On Brudney’s Normative Interpretation of the Young Marx’s Problem of Alienation

Marx’s concept of alienation inherits Hegel’s concepts of self-consciousness and labor, taking the negation of the negation as the expression of history. Traditional interpretations also, from the standpoint of historical materialism, regard the transformation of the mode of production as the fundamental path for sublating alienation. Daniel Brudney does not deny the traditional interpretation, but at the same time holds that the degree to which alienation is sublated should be taken, at the normative level, as the standard for measuring the degree of justice in a given society. Brudney introduces justification in the hope of discerning that people living under capitalist conditions likewise possess the possibility of moving toward the good life. As a leading student of Rawls, Brudney introduces a Rawlsian scheme of justification, taking reflective equilibrium as “an acceptable mode of justification.” This scheme begins with a reordering of the four determinations of alienated labor set forth in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereafter “the *Manuscripts*”), positing alienation as a logical rupture in the “mutual fulfillment” link of the conception of the human being as “concern,” and then introduces reflective equilibrium, striving within a constructive dynamic structure of justification to continuously endow the conception of the human being as “concern” with acceptability in capitalist society. In this respect, the scheme is cognitive rather than practical.

马克思的异化概念上承黑格尔的自我意识及劳动概念，把否定之否定作为历史的表达。传统解读也多从历史唯物主义立场把生产方式的变革视为扬弃异化的根本路径。布鲁德尼(Daniel Brudney)并不否认传统解读，但同时认为应当在规范性层面将对异化的扬弃程度视为衡量当下社会之正义程度的标准。布鲁德尼引入证成即希望辨明生活在资本主义条件下的人同样具备走向良善生活的可能。作为罗尔斯的高足，布鲁德尼引入罗尔斯式证成方案，把反思平衡视为“一种可接受的证成方式”。该方案始于对《1844年经济学哲学手稿》(以下简称“《手稿》”)所阐述的异化劳动四重规定的次序调整，将异化设定为作为“关切”的人的观念在“相互成全”环节上的逻辑断裂，进而引入反思平衡，力图在建构性的动态证成结构中不断赋予作为“关切”的人的观念在资本主义社会中的可接受性。就此而言，该方案是认知性而非实践性的。

Objectively speaking, although Marx’s ambiguous attitude toward normative questions makes this interpretation possible, it does not necessarily conform to Marx’s own position, and Brudney’s excessive leaning toward Rawls also exposes this interpretation to much criticism. This article holds that Brudney’s normative interpretation of the problem of alienation will inevitably lead to a selective “filtering” of Marx’s thought, but criticism of this scheme should not stop at the negation of external conditions; rather, it should penetrate into the justification itself. Since Brudney’s interpretation of the young Marx’s problem of alienation is based on a Rawlsian position of justification, Rawls’s constructivist conception of justification should be taken as a reference point for evaluating its justificatory effect. This article seeks to show that Brudney’s interpretation is invalid at certain key junctures, especially that the reflective equilibrium he introduces cannot bring the justification to the desired effect of dynamic reasoning, thereby demonstrating that reflective equilibrium is not a self-sufficient method of justification; only within a more holistic justificatory structure can a thorough reflection and weighing of the conception of the human being be achieved, and Brudney’s scheme precisely lacks these necessary elements. The conception of the human being as “concern” does not come from empirical distillation but is tinged with too much metaphysical color, which leads Brudney, although intending to introduce reflective equilibrium to bring justification closer to Rawls, in fact to move toward the foundationalism that Rawls opposes. Below, this article will begin with Brudney’s logical reconstruction of the four determinations of alienated labor in the *Manuscripts*.

客观地看，虽然马克思对规范性问题的模糊态度使这一解读成为可能，但该解读未必符合马克思本人的立场，布鲁德尼对罗尔斯的过多靠拢也使该解读面临诸多批评。本文认为，布鲁德尼对异化问题的规范性解读定然会导致对马克思思想有选择的“过滤”，但对该方案的批评不应停留在对外部条件的否定，而是应当深入其证成本身。既然布鲁德尼对青年马克思异化问题的解读是基于罗尔斯式证成立场，就应当把罗尔斯的建构主义证成理念作为参照物来评析其证成效果。本文力图表明，布鲁德尼的解读在某些关键环节上是无效的，尤其是其引入的反思平衡无法使证成达到应有的动态推理效果，进而表明：反思平衡并非自足的证成方法，必须在更为整体性的证成结构中才能对人的观念提供较为彻底的反思和权衡，布鲁德尼的方案则恰恰缺少这些必要元素；作为“关切”的人的观念并非来自经验的提炼，而是沾染过多形而上色彩，这就导致布鲁德尼虽然意在引入反思平衡来使证成向罗尔斯靠拢，但实则走向罗尔斯所反对的基础主义。下面，本文将从布鲁德尼对《手稿》中异化劳动四重规定的逻辑重构切入。

I. The Four Determinations of Alienated Labor and Their Reconstruction

一、异化劳动的四重规定及重构

Brudney’s interpretation of the problem of alienation originates from the classic exposition of the four determinations of alienated labor in the *Manuscripts*. His interpretation affirms the specific content of the four determinations but adjusts their form, that is, their order of arrangement.

布鲁德尼对异化问题的解读源自《手稿》对异化劳动四重规定的经典论述，其解读认同四重规定的具体内容，但对其形式，也就是其排列次序进行了调整。

In the *Manuscripts*, Marx treats the four determinations of alienated labor as a sequential conceptual system, namely: link a: the alienation of the worker from the product of his labor; link b: the alienation of the worker from the activity of labor; link c: the alienation of the worker from his species-being; and link d: the alienation of the worker from other human beings and their products. Although the *Manuscripts* does not strictly prescribe this ordering, there is objectively a certain progressive relationship.

在《手稿》中，马克思把异化劳动的四重规定视为一个前后相续的概念体系，即环节a：劳动者与劳动产品的异化；环节b：劳动者与劳动活动的异化；环节c：劳动者与类本质的异化，以及环节d：劳动者与他人及其产品异化。对此排序，《手稿》虽未做出严格规定，但客观存在某种递进关系。

Marx elaborates links a and b mainly on the basis of “the current economic facts,” i.e., the proportional relationship between the worker’s poverty and his production. First, the worker’s labor is objectified into a product, but in capitalist society, the product that the worker creates through his own labor and which ought to belong to him becomes, in reality, an alien being; the objectification of labor manifests as the alienness of the product. Second, “alienation is manifested not only in the result… (but also) in the activity of production itself.” Under capitalist conditions, labor, which ought to be intrinsic to the human being, becomes external to the human being. Labor becomes merely a means for the worker to satisfy needs other than labor itself.

马克思主要基于“当前的经济事实”即工人的贫困程度与其生产之间的正比关系来阐述环节a和环节b。首先，工人的劳动被对象化为产品，但在资本主义社会中，工人通过自身劳动创造的本该属于自己的产品却在现实中成为一种异己的存在物，劳动的对象化表现为产品的异己性。其次，“异化不仅表现在结果上……(还)表现在生产活动本身中”。资本主义条件下，本该内在于人的劳动却变得外在于人。劳动成为不过是工人满足除劳动之外的其他需求的手段。

On the basis of the first two links, Marx proposes link c, the alienation of the human being from his species-being. Regarding species-being, Marx makes two points: 1. The human being is a universal natural being and, through interaction with the inorganic world, becomes a part of nature; 2. The human being, in theory and in practice, regards himself and his objects as a dual existence, both as an individual and as a member of the species, and consciously engages in free, conscious labor activity that transforms the world. With respect to this species-being, on the one hand, alienated labor causes the product of labor, as humanized nature, to be expropriated, alienating the human being from nature. Since the human being is a part of nature, he necessarily opposes himself. On the other hand, the individual’s life activity, as species-life, no longer belongs to him but becomes a force opposed to him, setting species-life against individual life, and degrading labor and species-life from ends to means. As a result of the first three links, Marx points out that the fourth link of alienated labor is the alienation of the human being from other workers. But at least in the *Manuscripts*, Marx does not elaborate on this, merely passing over it in a few words. The discussion of the alienation of intercourse in the *Comments on James Mill* is, to a large extent, a response to the ambiguity here.

基于前两个环节，马克思提出环节c，人与类本质的异化。关于类本质，马克思有两点论述：1.人是一种普遍的自然存在物，并通过与无机界的互动成为自然界的一部分；2.人在理论和实践上都将自身及其对象视为既作为个体又作为类成员的二重性存在物，并且有意识地进行改造世界的自由自觉的劳动活动。就此类本质而言，一方面，异化劳动使作为人化自然的劳动产品被掠夺，人与自然界相异化。由于人是自然的一部分，人必然与其自身相对立；另一方面，作为类生活的个体生命活动不再属于自身，而是成为它的反对力量，使得类生活与个体生活对立，劳动和类生活就此从目的降为手段。作为前三个环节的结果，马克思指出，异化劳动的第四个环节是人与其他劳动者相异化。但至少在《手稿》中，马克思并未对此做出详述，而是一笔带过。《穆勒评注》对交往异化的论述很大程度上就是对此处之模糊性的回应。

Brudney obviously affirms the specific content of the above four determinations, but holds that granting priority to link a not only fails to explain the coherence among the four links of alienation but also “downgrades” Marx’s political economy based on commodity economy. In his view, the so-called “product that the worker creates through his own labor and which ought to belong to him becomes, in reality, an alien being” in link a implies that the worker lacks sufficient control over his labor product, which implies a Lockean self-ownership: the worker, as an individual, possesses his own body and therefore ought to possess the products created by his body. This, at a minimum, would face two problems:

布鲁德尼显然认同上述四重规定的具体内容，但认为在次序上赋予环节a以优先性不但无法解释异化四个环节之间的融贯性，也会使马克思基于商品经济的政治经济学说有所“降格”。在他看来，环节a中所谓的“本该属于自己的产品却在现实中成为一种异己的存在物”意味着工人与其劳动产品之间缺乏足够的控制与被控制关系，这就暗含一种洛克式自我所有权：工人作为个体拥有自己的身体，继而应当拥有自己的身体所创造出的产品。这样一来，至少会面临两个问题：

First, Lockean ownership does not conform to Marx’s classic exposition of the form of modern industry. In a modern economic society, “very few workers use the products they produce.” The direct purpose of modern workers’ material production is to exchange use-values for value, not to directly use or control their products. Moreover, even if modern workers could claim some kind of ownership over collective products, this ownership would only be abstract, not concrete, actual ownership.

第一，洛克式所有权与马克思对现代工业形态的经典论述不符。在现代经济社会中，“只有很少的工人会使用他们所生产的产品”。现代工人进行物质生产的直接目的是用使用价值来换取价值，而非直接使用或控制其产品。另外，现代工人即便有权利声称对集体产品的某种所有权，这种所有权也只是抽象的，而非具体的实际所有权。

Second, and more importantly, granting priority to link a cannot adequately explain link d. “One can conceive of a person being alienated from the product produced by another… but between these two workers, it might not lead to an alienated relationship, but rather to sympathy and solidarity.”

第二，更重要的是，赋予环节a以优先性无法对环节d做出充分解释。“一个人可以被设想为与他人所生产的产品相异化……但在这两个劳动者之间，或许不会导致异化关系，而是同情和团结。”

From this perspective, taking link a as the starting point may not only cause a certain rupture among the four links but also trigger an unnecessary justificatory burden; this may also be an important reason why the *Manuscripts*, although it has an ordering, does not strictly prescribe its sequence. Accordingly, Brudney reconstructs the above ordering from a normative standpoint, respectively: a′, alienation from the activity of labor; b′, alienation from the product of labor; c′, alienation from other human beings and their products; and d′, alienation from species-being. The reordering of these four links is no longer loose but has a strict sequential prescription.

由此看来，把环节a作为起点不但可能使四个环节存在某种程度的断裂，还可能引发不必要的证成负担，这可能也是《手稿》虽有排序，但并未对其次序进行严格规定的重要原因。据此，布鲁德尼从规范性立场对上述排序进行重构，分别是a′，与劳动活动的异化；b′，与劳动产品的异化；c′，与他人及其产品的异化；和d′，与类本质的异化。对这四个环节的重新次序不再是松散的，而是有着严格的次序规定。

First, if from a normative standpoint one places a′ first, predefining the proper form of labor and explaining the four moments of alienation on the basis of “relation,” then all moments can be given a more coherent explanation. In capitalist society, workers can control neither the content and form of their product nor the labor activity itself. For them, labor is entirely imposed; apart from earning money, it can constitute no sense of meaning for the worker, and naturally it cannot constitute “the first need of life” that transcends a mere means of subsistence. Moreover, since it can be determined that labor in capitalist society is the result of alienation, one must stipulate the normative standard of labor as “the first need of life.” Although the *Manuscripts* do not clearly articulate this standard, the *Comments on Mill* explicitly places it within the logical chain of “production—use” (“labor—product”): “This activity is not merely an activity of making an object, but an activity of providing a product for others to use.” Understood in this way, if the worker in the process of production possesses the intention of producing “for” others, and gains a sense of meaning from others’ satisfaction, then the worker can obtain sufficient control within this reciprocal relationship. If this sense of control is real, it can also reasonably explain the human relationship to labor activity and thereby overcome alienation at this level.

首先，如果基于规范性立场把a′放在首位，先行对恰当的劳动形式做出规定，并以“关系”为基点来解释异化的四个环节，所有环节都能得到更融贯的解释。资本主义社会中的工人既无法控制其产品的内容和形式，也无法控制劳动活动本身。对他们来说，劳动完全是被强加的，除了赚钱之外，无法对工人构成任何意义感，自然也无法构成超越谋生手段的“生活的第一需要”。另外，既然能确定资本主义社会中的劳动是被异化的结果，那就必须规定作为“生活的第一需要”的劳动的应然标准。这个标准，《手稿》虽没有清楚表述，但《穆勒评注》则将其明确置于“生产—使用”(“劳动—产品”)的逻辑链条中加以表述。“这个活动不仅仅是制造一个对象的活动，而且是为其他人提供使用产品的活动。”照此理解，如果工人在生产过程中拥有“为了”他人而生产的意愿，并且在他人的满足感中获得自身意义感的话，工人就能在这种相互性关系中获得足够的操控感。如果这种操控感是现实的，也就能合理解释人与劳动活动的关系从而克服这一层面的异化。

Second, the meaning of moment b′, that is, alienation from the product of labor, lies in the fact that if the producer in reality cannot possess the intention of producing “for” others, alienation from labor activity necessarily leads to alienation from the object of labor. That is, if the laborer cannot reasonably control the form and content of the product, their actual production may not reflect their true intentions.

其次，环节b′，也就是与劳动产品相异化的意义在于，如果生产者在现实中无法具备“为了”他人而生产的意图，与劳动活动的异化必然导向对劳动对象的异化。也就是说，如果劳动者不能对产品的形式和内容有合理操控，其在现实中的生产就未必能体现其真实意愿。

Next, moment c′ can be explained. Under the pure intention of earning wages, no proper form of labor exists. On the one hand, the laborer does not possess the subjective intention of “for” enabling consumers to obtain satisfaction; on the other hand, production in capitalist society is collective, and the subjective intentions of individuals do not orient toward the common intention of the collective activity, so a proper common intention cannot be formed. Thus, other workers and the collective product should be part of collective activity, but this collective activity cannot obtain its proper form, leading to mutual alienation.

继而可以解释环节c′。在纯粹获取工资的意图下，合理的劳动形式并不存在。一方面，劳动者并不具备“为了”使消费者获得满足感的主观意图；另一方面，资本主义社会中的生产是集体性的，个体的主观意图并不朝向集体活动的共同意图，这就无法形成恰当的共同意图。如此，其他工人及集体产品本应是集体活动的一部分，但这种集体活动无法获得恰当形式而导致相互之间的异化。

Finally, this priority model can also explain moment d′, that is, alienation from the species. The reasonable and proper transformation of nature through labor is the true realm of human flourishing, but the labor activity in this realm cannot be properly understood; the worker cannot be said to labor for the “species,” and the species in its true sense does not exist.

最后，这种优先性模式也可以解释环节d′，也就是与类的异化。合理而恰当地通过劳动改造自然乃是人类繁荣的真正领域，但这个领域的劳动活动无法得到恰当理解，工人谈不上为“类”而劳动，真正意义的类也就不存在了。

It can be seen that, starting from the priority of labor activity, alienation is explicitly directed toward the dimension of inter-subjective “relation.” This is also one of the main reasons Brudney’s interpretation of the young Marx’s problem of alienation leans more heavily on the *Comments on Mill* than on the *Manuscripts*. Next, we will see that Brudney sets this relation as inter-subjective “mutual fulfillment,” which presupposes a conception of the human being as mutual “concern.”

可见，从劳动活动的优先性出发，异化被明确引向主体间的“关系”维度，这也是布鲁德尼对青年马克思异化问题的解读更偏重《穆勒评注》而非《手稿》的主要原因之一。接下来，我们将看到，布鲁德尼把这种关系设定为主体间的“相互成全”，其背后则预设着一种作为相互“关切”的人的观念。

II. The Conception of the Human Being as Mutual “Concern” and Structural Friendship

二、相互“关切”的人的观念与结构性友谊

As above, since Brudney, on the basis of the proper form of labor activity, understands alienation as a normative rather than a descriptive concept, he must presuppose the proper form of labor activity. The *Comments on Mill* explicitly defines this form as “mutual fulfillment,” that is, producing and consuming “for” others. The word “for” here is meant to indicate a relational structure of mutual concern among free and equal subjects. In other words, “production—consumption” is not mutual profit under capitalist conditions, but a consciously structured relation of mutual concern: the individual’s “production” is “for” providing others with the goods they need to pursue their life plans; “consumption,” besides aiming to obtain necessary use-values, is more importantly “for” making possible the goodwill expressed by “production” as “concern.” In this regard, Brudney calls the relation formed by this “concern” a structural friendship between individuals. Specifically, this relation should satisfy the following four points of mutual “concern”:

如上述，布鲁德尼既然基于劳动活动的恰当形式把异化理解为规范性而非描述性概念，就必须先行预设劳动活动的恰当形式。《穆勒评注》明确将这种形式规定为“相互成全”，也就是“为了”他人而生产和消费。这里的“为了”一词要表明的即是一种自由而平等的主体之间相互关切的关系结构。换言之，“生产—消费”并非资本主义条件下的彼此获利，而是一种有意识地相互关切的关系结构，个体的“生产”是“为了”给他人提供可供他们追求其人生计划所需要的物品，“消费”除了意在获得必要使用价值，更重要的则是“为了”使“生产”所表达的“关切”之善意成为可能。就此而言，布鲁德尼把这种由“关切”而形成的关系称为个体间的结构性友谊关系。具体而言，这种关系应当在以下四点满足相互“关切”的要求：

(1) The purpose of my production is partly self-affirmation and partly to satisfy your needs. At the same time, only by satisfying your needs can I achieve my self-affirmation as an individual.

(1)我生产的目的一部分是实现自我肯定，一部分是为了满足你的需要。同时，只有满足你的需要才能实现我作为个体的自我肯定；

(2) When you consume, you are aware that I am producing for your needs and for my self-affirmation, thereby facilitating the completion of my individual goal.

(2)你在消费时，意识到我是为了你的需要以及实现自我肯定而进行生产的，因而促成我个体目标的完成；

(3) At the same time, I also know that you know that I am producing to satisfy your needs and to achieve my self-affirmation.

(3)同时，我也知道你知道我是为了满足你的需求以及实现自我肯定而进行生产的；

(4) You are aware that I know that you know that I am producing to satisfy your needs and to achieve my self-affirmation, and you express appreciation for this.

(4)你意识到我知道你知道我是为了满足你的需要以及实现自我肯定而进行的生产表示赞赏。

The above four points are the basic attitude of mutual “concern” arising from the fundamental dependence of human beings. The conception of the human being as “concern” is implicit in this attitude. On this, the young Marx presupposes two premises: first, the elimination of material scarcity (the abolition of the circumstances of justice), so that in communist society laborers will have no need to labor for wages; second, the definition of the nature of labor, so that in communist society everyone will engage in activities that can achieve self-affirmation. Brudney accepts the second premise but rejects the first. In his view, the continuous development of productive forces has no necessary connection with the transcendence of material scarcity. On the contrary, the constant enrichment of material goods resulting from the continuous development of productive forces will certainly change the structure of people’s reasonable desires; coupled with factors such as “the limitation of resources and the need to protect the environment,” “the spontaneously coordinated Fourierist proposition is insufficient.” Therefore, the transcendence of material scarcity should not be taken as a strict philosophical presupposition; communist society still needs to construct reasonable normative principles under the “circumstances of justice.”

上述四点即是基于人的基本依赖性而生发出的相互“关切”的基本态度，作为“关切”的人的观念即暗含在这种态度当中。对此，青年马克思预设了两个前提，一是摆脱物质匮乏(取消正义环境)，共产主义社会中的劳动者将没有必要为赚取工资而劳动；二是规定劳动的性质，共产主义社会中每个人从事的将是能实现自我肯定的活动。布鲁德尼认同前提二，但反对前提一。在他看来，生产力的持续发展与超越物质匮乏没有必然关联。相反，生产力的持续发展所导致的物质产品的不断丰富定然会改变人的合理欲望结构，再加上“资源的局限性、保护环境的需要”等要素，“自发协调的傅立叶式命题是不充分的”。因此，对物质匮乏的超越不应作为严格的哲学预设，共产主义社会仍然需要在“正义环境”下构建合理的规范性原则。

Regarding the second premise, “self-affirmation” under communist conditions is achieved through labor, but at the cognitive level it must satisfy two points: first, “I” should simultaneously regard the activities of “me” and “you” as activities realizing the nature of “me” and “you,” and the same holds for “you”; second, both “I” and “you” can fully understand the importance of labor for realizing human nature. These two points concern not only the content of labor (the product) but also the form of labor (the motive). In the “production—consumption” chain under communist conditions, I “both enjoy the individual expression of my life and, in the contemplation of the product, feel individual pleasure because I recognize that my individuality is a material, intuitively perceptible, and therefore unquestionable power.” This indicates that the key to material production achieving self-affirmation lies in obtaining a sense of control over the proper form and content of labor activity itself. Only under this sense of control, when I realize that “my” product of labor contributes to “your” self-realization, and “you” realize that this product is produced by “me” as a producer based on an inner concern for “you” as a consumer, rather than purely on the profit-seeking egoistic belief, can I “directly enjoy” both “objectifying the human essence” and “creating an object that corresponds to the needs of another human essence.” In other words, in communist society, “concern” becomes the basic motive of production and consumption at the level of legitimacy rather than instrumentality. In the “production—consumption” process, whether producer or consumer, each understands, acknowledges, and appreciates the goodwill of the other. In this ideal state, every individual can rationally design, revise, and pursue their own unique conception of the good based on their own interests, and these conceptions of the good can cognitively fit with one another.

关于前提二，共产主义条件下的“自我肯定”虽由劳动通达，但在认知层面需要满足两点：第一，“我”应当同时把“我”和“你”的活动视为实现“我”和“你”的本性的活动，对“你”来说同样如此；第二，“我”和“你”都能充分明确劳动对于实现人的本性的重要性。这两点不但关乎劳动的内容(产品)，更关乎劳动的形式(动机)。共产主义条件下的“生产—消费”链条中，我“既享受了个人的生命表现，又在对产品的直观中由于认识到我的个性是物质的、可以直观地感知的因而是毫无疑问的权力而感受到个人的乐趣”。这表明，物质生产活动通达自我肯定的关键在于获得一种对劳动活动本身的合理形式和内容的操控感。只有在这种操控感下意识到“我”的劳动产品有助于“你”的自我实现，且“你”能意识到该产品是“我”作为生产者基于作为消费者的“你”的内在关切而不是纯粹基于获得利润的利己性信念而生产时，我才能“直接享受到”既“物化了人的本质”，又“创造了与另一个人的本质的需要相符合的物品”。换言之，在共产主义社会中，“关切”在正当性而非工具性层面成为生产和消费的基本动机。在“生产—消费”过程中，不论生产者还是消费者，都会理解、承认并赞赏对方的善良意愿。在这种理想状态下，每个个体都能基于自己的兴趣理性设计、修正并追求其独有的善观念，而彼此的善观念能在认知层面彼此契合。

However, this mutual concern inevitably faces the following challenge: within the structure of each party’s will, such concern seems at most able to guarantee a certain abstract objectivity in principle, but in reality, the conceptions of the good that can lead to self-affirmation are diverse. Even from the highly simplified perspective of production and consumption alone, the two parties may in practice fail to realize mutual fulfillment due to a “misalignment” of concern. In response, Brudney introduces something akin to Rawls’s “primary social goods” to explain this: that is, regardless of how producers and consumers fulfill each other through the motive of concern, they cannot do without certain necessary goods, the most important of which is freedom. Only by ensuring that both parties have sufficient freedom to form, revise, and pursue various conceptions of the good is it possible, under the basic principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” to make it so that “I can … hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind.” [1]1 “Probing both ends” (叩其两端) is a Confucian phrase from the *Analects* (9.8), describing a method of inquiry that examines a question from both extremes to reach the mean. In other words, mutual concern is possible only within a structure of free production and consumption.

不过，这种相互关切必然面临如下质疑：这种关切在彼此的意愿结构中似乎至多只能在原则上确保某种抽象的客观性，但在现实中，能够通达自我肯定的善观念是多样化的，即便只从生产和消费这一高度简化的视角看，双方在现实中完全可能由于关切的“错位”而无法实现相互成全。对此，布鲁德尼引入一种类似罗尔斯的“基本社会善”来解释，也就是说，不论生产者和消费者如何以关切的动机相互成全，都离不开某些必要的善，其中最重要的就是自由。只有确保双方有形成、修正并追求各种善观念的足够自由，才有可能在“各尽所能，按需分配”的基本原则下使“我有可能随我的心愿……上午打猎，下午捕鱼，傍晚从事畜牧，晚饭后从事批判”，换言之，相互关切只有在自由的生产和消费的结构下才得以可能。

Brudney calls this structure “friendship in production for the species.” This friendship is not Aristotelian friendship in the classical sense, but a modern form of friendship that occurs indirectly among strangers. This conception of friendship acknowledges the extensive interdependence characteristic of a just environment. In a modern society composed of strangers, this interdependence is very extensive; the interdependence between production and consumption is merely a simplified model. Moreover, this interdependence is abstract: people know only that mutual dependence is a necessity, but they cannot know, and need not know, precisely whom they depend on. In reality, the intention of “I” to produce for “you” is not directed at a specific individual, but at the “species” (Gattung) constituted by self and other, producer and consumer. In other words, “I” am actually producing for the “species,” and “you” acknowledge this act of producing for the “species” and feel appreciation for it. In this sense, both production and consumption manifest the species-being of humanity: “each of us in his production doubly affirms himself and the other person.” [2]2 This is a paraphrase of a passage from Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. “Producing for the ‘species’ is no longer something one ‘must’ do for profit, but something one ‘ought’ to do and that is right for mutual fulfillment.”

这种结构，布鲁德尼称之为为“类”而生产的友谊。这种友谊并非古典意义的亚里士多德式友谊，而是一种在陌生人中间间接发生的现代意义的友谊。这种友谊观承认正义环境下的广泛依赖性。在陌生人组建的现代社会中，这种依赖性十分广泛，生产和消费之间的依赖性只是一种简化样式；另外，这种依赖性是抽象的，人们只知道相互依赖确有必然性，但无法明确知道，也不必知道具体在依赖谁。实际上，“我”为“你”而生产的意图并不指向具体的个人，而是指向由自我和他者、生产者和消费者共同构成的“类”。换言之，“我”实际上是在为 “类”而生产，“你”则承认“我”为“类”而生产的行为并对其感到赞赏。在此意义上，生产和消费所体现的都是人的类本性，“我们每个人在自己的生产过程中就双重肯定了自己和另一个人”。“为‘类’而生产不再是为了获利而‘要’做之事，而是为了彼此成全而‘该做’和正当之事。”

At this point, it is not difficult to see that the weakening and dissolution of alienation are reduced to a friendship relation of mutual concern mediated by the species, and to the unveiling of the conception of the person underlying this relation. Although “production” and “consumption” under capitalist conditions are not lacking in the good will of mutual “recognition” and “appreciation,” this will can at most be regarded as a contingent state of affairs lacking universality. This contingency makes capitalist society a “false community”; people living in this illusion cannot form a universally correct cognition of the conception of the person as one of mutual concern. The supersession of alienation by communism lies precisely in opening up, at the cognitive level, the mutual “recognition” and “appreciation” between self and other. Understood in this way, communism should not only be understood as a fundamental transformation of the mode of production, but also as a relational model and attitudinal stance distinct from capitalism. Brudney does not deny that the fundamental path to superseding alienation lies in a fundamental transformation of the mode of production, but mutual “recognition” and “appreciation” are themselves the ultimate orientation of historical materialism. More importantly, Brudney’s work is to justify the relevant concepts of communism under capitalist conditions, and then to “diagnose” capitalism from the standpoint of a justified normative position, rather than actually “doubly affirming oneself and the other person in one’s own production.” If this justification is successful, the conception of the person as one of concern described above can achieve universal recognition under capitalist conditions. Therefore, the hope of weakening and dissolving alienation lies in justifying, at the cognitive level, the conception of the person underlying the above relational model and attitudinal stance. But in Brudney’s view, the markedly Feuerbachian tendency of the 1844 Marx, who hoped “directly to change the present appearance of human nature,” [3]3 This is a reference to Marx’s early Feuerbachian humanism, which sought to change the alienated appearance of human nature through a direct transformation of consciousness. inevitably leads him to encounter a “justification problem” and also leads him to reject the philosophical mode of argumentation that could provide justification. In response, Brudney’s solution is to introduce from outside the Rawlsian moral-philosophical resource of reflective equilibrium.

至此，不难看到，对异化的弱化和消解被归结为以类为中介而相互关切的友谊关系，以及对该关系背后的人的观念的解蔽。资本主义条件下的“生产”和“消费”虽然并不缺乏彼此“承认”和“赞赏”的善良意愿，但这种意愿至多能被视为一种缺乏普遍性的偶然事态。这种偶然性使资本主义社会成为一种“虚假的共同体”，生活在这一假象中的人无法就作为相互关切的人的观念形成普遍的正确认知。共产主义对异化的扬弃即在于在认知层面打通自我与他者之间的相互“承认”和“赞赏”。照此理解，共产主义除了应被理解为生产方式的根本变革，还应当被视为一种有别于资本主义的关系模式和信念态度。布鲁德尼并不否认扬弃异化的根本途径在于生产方式的根本变革，但相互“承认”和“赞赏”本身就是历史唯物主义的最终导向。更重要的是，布鲁德尼的工作是在资本主义条件下对共产主义的相关理念进行证成，进而以得到证成的规范性立场对资本主义进行“诊断”，而非现实地“在自己的生产过程中就双重地肯定了自己和另一个人”。如果这种证成是成功的，上述作为关切的人的观念就能在资本主义条件下得到普遍承认。因此，弱化、消解异化的希望在于从认知层面对上述关系模式和信念态度背后的人的观念进行证成。但在布鲁德尼看来，1844年的马克思希望“径直改变人的本性在目前的表象”的显著费尔巴哈式倾向必然使之遭到“证成难题”，也使之拒斥了可能予以证成的哲学论证方式。对此，布鲁德尼的方案是从外部引入罗尔斯式反思平衡这一道德哲学资源。

III. Reflective Equilibrium and the Conception of the Person: A Rawlsian Justificatory Approach

三、反思平衡与人的观念：一种罗尔斯式证成理路

Brudney’s introduction of Rawlsian justificatory resources has deeper reasons beyond his intellectual lineage with Rawls. First, as noted above, the young Marx’s Feuerbachian stance necessarily leads him to reject a normative interpretation of the problem of alienation. Second, Brudney’s denial of presuppositions such as the transcendence of material scarcity leads him to maintain a “constrained” reading of the young Marx that is close to Rawls. [4]4 “Constrained” here refers to Brudney’s reading of Marx as limiting the scope of normative claims to the conditions of modern society, rather than positing a transhistorical ideal. Thus, building a normative bridge between Rawls and the young Marx is not only necessary but also possible. From the perspective of alienation, there are at least four reasons for introducing Rawlsian justificatory resources:

布鲁德尼引入罗尔斯式证成资源，除了与罗尔斯的师承关系，还有更深刻的原因。其一，如上述，青年马克思的费尔巴哈式立场使之必然拒斥对异化问题的规范性解读；其二，布鲁德尼对超越物质匮乏等预设的否定使其始终对青年马克思持某种近罗尔斯的“限定性”(constrained)解读。如此一来，在罗尔斯和青年马克思之间搭建规范性的桥梁不但是必要的，也是可能的。从异化角度看，引入罗尔斯式证成资源至少有四点理由：

(1) Brudney’s interpretation of Marx not only carries an obvious Rawlsian pre-understanding, but his normative interpretation of Marx is more radical than Rawls’s own.

(1)布鲁德尼对马克思的解读不但带有显见的罗尔斯式前理解，其对马克思的规范性解读较之罗尔斯更为激进。

(2) Rawls implicitly contains a conception of alienation similar to that interpreted from a relational perspective: “alienation comes not from labor but from the principles that regulate the basic structure of society.” [5]5 This is a paraphrase of a Rawlsian idea; the exact formulation is Brudney’s. This alienation leads to an individual’s sense of isolation and detachment within the community.

(2)罗尔斯那里暗含一种从关系角度解读的类似异化观念，“异化不是来自劳动，而是来自规导基本社会结构的原则”，这种异化导致个体在共同体面前的孤立感和游离感。

(3) On the issue of alienation, Rawls and the young Marx lead to different models of intersubjective relations, the basis of which lies in different understandings of the conception of the person: respectively, the conception of the person as “concern” and as “respect.”

(3)在异化问题上，罗尔斯和青年马克思分别导向不同的主体间关系模式，其基础则是对人的观念的不同理解，分别是作为“关切”和作为“尊重”的人的观念。

(4) Rawls’s constructivist justificatory framework introduces the “original position–reflective equilibrium” precisely to defend a conception of justice capable of dissolving this alienation, and the conception of the person underlying that conception of justice.

(4)罗尔斯的建构主义证成框架引入“原初状态—反思平衡”即意在对能消解此种异化的正义观，以及这种正义观背后的人的观念进行辩护。

Rawls did not formally develop a theory of alienation, but when describing the sense of detachment and isolation from the community that arises when citizens governed by the principle of limited utilitarianism cannot develop sufficient identification with that principle, he clearly expressed that this sense of detachment and isolation directly stems from a sense of deprivation, and the root of this sense of deprivation lies in the lack of mutual respect among citizens as equals. In this regard, Brudney’s use of the term “the respect-alienation” to describe this state is not unreasonable. [6]6 Brudney’s term “the respect-alienation” is used to describe a form of alienation rooted in the lack of mutual respect among citizens, as opposed to the Marxian alienation from labor. Rawls’s construction of the “two principles of justice” [7]7 Rawls’s two principles of justice are: (1) each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for all; and (2) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference principle) and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. inherently contains an objective demand to address this alienation. The complexity of the term “construction” lies in the fact that, although the object of construction is the “two principles of justice,” the construction of these principles takes place within the overall structure constituted by the “original position–reflective equilibrium.” The two-way dynamic reasoning generated by the original position and reflective equilibrium in the process of construction ultimately aims at justifying the conception of the person as “respect.”

罗尔斯并没有正式阐发过一种异化观，但他在描述有限功利主义原则规导下的公民无法对该原则产生足够认同而导致对共同体的游离感和孤立感时，明确表达过这种游离感和孤立感直接来自一种被剥夺感，而这种被剥夺感的根源则是源于缺乏对作为平等公民的彼此尊重。就此而言，布鲁德尼用“对尊重的异化”(the respect-alienation)来表述这种状态是不无道理的。罗尔斯建构的“两个正义原则”则不乏应对这种异化的客观诉求。“建构”一词的复杂性在于，虽然建构对象是“两个正义原则”，但对该原则的建构是在“原初状态—反思平衡”构成的整体结构下进行的，原初状态和反思平衡在建构过程中生成的双向动态推理最终指向对作为“尊重”的人的观念的证成。

Within the framework of the “original position–reflective equilibrium,” “construction” is not pure logical deduction, but possesses both the abstractness of practical reasoning and the reality of everyday reflection. First, although “construction” is driven by practical reason, its starting point is empirical, sensory material. This material is the conception of persons as free and equal, “extracted” from the public political culture of a democratic society; mutual “respect” is the basic relationship contained in this conception of the person. Second, based on this conception of the person, the specific form of the original position is formulated, and from this, systematic principles of justice are derived. Finally, reflective equilibrium is used to re-reflect on the original position and the conception of the person, so that abstract reasoning and practical deliberation continuously achieve coherence at certain specific points.

“原初状态—反思平衡”框架下，“建构”并非纯粹的逻辑演绎，而是兼具实践推理的抽象性和日常反思的现实性。首先，“建构”虽受实践理性驱使，但其起点是经验的感性材料。这种材料就是从民主社会的公共政治文化中“提炼”而成的自由而平等的人的观念，彼此“尊重”就是这种人的观念所蕴含的基本关系；其次，以此人的观念为依据拟定原初状态的具体形态，并由此推导出系统的正义原则；最后，用反思平衡对原初状态和人的观念进行再反思，使抽象推理和现实权衡在某些具体的点上不断达成融贯。

Around this distilled conception of the person, “construction” presents itself as a practical inference moving from the concrete to the abstract and then back to the concrete. Taking the conception of the person as the starting point of practical inference means using it to design the “original position.” Besides endowing the hypothetical “parties” with fairness in the contracting situation, the more important task is to make this procedure (the original position) itself express the intrinsic attributes of a conception of the person as mutual “respect.” Starting from this point, the “two principles of justice” can be derived through a strict deduction akin to “moral geometry.” However, since the conception of the person itself is something “distilled,” it is inevitably susceptible to various false consciousnesses and may carry biases. If such biases are left unreflected and uncorrected, the strictly deduced conclusions may diverge significantly from what “we” in the actual world can accept. The emergence of reflective equilibrium aims to use the standpoint of “we” in the actual world to constantly “probe both ends” [1]1 “Probing both ends” (叩其两端) is a Confucian phrase from the *Analects* (9.8), describing a method of inquiry that examines a question from both extremes to reach the mean. between logic and reality, thereby addressing the hermeneutic situation created by the above “distillation.” On the one hand, public political culture is not a fixed given state but an empirical result that accumulates and changes continuously in the course of historical development; the constructor’s selection of a conception of the person from public political culture is inevitably tinged with many prejudices, even biases. On the other hand, the lifeworld itself is dynamic, and the principles of justice derived from the original position may not always cohere with the actual lifeworld at every time and place. This requires us to “either revise the interpretation of the original position or revise our judgments,” thereby achieving a “fusion of horizons” between the “parties” in the original position and “we” in the real world at certain specific points. Under the premise that the original position is strictly bound to the conception of the person, the original position plays the role of a mediator between the reflective subject and the “distiller” of the conception of the person. Since the result of reflective equilibrium is “a point in infinity that we can never fully reach,” the conception of the person will naturally become a provisional concept that can be adjusted, revised, or even replaced at any time under this “infinite” weighing. In this sense, reflective equilibrium is a method “that, in the empirical world, tests whether a particular proposition coheres with one’s own system of beliefs through reflection, and then uses this coherence as a basis to provide justification for that proposition.” Although reflective equilibrium may not reach such thoroughness in Rawls, the constructive justification structure formed by “original position—reflective equilibrium” is always intended to prevent the conception of the person from sliding into foundationalism. Thus, reflective equilibrium is an auxiliary self-adjustment mechanism; its purpose is to resolve the coordination problem between abstract principles of justice and the actual lifeworld, not to serve as a self-sufficient method of justification. Only when placed within the structure jointly constituted with the original position can the necessity and possibility of adjusting, revising, and replacing the conception of the person be fully manifested.

围绕这个被提炼而成的人的观念，“建构”呈现为从具体到抽象，再到具体的实践推理。把人的观念作为实践推理的起点，也就是以人的观念拟定“原初状态”，除了要赋予假定的“各方”在立约环境中的公平性，更重要的是要使该程序(原初状态)自身表达出作为相互“尊重”的人的观念的内在属性。以此为起点，可以通过“道德几何学”式的严格演绎推导出“两个正义原则”。不过，既然人的观念本身是被“提炼”而成的，必定可能受到各种虚假意识的影响而带有偏见性。如果对此偏见不加反思和修正，严格演绎的结论可能会与实然世界中的“我们”的可接受性相去甚远。反思平衡的出场即意在以实然世界中的“我们”的立场在逻辑和现实之间不断“叩其两端”来应对上述“提炼”造成的诠释学处境：一方面，公共政治文化并非一成不变的既定状态，而是历史发展过程中不断累积并不断变化的经验结果，建构者对公共政治文化中人的观念的选择也必然沾染不少前见，甚至是偏见；另一方面，生活世界本身也是动态的，经由原初状态推导出的正义原则未必能随时随地与实然生活世界相融贯。这就需要我们“或者修改对原初状态的解释，或者修改我们的判断”，从而在某些具体的点上实现原初状态下的“各方”和现实世界中的“我们”之间的“视域融合”。在原初状态与人的观念严格绑定的前提下，原初状态扮演的角色是反思者和人的观念之“提炼者”之间的中介，反思平衡的结果既然是“我们永远无法达到的无限之中的某一点”，人的观念自然会在这种“无限”的权衡下成为可被随时调整、修正乃至更易的暂定性观念。就此而言，反思平衡是一种在经验世界中“通过反思来检验特定命题与自己的信念体系是否融贯，进而以这种融贯性为依据，为该命题提供辩护的方法”。虽然反思平衡在罗尔斯那里未必能通达如此彻底，但“原初状态—反思平衡”构成的建构性证成结构始终意在避免人的观念滑向基础主义。可见，反思平衡乃是一种附属性的自我调整机制，其意在解决的是抽象的正义原则和实然的生活世界之间的协调性问题，而不是一种自足的证成方法。只有将其安放在和原初状态共同组成的结构中，对人的观念进行调整、修正和更易的必要性和可能性才能充分显现。

Since Brudney’s interpretation of the alienation problem also ultimately rests on a certain conception of the person, his introduction of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium should likewise use this provisional standpoint to continuously dissolve the false consciousness that such a conception of the person may have absorbed. For the young Marx, under the real conditions where “the essence of man does not become evident through perceptible practice,” the introduction of this standpoint is possible provided the following two conditions are met.

既然布鲁德尼阐释异化问题的落脚点同样在于某种人的观念，其引入罗尔斯式反思平衡也应当通过上述暂定性立场不断消解这种人的观念可能沾染的虚假意识。对于青年马克思来说，在缺乏“人的本质通过可被感知的实践变得明显”的现实条件下，这一立场的引入在具备以下两个条件的情况下是可能的。

First, the distortion and obscuring of the conception of the person largely stem from capitalism’s control over spiritual production, but this control is not absolute; it is at most “moderate.” Second, although the conception of the person belongs to the superstructure constrained by the economic base, this does not mean that an appropriate conception of the person cannot be progressively clarified within a given mode of production and historical stage. What Brudney calls the young Marx’s “attempt to bid philosophy farewell” does not mean bidding farewell to all philosophy, but merely opposing the “insulated stance” that “falsely assumes its own isolation from the influence of social reality, and thus falsely assumes that what it expresses must be pure truth.” As an empirical method of reflection, reflective equilibrium seeks precisely to respond to this “insulated stance.” In other words, reflective equilibrium hopes to provide justification for the acceptability of a certain conception of the person within the empirical world, without changing its standpoint, thereby “providing a rational basis for beliefs about the person prior to social change.” However, the problem is that although Brudney has a strong intention to introduce reflective equilibrium, he does not place it within the structural framework jointly constituted by “original position—reflective equilibrium,” but instead seems to treat it simply as a self-sufficient method of justification. This approach not only renders his reflective equilibrium weak in argumentation but also leads to an obvious contradiction in the relationship between reflective equilibrium and the conception of the person.

第一，对人的观念的扭曲和遮蔽很大程度上源自资本主义对精神生产的控制，但这种控制并非绝对的，而至多是“中度的”。第二，人的观念虽是属于受经济基础制约的上层建筑，但并不表示某种恰当的人的观念在既定生产方式和历史阶段中无法得到渐进式澄清。布鲁德尼所谓的青年马克思“告别哲学的尝试”并非指告别一切哲学，而仅仅是反对“错误地假定了自身与社会现实影响之间的隔离，因而错误地假定了其所表述的内容必定是纯粹真理”的“隔离式立场”。作为一种经验性反思方法，反思平衡即力图对这种“隔离式立场”进行回应，换言之，反思平衡希望在避免转变立场的情况下，在经验世界中为某种人的观念的可接受性提供确证，从而“先于社会变革为人的信念提供理性基础”。但问题在于，布鲁德尼虽有引入反思平衡的强烈意愿，但并没有将其安放在“原初状态—反思平衡”共同构成的结构性框架中，而是似乎将其简单视为一种自足的证成方法。这一方案不但导致其反思平衡在论证上的薄弱，也导致在反思平衡和人的观念的关系问题上存在明显的矛盾。

Let us first examine his concentrated formulation of reflective equilibrium:

先来看他对反思平衡的集中表述：

First, the negative formulation: This formulation excludes the following two cases: that the reflecting subject always accepts the conception of the person found within itself, and that it never accepts any conception of the person found within itself.

一是否定性表述：该表述排除以下两种情况，即反思主体总是接受在其自身中发现的人的观念，以及绝不接受任何一种在其自身中找到的人的观念。

Second, the positive formulation: Under certain appropriate conditions, within the examination of an overall constructive point of view, if characteristics such as time, place, and culture are all taken into account, this conception of the person possesses acceptability.

二是肯定性表述：在某种适当条件下，在整体的建构性观点的考察中，若是把时间、地点和文化等特征都考虑在内，这种人的观念就具备可接受性。

From the negative formulation, Brudney clearly opposes any static understanding of the conception of the person. When one “never accepts any conception of the person found within itself,” the reflector regards every conception of the person as a product of false consciousness; obviously, in this case, there can be no reflection or equilibrium. When one “always accepts the conception of the person found within itself,” a certain one-directional reflective equilibrium is possible, but this reflective equilibrium takes some pre-determined conception of the person as a fixed point of justification and uses it as the interpretive benchmark for other elements of justification. Although this one-directional reflection and weighing is also an important form of reflective equilibrium, its application should be more confined to foundationalist modes of reasoning—that is, first confirming a first principle, then deriving other constitutive elements from this principle, and finally expanding and enriching the entire theoretical system. However, in Brudney’s view, this position is clearly “too broad”; the conception of the person is deeply influenced by the social background, and many conceptions of the person are tinged with false consciousness to varying degrees, and thus are insufficient to serve as fixed points for reasoning.

从否定性表述看，布鲁德尼显然反对对人的观念的任何静态理解。当“绝不接受任何一种在其自身中找到的人的观念”时，反思者把任何人的观念都视为虚假意识的产物，显然，在这种情况下谈不上任何反思和平衡；而当“总是接受在其自身中发现的人的观念时”，某种单向的反思平衡是可能的，但这种反思平衡是以某种先行确定的人的观念作为证成的固定之点，并以此作为对其他证成要素的诠释基准。尽管这种单向的反思和权衡也是反思平衡的重要形态，但其运用更多应局限于基础主义的推理模式，也就是先行确认某个第一原则，再从这个原则出发推导出其他构成性要素，最终使整个理论体系不断扩展和丰富。不过，在布鲁德尼看来，这种观点显然“过于宽泛”，人的观念深受社会背景的影响，许多人的观念不同程度沾染着虚假意识，因而不足以作为推理的固定之点。

From the positive formulation, Brudney hopes to break through the above one-directional understanding of reflective equilibrium and instead attempts to continuously eliminate the false consciousness that a certain conception of the person may have absorbed within a two-directional reflective structure. Although Brudney is vague about how the “overall constructive point of view” here leads to a two-directional reflective structure, we can supplement this based on the Rawlsian characteristics of his justification. As mentioned above, Rawlsian construction includes the empirical nature of the construction materials, the procedural nature of practical inference, and the breadth and dynamism of reflective equilibrium. This article argues that the reflective equilibrium in Brudney’s justification structure, besides requiring as comprehensive a consideration of context as possible, more importantly requires that the justification structure itself satisfy two requirements: First, the distillation of the conception of the person should possess a high degree of public recognition. Second, the empirical reflection on the conception of the person should be sufficiently dynamic; at the very least, it should not be fixed once set. In other words, the conception of the person should remain “open” to the reflection of all parties and continuously accept questioning, revision, or even replacement by different constructors.

从肯定性表述看，布鲁德尼希望打破对反思平衡的上述单向性理解，而是试图在双向的反思结构中不断剔除某种人的观念可能沾染的虚假意识。尽管这里的“整体的建构性观点”何以导向一种双向的反思结构，布鲁德尼语焉不详，但我们可以基于其证成的罗尔斯式特征做出某些补充。如上述，罗尔斯式建构包括建构材料的经验性，实践推理的程序性和反思平衡的广泛性、动态性。本文认为，布鲁德尼证成结构中的反思平衡除了对语境的考虑要尽可能全面，更重要的是证成结构本身应满足两点要求：第一，对人的观念的提炼应当具备较高的公认性；第二，对人的观念的经验性反思应当具备足够的动态性，至少，不能一经设定就固定不变。换言之，人的观念应当对各方的反思保持“敞开”，并不断接受不同建构者的质疑、修正甚至是更易。

Brudney clearly cannot satisfy these two requirements. The above analysis of Rawls has already shown that the reason the conception of the person can achieve dynamism and provisionality under the mechanism of reflective equilibrium lies not in the isolated introduction of this justificatory idea, but in the fact that the entire justificatory structure housing reflective equilibrium can truly accommodate the depth of reflection. The key to the dynamism of practical inference in “original position—reflective equilibrium” lies in using the “original position” as a mediator to form a two-directional interactive “effective history” between logic and reality, premises and conclusions. Compared with the strict constructiveness of “original position—reflective equilibrium,” the constructiveness in Brudney’s justification structure is much “weaker.” The specific manifestations and analysis are as follows:

布鲁德尼显然无法满足这两点要求。对罗尔斯的上述分析已经表明，人的观念之所以能在反思平衡机制下实现动态化和暂定化，并不在于对这种证成理念的孤立引入，而是取决于安放反思平衡的整个证成结构能够真正容纳反思的深度。“原初状态—反思平衡”中的实践推理具备动态性的关键在于以“原初状态”为中介在逻辑与现实、前提和结论之间形成双向互动的“效果历史”。与“原初状态—反思平衡”的严格建构性相比，布鲁德尼证成结构中的建构性则要“弱”得多，具体表现和分析如下：

First, although Brudney explicitly advocates introducing empirical “features” such as “time, place, and culture,” he does not specify what these “features” actually are. When the very rationality of these empirical “features” remains in doubt, any reflection inevitably tends toward dogmatism.

第一，布鲁德尼虽然明确主张要引入“时间、地点和文化”等经验性“特征”，但这些“特征”究竟如何，布鲁德尼并未指明。在这些经验性“特征”自身的合理性尚且存疑的情况下，任何反思都难免走向独断。

Second, in Rawls’s case, the reason why the conception of the person is always “open” and subject to adjustment and revision lies fundamentally in his repeatedly emphasized constructivist stance of “the political, not the metaphysical”: the conception of the person is merely the sensible material of construction, distilled from the empirical political world and constantly subject to testing. In Brudney’s interpretation of the young Marx’s problem of alienation, however, “care” [8]8 “Care” (关切) is Brudney’s term for a natural human disposition toward mutual concern, which he argues grounds the possibility of community in the young Marx’s thought. does not derive from facts in empirical society but is a conclusion deduced from a certain conception of human nature. In his view, the Marx of 1844 was still largely a Feuerbachian; both believed that, through some mediating mechanism, “an agent can affirm his human nature by establishing a firm relationship with the species as a whole.” [9]9 Daniel Brudney, *Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 207. For the young Marx, this meant constructing a community through “care”—a “natural relation” inherent in human nature—and thereby establishing a correlation between production and consumption. Judging from Brudney’s formulation, the conception of the person as “care” is a lower-order conception strictly deduced from the higher-order conception of structural friendship. It is evident that Brudney’s understanding of the conception of the person is not a “fact” distilled from the current political culture on the basis of some consensus in the empirical world and subject to testing, but rather a metaphysical conception that plays a foundational role in practical reasoning. This conception cannot be reflected upon and weighed by “us” in the empirical world; instead, it ought to serve as a normative standard to guide “us” in our thinking and action regarding other conceptions in the empirical world. In this light, the absence of the original position in Brudney’s work is not difficult to understand. The original position is intended to clarify initially obscure empirical elements through the rigorous reasoning mechanism of “moral geometry,” but Brudney’s metaphysical deduction of the conception of the person is never lacking in clarity from start to finish; thus, the original position naturally has no reason to exist.

第二，罗尔斯那里，人的观念之所以具备时刻“敞开”，且有被调整和更易的可能，根本原因在于其反复强调的“政治的，而非形而上学”的建构立场，人的观念只是在经验政治世界中被提炼并时刻有待检验的建构之感性材料。但在布鲁德尼对青年马克思异化问题的阐释中，“关切”并非来自经验社会的事实，而是从某种人性概念中推导出来的结论。在他看来，1844年的马克思很大程度上仍是费尔巴哈主义者，二者都相信，通过某种中介机制，“行为主体可以通过与作为整体的类建立一种牢固的关系来肯定自己的人性(human nature)”。对青年马克思来说，就是通过“关切”这一人性中蕴含的“自然关系”构建起共同体，进而在生产和消费之间建立起相关性。从布鲁德尼的表述看，作为“关切”的人的观念乃是从结构性友谊这个高阶观念中严格推导而成的低阶观念。可见，布鲁德尼对人的观念的理解并不是基于经验世界中的某种共识从当下政治文化中提炼而成并有待检验的“事实”，而是一种在实践推理中扮演着基础性角色的形而上学观念。这个观念不但无法被经验世界中的“我们”来反思和权衡，反而应当作为规范性标准来规导“我们”在经验世界中对其他观念的思考和行为。这样一来，布鲁德尼那里原初状态的缺位就不难理解了。原初状态意在使原本不甚明晰的经验性要素在严格的“道德几何学”的推理机制中变得明晰，但布鲁德尼对人的观念的形而上学推论自始至终不乏明晰性，如此，原初状态自然没有存在的必要。

Third, it is not hard to see that, in Brudney’s case, the metaphysical character of the conception of the person makes it difficult for the reflective equilibrium he introduces to truly “open up” to all constructors in a universalist context, and thus it can hardly maintain equal tolerance for the relevant positions of all constructors. The reason for this, aside from the fact that Brudney’s constructive “materials” cannot deviate from the relevant texts of the young Marx, lies more importantly within constructivist political philosophy itself. In Rawls’s work, from *A Theory of Justice* to *Political Liberalism*, although the constructivist justificatory stance is consistent, there is always a tension between the “givenness” and the “provisionality” of the conception of the person. Constructivist practical reasoning demands that reflective equilibrium keep the conception of the person in a constantly adjustable state, but political philosophy’s demand for normativity requires the provision of determinate and specific principles of justice. We also see that Rawls’s political philosophy consistently treats the “two principles of justice” as the only legitimate principles of justice across different justificatory contexts. However, although the “two principles of justice” themselves are profoundly influential, Rawls’s treatment of them as fixed is in fact inconsistent with the principle of “provisionality” in his constructivist conception. Brudney faces the same dilemma: Brudney acknowledges that it is not difficult to find the contingent fact of mutual care among subjects in capitalist society, but theoretical construction cannot stop at contingency; rather, it must elevate the state of affairs that appears as contingency in capitalist society into a normative principle for communist society, which is not yet present. Therefore, although it is not impossible to treat the conception of the person as mutually “caring” as an empirical fact distilled under capitalist conditions, once this fact is incorporated into a thorough procedure of reflective equilibrium, it would not only deviate considerably from the basic views in the *Comments on James Mill* but, more importantly, would be unable to provide an adequate defense of the specific relational form of communism. Brudney is clearly aware of this; thus, although he strives to introduce a two-way, dynamic reflective equilibrium, he still has to admit that “despite worries about the residue of false consciousness, its readers must find a given conception of the person.” [10]10 Brudney, *Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy*, p. 207.

第三，不难看到，在布鲁德尼这里，人的观念的形而上属性使其引入的反思平衡难以真正在普遍主义语境下向所有建构者“敞开”，自然难以对所有建构者的相关立场持平等的宽容。究其原因，除了布鲁德尼的建构“材料”不能背离青年马克思的相关文本，更重要的原因仍在于建构主义政治哲学内部。在罗尔斯那里，从《正义论》到《政治自由主义》，建构主义证成立场虽一以贯之，但在人的观念的“给定性”(given)和“暂定性”之间始终存在张力。建构主义实践推理要求用反思平衡把人的观念始终置于可调整的状态，但政治哲学对规范性的诉求则要求给出确定而具体的正义原则。我们也看到，罗尔斯政治哲学在不同证成语境下始终把“两个正义原则”作为唯一具备正当性的正义原则。不过，“两个正义原则”本身虽影响深远，但罗尔斯对“两个正义原则”固定化的处理实则与其建构主义理念的“暂定性”原则并不匹配。布鲁德尼同样面临这一困境：布鲁德尼承认，资本主义社会中不难发现主体间的相互关切这一偶然的事实，但理论建构不能止于偶然性，而是要把资本主义社会中呈现为偶然性的事态上升为尚未在场的共产主义社会中的规范性原则。因此，虽然把相互“关切”的人的观念视为资本主义条件下提炼而成的经验性事实并非不可能，但一旦将此事实纳入彻底的反思平衡程序中，不但与《穆勒评注》中的基本观点相去甚远，更重要的是无法对共产主义这一特定关系形态做出充分辩护。布鲁德尼显然很清楚这一点，因此，他虽然力图引入一种双向、动态的反思平衡，但仍然不得不承认，“尽管有对虚假意识之残余的担忧，然而，其读者必须找到一种给定的人的观念”。

IV. Conclusion

四、结论

Although Brudney makes a concerted effort to introduce the Rawlsian concept of reflective equilibrium, the two poles of logic and reality cannot achieve two-way interaction within his justificatory structure. The conception of the person becomes a “foundation” of theoretical construction that floats free of reflective equilibrium; the forcibly introduced reflective equilibrium can only make his theoretical construction appear coherent, when in fact it amounts to a limited “reflection” lacking “equilibrium.” In this respect, although Brudney’s program is not without a “Rawlsian” justificatory底色, its substance is at most a foundationalism with weak constructivist coloring. This foundationalist tendency may also be an important reason why Brudney values the young Marx over the mature Marx. Although Brudney’s Rawlsian justificatory program is insufficient to respond to the “justificatory problem” in which the young Marx was entangled, his excavation of the normative dimension of Marx’s thought is nonetheless a meaningful attempt. At the very least, his justificatory work helps to restore to the young Marx the normative dimension that has been “greatly underestimated.” [11]11 The phrase “greatly underestimated” (大大低估) refers to Brudney’s claim that the normative dimension of the young Marx’s thought has been neglected in mainstream Marxist scholarship. With regard to the integrity of Marx’s thought, it may be more necessary to continue the inquiry from the standpoint of historical materialism: “reflective equilibrium’s” justification of the conception of the person also unfolds within a historical horizon, but compared with the grand historical perspective of historical materialism, even a more refined reflective equilibrium introduces historicity only to an extremely limited extent. Capitalist society indeed requires some normative standard of evaluation, but how this standard can achieve better integration with historical materialism from a justificatory standpoint will be a necessary课题 for both the study of the young Marx and contemporary political philosophy. (Author’s affiliation: Jiangnan University)

布鲁德尼虽着力引入罗尔斯式反思平衡理念，但逻辑和现实这两端在其证成结构中无法实现双向互动，人的观念成为游离于反思平衡之外的理论建构之“基础”，强行引入的反思平衡只能使其理论建构看似融贯，实则只有缺少“平衡”的有限的“反思”。就此而言，布鲁德尼的方案虽不乏“罗尔斯式”证成底色，但其实质至多是具有较弱建构性色彩的基础主义，这种基础主义倾向可能也是布鲁德尼重视青年马克思甚于老年马克思的重要原因。布鲁德尼的罗尔斯式证成方案虽不足以回应青年马克思陷入的“证成难题”，但对马克思思想规范性维度的挖掘却不失为有意义的尝试。至少，其证成工作有助于把被“大大低估”的规范性维度重新赋予青年马克思。就马克思思想的整体性而言，或许更需要从历史唯物主义立场继续追问：“反思平衡”对人的观念的证成也是在历史视野中展开的，但与历史唯物主义的宏大历史观相比，即便是更为精致的反思平衡对历史性的引入也极其有限。资本主义社会确实需要某种规范性评价标准，但这个标准如何在证成立场下实现与历史唯物主义的更好融通，对青年马克思和当代政治哲学研究来说都将是必要的课题。 （作者单位：江南大学）

Online editor: Paul

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