehensive production, is of great theoretical significance for deepening the study of the history of the formation of historical materialism and its essence.

正因如此，学术界围绕马克思和恩格斯超越费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说在历史唯物主义生成过程中的地位等问题的研究，也出现了某种简单化的倾向。而基于思想史视域重新考察费尔巴哈在对费希特“理智直观”和黑格尔精神哲学的超越过程中所形成的“感性直观”学说的逻辑进路，以及马克思早期的哲学思考何以受费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的深刻影响，特别是马克思和恩格斯以全面生产理论超越费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的完整逻辑，对于深化历史唯物主义生成史及其实质研究具有重要的理论意义。

I. Feuerbach’s Critique of Fichte’s “Intellectual Intuition” and Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit and the Essence of His Doctrine of “Perceptual Intuition”

一、费尔巴哈对费希特“理智直观”与黑格尔精神哲学的批判及其“感性直观”学说的实质

To understand why Marx’s transcendence of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine constitutes an important link in the formation of historical materialism, one must first grasp the internal logic of Feuerbach’s “perceptual intuition” doctrine and its status in intellectual history, especially how Feuerbach, by criticizing Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” and Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, attempted to resort to the “perceptual intuition” doctrine to re-achieve the identity of thinking and being.

要理解马克思对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的超越何以构成历史唯物主义生成的重要环节，首先须把握费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的内在逻辑及其思想史地位，特别是费尔巴哈何以通过批判费希特的“理智直观”与黑格尔的精神哲学，试图诉诸“感性直观”学说来重新实现思维与存在的同一。

Grasping the identity of thinking and being is the theme of philosophy, and German classical philosophy, since Kant’s “Copernican revolution,” had been continuously deepening the exploration of this issue. Fichte attempted to resort to “intellectual intuition” to resolve the theoretical dilemma of Kant’s philosophy, in which phenomena cannot grasp the thing-in-itself, pointing out that “intellectual intuition” requires an intellectual subject, namely the “I” [Ich], as the bearer of action. Its methodological embodiment of grasping the identity of thinking and being is manifested in the following two links: First, the existence of the human “I” cannot be understood as a mere fact, but must be understood as a transcendental act of the human spirit, because “that which is posited straightforwardly and is grounded in itself is the ground of a certain act of the human spirit (the entire Wissenschaftslehre will show, of all acts), and thus the pure character of the act; the pure character of the activity in itself, abstracted from its particular empirical conditions.” [1]1 Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794/95), in *Fichtes Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, vol. I (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), p. 91. The Chinese text quotes from the Chinese translation of Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation. And humans possess “the capacity to posit something straightforwardly.” Therefore, the intellectual subject, through its positing act, creates the “I,” and the “I” also confirms the act. Second, the human “I” posits itself through intellectual intuition, and “the I and the not-I are two products of the original act of the I,” [2]2 Ibid., p. 104. both of which are produced by the positing activity of the I. Therefore, the “I” simultaneously posits the “not-I” opposed to it. However, Fichte posited two kinds of “I” with different connotations: one is the “absolute I,” which can simultaneously posit the “I” and the “not-I.” It is a transcendental I created by the “free inner intuition” of “intellectual intuition,” and thus can presuppose the identity of the “I” and the “not-I.” The other is the “I” opposed to the “not-I,” which is a finite I confirmed by empirical activity, and thus this “I” is constantly in opposition to the “not-I.” Although Fichte pointed out that both of the above two kinds of “I” are the human “I,” he did not explain why these two mutually contradictory kinds of “I” could simultaneously become the essential determination of the human being, thus falling into the “contradiction between the pure ‘I’ and the empirical, real ‘I’,” [3]3 This phrase is a reference to a well-known critique of Fichte’s philosophy, often associated with Hegel’s *Differenzschrift* or later discussions of the dualism in Fichte’s system. that is, falling into the theoretical dilemma of the divergence between the transcendental I and the empirical I of the human being.

把握思维与存在的同一是哲学的主题，德国古典哲学自康德“哥白尼式的革命”之后就在不断深化对这一问题的探讨。费希特试图诉诸“理智直观”来化解康德哲学通过现象无法把握物自体的理论困境，指出“理智直观”需要一个理智主体即“自我”作为行动的承担者，其把握思维与存在相同一的方法论体现为如下两个环节：第一，人的“自我”的存在不能被理解为一个单纯的事实，而是必须被理解为一种人类精神的先验行动，因为“直截了当地被设定的、以自身为根据的东西，就是人类精神的某一行动(整个知识学将表明，是一切行动)的根据，从而是行动的纯粹品性；抽去其特殊经验条件的自在活动的纯粹品性”,而人则具有“直截了当地设定某物的能力”,因此，理智主体通过其设定行动创造着“自我”,“自我”也证实着行动。第二，人的“自我”通过理智直观设定自身，而“自我与非我是自我的原始行动的两个产物”,两者都是由自我的设定活动产生出来的，因此“自我”同时也设定与其相对立的“非我”。然而，费希特设定了两种具有不同内涵的“自我”:一种是能够同时设定“自我”与“非我”的“绝对自我”,它是由“理智直观”这一“自由的内在直观”创造出来的先验自我，因而能够预先设定“自我”与“非我”的同一；另一种是与“非我”相对立的“自我”,它是由经验活动加以确证的有限自我，因而这种“自我”时刻处于与“非我”的对立之中。费希特尽管指出上述两种“自我”都是人的“自我”,却未解释为何上述两种相互矛盾的“自我”能够同时成为人的本质规定，进而陷入“纯粹的‘自我’与经验的、现实的‘自我’之间的矛盾”,亦即陷入人的先验自我与经验自我相背离的理论困境之中。

In order to resolve the above theoretical predicament of Fichte’s philosophy, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit did not posit the human being as an intellectual subject as Fichte did, but instead, on the basis of inheriting Fichte’s idea of “intellectual intuition,” took the self-moving “concept” as the subject. On the one hand, Hegel, based on the “intellectual intuition” of Fichte’s philosophy, held that “substance is a movement that sets itself up, or an activity that mediates itself and transforms itself into another,”[4]4 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §18. that is, “substance is a doubling activity that creates opposition, and this activity again negates this indifferent difference, negates the opposition created by the activity.” This means that the self-movement of substance is essentially an activity of “intellectual intuition,” a process of “doubling” in which substance both creates itself and creates its object. On the other hand, Hegel held that the activity of “intellectual intuition” does not require positing an intellectual subject as the bearer of this activity, because presupposing an intellectual subject would lead to “the absolute opposition of subject and object,”[5]5 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy*, trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 155. thereby hindering the speculative movement from advancing to higher, more universal theoretical moments. Instead, “the concept is a free thing existing independently as a substantive power, and it is the totality.”[6]6 G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 601. The concept itself is directly the subject, and thus there is no need to presuppose a thinking human being as its premise. In other words, the concept itself can not only exist apart from the human being, but can also sublate itself through speculative activity. Furthermore, in Hegel’s philosophy, the concept can directly grasp actual things through speculative movement. Hegel pointed out that because the concept itself is directly the self-moving subject, the concept is not a “static, inert subject bearing various attributes.”[7]7 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §23. The movement process of the concept-subject is the transformation process of its various spiritual forms, and this transformation process in his philosophical system is the concrete unfolding of the “science of the experience of consciousness.” Hence, in the speculative movement of the concept, “drawing the determinations back into itself” constitutes the fundamental attribute of the concept-subject, thereby avoiding the opposition between the transcendental self and the empirical self. Based on the above understanding, Hegel believed that thinking activity does not need to obtain the concrete content of thought from perceptual experience, nor does it need to grasp the essence of empirical objects through thinking activity. Instead, he held that the concept, through the speculative activity of setting itself up and sublating itself, can transform itself into higher spiritual forms, thereby grasping the essence of the object of thought. However, as Schelling said, a concept-subject capable of “self-movement” cannot be grasped by empirical “intuition,” and the speculative system constructed on the basis of this mysterious concept-subject cannot be verified through “intuition.” Hegel’s philosophy of spirit inevitably leads to a new theoretical predicament where thought degenerates into abstract speculation divorced from experience.

为了化解费希特哲学的上述理论困境，黑格尔的精神哲学未像费希特那样将人设定为理智主体，而是在继承费希特“理智直观”思想的基础上将能够自行运动的“概念”视为主体。一方面，黑格尔基于费希特哲学的“理智直观”思想，认为“实体是一个自己设定自己的运动，或者说一个以自身为中介而转变为另一个东西的活动”,亦即“实体是一个造成对立的双重化活动，而这个活动重新否定了这个漠不相关的差异性，否定了活动造成的对立”,这意味着实体的自我运动实质上就是“理智直观”活动，是实体既创造自身、又创造对象的“双重化”的过程；另一方面，黑格尔认为“理智直观”活动并不需要设定理智主体作为这一活动的承载者，因为预设理智主体会导致“主体与客体的绝对对立”,进而阻碍思辨运动走向更高的、更具普遍性的理论环节。相反，“概念是作为独立存在着的、实体性的力量的自由东西，并且是总体”,概念本身直接就是主体，因而无须设定一个能够思维的人作为前提。换言之，概念本身不仅能够脱离人而存在，还能够通过思辨活动自己扬弃自己。进而言之，在黑格尔哲学中，概念可以通过思辨运动直接把握现实事物。黑格尔指出，由于概念自身直接就是自行运动的主体，因而概念并不是一个“静止不动的、承担着各种属性的主体”。概念主体的运动过程就是它的各种精神形态的转变过程，而这一转变过程在他的哲学体系中就是“意识的经验的科学”的具体展开，因而在概念的思辨运动中“把各种规定收回到自身内”构成概念主体的根本属性，由此可以避免先验自我与经验自我的对立。基于上述认识，黑格尔认为思维活动无须从感性经验中获得思维的具体内容，也无须通过思维活动把握经验对象的本质，而是认为概念可以通过自己设定自己、自己扬弃自己这一思辨活动向更高的精神形态转变，进而把握思维对象的本质。但是我们看到，正如谢林所说，一个能够“自行运动”的概念主体无法被经验的“直观”把握到，而基于这一神秘的概念主体所建构的思辨体系也无法通过“直观”加以验证，黑格尔的精神哲学必然导致思维沦为脱离经验的抽象思辨这一新的理论困境。

It can be seen that precisely because they neglected the important role of the “perceptual” principle, both Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” and Hegel’s “concept” subject fell into an insurmountable theoretical paradox, thus failing to achieve the identity of thought and being. In view of this, in order to achieve the identity of thought and being, Feuerbach first took “perception,” a philosophical premise with a materialist tendency, as the foundation of his doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” and attempted to overcome the theoretical paradoxes of Fichte’s philosophy and Hegel’s philosophy from the following two aspects:

可以看到，正是由于忽视了“感性”原则的重要作用，费希特的“理智直观”与黑格尔的“概念”主体均陷入一种难以克服的理论悖谬之中，从而无法实现思维与存在的同一。有鉴于此，费尔巴哈为了实现思维与存在的同一，首先把“感性”这一具有唯物主义倾向的哲学前提作为其“感性直观”学说的基础，并试图从以下两个方面克服费希特哲学与黑格尔哲学的理论悖谬：

On the one hand, unlike Fichte’s “intellectual intuition,” Feuerbach opposed confirming the identity of thought and being by positing the “self” and the “non-self” (object) within thinking activity, and instead pointed out that only by positing the perceptual subject and the perceptual object in “perceptual intuition” can the identity of thought and being be confirmed. The specific steps of his argument are as follows: First, Feuerbach believed that the human being as a subject is first and foremost determined by its inner perceptual needs. Based on the simple fact that human beings feel “hunger” and “thirst” and therefore need to eat and drink, he revealed that human beings have an irresistible need for external “food” and “drink,” thereby pointing out that the human being is not only an intellectual subject capable of determining objects in abstract thinking activity, but also a perceptual subject with perceptual needs. Second, based on the above facts, Feuerbach proposed the methodology of “perceptual intuition,” which differs from Fichte’s “intellectual intuition.” He pointed out that in the process of grasping the inner determinations of the object through the thinking activity of “perceptual intuition,” the perceptual subject must establish concrete, real perceptual connections with the object based on its “inherent and objective” perceptual needs, thereby attempting to overcome the inner contradiction between the transcendental self and the empirical self in Fichte’s methodology of “intellectual intuition.”

一方面，不同于费希特的“理智直观”,费尔巴哈反对通过在思维活动中设定“自我”与“非我”(对象)来确证思维与存在的同一，而指出唯有在“感性直观”中设定感性主体与感性对象才能确证思维与存在的同一。其具体论证环节如下：首先，费尔巴哈认为人作为主体首先要被其内在的感性需要所规定，他基于人会感到“饥饿”和“口渴”进而需要吃和喝的简单事实，揭示出人对外在的“食物”和“饮料”具有不可遏制的需要，由此指出人不仅是能够在抽象的思维活动中规定对象的理智主体，而且是具有感性需要的感性主体。其次，基于上述事实，费尔巴哈提出了“感性直观”这一不同于费希特“理智直观”的方法论，指出感性主体在通过“感性直观”这一思维活动把握对象内在规定的过程中，必须立足其“固有而又客观的”感性需要才能与对象产生具体的、现实的感性联系，由此试图克服费希特“理智直观”方法论中先验自我与经验自我之间的内在矛盾。

On the other hand, Feuerbach pointed out that the perceptual subject as “species-essence” differs from Hegel’s “concept” subject. He held that there is no self-moving concept-subject as posited by Hegel; there are only perceptual subjects with species-consciousness. Specifically, Feuerbach believed that abstract concepts cannot be directly regarded as actual things capable of self-movement. Only concrete objects that possess a perceptual “essence” and can display differences from other perceptual “essences” through “self-activity” are actual things. Among all perceptual “essences,” because the perceptual subject is a being with the thinking ability of “consciousness of the species,” the perceptual subject is not only an “essence” based on perception, but also a “species-essence” with universal consciousness. Based on this, Feuerbach held that although the self-moving “concept” reveals the abstract “logical” connection divorced from perceptual objects, it cannot grasp the inner essence of perceptual objects. Therefore, the theoretical essence of Hegel’s “concept” subject is to usurp perceptual experience with rational speculation, which inevitably leads to the theoretical predicament of the separation of abstract rational speculation and perceptual experience. Only by recognizing that true thinking activity must start from the fact that every object has a perceptual “essence,” and by grasping the “essence” formed by each object based on perception through the human being’s “species” thinking, can the above theoretical predicament of Hegel’s philosophy be overcome.

另一方面，费尔巴哈指出，作为“类本质”的感性主体不同于黑格尔的“概念”主体，他认为不存在像黑格尔所设定的自行运动的概念主体，而只有感性的、具有类意识的主体。具体而言，费尔巴哈认为不能将抽象概念直接视为能够自行运动的现实事物，具有感性“本质”、能够通过“自我活动”显示与其他感性“本质”之间的差异的具体对象才是现实事物，而在所有的感性“本质”之中，由于感性主体是具有“对类的意识”这一思维能力的存在物，因而感性主体不仅是以感性为基础的“本质”,更是具有普遍意识的“类本质”。基于此，费尔巴哈认为能够自行运动的“概念”虽然揭示出脱离了感性对象的抽象的“逻辑”关联，却无法把握感性对象的内在本质，因而黑格尔“概念”主体的理论实质是用理性思辨僭越感性经验，由此必然导致抽象的理性思辨与感性经验相分离这一理论困境，而只有认识到真正的思维活动必须从每个对象都具有感性“本质”的事实出发，通过人的“类”思维把握每个对象基于感性所形成的“本质”,才能摆脱黑格尔哲学的上述理论困境。

Thus, Feuerbach pointed out that both Fichte and Hegel neglected the important role of the “perceptual” principle, and that the true subject is the perceptual subject with perceptual needs, capable of grasping perceptual objects in intuition. Only by restoring the foundational philosophical status of “perception” and thereby constructing a complete doctrine of “perceptual intuition” can previous theoretical limitations be avoided. In other words, Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” attempted to reveal that the perceptual subject possesses a “species-essence,” emphasizing that the perceptual subject must rely on the activity of “intuition” to grasp perceptual objects, and only thus can the identity of thought and being be achieved.

由此可见，费尔巴哈指出，费希特与黑格尔均忽视了“感性”原则的重要作用，而真正的主体则是具有感性需要的、能够在直观中把握感性对象的感性主体，只有通过恢复“感性”的哲学基础地位，进而建构完整的“感性直观”学说，才能避免以往的理论局限。换言之，费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说试图通过揭示感性主体具有“类本质”,强调感性主体必须依靠“直观”活动才能把握感性对象，由此才能实现思维与存在的同一。

II. Why the Young Marx Was Deeply Influenced by Feuerbach’s Doctrine of “Perceptual Intuition”

二、青年马克思何以深受费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的影响

To rethink the important role of Marx’s transcendence of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in the genesis of historical materialism, it is also necessary to examine why the young Marx, in the course of his intellectual exploration, was deeply influenced by Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition.” In the course of his intellectual exploration, the young Marx encountered two theoretical perplexities caused by his inability to completely escape the theoretical limitations of Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” and Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, which hindered his correct understanding of the essence of actually existing “relations of right,” i.e., relations of rights. Before the establishment of historical materialism, Marx found that only Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” could help overcome these two theoretical perplexities. This is specifically manifested in the following two aspects:

重思马克思对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的超越在历史唯物主义生成过程中的重要作用，还需要考察青年马克思在其思想探索历程中何以深受费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的影响。青年马克思在其思想探索历程中曾遭遇无法完全摆脱费希特“理智直观”与黑格尔精神哲学的理论局限所导致的两个理论困惑，阻碍了其正确理解现实存在的“法的关系”即权利关系的实质。而在历史唯物主义创立之前，马克思发现只有费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说才有助于克服上述这两个理论困惑。这具体体现为如下两个方面：

The first dilemma encountered by the young Marx was that merely appealing to Fichte’s doctrine of “intellectual intuition” was utterly incapable of overcoming the opposition between “what exists and what ought to be.” During his period studying law at the University of Berlin, Marx resolved to pursue jurisprudence and recognized that law and philosophy were interwoven. Consequently, he not only read a large volume of legal literature but also attempted “to make a philosophy of law run through the entire field of law” [8]8 Marx, “Letter to His Father,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1, p. 12. — that is, to use Fichte’s philosophical thought to lay the theoretical foundation of a philosophy of law for the Roman legal system. In this process, Marx gradually realized that although Fichte’s doctrine of “intellectual intuition” provided a philosophical framework capable of simultaneously positing the object of thought and the thinking subject, this thinking subject could only “circle around things” and could not “carefully study the object itself from the development of the object,” nor could it cause the thing itself to “form a lively thing unfolding in many aspects.” This thereby exposed the theoretical limitation that Marx, based on Fichte’s doctrine of “intellectual intuition,” could not unify “what exists and what ought to be.” Marx’s effort to lay a philosophical foundation for the Roman legal system thus ultimately ended in failure.

青年马克思遭遇的第一个困境是，仅仅诉诸费希特的“理智直观”学说根本无法克服“现有之物和应有之物”之间的对立。马克思在柏林大学法律系读书时期立志研究法学，并认识到法学与哲学交织在一起，因而不仅阅读了大量法学文献，而且试图“使一种法哲学贯穿整个法的领域”,也就是用费希特的哲学思想为罗马法体系奠定法哲学的理论地基。在此过程中马克思逐渐认识到，费希特的“理智直观”学说虽然提供了能同时设定思维对象与思维主体的哲学框架，但是这一思维主体只能“围绕着事物转”,而无法“从对象的发展上细心研究对象本身”,亦无法使事物本身“形成一种多方面展开的生动的东西”,从而也暴露出马克思基于费希特“理智直观”学说无法统一“现有之物和应有之物”的理论局限，马克思由此为罗马法体系奠定法哲学地基的努力最终归于失败。

The second dilemma encountered by the young Marx was that, although he had discerned the theoretical limitation of Hegel’s “logical, pantheistic mysticism,” he was still perplexed as to which theory could be appealed to in order to overcome the aforementioned limitation. During his tenure as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx encountered a series of debates concerning how to correctly elucidate actually existing “relations of right,” such as the debate on the “law on the theft of wood” and the debate on the poverty of the peasant population in the Moselle region. In the process of reflecting on the relationship between the philosophy of right and real material interests, Marx realized that Hegel’s philosophy of right, starting solely from the “general development of the human spirit” — abstract right, morality, and ethical life — attempted to interpret the process of realizing individual rights as the developmental process of an independent human spirit. This interpretive path, when addressing the problem of material interests, precisely exposed the following dual theoretical predicament: First, Hegel inverted the relationship between concept and reality, asserting that sensuous objects cannot provide concrete content for speculative reason, while speculative reason in its self-movement can directly create experience. He thus held that the philosophy of right, which examines actual relations of right, is not generalized from concrete relations among real people, but is rather the result of the self-movement of the concepts of the philosophy of right. Consequently, he erroneously regarded the monarch as the incarnation of abstract state will, the bureaucratic estate as the executor of abstract universal will, and the landed estate as an abstract substantial estate, thereby falling theoretically into the error of “logical, pantheistic mysticism.” Second, because he used abstract concepts of the philosophy of right to cover up actual relations of right, Hegel also erroneously regarded the “private” estate as the “universal estate” and private interest as universal interest. For this reason, Marx pointed out that the “monarch,” the “bureaucratic” estate, and the “landed” estate are all essentially estates pursuing “private interest,” and thus are all representatives of “private interest,” none of which can represent the “universal interest” of society as a whole. Therefore, Hegel’s philosophy of right was even less able to elucidate the problem of material interests in practice. How to resolve this theoretical predicament of Hegel’s philosophy of right necessarily constituted the focus of Marx’s philosophical reflection at this time.

青年马克思遭遇的第二个困境是，虽然洞察出黑格尔“逻辑的、泛神论的神秘主义”的理论局限，但仍困惑于诉诸何种理论能够克服上述局限。马克思在《莱茵报》担任编辑期间遭遇关于如何正确阐明现实存在的“法的关系”的一系列论战，比如关于“林木盗窃法”的辩论、关于摩塞尔地区农民贫困状况问题的论战等。而在思考法哲学与现实物质利益之间的关系问题过程中，马克思意识到黑格尔法哲学仅从抽象法、道德、伦理这一“人类精神的一般发展”过程出发，试图将个人权利的实现历程解读为独立的人类精神的发展历程，这一解读路径在解决物质利益问题时恰恰暴露出如下双重理论困境：第一，黑格尔颠倒了概念与现实之间的关系，主张感性对象不能为思辨理性提供具体内容，而思辨理性在自我运动中则能够直接创造经验，进而认为考察现实权利关系的法哲学不是从现实的人与人之间的具体关系中概括而来，而是法哲学概念自身运动的结果，因此错误地将君主看作是抽象的国家意志的化身,将官僚等级看作是抽象的普遍意志的执行者,将土地等级看作是抽象的实体性等级,进而在理论上陷入“逻辑的、泛神论的神秘主义”的谬误之中；第二，由于用抽象的法哲学概念掩盖了现实的权利关系，黑格尔又错误地将“私人”等级视为“普遍等级”,将私人利益视为普遍利益，为此马克思指出“君王”“官僚”等级与“地产”等级本质上都是追求“私人利益”的等级,因而都只是“私人利益”的代表，其中每一方都无法代表社会整体的“普遍利益”,因此黑格尔法哲学在实践上更无法阐明物质利益问题。而如何化解黑格尔法哲学的这一理论困境，必然构成此时马克思哲学思考的重点。

It can be seen that, before the genesis of historical materialism, Marx could only actually rely on Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” to overcome the theoretical predicaments of Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” and Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, thereby responding to the two theoretical dilemmas he himself had encountered. In his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right, Marx drew upon and absorbed Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in the following two aspects:

可以看到，在历史唯物主义生成之前，马克思实际上只能以费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说来克服费希特“理智直观”与黑格尔精神哲学的理论困境，进而回应自身遭遇的两个理论困境。马克思在批判黑格尔法哲学时从如下两个方面对费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说加以借鉴和吸收：

On the one hand, Marx recognized that appealing to Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” could not resolve the opposition between “what exists and what ought to be,” but Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” precisely provided the intellectual resources to resolve Fichte’s theoretical predicament, and thereby could also resolve the theoretical dilemma Marx himself faced. For Feuerbach pointed out that “the object to which the subject essentially and necessarily relates is nothing other than the subject’s own, but objective, essence.” [9]9 Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 4. Furthermore, in Feuerbach’s view, the human being is not merely an intellectual subject engaged in abstract thinking, but a sensuous subject who can confirm his own essence in the object through perceptual intuition; all sensuous objects are merely manifestations of the human being’s sensuous essence. This undoubtedly reflects the materialist character of his doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in terms of its presuppositions of thought. Thus, Marx highly praised Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” holding that it revealed the basic principle that “it is man who creates religion, and not religion that creates man,” [10]10 Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3, p. 175. and thereby brought about the conclusion of German religious criticism.

一方面，马克思认识到，诉诸费希特的“理智直观”无法解决“现有之物和应有之物”之间的对立，但费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说恰恰可以提供解决费希特理论困境的思想资源，进而也可以解决自身面临的理论困境。因为费尔巴哈指出，“主体必然与其发生本质关系的那个对象，不外是这个主体固有而又客观的本质”,进而言之，在费尔巴哈这里，人不只是进行抽象思维的理智主体，而是能够通过感性直观在对象中确证自身本质的感性主体，一切感性对象都不过是人的感性本质的表现，这无疑体现出其“感性直观”学说在思维前提上的唯物主义特征。由此马克思对费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说予以高度评价，认为其揭示了“人创造了宗教，而不是宗教创造人”的基本原理，由此才促成德国宗教批判的结束。

On the other hand, Marx attempted to use the concept of “species-essence” in Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” to overcome Hegel’s “logical, pantheistic mysticism” paradigm of thought. Marx pointed out that the object of the philosophy of right is not the private will representing private interest, but the universal will capable of representing the overall interest of society, i.e., the “species-will.” This universal “species-will” does not require that empirical individuals be transformed into mysterious, self-moving incarnations of concepts; it is directly “the will of the people possessing self-consciousness.” [11]11 Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3, p. 30. In other words, the “species-will” is the conscious expression of “species-activity,” that is, social activity with the people as the subject and capable of satisfying social needs. Feuerbach’s concept of “species-essence” was precisely the intellectual background supporting Marx’s formation of the above understanding.

另一方面，马克思试图以费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说中的“类本质”概念克服黑格尔“逻辑的、泛神论的神秘主义”思维范式。马克思指出，法哲学的研究对象不是代表私人利益的私人意志，而是能够代表社会整体利益的普遍意志即“类意志”,这种具有普遍性的“类意志”无须让经验中的个体转变为神秘的、能够自行运动的概念的化身，它直接就是“具有自我意识的人民意志”。换言之，“类意志”就是以人民为主体、能够满足社会需要的社会活动这种“类活动”的有意识的表达，而费尔巴哈的“类本质”概念恰恰是马克思形成上述认识的思想支援背景。

Moreover, after completing his questioning of Fichte’s “intellectual intuition” and his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right, and because he had not yet created historical materialism as a theoretical weapon for analyzing civil society, the critique of classical political economy in the *Paris Manuscripts* was still inspired by Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in the following two aspects:

不仅如此，在完成对费希特“理智直观”的质疑和对黑格尔法哲学的批判之后，由于未能创立历史唯物主义这一分析市民社会的理论武器，《巴黎手稿》对古典政治经济学的批判依然在如下两个方面受到了费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的启发：

On the one hand, Marx used Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” to critique the phenomena of “money alienation” and “labor alienation,” revealing that the cause of these alienations lay in classical political economy’s treatment of the human being as subject as an egoist, thereby regarding the accumulation of material wealth as the driving force of historical progress. First, Marx, based on Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” critiqued the phenomenon of “money alienation,” pointing out that the process of its generation can be divided into three theoretical links: “(1) private property for private property; (2) society for private property; (3) private property for society.” [12]12 Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3, p. 293. In particular, in the theoretical link of “private property for society,” Marx pointed out that the subject of classical political economy, in the “credit system,” shows itself not to be an authentic human being with a “social essence,” but an alienated, egoistic human being, and that money is the objectification of human egoism. This thereby exposed the theoretical essence of classical political economy as treating egoism as the essence of the human being, which is highly consistent with the argumentative approach of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in revealing religion as the alienation of the human essence. Second, in appealing to Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” to expound the sensuous manifestation of private property, Marx pointed out that the relationship between the human being under conditions of alienated labor and sensuous objects is one of “possession” or “having.” This relationship of “possession” or “having” of sensuous objects by the human being proves that the human being under conditions of alienated labor is not a human being with a social essence, but a human being with an egoistic nature, because his “need and enjoyment” of sensuous objects directly have an “egoistic character.” [13]13 Ibid., p. 300. The above understanding of Marx borrowed to a certain extent from the thought of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” which held that all sensuous objects are merely manifestations of the human essence.

一方面，马克思运用费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说批判“货币异化”与“劳动异化”现象，揭示出造成上述异化的原因在于古典政治经济学将作为主体的人视为利己主义者，进而将追求物质财富的积累视为历史进步的动力。首先，马克思基于费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说对“货币异化”现象展开批判，指出“货币异化”现象的生成过程可以分为三个理论环节，即“(1)为了私有财产的私有财产；(2)为了私有财产的社会；(3)为了社会的私有财产”。特别是在“为了社会的私有财产”这一理论环节中，马克思指出古典政治经济学的主体在“信用业”中显示出其并非具有“社会本质”的本真的人，而是异化的、利己主义的人，而货币是人的利己性的对象化，进而暴露出古典政治经济学的理论实质在于将利己性视为人的本质，这与费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说揭示宗教是人的本质的异化的论证思路高度一致。其次，在诉诸费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说阐述私有财产的感性表现时，马克思指出，处于异化劳动条件下的人与感性对象之间的关系是“占有”或“拥有”关系,这种人对感性对象的“占有”或“拥有”关系证明了处于异化劳动状况下的人不是具有社会本质的人，而是具有利己性的人，因为其对感性对象的“需要和享受”直接具有“利己主义性质”。马克思的上述认识在一定程度上借用了费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说所指出的一切感性对象都不过是人的本质的表现的思想。

On the other hand, in the process of his critique of Hegel’s dialectics and philosophy as a whole, Marx made use of Feuerbach’s concept of “species-essence” [Gattungswesen], thereby revealing that the error of Hegel’s philosophy lay not only in positing a mystical conceptual subject, but also in equating the essence of man with abstract self-consciousness. In the *Paris Manuscripts*, Marx not only pointed out that Feuerbach had truly overcome Hegel’s philosophy, but also summarized the main theoretical contribution of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” as revealing “the affirmative which is based upon itself and positively grounded in itself,” noting that this “affirmative” in Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” is the immanent “species-essence” [Gattungswesen]. He held that the concept of “species-essence” must be understood in two aspects: first, “species-essence” must be regarded as “natural being” [Naturwesen], i.e., man is to be seen as a being with an objective essence, and man’s objective essence is expressed in an irrepressible need for perceptual objects, thereby pointing out that perceptual objects are undoubtedly “indispensable and important objects for the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers” — this is consistent with Feuerbach’s view and line of thought that all natural beings possess “productive essential powers” [Wesenskraft] and have an “objective” [gegenständliche] essence; second, “species-essence” must be understood as a being with “species-consciousness.” Marx pointed out that man is not only a natural being, but also a “species-being” [Gattungswesen], and therefore “must confirm and manifest himself both in his being and in his knowledge” — this is similar to Feuerbach’s claim that man possesses a universal “species” thinking. Thus, it is precisely by appealing to Feuerbach’s concept of “species-essence” that Marx reveals the theoretical limitation of Hegel’s philosophy: it regards the subject merely as abstract “self-consciousness,” i.e., a “non-objective, spiritualistic being,” leading Hegel to neglect the perceptual essence of objects and thereby to treat the inner essence of objects as the self-determination of abstract spirit.

另一方面，马克思在对黑格尔的辩证法和整个哲学的批判过程中，运用了费尔巴哈的“类本质”概念，以此揭示出黑格尔哲学的谬误不仅在于设定了神秘的概念主体，而且将人的本质等同于抽象的自我意识。在《巴黎手稿》中，马克思不仅指出费尔巴哈真正克服了黑格尔哲学，而且将费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的主要理论贡献概括为揭示了“基于自身并且积极地以自身为根据的肯定的东西”,指出这一“肯定的东西”在费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说中就是内在固有的“类本质(Gattungswesen)”,认为对于“类本质”概念要从两个方面加以理解：一是必须将“类本质”视为“自然存在物(Naturwesen)”,亦即将人视作具有客观本质的存在者，而人的客观本质则表现为对感性对象具有不可遏制的需要，由此指出感性对象无疑是“表现和确证他的本质力量所不可缺少的、重要的对象”,而这与费尔巴哈的一切自然存在物都具有“生产性的本质力量(Wesenskraft)”且都具有“对象性的(gegenständliche)本质”的观点和思路相一致；二是必须将“类本质”理解为具有“类意识”的存在物，马克思指出人不仅是自然存在物，而且也是“类存在物(Gattungswesen)”,因而“必须既在自己的存在中也在自己的知识中确证并表现自身”,这与费尔巴哈所说的人具有普遍性的“类”思维有相似之处。可见，正是通过诉诸费尔巴哈的“类本质”概念，马克思揭示出黑格尔哲学的理论局限就在于他仅仅将主体视为抽象的“自我意识”,即 “非对象性的、唯灵论的存在物”,从而导致黑格尔忽视对象的感性本质，进而将对象的内在本质都视为抽象精神的自我规定。

III. Why the Transcendence of Feuerbach’s Doctrine of “Perceptual Intuition” Constitutes an Important Link in the Genesis of Historical Materialism

三、对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的超越何以构成历史唯物主义生成的重要环节

Through his philosophical explorations during the Paris period, Marx gradually came to realize that, because Feuerbach regarded only “perceptual intuition” — this “theoretical activity” — as “truly human activity,” it could exert no real influence on objective reality. If one merely appealed to Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” one could at most attain a moral critique of the alienated phenomena of real capitalist society, and could never truly change the state of human unfreedom in reality. Furthermore, only by thoroughly transcending Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” establishing a scientific theory of history and bringing it to bear on objective reality, could one find a scientific path to realize the identity of thinking and being, and thereby truly realize the actualization of philosophy. Therefore, after affirming and actively employing Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in works such as the *Paris Manuscripts*, Marx quickly turned to revealing and criticizing the theoretical limitations of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” in the *Theses on Feuerbach* and *The German Ideology*, taking this as an important link in the genesis of historical materialism. Its specific line of thought is manifested in the following two aspects:

经过巴黎时期的哲学探索，马克思逐渐认识到，由于费尔巴哈仅仅把“感性直观”这一“理论的活动看做是真正人的活动”,因此它无法对客观现实产生真正的影响，而如若仅仅诉诸费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说，也只能达至对现实资本主义社会异化现象的道德批判，根本无法真正改变现实中人的不自由状况。进而言之，只有彻底超越费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说，创立科学的历史理论并发挥其对客观现实的真正影响，才能找到实现思维与存在相同一的科学路径，进而真正实现哲学的现实化。因此，马克思经由在《巴黎手稿》等著作中对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的肯定与积极运用，迅速转向在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》《德意志意识形态》中对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说理论局限的揭示与批判，并以此作为历史唯物主义生成的重要环节。其具体思路体现在如下两个方面：

First, the *Theses on Feuerbach* criticizes and transcends Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” with the theory of “objective activity.”

第一，《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》以“对象性活动”理论批判并超越了费尔巴哈的“感性直观”学说。

The *Theses on Feuerbach* states at the outset that Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” “regards objects, reality, and the perceptual only in the form of the object or of intuition,” i.e., the “intuitive” activity of this perceptual subject can only present the inner essence behind perceptual objects in thought, rather than realizing the unity of the perceptual subject and the perceptual object (object) in reality. Consequently, Feuerbach is compelled to presuppose a “species-essence” with the character of a transcendental entity that can unify the perceptual subject and the perceptual object (object), and to reject practical activity as an egoistic activity that destroys the unity of subject and object (object), thereby leading to the following dual limitations in Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition”:

《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》开宗明义，指出费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说“对对象、现实、感性，只是从客体的或者直观的形式去理解”,亦即这种感性主体的“直观”活动只能在思维中呈现出感性对象背后的内在本质，而不是在现实中实现感性主体与感性客体(对象)的统一，因而费尔巴哈不得不预设能统一感性主体与感性客体(对象)的具有先验实体特征的“类本质”,并将实践活动视作破坏主体与客体(对象)统一性的利己主义活动而加以拒斥，进而导致费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说存在如下双重局限：

The first limitation is that Feuerbach understands the activity of the perceptual subject solely on the basis of “intuition” as a mental activity. Marx points out that Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” regards only “intuition” as a mental activity as “objectifying” activity, and does not understand “objective activity,” i.e., practical activity, as genuine “objectifying” activity. Thus, although Feuerbach correctly understands the perceptual subject as a subject that can grasp its own essence by appealing to perceptual objects, he holds that “intuition” as a mental activity is the true activity of the perceptual subject, capable of presenting man’s true essence, while concrete practical activity is disparaged by Feuerbach as the activity of the “filthy Jew,” i.e., egoistic activity, and is excluded from truly human activity.

第一个局限体现在费尔巴哈仅仅基于“直观”这一思维活动来理解感性主体的活动。马克思指出，费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说仅仅将“直观”这一思维活动理解为“对象化”活动，而没有把“对象性活动”即实践活动理解为真正的“对象化”活动。由此，费尔巴哈虽然正确地将感性主体理解为能够诉诸感性对象把握自身本质的主体，却认为“直观”这一思维活动才是感性主体的真正活动，才能呈现人自身的真正本质，而具体的实践活动则被费尔巴哈贬斥为“卑污的犹太人”的活动即利己活动而被排斥在真正的人的活动之外。

The second limitation is that Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” grasps the essence of the perceptual subject solely on the basis of the theoretical presupposition of “species-essence.” Although Feuerbach does not grasp the essence of the subject from the perspective of an intellectual subject or a conceptual subject, his approach, which is based on “the perceptual comes first” and extracts the “species-essence” through rational thought to grasp the essence of the subject, does not derive this essence through concrete “perceptual activity,” i.e., practical activity, but remains at the level of an innate, inherent inner essence. It can only manifest itself as “an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals in a natural way,” and therefore it is necessarily regarded as a transcendental presupposition for explaining the concrete forms of human practical activity.

第二个局限体现在费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说仅仅基于“类本质”这一理论预设来把握感性主体的本质。费尔巴哈虽然没有从理智主体或概念主体视角把握主体的本质，但其立足于“感性在先”并通过理性思维提炼出“类本质”来把握主体的本质，这一本质并非通过具体的“感性的活动”即实践活动提炼总结出来，而仍停留在先天固有的内在本质层面，只能体现为“一种内在的、无声的、把许多个人自然地联系起来的普遍性”,因此它必然被看作是为了解释人的实践活动之具体形式的先验预设。

The *Theses on Feuerbach* criticizes and transcends the above two theoretical limitations of Feuerbach from the following two aspects: First, Marx specifically criticizes Feuerbach for not understanding “real, perceptual activity,” i.e., practical activity itself, pointing out that perceptual objects should not be interpreted, as Feuerbach does, merely as “perceptual objects” that are intuited, but should be regarded as products of human practical activity. In practical activity, the perceptual subject not only transforms the perceptual object, but the perceptual subject itself is also transformed accordingly. Second, Marx holds that the essence of man should not be understood as “an abstraction inherent in each single individual,” but must be understood as the ensemble of all social relations constructed through man’s “perceptual activity,” i.e., practical activity.

《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》从如下两个方面批判并超越了费尔巴哈的上述两个理论局限：首先，马克思专门批判费尔巴哈不了解“现实的、感性的活动”即实践活动本身，指出不能像费尔巴哈那样将感性对象仅仅解读为被直观到的“感性客体”,而应将感性对象视为人的实践活动的产物。在实践活动中，感性主体不仅改造了感性对象，而且感性主体自身也随之得到改造。其次，马克思认为不能将人的本质理解为“单个人所固有的抽象物”,而是必须将其理解为通过人的“感性的活动”即实践活动所建构起来的一切社会关系的总和。

Second, *The German Ideology* deepens the critique and transcendence of Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition” found in the *Theses on Feuerbach* through the theory of total production, thereby promoting the genesis of historical materialism. This is concretely manifested in the following two aspects:

第二，《德意志意识形态》则通过全面生产理论，深化了《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》对费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说的批判与超越，推动了历史唯物主义的生成。这具体体现在如下两个方面：

First, Marx and Engels elucidated the laws of human social development through the theory of “comprehensive production,” criticizing and transcending Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” which was based on the activity of “species” thinking. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels concretized the concept of “practice” from the *Theses on Feuerbach*, explicitly summarizing human material productive activity into five types of production with a logical progressive relationship: the production of material means of subsistence, the production of new needs, the reproduction of the population, the production of social relations, and spiritual production. Among these five types of production, since the production of material means of subsistence “is the fundamental condition of all history,” and the already satisfied “first need,” the “activity of satisfying needs,” and the “tools used to satisfy needs” together give rise to the production of new needs as the “first historical act,” this objectively drives changes in the mode of production. It can thus be understood that elucidating the process of change in the material mode of production is the key link in interpreting the objective developmental process of human history. From this, Marx and Engels revealed that the activity of “perceptual intuition,” which grasps perceptual objects through direct observation, cannot fundamentally grasp the objective developmental process of human history. Therefore, although the philosophical premise of Feuerbach is not the “idea,” “self-consciousness,” or “the Unique One” [17]17 “The Unique One” (der Einzige) is a term from Max Stirner’s *The Ego and Its Own*, which Marx and Engels criticized in *The German Ideology*. as claimed by other idealists, this philosophy, by grasping perceptual objects through perceptual intuition, fundamentally fails to see that “the sensuous world around him is not a thing given directly from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations.” [18]18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 39. The perceptual objects it grasps are those unrelated to human productive practice; they are in fact perceptual objects “that existed prior to human history.” [19]19 Ibid., p. 40. Consequently, it is utterly incapable of solving the riddle of human history.

首先，马克思和恩格斯以“全面生产”理论阐明人类社会发展规律，批判并超越了费尔巴哈以“类”思维活动为基础的“感性直观”学说。在《德意志意识形态》中，马克思和恩格斯将《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中的“实践”概念具体化，将人的物质生产活动明确概括为具有逻辑递进关系的五种生产：物质生活资料生产、新的需要的产生、人口繁殖、社会关系生产以及精神生产。在这五种生产中，由于生产物质生活资料“是一切历史的基本条件”,而已经得到满足的“第一个需要”“满足需要的活动”以及“满足需要而用的工具”三者共同引发了作为“第一个历史活动”的新的需要的生产，在客观上推动了生产方式的变迁。进而可以得知，阐明物质生产方式的变迁过程才是解读人类历史客观发展进程的关键环节，由此马克思和恩格斯揭示出通过直观把握感性对象的“感性直观”活动无法从根本上把握人类历史客观发展进程，因而尽管费尔巴哈的哲学前提并非其他观念论者所说的“观念”“自我意识”或“唯一者”,但这种哲学通过感性直观把握感性对象，根本看不到“他周围的感性世界决不是某种开天辟地以来就直接存在的、始终如一的东西，而是工业和社会状况的产物，是历史的产物，是世世代代活动的结果”,其所把握的感性对象是与人的生产实践无关的感性对象，实际上是“先于人类历史而存在的”感性对象，因而根本无法解答人类历史之谜。

Second, Marx and Engels replaced and transcended the “species-essence” thinking inherent in Feuerbach’s doctrine of “perceptual intuition,” which bore the character of a transcendental entity, with the theory of “relations of production.” Marx and Engels held that although Feuerbach appealed to the perceptual first, positing an infinite “species-essence” through perceptual intuition, and regarded all ideas and consciousness generated by illusory ideology as “religious ideas” and “religious consciousness,” thereby providing a supporting background for revealing the actual causes of illusory ideology, because he “regards men only as ‘perceptual objects’” and fails to “observe men from their existing social connections, from the surrounding living conditions that make them what they are,” [20]20 Ibid., p. 41. he is not only unable to clarify the actual causes of illusory ideology but also powerless to overcome through practical activity the social alienation that gives rise to illusory ideology. Based on the theory of comprehensive production, Marx and Engels pointed out that all illusory ideology originates from the “naturally arisen” division of labor, and the only method to overcome illusory ideology is to resort to the establishment of a genuine community, thereby abolishing the “naturally arisen” division of labor. In view of this, there is no need to posit the transcendental entity of “species-essence”; directly analyzing the condition of “relations of production” under a specific mode of production can reveal the actual causes of illusory ideology. From this, they proposed the concrete plan of abolishing capitalist private property to overcome the condition of social alienation, pointing out that only in this way can the development and progress of human history be advanced. (Author affiliations: Tsinghua University)

其次，马克思和恩格斯以“生产关系”理论取代并超越了费尔巴哈“感性直观”学说所蕴含的具有先验实体特征的“类本质”思维。马克思和恩格斯认为，尽管费尔巴哈诉诸感性在先，通过感性直观设定了具有无限性的“类本质”,并将一切由虚幻意识形态产生的观念与意识都看作是“宗教观念”和“宗教意识”,进而为揭示虚幻意识形态的现实成因提供了支援背景，但由于他“把人只看做是‘感性对象’”,而未能“从人们现有的社会联系，从那些使人们成为现在这种样子的周围生活条件来观察人们”,因而不仅无法阐明虚幻意识形态的现实成因，更无力通过实践活动克服造成虚幻意识形态的社会异化状况。基于全面生产理论，马克思和恩格斯指出，一切虚幻意识形态根源于“自然形成的”分工状况，而克服虚幻意识形态的方法唯有诉诸建立真正的共同体，进而消灭“自然形成的”分工。有鉴于此，无须设定“类本质”这一先验实体，直接通过对特定生产方式下的“生产关系”状况的分析就能揭示虚幻意识形态的现实成因，并由此提出消灭资本主义私有制这一克服社会异化状况的具体方案，指出唯此才能推动人类历史的发展与进步。（作者单位：清华大学）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗