“The Poverty of Philosophy”: What Philosophy? What Poverty? — The Final Metaphysics and Marx’s Critique

*The Poverty of Philosophy. Answer to M. Proudhon’s “Philosophy of Poverty”* is the work that marks the public advent of Marxism. Literally speaking, Marx’s *The Poverty of Philosophy* clearly constitutes a critical contrast to Proudhon’s *Philosophy of Poverty* in an ironic sense at the level of expression. Yet what is the specific meaning and theoretical orientation of the proposition “the poverty of philosophy”? In the entire work, Marx does not directly address or discuss this question. This means that the task of revealing the specific meaning of “the poverty of philosophy” and its object of critique must be completed by us, but the scholarly community has long failed to give sufficient attention to this foundational work. In order to clarify the connotations of the two key concepts of “philosophy” and “poverty” to which Marx refers, it is necessary to return to Proudhon’s *Philosophy of Poverty* and to examine the two texts in relation to each other within a broader field of thought and historical context.

《哲学的贫困。答蒲鲁东先生的〈贫困的哲学〉》是标志马克思主义公开问世的著作。从字面上看，马克思的《哲学的贫困》显然是从表达形式上对蒲鲁东的《贫困的哲学》构成一种讽刺意义的对照批判。然而，“哲学的贫困”这一命题的具体含义及其理论指向是什么?马克思在整部著作中并未直接关涉和讨论这一问题。这意味着揭示“哲学的贫困”的具体含义及其批判对象的任务必须由我们来完成，但学界对这一基础性工作长期未能给予足够重视。为了澄清马克思所指的“哲学”和“贫困”两个关键概念的内涵，需要回到蒲鲁东的《贫困的哲学》,并在更广阔的思想场域和历史背景下把这两个文本关联起来考察。

Although existing research also involves a comparison of the two texts, the focus is mainly on Marx’s work. This article first concentrates on an interpretation of Proudhon’s philosophy, and then, on this basis, reinterprets *The Poverty of Philosophy* and reinterprets the specific meaning of “the poverty of philosophy.” This is because Marx’s critique of Proudhon is not a refutation of individual points, but a systematic critique of his entire “economics-metaphysics.” Therefore, only by first clarifying the specific content, philosophical stance, methodological foundation, and internal contradictions of Proudhon’s doctrine can we deeply grasp the positions of Marx and Proudhon in their specific historical and intellectual context, and reveal how Marx, through his critique of Proudhon, comprehensively reflects on and repositions philosophy and its role in social practice. Based on this, this article innovatively proposes a bold viewpoint: from the perspective of the dissolution of metaphysics completed by Hegel, Proudhon’s philosophy is the final effort of the metaphysical tradition, that is, “the final metaphysics,” and thus what it exposes is both poverty in its original sense and poverty in its ultimate sense. This judgment not only provides a new periodization for the history of philosophy, but also effectively redefines Proudhon’s position in the intellectual map of Hegel and Marx, and offers us a new way of understanding to deeply grasp the critical significance of *The Poverty of Philosophy*.

虽然既有研究也涉及两个文本的比较，但精力主要集中在马克思的著作上。本文先聚焦于对蒲鲁东哲学的阐释，继而在此基础上重新解读《哲学的贫困》,并重释“哲学的贫困”的具体含义。这是因为，马克思对蒲鲁东的批判不是对个别观点的反驳，而是对其整个“经济学—形而上学”的系统批判。因而唯有首先澄清蒲鲁东学说的具体内容、哲学立场、方 法论基础及其内 在矛盾，方能深入把握马克思和蒲鲁东在特定历史与思想语境中的位置，并揭示马克思如何通过对蒲鲁东的批判，全面反思和重新定位哲学及其在社会实践中的作用。基于此，本文创新性地提出了一个大胆的观点：从黑格尔完成的形而上学的解体角度来看，蒲鲁东的哲学是形而上学传统的最后努力，即“最后的形而上学”,因而其暴露的既是原初意义的贫困，也是最终意义的贫困。这一论断不仅为哲学史提供了新的分期方式，也事实上重新定义了蒲鲁东在黑格尔和马克思思想图谱中的位置，并为我们深刻把握《哲学的贫困》的批判意义提供了全新理解方式。

I. Proudhon’s “Economics-Metaphysics”

一 蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”

If one were to summarize in a single sentence what distinguishes Proudhon from other philosophers (or economists), it is that his philosophy (or economics) should, strictly speaking, be called “economics-metaphysics.” To better understand Proudhon’s theory, we first need to examine the historical background in which Proudhon lived and the theoretical task he set for himself, and then compare the differences between Proudhon and other thinkers.

如果用一句话来概括蒲鲁东与其他哲学家(或者说经济学家)的不同之处，那就是他的哲学(或者说经济学)严格来说应当叫“经济学—形而上学”。为了更好地理解蒲鲁东的理论，我们首先需要审视蒲鲁东所处的时代背景和他为自己设定的理论任务，然后再来比较蒲鲁东与其他思想家的不同之处。

(I) Proudhon’s Understanding of “Science”

(一)蒲鲁东对“科学”的理解

Proudhon’s *Philosophy of Poverty* was published in 1846, a period that coincides with the later stages of the Industrial Revolution in European history, when the gap between rich and poor was widening and the living conditions of the working class were generally deteriorating, thus also a period of social and political upheaval and intellectual transformation. Against this historical backdrop, Proudhon faced a theoretical situation in which two forces, the conservatives and the reformers, attacked each other: “On one side is political economy, or tradition; on the other side is socialism, or utopia.” [1]1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *System of Economic Contradictions, or The Philosophy of Poverty*, Vol. 1, trans. Benjamin R. Tucker (Boston: Benjamin R. Tucker, 1888), p. 33.

蒲鲁东的《贫困的哲学》发表于1846年，这一时期正值欧洲历史上的工业革命后期阶段，贫富差距加剧，工人阶级生活条件普遍恶化，因而也是社会政治动荡和思想变革的时期。在这一时代背景下，蒲鲁东面对的是保守派和革新派两种势力相互攻击的理论局面：“一方是政治经济学，或曰传统，另一方是社会主义，或曰乌托邦。”

In Proudhon’s view, so-called “political economy” is the knowledge obtained by observing various phenomena of the production and distribution of wealth, and then classifying and synthesizing the results of these observations. Since the phenomena observed by political economy are universally existing facts, as habits and traditions, and are frequently confirmed by the authority of law, political economy considers itself to be knowledge systematized by reasoning about constant and necessary facts. “Socialism,” on the other hand, declares that political economy is a sophistry fabricated to maintain the exploitation of the majority by the minority, and holds economists responsible for the problem of aggravated poverty.

在蒲鲁东看来，所谓“政治经济学”,就是对财富的生产与分配的各种现象进行观察，并将观察成果作分类和综合的知识。由于政治经济学观察的这些现象是普遍存在、作为习惯和传统的事实，并且经常得到法律权威的确认，因而政治经济学认为自己是对经常的和必然的事实进行推理而系统化的知识。而“社会主义”则宣称政治经济学是为了维护少数人对多数人的剥削而捏造出来的诡辩，并要经济学家对加剧的贫困问题负责。

According to Proudhon’s understanding, political economy tends to sanctify the principle of private property, while socialism extols the principle of common or associated ownership. Therefore, faced with the theoretical situation where political economy attacks socialism as “utopia” and socialism counterattacks political economy for “maintaining tradition (private property),” Proudhon set his theoretical task as criticizing traditional political economy and exploring an alternative socialist theory—petty-bourgeois socialism and anarchism. Consequently, reconciling the claims of both sides became his work:

根据蒲鲁东的理解，政治经济学趋向于把私有权原则神圣化，社会主义则是颂扬公有或联合原则。因此，面对政治经济学把社会主义攻击为“乌托邦”,社会主义反击政治经济学“维护传统(私有制)”这样的理论局面，蒲鲁东将其理论任务设定为批判传统政治经济学和探索替代的社会主义理论——小资产阶级社会主义和无政府主义。于是，协调两者的主张就成了他的工作：

“In this controversy, in order to find the truth, one must by no means reject the opinions of either of the opposing sides, but must reconcile the claims of both. My meaning is that science has already reached a conclusion such that: whether it be oppositions in nature or in the realm of ideas, they must be resolved on some broad basis or through some complex formula, that is, by making the opposing sides absorb each other and reconcile with each other.” [2]2 Proudhon, *Philosophy of Poverty*, Vol. 1, p. 34.

“在这场论争中，为了求得真理，绝不能排斥对立双方中任何一方的意见，而必须协调两者的主张。我的意思就是说，科学已经得出一个这样的结论：不论是自然界或者是观念形态上的对立，都必须在某种广泛的基础上或者说通过某种复杂的公式来解决，也就是说，使对立双方互相吸收，彼此协调。”

According to Proudhon, the mutual reconciliation of opposing sides is the requirement and conclusion of “science.” Therefore, understanding “science” here is the key to grasping Proudhon’s thought. Proudhon’s understanding of “science” is: “Everything it provides us is not given a priori from experience or reason; everything in this science, including substance and phenomenon, whole and category, fact and concept, originates from humanity itself… Social science is the unity of social reason and social practice.” [3]3 Proudhon, *Philosophy of Poverty*, Vol. 1, p. 35. We see that Proudhon here proposes a science “unlike other sciences”—a science that creates reality and reason itself. The reason this science can create reason and experience and achieve their unity is that the substance and phenomenon, whole and category, fact and concept it contains all originate from humanity itself. In Proudhon’s view, socialism, as an unreal utopia, denies human experience, while political economy only acknowledges reality and denies human reason; thus neither can become a true “science.” To realize this “science,” the opposing sides must absorb each other and reconcile with each other.

按照蒲鲁东的说法，对立双方彼此协调是“科学”的要求和结论。因此，如何理解这里的“科学”成了把握蒲鲁东思想的关键。蒲鲁东对“科学”的理解是：“它给我们提供的一切，都不是先验地来自经验或理性，这门科学的一切，包括本体和现象、整体与范畴、事实与概念，都是源自人类本身……社会科学是社会理性与社会实践的一致。”我们看到，蒲鲁东在这里提出了一种“不像其他科学那样”的科学——一门创造现实与理性本身的科学。这门科学之所以能够创造理性与经验并实现二者的统一，就在于它包含的本体与现象、整体与范畴、事实与概念，均源自人类本身。在蒲鲁东看来，社会主义作为非现实的乌托邦否认了人类的经验，政治经济学只承认现实性而否认人类的理性，因而两者都无法成为真正的“科学”。要实现这种“科学”,必须使对立双方互相吸收和彼此协调。

(II) The Distinctiveness of Proudhon’s “Economics-Metaphysics”

(二)蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”的不同之处

If we apply this understanding of “science” to “economics,” we obtain Proudhon’s understanding and redefinition of “economics”: “Economics is the most profound, the purest, and the most suitable for practice of all sciences. This new thesis makes economics a concrete logic or metaphysics, thereby fundamentally changing the foundation of old philosophy. In other words, for me, economics is an objective form and concrete embodiment of metaphysics.” [4]4 Proudhon, *Philosophy of Poverty*, Vol. 1, p. 36. That is to say, in Proudhon’s view, economics is the science that understands and explains the entire picture of human society. It should not only point out the basic principles of the entire process of social existence, that is, the theory and systematic knowledge of society’s constant change, but should also, based on existing achievements and various developing phenomena, constantly explore reform plans that can be immediately implemented. Thus, economics becomes metaphysics, a “metaphysics in action,” a “metaphysics most suitable for practice,” a “concrete metaphysics.” This is the first difference between Proudhon and other economists and philosophers.

如果我们将对这种“科学”的理解应用到“经济学”上，就会得到蒲鲁东理解的和重新定义的“经济学”:“经济学是一切科学中最渊博、最纯洁和最适用于实践的科学。这个新的论点，使经济学成为一种具体的逻辑学或形而上学，从而根本改变了旧哲学的基础。换句话说，对我来说，经济学是形而上学的一种客观形式和具体体现。”也就是说，在蒲鲁东看来，经济学是理解和解释人类社会全貌的科学。它不仅应当指出社会整个生存过程的基本原理，即关于社会不断变迁的理论和系统知识，而且还应根据已有的成果和正在发展中的各种现象，不断探索可以立即实行的改革方案。于是，经济学变成了形而上学，一种“行动中的形而上学”,一种“最适于实践的形而上学”,一种“具体的形而上学”。这就是蒲鲁东与其他经济学家和哲学家的第一个不同之处。

Proudhon believed that only by establishing the “natural history of labor” as the content of “economics” could the identity of “economics-metaphysics” be realized, and at the same time the meaningless struggle between political economy and socialism be dissolved. In his view, the debate between political economy and socialism, on the surface a struggle between the principle of private property and the principle of public ownership, was in essence a contradiction concerning the principle of labor organization. However, this struggle was “ridiculous,” because “labor is organizing itself spontaneously,” so that it is neither necessary to organize labor as socialism says, nor is labor already organized as political economy says. Proudhon’s view was that since the beginning of the world, labor has been organizing itself spontaneously, and will continue to organize itself spontaneously, and that it is through “labor” that humanity manifests the “self.” This “spontaneity” of labor organization and the “self” it manifests were identified by Proudhon as “the field of exploration of political economy as the concrete form of philosophy.”

蒲鲁东认为，只有把“劳动的自然史”确立为“经济学”的内容，才能实现“经济学—形而上学”的同一性，同时消解政治经济学与社会主义的无意义斗争。在他看来，政治经济学和社会主义之间的论战，从表面上看是私有制原则和公有制原则的斗争，从本质上看其实是关于劳动组织原则的矛盾。然而，这种斗争是“可笑的”,这是因为“劳动正在自发地组织着”,因而既不是像社会主义说的那样要去组织劳动，也不是像政治经济学说的那样劳动已经组织起来了。蒲鲁东的观点是，自开天辟地以来，劳动就在自发地组织着，并且仍将继续自发地组织着，并且人类正是通过“劳动”表现出“自我”。劳动组织的这种“自发性”和表现出的这种“自我”,被蒲鲁东指认为“作为哲学的具体形式的政治经济学的探索领域”。

In his writings, Proudhon tirelessly promoted this view: only by establishing the “natural history of labor” as content could the identity of economics and metaphysics be achieved. Generally speaking, economics studies the production, distribution, and exchange of wealth, while metaphysics explores categories such as being, reality, and essence. Proudhon believed that the dual nature of labor—both as economic practice and as the external manifestation of human reason—enabled economics and metaphysics to achieve unity. The so-called “natural history of labor” means that the laws of labor do not depend on social institutions or external organization, but are driven by internal laws, and this spontaneity has a metaphysical basis of legitimacy. For example, “God created all things simply by externalizing the various eternal laws of reason into reality; human labor is the continuation of God’s work.” [5]5 Proudhon, *System of Economic Contradictions, or The Philosophy of Poverty*, Chapter 1, Section 1. Another example: “Apart from labor, that is, the practice of reason, what else can be found to more reliably supervise philosophy, that is, the theory of reason? Conversely, what is more effective than philosophical formulas for supervising political economy?” Therefore, he believed that “whoever studies the laws of labor and exchange is a true expert in metaphysics.” In short, Proudhon held that labor is both the expression of reason (metaphysics) and the foundation of experience (economics), so the task of “economics-metaphysics” is to reveal the rational and empirical laws of the “natural history of labor.” Establishing the “natural history of labor” as the content of economics, in a sense, reconstructed the metaphysical foundation of political economy. Grasping labor through metaphysical means was the second difference between Proudhon and other thinkers.

蒲鲁东在其著作中不遗余力地宣传这一观点：只有将“劳动自然史”确立为内容，才能实现经济学与形而上学的同一性。一般来说，经济学研究财富的生产、分配和交换问题，形而上学则探讨存在、实在和本质等范畴。蒲鲁东认为，劳动的双重性质——既是经济实践，又是人类理性的外在表现——使得经济学与形而上学达成统一。所谓“劳动自然史”就是指劳动的规律不依赖社会制度或外部组织，而是由内在规律驱动，且这种自发性具有形而上学的合法性基础。比如，“上帝创造万物，无非就是把理性的各种永恒规律外化为现实；人类的劳动就是上帝的这项事业的延续。”)再如，“除了劳动、即理性的实践，还能找到什么更能可靠地监督哲学、即理性的理论呢?反过来，又有什么比哲学公式更能有效地监督政治经济学呢?”因此，他认为“谁要是研究劳动与交换的规律，谁就是真正的形而上学专家”。总之，蒲鲁东认为劳动既是理性(形而上学)的表达，也是经验(经济学)的基础，因而“经济学—形而上学”的任务是揭示“劳动自然史”的理性和经验规律。把“劳动自然史”确立为经济学的内容，某种意义上重构了政治经济学的形而上学基础。用形而上学的方式来把握劳动，是蒲鲁东与其他思想家第二个不同之处。

So, how does the “natural history of labor” unfold itself to present the logical order and rational series of economic categories? Proudhon divided human history into two periods: the barbarian and the civilized man. He believed that the poverty of barbarians was caused by a lack of labor—that is, the laziness and ignorance of barbarians made them rely only on natural products and raw animal flesh for survival; the poverty of civilized man was caused by a lack of good labor organization (that is, a lack of order). Therefore, to eliminate poverty, it was necessary to study the “natural history of labor” concerning labor organization. Proudhon further pointed out that the “natural history of labor,” as a kind of metaphysics, must follow the rational series of economic categories, and the way the rational series unfolds itself is contradiction itself and its overcoming. Since any systematic contradiction must ultimately move toward a coordinated combination, the “system of economic contradictions” lays the foundation for “universal association.” That is, “economic evolution” must lead all people from “primitive passive equality” to “positive equality in talent and knowledge,” thereby gradually transforming “equality in poverty” into “equality in welfare.” For Proudhon, this was the requirement of “God”—to harmonize the various orders of society, namely freedom, wealth, and science.

那么，“劳动自然史”是如何展开自身，以呈现经济范畴的逻辑顺序和理性系列的呢?蒲鲁东把人类历史分为野蛮人和文明人两个时期。他认为，野蛮人的贫困是缺少劳动造成的，即野蛮人的懒惰和愚昧使其只能依靠天然产物和野兽生肉为生；文明人的贫困则是缺少良好的劳动组织(即缺乏秩序)造成的。因此，为了驱除贫困，必须研究关于劳动组织的“劳动自然史”。蒲鲁东进一步指出，“劳动自然史”作为一种形而上学，必须遵循经济范畴的理性系列，而理性系列展开自身的方式就是矛盾本身及其克服。由于任何一种成系统的矛盾最终必然走向一种协调的组合，因而“经济矛盾的体系”就是为“普遍联合”打下基础。即“经济进化”必须引导所有的人从“原始的消极平等”进入“才能与知识上的积极平等”,从而实现“贫困的平等”逐步转变为“福利的平等”。而对蒲鲁东来说，这是“上帝”的要求——使社会的各种秩序，即自由、财富和科学彼此协调。

In this way, Proudhon’s argumentative work turned into how economic evolution, in accordance with the requirement of “God,” realizes the rational series: the “division” of labor, as the first stage of economic evolution, is the result of opposing the primitive caste system and hierarchy, but in turn negates labor itself, rendering intelligence useless and making workers labor like beasts; therefore, to restore the balance severely disrupted by the law of division, industry adopted “machinery” to reduce the intensity of workers’ labor and lower the price of products, thereby improving public welfare; division and machinery led to “competition,” which, in its origin, encouraged fairness, but in its result, competition was unfair; as the natural opposite of competition, “monopoly” is both a necessary condition for the basic principle of social composition and the establishment of the category of wealth, and the main source of plunder and poverty; to counter monopoly, society resorts to “taxation” laws and the “police” system; however, once workers rely on associations to apply violence against monopoly, “God” commands the police, originally established to protect the proletariat, to turn their bayonets against the proletariat… and so on. Proudhon claimed to have discovered the rational series of economic categories: division of labor, machinery, competition, monopoly, police or taxation, balance of trade, credit, property, republic, population.

这样一来，蒲鲁东的论证工作就转变为经济进化如何遵照“上帝”的要求实现理性系列：劳动的“分工”作为经济进化的第一个阶段，是对抗原始种姓制和等级制的结果，但反过来否定了劳动本身，使智力无用武之地、使劳动者像牲畜一样地劳动；于是，为了重建被分工规律严重破坏了的平衡，工业采用了“机器”,以减轻工人的劳动强度和降低产品的价格，从而提高公众福利；分工与机器导致了“竞争”,从竞争的起源来看是对公平的鼓励，但就其结果而言，竞争又是不公平的；作为竞争的天然对立物，“垄断”既是社会的基本构成原则和财富范畴成立的必要条件，又是掠夺和贫困的主要根源；为了对抗垄断，社会借助于“捐税”法律和“警察”系统；然而，工人一旦依靠同盟来对垄断施加暴力，“上帝”就命令原本保护无产阶级而建立的警察反过来将锋芒对准无产阶级……依此类推，蒲鲁东宣称自己发现了经济范畴的理性系列：分工、机器、竞争、垄断、警察或捐税、贸易的平衡、信用、所有权、共和制、人口。

Whether or not Proudhon actually discovered the so-called rational series of economic categories, and whether or not the problem should be posed in this way, for him, revealing the conceptual order of economic categories—that is, the logical order and rational series of economic theory—was the theoretical task of “economics-metaphysics.” At the same time, Proudhon believed that “economics-metaphysics,” as a “science most suited to practice,” had as its practical purpose the realization of the principle of equality in labor organization. These two points—the theoretical task and the practical purpose—constituted the third and fourth main differences between him and other thinkers.

无论蒲鲁东是否真的发现了所谓经济范畴的理性系列，无论问题是否应当以这种方式被提出，对他来说，揭示经济范畴的观念顺序，即经济理论的逻辑顺序与理性系列，就是“经济学—形而上学”的理论任务。同时，蒲鲁东认为，“经济学—形而上学”作为一种“最适于实践的科学”,其实践目的在于实现劳动组织的平等原则。理论任务与实践目的这两点，构成了他与其他思想家的第三个和第四个主要区别。

Finally, let us look at Proudhon’s conclusion. Proudhon believed that to overcome the “system of economic contradictions” and achieve the final state of labor organization for humanity, it was necessary to use a “formula of equilibrium” to bring all contradictions into universal balance. In his view, this formula, based on the principles of equality and exchange, could resolve various contradictions in the economy, for example, by eliminating the drawbacks of division through mutual aid, reducing the enslavement of workers by machinery, and avoiding the negative effects of monopoly and competition. Proudhon envisioned that this “formula of equilibrium” could not only maintain individual freedom and initiative but also return private wealth to society, thereby achieving political and economic balance through the movement of capital in and out. Therefore, Proudhon’s core solution was to support small private property and protect small-scale production, preventing small producers from going bankrupt in the environment of large-scale capitalist production. Many economists of the time, including Adam Smith and Marx, to some extent acknowledged the fact that the capitalist mode of production had enhanced productive forces. Smith emphasized that the division of labor and market expansion increased economic efficiency; Marx, while profoundly criticizing capitalism, also acknowledged that the productive forces created by capitalism provided the material basis for the realization of socialism—“The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.” [6]6 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Chapter 1. In contrast, Proudhon advocated protecting and developing small private property, attempting to maintain a relatively dispersed and small-scale division of labor in production. In Marx’s view, this conservative and regressive reformist stance could not resolve the fundamental contradictions of capitalism and hindered the realization of the proletarian revolution. Hence, he criticized “Monsieur Proudhon is thoroughly a petty-bourgeois philosopher and economist.” [7]7 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter 2, Section 1. This constituted the fifth difference between Proudhon and other thinkers.

最后，我们来看蒲鲁东的结论。蒲鲁东认为，为了克服“经济矛盾的体系”,实现人类最终的劳动组织状态，必须通过“平衡的公式”来使一切矛盾达到普遍的平衡。在他看来，这一基于平等和交换规则的公式可以解决经济中的种种矛盾，比如通过互助消除分工带来的弊端，减少机器对工人的奴役，并避免垄断和竞争造成负面影响。蒲鲁东设想，这种“平衡的公式”不仅能够维持个体的自由和积极性，还可以将私人财富返还给社会，从而通过资本进进出出的运动来实现政治和经济的平衡。因此，蒲鲁东的核心解决方案是支持小私有制和保护小规模生产，避免小生产者在资本主义大生产环境下陷入破产。当时的许多经济学家，包括亚当·斯密和马克思，都在一定程度上承认资本主义生产方式带来生产力提升的事实。斯密强调分工和市场扩张提高了经济效率，马克思虽然深刻批判资本主义，但也承认资本主义创造的生产力为社会主义的实现提供了物质基础——“资产阶级在它的不到一百年的阶级统治中所创造的生产力，比过去一切世代创造的全部生产力还要多，还要大”。相比之下，蒲鲁东却主张保护和发展小私有制，试图维持一种较为分散和小规模分工的生产模式。在马克思看来，这种保守的和退缩的改良主义立场无法解决资本主义的根本矛盾，阻碍了无产阶级革命的实现。因而，他批判“蒲鲁东先生彻头彻尾是个小资产阶级的哲学家和经济学家”。这就是蒲鲁东与其他思想家的第五个不同之处。

The five differences above show Proudhon’s attempt to transcend the opposition between political economy and socialism, tradition and utopia, striving to develop a so-called new “science”—an “economics-metaphysics” theory that merges metaphysics and economics, grasps labor in a metaphysical manner, seeks to reveal the logical order and rational series of economic categories, pursues the principle of equal labor organization, and protects small private property. However, since economics has become a metaphysics, it can only unfold itself within the framework of metaphysics. It is precisely here that Proudhon encounters the “poverty” of the metaphysics completed by Hegel. In response, Proudhon’s solution is to appeal to “God” to endow his theory with a transcendent authority.

以上五个不同之处展现了蒲鲁东试图超越政治经济学和社会主义、传统和乌托邦的对立，力求发展一种所谓的新“科学”——一种融合形而上学与经济学、以形而上学方式把握劳动、试图揭示经济范畴的逻辑顺序与理性系列、追求平等的劳动组织原则以及保护小私有制的“经济学—形而上学”理论。然而，经济学既然成为一种形而上学，那么也就只能在形而上学的框架内展开自身。蒲鲁东正是在这里遭遇了黑格尔完成的形而上学的“贫困”。对此，蒲鲁东的解决方案是，通过诉诸“上帝”来为其理论赋予一种超越性的权威。

II. The Relationship between Hegel’s Philosophy and Proudhon’s “Economics-Metaphysics”

二 黑格尔哲学与蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”的关系

In Proudhon’s *The Philosophy of Poverty*, “Hegel” appears only four times in total, while the concept of “God” appears more than six hundred times. Therefore, to understand the relationship between Hegel’s philosophy and Proudhon’s “economics-metaphysics,” we need to temporarily set aside “Hegel” and begin the discussion with “God.” The entire discussion will clarify how Proudhon uses Hegel’s method to present “God” and uses “God” to oppose Hegel’s “Absolute Idea.”

在蒲鲁东的《贫困的哲学》中，“黑格尔”总共只出现了四次，而“上帝”概念的出现频率却高达六百余次。因此，为了理解黑格尔哲学与蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”的关系，我们需要暂时放下“黑格尔”,而从“上帝”开始讨论。整个讨论将澄清蒲鲁东如何用黑格尔的方法呈现“上帝”,并用“上帝”来反对黑格尔的“绝对观念”。

(I) Explanation concerning “God”

(一)关于“上帝”的说明

“Before discussing the questions that form the subject of this new work, I need first to offer some explanations concerning a hypothesis, namely the hypothesis of God.” This is the opening sentence of *The Philosophy of Poverty*. For Proudhon, the significance of “God” for “economics-metaphysics” is similar to the significance of “universal gravitation” for the natural sciences: an unknowable force that pulls stars and atoms, driving the operation of the entire universe. So, what is “God”?

“在讨论构成这部新著对象的问题以前，我需要先就一个假设作些说明，这就是关于上帝的假设。”这是《贫困的哲学》的开篇之语。对蒲鲁东来说，“上帝”对于“经济学—形而上学”的意义，就类似于“万有引力”对于自然科学的意义：一种不可知的力量在牵引着群星和原子，推动着整个宇宙的运转。那么，“上帝”是什么呢?

“God is a being whose wisdom and activity possess an infinite power, identical and equivalent to fate, the summit of law, the summit of freedom, the summit of necessity… Because of God’s infinite character in all respects, it possesses an inherent characteristic… Because there is no contradiction in its own concept, God is possible.”

“上帝是这样一种存在，它的智慧与活动都具有一种无限的威力，简直与宿命相一致、相等同，是法律的顶峰、自由的顶峰、必然性的顶峰……由于上帝在一切方面无限的特性，所以它具有一种固有特点……因为在自己的概念中不存在任何矛盾，上帝才是可能的。”

“The hypothesis of an infinite being that is not an absolute being is admissible, because in such a being, freedom and wisdom, the self and the non-self, exist in a special and inconceivable, yet necessary, form.”

“无限存在但不是绝对存在的假设是说得过去的，因为在这种存在身上，自由与智慧、自我与非我以一种特殊的和不可思议的、但又是必然的形式存在着。”

For Proudhon, “God” is necessary for overcoming the “system of economic contradictions” because Proudhon defines “God” as a being “in whose own concept there is no contradiction.” Therefore, to achieve harmony in the social order, one cannot but appeal to “God.” For Proudhon:

在蒲鲁东那里，“上帝”之所以对克服“经济矛盾的体系”十分必要，是因为“上帝”被他规定为一个“在自己的概念中不存在任何矛盾”的存在。因此，要实现社会秩序的和谐，就不能不向“上帝”求助。对蒲鲁东来说：

First, “God” is an infinite being but not an absolute being. The so-called “infinite being” is a being “in whose own concept there is no contradiction.” Civilization, freedom, and humanity in reality are imperfect and need some guidance to achieve evolution. This guidance must be a supreme being, i.e., the summit of law, the summit of freedom, the summit of necessity. Conversely, the “absolute being” is the omniscient being in the religious sense, and Proudhon believes that “God” is not this kind of “absolute being,” meaning his “God” has no ability to foresee the future. Therefore, the existence of “God” does not guarantee that the social order can be as eternally stable as the natural order in the cosmic system—“Facts are commands, that is its motto, that is its only law.”

首先，“上帝”是无限存在但不是绝对存在。所谓“无限存在”,就是“在自己的概念中不存在任何矛盾”的存在。现实中的文明、自由和人类是不完美的，需要某种引导才能实现进化。这种引导必须是一种最高的存在，即法律的顶峰、自由的顶峰、必然性的顶峰。相反，“绝对存在”是宗教意义上的全知存在，而蒲鲁东认为“上帝”并非这种“绝对存在”,意味着他的“上帝”没有预见未来的能力。因此，“上帝”的存在并不保证社会秩序能够像宇宙体系中的自然秩序那样永恒稳定——“事实就是命令，这就是它的座右铭，就是它唯一的法律”。

Second, as an infinite being that takes facts as commands, “God” must simultaneously unfold itself in “infinite reason” and “infinite experience.” According to Proudhon’s view, everything exists, is connected, or is arranged in three transcendental capacities: space, time, and wisdom. Among these, wisdom is a being higher than space and time. All phenomena of nature and all manifestations of humanity are various ideas formed when “wisdom” pours down from above into “space” and “time”—initially pure things, which acquire a form that makes them actualized and superficial in the process of pouring. Therefore, everything is a reflection in space and time of an immaterial and static spirit. “God” is precisely the being that eternally dwells in all things in the world (both formed and unformed). In other words, all existence pervading space, all phenomena occurring in time, and humanity’s mission and all it creates are manifestations of “God.” Therefore, “God” exists only in “infinite reason” (transcendental wisdom) and “infinite experience” (transcendental space and time).

其次，作为以事实为命令的无限存在，“上帝”必须同时在“无限的理性”和“无限的经验”中展开自身。根据蒲鲁东的观点，任何事物都是在空间、时间和智慧三种超验性容量中存在、相连或配置。其中，智慧是高阶于空间和时间的存在。自然界的一切现象和人类的一切表现，都是“智慧”自上而下倾泻到“空间”和“时间”形成的各种观念——起初是纯粹的东西，在倾泻过程中获得了使其现实化和表面化的形体。因此，任何事物都是非物质的和静止的精神在空间和时间上的反映。“上帝”正是永恒寓于(形成的和未形成的)世间万物的存在。换句话说，遍及空间的一切存在、在时间中发生的一切现象，以及人类的使命及其创造的一切，都是“上帝”的表现。因此，“上帝”只存在于“无限的理性”(超验性的智慧)和“无限的经验”(超验性的空间和时间)之中。

Finally, although “God” is a being opposed to humanity, it is also the embodiment of humanity’s mission. “Freedom” is humanity’s activity within finite space and time, so “God” is “anti-freedom”; or rather, “God” is the summit of freedom, because “God” exists in infinite space and time. Logically, “freedom” and “wisdom” are in conflict with each other; when humanity gains “freedom,” it loses its grasp of “wisdom.” But when humanity’s “freedom” is guided by “God’s” “wisdom,” “affirmation” and “negation” achieve harmony at a higher level. Therefore, for “God,” the “self” is nothing but the “non-self.” That is to say, as the summit of freedom and the summit of necessity, “God” merges the “self” and the “non-self” into a unified whole.

最后，“上帝”虽然是反人类的存在，但同时也是人类使命的化身。“自由”是人类在有限的空间和时间中的活动，因而“上帝”是“反自由”的；或者说“上帝”是自由的顶峰，因为“上帝”存在于无限空间和时间之中。按理来说，“自由”与“智慧”是相互冲突的，当人类获得了“自由”,也就失去了对“智慧”的把握。但在人类的“自由”受到“上帝”的“智慧”引导时，“肯定”与“否定”在更高的层面上达到了和谐。因此，对“上帝”而言，“自我”无非就是“非我”。也就是说，作为自由的顶峰和必然性的顶峰，“上帝”把“自我”与“非我”融合为了一个统一的整体。

Through the above stipulations, “God” then relates to Proudhon’s “economics-metaphysics” in this way: humanity in a specific period can only act within the limits of finite space and time, thus possessing only “progressive reason.” This “progressive reason” is “the embodiment of eternal and unchanging ideas in flowing and advancing time.” It is in this sense that Proudhon calls economics “metaphysics in action,” i.e., “metaphysics set against the backdrop of constantly passing time.” Since the content of “economics-metaphysics” (such as noumenon and phenomenon, whole and category, fact and concept) originates from humanity itself, and humanity is a finite being that can only listen to the words of “God,” the unity of reason and experience achieved by “economics-metaphysics” is also finite. Conversely, “God” is the infinite manifestation of space and time. That is to say, “God” is the creator of infinite reason and infinite experience and achieves their unity. This means that for Proudhon, “God” is not the omniscient and omnipotent being in the religious sense, but an infinite being acting in the name of science, or the “supreme science” in the infinite sense.

经由上述规定，“上帝”便与蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”这样发生关系：某一具体时期的人类只能在有限的空间和时间范围内活动，因而只拥有“渐进的理性”。这种“渐进的理性”是“永恒不变的观念在流动着和前进着的时间中的体现。”正是在这个意义上，蒲鲁东把经济学称作“行动中的形而上学”,即“以不断流逝的时间为背景的形而上学”。由于“经济学—形而上学”的内容(如本体与现象、整体与范畴、事实与概念)源自人类本身，而人类是只能倾听“上帝”言语的有限存在，因此“经济学—形而上学”实现的理性与经验的统一也是有限的。相反，“上帝”则是空间和时间的无限表现形式。也就是说，“上帝”是无限的理性与无限的经验的创造者并实现了二者的统一。这就意味着对蒲鲁东来说，“上帝”不是宗教意义的全知全能的存在，而是以科学名义行事的无限存在，或者说是无限意义的“最高科学”。

(II) Using Hegel’s Method to Present “God,” Then Using “God” to Oppose Hegel’s “Absolute Idea”

(二)用黑格尔的方法呈现“上帝”,再用“上帝”反对黑格尔的“绝对观念”

In Proudhon’s view, to present “God” itself, i.e., to make “God” realize itself simultaneously in experience and reason, the “method” of “economics-metaphysics” must be able to proceed from both the particular and the general simultaneously, and equally value reason and experience, achieving “the creation of all existence from nothingness, infallibly leading to empirical reality.” Proudhon believes that “antinomy” is the method that meets this requirement. As long as this method is applied, an idea or a fact will reveal contradictory relations, thereby yielding a new synthetic idea. Therefore, the conclusions provided by antinomy are always correct, even without prior evidence and subsequent verification, and are correct in and of themselves. It is precisely through antinomy that the concept of “God” runs through “economics-metaphysics”—as the unifier of opposites in the infinite sense, God’s law, freedom, and necessity always find their concrete mapping in the movement of the system of economic contradictions.

在蒲鲁东看来，为了呈现“上帝”本身，亦即为了使“上帝”同时在经验和理性中实现自身，必须要求“经济学—形而上学”的“方法”能够同时从个别与一般出发，并同样重视理性和经验，做到“从虚无中创造一切存在、能够万无一失地导向实证现实性”。蒲鲁东认为，“二律背反”就是符合这一要求的方法。只要运用这种方法，一种观念、一个事实就会显示出矛盾关系，从而得出新的综合观念。因此，二律背反提供的结论，即使没有事前的证据和事后的证实，都始终是正确的，并且是自在和自为地正确的。正是通过二律背反，“上帝”的概念得以贯穿“经济学—形而上学”——作为无限意义的对立统一者，“上帝”的法则、自由和必然性在经济矛盾体系的运动中总能找到其具体的映射。

“In the social economy, everything that competition constantly creates, monopoly ceaselessly destroys; what labor produces, consumption devours; what ownership acquires, society usurps; hence arises a continuous movement, the immortal life of humanity. If one of these two opposing forces is suppressed, for example, if individual activity submits to social authority, organization degenerates into communism and ends in nothingness; conversely, if individual initiative lacks a countervailing force, the collective organism decays, and civilization can only hobble along under systems of hierarchy, inequality, poverty, and so on.”

“在社会经济中，凡是竞争所不断创造的事物，垄断都不停地加以破坏；劳动所生产的东西，消费都加以吞噬；所有权所取得的东西，社会都要加以霸占；由此就产生了持续的运动，产生了人类的不灭的生命。如果上述的两种对立的力量之一受到压抑，例如，个人的活动屈从于社会的权威，组织便蜕化为共产主义，并且以虚无而告终；相反地，如果个人主动性缺乏抗衡的力量，集体的机体便腐坏，文明便只能在等级、不平等和贫困等等制度下蹒跚而行。”

For Proudhon, antinomy is the source of eternal movement and the basis of equilibrium. Eternal movement and constantly reestablished equilibrium bring about the realization of the “series.” The so-called “series” refers to arranging various ideas according to natural categories and combining them together, thus regarded as the true embodiment of nature and the highest form of reason. Proudhon believed that the reasonable conclusion from the existence of antinomy and the series must be that the “first term” of a new series always exists as the opposite of the “last term” of the previous series. Therefore, “God” is no longer the absolute entity spoken of by philosophers, but can only be an infinite being containing opposites, such as self and non-self, subject and object. In other words, the constant existence of these opposites means that God is no longer an absolute being, but becomes an infinite being. However, since “God” is an infinite being, that is, existing as the “supreme science” in the sense of infinity, it naturally can understand and reveal how all opposing factors achieve harmony and unity at a higher level. Although humanity can gradually approach the essence of “God” through the method of antinomy, it can never grasp its full truth, because there is no final “God.”

对于蒲鲁东来说，二律背反是永恒运动的根源，是平衡的依据。永恒的运动和不断重建的平衡促成了“系列”的实现。所谓“系列”,是指按照自然的类别排列各种观念，并将它们组合在一起，因而被视为自然真实的体现和理性的最高形式。蒲鲁东认为，二律背反和系列的存在所带来的合理结论必然是，新一系列的“首项”作为上一系列的“末项”的对立物始终存在着。因此，“上帝”便不再是哲学家所说的绝对物了，而只能是包含对立面的无限存在，比如自我与非我、主体与客体。换言之，这种对立物的始终存在使上帝不再成为绝对存在，而是成为一种无限存在。但是，“上帝”既然是无限存在，即作为无限意义的“最高科学”而存在着的，自然也就能理解并揭示所有对立因素如何在更高层次上达成和谐与统一。尽管人类可以通过二律背反的方式逐渐接近“上帝”的本质，但却永远无法把握它的全部真相，因为不存在一个最终的“上帝”。

In essence, Proudhon’s antinomy and its series are Hegel’s dialectics. Although Proudhon borrowed Hegel’s dialectics to construct his own theory, he attempted to surpass Hegel and strenuously avoided mentioning “Hegel” and repeatedly clarified the essence of “God,” thereby expressing his differing views on Hegel’s philosophy and his intention to transcend it.

从本质上来说，蒲鲁东的二律背反及其系列，就是黑格尔的辩证法。尽管蒲鲁东借用了黑格尔的辩证法来构建自己的理论，但他试图超越黑格尔，并且极力避免提及“黑格尔”和反复澄清“上帝”的本质，以此来表达他对黑格尔哲学的不同观点和超越意图。

On the one hand, Proudhon acknowledged the significance of Hegel’s philosophical method for his work. Proudhon believed that the “method” of “economic-metaphysics” could only be “a dualism that creates all existence from nothing, infallibly leading to positive reality,” and this “dualism” could only be antinomy. Regarding antinomy, Proudhon thought that “the ancients only had a premonition of it; it was Kant who truly created it, and it was his successor Hegel who gave it immense power and made it shine brilliantly.” Therefore, the influence of Hegel’s philosophy on Proudhon’s method of “economic-metaphysical” analysis can be said to be direct.

一方面，蒲鲁东承认黑格尔哲学的方法对其工作的意义。蒲鲁东认为“经济学—形而上学”的“方法”只能是“从虚无中创造一切存在、能够万无一失地导向实证现实性的二元论”,而这种“二元论”只能是二律背反。关于二律背反，蒲鲁东认为“古人只是有所预见，真正创造它的是康德，而使它发挥巨大威力和大放光彩的，则是他的后继者黑格尔”。因此，黑格尔哲学对蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”分析方法的影响可以说是直接的。

On the other hand, Proudhon opposed Hegel’s philosophical system, especially its “absolute idea”—an objective reality existing eternally prior to nature and human society. Proudhon believed that the various systems proposed by philosophers, though full of logic, still dissolve and disappear into the conclusions of “common sense.” Thus, in the tone of a “new dialectician” and a “philosophical Titan,” he declared that he had completed a revolution in philosophy. Once the philosophical revolution is completed, it demands that “common sense”—as the “first term” existing as the opposite of “philosophy”—pronounce judgment in a new round of movement. In Proudhon’s view, it is precisely “common sense” that confirms the significance of the philosophical revolution he initiated and reaches this conclusion: the indisputable characteristic of science is the unity of reason and experience.

另一方面，蒲鲁东反对黑格尔哲学体系特别是其“绝对观念”——一种先于自然界和人类社会永恒存在的客观实在。蒲鲁东认为，哲学家提出的种种体系尽管充满逻辑性，但还是溶化和消失在“常识”的结论中。于是，他以“新的辩证法家”“哲学上的狄旦”的口吻宣布自己完成了哲学的革命。哲学革命一旦被完成，就要求“常识”——作为“哲学”对立面存在的“首项”——在新一轮运动中发布裁决。在蒲鲁东看来，正是“常识”确证了自己发起的哲学革命的意义，并且作出这一结论：科学的不容置辩的特征是理性与经验的一致。

For Proudhon, the error of idealist philosophy lies precisely in forcibly separating the two inseparable aspects of the “idea”—thought and matter. He believed that “subject” and “object,” “self” and “non-self,” are indivisible. All things are composed of “self” and “non-self” in varying proportions. The series of movement lies in the direction from “humanity” toward “God.” “Humanity” concentrates all characteristics pertaining to evolution, thought, and the possibility of falling into disorder; “God” concentrates all characteristics pertaining to infinity, spontaneity, and infallibility.

对蒲鲁东来说，观念论哲学的谬误就在于把“观念”不能截然分开的两个方面——思想与物质——硬是割裂开了。他认为“主体”和“客体”“自我”和“非我”是不可相互分割的。万事万物都是按不同比例由“自我”与“非我”构成。运动的系列就处在“人类”朝向“上帝”的方向。“人类”集中了一切属于进化的、思考的、可能陷入错乱的特征；“上帝”集中了一切属于无限、自发、永不谬误的特征。

In summary, Proudhon endorsed the “dualism” of Hegel’s philosophical method but criticized the “monism” of his view of history. “This dualism is eternal and irreducible; without it, neither subject nor object exists; the reality of one factor depends primarily on the existence of the other; attempting to separate them or reduce them is equally absurd, because both practices negate all truth and abolish science.” Proudhon believed that method and view of history should be consistent in their essence, jointly pointing to the unity of reason and experience. If the key elements of Hegel’s philosophy are “the movement of reason,” “system,” and “absolute idea,” then the corresponding elements of Proudhon’s “economic-metaphysics” are “the movement of reason and experience,” “series,” and “God” (infinite being). The clear differences between the two in their treatment of reason, experience, and absoluteness reflect Proudhon’s attempt to liberate himself from Hegel’s influence and develop his own unique philosophical system.

概括来说，蒲鲁东拥护黑格尔哲学方法上的“二元论”,但批判其历史观的“一元论”。“这种二元论是永恒的、不可缩简的，离开它就既不存在主体，也不存在客体；其中一个因素的现实主要取决于另一因素的存在；企图把它们隔离开或者把它们简化，都是同样荒谬的，因为这两种做法都是否定整个真理和取消科学。”蒲鲁东认为方法和历史观在其实质上应当是一致的，共同指向理性与经验的统一。如果说，黑格尔哲学的重要要素是“理性的运动”“体系”“绝对观念”,那么蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”相对应的要素就是“理性与经验的运动”“系列”“上帝”(无限存在)。两者在对待理性、经验和绝对性上明显区别，反映了蒲鲁东试图从黑格尔的影响下解放出来，发展出自己独特的哲学体系。

III. Proudhon’s “Economic-Metaphysics” Did Not Escape the Poverty of Philosophy

三 蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”没有摆脱哲学的贫困

In Proudhon’s view, Hegel’s philosophy was impoverished, so he attempted to surpass Hegel. However, in Marx’s view, Proudhon’s “economic-metaphysics” was merely “Hegelian rubbish,” essentially still not having escaped the poverty of philosophy. Below, from Marx’s perspective, we analyze why he believed Hegel’s philosophy had poverty, and why Proudhon’s “economic-metaphysics” failed to escape this poverty.

在蒲鲁东看来，黑格尔的哲学是贫困的，因而他试图超越黑格尔。然而在马克思看来，蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”不过是“黑格尔式的废物”,本质上仍然没有摆脱哲学的贫困。下面，我们从马克思的视角出发，分析他为何认为黑格尔哲学存在贫困之处，以及为什么蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”未能摆脱这种贫困。

(A) The Poverty of Hegel’s Philosophy

(一)黑格尔哲学的贫困

Theoretically speaking, the dialogue between Marx and Proudhon was possible precisely because they faced the same theoretical dilemma—the poverty of Hegel’s philosophy. Without the problem of the poverty of Hegel’s philosophy, there would be no Proudhon’s “economic-metaphysics,” no Marx’s historical materialism, and certainly no critique of “economic-metaphysics” by historical materialism. Therefore, the logical starting point for Marx’s writing of *The Poverty of Philosophy* and for our discussion here of the meaning of “the poverty of philosophy” is precisely the poverty of Hegel’s philosophy. Hence, Marx wrote in the final paragraph of the “Preface” to *The Poverty of Philosophy*: “In doing this thankless work, we have often had to lay aside our critique of M. Proudhon in order to criticize German philosophy.”

从理论上说，马克思与蒲鲁东的对话之所以可能，就在于他们面对着同样一个理论困境——黑格尔哲学的贫困。如果没有黑格尔哲学的贫困问题，就不会出现蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”,也不会有马克思的历史唯物主义，更不会发生历史唯物主义对“经济学—形而上学”的批判。因此，马克思撰写《哲学的贫困》,以及我们在这里讨论“哲学的贫困”的含义，其逻辑起点就是黑格尔哲学的贫困。也因此，马克思才在《哲学的贫困》“序言”中的最后一段写道：“我们在做这件不讨好的工作时常常不得不放下对蒲鲁东先生的批判，而去批判德国的哲学。”

*The Poverty of Philosophy* is divided into two chapters: Chapter I, “A Scientific Discovery,” mainly criticizes Proudhon’s erroneous understanding of use value, exchange value, constituted value, and the law of the proportionality of value; in Marx’s words, Proudhon “makes us almost into Englishmen.” Chapter II, “The Metaphysics of Political Economy,” mainly criticizes the fallacies of Proudhon’s “economic-metaphysics” and its ineffectiveness in analyzing and resolving the contradictions of capitalist society; in Marx’s words, Proudhon “makes us inevitably become Germans again.” Regarding these Englishmen and Germans, Marx provides an explanation: “If one Englishman turns men into hats, another German turns hats into ideas. This Englishman is Ricardo, a banking magnate and distinguished economist; this German is Hegel, a full professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin.” We are discussing Hegel here. So, what does it mean that Hegel “turns hats into ideas”? This is a very subtle metaphor! The author’s interpretation is as follows:

《哲学的贫困》总共分为两章：第一章“科学的发现”主要是批判蒲鲁东对使用价值、交换价值、构成价值、价值比例规律的错误理解，用马克思的话说就是蒲鲁东“使我们差不多变成了英国人”;第二章“政治经济学的形而上学”主要是批判蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”的谬误及其对于分析和解决资本主义社会矛盾的无效性，用马克思的话说就是蒲鲁东“使我们不由得又变成了德国人”。关于这里的英国人和德国人，马克思做了一个说明：“如果说有一个英国人把人变成帽子，那么，有一个德国人就把帽子变成了观念。这个英国人就是李嘉图，一位银行巨子，杰出的经济学家；这个德国人就是黑格尔，柏林大学的一位专任哲学教授。”我们在这里讨论的是黑格尔。那么，什么叫黑格尔把“帽子变成了观念”呢?这是一个非常精妙的隐喻!笔者给出的诠释是：

First, once a person becomes a “hat” they lose their “personhood,” that is, they become “impersonal.” Turning “the hat into an idea” means that this “idea” is “impersonal reason.” From an epistemological perspective, without “the person” it is impossible to discuss “subject” and “object.” This means that the idea, as “impersonal reason,” “has outside itself neither a place where it can posit itself, nor an object to which it can be opposed, nor a subject with which it can combine; therefore it has to turn itself upside down: posit itself, oppose itself, combine itself… This is: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.” This is precisely dialectics, the method of Hegel’s philosophy.

其一，人一旦变成“帽子”便失去了“人身”,即“无人身”。把“帽子变成了观念”是指这种“观念”是“无人身的理性”。从认识论角度说，没有“人”就不可能讨论“主体”和“客体”。这意味着观念作为“无人身的理性”,“在自身之外既没有可以设定自己的场所，又没有可以与之相对立的客体，也没有可以与之合成的主体，所以它只得把自己颠来倒去：设定自己，自相对立，自相合成……这就是：正题、反题、合题”。这正是辩证法，黑格尔哲学的方法。

Second, no matter how immortal and indestructible an “idea” may be, it is always a product of the human brain. Therefore, once an “idea” detaches from the person and exists as “impersonal reason,” this “absolute idea” can only appeal to “the illusory remnant of faith in a creator outside the world.” It is in this sense that Marx evaluates: “The dialectic in Hegel became mystified, but this by no means prevented him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”

其二，“观念”无论如何不死不灭，始终是人脑的产物。因此，一旦“观念”脱离人身，作为“无人身的理性”而存在，那么这种“绝对观念”只能诉诸“对世界之外的造物主的信仰的虚幻残余”。正是在这一意义上，马克思评价：“辩证法在黑格尔手中神秘化了，但这决没有妨碍他第一个全面地有意识地叙述了辩证法的一般运动形式。在他那里，辩证法是倒立着的。必须把它倒过来，以便发现神秘外壳中的合理内核。”

Therefore, the poverty of Hegel’s philosophy does not lie in the impotence of dialectics itself, but in the mysticism of Hegel’s philosophy that “mystified” its dialectics. Hegel tells us that dialectics allows us to obtain the content of things, but he further points out that this content is actually “the living development of the idea.” He considers this “the truly philosophical insight”: “Any thing, when considered in isolation, appears narrow and limited; its meaning and value derive from its subordination to the whole and from its being an organic moment of the idea.” However, this way of grasping the world through “impersonal reason”—the mode in which metaphysics and dialectics converge—detaches itself from concrete socio-historical conditions, holding that spirit or idea is the fundamental driving force behind all development. Thus, world history becomes the stage on which spirit displays and realizes itself. Although Hegel’s dialectics emphasizes the unity of opposites and qualitative transformation, it is confined to the conceptual level, neglecting concrete analysis of real social contradictions. In Marx’s view, this methodological limitation reflects the high abstraction and mysticism of Hegel’s philosophy, ultimately leading to the poverty of Hegel’s philosophy, rendering it incapable of truly understanding the mechanisms of social and historical development.

因此，黑格尔哲学的贫困并不在于辩证法本身的无能，而在于黑格尔哲学的神秘主义将其辩证法“神秘化”了。黑格尔对我们说，辩证法使我们获得事物的内容，但他进一步指出，这个内容实际上是“理念的活生生的发展”。他认为这是“真正哲学的识见”:“任何事物，一孤立起来看，便显得狭隘而有局限，其所取得的意义与价值即由于它是从属于全体的，并且是理念的一个有机的环节。”然而，这种试图通过“无人身的理性”来把握世界的方式——形而上学与辩证法的合流方式——脱离了具体的社会历史条件，认为精神或观念是一切事物发展的根本动力。于是，世界历史成了精神展示和实现自身的舞台。尽管黑格尔的辩证法强调对立的统一和质的转变，但它局限在观念层面，忽视了对现实社会矛盾的具体分析。在马克思看来，这种方法论的局限性反映了黑格尔哲学的高度抽象性和神秘主义，最终导致了黑格尔哲学的贫困，使其无法真正理解社会和历史的发展机制。

(II) Proudhon’s “Economics-Metaphysics” Did Not Escape the Poverty of Hegel’s Philosophy

(二)蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”没有摆脱黑格尔哲学的贫困

As mentioned earlier, Proudhon redefined economics from a philosophical perspective, or redefined philosophy from an economic perspective. For Proudhon, economics is the concrete embodiment of metaphysics, or concrete metaphysics. Proudhon believed he had completed the revolution in philosophy and reached the limit of the dissolution and development of Hegel’s philosophy because he thought he had achieved two things: first, he grasped Hegel’s dialectics; second, he realized the unity of reason and experience. However, in Marx’s view, Proudhon’s “economics-metaphysics” was impoverished and impotent, for reasons corresponding to the two aspects above: first, Proudhon clumsily imitated Hegel’s method, “reducing it to a most pitiful level,” essentially betraying Hegel’s dialectics. Second, in handling the relationship between reason and experience, Proudhon retained the mysticism of Hegel’s philosophy. For this reason, Marx called Proudhon’s work “Hegelian trash” and pointed out: “Since M. Proudhon cannot trace the real historical process, he offers us a set of paradoxes, a set of paradoxes that pretend to be dialectical paradoxes… The evolution M. Proudhon speaks of takes place in the mysterious womb of the absolute idea.”

前面提到，蒲鲁东从哲学角度重新定义了经济学，或者说从经济学角度重新定义了哲学。对蒲鲁东来说，经济学是形而上学的具体体现或者说是具体的形而上学。蒲鲁东之所以认为他完成了哲学的革命，达到了黑格尔哲学解体和发展过程的极限，就在于他认为自己做到了两点：其一，抓住了黑格尔的辩证法；其二，实现了理性与经验的统一。然而，在马克思看来，蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”是贫乏无能的，其原因则分别对应上述两个方面：一是蒲鲁东拙劣模仿黑格尔的方法，“把它降低到极可怜的程度”,实质上背弃了黑格尔的辩证法。二是蒲鲁东在理性与经验之间关系的处理上，保留了黑格尔哲学的神秘主义。正因如此，马克思把蒲鲁东的工作称作“黑格尔式的废物”并指出：“蒲鲁东先生无法探索出历史的实在进程，他就给我们提供了一套怪论，一套妄图充当辩证怪论的怪论……蒲鲁东先生所说的进化，是在绝对观念的神秘怀抱中发生的进化。”

1. Proudhon’s “Economics-Metaphysics” Reduced Hegel’s Dialectics “to a Most Pitiful Level”

1. 蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”把黑格尔的辩证法“降低到极可怜的程度”

Since economics becomes a concrete metaphysics, the task of economics becomes the study of the movement of conceptual categories. Proudhon specifically draws the reader’s attention: “We are not to narrate a history in accordance with the order of time, but a history in accordance with the order of ideas. The economic stages or categories sometimes appear simultaneously, sometimes in reverse order… However, economic theory has its own logical sequence and rational series. I am pleased that this sequence and series have been discovered by me.” Proudhon believes that the movement of the “system of economic contradictions” occurs under the action of antinomies, and this rational series of economic categories appears successively as: value, division of labor, machinery, competition, monopoly, police or taxes, balance of trade, credit, property, republic, population. But in Marx’s view, since Proudhon’s work is based on the belief that economic categories obey a certain rational series, it cannot truly reveal the concrete generative process and internal logical relationships of these categories in real social history. From Marx’s following explanations, it can be seen that Proudhon neglected the interdependence and historical continuity among social relations.

既然经济学成为一种具体的形而上学，那么经济学的任务也就成了研究概念范畴的运动。蒲鲁东专门提请读者注意：“我们要叙述的并不是那种符合时间顺序的历史，而是一种符合观念顺序的历史。各个经济阶段或经济范畴有时是同时出现，有时又先后颠倒……不过，经济理论有它自己的逻辑顺序和理性系列。我高兴的是，这种顺序和系列已经被我所发现。”蒲鲁东认为“经济矛盾的体系”的运动是在二律背反的作用下发生的，并且这个经济范畴的理性系列依次表现为：价值、分工、机器、竞争、垄断、警察或捐税、贸易的平衡、信用、所有权、共和制、人口。但在马克思看来，既然蒲鲁东的工作建立在经济范畴服从某种理性系列的信念基础上，也就不可能真正揭示这些范畴在现实社会历史中的具体生成过程和内在逻辑关系。从马克思的以下说明中，可以看出蒲鲁东忽视了社会关系之间的相互依存性和历史连续性。

First, Proudhon considers “value is the cornerstone of the economic edifice” and defines “value” as “the absolute state of determination reached through a series of fluctuations in supply and demand.” But as Marx points out, to constitute this “value”—this “value” involving the categories of supply, demand, and fluctuation—requires social relations such as “division of labor” and “competition,” yet these categories have not yet appeared in Proudhon’s rational series and logical sequence.

其一，蒲鲁东认为“价值是经济大厦的基石”,并把“价值”定义为“通过供给与需求的一系列波动而达到的绝对的确定状态”。但正如马克思指出，要构成这种“价值”——这种涉及供给、需求、波动范畴的“价值”——就必须有“分工”和“竞争”等社会关系，但这些范畴此时根本还未出现在蒲鲁东的理性系列和逻辑顺序中。

Second, Proudhon’s treatment of “division of labor” as the antithesis of “labor,” and then “machinery” as the antithesis of “division of labor” (i.e., the synthesis that reunifies dispersed labor) is untenable. Marx reminds the reader that, at least in England, “the great progress of division of labor began only after the invention of machinery.” In fact, technological progress and tool development are inseparably linked to the division of labor. Every major advance in “machinery” leads to an intensification of the “division of labor,” and every intensification of the “division of labor” also prompts new inventions of “machinery.”

其二，蒲鲁东把“分工”看作“劳动”的反题，再把“机器”看作是“分工”的反题(亦即“使分散了的劳动重归统一的合题”)是不成立的。马克思提醒读者，至少在英国，“机器发明之后分工才有了巨大进步”。事实上，技术进步和工具发展与分工之间具有不可分割的关系。“机器”的每一次重大进步都会导致“分工”的加剧，而“分工”的每一次加剧也会促使新的“机器”发明出现。

Third, Marx criticizes Proudhon for reducing the phenomenon of “monopoly” to a confirmation of bourgeois property rights, while neglecting the multi-staged nature and historical complexity of “monopoly.” For example, “monopoly” in the feudal period existed before the emergence of “competition.” But to accommodate his logical movement and rational series, Proudhon denies feudal “monopoly” and recognizes only bourgeois “monopoly”—bourgeois monopoly is a confirmation of small private property rights, therefore a good thing, coming from the revelation of “impersonal human reason.” This artificially constructed logical sequence severs the historical thread of “monopoly,” detaching Proudhon’s theory from the actual socio-economic process.

其三，马克思批判蒲鲁东将“垄断”现象简化为一种资产阶级的所有权确认，而忽视了“垄断”的多阶段性和历史复杂性。比如，封建时期的“垄断”在“竞争”出现之前就已经存在。但蒲鲁东为了迎合他的逻辑运动和理性系列，否认封建的“垄断”,而只承认资产阶级的“垄断”——资产阶级的垄断是对小私有制所有权的确认，因而是一件好事，它来自“无人身的人类理性”的启示。正是这种人为构造的逻辑顺序割裂了“垄断”的历史脉络，使蒲鲁东的理论脱离了实际的社会经济过程。

Fourth, Proudhon believes that the purpose of “consumption taxes” is to achieve equality and relieve the proletariat, as well as to oppose the feudal aristocracy that only knows consumption and pleasure. But in fact, the role of taxation under different historical conditions is not the same: under monarchy, taxes mainly appear as production taxes, used to control the growth of private wealth to maintain monarchical power; under constitutional systems, taxes more often appear as consumption taxes, which may actually increase the economic burden on the poor. Therefore, Marx criticizes Proudhon’s idealized understanding of “consumption taxes,” arguing that Proudhon did not recognize the class nature and function of taxation under different economic and social systems.

其四，蒲鲁东认为“消费税”的目的在于实现平等和救济无产阶级，以及对抗只知消费逸乐的封建贵族。但事实上，不同历史条件下的课税作用并不相同：在君主制下，税收主要表现为生产税，即用于控制民间财富增长以保持君主权力；在立宪制度下，税收更多表现为消费税，实际上可能加重贫困人群的经济负担。因此，马克思批判蒲鲁东对“消费税”的理想化理解，认为蒲鲁东没有认识到税收在不同经济社会制度下的阶级性质和功能。

In Marx’s view, Proudhon’s theoretical system contains fundamental contradictions, particularly its abstract simplification of the historical process and its mechanical arrangement of economic categories, which prevent him from understanding the historical continuity and dialectical development of social relations. The attempt to construct a “series of reason” through logical deduction severs social reality from historical dynamics. Therefore, Marx believes that Proudhon’s analysis of economic categories has lost both theoretical and practical value, and further discussion would only repeat his logical errors. The criticism offered so far is sufficient to question the validity of Proudhon’s theory; there is no need to invest more research effort in the subsequent economic categories and rational series—balance of trade, credit, property, republicanism, population.

在马克思看来，蒲鲁东的理论体系存在根本性矛盾，特别是对历史进程的抽象简化和对经济范畴的机械排列，使他未能理解社会关系的历史连续性和辩证发展。通过逻辑推演构建“理性系列”的试图，割裂了社会现实与历史动态。因此，马克思认为，蒲鲁东的经济范畴分析已经失去了理论和实践价值，进一步讨论只会重复其逻辑错误。目前为止的批评已经足以质疑蒲鲁东理论的有效性，其后的经济范畴和理性系列——贸易的平衡、信用、所有权、共和制、人口——已无必要投入更多的研究精力。

So why did Proudhon “reduce Hegel’s dialectics to the most pitiable level”? In Marx’s view: “When M. Proudhon examines any one of these stages, he cannot do without explaining it by means of all the other social relations, which, however, have not yet been generated by his dialectical movement. Later, when M. Proudhon, with the help of pure reason, generates these other stages, he treats them as newborn infants, forgetting that they are as old as the first stage.” [22]22 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter 2, Section 1. The metaphor is Marx’s own. This metaphor means that when Proudhon, through “pure reason,” deduces subsequent social phenomena or economic relations (such as division of labor, machinery, monopoly, etc.), he treats them as independent, newly born phenomena, but overlooks their interdependence with earlier stages. Here, Marx criticizes Proudhon for not treating economic relations as a continuous and developing whole, but instead fragmenting them into isolated stages, thereby causing logical ruptures and internal contradictions in the theory.

那么，蒲鲁东为什么会把黑格尔的辩证法“降低到极可怜的程度”呢?在马克思看来：“蒲鲁东先生在考察其中任何一个阶段时，都不能不靠所有其他社会关系来说明，可是当时这些社会关系尚未被他用辩证运动产生出来。当蒲鲁东先生后来借助纯粹理性使其他阶段产生出来时，却又把它们当成初生的婴儿，忘记它们和第一个阶段是同样年老了。”这个比喻是说，蒲鲁东在通过“纯粹理性”推导出后续的社会现象或经济关系(如分工、机器、垄断等)时，将它们视为独立的新生现象，但却忽视了它们与早期阶段的相互依存性。在这里，马克思是批评蒲鲁东在处理经济关系时，没有将它们视为一个连续且发展的整体，而是将其分割成孤立的阶段，从而导致了理论的逻辑断裂和内在矛盾。

Furthermore, Proudhon attempts to explain human history through a “series of reason,” but this “series of reason” is actually designed to reconcile contradictions, forming a petty-bourgeois “economics-metaphysics.” He seeks balance within the internal contradictions of economic categories, believing that every economic phenomenon contains both good and bad aspects, and the solution is to preserve the benefits while eliminating the harms. Consequently, Proudhon’s approach remains only at the “thesis” and “antithesis” stages of dialectics, whereas the true power of dialectics lies in generating new, higher-level syntheses—the “synthesis”—through the conflict and interaction of opposing sides. Although Proudhon attempts to reach this methodological height, in Marx’s view, “he never goes beyond the first two stages, namely the simple thesis and antithesis.” [23]23 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter 2, Section 1. This is because Proudhon fails to deeply understand the historical movements and fundamental contradictions behind these oppositions, instead simplistically understanding them as preserving the good and removing the bad, unaware that these oppositions form an indivisible whole through historical movement. As a result, Proudhon’s analysis fails to reveal the internal contradictions of capitalism, instead obscuring its true historical roots, mistakenly believing that reconciliation and reform can solve these problems.

此外，蒲鲁东试图通过“理性系列”来解释人类历史，但这种“理性系列”实际上是为了调和矛盾，形成一种小资产阶级的“经济学—形而上学”。他试图在经济范畴的内在矛盾中寻求平衡，认为每个经济现象都包含好和坏两个方面，解决方法就是保留益处，消除害处。因此，蒲鲁东的处理方式仅停留在辩证法的“正题”和“反题”阶段，而辩证法的真正力量在于通过对立双方的冲突和相互作用，生成新的、更高级的综合，即“合题”。尽管蒲鲁东企图达到这一方法论高度，但在马克思看来，“他从来没有超越过头两级即简单的正题和反题”。这是因为蒲鲁东没有深入理解这些对立背后的历史运动和根本矛盾，而是将其简化理解为保留好的，去除坏的，未意识到这些对立通过历史运动形成了不可分割的整体。结果，蒲鲁东的分析未能揭示出资本主义的内在矛盾，反而掩盖了其真实的历史根源，错误地认为调和与改良可以解决这些问题。

2. Proudhon’s “economic evolution” is “an evolution taking place in the mystical womb of the absolute idea”

2. 蒲鲁东的“经济进化”是“在绝对观念的神秘怀抱中发生的进化”

In Proudhon’s view, the relationship between God and humanity is doubly determined: on the one hand, God represents “infinite being,” transcending humanity’s “finite being”; in this sense, God is opposed to humanity. On the other hand, God is the embodiment of humanity’s mission; through their own activities, humans can hear and respond to God’s voice, discovering and realizing the social order prescribed by God. That is, although God prescribes the social order, He does not teach humanity to realize this social order once and for all. To make this social order a reality, humanity must discover it; to sustain this necessity, humanity must infer it. This setup means that the realization of social order does not occur through humanity’s autonomous historical practice, but through following the intention of an external, transcendent force (God). When Proudhon places economic evolution within this dual relationship between God and humanity, economic evolution ceases to be the result of social-historical laws and human activity, but is instead explained through a mysterious, infinite “God.” The so-called “evolution taking place in the mystical womb of the absolute idea” criticizes Proudhon’s theory of economic evolution for relying on God as an infinite force, causing the process of economic development to detach from the real historical foundation and fall into the shackles of metaphysics.

在蒲鲁东那里，上帝与人类的关系被这样双重规定着：一方面，上帝代表着“无限存在”,超越了人类的“有限存在”,在此意义上，上帝是与人类对立的；另一方面，上帝又是人类使命的化身，人类通过自身的活动能够听到并回应上帝的声音，去发现和实现上帝所规定的社会秩序。也就是说，上帝虽然规定了社会秩序，但却不教导人类一劳永逸地实现这种社会秩序。为了使这种社会秩序变为现实，必须由人类来发现它；为了使这种必然性存在下去，必须由人类来推断它。这种设定使得社会秩序的实现并不是通过人类自主的历史实践，而是通过追随一种外在的、超验的力量(上帝)的意图。当蒲鲁东将经济进化置于上帝与人类的这种双重关系中时，经济进化就不再是社会历史规律和人类活动的结果，而是通过神秘的、无限的“上帝”来解释的。所谓“在绝对观念的神秘怀抱中发生的进化”,是批判蒲鲁东的经济进化理论依赖于上帝这个无限的力量，使得经济的发展过程脱离了现实的历史基础，而落入了形而上学的桎梏。

In other words, Proudhon’s “economic evolution” can only be gradually realized under the guidance of God, and thus remains constrained by the metaphysical framework, still resorting to an absolute, transcendent being to explain social and economic phenomena. Therefore, although Proudhon consistently argues that “God” is not an absolute being but an infinite being, and vigorously clarifies the distinction between absolute being and infinite being, this effort cannot free him from “the mystical womb of the absolute idea.” This is the basic interpretation of Proudhon’s mysticism, but it is not enough; on this basis, it is necessary to rely on Marx’s historical materialism to complete a thorough critique of it.

换言之，蒲鲁东的“经济进化”只有在上帝的指引下才能逐步实现，因而依旧受制于形而上学的框架，仍然要诉诸一种绝对的、超验的存在来解释社会和经济现象。因此，尽管蒲鲁东一直主张“上帝”不是绝对存在，而是无限存在，并且极力澄清绝对存在和无限存在的区别，然而这一努力并不能使他摆脱“绝对观念的神秘怀抱”。这是对蒲鲁东的神秘主义的基本解读，但还不够，在此基础上，需要借助马克思的历史唯物主义才能完成对其彻底的批判。

“M. Proudhon the economist understands very well that men make cloth, linen, and silk fabrics in definite relations of production. But what he does not understand is that these definite social relations are just as much produced by men as are linen, flax, etc. Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces, men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.” [24]24 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter 2, Section 1.

“经济学家蒲鲁东先生非常明白，人们是在一定的生产关系中制造呢绒、麻布和丝织品的。但是他不明白，这些一定的社会关系同麻布、亚麻等一样，也是人们生产出来的。社会关系和生产力密切相联。随着新生产力的获得，人们改变自己的生产方式，随着生产方式即谋生的方式的改变，人们也就会改变自己的一切社会关系。手推磨产生的是封建主的社会，蒸汽磨产生的是工业资本家的社会。”

What Marx says here includes two layers of meaning:

马克思这里讲的包括两层意思：

First, it criticizes Proudhon’s method for mystifying the process of “economic evolution,” attributing it to a transcendent, independently existing “God,” failing to provide a scientific analysis consistent with historical reality, and thus falling into a metaphysical, mystifying explanation. In Marx’s view, “economic evolution” should be explained in terms of material life and class struggle. However, Proudhon treats “God” as the dominant force of history—“According to him, it is abstraction, category, and not man, that creates history.” [25]25 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter 2, Section 1. The result is that once these abstract ideas are separated from humanity’s material activities, they are regarded as eternal and immutable entities. The problem is that these “social relations” themselves are also produced by people, and they change with the development of productive forces. Just as the hand-mill produces feudalism, the steam-mill produces industrial capitalism. This shows that the development of history and society does not originate from abstract ideas or transcendent forces, but is rooted in specific material conditions and changes in the mode of production. By criticizing Proudhon’s error of placing abstract categories above material historical conditions, Marx emphasizes the core position of historical materialism, namely that social relations and economic structures are products of human material practice, not metaphysical abstract categories.

其一，批判蒲鲁东的方法神秘化了“经济进化”的过程，将其归因于超验的、独立存在的“上帝”,未能提供科学的、符合历史实际的分析，因此陷入了形而上学的神秘化解释。在马克思看来，“经济进化”应该从物质生活和阶级斗争中寻找解释。然而，蒲鲁东却把“上帝”当作历史的主导力量——“根据他的意见，创造历史的，正是抽象、范畴，而不是人”。其结果是，一旦将这些抽象的观念与人类的物质活动分离开来，它们便被视为永恒的且不可改变的存在。问题在于，这些“社会关系”本身同样是人们生产出来的，并且随着生产力的发展而变化。正如手推磨产生的是封建主义，蒸汽磨产生的是工业资本主义。这说明历史和社会的发展绝非源于抽象的理念或超验的力量，而是根植于具体的物质条件和生产方式的变迁。通过批判蒲鲁东将抽象范畴置于物质历史条件之上的错误，马克思强调了历史唯物主义的核心立场，即社会关系和经济结构是人类物质实践的产物，而不是形而上学的抽象范畴。

Second, it points out that conclusions drawn from the mystical womb of the absolute idea are unscientific. In Marx’s view, “economic evolution” does not take place “in the mystical womb of the absolute idea,” but rather “presupposes the existence of all the productive forces that can be generated in the womb of the old society.” [26]26 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter 2, Section 1. He argues that fundamental changes in social relations occur only when existing social relations can no longer accommodate the emerging productive forces. Under these conditions, social revolution, because it can break through outdated relations of production, becomes an important factor in promoting historical progress, and the truly powerful “productive forces” are the oppressed class with revolutionary potential, namely the proletariat. Therefore, Marx criticizes the reformist strategies of petty-bourgeois socialists, arguing that their attempts to carry out social reform without touching productive forces and relations of production are unworkable. Genuine social transformation requires fundamentally reconfiguring productive forces and relations of production in order to achieve the liberation of the whole society.

其二，指出从绝对观念的神秘怀抱中得出的结论是不科学的。在马克思看来，“经济进化”不是“在绝对观念的神秘怀抱中发生的”,相反是“以旧社会的怀抱中所能产生的全部生产力的存在为前提的”。他认为，只有当现有的社会关系无法继续容纳新兴的生产力时，社会关系才会发生根本变革。在这种条件下，社会革命因其能够打破陈旧的生产关系从而成为推动历史进步的重要因素，而真正强大的“生产力”就是具有革命潜力的被压迫阶级即无产阶级。因此，马克思批评小资产阶级社会主义者的改良策略，认为他们试图在不触动生产力和生产关系的前提下进行社会改革，这种方式是行不通的。真正的社会变革需要从根本上重新配置生产力和生产关系，才能实现全社会的解放。

In the final analysis, Proudhon failed to break free from the shackles of metaphysics, always lingering at the level of abstract concepts and never entering into concrete historical conditions. This made his theory unable to become an effective tool for promoting social change; instead, it became in reality an empty utopian fantasy. Through this critique, Marx revealed that Proudhon’s ostensibly revolutionary discourse was in fact still attached to a metaphysical conservatism divorced from actual history. Historical materialism places the analysis of economic and social phenomena within the concrete historical conditions of material production and class struggle, truly transcending the limitations of metaphysics and providing a completely new theoretical framework for understanding the historical development of capitalism. The practical outlook of this new philosophy emphasizes that the driving force of historical development comes from material production and class struggle, not from abstract deductions divorced from reality. This practical perspective is precisely the fundamental point of ideological opposition between Marx and Proudhon.

归根结底，蒲鲁东未能摆脱形而上学的束缚，始终在抽象概念的层面徘徊，而没能进入具体历史条件之中。这使得其理论难以成为推动社会变革的有效工具，反而在现实中成为一种空洞的乌托邦式幻想。通过这一批判，马克思揭示出蒲鲁东表面上革命的论述实质上依旧依附于一种脱离现实历史的形而上学保守性。历史唯物主义将经济社会现象的分析置于物质生产与阶级斗争的具体历史条件之中，真正超越了形而上学的局限，为理解资本主义的历史发展提供了一个全新的理论框架。这一新哲学的实践观强调，历史发展的动力来自物质生产和阶级斗争，而非脱离现实的抽象推演。这种实践观照正是马克思与蒲鲁东之间思想对立的根本所在。

In the author’s view, the reason Proudhon failed to overcome the problem of the poverty of Hegelian philosophy is this: Proudhon attempted to use Hegel’s method to summon a new “God,” and then used this new “God” to oppose Hegel’s “Absolute Idea”; consequently, his final result was merely using “Hegel” to oppose “Hegel,” and naturally he could not escape the constraints of Hegel’s philosophical system. Regarding this, the author is willing to offer the following assessment: Hegel strangled one “God” and created another “God”; Proudhon strangled Hegel’s “God,” and his result was merely to produce yet another “God.” Or, in other words, the so-called development of philosophy is nothing more than constantly replacing the “substance” of “God” within the framework of metaphysics, without truly surpassing the limits of metaphysics and delving into material conditions of life and human social practice to find the driving force of historical change. This is the root of the poverty of philosophy.

在笔者看来，蒲鲁东之所以没能克服黑格尔哲学的贫困问题，原因就在于：蒲鲁东企图借用黑格尔的方法召唤一个新的“上帝”,再用这个新“上帝”反对黑格尔的“绝对观念”,因而其最终结果不过是用“黑格尔”反对“黑格尔”,自然不能摆脱黑格尔哲学体系的束缚。对此，笔者愿意做这样一个评价：黑格尔扼杀了一个“上帝”,又创造了另一个“上帝”,蒲鲁东扼杀了黑格尔的“上帝”,而其结果不过是造出了另外一个“上帝”。或者换句话说，哲学的所谓发展不过是在形而上学的框架内，不断替换“上帝”的“实体”,而没有真正逾越形而上学的限制，深入到物质生活条件和人类社会实践中去寻找历史变迁的动力。这就是哲学贫困的根源。

IV. Proudhon’s Poverty Is the Poverty of the Ideologists

四 蒲鲁东的贫困是意识形态家们的贫困

As a polemical work, the direct purpose of *The Poverty of Philosophy* is, of course, to respond to and critique Proudhon’s *The Philosophy of Poverty*. From this perspective, the analysis up to this point already allows for the following assessment: In *The Philosophy of Poverty*, Proudhon attempted to analyze the “system of economic contradictions” through metaphysical means and tried to solve the problem of human poverty with a “formula of equilibrium” based on mutual aid and equality. However, in Marx’s view, Proudhon’s analysis was deeply mired in an idealist framework, failing to grasp the historicity of economic relations and the foundational role of productive forces in social change. Therefore, *The Poverty of Philosophy* is not merely a critique of Proudhon’s “economics-metaphysics”; it is a thorough negation of Proudhon’s attempt to replace historical practice with conceptual logic and to dissolve concrete material processes with abstract categories.

《哲学的贫困》作为论战性著作，其直接目的当然是回应并批判蒲鲁东的《贫困的哲学》。从这个角度来说，分析至此，已经可以作这样一个评价：在《贫困的哲学》中，蒲鲁东试图通过形而上学的方式解析“经济矛盾的体系”,并试图以一种基于互助和平等的“平衡公式”来解决人类社会的贫困问题。然而，在马克思看来，蒲鲁东的分析深陷于唯心主义框架，未能抓住经济关系的历史性和生产力在社会变革中的基础性作用。因此，《哲学的贫困》不仅仅是针对蒲鲁东“经济学—形而上学”的批判，它更是对蒲鲁东试图用观念逻辑取代历史实践、以抽象范畴消解具体物质过程的彻底否定。

However, the understanding of the proposition “the poverty of philosophy” must by no means be limited to a comparison of the ideas of Marx and Proudhon alone; it must be examined within a broader intellectual landscape and historical context. From this perspective, we should rather offer the following assessment: Proudhon’s work involves a meaningful event, namely, the process of the dissolution of the Absolute Spirit (or Absolute Idea). He attempted to recombine the various components of the wreckage of Hegelian philosophy to form a new theoretical system. Yet Proudhon’s critique and various efforts never left the ground of Hegelian philosophy. Not only his answers, but even the questions he himself posed, contained mysticism. Although Proudhon asserted that he had surpassed Hegelian philosophy, his dependence on Hegel precisely explains why he could not truly break through Hegel’s system.

然而，对“哲学的贫困”这一命题的理解绝不能仅仅局限于对马克思和蒲鲁东两个人的思想比较上，而必须放到更为广阔的思想图景和时代背景下来加以考察。从这个角度来说，我们更应该作这样一个评价：蒲鲁东的工作涉及的是一个有意义的事件，即绝对精神(或者说绝对观念)的瓦解过程。他试图将黑格尔哲学残骸中的各个组成部分重新化合，以形成新的理论体系。然而，蒲鲁东的批判和种种努力，始终没有离开过黑格尔哲学的基地。不仅是他的回答，而且连其所提出的问题本身，都包含着神秘主义。尽管蒲鲁东断言自己已经超越黑格尔哲学，但对黑格尔的依赖关系正好说明了为什么他无法真正击穿黑格尔的体系。

This description of the poverty and impotence of Proudhon’s “economics-metaphysics” borrows to a considerable extent from the evaluation of the Young Hegelians in *The German Ideology*. Yet we do not find this “grafting” work to be “forced.” This is precisely because Proudhon’s poverty is not merely his own poverty; it represents a universal problem of poverty in the philosophical field during the process of the dissolution of Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit.” Therefore, the philosophical poverty faced by the Young Hegelians is equally reflected in the failure of Proudhon’s theory. Its root lies in their neglect of history and material conditions, leading to an inability to provide a genuine driving force for social change, and they never transcended the conceptual constraints left by Hegelian philosophy. Hence, Proudhon’s poverty is not only the limitation of an individual’s thought but also reflects the universal crisis faced by the philosophical field after the dissolution of the Hegelian system.

这里对蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”贫乏无能的描述，在相当程度上借用了《德意志意识形态》对青年黑格尔派的评价。但我们却并未因此对这一“嫁接”工作感到“生硬”。这正是因为蒲鲁东的贫困，不单是他自己的贫困，而是代表了黑格尔的“绝对精神”的瓦解过程中哲学领域的一种普遍的贫困问题。因此，青年黑格尔派所面临的哲学贫困，同样体现在蒲鲁东理论的失败中。其根源在于他们对历史和物质条件的忽视，导致无法为社会变革提供真正的动力，始终未能超越黑格尔哲学遗留的观念束缚。因此，蒲鲁东的贫困不仅是个人思想的局限，更反映了黑格尔体系瓦解后哲学领域普遍面临的危机。

The difference is that the German ideologists “did not think of inquiring into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the connection of their criticism with their own material environment.” [27]27 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 30. Proudhon, on the other hand, strove to combine reason with experience. In his “economics-metaphysics,” Proudhon regarded “God” as a combination of infinite reason and infinite experience — both the embodiment of wisdom and the pinnacle of freedom. This means that “God” is not only the highest expression of reason but also the source of all human experience. Through the concept of “God,” Proudhon attempted to resolve the potential contradiction between freedom and wisdom, that is, the problem between reason and experience, which in the philosophical tradition is usually seen as separate or opposed.

区别在于，德意志意识形态家们“没有一个想到要提出关于德国哲学和德国现实之间的联系问题，关于他们所作的批判和他们自身的物质环境之间的联系问题。”蒲鲁东则努力地把理性与经验结合在一起。在蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”中，他将“上帝”视为无限的理性和无限的经验的结合体——既是智慧的化身也是自由的顶峰。这意味着“上帝”不仅是理性的最高表现，也是所有人类经验的根源。通过“上帝”概念，蒲鲁东试图解决自由与智慧之间的潜在矛盾，也即是哲学传统中通常被视为隔离或对立的理性与经验之间的问题。

From the perspective of the dissolution of metaphysics completed by Hegel, Proudhon’s philosophy is both the final poverty and the original poverty. It is said to be the final poverty because, compared to the German ideologists, he took two steps forward: first, Proudhon grasped Hegel’s dialectic (although Marx believed he “reduced Hegel’s dialectic to the most pitiful level”); second, Proudhon attached equal importance to reason and experience and attempted to achieve their unity in the rational series of “economic evolution” (although this unity was realized in the form of “God,” and things were defined as “the reflection of immaterial and motionless spirit in space and time”). In a certain sense, Proudhon’s “economics-metaphysics” reached the limit of the process of dissolution and development of Hegelian philosophy; metaphysics could no longer take a single step forward. Therefore, Proudhon’s poverty is the final poverty of metaphysics. But at the same time, Proudhon’s philosophy also embodies the original poverty of classical German philosophy. His “economics-metaphysics” remained trapped in the fundamental problem of Hegelian philosophy, which is also the fundamental problem of classical German philosophy, namely, the inherent fundamental problem of the idealist philosophical standpoint and idealist conception of history. From this perspective, Proudhon was merely a French “German ideologist” and an ideologist in the field of political economy.

从黑格尔完成的形而上学的解体角度来看，蒲鲁东的哲学既是最后的贫困，也是原初的贫困。之所以说他的哲学是最后的贫困，是因为他相对于德意志意识形态家们而言，向前迈进了两步：一是蒲鲁东抓住了黑格尔的辩证法(尽管马克思认为他把黑格尔的辩证法“降低到极可怜的程度”);二是蒲鲁东对理性与经验同等重视，并试图实现两者在“经济进化”的理性系列中的统一(尽管这种统一是以“上帝”的形式来实现，并且事物被规定为“非物质的和静止的精神在空间和时间上的反映”)。从某种意义来说，蒲鲁东的“经济学—形而上学”达到了黑格尔哲学解体和发展过程的极限，形而上学再也不能往前迈进一步了。因此，蒲鲁东的贫困是形而上学的最后贫困。但同时，蒲鲁东的哲学也体现了德国古典哲学的原初贫困，他的“经济学—形而上学”仍受困于黑格尔哲学的根本问题，也是德国古典哲学的根本问题，即唯心主义哲学立场和唯心史观先天具备的根本问题。从这个角度来说，蒲鲁东不过是法国的“德意志意识形态家”和政治经济学领域的意识形态家。

In Marx’s view, at the crossroads of the dissolution of Hegelian philosophy, Proudhon was not much more insightful than the ideologists; hence his work was insufficient to truly lead him onto the path of history. For Marx, history does not need a mysterious “God,” nor does it need a transcendent concept as the starting point for historical narrative; it only needs to “regard men as both the authors and the actors of their own drama.” [28]28 Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), in *Marx Engels Collected Works*, vol. 11 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), p. 104. As for the understanding of the authors and actors of the drama, we can fully explain it with this passage: “Men cannot freely choose their own productive forces — which form the basis of all their history — for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of previous activity. Thus the productive forces are the result of man’s practical energy, but this energy is itself circumscribed by the conditions in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already acquired, by the social forms which exist before them, which they do not create, which are the product of the preceding generation… Because of this simple fact, a connection is formed in men’s history, the history of mankind is formed, and this history becomes all the more the history of mankind as the productive forces of men and, consequently, their social relations have developed.” [29]29 Karl Marx, Letter to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov, 28 December 1846, in *Marx Engels Collected Works*, vol. 38 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), p. 96. This idea was later given full expression in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and became another theoretical and practical battlefield between Marx and Proudhon.

在马克思看来，在黑格尔哲学解体的十字路口，蒲鲁东并没有比意识形态家们高明多少，因而他的工作并不足以使他真正通往历史的道路。对马克思来说，历史不需要一个神秘的“上帝”,不需要一个超验的概念作为历史叙述的出发点，而只需要“把人们当成他们本身历史的剧中人物和剧作者”。至于对剧中人物与剧作者的理解，我们完全可以用这段文字说明：“人们不能自由选择自己的生产力——这是他们的全部历史的基础，因为任何生产力都是一种既得的力量，是以往的活动的产物。可见，生产力是人们应用能力的结果，但是这种能力本身决定于人们所处的条件，决定于先前已经获得的生产力，决定于在他们以前已经存在、不是由他们创立而是由前一代人创立的社会形式……由于这一简单的事实，就形成人们的历史中的联系，就形成人类的历史，这个历史随着人们的生产力以及人们的社会关系的愈益发展而愈益成为人类的历史。”这一思想后来在《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》中得到了淋漓尽致的发挥，并成为马克思与蒲鲁东的又一个理论与实践战场。

From Marx’s critical perspective, Proudhon’s philosophy can be regarded as “the final metaphysics.” “The final metaphysics” is not merely an academic judgment; it also reshapes the narrative framework of the history of philosophy. This concept not only provides the scholarly community with a perspective for re-examining the deep relationship between the metaphysical tradition and Marxism, but also endows the relationship between Proudhon and Marx with a new theoretical height. Although metaphysics as a mode of existence of philosophy did not thereby perish — for example, later Neo-Hegelianism, phenomenology, and existentialism all retained metaphysical characteristics to varying degrees — Proudhon’s work can still be seen as the “final form” of classical metaphysics. What truly put an end to metaphysics was Marx’s new philosophy, which extended materialism into the historical domain, namely historical materialism. Historical materialism truly grasped dialectics and achieved the unity of logic and history, which differs from the idealist dialectics within the metaphysical framework. Marx’s contribution lies in the fact that he no longer made history subordinate to some transcendent idea, but instead took history itself as the starting point of theory. Therefore, Proudhon’s failure also marks the end of the metaphysical tradition, because after Marx, traditional metaphysics as a closed, holistic system no longer held a dominant position, and philosophy either accepted historical materialism or turned toward subjective idealism, positivism, or other new theoretical systems, but could never return to a Hegelian holistic system of metaphysics.

从马克思的批判角度来看，蒲鲁东的哲学可以被认为是“最后的形而上学”。“最后的形而上学”不仅是一个学术性判断，同时也重塑了哲学史的叙述框架。这个概念不仅为学界提供了重新审视形而上学传统与马克思主义深层关系的视角，还赋予了蒲鲁东与马克思之间关系以新的理论高度。尽管形而上学作为哲学的一种存在方式并未因此消亡——比如后来的新黑格尔主义、现象学、存在主义依然在不同程度上保留了形而上学的特征。但是，蒲鲁东的工作仍然可以看作是经典形而上学的“最后形态”。而真正终结形而上学的，则是把唯物主义贯穿到历史领域的马克思的新哲学，即历史唯物主义。历史唯物主义真正抓住了辩证法，并实现了逻辑与历史的统一，这与形而上学框架内部的观念论辩证法不同。马克思的贡献在于，他不再让历史服从于某种超验的理念，而是将历史本身作为理论的出发点。因此，蒲鲁东的失败也标志着形而上学传统的终结，因为在马克思之后，传统形而上学作为一个封闭的、整体性的系统不再具有统治地位，而哲学要么接受历史唯物主义，要么转向主观唯心主义、实证主义或其他新的理论体系演化，但再也无法回到黑格尔式的形而上学整体性体系。

Conclusion

结 语

After the dissolution of Hegelian metaphysics, the fate of philosophy became a question of the times. Both Marx and Proudhon firmly grasped “labor” and “contradiction,” introducing dialectics into the analysis of material life. The former, on the basis of materialist dialectics, established labor as the fulcrum for the unity of logic and history; the latter regarded labor as the expression of reason (metaphysics) and the foundation of experience (economics), attempting to unify reason and experience through idealist dialectics. Although Proudhon’s “unity of experience and reason” and Marx’s “unity of logic and history” appear superficially similar, they in fact represent fundamentally different theoretical paths. Proudhon understood labor as a “reason-experience” bridge — that is, labor is not only an economic act but also the realization of reason — hence his dialectics was completed within the realm of ideas, essentially transforming economic problems into movements of reason. Marx, by contrast, completely reversed the field of dialectics: labor is not the externalization of the idea, but sensuous, objective activity and a real historical process; hence his dialectics unfolds in history and practice. In other words, although dialectics is not Marx’s exclusive property, whether dialectics is anchored in the logical domain of conceptual movement or rooted in the historical process of material production determines two fundamentally different paths of philosophical development.

在黑格尔形而上学解体之后，哲学的命运成了时代的课题。马克思和蒲鲁东都牢牢抓住“劳动”和“矛盾”,将辩证法引入物质生活分析。前者在唯物辩证法基础上，把劳动确立为逻辑与历史相统一的支点；后者则将劳动视为理性(形而上学)的表达与经验(经济学)的基础，试图用观念辩证法统一理性与经验。蒲鲁东的“经验与理性的统一”与马克思的“逻辑与历史的统一”虽然表面上相似，但实则代表着截然不同的理论路径。蒲鲁东把劳动理解为一种“理性—经验”桥梁，即劳动不仅是经济行为，也是理性的实现，因而其辩证法是在观念内部完成的，本质上是将经济问题转化为理性运动。马克思则彻底扭转了辩证法的场域：劳动不是理念的外化，而是感性的对象性活动和现实的历史过程，因而其辩证法是在历史与实践中展开的。换言之，尽管辩证法并非马克思的专利，但是将辩证法锚定在概念运动的逻辑领域，还是根植于物质生产的历史进程，这决定了两种根本不同的哲学发展路径。

So, how should we understand the “poverty of philosophy” identified by Marx? The “philosophy” criticized in *The Poverty of Philosophy* refers to Proudhon’s attempt to integrate “experience” with “reason” in an “economics-metaphysics,” which still continued the Hegelian tradition of idealist dialectics and metaphysics — that is, an attempt to unify reality with a logical system without touching the practical transformation of reality itself. And the “poverty” it identifies is not merely the poverty of Proudhon’s philosophy in the literal sense, but should rather be understood as the poverty of “the final metaphysics” — the ineffectiveness of the entire metaphysical tradition in its “final effort” at self-salvation. It marks the ultimate failure of the metaphysical tradition in its process of self-renewal: when it developed to its theoretical limit, it still could not leap out of the abstract logical system it had itself set up. Therefore, in Marx’s view, this kind of metaphysics had lost the possibility of undertaking the task of a philosophical revolution. It can be said that constantly replacing the entity of “God” within the confines of the metaphysical framework, rather than delving into material life and social practice to find the driving force of historical development, is the fundamental problem identified by “the poverty of philosophy.” This “poverty” shows that when metaphysics attempts to renew or save itself within its own interior, the result often remains trapped in a logical system, unable to cut into the real movement of history.

那么，应当如何理解马克思指认的“哲学的贫困”呢?《哲学的贫困》批判的“哲学”,指的是蒲鲁东试图以“理性”整合“经验”的“经济学—形而上学”,其背后仍然延续了黑格尔式的观念辩证法和形而上学传统，即试图用逻辑体系来统一现实，却不触及现实本身的实践变革。而其所指认的“贫困”,不仅仅是字面意义上的蒲鲁东哲学的贫困，更应当理解为“最后的形而上学”的贫困，即整个形而上学传统在做自我拯救之“最后努力”的无效性。它标志着形而上学传统在自我更新过程中的最终失败——当其发展到理论上的极限时，仍无法跳出自己设定的抽象逻辑体系。因此，在马克思看来，这种形而上学已丧失承担哲学革命任务的可能性。可以说，在形而上学的框架限制内不断替换“上帝”的实体，而不是深入到物质生活和社会实践中去寻找历史发展的动力，就是“哲学的贫困”指认的本源性问题。这种“贫困”表明，当形而上学试图在自身内部进行自我更新或自我拯救时，其结果往往停留于逻辑体系之中，而无法切入现实的历史运动。

In fact, the validity of a philosophical revolution, that is, its position in the history of philosophical thought, is not beyond testing. The philosophical revolution achieved by Marx through the historicized reconstruction of dialectics enabled Proudhon’s philosophy, as “the final metaphysics,” to provide a new method of periodization for the history of philosophy. It is precisely in this philosophical divide that historical materialism established a new paradigm that transcends metaphysics and enters into practical science.

其实，哲学革命的有效性，亦即其在哲学思想史中的地位，并非不可检验。马克思通过对辩证法的历史化重构实现的哲学革命，使得蒲鲁东哲学作为“最后的形而上学”为哲学史提供了新的分期方法。正是在这一哲学分野中，历史唯物主义确立了其超越形而上学、进入实践科学的新范式。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗