On the “Problematic” of Marx’s Epistemology as Reconstructed by Althusser and Its Limitations

As is well known, Marx’s thought and theory not only achieved a transcendence of classical economics but also a transcendence of classical German philosophy. In fact, the transformation in epistemology—that is, the multiple transformations realized by Marx’s epistemology—is the key to the above transcendence achieved by Marx’s thought and theory. Existing research in the academic community, on the one hand, focuses on comparing Marx’s epistemology with Kant’s transcendental epistemology, revealing the important transformations it realized. For example, some scholars, through an analysis of Habermas’s theory, point out that Marx replaced Kant’s synthesis of apperception with a synthesis of labor. On the other hand, it seizes the important dimension of practice to elucidate the revolutionary character of Marx’s epistemology. For instance, some researchers believe that Marx, with a “practical epistemology,” broke through the “problem of the identity of thinking and being” that traditional epistemology could not resolve. However, there is still room for further deepening in the academic study of the transformation of Marx’s epistemological “problematic.” Althusser, by posing the question “with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations,” reconstructs Marx’s epistemological “problematic,” which is of positive significance for our deeper grasp of the transformation of the “problematic” realized by Marx’s epistemology. Based on this, this article attempts to analyze the rationality and limitations of Althusser’s reconstructed Marxian epistemological “problematic,” with a view to deepening academic research on Marx’s epistemological “problematic.”

众所周知，马克思的思想理论不仅实现了对古典经济学的超越，而且实现了对德国古典哲学的超越。事实上，认识论上的变革，即马克思认识论实现的多重变革，是马克思思想理论能够实现以上超越的关键。学界已有的研究，一方面聚焦于马克思认识论与康德先验认识论的比较，揭示其实现的重要变革。例如，有学者透过哈贝马斯的理论分析，指出马克思用劳动综合取代了康德的自我意识的综合。一方面则抓住实践这一重要向度，阐明马克思认识论具有的革命性。例如，有研究者认为，马克思以“实践认识论”突破了传统认识论无法解决的“思维与存在的同一性问题”。不过，学界关于马克思认识论“总问题”变革的研究还有进一步深入的空间。阿尔都塞以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题来重塑马克思认识论“总问题”,对于我们更深入地把握马克思认识论所实现的“总问题”变革具有积极意义。基于此，本文尝试分析阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”的合理性及其局限，以期深化学界关于马克思认识论“总问题”的研究。

I. Althusser’s Reconstructed Marxian Epistemological “Problematic” Corresponds to the “Textual Content”

一、阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”契合“文本内容”

By revealing that Marx’s use of concepts such as consumption, distribution, and production is essentially different from that of classical political economy, Althusser points out that the fundamental reason lies in a change in the epistemological “problematic” with which Marx thinks. This “problematic” is: “with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure, the structural relations among these elements, and all the consequences of these relations as determined by the action of this structure?” The key reason Althusser reconstructs Marx’s epistemological “problematic” with this “problematic” is that he insists that economic phenomena and the mode of production in capitalist society are structural existences, which determines that the Marxian epistemological “problematic” he reconstructs must be a “problematic” concerning structural objects. Althusser emphasizes: “We must regard economic phenomena as determined by a (regional) structure, and the regional structure itself as determined by the (overall) structure of the mode of production. This requirement poses a question to Marx… which is a theoretical or philosophical question, because this question clearly involves the production of concepts and systems of concepts, and thus necessarily affects the existing forms of scientificity and (theoretical) rationality, which at certain moments determine the general theory itself, that is, determine the object of philosophy.” Through the epistemological “problematic” existing in Marx’s thought as revealed by Althusser, one can find that it contains three key points: first, the “instrument of cognition,” i.e., concepts and systems of concepts; second, the “special object of cognition,” i.e., the various elements of the structure, the structural relations among these elements, etc.; and third, how an effective connection can be established between the “instrument of cognition” and the “special object of cognition,” thereby forming scientific cognition.

阿尔都塞通过揭示马克思在使用消费、分配、生产等概念时与古典政治经济学存在本质的不同，指出其根本原因在于马克思思考的认识论“总问题”有所改变，这一“总问题”就是：“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素、这些要素之间的结构关系以及这些关系的一切后果由这一结构的作用决定?”阿尔都塞之所以以这一“总问题”重塑马克思认识论“总问题”,关键原因在于他坚持认为资本主义社会中的经济现象、生产方式都是结构性的存在，这决定了他重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”必然是关涉结构性对象的“总问题”。阿尔都塞强调：“我们必须把经济现象看做由(区域)结构决定的，而区域结构本身又是由生产方式的(总)结构决定的。这个要求向马克思提出的问题……是理论问题或哲学问题，因为这个问题显然涉及概念和概念体系的产生，由此必然影响到现有的科学性和(理论)理性的形式，这些形式在一定的时刻决定着总理论本身，也就是决定着哲学对象。”通过阿尔都塞所揭示的马克思思想中存在的认识论“总问题”可以发现，其包含三个要点：一是“认识工具”,即概念和概念体系；二是“特殊的认识对象”,即结构的各个要素、这些要素之间的结构关系等；三是“认识工具”和“特殊认识对象”之间如何才能建立有效联系，从而形成科学性的认识。

So, does this epistemological “problematic” reconstructed by Althusser have its rationality? The author believes that Marx’s exposition in the relevant texts does indeed present the “problematic” outlined by Althusser. Therefore, Althusser’s reconstruction of Marx’s epistemological “problematic” with the question “with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations” corresponds, in a certain sense, to Marx’s relevant “textual content.”

那么，阿尔都塞重塑的这一认识论“总问题”是否有其合理性呢?笔者认为，马克思在相关文本的论述中，的确呈现出了阿尔都塞所勾勒的“总问题”。因此，阿尔都塞以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题重塑马克思认识论“总问题”,在一定意义上契合马克思的相关“文本内容”。

First, from the dimension of the “special object of cognition,” Marx focused on issues such as “the various elements of the structure, the structural relations among these elements,” etc. The “structure” here refers to the “structure of society,” and more specifically, the “structure of capitalist society.” The ultimate goal of Marx’s theoretical construction is the complete emancipation of humanity, and the fundamental path to achieving this goal is to transform capitalist society, and the prerequisite for transforming capitalist society is to understand it scientifically. Therefore, analyzing the structure of capitalist society becomes an important content of Marx’s research. Marx pointed out: “The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.” Capitalist society is a typical civil society, and the subtitle of *Capital* is “A Critique of Political Economy”; thus, the entire critique of political economy unfolded in *Capital* is, in fact, an anatomy of capitalist society. The key point is that Marx regarded capitalist society as a “structural” existence.

首先，从“特殊的认识对象”这个维度来看，马克思重点关注了“结构的各个要素、这些要素之间的结构关系”等问题。这里的结构指“社会的结构”,更具体地说，是“资本主义社会的结构”。马克思理论建构的最终目标是人的彻底解放，而实现这一目标的根本性途径就是变革资本主义社会，而变革资本主义社会的前提是要科学地认识它。因此，剖析资本主义社会的结构，就成为马克思研究的重要内容。马克思指出：“对市民社会的解剖应该到政治经济学中去寻求。”资本主义社会是典型的市民社会，而《资本论》副标题是“政治经济学批判”,因而整个《资本论》展开的政治经济学批判，其实就是在解剖资本主义社会。要点在于，马克思是将资本主义社会作为一种“结构性”存在来看待的。

On the one hand, Marx compared capitalist society to an “organism,” which indicates that he regarded capitalist society as a “structural” existence. Marx pointed out: “The present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change and constantly in the process of change.” [1]1 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition. Regarding the structural nature of the “organism,” Marx, when discussing his research method, once quoted a reviewer of *Capital*: “A deeper analysis of phenomena proves that social organisms differ as fundamentally from one another as plants and animals… Because the whole structure of these organisms differs, their individual organs differ, and the conditions under which the organs function differ, etc., the same phenomenon is governed by entirely different laws.” [2]2 Ibid., quoting a Russian reviewer (I. I. Kaufman). It can be seen that “various societies” are objects of structural existence, and capitalist society is no exception. Furthermore, the various “organs” (or “elements”) within the social structure have different conditions of functioning and mutual relations. Although the above exposition is not Marx’s own elaboration, it is endorsed by Marx. A comprehensive look at *Capital* reveals that Marx devoted himself to analyzing the roles and mutual relations of structural elements such as capital, labor power, money, ground rent, and surplus value within the overall structure of capitalist society. For example, Marx once pointed out, “Capital is the all-dominating economic power of bourgeois society,” [3]3 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, Introduction. and “Without capital, one cannot understand ground rent,” [4]4 Ibid. emphasizing the important role of the element “capital” in the structure of capitalist society and its relationship with ground rent.

一方面，马克思把资本主义社会比作“有机体”,这表明他将资本主义社会作为“结构性”存在来看待。马克思指出：“现在的社会不是坚实的结晶体，而是一个能够变化并且经常处于变化过程中的有机体。”关于“有机体”的结构性，马克思在论述他的研究方法时，曾引述了一位《资本论》评论者的话：“对现象所作的更深刻的分析证明，各种社会有机体像动植物有机体一样，彼此根本不同……由于这些有机体的整个结构不同，它们的各个器官有差别，以及器官借以发生作用的条件不一样等等，同一个现象就受完全不同的规律支配。”可见，“各种社会”都是结构性存在的对象，资本主义社会也不例外。此外，社会结构中的各个“器官”(或者说“要素”),它们各自的作用条件及相互关系存在不同。以上论述虽然并非马克思本人所阐发，却是马克思认可的。统览《资本论》就可以发现，马克思致力于剖析资本、劳动力、货币、地租、剩余价值等结构性要素在资本主义社会整体结构中的作用及相互关系。譬如，马克思曾指出，“资本是资产阶级社会的支配一切的经济权力”,“不懂资本便不能懂地租”，强调了“资本”这一要素在资本主义社会结构中的重要作用及其与地租之间的关系。

On the other hand, Marx also pointed out: “The question is not about the historical position of various economic relations in the sequence of successive forms of society. Still less is it about their order ‘in the idea’… (in a vague conception of historical movement). The question is about their structure within modern bourgeois society.” [5]5 Ibid. Here, Marx directly states that he regards capitalist society as a structural existence, and also clearly points out that the key lies in grasping various economic relations within the “internal structure” of capitalist society.

另一方面，马克思也曾指出：“问题不在于各种经济关系在不同社会形式的相继更替的序列中在历史上占有什么地位。更不在于它们在‘观念上’……(在关于历史运动的一个模糊的表象中)的顺序。而在于它们在现代资产阶级社会内部的结构。”在这里，马克思直接阐明他将资本主义社会作为一种结构性存在来看待，并且还明确指出问题的关键在于，要在资本主义社会“内部的结构”中把握各种经济关系。

Secondly, from the dimension of “cognitive tools,” in order to accurately dissect capitalist society as a structural existence, Marx creatively proposed a number of new concepts and conceptual systems. Thinkers before Marx, whether economists or philosophers, had never taken the structural elements and their interrelations within capitalist society as the key object of cognition. Moreover, the overall structure of capitalist society as understood by Marx requires “heterogeneous, discontinuous concepts of time,” which, “at the level of the mode of movement, is a composite of different times (measures),” so that “to conceptualize such complex relations of the capitalist social structure, although not impossible, is in fact very difficult.” [6]6 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2009), p. 100. [The original text cites Althusser’s concept of “heterogeneous, discontinuous time” as a structuralist reading of Marx’s method.] Nonetheless, Marx still provided us with the necessary conceptual system for understanding the overall structure of capitalist society, a system composed of concepts such as surplus value, labor power, value form, relations of production, and variable capital. It is this entirely new conceptual system created by Marx that enables us to deeply analyze capitalist society as a structural existence, allowing us to follow Marx’s steps and surpass previous economists and philosophers, because they “at the level of economic facts will ‘see’ no structure, just as ‘physicists’ before Newton could not ‘see’ the law of gravity in a falling body, or chemists before Lavoisier could not ‘see’ oxygen in ‘dephlogisticated’ air.” [7]7 Ibid., p. 22. [Althusser uses the analogy of pre-scientific blindness to illustrate how classical political economy failed to see the structural relations of capitalism.] Obviously, here we cannot examine one by one how Marx created these unique concepts for grasping the structure of capitalist society, nor the interrelations among them, nor can we easily explain how to understand the overall structure of capitalist society through them. However, we can select two important concepts from among the new concepts Marx proposed for revealing the structure of capitalist society for analysis.

其次，从“认识工具”这个维度来看，为了准确解剖作为结构性存在的资本主义社会，马克思创造性地提出了一些新的概念和概念体系。马克思之前的思想家，无论是经济学家还是哲学家，都不曾将资本主义社会内部的结构性要素及相互关系作为认识的重点对象。此外，马克思理解的资本主义社会整体结构需要“异质的非连续性的时间概念”,它在“运动方式的层面上，就是不同时间(的量度)的复合态”,因而要将资本主义社会结构“如此复杂的关系加以概念化，虽然不是不可能的，但实际上是很难的”。尽管如此，马克思仍然为我们认识资本主义社会整体结构提供了必要的概念体系，这一概念体系由剩余价值、劳动力、价值形式、生产关系、可变资本等概念构成。正是马克思创造的这一全新的概念体系，使得我们能够深度剖析资本主义社会这一结构性存在，使得我们能够跟随马克思的步伐超越以往的经济学家和哲学家，因为他们“在经济事实的层面上将‘看不到’任何结构，正像牛顿以前的‘物理学家’不能在落体中‘看到’引力定律或者拉瓦锡以前的化学家不能在‘脱燃素的’空气中‘看到’氧一样”。显然，在此我们不能一一考察马克思如何创造了这些把握资本主义社会结构的独特概念，以及它们之间的相互关系，也难以阐释如何通过它们认识资本主义社会的整体结构。不过，我们可以选取马克思为揭示资本主义社会结构而提出的新概念中的两个重要概念来加以分析。

First, the concept of surplus value. Engels pointed out that surplus value is one of Marx’s two great discoveries in his lifetime. [8]8 Frederick Engels, “Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 162. [Engels’s eulogy identifies surplus value and the materialist conception of history as Marx’s two great discoveries.] It was the discovery of surplus value that enabled Marx to successfully reveal “the special law of motion governing the modern capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society it produces.” [9]9 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 92. [The “Afterword to the Second German Edition” contains this formulation; the original text quotes from a Chinese edition.] Thus, surplus value not only occupies an important position in Marx’s entire ideological system but is also crucial for revealing the overall operational laws of capitalist society. When Marx discusses the “general formula for capital” in *Capital*, he reveals that the circulation process “G—W—G′” produces an increment, namely “ΔG,” and this increment is precisely “surplus value.” [10]10 Ibid., p. 251. [Marx’s general formula for capital is M–C–M′, where the increment ΔM is surplus value.] Here, Marx clearly defines the concept of surplus value. Furthermore, Marx surpassed the classical political economists by revealing that, although surplus value cannot be separated from the sphere of circulation, it essentially arises from the sphere of production, from surplus labor in the sphere of production, that is, “surplus value always arises from a quantitative surplus of labor, from the prolongation of the duration of the same labor process….” [11]11 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 320. [Marx argues that surplus value originates from the prolongation of the working day in the production process.] As some researchers have emphasized, Marx’s concept of surplus value is a “non-calculable, non-quantitative concept.” [12]12 The original text cites a Chinese secondary source; the phrase “non-calculable, non-quantitative concept” emphasizes that surplus value is a social relation, not a mere numerical magnitude. This concept of surplus value, with such a clear definition and distinct characteristics, was Marx’s original creation, a brand-new concept he refined to reveal the essence of capitalist exploitation and to understand the overall structure of capitalist society. Marx pointed out: “It seems that Ricardo also did not clarify this problem… Surplus value—insofar as it is the basis of profit but differs from what is usually called profit—has essentially never been elucidated.” [13]13 Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, part 2 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 406. [Marx criticizes Ricardo for conflating surplus value with profit, failing to grasp the former as a distinct category.] In fact, in Marx’s view, Ricardo’s understanding of profit had already touched upon surplus value, but regrettably, Ricardo ultimately failed to completely distinguish profit from surplus value, which means Ricardo could not have proposed the concept of surplus value in Marx’s sense.

其一，剩余价值概念。恩格斯曾指出，剩余价值是马克思一生中两个伟大的发现之一。正是剩余价值的发现，使得马克思成功揭示了“现代资本主义生产方式和它所产生的资产阶级社会的特殊的运动规律”。可见，剩余价值不仅在马克思整个思想体系中占据重要地位，而且对于揭示资本主义社会整体运作规律至关重要。马克思在《资本论》中论述“资本的总公式”时，揭示出“G—W—G′”这一流通过程会产生一个增殖额，即“ΔG”,而这个增殖额正是“剩余价值”。在此，马克思清晰定义了剩余价值概念。此外，马克思还超越了古典政治经济学家，揭示出剩余价值虽然离不开流通领域，但本质上产生自生产领域，来自生产领域中的剩余劳动，即“剩余价值都只是来源于劳动在量上的剩余，来源于同一个劳动过程……的持续时间的延长”。正如有研究者所强调的那样，马克思的剩余价值概念是“非计算的、非量的概念”。具有如此清晰定义和明确特征的剩余价值概念是马克思的首创，是他为了揭示资本主义剥削实质、认识资本主义社会整体结构所提炼的全新概念。马克思指出：“看来李嘉图也没有搞清楚这个问题……剩余价值——就它虽然是利润的基础，但又不同于通常所说的利润这一点来说——实质上从来没有被阐明过。”其实，在马克思看来，李嘉图关于利润的理解已经触及了剩余价值，但遗憾的是，李嘉图毕竟未能将利润和剩余价值彻底区分开，而这就意味着李嘉图不可能提出马克思意义上的剩余价值概念。

Second, the concept of value form. In the preface to the first edition of *Capital*, Marx points out: “For bourgeois society, the commodity form of the product of labor, or the value form of the commodity, is the economic cell-form.” [14]14 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 90. [The “Preface to the First German Edition” uses the biological metaphor of the “cell-form” to describe the commodity’s value form as the elementary unit of bourgeois society.] In this regard, we need to grasp two key points: first, Marx uses the metaphorical expression “cell-form” to speak of “value form,” indicating that Marx regards capitalist society as a structural existence, because the “cell” is a very important micro-element of the structural existence of an animal’s body; second, it highlights the importance of “value form” for understanding capitalist society, just as the “cell” is the foundational component of an animal’s body, “value form” is a key element for dissecting the overall structure of capitalist society. Precisely because “value form” is so important for grasping capitalist society, Marx subjected it to a detailed examination, not only investigating the relative value form and the equivalent form it involves but also systematically outlining its evolutionary process, from the accidental value form to the expanded value form, then to the general value form, and finally to the “dazzling money form.” [15]15 Ibid., p. 139. [Marx traces the historical development of value forms from accidental to expanded to general to money form, the last being “dazzling” in its apparent simplicity.] The point is that Marx made a substantive advance in the study of “value form,” because Marx clearly states: “The value form, whose completed shape is the money form, is very devoid of content and extremely simple. Nevertheless, for more than two thousand years human intelligence has been trying to fathom it, without any result.” [16]16 Ibid., p. 139. [Marx notes the paradox that the money form, though simple, eluded analysis for millennia.] Moreover, Marx also explained that “one of the fundamental shortcomings of classical political economy is that it never succeeded, from the analysis of the commodity, and especially of the value of the commodity, in discovering the value form which makes value into exchange value,” and even “Adam Smith and Ricardo, for example, treat the value form as something completely unimportant or external to the nature of the commodity.” [17]17 Ibid., p. 174. [Marx criticizes classical political economy for neglecting the value form as a distinct object of analysis.] Accordingly, political economists before Marx completely ignored “value form,” and therefore could not have made any substantive contribution to the content or analysis of this concept. In fact, “value form” reveals a relationship, namely the relationship between commodities and commodities, because “value itself has no direct objective form of manifestation and must be realized through the objectified ‘natural form’ of another commodity, appearing as ‘exchange value.’” [18]18 The original text paraphrases Marx’s argument that value must be expressed through the natural form of another commodity; see *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 138–163. As some commentators have said: “What Marx valued was the field of relations in which things are situated, not the things themselves.” [19]19 The original text cites a Chinese secondary source; the phrase emphasizes Marx’s relational ontology over a focus on things in themselves. Therefore, it is precisely Marx’s attention to the relationship between the field of relations in which things are situated and the things themselves that enabled him to make a breakthrough analysis of “value form.”

其二，价值形式概念。马克思在《资本论》第一版序言中指出：“对资产阶级社会说来，劳动产品的商品形式，或者商品的价值形式，就是经济的细胞形式。”对此，我们需要重点把握两点：一是马克思以“细胞形式”这种比喻的说法来言说“价值形式”,说明马克思将资本主义社会作为一种结构性存在来看待，因为“细胞”之于动物的身体来说是其结构性存在的一种非常重要的微观要素；二是凸显了“价值形式”对于理解资本主义社会的重要性，就像“细胞”是动物身体的构成基础一样，“价值形式”是解剖资本主义社会整体结构的关键要素。正是因为“价值形式”对于把握资本主义社会来说很重要，所以马克思对它进行了精细考察，不仅考察了它涉及的相对价值形式和等价形式，而且系统勾勒了它的演变历程，即从偶然的价值形式到扩大的价值形式，再到一般价值形式，最后到令人“炫目的货币形式”。要点在于，马克思对“价值形式”的研究作出了实质性的推进，因为马克思明确指出，“以货币形式为完成形态的价值形式，是极无内容和极其简单的。然而，两千多年来人类智慧对这种形式进行探讨的努力，并未得到什么结果”。不仅如此，马克思还曾阐明，“古典政治经济学的根本缺点之一，就是它从来没有从商品的分析，特别是商品价值的分析中，发现那种正是使价值成为交换价值的价值形式”,甚至于“像亚·斯密和李嘉图，把价值形式看成一种完全无关紧要的东西或在商品本性之外存在的东西”。据此而论，马克思之前的政治经济学家根本忽略了“价值形式”,因而不可能对这一概念的内容、分析有实质性贡献。实际上，“价值形式”展示出了一种关系，即商品与商品之间的关系，因为“价值本身没有直接的对象性表现形式，不得不通过另一个商品的对象化的‘自然形式’表现为‘交换价值’实现出来”。正如有论者所说：“马克思所重视的是物所处的关系之场域，而不是物本身。”因此，正是马克思对物所处的关系和物本身之间关系的关注，才使得他对“价值形式”作出了突破性分析。

Finally, from the dimension of how to establish an effective connection between “cognitive tools” and “special objects of cognition,” Marx addressed the key to this effective connection. Not to mention that through the overall presentation of *Capital*, Marx has already demonstrated that his original new concepts and conceptual system effectively reflect the overall structure of capitalist society, laying the foundation for our understanding of this structural existence of capitalist society; even solely from the methodological level he adhered to, it suffices to illustrate the effective connection between “cognitive tools” and “special objects of cognition.” On the one hand, the dialectical materialism that Marx adhered to is the key to ensuring an effective connection between “cognitive tools” and “special objects of cognition.” Marx criticized Hegel’s idealist dialectics, insisting that “the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man and translated into forms of thought.” [20]20 Marx, *Capital*, Afterword to the Second German Edition. [Translator’s note: This is a standard Marx citation; the English follows the standard translation.] Dialectical materialism ensured that the concepts Marx proposed for understanding the overall structure of capitalist society were not pure speculative thinking, but closely dependent on “material things,” dependent on the reality of capitalist society. On the other hand, Marx discussed a more specific method, namely “the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete,” and this method is likewise the key to ensuring an effective connection between “cognitive tools” and “special objects of cognition.” The general method of political economy merely proceeds from concrete reality to derive “abstract general relations,” whereas Marx emphasized that a further step is needed: to move from the abstract to the “concrete in thought,” that is, to reproduce in thought the various specific determinations of the object of cognition and their relations. Marx also reminded us that the “concrete in thought” can never replace the “concrete in reality”; the latter determines the former, not the other way around, because the “concrete in thought” is merely “the way in which thought grasps the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete in the mind. But by no means is it the process of the genesis of the concrete itself.” [21]21 Marx, *Grundrisse*, Introduction. [Translator’s note: Standard Marx citation.] Therefore, the “method of rising from the abstract to the concrete” that Marx upheld also ensured that the concepts and conceptual system he proposed could provide a scientific understanding of the object of cognition.

最后，从“认识工具”和“特殊认识对象”之间如何建立有效联系这一维度来看，马克思论及了这种有效联系的关键。且不论马克思通过《资本论》的整体呈现，已经展示出他独创的新的概念和概念体系有效地反映了资本主义社会的整体结构，为我们认识资本主义社会这一结构性存在奠定了基础，单从他坚持的方法论层面来看，也足以说明“认识工具”与“特殊认识对象”之间的有效联系。一方面，马克思坚持的辩证唯物主义方法是确保“认识工具”与“特殊认识对象”之间具有有效联系的关键。马克思批判了黑格尔的唯心主义辩证法，坚持“观念的东西不外是移入人的头脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已”。辩证唯物主义方法确保了马克思提出的用以认识资本主义社会整体性结构的概念并不是纯思维的思辨，而是密切依赖“物质的东西”,依赖资本主义社会现实。另一方面，马克思论述了一种更为具体的方法，即“从抽象上升到具体的方法”，而这一方法同样是确保“认识工具”与“特殊认识对象”之间具有有效联系的关键。一般的政治经济学方法，只是从现实具体出发得出“抽象的一般的关系”,而马克思则强调，还需要更进一步，即从抽象达到“思维具体”,也就是在思维中再现认识对象的各种具体规定及其关系。马克思还不忘提醒我们，“思维具体”决不能代替“现实具体”,是后者决定前者，而不是相反，因为“思维具体”只是“思维用来掌握具体、把它当做一个精神上的具体再现出来的方式。但决不是具体本身的产生过程”。因此，马克思所秉持的“从抽象上升到具体的方法”,也确保了他所提出的概念和概念体系能够对认识对象进行科学认识。

In summary, Althusser’s reshaping of the “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology through the question “with what concepts and what conceptual system can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations” corresponds, in a certain sense, to Marx’s relevant “textual content.”

综上所述，阿尔都塞以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题重塑马克思认识论“总问题”,在一定意义上契合马克思的相关“文本内容”。

II. Althusser’s Reshaped “Problematic” of Marx’s Epistemology Conforms to “Logical Evolution”

二、阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”符合“逻辑演进”

Besides corresponding in a certain sense to Marx’s relevant “textual content,” Althusser’s reshaped “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology also conforms, to some extent, to the “logical evolution” of the epistemological “problematic” within classical German philosophy. As is well known, Marx’s philosophical thought was constructed on the basis of criticizing and absorbing the philosophical theories of classical German philosophers represented by Kant, Hegel, and others. Therefore, grasping the “logical evolution” of the transformation of Marx’s epistemological “problematic” “requires relying on the theoretical legacy of Kant and Hegel.” [22]22 Author’s citation; source not specified in the original. Based on this, we can summarize this “logical evolution” as: from Kant’s “how is knowledge possible” to Hegel’s “how is a scientific system as truth possible,” and then to Althusser’s reshaped “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology — “with what concepts and what conceptual system can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations.”

除了在一定意义上契合马克思的相关“文本内容”外，阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”也在一定程度上符合认识论“总问题”在德国古典哲学中的“逻辑演进”。众所周知，马克思的哲学思想是在批判和吸收以康德、黑格尔等为代表的德国古典哲学家的哲学理论的基础上构建起来的，因而把握马克思认识论“总问题”变革的“逻辑演进”,“需要依托康德和黑格尔的理论遗产”。基于此，我们可以将这一“逻辑演进”概括为：从康德的“认识何以可能”到黑格尔的“作为真理的科学体系如何可能”,再到阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”——“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”。

Kant explicitly posed the question: “what are the conditions for the possibility of knowledge.” It is undeniable that this question posed by Kant became a core issue that modern epistemological philosophy had to confront. Therefore, the “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology must have a profound logical connection with this core epistemological question raised by Kant. To accurately grasp this logical connection, it is necessary, on the one hand, to briefly analyze how Kant answered the question “how is knowledge possible,” and on the other hand, to elucidate the limitations of Kant’s answer and the limitations of the question “how is knowledge possible” itself.

康德明确追问了这样一个问题，即“认识的可能性的条件是什么”。不可否认，康德追问的这一问题成为近代认识论哲学研究不得不面对的核心问题。因此，马克思认识论的“总问题”必然与康德提出的这一认识论的核心问题具有深刻的逻辑联系。为了准确把握这种逻辑联系，一方面需要简要分析康德对“认识何以可能”这一问题作出了怎样的回答，另一方面需要阐明康德所提供的答案的局限以及“认识何以可能”这一问题本身的局限。

Kant answered the question “how is knowledge possible” on the basis of a strict subject-object dichotomy; therefore, his analysis and explanation of knowledge still operated within the framework of the “subject-object” paradigm. However, Kant advocated “tracing back, prior to experience, the a priori conditions that make empirical knowledge possible,” [23]23 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B20. [Translator’s note: Standard Kant citation format.] thereby justifying the principle that “objects must conform to our cognition,” [24]24 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxvi. [Translator’s note: The “Copernican Revolution” reference.] thus completing the “Copernican Revolution” in the history of philosophy. To go further, Kant reversed traditional epistemology: the knowing subject does not passively copy the object, but possesses “activity,” because the subject provides within itself the transcendental conditions that make knowledge possible. For Kant, it is precisely by relying on the “a priori knowledge” within themselves that people transform the chaotic manifold of human experience into unified perception; “otherwise human experience would be nothing but an impossible chaos, a purely formless, fragmentary multiplicity.” [25]25 Author’s paraphrase of Kant; source not specified. Kant emphasized that although all human knowledge begins with empirical knowledge, this does not mean that it all arises from experience; on the contrary, empirical knowledge itself “is a composite of what we receive through impressions and what our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensory impressions) supplies from itself.” [26]26 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B1. [Translator’s note: Standard opening of the Introduction.] What is referred to here as “what it supplies from itself” is what Kant called “a priori knowledge,” which is also the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge. Kant understood “a priori knowledge” as “knowledge absolutely independent of all experience,” [27]27 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B3. [Translator’s note: Standard definition.] and he conducted a profound exploration of which “a priori knowledge” makes “how is knowledge possible” possible, meticulously examining a series of “a priori knowledge,” including the two transcendental elements of time and space, transcendental schemata such as causality, and the synthesis of the transcendental imagination, elucidating their unique roles in the cognitive process of the human subject.

康德是在严格的主客二分的基础上来回答“认识何以可能”这一问题的，因此他关于认识的分析和阐释仍然在“主体-客体”范式的框架下。不过，康德主张“先于经验而去追溯经验知识之所以可能的先天条件”,证成了“对象必须遵照我们的认识”。这一原则，从而完成了哲学史上的“哥白尼革命”。更进一步说，康德倒转了传统的认识论，即认识主体并不是被动地摹写客体，而是有“主动性”的，因为主体在自身之内提供了使认识得以可能的先验性条件。在康德这里，人们恰恰是凭借在自身之内的“先天知识”,将纷繁复杂的人类经验转变为统一的知觉，“否则人类的经验只是一种不可能的混沌、纯粹无形式的、零碎的多样性”。康德强调，虽然人类的知识都是从经验知识开始，但这并不意味着它们都产生自经验，相反，经验知识本身“也是由我们通过印象所接受的东西和我们自己的认识能力(通过仅仅由感性印象所诱发)从自己本身提供的东西的一个复合物”。此处提到的“从自己本身提供的东西”就是康德称为“先天知识”的东西，也是认识得以可能的必要条件。康德把“先天知识”理解为“绝对不依赖于一切经验而发生的知识”,他对有哪些“先天知识”使得“认识何以可能”进行了精深的探索，细致考察了包括时间和空间这两个先验要素、因果关系等先验图型以及先验想象力的综合等在内的一系列“先天知识”,阐明了它们在人类主体认识过程中的独特作用。

Although we cannot examine here one by one all the “a priori knowledge” that Kant identified, since human cognition cannot do without concepts, and how humans produce concepts is the key to “how is knowledge possible,” we focus on examining Kant’s discussion of “a priori concepts.” Kant famously said: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” [28]28 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B75. [Translator’s note: Standard famous dictum.] If human sensibility provides content for cognition, then human understanding provides concepts for cognition. Kant emphasized: “Intuition and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them in some way, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge.” [29]29 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B74. [Translator’s note: Standard formulation.] In Kant’s view, intuition and concepts constitute the necessary conditions for the possibility of human cognition; both are indispensable, and neither can be lacking. Relatively speaking, intuition is not complicated; what is complicated is concepts. So how are concepts actually formed? Kant believed that the formation of concepts requires two kinds of “synthesis”: first, the synthesis of the transcendental imagination; second, the synthesis formed by the unity of transcendental apperception. The former synthesizes the manifold of intuition, preparing for the generation of a priori concepts; the latter, on the basis of the former synthesis, forms a genuine conceptual synthesis. On this, Kant pointed out: “For the a priori knowledge of all objects to be attained, what must first be given is the manifold of pure intuition; second, the synthesis of this manifold by the imagination, but this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts that give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, provide the third element for the cognition of a presented object, and they rest on the understanding.” [30]30 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B104. [Translator’s note: Standard passage on the three elements.] Thus, the formation of concepts relies on two kinds of transcendental synthesis, and these two syntheses are not separate but sequentially connected; only through their joint action can “a priori concepts” truly arise, and human cognition become possible.

尽管在这里我们无法一一考校康德所锚定的“先天知识”,但是，因为人类主体的认识无法离开概念，而人如何产生概念是“认识何以可能”的关键，所以我们重点考察康德关于“先天概念”的论述。康德有句名言：“思想无内容则空，直观无概念则盲。”如果说人的感性能力为认识提供了内容，那么人的知性则为认识提供了概念。康德强调：“直观和概念构成了我们一切知识的要素，以至于无论是概念没有以某些方式与它们相应的直观、还是直观没有概念，都不能提供知识。”在康德看来，直观和概念构成了人之认识得以可能的必要条件，二者缺一不可。相对而言，直观并不复杂，复杂的是概念。那么，概念究竟是如何形成的?康德认为，概念的形成需要通过两种“综合”:一是先验想象力的综合；二是先验统觉的统一性所形成的综合。前者将直观的杂多综合起来，为先天概念的产生作准备；后者则在前者综合的基础上，形成真正的概念性综合。对此，康德指出：“为了达到一切对象的先天知识，必须被给予我们的，首先是纯直观的杂多；其次是这种杂多凭借想象力的综合，但这还没有提供知识。给这种纯粹的综合提供统一性、并仅仅存在于这种必然的综合统一的表象之中的概念，为一个呈现的对象的认识提供了第三种东西，而且所依据的是知性。”可见，概念的形成凭借两种先验综合，并且这两种综合并非割裂的，而是前后联系的，只有在它们的共同作用下，“先天概念”才能真正产生，人的认识才得以可能。

There is no doubt that Kant made an outstanding contribution to the epistemological question of “how is knowledge possible,” particularly in his determination that the “a priori knowledge” provided by the subject itself is a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge, offering an excellent line of argument for grasping the micro-level generative path of cognition. However, Kant’s inquiry into and research on “how is knowledge possible” does not constitute the entirety of epistemological study; or, to put it more directly, both his answer to “how is knowledge possible” and the question itself have evident limitations.

毋庸置疑，康德在追问并解答“认识何以可能”这一认识论问题上作出了突出贡献，特别是他认定主体自身之内提供的“先天知识”是认识得以可能的必要条件，为人们把握认识的微观生成路径提供了出色的论证思路。不过，康德关于“认识何以可能”的追问和研究并不是认识论研究的全部，或者说得更直接一些，他关于“认识何以可能”的解答以及这一问题本身都存在明显的局限。

First, Kant’s epistemological analysis necessarily relies on the “transcendental subject,” yet this subject is an illusion. Adorno’s critique of the “transcendental subject” is reasonable; he points out: “‘The transcendental subject is the Archimedean point’—this view may be an illusion, but this illusion can hardly be completely eliminated through the analysis of pure subjectivity alone. For this illusion contains something real that has not been dissected out from the mediation of thought, namely, the priority of society over individual consciousness and all its experience.” [31]31 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 180. It can be seen that the abstract “transcendental subject” does not exist, because any real subject has already been mediated by “society.” It should be noted that Adorno’s critique of the “transcendental subject” is consistent with Marx, who always understood humans as beings living in society, whose essence in reality is the “ensemble of all social relations.” [32]32 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 4. Therefore, from a strict dialectical materialist standpoint, the “transcendental subject” on which Kant’s epistemological construction depends is indeed an illusion.

其一，康德的这一认识论分析必然依赖于“先验主体”,而这一主体却是一种幻相。阿多尔诺对“先验主体”的批判是合理的，他指出：“‘先验主体是阿基米德点’——这个观点也许是幻相，但这个幻相几乎不能通过对纯粹主观性自身的分析而完全消除。因为这个幻相内含着未从思维中介中剖析出来的那种真实的东西，即社会对个体意识及其所有经验的先在性。”可见，抽象的“先验主体”并不存在，因为任何现实的主体都已经被“社会”中介。需要指出的是，阿多尔诺关于“先验主体”的批判与马克思一致，马克思始终将人理解为生存于社会中的人，其本质在现实性上是“一切社会关系的总和”。因此，基于严格的辩证唯物主义立场，康德认识论建构所依赖的“先验主体”的确是一种幻相。

Second, Kant’s epistemological analysis is clearly lacking in sociality, historicity, and practicality. “Kant’s critique of knowledge suspends the dimensions of historicity and sociality,” [33]33 Author’s reference; likely from a Chinese source on Kantian epistemology. not only because Kant’s “transcendental subject” lacks a social foundation, but also because he “confines himself to the micro-level examination of the cognitive process of the single subject, i.e., the individual.” [34]34 Ibid. Kant’s epistemological analysis lacks a practical dimension; as Sohn-Rethel criticizes, Kant neglects the dimension of manual labor, and his “main effort is directed toward proving the self-grounding autonomy of mental labor.” [35]35 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology* (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 7.

其二，康德的认识论分析明显地缺乏社会性、历史性和实践性。“康德的认识批判悬搁了历史性和社会性的维度”,这不仅因为康德的“先验主体”缺乏社会性根基，而且因为他“局限于单个主体即个人的认识过程的微观考察”。康德的认识论分析缺乏实践性向度，如索恩-雷特尔批判的那样，康德忽视了体力劳动的向度，他“主要努力的方向是证明脑力劳动的自我奠定的自律”。

Third, the “subject-object” cognitive model on which Kant’s epistemological analysis relies also has limitations. The reason the “subject-object” cognitive model is flawed is that many of the objects people confront are not “pure objects” but objects mediated by the subject. For example, the numerous objects Marx studies in *Capital*, including commodities, money, and capital, are not “pure objects.” Taking only the commodity as an object, Marx points out: “Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values.” [36]36 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 138. In Marx’s view, the exchange-value attribute of commodities makes them not pure objects, but objects mediated by the subject; this kind of object “is always an object given in the form of thought, because it is always an object given in the form of (exchange) value.” [37]37 Author’s reference; likely from a secondary source on Marx’s value theory. In short, subject and object are not sharply demarcated but interpenetrate each other. Or, from a structuralist perspective, subject and object are already “in a symbolic or properly structuralist relationship,” [38]38 Author’s reference; likely from a structuralist or Althusserian source. making it impossible to effectively “separate” the two.

其三，康德认识论分析所依赖的“主体-客体”认识模式也存在局限。“主体-客体”认识模式之所以存在缺陷，是因为人们面对的大量客体并不是“纯粹客体”,而是被主体中介过的客体，如马克思在《资本论》中研究的大量客体，包括商品、货币、资本等，就并非“纯粹客体”。仅以商品这一客体为例，马克思指出：“在商品体的价值对象性中连一个自然物质原子也没有。”在马克思看来，商品的交换价值属性使得它不是纯粹的客体，而是由主体所中介的客体，这种客体“是一个总是以思想的形式被给予的对象，因为它是一个总是以(交换)价值的形式被给予的对象”。要言之，主体与客体之间并非泾渭分明，而是相互渗透。或者从结构主义的视角来看，主体与客体已经“处于一种象征的或适当结构主义的关系之中”,从而无法有效地将两者“剥离”开来。

Fourth, the question Kant asks—“how is knowledge possible”—is certainly an important issue in epistemological research, but it is not the only one. Questions such as those Althusser asks—“by what mechanism does the cognitive process, which takes place entirely in thought, cognitively grasp its real object, which exists outside thought in the real world” [39]39 Louis Althusser, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979), p. 56.—or those Sohn-Rethel asks—how the conceptual forms of scientific and philosophical mental labor can be understood as historical phenomena—or those Adorno asks—how one can access “what is excluded by the abstract mechanism of the concept and has not yet become an example of the concept” [40]40 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 8.—are all important issues in the field of epistemology. Therefore, from the broader perspective of epistemological research, merely inquiring into the question “how is knowledge possible” is clearly insufficient.

其四，康德所追问的“认识何以可能”这一问题固然是认识论研究中的一个重要问题，却不是唯一问题，如阿尔都塞所追问的——“完全在思维中进行的认识过程以何种机制在认识上掌握存在于思维之外，现实世界之中的它的现实对象”,再如索恩-雷特尔所追问的——科学和哲学的脑力劳动的概念形式如何才能被理解为历史现象,又如阿多尔诺所追问的——如何才能通达被概念的“抽象机制排除的尚未成为概念范例的东西”等，都是认识论领域的重要问题。因此，从认识论研究的更广阔的视野来看，仅仅追问“认识何以可能”这一问题显然是不够的。

Hegel evidently saw the numerous problems in Kant’s epistemological analysis, and thus transformed the question Kant asked—“how is knowledge possible”—in epistemological research, and broke through Kant’s analytical method under the subject-object dichotomy. In the “Introduction” to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel expresses “a clear intention to break through Kant’s critique of knowledge and restructure the epistemological problematic.” [41]41 Author’s reference; likely from a Chinese commentary on Hegel. Dissatisfied with epistemological analysis under the subject-object dichotomy, Hegel replaced it with “the unity formed by the self-movement of spirit.” Hegel critically points out: “Applying the single, immovable form of the cognitive subject to ready-made things, injecting material from outside into this static element—these practices, like arbitrary fancies about content, fail to satisfy our demands.” [42]42 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), § 53. Although Hegel does not name Kant, Kant’s epistemological analysis is precisely the object of Hegel’s critique here. The reason for saying this is that Kant found the various “a priori knowledge” that makes knowledge possible within the subject, and these “a priori knowledge” are precisely the “immovable forms” Hegel criticizes. Although Hegel’s main critique here is directed at the “static nature” of the cognitive mode, he has already expressed dissatisfaction with the subject-object dichotomy. Hegel further points out: “Concepts such as ‘subject,’ ‘object,’ ‘God,’ ‘nature’ … are taken for granted as common sense, as some kind of valid foundation, and constitute fixed starting points and endpoints. Movement shuttles back and forth between these fixed, ever-immovable starting points and endpoints, thus moving only on their surface.” [43]43 Ibid., § 55. Here Hegel explicitly criticizes the dichotomy of “subject” and “object,” suggests that the basis of validity for each needs to be examined, and critically points out that the “cognition” conducted by taking the two as starting points and endpoints remains only on the “surface.”

黑格尔显然看到了康德认识论分析的重重问题，因而在认识论研究方面变革了康德所追问的“认识何以可能”这一问题，并突破了康德主客二分模式下的认识论分析方法。黑格尔在《精神现象学》的“导论”中表达了“突破康德认识批判、重塑认识论问题的明确意图”。黑格尔不满于主客二分模式下的认识论分析，以“精神的自我运动所形成的统一”取代了主客二分模式。黑格尔批判性地指出，“把认知主体之唯一的一个不动的形式应用到现成事物上面，从外面把材料注入到这个静态的要素里面，这些做法就和那些关于内容的随意奇想一样，都没有满足我们的要求”。黑格尔尽管没有提名康德，但是康德的认识论分析恰恰是黑格尔在这里批判的对象。之所以如此说，是因为康德是在主体内部找到了认识得以可能的种种“先天知识”,而这些“先天知识”就是黑格尔所批判的“不动的形式”。黑格尔虽然在这里重点 批判的是认识方式的“静态性”,但已经表露出了对主客二分的不满。黑格尔进一步指出：“‘主体’、‘客体’、‘上帝’、‘自然’……等概念被不假思索地当作常识，当作某种有效的基础，并构成一些固定的出发点和归宿。运动在这些固定的、始终一动不动的出发点和归宿之间来回穿梭，因此仅仅是在它们的表面上进行。”黑格尔在此明确批判了“主体”与“客体”的二分，提示二者各自的有效性基础有待考证，批判性地指出将二者作为出发点和归宿所进行的“认识”仅仅停留在“表面上”。

In fact, Hegel insists that “subject” and “object” are unified within the self-movement of spirit. In Hegel’s view, “‘Spirit’ is the most sublime concept … it is a being that exists in and for itself. … It is a spiritual substance.” [44]44 G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Part Three: *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace and A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), § 381. At the same time, Hegel also points out: “Substance is essentially a subject.” [45]45 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 17. Therefore, Hegel understands spirit both as substance and as subject, which means that the spirit as Hegel understands it can achieve “autonomous” movement by mediating itself. Hegel emphasizes: “Spirit transforms itself into an object, because it is such a movement: transforming itself into an other, that is, into an object of spirit’s own self, and at the same time sublating this other-being.” [46]46 Ibid., § 36. Thus, in Hegel’s view, “subject” and “object” are merely externalizations of the “spiritual” substance, two forms of manifestation of the “spiritual” substance, just as Marx says that commodities and money are two forms of manifestation of the value substance. In this way, Hegel unifies “subject” and “object” within the “spiritual substance,” or within the self-movement of spirit. Hence, it can be considered that “the identity of subject and object is the new coordinate system of Hegel’s epistemology.” [47]47 Author’s reference; likely from a Chinese source on Hegelian epistemology.

事实上，黑格尔坚持“主体”与“客体”统一于精神的自我运动之内。在黑格尔看来，“‘精神’是一个最崇高的概念……它是一个自在且自为存在着的存在。……它是一个精神性实体”。与此同时，黑格尔还指出：“实体在本质上是一个主体。”因此，黑格尔将精神既理解为实体，又理解为主体，这意味着黑格尔所理解的精神可以以自我为中介实现“自主”运动。黑格尔强调：“精神转变为一个对象，因为它就是这样一种运动：自己转变为一个他者，也就是说，转变为精神的自主体的一个对象，同时又扬弃这个他者存在。”所以，在黑格尔看来，“主体”和“客体”不过是“精神”实体的外化，是“精神”实体的两种表现形式，就像马克思说商品和货币是价值实体的两种表现形式一样。这样一来，黑格尔就将“主体”和“客体”统一于“精神实体”中，或者说统一于精神的自我运动中。因而可以认为，“主客体的同一性是黑格尔认识论的新坐标系”。

Starting from the new epistemological coordinate of “the identity of subject and object,” the epistemological “problematic” that Hegel pursued focused on “how a scientific system of truth is possible.” Hegel explicitly stated: “Truth, as an existent, can have its true form only in a scientific system of truth.” Then, how can this “scientific system of truth” be constructed? “Truth attains its element of existence only in the concept.” Therefore, Hegel’s so-called “scientific system of truth” can, in a certain sense, be described as a “scientific system of concepts.” No wonder Hegel emphasized: “We attempt to present a scientific system through the self-movement of the concept, but this effort seems unlikely to gain people’s recognition.” It can be seen that this “scientific system of truth” is constructed through the self-movement of the concept, and the role of the human individual in this process can even be disregarded, to the point that Hegel stated, “In the entire work of spirit, only a tiny share can be attributed to the action of the individual.” Furthermore, the “scientific system of truth” that Hegel emphasized possesses historicity and dynamism: “historicity” is reflected in the fact that the concept, as the element of truth’s existence, undergoes a longitudinal historical process of development; while “dynamism” is manifested in the self-mediating movement of the concept itself. Hegel once explicitly stated: “What this Phenomenology of Spirit presents is precisely the process of transformation of science or knowledge in general. The initial knowledge, i.e., an immediate spirit, is something devoid of spirit, a sensory consciousness. To become true knowledge, or to produce the element of science (i.e., the pure concept of science itself), it must undergo a long and arduous labor.” Here, we need to grasp three key points: First, Hegel focuses on the transformative process of “science and knowledge,” and his inquiry into the question “how a scientific system of truth is possible” has a strict epistemological significance; second, the scientific system of concepts is not achieved overnight but requires a process of “long and arduous labor”; third, in this process, the subject of “arduous labor” is not the human being, but “spirit” or the “concept” itself. In short, Hegel not only replaced Kant’s question “how is knowledge possible?” with “how is a scientific system of truth possible?” but also provided a systematic answer to the latter.

从“主客体的同一性”这一认识论的新坐标系出发，黑格尔所追问的认识论“总问题”关注“作为真理的科学体系如何可能”。黑格尔明确表示：“真理，作为一个实存，其真实的形态只能是一个科学的真理体系。”那么，这一“科学的真理体系”如何才能得以建构呢?“真理唯有在概念那里才获得它的实存要素”。因此，黑格尔所谓的“科学的真理体系”在一定意义上可以说是“科学的概念体系”。难怪黑格尔强调：“我们尝试着通过概念的自身运动而呈现出一个科学体系，但这份努力看起来不容易得到人们的认 可。”可以看到，这个“科学的真理体系”是通过概念自身的运动而构建的，人类个体在这个过程中的作用甚至可以忽略不计，以至于黑格尔表示，“在精神的整个作品里，只有一点微不足道的份额可以归功于个体的行为”。此外，黑格尔所强调的“科学的真理体系”具有历史性和动态性，“历史性”体现在作为真理实存要素的概念有一个纵向的历史发展过程；而“动态性”体现为概念本身的自我中介运动。黑格尔曾明确表示：“这部精神现象学所呈现出来的，就是一般意义上的科学或知识的这个转变过程。最初的知识，亦即一个直接的精神，是一种缺乏精神的东西，是一种感性意识。为了成为真正的知识，或者说为了制造出科学的那个要素(即科学的纯粹概念本身),它必须经历一番漫长的辛勤劳作。”此处，我们需要重点把握三点：其一，黑格尔关注“科学和知识”的转变过程，他关于“作为真理的科学体系如何可能”这一问题的追问具有严格的认识论意义；其二，作为科学的概念体系并非一蹴而就，需要经历“漫长的辛勤劳作”过程；其三，在这个过程中，“辛勤劳作”的主体并不是人类，而是“精神”或者说“概念”自身。总之，黑格尔不仅用“作为真理的科学体系如何可能”取代了康德的“认识何以可能”这一问题，而且对前者作出了系统解答。

Although Hegel’s epistemological analysis achieved breakthroughs and developments compared to Kant—particularly in that he not only replaced Kant’s subject-object dichotomy with “the unity of subject and object in the self-movement of spirit,” but also substituted Kant’s “how is knowledge possible?” with “how is a scientific system of truth possible?” and introduced “historicity” and “dialectical movement” into epistemological analysis—nevertheless, just as Kant’s epistemological analysis could not satisfy Hegel, Hegel’s epistemological analysis equally could not satisfy Marx. From Marx’s perspective, Hegel’s epistemological analysis mainly suffered from the following three problems. First, it fell into an idealist illusion, because Hegel “understood the real as the result of self-synthesizing, self-deepening, and self-moving thought.” According to dialectical materialism, it is not “thought” that produces and determines “the real,” but “the real” that produces and determines “thought.” Therefore, Marx insisted that “the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the human mind and translated into forms of thought.” It is precisely on this basis that Marx particularly emphasized the need to turn Hegel’s “inverted” dialectics right side up. Second, it left insufficient room for the human subject. In Hegel’s view, “knowledge” became an “autonomous entity” capable of mediating itself, developing itself, and constructing a system, while the human subject became a negligible existence in this process, with its subjective initiative greatly obliterated. Of course, Marx resolutely opposed Hegel’s approach, because what he emphasized—such as “the point is to change the world,” the material production process being under “the conscious and planned control of human beings,” and other forms of “social practice”—all require human subjective initiative. Thus, contrary to Hegel, in Marx’s view, it is not “knowledge” that uses the human subject to achieve its own developmental ends, but the human subject that uses “knowledge” to achieve its own ends. Third, it neither recognized society as a structural existence nor explained what conceptual system could analyze and grasp the various elements of society as a structural existence and their relations. In the field of epistemological research, Hegel focused solely on “the self-development of spirit” or “the self-movement of the concept,” thereby neglecting the analysis of actual human society. Clearly, this limitation in Hegel’s epistemological analysis was one that Marx’s epistemological analysis specifically sought to overcome. This is because the foothold of Marx’s philosophical thought has always been actual society; what he pursued was not the “illusory happiness” offered by religion, but real happiness. Therefore, Marx strongly demanded the transformation of the existing capitalist society through concrete practice. To transform capitalist society, it was necessary to achieve a scientific understanding of this object and to uncover the “natural laws of its own movement.”

尽管黑格尔的认识论分析相较于康德有所突破和发展，特别是他不仅以“主客体统一于精神的自我运动”取代了康德的主客二分模式，而且以“作为真理的科学体系如何可能”代替了康德的“认识何以可能”,还将“历史性”和“辩证运动”引入了认识论分析，但是，正像康德的认识论分析不能令黑格尔满意一样，黑格尔的认识论分析同样不能让马克思满意。从马克思的观点来看，黑格尔的认识论分析主要存在以下三个问题。其一，陷入了唯心主义的幻觉，因为黑格尔“把实在理解为自我综合、自我深化和自我运动的思维的结果”。按照辩证唯物主义的观点，不是“思维”产生并决定“实在”,而是“实在”产生并决定“思维”。因此，马克思坚持认为，“观念的东西不外是移入人的头脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已”。也正是基于这一点，马克思特别强调要把黑格尔“倒立着的”辩证法给翻转过来。其二，没有给人类主体留下足够的位置。在黑格尔这里，“知识”成了“自主体”,它自己能够成为自身中介发展自身，建构体系，人类主体在这个过程中成了微不足道的存在，其主观能动性被极大地抹杀了。当然，马克思坚决反对黑格尔的这种做法，因为其强调的“问题在于改变世界”、物质生产过程处于人的“有意识有计划的控制之下”等“社会实践”均需要人的主观能动性。所以，与黑格尔相反，在马克思这里，不是“知识”利用人类主体实现自己发展的目的，而是人类主体利用“知识”实现自己的目的。其三，既没有对作为结构性存在的社会加以认识，也没有阐释何种概念体系能够分析和把握作为结构性存在的社会的各个要素及其关系。在认识论研究领域，黑格尔将目光仅仅聚焦于“精神的自我发展”或“概念的自我运动”,从而忽视了对现实的人类社会的分析。显然，黑格尔在认识论分析中的这一局限，是马克思认识论分析中重点加以克服的。这是因为，马克思哲学思想的立足点一直都是现实的社会，他所追求的不是宗教给予的“虚幻幸福”,而是现实幸福。因此，马克思强烈地要求通过具体的实践变革现存的资本主义社会。要变革资本主义社会，就必须对这一对象作出科学的认识，探明这一社会“本身运动的自然规律”。

Marx’s epistemology transcends Kant’s and Hegel’s epistemologies on both factual and logical levels. By means of the epistemological “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology as reshaped by Althusser—namely, “with what concepts and what conceptual system can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations?”—we can very concretely grasp precisely how Marx’s epistemology transcends Kant’s and Hegel’s epistemologies. First, and most intuitively, Marx’s epistemological “problematic” is already different from the epistemological “problematic” pursued by Kant and Hegel. This change in the epistemological “problematic,” compared to any innovation in a particular concept or any transformation in a specific research method that Marx achieved in the field of epistemological philosophy, is even more capable of demonstrating the breakthrough contribution of Marx’s epistemology relative to Kant’s and Hegel’s epistemologies. It is precisely for this reason that Althusser regarded this change in the epistemological “problematic” as “Marx’s immense theoretical revolution.” [48]48 Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2005), p. 33. Second, this new epistemological “problematic” requires that “we cannot think the determination of the elements by the structure either with the category of analytical and transitive causality, nor with the category of the universal expression causality of an inner essence immanent in the phenomena,” [49]49 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2009), p. 186. thereby fully demonstrating that the object of cognition, the paradigm of cognition, and the method of cognition that Marx’s epistemology focuses on are different from those that Kant’s and Hegel’s epistemologies focus on, and this is also the progressive aspect of Marx’s epistemology relative to Kant’s and Hegel’s epistemologies. Third, through the epistemological “problematic” of “with what concepts and what conceptual system can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations?” it can be discovered that, on the one hand, compared to Kant’s epistemology, Marx’s epistemology places greater emphasis on introducing the categories of history and society into epistemological analysis, rather than being confined to the subject-object dichotomy of a single cognitive subject and cognitive object; on the other hand, compared to Hegel’s epistemology, Marx’s epistemology pays more attention to social reality and also emphasizes the subjective initiative of the subject, because “the various elements of a structure and their relations” directly point to the reality of capitalist society, and “what concepts and what conceptual system” requires the subject to engage in arduous theoretical exploration in the face of the real world. Finally, this epistemological “problematic,” different from Kant’s and Hegel’s, indicates that Marx introduced a “structural” mode of thinking into epistemological analysis, because Marx explicitly regarded capitalist society as a “structural” existence and demanded in-depth research into its structural elements—such as commodities, the value-form, money, capital—and their interrelations.

马克思认识论在事实和逻辑双重层面上超越了康德和黑格尔的认识论。借助于阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”,即“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”,我们可以非常具体地把捉到马克思认识论究竟如何超越了康德和黑格尔的认识论。首先，最直观的是，马克思的认识论“总问题”已然不同于康德和黑格尔所追问的认识论“总问题”。这种认识论“总问题”的改变，相对于马克思在认识论哲学领域中所实现的某一概念的革新或者某一研究方法的变革来说，更加能够展示出马克思认识论相较于康德认识论和黑格尔认识论而言所具有的突破性贡献。也正因为如此，所以阿尔都塞才把这种认识论“总问题”的改变看作“马克思的巨大的理论革命”。其次，这种新的认识论“总问题”要求我们“不仅不能用分析的和传递的因果关系这一范畴来思考结构对各个要素的决定作用，而且也不能用现象所固有的内在本质的普遍表现因果关系这一范畴来思考这种决定作用”,由此充分展示出马克思认识论关注的认识对象、认识范式以及认识方法不同于康德认识论和黑格尔认识论关注的认识对象、认识范式以及认识方法，而这也是马克思认识论相较于康德认识论和黑格尔认识论的进步之处。再次，透过“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一认识论“总问题”可以发现，一方面，马克思认识论相较于康德认识论而言，更注重将历史和社会的范畴引入认识论分析中，而不再是局限于单个的认识主体与认识对象的主客二分的认识论模式；另一方面，马克思认识论相较于黑格尔认识论而言，更关注社会现实，也更强调主体的主观能动性，因为“结构的各个要素及其关系”直接指向资本主义社会现实，“何种概念和何种概念体系”要求主体面对现实世界进行艰辛的理论探索。最后，这一不同于康德和黑格尔的认识论“总问题”表明了马克思将一种“结构化”的思维引入了认识论分析，因为马克思明确将资本主义社会作为一种“结构性”的存在来看待，并要求对其包含的商品、价值形式、货币、资本等结构性要素及其相互关系作深入研究。

In sum, examining the “problematic” of Althusser’s restructured Marxist epistemology within the “evolutionary logic” of classical German philosophy not only broadens the horizon for studying the relationship between Marxist philosophy and Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, but also precisely reveals the core of Marxist epistemology that transcends Kantian and Hegelian epistemology.

总之，将阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”置于德国古典哲学的“演进逻辑”之中加以考察，不仅拓宽了研究马克思哲学与康德哲学、黑格尔哲学间关系的视野，而且精准地展示了马克思认识论超越于康德认识论和黑格尔认识论的核心所在。

III. The Limitations of the “Problematic” of Althusser’s Restructured Marxist Epistemology

三、阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”的局限性

Although Althusser restructured the “problematic” of Marxist epistemology with the question “with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations,” which to a certain extent both corresponds to Marx’s relevant “textual content” and conforms to the “logical evolution” of the epistemological “problematic” in classical German philosophy, it nonetheless has profound limitations.

尽管阿尔都塞以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题重塑马克思认识论“总问题”,在一定意义上既契合马克思的相关“文本内容”,又符合认识论“总问题”在德国古典哲学中的“逻辑演进”,但是也存在深刻的局限性。

First, Althusser’s effort to restructure the “problematic” of Marxist epistemology fails to fully incorporate the important category of practice in Marxist epistemology. In his *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx designated his own philosophy as, in a certain sense, “practical philosophy.” In that text, he specifically criticized all previous materialism, including Feuerbach’s, pointing out that its main defect lies in understanding objects, reality, and sensuousness only in the form of the object, without grasping them “as sensuous human activity, as practice,” and he emphasized that “all social life is essentially practical.” Here, Marx indicates a core of his dialectical materialism, namely, the emphasis on understanding objects, reality, and sensuousness from the dimension of practice; at the same time, he indicates that his epistemology has a practical character, because the understanding of objects and reality itself belongs to the category of epistemology. When Althusser restructured the “problematic” of Marxist epistemology with the question “with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations,” he did not entirely overlook the category of practice. On the contrary, Althusser placed special emphasis on practice, stressing that all levels of social existence are domains of different practices—economic practice, political practice, ideological practice, as well as technical practice and scientific practice—and he particularly extolled “theoretical practice.” “Theoretical practice” differs from other practices, from non-theoretical practices, “in the type of object (raw material) it processes, the type of means of production it sets in motion, the type of social-historical relations within which it produces, and finally, the type of object (knowledge) it produces.” Althusser’s restructuring of the “problematic” of Marxist epistemology actually focuses on “theoretical practice,” and the problem lies precisely here. “Theoretical practice” is only a part of practice, representing only the dimension of “mental labor,” while the dimension of “physical labor” is excluded.

第一，阿尔都塞重塑马克思认识论“总问题”的努力未能完整地吸纳实践这一马克思认识论哲学的重要范畴。马克思在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中标定了自己的哲学在一定意义上可以称为“实践哲学”。他在该文本中特别批判了从前的一切唯物主义，包括费尔巴哈的唯物主义，指出它们的主要缺点在于，对对象、现实、感性等的理解，只是从客体的形式去理解，而未能将其“当做感性的人的活动,当做实践去理解”,并且强调“全部社会生活在本质上是实践的”。在此，马克思表明了他的辩证唯物主义的一个核心，即注重从实践的维度来理解对象、现实、感性等；同时表明了他的认识论具有实践特质，因为对对象、现实的理解本身就属于认识论范畴。阿尔都塞在以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题重塑马克思认识论“总问题”时，并非完全没有留意到实践范畴。恰恰相反，阿尔都塞特别注重实践，强调社会存在的一切层次都是不同实践的领域——经济的实践、政治的实践、意识形态的实践以及技术的实践和科学的实践等，尤其推崇“理论实践”。“理论实践”在“它所加工的对象型式(原料)、它所推动的生产资料型式、它借以在其中进行生产的社会历史关系的型式方 面，最后，在它生产的对象(认识)型式方面，不同于其他的实践，不同于非理论的实践”。阿尔都塞重塑马克思认识论“总问题”实际上注重的是“理论实践”,而问题就出在这里。“理论实践”只是实践的一部分，仅代表了“脑力劳动”这一实践向度，而“体力劳动”这一实践向度被排除在外。

Second, Althusser’s effort to restructure the “problematic” of Marxist epistemology is overly confined within the “structuralist mode of thinking,” thereby neglecting the fundamental principle of the unity of the logical and the historical in Marxist epistemology. It must be acknowledged that Althusser’s restructuring of the “problematic” of Marxist epistemology with the question “with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations” does, to a certain extent, correspond to the research interest of Marxist epistemology, namely, the scientific analysis and understanding of the structural existence of capitalist society. However, the problem with Althusser’s formulation is also very evident—it only seizes the single dimension of the structural character of capitalist society, while neglecting the historical character of capitalist society and overlooking the transformation of human society under the unity of the logical and the historical. In short, although the question Althusser posed—“with what concepts and what system of concepts can one think the various elements of a structure and their relations”—can serve as an important problem that Marxist epistemology must solve, because it is confined within the “structuralist mode of thinking,” it can only understand and deal with structural objects, but cannot effectively understand and deal with objects that unify the logical and the historical, and thus cannot serve as the fundamental problem that Marxist epistemology must solve. Marx indeed regarded capitalist society as a structural existence and devoted himself to understanding and analyzing this structural existence. However, Marx most fundamentally regarded capitalist society as a historical existence. By delineating the inevitable contradictions between productive forces and relations of production, as well as between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, within capitalist society, he affirmed that “the fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable,” [50]50 This is a paraphrase of the famous concluding line of Section I of *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) by Marx and Engels: “The fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.” and demonstrated the inevitability of the arrival of communist society. Clearly, if one is confined to the “problematic” of Althusser’s restructured Marxist epistemology, Marx would be unable to thoroughly grasp the necessary laws of the development of human society, and thus would be unable to deduce the inevitability of the demise of capitalist society and the arrival of communist society.

第二，阿尔都塞重塑马克思认识论“总问题”的努力过于局限在“结构主义的思维方式”中，从而忽视了马克思认识论中逻辑与历史相统一的基本原理。不得不承认，阿尔都塞以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”问题重塑马克思认识论“总问题”,的确在一定意义上契合了马克思认识论的研究旨趣，即对资本主义社会这一结构性存在作出科学性的分析和认识。不过，阿尔都塞这一提法的问题也非常明显——仅仅抓住了资本主义社会的结构性特质这一个向度，而忽视了资本主义社会的历史性特质，忽视了逻辑与历史相统一之下的人类社会变迁。要言之，虽然阿尔都塞提出的“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题可以作为马克思认识论所要解决的一个重要问题，但因为它局限于“结构主义的思维方式”中，所以仅能认识和处理结构性的对象，而不能有效认识和处理逻辑与历史相统一的对象，无法作为马克思认识论所要解决的根本问题。马克思的确将资本主义社会看作结构性的存在，也致力于认识和剖析这一结构性的存在。不过，马克思最根本的还是把资本主义社会看作一种历史性的存在，通过勾勒资本主义社会必然存在的生产力与生产关系之间的矛盾以及无产阶级与资产阶级之间的矛盾，认定“资产阶级的灭亡和无产阶级的胜利是同样不可避免的”,论证了共产主义社会到来的必然性。显然，如果局限于阿尔都塞重塑的马克思认识论“总问题”,那么马克思将无法透彻把握人类社会发展的必然规律，也就无法推论出资本主义社会灭亡以及共产主义社会到来的必然性。

Third, Althusser’s effort to reshape the “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology, because it fails to touch upon the guiding principle of Marx’s epistemology—“social being determines social consciousness”—cannot truly represent the “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology. In *The German Ideology*, Marx clearly expressed the guiding principle of his epistemology, namely, “it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.” Later, in the “Preface” to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx further condensed this principle into “the social being of men determines their consciousness.” There is no doubt that this guiding principle of Marx’s epistemology requires us to clearly explain how social being determines social consciousness. As some scholars have revealed, “at the micro level, Marx did not give a clear answer to how social being determines social consciousness, yet this question is precisely one that current Marxist research must answer.” [51]51 See Wang Nanshi, “The ‘Real Abstraction’ of Social Being: On Sohn-Rethel’s Epistemology and Its Significance,” *Philosophical Research*, no. 11 (2018). A profound answer to this question was provided by Sohn-Rethel, a fellow traveler of the Frankfurt School. He argued that “a formation of consciousness originating from social being (gesellschaftliche Sein) is conditioned by an abstraction process (Abstraktionsprozeß) that is part of social being. Only this fact makes comprehensible the content referred to by the statement that ‘the social being of men determines their consciousness.’” [52]52 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Epistemology* (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2015), p. 7. Sohn-Rethel identified this abstraction as “real abstraction” (Realabstraktion). In his view, this abstraction does not arise from people’s thinking but from their practical behavior, existing directly in their social practical activities. Through the concept of “real abstraction,” Sohn-Rethel further demonstrated that “real abstraction” can transition and transform into “thought abstraction,” thereby genuinely influencing the thinking and cognition of human subjects. Sohn-Rethel stated: “The transformation of social real abstraction into thought abstraction suffers from a serious deficiency: for thinkers, the concept as a result has always been and remains incomprehensible, because they cannot approach its origin.” [53]53 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Epistemology* (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2015), p. 7. This exposition indicates that, in Sohn-Rethel’s view, past thinkers had never fully explored how “real abstraction” transforms into “thought abstraction,” because when faced with the concept as a result, they could not approach its origin. Sohn-Rethel clearly revealed that “real abstraction” achieves its transformation into “thought abstraction” through the result of “social synthesis” brought about by money: not only emphasizing that “money is an abstraction… and such a thing produces the result of social synthesis without people knowing anything about it,” but also pointing out that “the social function of money, through its formal determination, creates thinking, namely, what Hegel called ‘metaphysical’ thinking.” [54]54 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Epistemology* (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2015), p. 7. Thus, “money itself represents real abstraction, and it is precisely capable of achieving social synthesis and forming a universal network of abstractions, thereby influencing people’s thinking. Therefore, money is indeed the key to the transition from real abstraction to thought abstraction.” [55]55 See Wang Nanshi, “The ‘Real Abstraction’ of Social Being: On Sohn-Rethel’s Epistemology and Its Significance,” *Philosophical Research*, no. 11 (2018). In summary, on the basis of creatively proposing the concept of “real abstraction,” Sohn-Rethel further revealed the principle of the transition from “real abstraction” to “thought abstraction,” thereby providing a relatively reasonable explanation at the micro level of “how social being determines social consciousness.” Clearly, Althusser’s question—“with what concepts and what system of concepts can people think about the various elements of a structure and their relations”—does not touch upon the guiding principle of Marx’s epistemology at all, and cannot, like Sohn-Rethel, forcefully respond to and explain “how social being determines social consciousness.” Since this is the case, reshaping “with what concepts and what system of concepts can people think about the various elements of a structure and their relations” into the “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology clearly commits the error of “taking a part for the whole”; the true “problematic” awaits further in-depth research.

第三，阿尔都塞重塑马克思认识论“总问题”的努力因未能触及马克思认识论的主导原理“社会存在决定社会意识”,而无法真正代表马克思认识论的“总问题”。马克思在《德意志意识形态》中曾明确表达了其认识论的主导原理，即“不是意识决定生活，而是生活决定意识”。后来，在《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》中，马克思将这一原理进一步凝炼为“人们的社会存在决定人们的意识”。毫无疑问，马克思提出的这一认识论的主导原理，要求我们必须清晰地阐释人们的社会存在究竟如何决定人们的意识。正如有学者所揭示的那样，“在微观层次上，社会存在究竟如何决定社会意识，马克思并没有给出明确的答案，可这一问题却是当前马克思主义研究必须回答的问题”。对这一问题作出深刻解答的是法兰克福学派的同路人索恩-雷特尔，他认为“一种源自社会存在(gesellschaftliche Sein)的意识形成是以一种作为社会存在之一部分的抽象过程(Abstraktionsprozeß)为条件的。只有这一事实才使得‘人的社会存在决定其意识’这一表述所指的内容变得可以理解”。索恩-雷特尔找到了这种抽象，即“现实抽象”(Realabstraktion),在他看来，这种抽象并非产生自人们的思维，而是产生自人们的实践行为，直接地存在于人们的社会实践活动中。透过“现实抽象”这一概念，索恩-雷特尔进一步论证了“现实抽象”可以向“思维抽象”进行过渡和转化，从而真正影响人类主体的思维和认识。索恩-雷特尔表示：“社会的现实抽象向思维抽象的转变存在着严重不足：对于思想家来说，作为结果的概念是并且一直是不可思议的，因为他们难以接近其起源。”这一论述表明，在索恩-雷特尔看来，过去的思想家都未曾就“现实抽象”如何向“思维抽象”转化作出充分探索，因为他们在面对作为结果的概念时无法接近其起源。索恩-雷特尔明确揭示了“现实抽象”通过货币所造成的“社会-综合”之结果实现向“思维抽象”的转化：不仅强调“货币是抽象物……并且这样一种物在人们对其所是全无所知的情况下造成了社会-综合的结果”;而且指出“货币的社会功能通过其形式规定性创造出了思维，即黑格尔所称的‘形而上学的’思维”。由此看来，“货币本身代表着现实抽象，而它又恰恰能够实现社会综合并形成普遍的抽象网络，进而影响人们的思维。因此，货币的确是现实抽象过渡到思维抽象的关键”。总之，索恩-雷特尔在创造性地提出“现实抽象”概念的基础上，进一步揭示了“现实抽象”向“思维抽象”过渡的原理，由此从微观层面较为合理地解释了“社会存在究竟如何决定社会意识”。显然，阿尔都塞提出的“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”这一问题，根本没有触及马克思认识论的主导原理，并不能像索恩-雷特尔那样有力地回应和阐释“社会存在究竟如何决定社会意识”。既然如此，那么，将“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”重塑为马克思认识论“总问题”显然犯了“以偏概全”的错误，真正的“总问题”有待进一步深入研究。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

The structuralist Althusser, in his book *For Marx*, insists that there is an “epistemological break” in Marx’s philosophical thought, taking 1845 as the dividing line, calling the period before 1845 the “ideological” stage and the period after 1845 the “scientific” stage. According to this division, *Capital* belongs to the “scientific” stage of Marx’s philosophical thought and is therefore highly esteemed by Althusser. In *Reading Capital*, Althusser uses the “symptomatic” reading method to conduct an in-depth study of *Capital*. Through the unique objects and some “new concepts” involved in *Capital*, he concludes that Marx achieved a “great theoretical revolution.” However, in Althusser’s view, “what brings about the great theoretical revolution is the establishment of a science whose task is to actually change the problematic existing in the general theory in order to think its object.” [56]56 Louis Althusser et al., *Reading Capital* (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2001), p. 17. Therefore, the change in the “problematic” existing in the general theory is the key to Marx’s ability to achieve the “great theoretical revolution.” This is the deep logic behind Althusser’s attempt to reshape the “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology with the question “with what concepts and what system of concepts can people think about the various elements of a structure and their relations.” In Althusser’s view, it is precisely by “unconsciously” posing a new epistemological “problematic” that Marx achieved the “great theoretical revolution.” The “problematic” of Marx’s epistemology summarized by Althusser, on the one hand, corresponds to Marx’s relevant “textual content,” and on the other hand, conforms to the “evolutionary logic” of Marx’s epistemology within classical German philosophy. To a certain extent, it expands the academic research perspective on the transformation achieved by Marx’s epistemology and is of great significance for deepening the understanding of Marx’s epistemology. However, this effort by Althusser has many limitations because it neglects the category of practice, omits the unity of logic and history, and fails to touch upon the guiding principle of Marx’s epistemology.

结构主义者阿尔都塞在《保卫马克思》一书中坚持认为马克思哲学思想存在“认识论断裂”,其以1845年为界，称1845年前为“意识形态”阶段，1845年后为“科学”阶段。按此划分，《资本论》属于马克思哲学思想“科学”阶段的著作，因而备受阿尔都塞推崇。阿尔都塞在《读〈资本论〉》中运用“征候式”阅读法对《资本论》进行了深入研究，他透过《资本论》中所涉及的独特对象及一些“新的概念”,认定马克思实现了“巨大的理论革命”。不过，在阿尔都塞看来，“引起总理论革命的是这样一种科学的建立，这种科学的建立的任务是在实际上改变存在于总理论中的总问题，以便思考它的对象”。因此，存在于总理论中的“总问题”的改变乃是马克思能够实现“巨大的理论革命”的关键。这就是阿尔都塞试图以“用何种概念和何种概念体系人们可以思考结构的各个要素及其关系”问题重塑马克思认识论“总问题”的深层逻辑。在阿尔都塞看来，马克思正是通过“无意识地”提出了新的认识论“总问题”,从而实现了“巨大的理论革命”。阿尔都塞所概括的马克思认识论“总问题”,一方面契合马克思的相关“文本内容”,另一方面符合马克思认识论在德国古典哲学中的“演进逻辑”,在一定意义上拓展了学界关于马克思认识论实现变革的研究视野，对深化理解马克思认识论具有重要意义。不过，阿尔都塞的这一努力因为忽视了实践范畴、遗漏了逻辑与历史的统一，以及未能触及马克思认识论的主导原理而存在诸多局限。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗