The Temporal Horizon of Marx’s Dialectic and Its Historical Significance

Temporality and dialectic occupy a very important position in Marx’s philosophy. Academic circles have already conducted extensive and in-depth discussions on the connotations and significance of both, but explorations of the temporal horizon of dialectic have rarely been carried out. Current research on this issue is concentrated on the relationship between dialectic and history. First, it explains the consistency between dialectic and historical movement. For example, Wu Xiaoming holds that Marx’s dialectic “is the historicity that uniquely lives within ‘real history’.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition,” Capital, vol. 1, in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 35 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996), p. 20. Second, it explains the inner unity of dialectic and history. For example, Xue Jinxi argues that “Marx’s historical dialectic possesses the dual purport of ideological critique and revealing the historical determinacy of social existence.” [2]2 Liu Shaoming, “Marx’s Dialectic and the Temporality of the Subject,” Philosophical Research, no. 3 (2020), p. 25. Third, it explains the mutual interpretive model of dialectic and history. For example, Peng Shuangzhen, through elaborating “the theoretical mutual interpretation of Marx’s dialectic and the conception of history,” [3]3 Ibid., p. 26. reveals the historical foundation of Marx’s dialectic and the dialectical nature of history. However, none of these three aspects of research explain the role of Marx’s temporality in the manifestation of dialectic, nor do they highlight the important significance of dialectic under Marx’s temporal horizon.

时间性与辩证法在马克思哲学中具有十分重要的位置。学术界对两者内涵与意义的探讨已经十分广泛和深入，但是对辩证法的时间性视域的探讨鲜有展开。目前对这一问题的相关研究集中在辩证法与历史的关系方面。第一，说明辩证法与历史运动的一致性。比如，吴晓明认为马克思的辩证法“是唯一地生存于‘现实历史’中的历史性”。第二，说明辩证法与历史的内在统一。比如，薛晋锡认为“马克思历史辩证法具有意识形态批判和揭示社会存在历史规定性的双重旨趣”。第三，说明辩证法与历史的互相阐释模式。比如，彭双贞通过阐述“马克思辩证法与历史观的理论互释”,揭示马克思辩证法的历史基础和历史的辩证法本性。但是，这三个方面的研究都没有说明马克思的时间性对于辩证法的显现作用，也没有彰显马克思时间性视域下辩证法的重要意义。

This article argues that the phenomenological primordial time in Marx’s theory is the condition for the manifestation of the subject, the negative character, and the basic forms of his dialectic. Primordial time is temporality distinct from abstract time, and the manifesting function of temporality is accomplished through phenomenological reduction. In terms of the path of reasoning, dialectic and phenomenological method are two methods with principled differences. The core difference lies in their attitudes toward immediacy (Husserl’s intuition and Heidegger’s being-in-the-world) and mediation (the self-mediation and negation of absolute spirit represented by Hegel). Phenomenological method values direct givenness based on transcendental reduction, opposes the transcendental gap created by abstract and presupposed mediation and negativity, and advocates “manifesting itself within itself” in direct givenness. Dialectic, by contrast, tends to take opposition, difference, and mediation as basic concepts, opposes “superficial” immediacy, and holds that one must use self-negation as a ladder within mediation to achieve the self-development of the dialectical subject. However, dialectic and phenomenological method are not two incompatible methods. Husserl attempted to combine these two methods: he used the intuitive constitution of concepts and categories by the human being in the life-world to “analyze the constitutive role of the intentional conscious activities of the intersubjective subject for them, which in fact lays a phenomenological foundation for dialectic.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 27. Therefore, an important approach to combining dialectic and phenomenological method is to take the immediacy after transcendental reduction as the condition for the manifestation of mediation and negativity. In the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists, the primordial givenness of immediacy is not static but contains a temporal “horizon” (Horizont). “Any understanding of Being must take time as its horizon,” [5]5 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 41. and the temporal horizon becomes the condition for the manifestation of things. Merleau-Ponty holds that “time is the foundation and measure of our spontaneity, the power of outward transcendence and ‘nihilation’,” [6]6 Ibid., p. 42. and the temporal horizon can manifest the negativity of dialectic. Similarly, Marx’s philosophy employs a method akin to phenomenological transcendental reduction, reducing the individual, nature, and society to perceptual practical activity for manifestation. The temporality constituted by the subject of primordial perceptual practical activity and its movement contains a triple horizon: simultaneity, futurity, and historical field. Therefore, Marx’s dialectic is manifested from this triple temporal horizon: the opposing human being and nature, and the individual and society in dialectic, are manifested as the direct subject of dialectic within the horizon of simultaneity; the self-negation of the subject emerges in future-oriented perceptual practical activity; and the dialectical forms of the negation of the negation and the unity of opposites unfold within the historical field where the past, present, and future of practical activity are unified. Moreover, the practical subject, within its own temporality, manifests the phenomena of mediation, negativity, and development inherent in itself. This dialectical phenomenon coincides with Heidegger’s definition of phenomenon — “that which shows itself in itself, the manifest.” [7]7 Karl Marx, “Comments on James Mill,” in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 217. Thus, Marx’s philosophy, through the temporal horizon contained in the immediacy of perceptual practical activity, manifests the mediation and negativity of dialectic, enabling an appropriate fusion of dialectic and phenomenological method. This also explains the important breakthrough of Marx’s philosophy in dialectical theory and demonstrates the revolutionary significance of temporal dialectic over non-temporal dialectic.

本文认为，马克思理论中的现象学式的原初时间是其辩证法主体、否定特性与基本形式的显现条件。原初时间就是不同于抽象时间的时间性，时间性的显现作用是通过现象学还原而完成的。从运思路径上说，辩证法与现象学方法是有着原则性区别的两种方法，最核心的区别在于，对待直接性(胡塞尔的直观和海德格尔的在-世界-中-存在)和中介性(以黑格尔为代表的绝对精神的自我中介和否定)的态度不一样。现象学方法重视超越论还原基础上的直接给予，反对抽象和预设的中介性和否定性造成的超越性鸿沟，主张在直接给予的“自身之中显现自身”。而辩证法则倾向于以对立性、差异性和中介性为基本概念，反对“肤浅”的直接性，认为要在中介性中以自我否定为阶梯，实现辩证法主体的自我发展。但是，辩证法与现象学方法并非两种不可相容的方法。胡塞尔就试图结合这两种方法，他用生活世界中人的直观构造概念和范畴，“分析主体际的意向的意识活动对它们的构成作用，这实际上是为辩证法奠定一个现象学的基础”。因此，辩证法与现象学方法结合的重要思路就是以超越论还原后的直接性作为间接性和否定性显现的条件。在胡塞尔、海德格尔、梅洛-庞蒂等现象学家的现象学中，原初的直接性给予都不是静态的，而是蕴含一个时间性“视域”(Horizont),“任何一种存在之理解都必须以时间为其视野”,时间性视域成为事物显现的条件。梅洛-庞蒂认为，“时间是我们的自发性的基础与尺度，是那种向外超越和‘虚无化’的力量”,时间性视域可以显现辩证法的否定性。类似地，马克思哲学运用了现象学式的超越论还原方法，将个人、自然和社会还原到感性实践活动之上显现。原初感性实践活动主体及其运动所构造的时间性，蕴含三重视域：同时性、未来性和历史场域。因此，马克思辩证法从这三重时间性视域中得以显现：辩证法中对立的人与自然、个人与社会在同时性视域中显现为直接的辩证法主体；主体的自我否定在面向未来的感性实践活动中出场；否定之否定和对立统一的辩证法形式在实践活动的过去、现在与未来统一的历史场域中得到展开。并且，实践主体在自身的时间性中显现自身蕴含的间接性、否定性与发展性现象，这种辩证法现象与海德格尔对现象的定义——“就其自身显示自身者，公开者”——不谋而合。所以，马克思哲学以直接性的感性实践活动蕴含的时间视域，显现了间接性和否定性的辩证法，使得辩证法与现象学方法得以恰当融合。这也说明了马克思哲学在辩证法理论上的重要突破，展现了时间性的辩证法对非时间性的辩证法的革命性变革意义。

I. Primordial Simultaneity: The Transcendental Temporal Horizon of the Dialectical Subject

一、原初的同时性：辩证法主体的超越论时间性视域

Discussions of the subject of Marx’s dialectic contain two seemingly inconsistent views. One view holds that “the active subject of Marx’s dialectic is established society,” [8]8 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 336. while the other holds that dialectic “is based on human’s active perceptual practical activity.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 337. In fact, these two views are one and the same, because the former must acknowledge that Marx’s dialectic is “displaced onto the foundation of ‘objective activity’ or ‘perceptual practical activity’,” [10]10 Liu, “Marx’s Dialectic and the Temporality of the Subject,” p. 28. and the latter must also acknowledge “the sociality of production.” [11]11 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 276. So, is the subject of Marx’s dialectic society or perceptual practical activity? From the inner consistency of these two views, it can be seen that both society and human practical activity are indispensable parts of the dialectical subject. Society and human practical activity are analytical conclusions drawn from a reflective examination of the subject of Marx’s dialectic, but in fact, both are already primordially contained within the subject after transcendental reduction, making the individual-society practical activity as a whole the true subject of dialectic. The reason Marx was able to implement transcendental reduction on the dialectical subject is that the dialectical subject is grounded in a foundation of primordial temporality of simultaneity. Primordial simultaneity, as the primordial givenness after phenomenological reduction, is the condition for the manifestation of the dialectical subject. This primordial simultaneity is embodied in two aspects within Marx’s dialectical subject.

对马克思辩证法主体的探讨包含两种看似不一致的观点。一种观点认为“马克思辩证法的活动者主体乃是既定社会”,另一种观点认为辩证法“立足于人的能动的感性实践活动”。实际上，这两种观点是一种观点，因为前者需要承认马克思辩证法被“移置到‘对象性的活动’或‘感性实践活动’的基础之上”,后者也必须承认“生产的社会性”。那么，马克思辩证法的主体到底是社会还是感性实践活动?从这两种观点的内在一致性可以看出，社会与人的实践活动都是辩证法主体必不可少的部分。社会与人的实践活动是对马克思辩证法主体进行反思性考察而得出的分析性结论，但事实上，两者已经原初地包含在超越论还原之后的主体中，这使得个人-社会的实践活动作为一个整体成为辩证法的真正主体。而马克思之所以能够对辩证法主体实施超越论还原，是因为辩证法主体被奠定在一种原初的同时性的时间性基础之上。原初的同时性作为现象学还原后的原初被给予，是辩证法主体得以显现的条件。这种原初的同时性在马克思的辩证法主体中体现为两个方面。

First, the subjective and the objective are unified in primordial simultaneity.

第一，主观与客观在原初的同时性中被统一。

To resolve the problems of truth, existence, and the confirmation of species-essence, Marx carried out a transcendental reduction of the “subjective” and the “objective,” placing them on the same plane for understanding. The so-called transcendental reduction means suspending the transcendence of the “objective” over the “subjective” and pulling it back to be understood within the perceptual practical activity and practice that serve as the ground of their manifestation. This understanding is consistent with Husserl’s transcendental reduction: “an attempt to explain objectivity as a product constituted within transcendental subjectivity.” [12]12 Ibid., p. 277. This is also the reason Marx criticizes Feuerbach for not treating objects or objective reality “as human perceptual practical activity, as practice, not from the perspective of the subject.” [13]13 Liu, “Marx’s Dialectic and the Temporality of the Subject,” p. 29. In fact, only by proceeding from the subject’s perceptual practical activity can nature be explained, thereby grasping nature as an object as “humanistic nature.” [14]14 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 277. Of course, Marx’s reduction of the “transcendence” between subject and object is not as radical as Husserl’s, which understands the object in terms of “immanence,” but rather from the perspective of co-manifestation, i.e., both the subjective and the objective manifest themselves in perceptual practical activity. The “immanent” aspect is purely subjective material, but for Marx, “perception” as subjective material is not purely subjective consciousness; it is “at the same time” objective. This simultaneity can be discussed from both the active and passive aspects. From the active aspect, “perception” is both the perceptual object and the expression of the human self. Marx holds that “man has real, perceptual objects as objects of his essence, i.e., as objects of his life-expression,” [15]15 Ibid., p. 336. so when man actively expresses his life, he simultaneously manifests the perceptual object; both appear together in this perceptual practical activity. From the passive aspect, “perception” is not purely immanent consciousness, because “to say that a thing is perceptual means that it is passive,” [16]16 Ibid., p. 337. which implies “having perceptual objects outside itself, having its own perceptual objects.” [17]17 Ibid., p. 299. However, this “outside itself” as the reflective transcendence of “spatial exteriority,” “spatial difference,” and “spatial interval” has already been reduced within perception; the “outside” must be originally manifested “within” perception. Human perceptual passivity manifests both human perception and the effect of objects on man. Perceptual practical activity can manifest simultaneously as subjective and objective, indicating that both originally coexist within the perceptual practical activity that unifies subject and object (their specific logical distinction can only unfold in reflective theoretical thought). Human perceptual practical activity is similar to the Dasein of being-in-the-world in Marcuse’s historical materialist phenomenology: “what is given is always only the Dasein of historical being-in-the-world, which already simultaneously contains spirit and matter, consciousness and being.” [18]18 Ibid., p. 296. Without this simultaneity, it would lead to either the presence of the subject without the object or the presence of the object without the subject. The presence of the subject without the object cannot account for the reality of perception, as it is merely an imagination or fabrication of consciousness. The presence of the object without the subject is a pure abstraction, because “nature, taken abstractly, for itself, fixed in isolation from man, is nothing for man.” [19]19 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 345. Therefore, the unified manifestation of subject and object is based on their simultaneous presence, i.e., on their original simultaneity as the horizon of manifestation.

马克思为解决真理问题、生存问题和类本质确证问题对“主观”与“客观”进行了超越论还原，将二者放到同一层面来理解。所谓的超越论还原，即将“客观”对“主观”的超越进行悬置，将其拉回作为二者显现地基的感性实践活动、实践中来理解。这种理解与胡塞尔的超越论还原是一致的：“试图将客体性解释成为一种在超越论的主体性中构造出来的产物。”这也是马克思批判费尔巴哈不是把客体或对象“当做人的感性实践活动,当做实践去理解，不是从主体方面去理解”的原因。而实际上，只有从主体的感性实践活动出发才能解释自然，从而将作为客体的自然把握为“人本学的自然界”。当然，马克思对主客观之间的“超越”的还原并不是如胡塞尔那般激进地将客体放到“内在性”方面去理解，而是从共同显现的角度来理解，即主观与客观都在感性实践活动中显现。“内在性”方面是纯粹的主观材料，但对马克思来说作为主观材料的“感性”并不是纯粹主观的意识，它“同时”也是客观的。这种同时性可以从主动和被动两个方面来说。从主动方面来说，“感性”既是感性对象，也是人自身的表现。马克思认为“人有现实的、感性的对象作为自己本质的即自己生命表现的对象”,因此，人主动地表现自己的生命也就显现了感性对象，二者同时显现在这个感性实践活动中。从被动方面来说，“感性”不是纯粹内在的意识，因为“说一个东西是感性的，是说它是受动的”,这意味着“在自身之外有感性的对象，有自己的感性的对象”,只不过这个“自身之外”作为“空间之外”“空间差异”“空间间隔”的反思性超越已经在感性之中被还原，“外”必须原初地在“感性”之中被显现。人的感性受动性既展现人的感性，也展现对象对人的作用。感性实践活动可以同时显现为主观和客观，说明两者原初地同时存在于主观与客观一体的感性实践活动中(其具体的逻辑区分只能在反思的理论思考中展开)。人的感性实践活动类似于马尔库塞历史唯物主义现象学中的在世存在 的此在，“被给予的永远只是作为历史的在世存在的此在，这就已经同时包含了精神和物质，意识和存在”。如果没有这个同时性，将导致主观在场时客观不在场或客观在场时主观不在场。主观在场时客观不在场不能说明感性的实在性，因为它仅仅是一种想象或意识的编造。客观在场时主观不在场则是一种纯粹的抽象，因为“被抽象地理解的、自为的、被确定为与人分隔开来的自然界,对人来说也是无”。因此，主观与客观的一体化显现以两者的同时在场为基础，也就是以两者原初的同时性为显现视域。

Second, the unified manifestation of the individual and society within the horizon of original simultaneity.

第二，个体与社会在原初的同时性视域中显现的一体化。

The unity of man and nature requires the unity of man and society as its precondition, because “the human essence of nature exists only for social man.” [20]20 Ibid., p. 298. However, the unity of man and nature differs between a society based on private property and a communist society. The direct unity of man and society is manifested in the simultaneous manifestation of man and society in perceptual practical activity; this simultaneous manifestation is also achieved on the basis of transcendental reduction. The transcendence of society over the individual is analogous to the transcendence of nature over man, i.e., the gap between society and the self is similar to the gap between the objective and the subjective. However, by reducing the transcendence of society over the individual to the original manifestation of perceptual practical activity, Marx demonstrates that the individual and society coexist and manifest together in the same practical activity. First, the individual’s “activity and enjoyment, which are directly expressed and confirmed through actual intercourse with others,” [21]21 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 47. are social; individual activity manifests the institutions of social operation and the individual’s relations with others. Second, the social identity shaped by social relations of production causes the individual to “stand in this communal relationship not as individuals but as members of a class.” [22]22 Ibid., p. 77. Third, even when “I am engaged in an activity that I can rarely carry out in direct association with others, I am still social … not only the material of my activity—even the language the thinker uses—is given to me as a social product.” [23]23 Ibid., p. 51. Finally, the individual’s “consciousness is from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.” [24]24 Ibid., p. 44. Therefore, the individual’s identity, consciousness, mode of activity, tools, and materials all simultaneously contain social institutions, social relations, and the results of others’ practical activity. Hence, the individual and society are inseparably “coexistent” within the same activity and contain the potential for further differentiation, research, and exploration. If one discusses only the social totality while ignoring the individual’s perceptual practical activity, the reality of society becomes difficult to guarantee; if one discusses only the individual’s practical activity while ignoring its social background, the discussion of individual practical activity remains abstract. Thus, original simultaneity makes the individual-society the subject of dialectics, and this dialectical subject further unifies with nature, becoming the individual-society-nature.

人与自然的统一需要以人与社会的统一为前提，因为“自然界的人的本质只有对社会的人来说才是存在的”,只不过在私有制社会中和在共产主义社会中人与自然的统一是有区别的。人与社会的直接统一表现在人与社会在感性实践活动中的同时显现，这种同时显现也是在超越论还原的基础上实现的。社会对个体的超越就如同自然对人的超越，即社会与我的鸿沟类似于客观与主观的鸿沟。但是，马克思通过将社会对个体的超越还原到感性实践活动的原初显现之上，说明了个体与社会在同一实践活动中同时存在，一同显现。首先，个体“直接通过同别人的实际交往表现出来和得到确证的那种活动和享受”是社会性的，个体活动表现的是社会运作的制度和活动者与其他人的关系。其次，受社会生产关系影响的社会身份让个体“不是作为个人而是作为阶级的成员处于这种共同关系中”。再次，即使当我“从事一种我只在很少情况下才能同别人进行直接联系的活动的时候，我也是社会的……不仅我的活动所需的材料——甚至思想家用来进行活动的语言——是作为社会的产品给予我的”。最后，个体的“意识一开始就是社会的产物，而且只要人们存在着，它就仍然是这种产物”。因此，个体的身份、意识、活动方式、活动工具和材料等都同时包含了社会制度、社会关系和他人的实践活动的结果。所以，个体和社会不可分割地“同时存在”于同一个活动之中，并且包含进一步区分、研究和探索的潜能。如果仅仅讨论社会总体而忽略个体的感性实践活动，那么社会的实在性就难以保证；如果仅仅讨论个体的实践活动而忽略其社会背景，那么对个体的实践活动的讨论也是抽象的。因此，原初的同时性让个体-社会成了辩证法主体，这一辩证法主体进而与自然统一，变成个体-社会-自然。

It is worth noting that the horizon of simultaneity differs from objectified simultaneity; the former is the foundation of the latter. Objectified simultaneity refers to being perceived at the same time, or spatial things coexisting simultaneously—it can be scientific simultaneity, or it can manifest as the simultaneous appearance in the cognitive form of space that Kant describes as “presupposing reciprocal interaction.” [25]25 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Deng Xiaomang (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), B257. [Translator’s note: English edition: *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B257, p. 318.] Objectified simultaneity is based on the subject-object dichotomy, proceeding from objective space and exploring the “simultaneous appearance” of different objects through the differences between man and things or between things and things. However, the simultaneity of the dialectical subject in Marx, as the horizon of manifestation of the subject after transcendental reduction, reveals the “belonging-together” and “co-appearance” between subject and object and between persons, without yet undergoing objectified spatial differentiation. Original simultaneity is similar to Heidegger’s original relation between man and Being: “man and Being belong to each other … they mutually appropriate each other,” [26]26 Martin Heidegger, “The Principle of Identity,” in *Identity and Difference*, trans. Wang Qingjie and Chen Jiawen (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2011), p. 30. [Translator’s note: English edition: *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 31.] manifesting simultaneously in human existential activity. The original simultaneity in Marx’s philosophy precedes any simultaneity in the objective spatial sense, because time is the space for human development [27]27 Karl Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 127. [Translator’s note: The phrase “time is the space for human development” is a paraphrase of Marx’s statement in *The Poverty of Philosophy*: “Time is the space for human development.”] and the condition for the manifestation of space. In the sense of the phenomenological horizon of manifestation, the co-manifestation of simultaneity is “prior to” reflective “simultaneous occurrence,” and in the sense of constructing objective space, it grounds the simultaneity of reflective sensation, things, space, and logic. It is only through the simultaneous manifestation of the individual, society, and nature that we can further examine their relative independence and specific content. It realizes a demand similar to phenomenology’s “return to the things themselves,” [28]28 “Return to the things themselves” (*zu den Sachen selbst*) is a central methodological slogan of Husserlian phenomenology, calling for a direct examination of phenomena as they appear to consciousness, free from presuppositions. achieving the real unity of abstract thought elements within simultaneity.

值得注意的是，同时性视域与客观化的同时性不同，前者是后者的基础。客观化的同时性是指同时被感觉到，或者空间事物同时存在——可以是科学上的同时发生，也可以表现为康德所说的在以“相互之间的交互作用为前提条件”的认识形式空间中同时出现。客观化的同时性以主客二分为基础，从客观的空间出发，以人与物或者物与物的差异来探讨不同对象的“同时出现”。但是，马克思辩证法主体的同时性作为超越论还原后主体的显现视域，展现了主客之间、人与人之间的“同属一体”和“共同出场”,尚未进行客观化的空间区分。原初的同时性类似于海德格尔所说的人与存在的原初关系，“人与存在相互转让……相互归属”,同时显现于人的生存活动之中。马克思哲学中的原初同时性先于任何客观空间意义上的同时 性，因为时间是人类发展的空间，是空间显现的条件。在现象学显现视域的意义上，同时性的共同显现“先于”反思性的“同时发生”,并且在构造客观空间的意义上，为反思的感觉、事物、空间、逻辑的同时性奠基。正是有了个体、社会、自然的同时性显现，才能进一步考察个体、社会、自然的相对独立性和具体内涵。它实现了类似于现象学的“回到事实本身”的诉求，让抽象的思维要素在同时性中实现实在的统一。

II. Future-Oriented Practice: The Original Difference of Dialectics and the Temporality Horizon of Negativity

二、面向未来的实践：辩证法的原初差异性 与否定性的时间性视域

Marx held that “dialectics, in its comprehension of every existing form, is in its very essence critical and revolutionary, because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and hence takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition,” Capital, vol. 1, in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 35 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996), p. 20. Therefore, dialectics always maintains a critical and revolutionary attitude toward itself. Although the critical, revolutionary attitude, as the self-negation of the subject, is the self-movement of the subject, it is not “the ‘self-activity’ of the absolute spirit, just as … the ‘real subject’ is not the ‘substance-subject’ of the absolute”; [2]2 Liu Shaoming, “Marx’s Dialectic and the Temporality of the Subject,” Philosophical Research, no. 3 (2020), p. 25. it finds, in original simultaneity, the perceptual reality that transcends spirit. It also acknowledges that the negation of the dialectical subject is the subject’s own self-negation, not the negation of the subject by something external to it. “Original negation should carry within itself that which it negates, and should actively become its own negation.” [3]3 Ibid., p. 26. The dynamic nature of the subject’s activity oriented toward the future manifests the subject’s self-negation. Marx held that the dynamic nature of the subject is first and foremost manifested in practical activity oriented toward the future, which embodies temporality in the phenomenological sense and constitutes a “individual-society time unity.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 27. In Marx’s theory, practical activity oriented toward the future includes three forms: survival and reproduction, self-affirmation, and the grasping of truth. These forms, from different levels, reveal how the temporal horizon of futurity manifests the original difference and negativity of dialectics. Moreover, the dialectical subject in these three forms remains the unity of the individual, society, and nature as they appear in simultaneity—that is, the individual-society-nature.

马克思认为：“辩证法对每一种既成的形式都是从不断的运动中，因而也是从它的暂时性方面去理解；辩证法不崇拜任何东西，按其本质来说，它是批判的和革命的。”因此，辩证法始终对自身保持批判的和革命的态度。虽然批判的、革命的态度作为主体的自我否定是主体的自我运动，但是它并不是“绝对精神的‘自我活动’,就像……‘实在主体’不是作为绝对者的‘实体-主体’一样”,它在原初的同时性中找到了超越精神的感性实在性。它也承认辩证法主体的否定是自身对自身的否定，不是外在于主体之物对于主体的否定。“原初的否定应该在它本身之中带有它所否定的东西，应该主动地成为它本身的否定”。主体面向未来活动中的动态性彰显了主体的自我否定。马克思认为，主体的动态性首先表现为面向未来的实践活动，面向未来的实践活动体现了现象学意义上的时间性，是“个人-社会时间统一体”。马克思理论中面向未来的实践活动包含生存繁衍、自我确证、把握真理三种形式，它们从不同层面展现了未来性的时间视域对辩证法的原初差异性和否定性的显现，且这三种形式的辩证法主体仍然是个人、社会、自然在同时性显现中的统一，即个人-社会-自然。

First, in the activity of survival and reproduction, the human pursuit of the satisfaction of future needs is both the temporal horizon that manifests the difference between need and object and the temporal horizon that manifests the negativity of production. Marx held that “life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.” [5]5 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 41. At the same time, “the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs.” [6]6 Ibid., p. 42. Thus, the basic movement of survival proceeds from need to production and then to new needs, which itself seems to constitute a dialectical movement. However, if the dialectical subject manifests itself and the object in simultaneity, and the object already seems to be within the subject itself, then why must the subject produce material means to satisfy its own needs? There are two reasons. On the one hand, need manifests the difference within the dialectical subject itself—that is, the difference between the subject’s need and the needed object. Marx illustrates this with the example of hunger: “Hunger is a natural need; it therefore needs a nature outside itself, an object outside itself, in order to satisfy itself, to still itself.” [7]7 Karl Marx, “Comments on James Mill,” in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 217. But this spatialized object “outside itself” has already been placed within sensibility through transcendental reduction. How can hunger, as a human sensation, be both within itself and yet maintain difference from the object? Because “the object of [man’s] desire … exists outside him, as an object independent of him,” [8]8 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 336. so human hunger simultaneously manifests his desire and the object that is “not yet” used to satisfy that desire. Therefore, human desire produces human lack, and the need arising from lack unfolds the dialectical difference between the present insufficiency of the subject’s needs and their future fulfillment through activity. Hence, the original difference of the dialectical subject unfolds within the possibility of the future. On the other hand, the subject’s activity of producing the material means for its own needs manifests the subject’s self-negation—that is, the negation by its own activity of the limiting state of its own needs, as well as the subject’s attempt to achieve the satisfaction of its needs through production. Marx held that “because [man] feels himself to be passive, he is a passionate being.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 337. The transition from passivity to passion embodies this negation. Of course, this negation is from the very beginning an activity aimed at achieving the subject’s future satisfaction. Therefore, negativity, as the core of dialectics, is manifested in the process of the subject “constantly negating itself and opening itself to self-transcendence toward the future.” [10]10 Liu, “Marx’s Dialectic and the Temporality of the Subject,” p. 28. And the satisfied subject produces new needs, allowing the dialectical movement to continue within a new temporality.

第一，在生存繁衍活动中，人对于未来需要满足的追求，既是显现需要与对象差异性的时间性视域，也是显现生产否定性的时间性视域。马克思认为，“为了生活，首先就需要吃喝住穿以及其他一些东西。因此第一个历史活动就是生产满足这些需要的资料，即生产物质生活本身”,同时，“已经得到满足的第一个需要本身、满足需要的活动和已经获得的为满足需要而用的工具又引起新的需要”。因此，生存的基本运动是从需要到生产再到新的需要的过程，这似乎本身就构成了一个辩证运动。但是，如果辩证法主体在同时性中显现了自身与对象，对象似乎已经在主体自身之中，那么主体为何要生产物质资料来满足自身需要?原因有两个方面。一方面，需要体现了辩证法主体自身的差异，即主体需要与被需要物之间的差异。马克思以饥饿为例进行说明，“饥饿是自然的需要;因此，为了使自身得到满足，使自身解除饥饿，它需要自身之外的自然界、自身之外的对象”。但是，这个空间化的“自身之外”的对象已经在超越论还原中被放到感性之中了，饥饿作为人的感觉如何既在自身之中又与对象保持差异呢?因为人的“欲望的对象是作为不依赖于他的对象而存在于他之外的”,所以人的饥饿同时显现的是他的欲望及其“尚未”被用来满足欲望的对象。因此，人的欲望产生了人的匮乏，匮乏的需要将展开主体当下的需要不能自足与未来活动对其填充之间的辩证法差异。所以，辩证法主体的原初差异是在未来的可能性中展开的。另一方面，主体生产自身需要的物质资料活动表现了主体的自我否定，即自身活动对自身需要限制状态的否定，以及主体试图在生产中实现对自身需要的满足。马克思认为，“因为它感到自己是受动的，所以是一个有激情的存在物”,从受动到激情的转变就体现了这种否定。当然，这种否定在一开始就是为了实现主体未来满足的活动，因此作为辩证法核心的否定性是在主体“不断地否定自身、向未来敞开自我超越”的过程中被展现的。而得到满足的主体又生产了新的需要，从而让辩证运动在新的时间性中继续。

Second, in the activity of self-affirmation, the human pursuit of the future appropriation of species-being is the temporal horizon of the subject’s self-negation. Survival and reproduction aim at the satisfaction of human needs and the continuation of life; self-affirmation, by contrast, is the process by which man “proves himself a conscious species being … in that he creates a world of objects by his practical activity, in his working-up of inorganic nature.” [11]11 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 276. This process unfolds a twofold negativity. On the one hand, the objectified world created by the activity of self-affirmation is a negation of the self, because man “contemplates himself in a world which he has created.” [12]12 Ibid., p. 277. On the other hand, the activity of self-affirmation takes the self as its object, indicating that “when I reflect on ‘I’ as an object, it means that I do not have to take this ‘object-I’ for granted,” [13]13 Liu, “Marx’s Dialectic and the Temporality of the Subject,” p. 29. and the subject achieves self-transcendence, thereby attaining freedom. This freedom is manifested in the fact that “man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom from such need.” [14]14 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 277. Therefore, the activity of self-affirmation and its result are a negation of the subject itself, and this negation presupposes an affirmative futurity. On the one hand, the activity of self-affirmation appropriates the object “through his objective relation, i.e., through his relation to the object”; [15]15 Ibid., p. 336. the negation of the objective relation is merely a means for the subject’s activity of self-affirmation. The subject’s activity of producing objects is oriented toward the future appropriation of the object, thereby “affirming himself in the objective world.” [16]16 Ibid., p. 337. On the other hand, man’s reflection on himself is not an end but a means, because the ultimate purpose of reflection is for man to “appropriate his total essence in a total manner, that is to say, as a whole man.” [17]17 Ibid., p. 299. The freedom of self-negation and its activity are the pathway toward the future comprehensive appropriation of one’s own essence. The objectification of the self and the activity of self-negation originate from the contradiction between the dialectical subject’s “being limited” and the expectation of removing that limitation in the future—a contradiction similar to that in the subject’s future-oriented survival and reproduction. Of course, this activity of self-affirmation is also social in nature, because in alienated labor the self-affirmation of man is difficult to achieve; it becomes possible only in communist society. [18]18 Ibid., p. 296. Therefore, the sublation of private property to achieve communism is the goal of the activity of self-affirmation. In summary, it is not difficult to find that the self-reflection, negation, and objectification activities of self-affirmation all unfold through temporal activities oriented toward the future.

第二，在自我确证活动中，人对未来的类本质占有的追求，是主体自我否定的时间性视域。生存繁衍是人为了实现自身需要的满足和生命的存续，自我确证则是人“通过实践创造对象世界,改造无机界”,“证明自己是有意识的类存在物，就是说是这样一种存在物，它把类看做自己的本质，或者说把自身看做类存在物”。这个过程中展开了两重否定性。一方面，自我确证活动创造的对象化世界是对自身的否定，因为人要“在他所创造的世界中直观自身”。另一方面，自我确证活动以自身为对象，说明了“我把‘我’当作对象来反思，就意味着我不必把这个‘客体我’当作天经地义的”,主体实现了对自身的超越，从而实现了自由。这种自由表现在“人甚至不受肉体需要的影响也进行生产，并且只有不受这种需要的影响才进行真正的生产”。因此，自我确证活动及其结果是对主体自身的否定，而且这个否定以未来性的肯定为前提。一方面，自我确证活动“通过自己的对象性关系，即通过自己同对象的关系”而占有对象，对象性关系的否定只是主体自我确证活动的手段。主体生产对象的活动是朝向未来的对对象的占有，从而“在对象世界中肯定自己”。另一方面，人对自身的反思不是目的而是手段，因为人的反思最终是让自己“作为一个完整的人，占有自己的全面的本质”。自我否定的自由及其活动，是朝向未来的全面占有自身本质的途径。自我的对象化和自我否定的活动，来源于辩证法主体的“受限制”与未来解除限制的期待之间的矛盾，这与主体面向未来的生存繁衍一样。当然，这种自我确证活动也是社会性的，因为在异化劳动中人的自我确证难以实现，只有在共产主义社会中人的自我确证才得以可能。所以，扬弃私有制以实现共产主义，是自我确证活动的目标。综上不难发现，自我确证活动的自我反思、否定、对象化活动都是以朝向未来的时间性活动展开的。

Third, the expectation of achieving “harmony” in cognition through truth-oriented activity is the horizon for the negative unfolding of dialectics. Marx points out: “The question whether objective [gegenständliche] truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.” This embodies Marx’s idea of transcendental reduction, namely, that practical activity, as the condition for the manifestation of transcendental reduction, enables thought to find its own “this-sidedness.” “This-sidedness” indicates that there is no insurmountable gap between thought and its object; both manifest themselves on the basis of practical activity. However, if both are situated within “this-sidedness,” does the subject still need cognition? Clearly, an original difference is also required here, and the subject must eliminate this difference through sensuous practical activity. This difference originates from contradiction and disharmony: “He inevitably encounters things that contradict his consciousness and his sensations, things that disturb the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world he presupposes, especially the harmony between man and nature.” On the surface, this difference already presupposes the existence of contradiction, but if one explains this contradiction by positing an opposition between subject and object, the achievements of transcendental reduction would be abandoned. To account for this contradiction, Marx allows the “object” to emerge and manifest itself in a way that disturbs harmony. Harmony here refers to the harmony between the subject’s expectation and the subject’s sensation. In Husserl’s terms, harmony manifests as “intuition fulfilling the intention of expression.” Disharmony, then, indicates that in a sensuous practical activity, what one experiences is the difference between expectation and sensation itself. Thus, it is not that this difference presupposes contradiction; rather, it is in this expectation-laden sensuous practical activity that contradiction is manifested. This difference prompts the subject to further negate its own cognition and engage in a new “act of fulfillment.” It should be noted that although Marx opens up the self-negation of truth-oriented activity through a phenomenological future horizon, the future-oriented expectation in Marx’s theory of truth differs from intuitive fulfillment. The expectation in Marx’s theory lacks an intuitive essence; expectation-laden sensuous practical activity has its social and historical factors, whereas intuitive essence possesses a certain transhistorical and transsocial character—this is also where Marx surpasses Husserl. Therefore, the original difference of truth-oriented sensuous practical activity and the further negation are both manifested in future-oriented sensuous practical activity, oriented toward the harmony between sensuous expectation and sensation itself.

第三，真理性活动对实现认知的“协调”的期待，是辩证法的否定性展开的视域。马克思指出：“人的思维是否具有客观的[gegenständliche]真理性，这不是一个理论的问题，而是一个实践的问题。人应该在实践中证明自己思维的真理性，即自己思维的现实性和力量，自己思维的此岸性。”这体现了马克思的超越论还原思想，即实践活动作为超越论还原的显现条件，让思想找到了自身的“此岸性”。“此岸性”说明了思维与对象之间并非有着不可消除的鸿沟，二者都在实践活动的基础上显现。但是，假如二者都处于“此岸”之中，那么主体还需要认知吗?显然，这里也需要一个原初的差异，并且需要主体在感性实践活动中去消除这个差异。这个差异来源于矛盾与不和谐：“他不可避免地碰到与他的意识和他的感觉相矛盾的东西，这些东西扰乱了他所假定的感性世界的一切部分的和谐，特别是人与自然界的和谐。”表面上，这里的差异已经预设了矛盾的存在，但是如果运用主体与客体对立的方式来阐述这种矛盾，就会抛弃超越论还原的已有成果。为了解释这个矛盾，马克思让“对象”以一种扰乱和谐的方式出场和显现。这里的和谐是指主体的期待与主体的感觉之间的和谐。用胡塞尔的语言表达，即和谐表现为“直观使表达的意向得到充实”。不和谐则表示在一个感性实践活动中，人感受到的是期待与感性自身的差异。因此，不是这种差异预设了矛盾，而是人在这种期待性的感性实践活动中显现了这种矛盾。这种差异引起了主体进一步对自身认知的否定，进行新的“充实活动”。需要说明的是，尽管马克思以现象学式的未来视域打开了真理性活动的自我否定，但是马克思理论中真理活动的未来期待性与直观的充实是有区别的。马克思理论中的期待活动并没有一个直观本质，期待性的感性实践活动有其社会因素和历史因素，而直观性的本质则具有一定的超历史性和超社会性，这也是马克思超越胡塞尔的地方。因此，真理性的感性实践活动的原初差异和进一步的否定活动都是在面向未来的感性实践活动中被显现的，它朝向的是感性期待与感性自身的协调。

Similar to original simultaneity, a distinction must be made here between original futurity and objectified future time, with futurity serving as the basis for the manifestation of objectified time. Sensuous practical activity is “a phenomenologically unified act that can never be dissolved into a sum of these ‘movements’”; hence, original temporality is also a unified, immediate temporality of sensuous practical activity, and one cannot use reflective, spatialized accounts of the propagation of light, sound, or the body to explain the temporal unit and causal process of this sensuous practical activity. If temporality is broken down into analytical temporal units, time would be objectified and abstracted, because objective objects have already been reduced in transcendental reduction, and objective time has not yet been thematized. Only on the basis of direct future-oriented activity can objective time be conceptualized and quantified in a reflective sense. For example, measuring the number of movements (duration) of certain specific pointers (such as a second hand) contained in a practical activity process, and describing the length of the process of elements’ movement in terms of pointer movement as a unit, this temporal length can only manifest itself on the basis of sensuous practical activity and comparative activity. Therefore, any quantified objective time is grasped within the temporal horizon of future-oriented sensuous practical activity. The horizon condition of temporality cannot be further broken down into other temporal units; rather, it is the condition for the manifestation of those other temporal units.

与原初的同时性类似，这里需要区分原初的未来性与客观化的未来时间，并且将未来性作为客观化时间显现的基础。感性实践活动是“一个在现象学上统一的行为，它永远不可能化解在这些‘运动’的一个总和之中”,因而原初时间性也是一个统一的、直接性的感性实践活动时间，不能用反思性的、空间化的光、声音到身体的传播来说明这个感性实践活动的时间性单位及因果历程。如果将时间性拆分为分析性的时间单位，则要将时间客观化、抽象化，因为客观对象在超越论还原中已经被还原，客观的时间尚未被主题化研究。只有在直接性的面向未来的活动基础之上，客观的时间才在反思的意义上被概念化和数量化。比如，计量某一实践活动过程包含的若干特定指针(比如秒针)运动的次数(时长),以指针运动为单位描述要素运动过程的长度，这个时间长度只能在感性实践活动和对比活动基础上才显现出来。因此，任何数量化的客观时间都在面向未来的感性实践活动的时间性视域中被把握。时间性的视域条件并不能进一步被拆分为其他时间单位，它反而是其他时间单位的显现条件。

III. The Historical Field of Subject Activity: The Temporal Horizon of the Dialectical Form

三、主体活动的历史场域：辩证法形式的时间性视域

The historical field of sensuous practical activity is the horizon for the manifestation of the dialectical form of the negation of the negation. The dialectical form in Marx’s theory is not mere difference and negation, but the negation of the negation and the unity of opposites on the basis of difference and negation. The dialectical form emerges as the historicity of human sensuous practical activity; thus, historicity constitutes the temporal basis of dialectics. The term “historicity” is used here rather than “history” to highlight the reality of the original history Marx refers to—that is, it is not any abstract theoretical history. “History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, capital funds, and productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations; thus, on the one hand, each generation continues its inherited activity under completely changed circumstances, and, on the other hand, modifies the old circumstances by a completely changed activity.” “Succession” is not a simple temporal continuum or flow, but a temporal field of sensuous practical activity from the past, through the present, to the future, similar to Husserl’s notion of the present-time whole constituted by retention, primal impression, and protention, and Heidegger’s holistic temporal “temporalization,” where the three dimensions of time are within the same temporal field yet provide the possibility for the formation of the entire temporal process. If time is simply treated as a process rather than a historical field of “succession,” one cannot grasp how the historical process occurs, cannot return to the original temporal field to manifest history, and can only “compile history according to some scale external to it.” At the same time, the historical field “cannot be measured; it cannot be quantified into abstract time”; rather, it is the ground for the manifestation of abstract time. Here, the temporality of historical occurrence is what is called historicity. Marx holds that “circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated,” because changing circumstances, as a sensuous practical activity carried out within the historical field, integrates the past circumstances and education with the present person’s future-oriented transformation.

感性实践活动的历史场域是否定之否定的辩证法形式的显现视域。马克思理论中的辩证法形式并不是单纯的差异与否定，而是差异与否定基础上的否定之否定和对立统一。辩证法形式是作为人的感性实践活动的历史性出场的，因而历史性构成了辩证法的时间性基础。这里用“历史性”而不是历史，是为了突出马克思所说的原初历史的实在性，即它不是任何抽象的理论历史。“历史不外是各个世代的依次交替。每一代都利用以前各代遗留下来的材料、资金和生产力；由于这个缘故，每一代一方面在完全改变了的环境下继续从事所继承的活动，另一方面又通过完全改变了的活动来变更旧的环境。”“依次交替”不是一个简单的时间连续或流动，而是从过去、现在到未来的感性实践活动的时间场域，类似于胡塞尔意义上的滞留、当下和前摄构成的现在时间整体和海德格尔意义上的整体的时间“到时”,时间的三个维度处于同一个时间场域中，但是又为整个时间历程的形成提供了可能。如果简单地将时间当作一个过程而不是“依次交替”的历史场域，则不能把握历史的进程如何发生，不能回到原初时间场域来显现历史，就只能“遵照在它之外的某种尺度来编写”历史。同时，历史场域“是无法度量的：它们无法被量化为抽象时间”,反而是抽象时间的显现地基。在这里，历史发生的时间性才是所谓的历史性。马克思认为，“环境正是由人来改变的，而教育者本人一定是受教育的”,因为改变环境作为在历史场域中进行着的感性实践活动，将过去的环境和教育与当下的人朝向未来的改变融为一体。

First, the logical form of the negation of the negation, as a historical process, must manifest itself in the field of actual history. To begin with, Marx’s exposition of the “negation of the negation” can be presented from the perspectives of the alienation and restoration of individual existence and the succession of social formations, but ultimately these two perspectives are one and the same. The past, present, and future of the historical field that Marx discusses differ from the temporal dimensions of Husserl’s individual consciousness and Heidegger’s Dasein’s existence; rather, they possess a “variability” or “elasticity.” This “variability” or “elasticity” can manifest itself as the historical field of individual existence, verification, and cognition, or as intergenerational succession that transcends the individual, or as the succession of social formations. Therefore, the negativity that Marx speaks of can be defined according to different levels of investigation. The source of this “variability” or “elasticity” lies in Marx’s treatment of the subject of dialectics as a unity of the individual, society, and nature—that is, individual-society-nature. The historical fields of the individual, society, and nature all belong to the dialectical process through which the subject of dialectics unfolds itself; hence the negation of the negation of the subject of dialectics can also be expressed as the negation of the negation of a single element. This “variability” or “elasticity” based on unity enables Marx to transcend the limitations of general phenomenologists in expressing temporal modalities. How, then, is the unity of the human being and the succession of social history possible? From the human perspective, Marx holds that “all history is the history of preparation for ‘man’ to become the object of sensuous consciousness and for the need of ‘man as man’ to become a need (the history of development).” [36]36 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 304. Thus, history can be expressed as the history of changes in human existence. However, the future goal of history—that “the need of ‘man as man’ becomes a need”—can be realized only in communist society, because the liberation of the individual presupposes the liberation of social formations and social relations: “the actual intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his actual relations.” [37]37 Ibid., p. 307. Moreover, the historical process cannot be merely the course of the individual: “a particular individual is merely a particular species-being, and as such is mortal.” [38]38 Ibid., p. 299. Therefore, the individual must view, from the height of “mankind” or society, how he participates in the inheritance of history under given social conditions. Of course, it must also be recognized that “man is a particular individual, and it is precisely his particularity that makes him an individual, a real, individual social being.” [39]39 Ibid., p. 299. Without individuals, there would be no history; hence every temporal modality of history must be examined by combining the perspectives of both the individual and society.

第一，否定之否定的作为历史过程的逻辑形式，必须在实在性的历史场域中显现。首先，马克思对“否定之否定”的阐述可以从个体生存的异化与复归、社会形态更替的角度展现，但是这两个角度最终是一体的。马克思所谈的历史场域的过去、现在和未来不同于胡塞尔的个体意识和海德格尔的此在生存的时间维度，而是有其“可变性”或“伸缩性”。这个“可变性”或“伸缩性”既可以表现为个体生存、确证、认知的历史场域，也可以表现为超越个体的代际更替，还可以表现为社会形态的更替。因此，马克思所说的否定性可以根据不同的考察层面来进行界定。“可变性”或“伸缩性”的源头在于马克思将辩证法的主体当作个体、社会、自然的统一体，即个体-社会-自然。个体、社会、自然的历史场域都属于辩证法主体展开自身的辩证过程的一部分，因此辩证法主体的否定之否定也可以表现为单个要素的否定之否定。这种统一基础上的“可变性”或“伸缩性”让马克思超越了一般现象学家对时间样态表达的局限性。那么，人与社会历史更替的统一性如何可能?从人的角度来说，马克思认为“全部历史是为了使‘人’成为感性意识的对象和使‘人作为人’的需要成为需要而作准备的历史(发展的历史)”,因此，历史可以表现为人的生存变化的历史。但是，历史以“‘人作为人’的需要成为需要”的未来目标只有在共产主义社会中才能实现，因为个体的解放以社会形态、社会关系的解放为前提——“个人在精神上的现实丰富性完全取决于他的现实关系的丰富性”。另外，历史的过程不可能只是个人的历程，“特定的个体不过是一个特定的类存在物,而作为这样的存在物是迟早要死的”,因此个体必须从“人类”或社会的高度去看待自身如何在一定的社会条件下参与历史的继承。当然，也必须看到，“人是特殊的个体，并且正是人的特殊性使人成为个体，成为现实的、单个的社会存在物”,没有个体将没有历史，所以历史的每一个时间样态都必须结合个体和社会这两个角度来考察。

How, then, does the process of the negation of the negation of the unity of the human being and society unfold? Marx holds that communism, “as the negation of the negation, is the affirmation,” [40]40 Ibid., p. 306. and “is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man.” [41]41 Ibid., p. 296. The first negation is the negation of the human being in private property: “all the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of all these senses—the sense of having. The human essence has been reduced to this absolute poverty.” [42]42 Ibid., p. 300. It is a negation of the human essence, of human activity, of relations between human beings, and of relations between human beings and things. The second negation is the negation of the alienation of the human being in private property: “the supersession of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes.” [43]43 Ibid., p. 300. However, for these two negations to constitute the form of the negation of the negation in dialectics, another important condition must be satisfied: they must be the process of inheritance and change of the same subject of dialectics (individual-society-nature) within its historical field; otherwise, they could not become a continuous, ascending, restorative process. The negation of the negation in dialectics is “the positive supersession of human self-alienation, and therefore the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man.” [44]44 Ibid., p. 296. The first negation, the alienation of the human being, is the human being’s being bound by the social formation of private property that he himself has produced; it is the negation of the “free association” of human beings under conditions of low productive forces. The first negation is the mediation of the second negation, providing the preparation of productive forces and material production for human liberation. The second negation inherits the productive forces provided by the society of private property and realizes the association of free individuals at a higher level. Therefore, the negation of the negation is both the process of human liberation and the process of social development; it originates from the continuity of human practical activity and the successive course of social formations. In this sense, the form of the negation of the negation is grounded in the historical field as sensuous practical activity.

那么，人与社会统一的否定之否定的过程如何展开?马克思认为，共产主义“作为否定的否定的肯定”,“是人的解放和复原”。这个过程的第一个否定是人在私有财产中被否定，“一切肉体的和精神的感觉都被这一切感觉的单纯异化即拥有的感觉所代替。人的本质只能被归结为这种绝对的贫困”。它是对人的本质、人的活动、人与人的关系、人与物的关系的否定。这个过程的第二个否定是对私有财产中人的异化的否定。“对私有财产的扬弃，是人的一切感觉和特性的彻底解放”。但是，这两次否定能够成为辩证法否定之否定的形式，还需要满足另一个重要的条件，即它们是同一个辩证法主体(个体-社会-自然)在其历史场域中的继承与改变过程，否则就不能成为一个连续的、上升的、复归的过程。辩证法的否定之否定是对“人的自我异化的积极的扬弃，因而是通过人并且为了人而对人的本质的真正占有”。作为第一次否定的人的异化，是人被自己生产出来的私有制的社会形态束缚，是对低生产力条件下人的“自由联合”的否定。第一次否定是第二次否定的中介，为人的解放提供了生产力和物质生产的准备。第二次否定继承了私有制社会提供的生产力，在更高层次上实现了自由人的联合体。因此，否定之否定既是人的解放过程也是社会的发展过程，它源于人的实践活动的连续性和社会形态的承续历程。就此而言，否定之否定形式奠基于作为感性实践活动的历史场域。

It should be noted that the negation of the negation of the unity of the human being and society can, on the surface, be expressed as a “natural” process, because this process has its “regularity” that is independent of human will. Regularity, as the logic of the “object,” has already been suspended and reduced in transcendental reduction. [45]45 “Transcendental reduction” refers to the phenomenological method of bracketing the natural attitude and the objective world to focus on the structures of consciousness, as developed by Edmund Husserl. Moreover, the regularity of the object is also grounded in the simultaneity of sensuous practical activity and the verification and fulfillment of the future by the activity of truth; the “natural” and “objective” law of the negation of the negation is still manifested within the sensuous practical activity of the subject of dialectics. Therefore, the form of the negation of the negation that is independent of human will can only take the historical field as its horizon of manifestation.

需要说明的是，人与社会的统一体的否定之否定表面上可以表述为“自然”过程，因为这个过程有其不以人的意志为转移的“规律性”。规律作为“对象”的逻辑，在超越论还原中已经被悬置和还原。而且，对象性的规律也奠基于感性实践活动的同时性和真理性活动对未来的验证与充实，“自然”的、“客观”的否定之否定规律仍然是在辩证法主体的感性实践活动中展现出来的。所以，不以人的意志为转移的否定之否定形式只能以历史场域作为显现的视域。

Second, the historical field is the condition for the manifestation of the dialectical form of the unity of opposites. If the subject of Marx’s dialectics unfolds the dialectical form of self-negation through its historical field, then “the so-called two is established only through the self-negation of the one, and thus the most essential contradiction is self-negation.” [46]46 Liu Shaoming, “The Self-Negation of the Subject of Dialectics and the Form of the Unity of Opposites,” *Philosophical Research*, no. 3 (2023), p. 28. Therefore, the dialectical form of the unity of opposites is a derivative form unfolded on the basis of the form of the negation of the negation. Although the dialectical form of the unity of opposites is an important form and driving force of historical development, it must ultimately be reduced, on the basis of transcendental reduction, to the self-negation of the subject of the dialectics. Here, taking productive forces and relations of production as an example, we illustrate how the relationship of the unity of opposites manifests itself through the self-negation of the subject of the dialectics. First, the unity of opposites between productive forces and relations of production unfolds in the process of historical movement. The unity of opposites between productive forces and relations of production is expressed as follows: “The old relations of intercourse, which have become fetters, are replaced by new relations of intercourse adapted to the more developed productive forces and hence to the progressive mode of the autonomous activity of individuals; the new relations of intercourse in turn become fetters and are then replaced by yet another form of relations of intercourse.” [47]47 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 575. It can be seen that the opposition between the two is manifested in the obstruction of the development of productive forces by relations of production at a certain stage, while their unity is manifested in the promotion of productive forces by relations of production at a certain stage; obstruction and promotion constitute a historical process of movement. Second, the replacement of productive forces and relations of production each within the historical field is the manifestation of the subject of the dialectics in the historical field. Marx holds that “the relation of productive forces to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the action or activity of individuals.” [48]48 Ibid., p. 575. Productive forces are the capacity of human perceptual practical activity, especially material productive activity; they manifest themselves through the capacity of human beings and the scope and depth of nature’s transformation that are simultaneously revealed in perceptual practical activity. Hence, in transcendental reduction, productive forces belong to the unity of human beings and nature. Similarly, the form of intercourse as relations of production belongs to the unity of human beings and society. Therefore, the unity of relations of production and productive forces is the rational operation and progress of the individual-society-nature as the subject of the dialectics in terms of survival, verification, and cognition, while their conflict is manifested as the future-oriented limitation of the subject of the dialectics in survival, verification, and cognition, specifically in forms such as stagnation of productive forces, economic crises, and class struggle. The reason why the unity of opposites between productive forces and relations of production can manifest itself as a process of historical development is that the self-negation and development of the subject of the dialectics—the changes in the relationship between human beings and nature and the relationship between human beings and society within their historical field—occur. Therefore, the dialectics of the unity of opposites between productive forces and relations of production exists within the historical field of the subject of the dialectics’ own inheritance and change. Similarly, on the basis of transcendental reduction, the unity of opposites between human beings and society, between human beings and nature, between the economic base and the superstructure, and between labor and capital can all be reduced to the form of the negation of the negation within the historical field; the unity of opposites between their elements must be manifested in the history of the subject of the dialectics, and the respective histories of their elements also take the history of perceptual practical activity as the condition of manifestation.

第二，历史场域是对立统一的辩证法形式的显现条件。如果说马克思的辩证法主体通过其历史场域展开了自我否定的辩证法形式，那么“所谓的二只是由于一的自否定而建立起来的，因而最本质的矛盾是自否定”。因此，对立统一的辩证法形式是在否定之否定形式的基础上展开的一种衍生形式。虽然对立统一的辩证法形式是历史发展的重要形式和动力，但它最终要在超越论还原的基础上被还原为辩证法主体的自我否定。这里以生产力与生产关系为例，说明对立统一关系如何通过辩证法主体的自我否定显现出来。其一，生产力与生产关系的对立统一在历史运动的过程中展现。生产力与生产关系的对立统一表现在：“已成为桎梏的旧交往形式被适应于比较发达的生产力，因而也适应于进步的个人自主活动方式的新交往形式所代替；新的交往形式又会成为桎梏，然后又为另一种交往形式所代替。”)可见，二者的对立表现在某一阶段生产关系对生产力发展的阻碍，二者的统一表现为某一阶段生产关系对生产力的推动，阻碍与推动构成了一个历史的运动过程。其二，生产力与生产关系各自在历史场域中的更替是辩证法主体在历史场域中的显现。马克思认为，“生产力与交往形式的关系就是交往形式与个人的行动或活动的关系”。生产力就是人的感性实践活动尤其物质生产活动的能力，它通过感性实践活动中同时显现的人的能力和自然的被改造范围、深度而显现出来，因而生产力在超越论还原中属于人-自然的统一体。同样地，作为生产关系的交往形式属于人-社会的统一体。所以，生产关系与生产力的统一就是个人-社会-自然作为辩证法主体在生存、确证与认知上的合理运转与进步，而两者的冲突则表现为辩证法主体在生存、确证与认知上的未来导向的受限，具体表现为生产力停滞、经济危机和阶级斗争等形式。生产力与生产关系的对立统一之所以能够表现为历史的发展过程，是因为辩证法主体的自我否定及发展——人与自然关系和人与社会关系在其历史场域中的变更。因此，生产力与生产关系对立统一的辩证法存在于辩证法主体自身的继承与改变的历史场域之中。同理，在超越论还原的基础上，人与社会的对立统一、人与自然的对立统一、经济基础与上层建筑的对立统一、劳动与资本的对立统一都可以还原为历史场域中的否定之否定形式，其要素之间的对立统一必须在辩证法主体的历史中体现出来，其要素各自的历史也以感性实践活动的历史作为显现条件。

In summary, the threefold temporality in which dialectics unfolds in Marx’s theory is unified; the unity among the three is manifested at two levels: methodology and actuality. From the perspective of methodological steps, the three constitute a system of temporality that advances layer by layer. Original simultaneity is the condition for the unfolding of negativity, and negativity is in turn the condition for the unfolding of the historical field. Original simultaneity manifests the immediate givenness after Marx’s transcendental reduction, enabling individuals, society, and nature to belong to one another and manifest simultaneously. Futurity is the future-oriented activity of the subject of the dialectics; it unfolds the difference and negativity of dialectics on the basis of original simultaneity. Dialectics unfolds according to the forms of the negation of the negation and the unity of opposites; this is the law and path of the negativity of dialectics. From the perspective of actuality, the three constitute a system of temporality that gradually moves toward completeness. The historical field in which dialectics unfolds contains the negativity of the subject of the dialectics, and the negativity of the subject of the dialectics contains the simultaneity of individuals, society, and nature within the subject. The subject of the dialectics manifested in simultaneity always appears in future-oriented perceptual practical activity; the subject’s future-oriented perceptual practical activity is in turn completed within the overall historical field (in the complete temporal field, futurity is the emphasized dimension). These two modes of unification of temporality demonstrate the systematization of Marx’s theory constructing the temporal horizon of dialectics.

综上，马克思理论中辩证法展开的三重时间性是统一的，三者之间的统一体现在方法论和现实性两个层面。从方法论步骤来说，三者构成一个层层推进的时间性体系。原初的同时性是否定性展开的条件，否定性又是历史场域展开的条件。原初的同时性显现了马克思在超越论还原之后的直接给予，使个人、社会、自然相互归属和同时显现。未来性是辩证法主体面向未来的活动，它在原初同时性的基础上展开了辩证法的差异性和否定性。辩证法按照否定之否定和对立统一的形式展开，这是辩证法否定性的规律和路径。从现实性来说，三者构成一个逐步走向完满的时间性体系。辩证法展开的历史场域包含了辩证法主体的否定性，辩证法主体的否定性包含了主体中个人、社会与自然的同时性。同时性中显现的辩证法主体，总是在面向未来的感性实践活动中现身；主体面向未来的感性实践活动又是在整体的历史场域(在完整的时间场域中，未来性是被强调的维度)中完成的。时间性的这两种统一方式，展现了马克思构建辩证法时间性视域理论的体系化。

IV. Transcending Non-Temporal Dialectics: The Significance of Marx’s Use of Temporality as the Horizon of Manifestation of Dialectics

四、超越非时间性的辩证法：马克思将时间性 作为辩证法显现视域的意义

Through a phenomenological transcendental reduction, Marx returns to the subject of the dialectics of the individual-society-nature within the horizon of original simultaneity. Taking future-oriented perceptual practical activity as his horizon, he manifests the original difference and negativity of dialectics. On this basis, he treats the unity of opposites of dialectics as a derivative form of the negation of the negation of dialectics, and holds that these two forms of dialectics manifest themselves through the historical field that integrates the past, present, and future. Therefore, the subject of dialectics, the driving force of dialectics, and the forms of dialectics all manifest themselves within the horizon of original temporality. Marx uses the phenomenological method to manifest dialectics on the basis of temporality, transcending Hegelian dialectics’ exclusion of the basis of temporality, thereby providing a basis for the manifestation of the reality of dialectics. Of course, we must recognize that Marx inherited many aspects of Hegelian dialectics. First, Marx inherited Hegel’s theory of the subjectivity of dialectics. Hegelian dialectics “always implies the unfolding of a self-activity, the presentation of the thing itself,” [49]49 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Wang Jiu-xing (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1979), vol. 1, p. 11. and Marx also holds that dialectics must have a subject. Second, Marx inherited Hegel’s theory of the negativity of dialectics. Hegel holds that “substance as subject is a pure simple negativity,” [50]50 Ibid., p. 25. and dialectics manifests itself as self-negation. Marx also takes the self-negation of the subject as the driving force of the unfolding of dialectics. Finally, Marx inherited the historical character of Hegelian dialectics. Hegel holds that the dialectical movement process of spirit, “i.e., history, is a cognizing, self-mediating process of transformation.” [51]51 G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. by He Lin (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1980), p. 424. Marx holds that history itself has a process of continuous inheritance, negation, and development, which is precisely the process of the self-negation of the subject of dialectics. In fact, there is also a certain kind of phenomenological reduction in Hegel’s philosophy, namely, the suspension of the existence of nature and the placement of the manifestation of nature onto the construction of knowledge: “natural consciousness will prove to be only a concept of knowledge.” [52]52 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, vol. 1, p. 62. Hegel also synthesizes the subject of dialectics, holding that human beings, society, and nature are unified in spirit. However, Hegel’s reduction excludes the horizon of temporality; he logicizes simultaneity, futurity, and the historical field, and thus this reduction is a “false reduction.” [53]53 Liu Shaoming, “The Self-Negation of the Subject of Dialectics and the Form of the Unity of Opposites,” p. 30. From the perspective of phenomenology, it is possible to analyze, from the three angles of simultaneity, futurity, and the historical field, how Marx’s temporal dialectics transcends Hegel’s non-temporal dialectics, thereby revealing the historical significance of Marx’s temporal dialectics.

马克思通过现象学式的超越论还原，在原初的同时性视域中回到了个体-社会-自然的辩证法主体。他以面向未来的感性实践活动为视域，显现了辩证法的原初差异和否定性。在此基础上，他将辩证法的对立统一当作辩证法的否定之否定的衍生形式，并且认为这两种辩证法形式通过融合过去、现在和未来的历史场域显现出来。因此，辩证法主体、辩证法动力与辩证法形式都在原初的时间性视域中显现。马克思用现象学方法将辩证法在时间性基础上显现出来，超越黑格尔辩证法对时间性基础的排斥，从而为辩证法的实在性提供了显现基础。当然，我们要看到马克思对黑格尔辩证法有多方面的继承。首先，马克思继承了黑格尔辩证法的主体性理论。黑格尔辩证法“总意味着一个自我活动者的展开，意味着事物自身的呈现”,马克思也认为辩证法必须有一个主体。其次，马克思继承了黑格尔辩证法的否定性理论。黑格尔认为“实体作为主体是一个纯粹的单纯否定性”,辩证法表现为自我否定。马克思也以主体的自我否定作为辩证法展开的动力。最后，马克思继承了黑格尔辩证法的历史性特征。黑格尔认为精神的辩证运动历程“亦即历史，是一种认知着的、自行中介着的转变过程”。马克思则认为历史本身有一个不断继承、否定和发展的过程，这个过程即辩证法主体自我否定的过程。实际上，黑格尔哲学中也存在某种现象学还原，即将自然的存在进行悬置，将自然的显现放到知识的构造上，“自然意识将要表明自己仅仅是知识的一个概念”。黑格尔也对辩证法的主体进行了综合，认为人、社会与自然在精神上是统一的。但是，黑格尔的还原排除了时间性视域，他将同时性、未来性和历史场域逻辑化，因而这种还原是一种“假还原”。在现象学的视域下，可以从同时性、未来性和历史场域三个角度，分析马克思时间性辩证法对于黑格尔非时间性辩证法的超越，展现马克思时间性辩证法的历史意义。

First, Marx, through the real and concrete subject in the synchronic horizon, transcends Hegel’s abstract dialectical subject that excludes the synchronic horizon. The subject of Hegel’s dialectics is abstract at every stage of its movement and does not possess the reality at any stage that Marx’s dialectical subject does. Marx’s dialectical subject is the simultaneously manifesting individual, society, and nature—that is, individual-society-nature—while Hegel’s dialectical subject is absolute spirit. On the surface, Hegel’s absolute spirit also contains content such as man, society, and nature, but in the process of the dialectical movement, its subject is not the simultaneous manifestation of individual, society, and nature, and at each stage it is abstract. First, Hegel’s nature is externalized from the absolute idea: “The absolutely free idea … in its absolute truth, it decides to let its particularity, or its initial determination and its other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflection, freely externalize itself as nature.” [54]54 G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, Part One: Logic, §244, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 275. Nature is merely one stage of the dialectical movement of absolute spirit, unlike Marx’s dialectical subject, which always includes nature. Second, although Hegel’s absolute spirit must pass through stages with social characteristics such as objective spirit, society, state, and ethics as objective spirit are sublated in absolute spirit; they do not exist at every stage. Moreover, Hegel’s objective spirit itself is abstract because it is not a society grounded in Marx’s mode of production. Finally, although Hegel’s dialectics ultimately aims to achieve a so-called totality and completeness, its nature and objective spirit have already been sublated by absolute knowledge and are no longer the manifestation of real nature and objective spirit. Therefore, absolute spirit, as the subject of dialectics, does not simultaneously manifest individual, society, and nature in the process of self-negation. The phenomenological-style transcendental reduction is crucial for the concrete manifestation of Marx’s dialectical subject, surpassing Hegel’s abstract dialectical subject.

第一，马克思以同时性视域中现实和具体的主体，超越了黑格尔排除同时性视域中的抽象辩证法主体。黑格尔的辩证法主体在运动的诸阶段上都是抽象的，不具备马克思的辩证法主体那样的在任何阶段的现实性。马克思的辩证法主体是同时显现的个人、社会、自然，即个人-社会-自然，而黑格尔的辩证法主体是绝对精神。表面上看，黑格尔的绝对精神也包含人、社会和自然等内容，但是在辩证法运动的发展过程中，其主体不是个人、社会、自然的同时显现，且在每一个阶段都是抽象的。首先，黑格尔的自然是绝对理念外化出来的：“绝对自由的理念……在它自身的绝对真理性里，它自己决定让它的特殊性环节，或它最初的规定和它的异在的环节，直接性的理念，作为它的反映，自由地外化为自然。”自然只是绝对精神辩证运动的某一阶段，不像马克思的辩证法主体那样始终包含自然。其次，黑格尔的绝对精神虽然要经历客观精神等具有社会特征的阶段，但是社会、国家、伦理等客观精神会在绝对精神中被扬弃，它并不存在于每一个阶段。而且，黑格尔的客观精神本身也是抽象的，因为它不是奠基于马克思的生产方式基础上的社会。最后，尽管黑格尔的辩证法最终要实现所谓的整体和大全，但是其自然和客观精神已经被绝对知识扬弃，不再是真的自然和客观精神的显现。所以，绝对精神作为辩证法主体，在自我否定的过程中，并不是同时显现个体、社会、自然。现象学式的超越论还原对于马克思辩证法主体的具体显现至关重要，它超越了黑格尔抽象的辩证法主体。

Second, the negativity of Marx’s dialectics, unfolded in futurity, transcends the false negativity and “non-futurity” in Hegel’s dialectics. First, the future-oriented dimension of Marx’s sensuous practical activity provides the real driving force for dialectics, surpassing the false negativity of Hegel’s dialectics. Marx holds that sensuous practical activity manifests the duplication of the world: “Man not only duplicates himself intellectually, as in consciousness, but actively, really, and thus sees himself in a world he has created.” [55]55 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 277. In the duplication of the world, the sensuous object becomes its own opposite, negating itself; this opposition and negation are merely man’s negation of himself, because he “sees himself in a world he has created.” However, the self-negation of Marx’s dialectics originates from passivity, cognitive dissonance, and existential dissatisfaction. The negation in Marx’s dialectics is not self-positing, because man still has passivity in his contemplation of the world he has created. At the same time, the negation of oneself is not completed; creating oneself and contemplating oneself still have their dissonance and dissatisfaction. These three, as activities oriented toward the future, are the true horizon for the unfolding of dialectical self-negation. Marx holds that the subject of Hegel’s dialectics also contains the duality of man and nature, except that nature and things “are posited by self-consciousness,” [56]56 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 332. so this duality and negativity remain the identity within spirit. Therefore, the self-negation of Hegel’s dialectical subject lacks passivity, cognitive dissonance, and dissatisfaction; its internal “opposition” and “duality” are posited and “feigned” by itself. Spirit “releases from itself only this abstract nature,” [57]57 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 333. and the essence of nature is still spirit. Spirit is essentially “a historicity abstracted from historical determinate being that transcends the painful opposition between nature and history”; [58]58 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 320. the false nature ultimately becomes merely a part of spirit’s “history,” the heterogeneity in history is eliminated, and the negativity of dialectics becomes false negativity and alienation.

第二，马克思在未来性中展开的辩证法的否定性，超越了黑格尔辩证法中的虚假否定性和“非未来性”。其一，马克思的感性实践活动的未来面向，为辩证法提供了真正的动力，超越了黑格尔辩证法的虚假否定性。马克思认为，感性实践活动显现了世界的二重化：“人不仅像在意识中那样在精神上使自己二重化，而且能动地、现实地使自己二重化，从而在他所创造的世界中直观自身。”在世界二重化中，感性对象成为自己的对立面，否定了自身，这种对立与否定仅仅是人对自己的否定，因为他是在“他所创造的世界中直观自身”。但是，马克思辩证法的自我否定来源于被动性、认知的不协调性与生存的不满足性。马克思辩证法的否定不是自我的设定，因为人在对自身创造的世界的直观中仍然有被动性。同时，对自己的否定并没有完成，创造自身和直观自身仍然有其不协调性和不满足性。这三者作为面向未来的活动，是辩证法自我否定的真正展开视域。马克思认为黑格尔的辩证法主体中也有人与自然的二重性，只不过自然与物“是自我意识所设定的东西”,因而这种二重性和否定性仍然是精神内部的同一性。所以，黑格尔的辩证法主体的自我否定中并没有被动性、认知的不协调性、不满足性，它内部的“对立”和“二重性”都是它自己设定和“假装”出来的。精神“从自身释放出去的只是这个抽象的自然界”,自然界的本质还是精神。精神实质上是“从历史的定在中抽象出来的历史性超越了自然与历史之痛苦的对立”,虚假的自然界最终只是精神“历史”的一部分，历史中的异质性被消除，辩证法的否定性成了虚假的否定性和异化。

Second, the exposition of sensuous practical activity oriented toward the future allows Marx’s dialectics to transcend the “non-futurity” of Hegel’s dialectics. In Hegel, the future is the direction of movement in which absolute spirit sublates alienation and returns to its own embrace. However, the driving force of this direction of movement is a false driving force—that is, it does not proceed from existential dissatisfaction, self-non-certainty, or cognitive dissonance, but from false difference. False difference means that Hegel “not only leads difference back to identity, but also makes identity the sufficient condition for difference to exist and be thought,” [59]59 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 44. so the movement of dialectics “remains an uncritical movement in Hegel.” [60]60 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 332. Therefore, the future, as the endpoint of non-difference and uncritical movement, is actually a “non-future,” because its final content is determined from the outset, with no possibility of genuine development and progress. The development of society and the ultimate form of man do not transcend the limits set by Hegel; in Hegel, the endpoint of dialectics is confined within the self-positing of world spirit, “Hegel stands on the side of what is unchanging in history,” [61]61 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 320. after all, when spirit attains absolute knowledge, it “means that spirit returns into itself.” [62]62 G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 479. The posited “non-futurity” is insufficient to explain the dialectical subject’s genuine negation of itself; it cannot achieve the progress of society and man as Marx’s temporal dialectics does, nor can it realize progress in truth and self-certainty.

其二，对朝向未来的感性实践活动的阐述，让马克思辩证法超越了黑格尔辩证法的“非未来性”。在黑格尔那里，未来是绝对精神扬弃异化回到自身怀抱所朝向的运动方向。但是，这个运动方向的动力是一个虚假的动力，即不是从生存不满足、自我不确证、认知不协调出发，而是从虚假的差异性出发。虚假的差异性意味着黑格尔“不但将差异引回了同一性，而且还使同一性成为了差异得以存在、得以被思考的充分条件”,所以辩证法的运动“在黑格尔那里还是非批判的运动”。因此，未来作为非差异性和非批判运动的终点，实际上是一个“非未来”,因为它最终的内容在一开始就被决定了，没有真正发展和进步的可能性。社会的发展和人的终极形态不会超越黑格尔设定的极限，在黑格尔那里，辩证法的终点被限定在世界精神自身的设定里面，“黑格尔站在了历史之不变的东西一边”,毕竟精神在达到绝对知识的时候“意味着精神返回到自身之内”。被设定的“非未来性”不足以阐释辩证法主体对自身的真正否定，不能像马克思的时间性辩证法那样实现社会与人的进步，也不能在真理和自我确证方面实现进步。

Third, Marx’s temporal dialectics, manifested in the historical field, transcends Hegel’s non-temporal dialectics manifested in logic. For Hegel, “in the self-identicality of freedom, of self-subsistent being-for-self, I=I, the concept is in and for itself absolute negativity and freedom, and therefore time is not its power; the concept is not in time, nor is it a temporal thing.” [63]63 G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 46. Hegel holds that the concept is not only supra-temporal but also superior to time: “Only natural things are subject to time because they are finite; on the contrary, the true, the Idea, and Spirit are eternal.” [64]64 G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 128. Hence, his dialectics is also supra-temporal. Temporalized nature is merely one moment of the negation of the negation in dialectics; the other moments of the negation of the negation in dialectics do not manifest through time. However, supra-temporal dialectics only proves the illusoriness of dialectics itself. If Hegel holds that “time = negativity relating itself to itself,” [65]65 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 487. then negativity must necessarily be temporalized, and consequently the process of externalization from logic to nature itself must also be temporalized. At the same time, Hegel holds that “the opposition of nature to thought is a defect of nature,” [66]66 G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 13. and thus he locates time in naturalness and disparages it, without discovering that primordial time is the time from logic to nature. Hegel’s disparagement of natural time is equivalent to disparaging time itself. Time is not something conceptual, but the condition of manifestation in which the concept moves. Similarly, if absolute spirit is timeless eternity, i.e., “eternity is the absolute present, the now that has neither before nor after,” [67]67 G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 1, trans. R.F. Brown et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 290. then how can it prove that “its essence, formally speaking, is freedom, i.e., the absolute negativity of the concept as self-identicality”? [68]68 Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 46. For negativity must be linked to temporality. The reason why the dialectical negation of absolute spirit does not require time is that absolute spirit knows “the non-existence of the difference between the object and itself.” [69]69 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 490. Thus, absolute spirit “pretends to be its own other, pretends to be sensuousness, reality, life,” [70]70 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 332. and negation is merely a feigned negation. The reason why the negation of supra-temporal or timeless dialectics can be established is that “the method that has become abstract and intuitive distorts and ruins history.” [71]71 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Holy Family*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 4 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 127. Marcuse holds that Hegel’s “historicality is delineated through a particular ‘temporality’; the wholeness or consistency of life is ‘determined through time,’” [72]72 Herbert Marcuse, *Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, trans. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 2. which is actually a reinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of history through the tone of Dilthey’s philosophy of life and in the manner of Heidegger’s phenomenological temporality, and also a “salvation” of Hegel’s dialectics. The temporality Marcuse speaks of is the primordial unity of past, present, and future, similar to the historical field in which dialectics manifests in Marx’s theory. Therefore, Marx, with his temporal dialectics, transcends Hegel’s non-temporal dialectics, and this is also a “salvation” of Hegel’s non-temporal dialectics, thereby achieving a historical breakthrough and transformation of dialectics.

第三，马克思在历史场域中显现的时间性辩证法，超越了黑格尔在逻辑中显现的非时间性辩证法。对于黑格尔来说，“在自由的、自为实存的自我同一性，我=我中，概念自在自为地是绝对否定性和自由，因此时间并不是其力量，概念也不在时间当中、不是时间之物”。黑格尔认为概念不仅是超时间的，而且是优越于时间的：“只有自然物是服从时间的，因为它是有限的；相反，真、理念和精神则是永恒的。”因此，其辩证法也是超越时间的。时间化的自然只是辩证法否定之否定的一个环节，辩证法否定之否定的其他环节都不通过时间显现。但是，超时间的辩证法只不过证明了辩证法自身的虚妄。如果黑格尔认为“时间=自身同自身相联系的否定性”,那么否定性就必然是时间化的，因而从逻辑到自然的外化过程本身也必然是时间化的，同时，黑格尔认为“自然界同思维的对立,是自然界的缺陷”,这样一来，黑格尔便将时间安置在自然性身上并进行贬低，却没有发现原初的时间是从逻辑到自然的时间。黑格尔贬低自然时间，也就等同于贬低时间。时间并不是概念性的东西，而是概念赖以运动的显现条件。同样，如果绝对精神是无时间的永恒，即“永恒是绝对的当下，是既无先也无后的现在”,那么它如何证明其“本质从形式上看就是自由，即概念的作为自身同一性的绝对否定性” 因为，否定性要与时间性挂钩。之所以绝对精神的辩证否定不需要时间，是因为绝对精神知道“对象同它之间的差别的非存在”。所以，绝对精神“冒充为它自身的他物,冒充为感性、现实、生命”,否定也只不过是假装否定而已。之所以超时间或无时间的辩证法的否定能够成立，是因为“变得抽象的、直观的方法歪曲和糟蹋了历史”。马尔库塞认为，黑格尔的“历史性是通过一个特殊的‘时间性’刻画出来的，生命的整体或一致性是‘通过时间规定的’”,这实际是通过狄尔泰生命哲学的口吻，以海德格尔现象学时间性的方式对黑格尔历史理论的重新阐释，也是对黑格尔辩证法的“拯救”。马尔库塞所说的这个时间性就是过去、现在、未来的原初统一，类似于马克思理论中辩证法显现的历史场域。因此，马克思以时间性辩证法，超越了黑格尔的非时间性辩证法，也是对黑格尔非时间性辩证法的“拯救”,从而实现了辩证法的历史性突破和变革。

Of course, theoretical transcendence also has practical significance. Marx’s temporal dialectics’ transcendence of Hegel’s non-temporal dialectics not only provides an appropriate perspective for understanding the subject of dialectics but also provides a substantive basis for the motive force and form of dialectics, thereby making dialectics a sharp weapon for criticizing reality. Because the subject of dialectics, in its future-oriented action and in the constantly progressing historical field, demands the transformation of present reality, the overthrow of unjust society, the change of unsatisfactory living conditions, and the exposure of the lie of the “eternal present” society, therefore “dialectics, in its rational form, arouses the wrath and terror of the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen,” [73]73 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 35 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996), 19. which precisely demonstrates the practical power of temporal dialectics. (Author’s affiliation: Fudan University)

当然，理论的超越也具有现实的意义。马克思的时间性辩证法对黑格尔的非时间性辩证法的超越，既为理解辩证法主体提供了恰当的视角，也为辩证法的动力和形式提供了实在性的基础，从而让辩证法成为批判现实的锐利武器。因为辩证法主体在面向未来的行动中、在不断进步的历史场域中都要求变革当下的现实，推翻不合理的社会，改变不理想的生存状态，揭穿“永恒当下”的社会的谎言，所以“辩证法，在其合理形态上，引起资产阶级及其空论主义的代言人的恼怒和恐怖”,这正说明了时间性辩证法的现实力量。（作者单位：复旦大学）

Online editor: Paul

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