From Philosophy of Praxis to Practical Materialism: Cieszkowski, Hess, and Marx

The young Marx’s departure from Hegelianism toward “practical materialism” has always been the most intractable and yet most fascinating puzzle in Marx studies. Hiromatsu Wataru pointed out that this transformation was a synthesis of three currents within the Young Hegelian movement: the first was the critique of religion constituted by Strauss, Bauer, and Feuerbach; the second was the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history constituted by Cieszkowski and Hess; and the third was Ruge’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right. Of these three threads, the first and the third have been richly discussed, while the second has remained far more obscure. This is, first of all, because neither of the two founders of Marxism provided direct evidence. Engels, in discussing the disintegration of the Hegelian system and the way out, recalled: “In the Germany of that time, what was of practical importance was, first of all, two things: religion and politics” — he precisely “omitted” the second thread and its two protagonists. Marx himself never mentioned Cieszkowski in his scholarly works; he hinted at Hess’s revelatory role, but the latter’s radiance was soon extinguished in Marx’s aversion to “true socialism.” Whether or not the second thread that Hiromatsu spoke of holds, it is necessary to explore the connection between Cieszkowski and Hess and Marx. If their influence on Marx is valid in terms of the objectivity of thought, then the silence of the parties concerned compels later researchers all the more to bring to light this obscure chain of thought; if this influence is, as some researchers believe, invalid — for instance, Lukács — then clarifying the distinction between Marx and these two earlier “philosophers of praxis” can better highlight the transcendent content and significance of Marx’s practical materialism.

青年马克思告别黑格尔主义向“实践唯物主义”的转变，历来是马克思研究中最难解又最有魅力的谜。广松涉指出，这一转变乃是青年黑格尔派内部三种潮流的综合：其一是由施特劳斯、鲍威尔、费尔巴哈所构成的宗教批判；其二是由切什考夫斯基、赫斯构成的黑格尔历史哲学批判；其三是卢格的黑格尔法哲学批判。在这三条线索中，第一条和第三条都有丰富的讨论，第二条则暗淡许多。这首先是因为两位马克思主义创始人都没有提供直接的证明。恩格斯在谈论黑格尔体系的瓦解与出路时回忆道：“在当时的理论的德国，有实践意义的首先是两种东西：宗教和政治”,他恰恰“遗漏”了第二条线索及其两位主角；马克思本人则从未在学术著作中提及切什考夫斯基，他暗示了赫斯的启示性作用，但后者的光芒随即消失在马克思对“真正的社会主义”的厌恶中。无论广松涉所言的第二条线索是否成立，探讨切什考夫斯基和赫斯与马克思的关联都是必要的。如果他们对马克思的影响在思想的客观性上是成立的，那么当事人的沉默更加逼迫后世研究者将晦暗的思想链条揭示出来；如果这一影响如有些研究者认为的那样是无效的——比如卢卡奇,那么阐明马克思与两位更早的“实践哲学家”的区别，则更能彰显马克思实践唯物主义的超越性内涵和意义。

I. Philosophy of Praxis and Philosophy of History

一、实践哲学与历史哲学

Whether it was because of Cieszkowski’s devout religious stance and conservative political attitude that Marx remained silent about him is unknown to later generations. Only a letter from Marx to Engels in his later years reveals a little: “This Cieszkowski (i.e., Cieszkowski — author’s note) … once actually visited me in Paris (in the days of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*), and he made me so utterly unwilling and unable to read his wretched works.” But what Marx clearly despised was Cieszkowski’s economic treatise *Credit and Circulation*, not his most valuable work, *Prolegomena to a Historiosophy*. The influence of the *Prolegomena to a Historiosophy*, published in 1838, certainly reached Marx. Cieszkowski’s teacher at the University of Berlin, Dozent Werder, had lectured on it from the proof sheets for an entire semester — at a time when Marx was enrolled there. After its publication, it attracted the attention of Bauer, Ruge, and Hess — those German Young Hegelians with whom Marx had close dealings — and also caught the eye of foreign exiles such as Herzen and Bakunin. More importantly, it prefigured the tendency of Marx’s doctoral dissertation: the unity of the world’s becoming philosophical and philosophy’s becoming worldly. The fragmented state of German philosophy during Marx’s student days is reviewed in detail in Engels’s later work *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*: the ostensibly conservative character of Hegel’s philosophy meant that people “had nothing more to do but fold their hands in amazement before this absolute truth”; while its revolutionary side lay in pointing out that “nothing is final, absolute, sacred, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, the endless ascent from the lower to the higher.” Regarding the latter, Engels particularly emphasized: “Hegel himself never drew this conclusion explicitly.” So who drew this conclusion? It was not any single individual, but the entire Young Hegelian movement. Yet among those who first attempted and fruitfully carried out this work, Cieszkowski — who did not enter Engels’s recollection — must certainly be included.

是否是由于切什考夫斯基虔诚的宗教立场和保守的政治态度而让马克思对其闭口不提，后人不得而知，只有马克思晚年给恩格斯的一封信中透露了些许，“这个采什科夫斯基(即切什考夫斯基——引者注)……有一天真的在巴黎(《德法年鉴》的时代)访问了我，他弄得我简直一点不想，也无法去阅读他的拙劣的作品。”但马克思明确鄙夷的是切什考夫斯基的经济学论著《信贷与流通》,而非他最有价值的《历史哲学导论》。1838年出版的《历史哲学导论》的影响肯定波及了马克思，切什考夫斯基在柏林大学的老师维尔德(Dozent Werder)就曾拿着样刊讲授了一个学期——当时马克思正在校就读，它出版后引起了鲍威尔、卢格、赫斯这些与马克思交往密切的德国青年黑格尔派的重视，也让赫尔岑、巴枯宁等外国流亡者侧目,更重要的是，它预先表达了马克思博士论文的倾向：哲学世界化和世界哲学化的统一。马克思读书时候德国哲学界的分裂状况在恩格斯晚年的《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》中有详细回顾：黑格尔哲学表面保守的性质使人们“除了袖手一旁惊愕地望着这个已经获得的绝对真理，就再也无事可做了”;而它革命的一面在于指出“除了生成和灭亡的不断过程、无止境地由低级上升到高级的不断过程，什么都不存在”。对于后者，恩格斯特别强调：“他(黑格尔)本人从来没有这样明确地作出这个结论”。那么是谁作出了这个结论?并非某个人，而是整个青年黑格尔派。但在率先尝试并富有成效地进行这项工作的人中，肯定就包括没有进入恩格斯回忆的切什考夫斯基。

Although Cieszkowski’s work is titled “history,” what it points to is not the past but the future. Hegel had already revealed that the unfolding of world history is the self-manifestation of objective reason; he used a succession of national spirits to demonstrate the self-transformation, refinement, trimming, and sublimation of absolute spirit, thereby endowing historical development with an inherent processuality and totality. However, Hegel’s work was not perfect. The great method and principle he established were deliberately abandoned by him, because in the end, world history was divided in temporal sequence into Oriental civilization, Greek civilization, Roman civilization, and Christian-Germanic civilization. This four-stage division did not conform to the triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, and, most importantly, it did not achieve the ultimate “reconciliation” demanded by dialectics. Hence Cieszkowski criticized: “When Hegel reasoned through and perfected his theoretical system, he did not have a consciousness of the ‘organic,’ nor did he form a complete concept of the ‘historical whole.’” Cieszkowski was dissatisfied that Hegel’s philosophy of history only provided reflection on the past, without knowledge of the future. Hegel, like the Kant he opposed, remained mired in agnosticism: ignorance of the future. Cieszkowski’s doctrine of “organic history” sought precisely to establish the knowability of the future: “The historical whole should be composed of the past and the future; it includes both the path already traveled and the path yet to be traveled. Therefore, our primary task is to penetrate the essence of the future through reflection on the past.” Thus, the future, as the most important factor, was incorporated into the category of the philosophy of history. Cieszkowski rewrote world history. On the principle of dialectics, it has only three periods: the past, the present, and the future. The “past” is the identity of the sensuous individual based on natural existence with nature; the “present” is the identity of the self-existence based on spirit with self-thinking; the “future” is the identity of the self-will based on absolute action with concrete practical activity. The “past” corresponds to the first three periods in Hegel (Oriental, Greek, and Roman); the “present” corresponds to the Germanic world; and the future, as the synthesis, unfolds gradually through people’s practical action. Since a biologist, relying on organic thinking, can deduce the entire body of an ancient animal from its teeth, so too can people deduce, discover, and construct the essence of the future from past history. There are three ways to know the future: feeling, thought, and will. Feeling can only “pre-sense” and prophesy the future; thought can only infer and speculate about the future; only will can reveal the full truth and reality of the future, because will governs people’s actions and practice, and can thus objectify and effectively realize known truth. Here, the essential connection among philosophy of history, philosophy of the future, and philosophy of praxis is established. The stagnant situation after Hegel, where there was “nothing more to do,” was breached through an opening.

切什考夫斯基的著作虽以“历史”为题，但它所指向的并非是从前而是未来。黑格尔已然揭示了世界历史的开展是客观理性的自我显现，他用一系列民族精神的更替表明了绝对精神的自我改造、提炼、修整和升华，因而使历史发展具有了内在的过程性和整体性。但是，黑格尔的工作并不完美，他建立的伟大方法和原则被他自己故意抛弃了，因为最终世界历史在时间序列中依次被划分为东方文明、希腊文明、古罗马文明和基督教—日耳曼文明，这四阶段的划分并不符合正—反—合的三段论，以及最重要的，并没有达成辩证法所要求的最终的“和解”。因而切什考夫斯基批评：“黑格尔在推理过程和完善理论体系之时，并没有‘有机体’意识，也没有形成完满的‘历史整体’观念。”切什考夫斯基不满黑格尔的历史哲学只提供对过去的反思，却没有关于未来的知识，黑格尔和他所反对的康德一样沉陷在不可知论中：对未来的无知。而切什考夫斯基的“有机的历史”学说就是要力求确定未来的可知性，“历史整体应该由过去和未来组成，它既包含已行之路，也包含将行之路，因此，我们的首要任务就是通过反思过去而去洞察未来的本质。”由此，未来作为最重要的因素被纳入历史哲学的范畴。切什考夫斯基重新编写世界历史，它在辩证法的原则上只有三个时期：过去、现在和未来，“过去”是以自然存在为基础的感性个体与自然界的同一，“现在”是以精神为基础的自我存在与自我思考的同一，“未来”是以绝对行动为基础的自我意志与具体实在活动的同一。“过去”对应的是黑格尔那里的前三个时期(东方、希腊和古罗马),“现在”对应的是日耳曼世界，而作为合题的未来通过人们的实践行动而徐徐展开。既然生物学家依靠有机体思维可以从上古动物的牙齿中推演出它的整个躯体，那么，人们也可以从过去的历史中去推导、发现和构建未来的本质。获知未来有三种方式：感觉、思维和意志，感觉只能对未来进行“预感”和预言，思维只能对未来进行推理和猜测，只有意志才能揭示未来的全部真理和现实，因为意志主导着人们的行动和实践，因而能把已知真理客体化和有效实现出来。在此，历史哲学—未来哲学—实践哲学的本质关联被建立起来了，黑格尔之后“无事可做”的沉闷局面被打开了一个缺口。

Philosophy of praxis is an ancient form of wisdom. In former times it signified action under the guidance of free will or conscience, but it acquired the meaning of “history” only within the Hegelian context. Hegel revealed that the chaotic and confused course of history is in fact set by the grand absolute reason, so history has direction and purpose, and praxis is the historical action that realizes that purpose. However, before Hegel, the purpose of historical action could only be revealed after the dust of facts had settled; after all, the owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk: “Philosophy always comes too late. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality has completed its formative process and made itself ready.” [1]1 G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Preface. That is, consciousness can only interpret and explain after the fact, but cannot participate in action. Now, since Hegel has already displayed absolute knowledge, those who have insight into absolute knowledge can look forward to the future; they no longer act unconsciously and accidentally. “Action” acquires an entirely new quality: “Action is no longer a purely immediate result that is merely received and reflected upon; it is a fact that has already been reflected upon, coordinated, considered, and planned by humans in advance, and only then completed.” [2]2 August Cieszkowski, *Prolegomena to Historiosophy*. The groundbreaking significance of this thesis lies in the fact that humans are no longer passively and blindly serving as instruments of historical reason; they can, within necessity (rather than outside it), decide their own destiny, participate in the planning of the future, and autonomously execute that plan.

实践哲学是一门古老的智慧，从前它意指在自由意志或良知的支配下行动，但只有在黑格尔主义的语境中，它才具有了“历史”的意义。黑格尔揭示了庞杂混乱的历史其实是由宏大的绝对理性所设定的，所以历史是有方向、有目的的，实践则是实现目的的历史行动。但是，在黑格尔之前，历史行动的目的只能在事实尘埃落定之后才被揭示出来，毕竟，密涅瓦的猫头鹰要等到黄昏才会起飞，“哲学总是来得太迟。哲学作为有关世界的思想，要直到现实结束其形成过程并完成其自身之后，才会出现。”也就是说，意识只能在事实之后去进行阐释和说明，却无法参与到行动之中。现在，既然黑格尔已经将绝对知识展现出来，那么洞察了绝对知识的人们就可以展望未来，他们不再是无意识地、偶然地开展行动了。“行动”有了全新的性质，“行动不再是一个纯粹只被接收、被反思的直接结果，它是一种已经经过人类提前反思、协调、思量、计划，然后才被完成的事实。”这个论断的开创性意义在于，人不再被动盲目地充当历史理性的工具，他可以在必然性之中(而不是之外)自行决定自己的命运，可以参与未来的规划并自主地执行规划。

Cieszkowski focused his discussion on the proposition of the “identity of thought and being,” a problem that Engels emphasized as “the great basic question of modern philosophy.” [3]3 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. In Engels’s context, “modern” refers especially to the period of the dissolution of the Hegelian system, and Cieszkowski was precisely the one who inaugurated this period. The identity of thought and being was described by Hegel as “God’s walk on earth,” that is, the process of the “self-externalization” of absolute spirit. But self-externalization was not the focus of his exposition; after all, it was merely a moment to be sublated before spirit ascended to the final synthesis. Only thought can accomplish the final reconciliation; therefore, will and praxis are still devoured by theory and do not gain their own independence. Hegel himself once asked his listeners to bring the spirit of the age “out of its state of seclusion and lack of vitality into the broad light of day,” [4]4 G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Introduction. but Hegel did not explain how to achieve this. On the contrary, before issuing this call, he still emphasized that “no philosophy can transcend its age; the history of philosophy is the innermost core of world history.” [5]5 Ibid. Hegel completed the deduction of the process of absolute spirit “in itself” and “for itself,” but stopped short of “self-externalization.” Without this link, thought cannot break through its seclusion and become vital, and spirit cannot complete its concrete evolution and truly walk on earth. To realize Hegel’s call, Cieszkowski adjusted praxis to the “synthesis” link. Since praxis is already “post-theoretical” and guided by absolute knowledge, then theory (spirit), which in Hegel was regarded as the final result, is only a “mediation” in Cieszkowski. The true identity of thought and being will be accomplished in praxis, not in speculation. Praxis brings about the fusion of externality and internality, and the substantive reconciliation of objective and subjective, matter and spirit, reality and ideal. When the proposition of the “identity of thought and being” changes from a theoretical problem to a practical problem, then “philosophy must also descend from the heights of theory into the realm of practice. The future destiny of philosophy is ‘philosophy with a practical character,’ or more precisely, ‘philosophy of praxis.’” [6]6 August Cieszkowski, *Prolegomena to Historiosophy*.

切什考夫斯基着重讨论了“思想与存在同一”的命题，这一问题被恩格斯强调为“近代哲学的重大的基本问题”,在恩格斯的语境中，“近代”尤指黑格尔体系瓦解的时期，而切什考夫斯基正是开启这个时期的人。思想与存在的同一被黑格尔描述为“上帝在大地上的行走”,也就是绝对精神的“自我外化”的过程，但是自我外化并不是他论述的重点，毕竟这只是精神上升到最后综合之前被扬弃的环节。只有思想才能完成最后的和解，因此，意志和实践依然被理论所吞噬，而没有获得自己的独立性。黑格尔自己曾要求他的听众把时代精神“从它的闭塞境况和缺乏生命力中带到光天化日之下”,但是黑格尔并没有说明如何做到这一点，相反，在发出这一号召前，他仍在强调“没有一种哲学能够超出它的时代，哲学的历史是世界历史的最内在的核心。”黑格尔完成了对绝对精神“自在”和“自为”过程的演绎，却在“自我外化”前止步。缺少了这个环节，思想无法突破闭塞而变得富有生气，精神无法完成具体的演化而真正行走于大地。为了实现黑格尔的号召，切什考夫斯基把实践调整为“综合”环节，既然实践已经是“后理论的”,已经得到绝对知识的引导，那么在黑格尔那里被视为最终结果的理论(精神),在切什考夫斯基这里只是“中介”,思维和存在的真正的同一将在实践而非思辨中完成。实践促成了外在性与内在性的融会贯通，促成客观与主观、物质与精神、现实与理想的实质性和解。当“思想与存在的同一性”命题从理论问题变成现实问题，那么，“哲学也必须从理论的高度下落到实践领域之中，哲学未来的命运就是‘具有实践性质的哲学’,或者更确切地说，是‘实践哲学’”。

When praxis was highlighted by Cieszkowski as the true mission of philosophy, the Young Hegelians who were trying to break out of Hegelian philosophy were undoubtedly greatly stimulated. First, the “existing” was no longer regarded as the “actual” that is rationally existent; the existing is merely the result of the unconscious actions of people in the past, while the actual is what people of the present can know and desire; it exists in the future and awaits people to consciously create and plan it. Second, the object of praxis, that is, material existence, must be taken seriously. Moreover, Cieszkowski had already stated that philosophy of praxis would necessarily manifest itself as truth in its influence on “everyday life and social relations,” and philosophy must also become practical, must become popular and accessible to the masses. Third, Cieszkowski even introduced French socialism. He reminded German philosophers to pay attention to Fourier, although the latter’s utopian and mechanical character was obvious, “it has taken an extraordinarily significant step in the development of organic truth in reality.” [7]7 Ibid. Those unwilling to sink into quietism should see in it an opportunity “full of vitality.” Regarding Cieszkowski’s contribution, McLellan commented that he was “the first to promote the process of rapid secularization that began among the Young Hegelians in the following years.” [8]8 David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx*. Indeed, years later, these revelations of Cieszkowski all yielded brilliant results in Marx, but his role was merely that of a “promoter.” There were too many questions he did not answer, or even failed to recognize at all. For example: Where does the absolute knowledge that permeates praxis come from? Is it pre-existing like God? Who is the subject of praxis that sees into the future? Is it the bourgeoisie? Why is the German bourgeoisie so weak, conservative, and utterly lacking in practical capacity? Cieszkowski himself had no class perspective at all; from a nationalist standpoint, he placed his hopes for the future on the Slavs, who were politically and economically backward. What are the fundamental factors constituting everyday life and social relations, and where should practical activity to change them begin? Since socialism is both beneficial and flawed, how should it be transformed? And so on. All these questions that were opened up could only be left for Marx to answer one by one years later.

当实践被切什考夫斯基凸显为哲学的真正使命，那些试图从黑格尔哲学中突围的青年黑格尔派们无疑会受到巨大的刺激：其一，“现存”不再被视作合理存在的“现实”,现存只是从前的人们无意识行动的结果，而现实是当下的人们可知和可欲求的，它存在于未来，有待人们有意识地去创造和谋划；其二，实践对象，也就是物质存在必须得到重视，而且，切什考夫斯基已经明言，实践哲学必然会在对“日常生活和社会关系”的影响中展现自身为真理，哲学也必须变得实用，必须通俗易懂而为大众所掌握；其三，切什考夫斯基甚至引入了法国的社会主义，他提醒德国的哲学家们注意傅立叶，尽管后者的空想性质和机械性质显而易见，但“它在现实发展有机真理方面已经迈出了具有非凡意义的一步”,不愿沉陷在寂静主义中的人应该从中看到“充满活力”的契机。关于切什考夫斯基的贡献，麦克莱伦评价道，他是“第一个促进后来若干年内青年黑格尔派中开始迅速世俗化过程的人”。确实，若干年后，切什考夫斯基的这些启示都在马克思那里收获了耀眼的成果，但他的作用也仅仅是“促进”。有太多的问题他没有回答，甚至完全没有意识到，比如：渗透实践的绝对知识从哪里来，它就如上帝一样先在吗?洞悉未来的实践主体是谁，是资产阶级吗，为什么德国的资产阶级如此软弱保守而毫无实践能力?切什考夫斯基本人根本没有阶级视角，他从民族主义立场把未来寄托给政治和经济都十分落后的斯拉夫人。构成日常生活和社会关系的根本因素是什么，改变它们的实践活动应该从哪里入手?既然社会主义既是有益的又是有缺陷的，那如何改造它?等等。所有这些被开启的问题只能留待马克思在若干年后一一回答。

II. Philosophy of Praxis and Modern Critique

二、实践哲学与现代批判

In the line of Cieszkowski–Hess–Marx, Hess is by no means merely a transitional figure; on the contrary, his influence was personally acknowledged by Marx. But researchers such as Cornu, Avineri, and McLellan are more concerned with *The Essence of Money* or *The Last Philosophers* than with his earlier works. Mehring and Sidney Hook even simply equated Hess with the “True Socialists.” [9]9 “True Socialists” refers to a faction within the German socialist movement of the 1840s that combined French socialist ideas with German idealist philosophy, criticized by Marx and Engels for its abstract moralizing and detachment from class struggle. As far as the theme of this article is concerned, the focus is on what Hess inherited and surpassed from Cieszkowski, and what might ultimately have stimulated Marx.

在切什考夫斯基—赫斯—马克思的线索中，赫斯绝非只是一个过渡性人物，相反，他的影响是得到马克思亲自承认的。但科尔纽、阿维纳瑞、麦克莱伦等研究者更在意的都是《货币的本质》或《最后的哲学家》,而非他更早的作品，梅林和悉尼·胡克甚至干脆把赫斯与“真正的社会主义者”等同起来。就本文的主题而言，焦点乃在于赫斯从切什考夫斯基那里继承和超出了什么，并最终可能对马克思产生了刺激。

On the question of the philosophy of history, Hess was actually oriented toward the future earlier than Cieszkowski. As early as 1837, he wrote *The Holy History of Mankind*, a book that shared an unspoken intention with *Prolegomena to Historiosophy*: “This book is an attempt to find order out of chaos, that is, the first attempt to grasp world history in its totality and regularity.” Starting from the narrative logic of the Bible, Hess arrived at a tripartite structure similar to Hegelianism: the first period of humanity was the “Age of the Father,” from Adam to the birth of Christ, when humanity was not yet tainted by the sin of private property; the second period was the “Age of the Son,” from Christ to Spinoza, when Christianity’s claim to confirm God through the inner soul also meant that concern for the self was placed at the forefront of life, ultimately leading to economic egoism (capitalism); the third period was the “Age of the Holy Spirit,” initiated by Spinoza and leading to the future, where in Spinoza’s pantheism, God or Nature can only be grasped through intellectual love, and people must construct the order of life according to comprehensible universal reason. The future, as the final age, will see humanity return to the promised Jerusalem, where “the whole country will be a pleasant great garden, with happy and industrious people strolling through it, enjoying life; if anyone seeks suffering to destroy this garden, he will find nothing; humanity has bid farewell to misfortune.” This heavy mythological narrative of “Eden—Fall and Suffering—Return to Jerusalem” was certainly not something Marx would accept. To use Marx’s later criticism of Grün, “this philosophical method of dealing with history by using certain church-historical categories is very shoddy, remaining at the level of purely belles-lettristic phrases.” [10]10 Marx’s criticism of Karl Grün, a “true socialist,” appears in *The German Ideology* (1845–1846). This soteriological historiography, aimed at the advent of the Messiah, could provide nothing useful for practical communism. However, Hess did say something useful, so much so that *The Holy History of Mankind* “powerfully demonstrated the convergence of religious and socialist themes” [11]11 Quotation from a secondary source; the original reference is to Hess’s early work. — namely, the critique of private property. Although Marx began to focus on material interest issues from the discussion of the law on theft of wood, at least this topic in *The Holy History of Mankind* was close to his concerns (if he had read the book). And when Cieszkowski’s concept of praxis was absorbed and modified by Hess, this topic would also move from mythological historiography into secular social critique.

在历史哲学的问题上，赫斯倒是比切什考夫斯基更早面向未来。他在1837年就写作了《人类的圣史》,这本书与《历史哲学导论》有着不谋而合的意图，“本书是从混沌中找出秩序的尝试，即将世界史放在其整体性和规律性中加以把握的最初尝试。”赫斯从圣经的叙事逻辑出发，达成了与黑格尔主义类似的三段论结构：人类的第一个时期是“圣父的时代”,从亚当到基督的诞生，此时的人类没有沾染私有财产的罪恶；第二个时期是“圣子的时代”,从基督到斯宾诺莎，当基督教主张从内在的灵魂来确证上帝，也意味着对自我的关切被放在了生活的首位，最终自我关切导向了经济利己主义(资本主义);第三个时期是“圣灵的时代”,由斯宾诺莎所开启并通向未来，在斯宾诺莎的泛神论里，上帝或自然只能通过理智之爱来把握，人们必须按照可理解的普遍理性来建构生活的秩序。未来作为最后的时代，人类将重回被许诺的耶路撒冷，在那里，“整个国家将会是一个宜人的大花园，幸福而勤劳的人们徜徉其中，享受生活；如果有人要寻求苦难来破坏这个花园，那他将一无所获；人类已经告别不幸。”这种浓重的“伊甸园—堕落与受难—重回耶路撒冷”的神话叙事，当然不会被马克思接受，用马克思后来批判格律恩的话来说，就是“利用某些教会—历史的范畴来对付历史的这种哲学手法是很低劣的，处在纯粹美文学词句的水平”。这种以弥赛亚降临为目的的救赎史学没办法为实践的共产主义提供任何有益的东西。不过，赫斯还是说出了有益的东西，以致使《人类的圣史》“强有力地表明了宗教和社会主义主题的会合”,那就是对私有财产的批判。尽管马克思是从林木盗窃法讨论中开始关注物质利益问题的，但至少《人类的圣史》的这个话题与他的关切是相近的(如果他读到该书的话)。而当切什考夫斯基的实践概念被赫斯吸纳和修改，这个话题也将从神话史学进入世俗的社会批判。

In *The European Triarchy*, Hess praised Cieszkowski for “revealing that the action of the free spirit has unfolded from the beginning of history,” thereby giving the action of spirit world-historical significance and ultimately transforming the philosophy of history into a philosophy of action. But Cieszkowski also overlooked the most important thing. In Hess’s view, Cieszkowski’s action of spirit remained trapped within Hegel’s speculative, abstract, grand but mysterious absolute spirit, whereas the crucial point was to reduce absolute spirit to subjective spirit. Subjective spirit is the core of the phenomenology of spirit, wherein the desires, will, and self-consciousness of real individuals in history are highlighted, wherein the formation of the self and the self’s split from the object, as well as the overcoming of this split to achieve unity, are displayed. Hegel had long emphasized: “The richest is the most concrete and the most subjective.” Now Hess attributed this richest thing to the practical self. He even anticipated, in an “existentialist” tone, that practice and the self are one and the same: “Life is activity. Activity is the return to identity through the positing and sublation of the opposites of life, the creation of a life-identity and self-identity by breaking the boundary of activity between self and non-self.” [12]12 Hess’s formulation echoes Fichtean and Hegelian themes of self-activity and identity. The idealism from Fichte to Hegel had already shown that self-consciousness is necessarily a creative factor that objectifies itself in the human world; Hess no longer needed, like Descartes, to regard the self as a substance unfolding only in the immanent process of “I think.” Instead, the self obtains its concrete content through practical activity on the external world. Thus, the individual could no longer be a helpless bystander while “God walks on earth”; he obtained the ontological promise of becoming both the “actor” and the “playwright” of history. [13]13 The phrase “actor and playwright of history” alludes to Marx’s concept in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), where humans make their own history but not under conditions of their choosing. The future, which in Cieszkowski was cognized as a whole, could in Hess acquire concrete content as an object of human practice.

赫斯在《欧洲三头政治》中表扬切什考夫斯基“揭示了自由的精神的行动，已从历史的发端展开”,从而使精神的行动获得了世界历史的意义，并最终把历史的哲学转变为行动的哲学，但切什考夫斯基也忽略了最重要的东西。在赫斯看来，切什考夫斯基的精神的行动依然固守在黑格尔的思辨、抽象、宏大但神秘的绝对精神内，而重要的是把绝对精神还原为主观精神。主观精神才是精神现象学的核心，在其中凸显了历史中现实个人的欲望、意志和自我意识，在其中展现了自我的形成以及自我与客体的分裂并克服这一分裂而达成统一的过程。黑格尔早已强调：“最丰富的东西是最具体的和最主观的”,现在赫斯将这最丰富的东西归属于实践的自我，他甚至预先以一种“存在主义”的口吻表明实践与自我就是一回事，“生命就是活动。活动就是通过设定与扬弃生活的对立面的同一性的回复，就是通过打破了自我与非我的活动界限而创造一种生活的同一性和自我的同一性。”从费希特到黑格尔的观念论已然说明，自我意识乃是必然在人的世界中将自身对象化的创造性因素，赫斯就不需再像笛卡尔那般把自我视为只在内在性的“我思”过程中展开的实体，相反，自我在对外部世界的实践活动中获得其具体的内容。于是，个人可以不再是“上帝在大地上行走”时无助的旁观者，他获得了成为历史“剧中人”和“剧作者”的存在论允诺。在切什考夫斯基那里从整体上得到认知的未来，在赫斯这里可以作为人的实践对象获得具体的内容。

When practice seeks concrete content, it also means that the orientation of the philosophy of history shifts from the future to the present. Since the future is “the result of what is happening” (the title of the second part of *The Holy History of Mankind*), the opening of the future through practice first manifests as a change to the present. To this end, Hess introduced French socialism, for socialism was the most practically oriented trend of thought at the time. Although he started from Judaism, embraced socialism with a strong aversion to the Christian world, and was ultimately easily exploited by “true socialism,” he indeed initiated a unique attempt to combine Judaism, socialism, and Hegelianism. The combination of the first two made him a prophet of Zionism, while the combination of the latter two made him the first socialist in German philosophical circles. The value of this latter achievement for Marx is beyond doubt. When Marx turned to socialism, he specifically praised Hess’s relevant essays as “rich in content and original works.” [14]14 Marx’s praise appears in his 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and related writings, referring to Hess’s articles such as “On the Essence of Money.”

当实践谋求具体的内容，也意味着历史哲学的指向从未来转向现代，既然未来是“正在发生的事情的结果”(《人类的圣史》第二部分的标题),那么实践对未来的开启首先表现为对现代的改变。为此，赫斯引入了法国的社会主义，毕竟社会主义是当时最有实践倾向的思潮。尽管他是从犹太主义出发，带着对基督教世界的强烈憎恶而接纳社会主义，并最终轻易地被“真正的社会主义”所利用，但他确实开创了一个独特的尝试，即把犹太主义、社会主义和黑格尔主义结合起来，前两者的结合使他成为犹太复国主义的先知，而后二者的结合则使他成为德国哲学圈中第一个社会主义者。后面的这项成就对马克思的帮助是毋庸置疑的，当马克思转向社会主义时，他专门表扬赫斯的相关论文是“内容丰富而有独创性的著作”。

In the concluding section of *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel makes two important declarations: first, that the modern age is the final stage of history; second, that Germany, through its inner spiritual revolution, together with France’s external political revolution, has completed the end of history. Both of these points were criticized by Hess. Hess pointed out that the modern age is far from having achieved harmony and remains an era filled with suffering and opposition. “The present objective world inherited from past ages in fact still contradicts the subjective world of our modern feelings and ideas”; “we still suffer from the symptoms of the Middle Ages, namely the opposition between practice and theory, politics and religion, this world and the other world.” [15]15 Moses Hess, *Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850*, ed. Auguste Cornu and Wolfgang Mönke (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), p. 211. The symptoms of the Middle Ages were the opposition between priests and lay believers, and between landed aristocrats and peasants; now they have transformed into the opposition between the moneyed aristocracy and the impoverished masses in the capitalist world. In this capitalist world of petty shopkeepers, people tear at and devour one another like beasts of prey and vampires. In a word, what is active in the modern age is still a starkly bloody “animal world,” far from the peace and freedom promised by the end of history. France’s political revolution pursued equality; Germany’s idealist revolution aimed at freedom. For Hess, these two are not different forms of absolute reason but rather transitional moments to be sublated and synthesized. The French communists represented by Babeuf [16]16 François-Noël Babeuf (1760–1797) was a French revolutionary and early communist thinker who led the Conspiracy of the Equals, advocating for the abolition of private property and the establishment of a communal society. still inherited the strong “materialist” tendency of the sans-culotte revolution; they understood equality in a crude, passive way, that is, as equality in material enjoyment. In the terminology of German philosophy, in French communism “material wealth is the spirit’s being-for-itself that has become a fixed idea.” [17]17 Hess, *Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften*, p. 213. The entire meaning of freedom is expressed as dependence on material things, not understood as the self-development and free action of spirit; freedom remains in natural contingency and has not yet risen to “self-determination.” Even Proudhon, who possessed the most dialectical spirit, could only “ultimately move toward the crudest, most abstract communism, monastic or Christian communism, toward the elimination of any individual independence, the stifling of life or freedom.” [18]18 Hess, *Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften*, p. 214. The German idealist philosophical revolution, on the other hand, displayed the principle of the absolute freedom of spirit. From Kant onward, German philosophers, like Robespierre, beheaded the rulers of thought. But while they elegantly delineated spiritual freedom, they “had not yet begun to think about the actual freedom of the people” and had not yet “actually won over the people,” so that the great classical philosophy “if it did not simultaneously grant the people actual social freedom, even if it granted them spiritual freedom, was an ineffective attempt.” [19]19 Hess, *Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften*, p. 215. The clearest example is that the *Rheinische Zeitung*, to which Hess and Marx contributed, was brutally shut down, and their own people—the Jews—were still struggling to obtain the “human rights” that had already been universally accepted. [20]20 The *Rheinische Zeitung* was a liberal newspaper published in Cologne from 1842 to 1843, for which Marx served as editor; it was banned by Prussian authorities for its radical content. The reference to Jews struggling for “human rights” alludes to the ongoing debate over Jewish emancipation in Germany, which Marx addressed in his essay “On the Jewish Question.” Hegel placed the highest realm of ethical freedom and universality in the state. This abstract “rational state” bore the same connotation as religion and Cieszkowski’s “future”: a prediction of a united social life. When the state is taken as truth, it instead becomes an illusion, a reactionary force, “letting an abstraction, a ‘universal’ that is never real except in the individual, swallow up real life, the life of real individuals.” [21]21 Hess, *Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften*, p. 218.

黑格尔在《历史哲学》的结论部分有两点重要声明，其一是现代是历史的最后阶段，其二是德国以内在的精神革命与法国外在的政治革命一道完成了历史的终结。这两点都遭到赫斯的批判。赫斯指出，现代远没有实现和谐，仍然是一个充斥痛苦和对立的时代，“从以往时代继承下来的现在的客观世界，事实上仍与我们近代的感情和理念的主观世界相矛盾”,“我们现在仍在为中世纪的世界症状，即为实践与理论、政治与宗教、此岸与彼岸的对立而苦恼”。中世纪的症状即是神父和俗世信徒的对立、土地贵族与农民的对立，现在它转变成资本主义世界中金钱贵族与赤贫大众的对立。在这个资本主义的小商人世界里，人们像食肉兽和吸血鬼一样彼此厮杀啃食。一言以蔽之，在现代，活跃的仍然是一个活脱脱的血腥的“动物世界”,远不是历史终结所允诺的和平和自由。法国的政治革命以平等为追求，德国的观念论革命以自由为目标，在赫斯这里，这二者并非绝对理性的不同表现形式，反而是有待被扬弃被综合的过渡环节。以巴贝夫为代表的法国共产主义者依然继承着无套裤汉革命的那种强烈的“唯物主义”倾向，他们以粗鄙、消极的方式理解平等，即在物质享受上的平等，用德国哲学的术语来说，在法国共产主义那里，“物质财富是成为固定观念的精神的自为存在”。自由的全部含义都表现为对物质性东西的依附，而没有被理解为精神的自我发展和自由行动，自由停留在自然的偶然性中，还没有上升为“自我决定”。即使是最具辩证法精神的蒲鲁东，也只能“最终走向最粗俗的、最抽象的共产主义，僧侣的或基督教的共产主义，走向消灭任何个体的独立自主，扼杀生活或自由。”德国的观念论哲学革命倒是展现了精神绝对自由的原则，从康德起，德国哲学家们像罗伯斯庇尔一样砍倒了思想上的统治者，但是他们在精巧地勾勒精神自由的同时，却“还没有开始思考现实的民众的自由”,还没有“实际地获得民众”,以至于伟大的古典哲学“如果不同时给予民众现实上的社会的自由，即使给予民众精神上的自由，那也是无效的尝试”。最明显的例证就是，赫斯和马克思供稿的《莱茵报》被粗暴查封，他们俩的民族——犹太人还在苦苦争取已经被普遍接受的“人权”。黑格尔把伦理自由的最高境界、普遍性寄托于国家，这个抽象的“理性国家”承载的是和宗教以及切什考夫斯基的“未来”一样的内涵：对团结一致的社会生活的预测。当国家被当作真理，它反倒成了一种虚幻，一种反动的力量，“让一种抽象、让一种除了在个体本身中决不真实的‘普遍’去吞并现实的生活、现实的个体的生活。”

In his polemic with Lorenz von Stein (*Socialism and Communism*), Hess clearly distinguished between socialism and communism. He accepted Stein’s criticism of the crude side of communism and then supplemented it with the German philosophy of spirit inaugurated by Spinoza. This can be regarded as the first attempt to establish “scientific socialism.” Since the current revolutions in France and Germany each represent only one side of freedom, socialism, as the synthesis of the two, signifies “the one and only complete freedom.” This final freedom includes infinity in both the material and spiritual realms, that is, liberation from both poverty and religion, while France and Germany each pursue only one point and lack the other. Hess declared that only practice can bridge the material and the spiritual, and can realize the one and only complete freedom. Following the direction opened by Cieszkowski, Hess introduced socialism, thereby greatly supplementing the philosophy of praxis with the material side that Cieszkowski lacked. Some researchers remind us that the tone of Cieszkowski’s work is optimistic, while Hess’s is one of thirst, [22]22 See Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 126. because Cieszkowski’s eyes were fixed only on the future, full of confidence in the rationality of history, the logic of the organism, and the beautiful end, whereas Hess’s gaze was directed at reality, anxious and uneasy about the conflicts, enslavement, and suffering encountered by people in the present moment. It is precisely Hess’s thirst that gives the philosophy of praxis greater force. And as the first socialist among German philosophers, he infused socialism with logic and direction. He pointed out that the ultimate goal of socialism is freedom, not material equality. Only by taking the evolutionary logic and developmental stages of freedom (absolute spirit) as displayed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a reference can socialism escape the “natural stage” and avoid becoming merely the “opposite” of capitalism. Thus, the philosophy of praxis initiated the “scientification” of socialism. While listing Hess’s above achievements, we cannot ignore the questions he left for his successors: What exactly is the relationship between the material and the spirit? Without clarifying this, practice as the synthesis of the two cannot be discussed. If private property is, as Hess claims, purely a kind of sin and suffering, then how did it arise? And, more importantly, where does one begin to eliminate private property, and how is it possible? If love and education alone suffice, then these two things have always existed—why have they been unable to curb the growth of private property?

在与施泰因(Lorenz von Stein)的论战(《社会主义和共产主义》)中，赫斯明确区分了社会主义和共产主义，它认可施泰因对共产主义粗鄙一面的批评，继而用斯宾诺莎所开启的德国精神哲学来为之补充，这可谓是建立“科学社会主义”的第一次尝试。既然当前法国和德国的革命都只代表着自由的一个侧面，那么社会主义作为这二者的综合，就意味着“唯一而完全的自由”,这最后的自由包含物质和精神上的无限性，也即同时摆脱贫困和宗教，而法国和德国都只追求其中一点而欠缺另一点。赫斯宣告，能够打通物质与精神的，能够实现唯一而完全的自由的，唯有实践。沿着切什考夫斯基所开启的方向，赫斯引入了社会主义，从而为实践哲学大大增补了切什考夫斯基所缺乏的物质的一面。有研究者提醒我们，切什考夫斯基著作的基调是乐观主义，而赫斯的则是焦渴,因为切什考夫斯基的眼里只有未来，他对历史的理性、有机体的逻辑和美好的终结充满信心，而赫斯目光投向的是现实，他为历史当下的人们所遭遇的冲突、奴役、苦难而焦虑不安。正是赫斯的焦渴，使得实践哲学更具力量。而作为德国哲学家中第一个社会主义者，他为社会主义注入了逻辑和方向，他指明了社会主义的最终目标是自由，而非物质层面的平等，只有以精神现象学所展示的自由(绝对精神)的演进逻辑和发展环节为参照，社会主义才能摆脱“自然阶段”而不至于仅仅成为资本主义的“反面”,由此实践哲学开启了社会主义的“科学化”。在罗列赫斯的上述功绩时，同样不能忽略他留给后继者的问题：物质与精神究竟是什么关系?不澄清这一点，实践作为这二者的综合就无从谈起。如果私有制真如赫斯所言纯粹只是一种罪恶和受难，那它何以发生?以及更重要的，消除私有制从何着手，如何可能?如果是靠爱和教育就可以的话，那这两件事情一直存在，何以无法遏制私有制的壮大?

III. What Does It Mean for “Materialism” to Replace “Philosophy”?

三、“唯物主义”取代“哲学”意味着什么?

Marx never directly discussed Cieszkowski and Hess in his publicly published or prepared-for-publication writings. In the case of the former, this may have been out of aversion; in the case of the latter, it was likely out of respect—Hess was always a socialist activist, a member of both the Communist League and the First International alongside Marx. As Mehring evaluated, during the revolutionary period that “might have been subject to a death sentence,” Hess was “clear of conscience.” [23]23 Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx: The Story of His Life*, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936), p. 107. Marx’s criticism of the “true socialists” cannot be directly transferred to Hess. However, emotional factors and moral evaluations cannot replace theoretical critique. Just as their contribution to the foundation of Marxism is objective, Marx’s critical transcendence of them is equally objective. Returning to the theme of this article: philosophy of history and philosophy of praxis. Through Cieszkowski and Hess, we have already clarified that the philosophy of history and the philosophy of praxis are one, the key being to open history to the future through practice. Yet, in Marx, an interesting phenomenon appears: both history and practice are given a direction: materialism. Marx’s doctrine is named “historical materialism,” while he himself interprets communism as “practical materialism.” The connotations of these two terms are essentially consistent. We must ask: What does it mean for “materialism” to replace “philosophy”? This question can be transformed into two negative questions: (1) What are the shortcomings of the philosophy of history? (2) What does the philosophy of praxis still lack?

马克思从来没有在公开出版或准备公开出版的文献中直接谈论切什考夫斯基和赫斯，对于前者，可能是出于厌恶，对于后者，很有可能是出于敬重——赫斯一直是社会主义的活动家，和马克思一样既是共产主义者同盟又是第一国际的成员，如梅林的评价，在可能“受到死亡宣告的革命期间”,赫斯是“问心无愧的”;马克思对“真正的社会主义者”的批评不能直接转嫁给赫斯。但是，情感因素和道德评价不能代替理论批判。正如他们对马克思主义的奠基是客观的，马克思主义对他们的批判超越同样是客观的。回到本文的主题：历史哲学和实践哲学。通过切什考夫斯基和赫斯，我们已然明确，历史哲学与实践哲学是一体的，其中的关键是通过实践让历史向未来开放。然而，在马克思这里一个有趣的现象出现了，历史和实践都被赋予了一个指向：唯物主义。马克思的学说被命名为“历史唯物主义”,而他自己则将共产主义阐释为“实践的唯物主义”,这两个术语的内涵是基本一致的。必须追问的是：用“唯物主义”取代“哲学”意味着什么?这个问题又可以转化为两个否定性的问题：(1)历史哲学的弊端是什么?(2)实践哲学还欠缺什么?

(1) The Philosophy of History: Within the “Mystical Shell” of the Concept

(一)历史哲学：在观念的“神秘外壳”之内

Several years after completing *Capital*, Marx issued a concluding statement on his attitude toward Hegel: Hegel’s dialectic must be inverted, “in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.” The so-called rational kernel is the understanding of existing things as a continuous movement toward inevitable demise—a position accepted from Cieszkowski onward by the entire Young Hegelian school, and the core claim distinguishing them from the orthodox. The so-called mystical shell is the treatment of the thinking process as an independent subject, as the “creator of the real world.” Later Engels gave a more direct explanation of the “mystical shell,” calling Hegel “a man who, in the final analysis, acknowledges some kind of creation,” because “this absolute idea has existed from eternity, independently of the world and somewhere or other before the world.” It was precisely because they could not shake off the mystical shell that Cieszkowski and Hess ultimately remained only radical Hegelians. As Nicholas Lobkowicz assessed, their alteration of Hegelianism was “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary.” Merely from the titles of their works—“Historical Philosophy” and “The Sacred History of Mankind,” the former’s final chapter being “The Teleology of World History” and the latter’s final section being “The New Jerusalem and the Final Age”—one can see that the history they wrote about was governed by some abstract and mystical absolute outside history itself, an absolute that pre-exists history (the world) and pre-sets the trajectory and purpose of history.

马克思在完成《资本论》数年后就他对黑格尔的态度有一个总结性的声明：必须把黑格尔的辩证法倒过来，“以便发现神秘外壳中的合理方法”。所谓合理方法，是把现存事物理解为必然灭亡的持续运动，这是从切什考夫斯基起直至整个青年黑格尔派都接受的立场，也是他们区别于正统派的核心主张；所谓神秘外壳，则是把思维过程看成是一个独立主体，看成是“现实事物的造物主”。后来恩格斯对“神秘外壳”做了更直接的说明，他把黑格尔称为“归根到底承认某种创世说的人”,因为“这个绝对观念是从来就存在的，是不依赖于世界并且先于世界而在某处存在的。”正是由于无法摆脱神秘外壳，切什考夫斯基和赫斯终究只能是黑格尔主义的激进派，如洛布克维奇(Nicholas Lobkowicz)所评价的那样，他们对黑格尔主义的改变是“推进式的”(evolutionary)而非“颠覆性的”(revolutionary)。仅从他们著作的名字——“历史哲学”和“圣史”,前者最后一章名为“世界历史目的论”,后者最后一章最后一节名为“新的耶路撒冷与最后的时代”——就可以看出，他们笔下的历史被历史之外的某个抽象而神秘的绝对者所主宰，绝对者先于历史(世界)而预先设定了历史的轨道和目的。

Consider Cieszkowski first. Cieszkowski said: “Just as all things in the world must submit to history, so history, in its corresponding order, submits only to God… God is therefore the judge of world history.” In his view, the truest and most important elements in history are spiritual factors such as “religion, language, art, science, law.” The task he set for historical philosophy was to integrate the development of these spiritual factors into the historical organism. Readers familiar with Marx will know that among the historical elements Cieszkowski lists, there is no “matter”; they are all, without exception, ideology. Ideology “has no history”; it can only change with changes in the material mode of production that serves as its foundation. Cieszkowski had already realized that for history to advance into the future, a “philosophical” breakthrough was necessary—that is, a “positive breakthrough of the viewpoint itself.” But how is a breakthrough of viewpoint possible? At this point, referring to Marx’s critique of Proudhon, Cieszkowski’s problem becomes very clear: “Men who produce social relations in accordance with their material productivity also produce ideas and categories.” That is, only when people’s actual historical life achieves a breakthrough can ideas, or historical philosophy, achieve a breakthrough.

先看切什考夫斯基。切什考夫斯基说：“正如世界万物都必须服从于历史一样，历史按照相应的次序只服从于上帝……上帝因此就是世界历史的法官。”在他看来，历史中最真实和最重要的元素是“宗教、语言、艺术、科学、法律”等精神因素，他为历史哲学所设定的任务就是，把这些精神因素的发展整合进历史有机体。熟悉马克思的读者都知道，切什考夫斯基列举的历史元素中没有“物质”,而无一例外都是意识形态。意识形态“没有历史”,它们只能随作为它们基础的物质生产方式的变革而变革。切什考夫斯基已经意识到了，历史要向未来前进，必须要有“哲学”的突破，也就是“观点本身的积极突破”,可观点的突破如何可能?这时参考马克思对蒲鲁东的批评，切什考夫斯基的问题就变得十分清晰了，“适应自己的物质生产水平而生产出社会关系的人，也生产出各种观念、范畴。”也就是说，只有人们真实的历史生活有所突破，观念或曰历史哲学才能有所突破。

Consider Hess next. Hess shifted the focus of historical philosophy to the modern era, thereby opening up a dimension of modern/real critique. By means of socialism, he further concentrated modern critique on private property—this is where Hess was more advanced than Cieszkowski. However, due to his deeply rooted Jewish religious stance, he never transcended a “V”-shaped view of history: Garden of Eden—Way of Suffering—Jerusalem. This historical narrative is the simplest logic of alienation. In *The Sacred History of Mankind*, Hess once described the future in the same brushstrokes he used for the Garden of Eden, but he soon corrected himself. Later he took subjective spirit as the cornerstone of his historical philosophy and introduced Feuerbach’s philosophy of species-being. Thus the evolution of historical reason was transformed into the realization of man’s free nature; eschatology was transformed into a theory of human nature. But the structure of dualism and teleology did not change—the opposition between “Way of Suffering—Jerusalem” merely became the opposition between “animal/non-human—human.” In *The Communist Catechism*—a work fortunately superseded by the *Communist Manifesto* and never adopted as the program of the Communist League—Hess repeatedly spoke of human nature, for example: freedom is “to live and act according to one’s own nature, to be able to express one’s essence in action without hindrance”; “a society organized according to the laws of human nature is a living organism,” and so on. This unconditional expectation of a perfect and beautiful human nature is, in the final analysis, still a dualistic narrative of “man—God” and “this shore—the other shore.” Hess never explained: why must the end of the Way of Suffering necessarily be Jerusalem? Why would private property, which has the powerful capacity to create profound suffering, be replaced out of thin air by human nature? Why is the upward-turning right half of the “V” destined to occur? Marx once mocked the style of German philosophers, who believed that “the ignorant, mundane world only needs to open its mouth for the roast pigeon of absolute science to fall right in.” This mockery inadvertently hit Hess as well. Marx himself certainly went through a stage of talking at length about alienation. But it must be noted that when he said communism is the sublation of alienation, the return of human nature, and the solution to the riddle of history, he did not forget to emphasize: “the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of private property—that is, in the economic movement.” To understand the movement of history starting from the economic movement—this is the materialist domain that Hess, and Cieszkowski as well, never entered.

再看赫斯。赫斯把历史哲学的重心转移到现代，从而开启了现代/现实批判的维度，他借助社会主义又把现代批判的焦点集中在私有制上，这是赫斯比切什考夫斯基进步的地方。但是由于他根深蒂固的犹太教立场，他始终没有超脱“V”字型的历史观：伊甸园—受难之路—耶路撒冷，这一历史叙事是最简单的异化逻辑。在《人类的圣史》中，赫斯曾以描述伊甸园的笔触来描述未来，但很快被他自己修正了。后来他把主观精神当作他历史哲学的基石，并且引入了费尔巴哈的类哲学，于是历史理性的演化转化为人的自由本性的实现，末世论转变为人性论，但二元论与目的论的结构没有变，无非是“受难之路—耶路撒冷”之间的对立变为“动物/非人—人”之间的对立。在《共产主义信条问答》中——这篇著作幸而被《共产党宣言》所取代，没有成为共产主义者同盟的纲领——赫斯一再述说着人性，比如：自由就是“按照自己的本性去生活和活动，可以毫无阻碍地在行动中表现自己的本质”;“人类按照人类本性的法则组织起来，这样的社会就是一个生机勃勃的机体”,等等。对完满美好的人性的无条件期待，说到底还是“人—神”“此岸—彼岸”的二元叙事。赫斯未曾解释：为什么受难之路的终点就必然会是耶路撒冷?为什么有强大能力制造深重苦难的私有制就会凭空被人性所代替?为什么“V”字中转折向上的右半边就注定会发生?马克思曾嘲讽德国哲学家的做派，他们相信“愚昧的凡俗世界只需张开嘴等着绝对科学这只烤乳鸽掉进来就得了”,这个嘲讽无意间也命中了赫斯。马克思自己当然也经历过一个大谈特谈异化的阶段，但是必须注意到的是，当他说共产主义是异化的扬弃、人性的复归、历史之谜的解答时，他不忘强调，“整个革命运动必然在私有财产的运动中，即在经济的运动中，为自己既找到经验的基础，也找到理论的基础。”从经济的运动出发来理解历史的运动，这是赫斯也包括切什考夫斯基从来没有进入的唯物主义领域。

(II) Philosophy of Praxis: Outside Real Social Existence

(二)实践哲学：在现实的社会存在之外

Marx’s new worldview is founded on the practical declaration that “the point is to change the world.” Yet changing the world was not Marx’s original invention; after all, Cieszkowski and Hess had already issued the same call. Through the explanation in *The German Ideology* that “for the practical materialist, i.e., the communist, the whole question is to revolutionize the existing world, practically to oppose and change existing things,” the novelty of Marx’s practical declaration in distinction from his predecessors becomes clear: the point is how to understand the existing world and “practically” change it.

马克思的新世界观奠基于“问题在于改变世界”的实践宣告，可改变世界并非马克思的原创，毕竟切什考夫斯基和赫斯都已经发出了同样的呼吁。通过《德意志意识形态》中“对实践的唯物主义者即共产主义者来说，全部问题都在于使现存世界革命化，实际地反对并改变现存的事物”的说明，马克思实践宣告之区别前人的新意才得以明确，即问题在于如何理解现存世界并“实际地”改变之。

Cieszkowski’s exposition of practical philosophy is that “now, the normal influence of philosophy on human social relations is about to begin, to the extent that absolute objective truth can develop not only in pure passivity but also in self-created actuality,” so the task of the practical philosopher is “to grasp the desire to construct social institutions and to construct a transcendental society.” Cieszkowski never entered the existing world; he mentioned social relations but knew nothing of their internal structure, whether political relations or the more fundamental economic relations. When he defined practice from the level of absolute truth, i.e., philosophy, the task of practice could only be to construct society transcendentally. His historical teleology determined that his practice could only become intellectualized. When Marx ridiculed “the Germans… who have never provided a secular basis for history and therefore have never possessed a historian,” these Germans undoubtedly included the non-German “German philosopher” Cieszkowski. In contrast, France and England provided the materialist basis for historiography, namely “the history of civil society, the history of commerce, and the history of industry,” etc., [26]26 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 38. The passage is from the section criticizing German ideology for lacking a materialist basis for history. which laid the foundation for what Marx called “historical science.” Only by understanding the secular basis of history can one understand the connotation of practical materialism, i.e., planning the reconstruction of society in the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse of people. Moreover, only in the practical action of creating a future society can people obtain knowledge of the future; humanity’s identity as historical practitioners precedes its identity as historical philosophers. The ensuing question is: who is to reconstruct society? Because Cieszkowski’s practical philosophy lacked a social basis, as commentators have noted, he “did not envisage a putative historical subject capable of implementing his radical changes, and thus ultimately could not form a theory of social action.” [27]27 This is a paraphrase of a critical observation by a commentator on Cieszkowski’s failure to identify a historical agent for social transformation. Based on intense national sentiment, he placed his hopes in his homeland Poland and the Slavic nations, but this hope, lacking any real foundation, could only degenerate into utopianism and disappointment. In contrast, the proletariat in whom Marx placed his hopes was a conclusion drawn from the analysis of historical science. The proletariat is shaped by modern industry, commerce, and property relations; it matures within the womb of capitalism, and its struggle can promote rather than destroy social productive forces. With this scientific explanation, practice is infused with material force.

切什考夫斯基对实践哲学的阐述是“现在，哲学对人类社会关系的正常影响即将拉开帷幕，以至于绝对客观真理不仅可在纯粹的被动性中发展，而且也可以在自我创造的现实性中发展”,所以实践哲学家的任务是“抓住建构社会制度和构造先验社会的渴望”。切什考夫斯基从没有进入过现存世界，他提到了社会关系，但对其内部结构，无论是政治关系还是更为基础的经济关系都一无所知，当他从绝对真理，也就是哲学的层面来定义实践时，实践的任务就只能是先验地构造社会。他的历史目的论决定了他的实践只能知识化。当马克思嘲笑“德国人……从来没有为历史提供世俗基础，因而也从未拥有过一个历史学家”时，这些德国人中无疑也包括了非德国的“德国哲学家”切什考夫斯基，与之相反，法国和英国为历史编纂学提供了唯物主义基础，那就是“市民社会史、商业史和工业史”等等,后者奠定了马克思所说的“历史科学”的内涵。理解了历史的世俗基础，才能理解实践的唯物主义的内涵，也就是在生产力的普遍发展和人们的世界交往中谋划社会的重建，而且，只有在创造未来社会的实践行动中，人们才能获得对未来的认知，人类作为历史实践者的身份先于作为历史哲学家的身份。随之而来的问题是，谁来重建社会?由于切什考夫斯基的实践哲学没有社会基础，所以如评论者所言，他“没有设想一种能够实施他的激进变革的拟设的历史主体，因而终究不可能形成一种社会行动理论”,他基于浓烈的民族情感而寄望于他的祖国波兰和斯拉夫民族，但这种没有现实依据的寄望只能沦为空想和失望。与之相反，马克思所寄望的无产阶级则是基于历史科学的分析而得出的结论。无产阶级由现代的工业、商业、财产关系所塑造，他们成熟于资本主义的胎胞中，他们的斗争可以促进而非摧毁社会生产力，有了这些科学的说明，实践才被灌注了物质力量。

Hess went much further than Cieszkowski. His practical philosophy already contained many social factors: he criticized the state and human rights; he discussed money, intercourse, and social antagonism; his future vision of synthesizing the German, French, and English “European triumvirate” provided the basis for Marx’s later unification of idealist philosophy, socialism, and political economy. According to Robert Tucker, Hess had already realized that “the critique of political economy is the next step on the philosophical agenda.” [28]28 Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 111. Tucker argues that Hess anticipated the need for a critique of political economy within the philosophical project. This plan even propelled Engels toward Marxism from “another road.” [29]29 Engels’s “another road” refers to his independent path to communism via the study of political economy in England, as distinct from Marx’s philosophical route. That is to say, Hess was already extremely close to Marxism, yet he stopped at the threshold of stepping into materialist practical theory. Take Hess’s most accomplished work, *On the Essence of Money*, which has been unanimously praised by all commentators and widely recognized as having a direct influence on Marx during his Paris period. In it, Hess had already advanced to: (1) people’s “real life consists only in the exchange of their productive life activities, only in common activity, only in connection with the entire social body,” so to understand human practice, one must understand society; (2) “the social world… has a natural history, has its origin, has its history of creation,” so to understand society, one must enter into the history of society; (3) the modern commercial world in which we live is “the apex of the social animal world,” and the essence of this world is money, so to understand the present age, one must understand money. Where Hess stopped, Marx correspondingly advanced: (1) so-called society is the sum total of people’s relations of intercourse, and relations of intercourse are generated in civil society, so to understand society, one must examine civil society, i.e., people’s economic life; (2) the key to economic life lies in the mode of production, so to understand the history of society, one must concretely examine the formation and evolution of the division of labor, industrial technology, trade markets, and property systems, and how they promoted changes in law and politics; (3) the reason money causes the various evils Hess denounced is that it has metamorphosed into capital, so to understand the “essence of money,” one must understand what capital does, and thus must enter into the critique of political economy. These three advances of Marx were precisely the focus of his work from 1844 to 1846, and they continued throughout his entire subsequent academic career. These three years were also the process of Marx and Hess moving from proximity to parting ways, until they each reached scientific socialism and Zionism on their respective paths. From the perspective of the divergence between practical philosophy and practical materialism, their separation was already predetermined. Hess never truly entered social history, so the egoistic bourgeois modern world appeared to him as entirely evil, and his practice was “to retreat from that world and enter the sphere of sound, free life.” [30]30 Moses Hess, *On the Essence of Money*, in *The Holy Family* (1845), where Hess contrasts the corrupt commercial world with a future realm of free, cooperative life. Marx, on the contrary, saw from the history of real life that the generation and sublation of alienation travel the same road; only by moving forward from the modern world can liberation be attained. For Hess, the practical subject capable of bearing the historical mission was the Jews, while the Jews and Marx’s “workers” shared only superficial features such as extreme poverty, suffering, anger, exclusion, or sympathy, but lacked the class attributes crystallized from the concrete structure of civil society through the power of abstraction. When Marx defined communism as the real movement of the proletariat abolishing the existing state of affairs, he particularly emphasized: “the conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” [31]31 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 49. This is Marx’s formulation of communism as a real movement based on existing material conditions. Only by understanding this premise as material activity does practical philosophy transform into practical materialism, does the scientization of communism be declared complete, and does practical philosophy thereby receive a new name: the theory of proletarian revolution. (Author affiliation: Sun Yat-sen University)

赫斯比切什考夫斯基走得远得多，他的实践哲学已然具有了诸多社会因素，他批判国家和人权，他探讨货币、交往和社会对抗，他的综合德法英“欧洲三头政治”的未来构想为马克思后来统一观念论哲学、社会主义、政治经济学提供了基础。按照罗伯特·塔克的说法，赫斯已经意识到“政治经济学的批判就是哲学日程中的下一步工作”,这项谋划甚至推动恩格斯从“另一条道路”通向马克思主义。也就是说，赫斯离马克思主义已经无比接近了，可他却止步于踏进唯物主义实践论的路口上。就从赫斯最有建树的《论货币的本质》来看，这篇文章受到所有评论者的一致赞誉，且被广泛认定对巴黎时期的马克思有直接影响。在其中，赫斯已经推进到：(1)人们的“现实生活只是在于他们的生产性的生命活动的交换，只是在于共同活动，只是在于同整个社会身体的联系”,所以，要理解人的实践就要理解社会；(2)“社会的世界……有自然史、有其起源、有其创造史”,所以，要理解社会就要进入社会的历史；(3)我们置身其中的现代商业世界乃是“社会动物世界的顶点”,这个世界的本质是货币，因此，要理解当代就要理解货币。在赫斯止步之处，马克思相应的推进是：(1)所谓社会就是人们交往关系的总和，而交往关系是在市民社会中生成的，所以理解社会就要考察市民社会，也就是人们的经济生活；(2)经济生活的关键在于生产方式，因此理解社会的历史，就要具体考察分工、工业技术、贸易市场、财产制度的形成和演变，以及它们如何促成了法和政治的变革；(3)货币之所以会造成赫斯所控诉的种种罪恶，是因为它羽化为资本，因此要理解“货币的本质”,必须理解资本何为，也就必须要进入政治经济学批判。马克思的三项推进正是他在1844年至1846年间的工作重点，并延续到他后来整个学术生涯，这三年也是马克思与赫斯从走近到分道扬镳的过程，直至他们在各自道路上通达科学社会主义和犹太复国主义。从实践哲学与实践唯物主义的分野看，他们的分离早已注定。赫斯没有真正进入社会史，所以利己主义的资产阶级现代世界在他看来全然是一种罪恶，他的实践便是“从那个世界退却出来而进入健全的自由的生活领域”,马克思则相反，他从现实生活的历史中看到的是，异化的产生与扬弃走在同一条道路上，只有从现代世界中向前进才能获得解放。在赫斯那里，能承载历史使命的实践主体是犹太人，而犹太人与马克思的“工人”只是分享了赤贫、苦难、愤怒、被排斥或被同情等这些表面的特征，却不具备依靠抽象力从市民社会的具体结构中结晶出来的阶级属性。当马克思将共产主义定义为无产阶级消灭现存状况的现实的运动时，他特别强调：“这个运动的条件是由现有的前提产生的”。只有理解了这个作为物质活动的前提，实践哲学才转变为实践唯物主义，共产主义的科学化才宣告完成，实践哲学也由此获得了新的命名：无产阶级革命理论。（作者单位：中山大学）

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