On Marx’s “Inversion” of Hegel’s Dialectic from the Perspective of the Developmental Thread of Historical Materialism

Introduction

引 言

On the question of how Marx inverted Hegel’s dialectic, people often understand it in terms of a shift of standpoint from idealism to materialism, or as moving the dialectic from the foundation of idealism onto the foundation of materialism. But this mode of understanding leads people not only to fail to grasp the “rational kernel” of Hegel’s dialectic, but also to fall into a formalist understanding of the process of inversion. However, by sequentially examining Marx’s relevant original works and proceeding from the developmental thread of Marx’s historical materialism, a study of the specific content of the inversion—that is, the connotative structure of the two dialectics—reveals that historical materialism is not a formal “inversion” of Hegel’s dialectic, but rather a transformation of its theoretical framework, that is, a shift from the connotative structure of an “abstract philosophical dialectic” to a “concrete historical dialectic,” moving the dialectic from the abstract level of philosophy to the real productive activity of human beings. The dialectic is no longer a logic external to human activity, but a concrete historical activity unified with human productive activity.

对于马克思如何颠倒黑格尔辩证法的问题，人们往往从唯物主义与唯心主义的立场转换，或是把辩证法从唯心主义的地基上迁移到唯物主义的地基上来加以理解。但这样的理解方式导致人们不仅没有很好地把握黑格尔辩证法的“合理内核”,更使其对颠倒过程的理解陷入形式主义的认识之中。然而，通过顺次考察马克思的相关原著，从马克思历史唯物主义发展的脉络出发，对具体的颠倒内容即两种辩证法的内涵结构进行研究即可发现，历史唯物主义并非是对黑格尔辩证法形式上的“颠倒”,而是对其理论框架的转换，即从“抽象的哲学辩证法”转向“具体的历史辩证法”的内涵结构，将辩证法从哲学抽象的层面转向人的现实生产活动，辩证法不再是外在于人的活动的逻辑，而是与人的生产活动相统一的具体的历史活动。

1 The Construction of Hegel’s “One-Many-One” Framework

1 黑格尔“一多一”框架的构建

Hegel’s philosophy possesses a closed, circular world schema. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, consciousness begins with sense-certainty, where a differentiation emerges between “this one” and meaning [Meinen]. Here, “this one” is the universal, referring to the particular meaning; the relationship between “this one” and meaning is a relationship of the one and the many. Such a “one-many relationship,” when developed to complete unity, becomes the relationship between the concept or universal and the thing. The concept and the thing, as a new “one-many contradiction,” enter into perception. In perception, the thing, as an object, possesses different concepts, while at the same time one concept corresponds to different objects. Therefore, concepts are both interpenetrating with one another, because they are all collected together in one object as particular qualities, and mutually exclusive, because as single concepts they are each self-related without reference to the others; each confronts only the thing-object and never other concepts. Thus, the “one-many contradiction” between concept and thing transforms into the “one-many contradiction” between the particular concept as a quality and the whole concept as the thing itself. Each particular concept is a “one,” while different concepts combined together become a “many”; multiple particular concepts, sublating one another, in turn produce the whole concept as a “one.” The development of the unity of opposites of concepts moves consciousness from perception to understanding. The mutual contradiction of concepts and the dissolution of contradiction also move concepts toward higher concepts, and the thing thereby moves toward its own essence, namely thought. Consciousness sees thought itself in the essence of the object, and thus it recognizes that its object is precisely itself, thereby forming self-consciousness, which unifies consciousness and object. Self-consciousness then unifies the “one-many contradiction” of concepts into a higher “one,” which is self-consciousness as individual. The individual “one” splits into multiple “ones”; the multiple “ones,” through mutual opposition and sublation, form a new whole “one,” and the whole “one” itself becomes an individual “one” at a higher level; the endpoint of the previous stage becomes the new starting point of the next stage. Therefore, the circular movement of “one-many-one” is the structure of Hegel’s dialectic, and this is also the inner essential law of the movement of thought. On the other hand, the content contained in Hegel’s “one-many structure” is the productive activity of abstract concepts. Here, the first “one” refers to the initial abstract concept; the “many” refers to the opposite concepts alienated from the initial concept; the latter “one” refers to the higher concept formed by sublating the opposite concepts as the “many.” Therefore, the process of “one-many-one” is precisely the process in which the concept continuously alienates itself to produce opposite concepts, and then sublates this alienated opposition to produce a higher whole concept; it is also the process in which understanding sublates itself, rising from mutually contradictory abstraction to dialectical reason. But whether it is alienation or the sublation of alienation, both belong to the productive activity of concepts.

黑格尔哲学有一张封闭回环的世界图式。在《精神现象学》里，意识从感性确定性开始出现了“这一个”和意谓之间的分化，其中“这一个”是一般的，是对特殊的意谓的指代，“这一个”与意谓之间的关系就是一与多的关系。如此的“一多关系”发展到完全的统一就成为了概念或共相与事物之间的关系。概念与事物作为新的“一多矛盾”进入了知觉，在知觉里事物作为一个对象有着不同的概念，同时一个概念又对应着不同的对象。因此概念与概念之间既是相互贯通的，因为它们都作为某一个特质共同集合在一个对象上；又是相互排斥的，因为它们作为单一的概念都是互不相关的自我关联，它们各自仅仅面对着事物对象而从不面对其他概念。如此，概念与事物之间的“一多矛盾”就转化为作为特质的个别概念与作为事物本身的全体概念之间的“一多矛盾”,每一个别概念都是“一”,而不同的概念组合在一起就成为“多”,多个个别概念相互扬弃又生产出了作为“一”的全体概念。概念对立统一的发展使意识从知觉走向了知性，概念之间相互矛盾和矛盾的消解也使概念走向了更高的概念，而事物由此走向了自身的本质即思想。意识在对象的本质中看到了思想本身，于是它认识到它的对象恰恰是自己，进而形成了统一意识与对象的自我意识。自我意识便将概念的“一多矛盾”统一到更高的“一”里，这就是作为个体的自我意识。个别的“一”分裂为多个“一”,多个的“一”之间因相互对立以及扬弃而形成新的全体“一”,而全体的“一”本身又成为更高层面的个别的“一”,上一阶段的终点成为了下一阶段的新起点。因此，“一多一”的圆圈运动就是黑格尔的辩证法结构，这也是思维运动的内在本质规律。另一方面，黑格尔的“一多结构”里所包含的内容是抽象的概念生产活动，其中第一个“一”是指初始的抽象概念，“多”是指初始概念异化出相对立的概念，后一个“一”则是指扬弃了作为“多”的对立概念而形成的更高概念。因此，“一多一”的过程就是概念不断异化自身生产对立性概念，而又扬弃这种异化对立来生产更高的全体概念的过程，也是知性扬弃自己从互相矛盾的抽象上升到辩证的理性的过程。但不论是异化还是异化的扬弃，都属于概念的生产活动。

Viewed in terms of the philosophical system, the dialectical structure of “one-many-one” also runs through Hegel’s entire philosophy. The *Science of Logic* – Philosophy of Nature – Philosophy of Spirit constitutes the structure of Hegel’s philosophical system. Here, the *Science of Logic* is the developmental logic that exists transcendentally before the world is generated, and is thus the most abstract “one,” the beginning of everything. The *Science of Logic* as the beginning “one” governs the inner law of the world and alienates itself to produce the sensory world, forming the Philosophy of Nature. At this point, the Philosophy of Nature is the “many” of phenomena opposed to the *Science of Logic* as essence; or rather, each phenomenon of the Philosophy of Nature contains the potential but complete “one” of the *Science of Logic*. Therefore, the Philosophy of Nature itself becomes a collection of multiple “ones.” When the Philosophy of Nature develops fully and forms consciousness, it enters the Philosophy of Spirit. In the Philosophy of Spirit, the *Science of Logic* and the Philosophy of Nature achieve unity. Consciousness first perceives the natural phenomena of the sensory world, and then, through reflection on the sensory world, leaps to the supersensory world to recognize logic. The “one” of logic and the “many” of nature finally conclude in the world of consciousness with the “one” of the Idea.

在哲学体系上看，“一多一”的辩证结构同样也贯穿着黑格尔哲学的始终。《逻辑学》-自然哲学-精神哲学是黑格尔哲学体系的结构，其中《逻辑学》是作为世界产生之前而先验存在的发展逻辑，因而也是最抽象的“一”,是一切的开端。作为开端“一”的《逻辑学》主宰着世界的内在规律,并异化生产着感观世界而形成自然哲学，届时自然哲学就是与作为本质的《逻辑学》相对立的现象的“多”,或者说自然哲学的每一个现象都包含着潜在但完整的《逻辑学》的“一”,因此自然哲学本身就成为了多个“一”的集合。自然哲学发展完全形成了意识而进入到精神哲学，在精神哲学里《逻辑学》与自然哲学达成了统一，意识首先体察到感观世界的自然现象，而又以对感观世界的反思而飞跃到超感观世界认识逻辑，逻辑的“一”与自然的“多”在意识的世界里最终以理念的“一”结束。

In the section “Being-for-Self” of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel discusses the relationship between the “one” and the “many.” For instance: “‘The one’ is the simple relation of being-for-self to itself, whose moments have dissolved in this relation; in this relation it has the form of immediacy, and therefore its moments become existent.” In other words, Hegel regards being-for-self as the “one,” and the infinite self-relation as the “one.” And because this infinite self-relation is both an infinite negation of itself and an infinite sublation of this negation, this “one” of being-for-self is not merely a simple idea but also possesses existent content; the “one” as being-for-self can be called the “spiritual unit.” “But since being-for-self is fixed as one, as a being-for-self thing, as something immediately present, its negative self-relation is at the same time a relation to an existent thing; since this relation is likewise negative, that through which the one relates to itself is still determined as an existent and an other; this other, as essentially self-relation, is not indeterminate negation, i.e., the void, but is likewise a one. The one thus becomes many ones.” Here, Hegel again decomposes the “one” of being-for-self into itself and the object to which it relates, i.e., the existent and the other. But the existent and the other also contain self-relation within themselves, so they too are “ones”; thus, from the “one” arises the “many.” We can see that in the above “one-many relationship,” the “one” is being-for-self or spiritual, a unity containing consciousness and its object, while the “many” is a collection of “ones.” Therefore, both the alienation from “one” to “many” and the sublation from “many” to “one” are activities of consciousness.

在《逻辑学》的“自为之有”章节中，黑格尔论述了“一”与“多”的关系问题。如“‘一’就是自为之有对自身的单纯关系，它的环节在这种关系中消融了，它在这种关系中有了直接性的形式，因此它的环节变成了实有的。”换句话说，黑格尔把自为之有视作“一”,把无限的自我关系视作“一”,而又因为这种无限的自我关系既是对自身无限的否定，也是对这种否定无限的扬弃，故而这种自为之有的“一”就不仅仅是单纯的观念，同时也有着实有的内容，作为自为之有的“一”就可以称为“精神的单元”。“但是自为之有既然作为一，作为自为之有物，作为直接当前的东西固定下来，它的否定的自身关系，也就同时是对一个有的事物的关系；这种关系既然也同样是否定的，那么一与自身相关所依靠的那个东西，也就仍然被规定为一个实有和一个他物；这个他物，作为本质上的自身关系，便不是不曾规定的否定，即空，而也同样是一。一于是就变为多个的一。”在这里黑格尔又把自为之有的“一”分解为它本身和它自我关联的对象，即实有与他物，但实有与他物又内涵着自身关系，因此它们也都是“一”,于是从“一”中生出“多”。我们可以看到在以上的“一多关系”中，“一”是自为的或精神的，是包含着意识及其对象的统一体，而“多”则是“一”的集合。所以从“一”到“多”的异化和从“多”到“一”的扬弃，都是意识的活动。

In summary, Hegel’s dialectic follows the skeleton of “one-many-one,” and the core driving force that fills this skeleton with flesh and blood and sets it in motion is the activity of consciousness. The mediation through which the alienation of the concept and the sublation of alienation are accomplished is consciousness’s awareness of the existence of the alien other and its awareness that the existence of the alien other is itself. In other words, the contradiction between thoughts and the fusion between thoughts is the content of the movement of the dialectic, and at the same time the process of speculation.

总的来说，黑格尔辩证法遵循着“一多一”的骨架，且这个骨架得以充实血肉而运动起来的核心动力是意识的能动性，概念的异化与异化的扬弃得以完成的中介是意识意识到了异己的存在并意识到了异己的存在就是它自己。换句话说，思想与思想之间的矛盾和思想与思想之间的融合就是辩证法运动的内容，同时也是思辨的过程。

2 Marx’s “Many-One-Many” Framework as an “Inversion” of Hegel’s Dialectic

2 马克思“多一多”框架对黑格尔辩证法的“颠倒”

Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic begins with *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. In his youth, Marx was deeply influenced by Hegelian philosophy. However, during his time at the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx encountered “the difficult question of material interests.” In discussions surrounding issues such as land ownership, the law on the theft of wood, and freedom of the press, he discovered that the fundamental purpose of existing law was to protect the economic interests of the ruling group and to deprive the底层人民 [n1] of their material interests, yet the law could be sheltered by Hegel’s philosophy of right. In Hegel’s view, the dialectical chain from the state to civil society proceeds first from the concept of the state. The concept of the state, as the logic of social activity, is the “One” of the beginning. The concept of the state objectifies civil society on the basis of itself as principle. Civil society, then, contains the concept of the state as the “Many.” When the contradiction between the concept of the state as the “One” and civil society as the “Many” is sublated anew into a unity, it becomes the reality of the state. Marx’s inversion of this logic proceeds from civil society to the state. He argues that the state arises from the activity of real human beings, and that the functions of the state are the embodiment of social activity. Therefore, the essence of the state is rooted in human activity; it is not the state that determines civil society, but civil society that determines the state. Marx criticizes Hegel for taking the conceptual concept of the state as his logical starting point, and further criticizes the way the concept alienates itself to create its own conceptual differences and the objective reality of these conceptual differences: “The idea is made the subject, and the actual differences and the actual reality of the differences are regarded as the development and product of the idea, whereas the opposite is the case: the idea should be derived from the actual differences.” [n2] Marx discards Hegel’s starting point of the “One” of the concept and inverts the starting point to civil society, i.e., the real “Many.” However, this inversion occurs only as an “inversion of the One and the Many” at the starting point; it merely transforms the theoretical premise from an abstract ideal foundation into the sensuous “human being,” without yet thoroughly settling accounts with the entire dialectical chain of “One-Many-One.” Secondly, this method of inversion is not a critique proceeding from the inner logic of the dialectic, but rather a borrowing of Feuerbach’s method of “inversion of subject and predicate.” [n3] Some scholars distinguish this “inversion of subject and predicate” from the “standing on its head” of the dialectic and accordingly distinguish between the “young Marx” and the “mature Marx.” Finally, this inversion is merely an inversion of the key concepts of Hegel’s philosophy of right, and has not yet developed into a critique of Hegelian philosophy itself.

马克思对黑格尔辩证法的颠倒开始于《黑格尔法哲学批判》。马克思在青年时期深受黑格尔哲学的影响。然而，在莱茵报时期马克思面临“物质利益的难事”,在围绕土地所有制、林木盗窃法、出版自由等问题的讨论中，他发现现行法律的根本目的是为了保护统治集团的经济利益以及剥夺底层人民的物质利益，而法律却又可以被黑格尔法哲学所庇护。在黑格尔看来，从国家到市民社会的辩证链条首先从国家观念出发，国家观念作为社会活动的逻辑是开端的“一”,国家观念以自身作为原则对象化出了市民社会，市民社会则作为包含着国家观念的“多”,而国家观念与市民社会作为“一”与“多”的矛盾重新扬弃为统一体时就成为了国家现实。马克思对这一逻辑的颠倒是从市民社会出发而到国家，他认为国家是在现实的人的活动中产生的，国家的职能是社会活动的体现，因此国家的本质根源于人的活动，不是国家决定市民社会而是市民社会决定国家。马克思批判黑格尔以观念的国家概念作为逻辑起点，进而批判观念异化自身创造出了自身的观念差异以及这些观念差异的客观现实性，“观念反而成了主体；各种差别及各种差别的现实性被设定为观念的发展，观念的产物，其实恰好相反，观念应当从现实的差别中产生出来。”马克思抛弃了黑格尔从观念的“一”出发的开端，而把开端颠倒为市民社会即现实的“多”。但是这种颠倒仅仅发生于对开端的“一多颠倒”,只是把理论的前提从抽象的理念基础转化为感性的“人”,而尚未对整个“一多一”的辩证链条进行彻底清算。其次，这种颠倒的手法并非是从辩证法的内在逻辑出发的批判，而是对费尔巴哈“主谓颠倒”的手法加以借用,有学者把这种“主谓颠倒”和辩证法的“头足倒置”区别开来并依此区分“青年马克思”和“成熟马克思”。最后，这种颠倒仅仅是对黑格尔法哲学的关键概念进行的颠倒，而尚未发展到对黑格尔哲学本身的批判。

Thereafter, Marx turned his gaze from the abstract concept to abstract existence, i.e., capital, and investigated social life from the standpoint of real relations of capital. The further development of Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic is displayed in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereinafter referred to as the *Manuscripts*). Here, when analyzing activity in the sphere of social material life, Marx emphatically puts forward the concept of “alienated labor.” He inverts Hegel’s alienation in the spiritual sphere into alienated labor in material life, which constitutes a development of the inversion of Hegel’s dialectic. In Hegel’s philosophy, alienation is precisely the process from the “One” to the “Many.” From the perspective of the Hegelian philosophical system, it is the process of logic externalizing itself into nature; it is the process of logic, as the “One,” running through the “Many” of natural things; it is the process by which natural things create themselves according to logic; and it is also the process by which logic externalizes and objectifies itself into various phenomena. From the perspective of the dialectical movement of the concept, alienation is the process by which the concept differentiates into opposing concepts; it is the process by which the “One” at the starting point alienates into the opposing concepts of a contradiction; it is the process by which, in the dialectical movement of the concept, it splits into positive and negative aspects through internal struggle and opposition. From the perspective of spiritual activity, on the one hand, Hegel posits the structure of self-consciousness as a contradictory entity containing an object. Self-consciousness contains the immediate object but at the same time negates it. Therefore, the process of alienation from the “One” to the “Many” contains the creation of self-consciousness, or “the labor of spirit.” On the other hand, Hegel believes that alienation is also the mutual transformation and mutual interpenetration between self-consciousness and the object. This interpenetration causes both self-consciousness and the object to sublate their respective subjectivity and objectivity and become a “pure universal.” Alienation is the necessary mediation for producing this “pure universal.” That is to say, alienation and the sublation of alienation are the same process. While the “One” alienates into the “Many,” it simultaneously generates the “pure universal,” which serves as the mediation for the “Many” to contain the “One” within itself.

此后，马克思把目光从抽象观念转向到抽象存在即资本中，从现实的资本关系出发对社会生活进行考察。马克思颠倒黑格尔辩证法的进一步发展在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》(以下简称《手稿》)中有所展现。在此，马克思分析社会物质生活领域的活动时，着重提出了“异化劳动”的概念，他把黑格尔在精神领域的异化颠倒为物质生活中的异化劳动，是对颠倒黑格尔辩证法的发展。异化在黑格尔哲学里就是由“一”向“多”的过程，从黑格尔哲学体系来看，是逻辑外化为自然的过程，是逻辑作为“一”贯穿到自然事物种种的“多”中，是自然事物依照逻辑而创造自己的过程，也是逻辑外化、对象化为种种现象的过程。从概念的辩证运动来看，异化是概念分化出对立概念的过程，是从“一”的开端异化出矛盾的对立概念的过程，是概念的辩证运动中由内部斗争对立而分裂为正反两个方面的过程。从精神活动来看，一方面，黑格尔把自我意识的结构设定为一个包含着对象的矛盾体，自我意识包含着直接的对象但同时又否定着对象，因此由“一”向“多”的异化过程里就包含着自我意识的创造，或者“精神的劳动”。另一方面，黑格尔认为异化也是自我意识与对象之间的相互转化、相互贯通，这种贯通使得自我意识和对象都扬弃了各自的主观性和客观性而成为“纯粹的普遍物”,而异化就是生产这种“纯粹的普遍物”的必要中介。这就是说，异化与异化的扬弃是同一个过程，“一”在异化成为“多”的同时生成“纯粹的普遍物”,以此为中介使得“多”中内涵着“一”。

Alienated labor is the result of Marx inverting the alienation that occurs in the concept into the real activity of human beings. In alienated labor, there exists the opposition between the human being and his labor. The process of objectified production transforms the human being’s “living labor” into “dead labor” fixed in the product. Once labor as activity is transformed into the result of labor, it stands in opposition to the laborer, becoming a product that comes from the laborer yet is alien to him. Marx argues that alienated labor manifests itself in four aspects: the alienation of the laborer from his product of labor, the alienation of the laborer from his labor activity, the alienation of the human being from his species-being, and the alienation of human beings from one another. First, under alienated labor, once the product of labor is produced, it is separated from the laborer, and the laborer needs the product of labor to satisfy his own needs of life. Therefore, he is compelled to regard labor as a means of satisfying his own needs of life. He must first satisfy the needs of alienated labor before he can satisfy human needs. Second, alienated labor as a result is the product of labor external to the laborer. This is fundamentally because the activity process of alienated labor is a process in which the laborer is dominated and ruled. In alienated labor, the laborer must produce products of labor that do not belong to him in a way that negates himself. Hence, the entire activity of alienated labor does not belong to the laborer himself. Third, alienated labor changes the human being’s species-consciousness, causing him to regard his own species-being as a means of subsistence. He no longer freely practices to regard himself and others as the same species. Human beings negate both their own species-being and the species-being of others. Fourth, the mutual negation among human beings causes human beings to be alienated from one another. Therefore, regarding the mutual relationship between Marx’s alienated labor and Hegel’s concept of alienation: first, alienated labor produces relations of opposition ranging from those between the human being and the product of labor to those between human beings. This relation of opposition is precisely consistent with the moment of opposition in the alienation of the concept, except that one is the opposition of concepts in the conceptual sphere, while the other is the opposition of human beings in the sphere of real life. Second, the process by which alienated labor occurs is identical to the process by which the alienation of the concept produces. In alienated labor, what is produced through objectification is the product of labor, while in the alienation of the concept, what is produced through objectification is another concept. Once the product of labor is produced, it separates from the laborer and becomes an alien existence; once the new concept is produced through alienation from the old concept, it separates from it and stands in mutual opposition. Alienated labor, as the product produced, in turn enslaves the laborer and becomes the dominant party. Once the new concept produced by alienation is formed, it causes the dialectic to move toward the “anti-” stage of the “thesis-antithesis-synthesis,” and at this point the new concept produced by alienation becomes the principal aspect of the contradiction. Finally, Hegel’s process of conceptual alienation generates the “pure universal,” enabling the alienating concept to sublate alienation and become spirit again. Marx’s alienated labor, proceeding from the real relations of production of human beings, holds that production occurring through enslavement and exploitation will be sublated in the process of the socialization of production, thereby achieving the return of the human being’s species-being and the realization of communism. Alienation and alienated labor possess a structural identity. The distinction fundamentally lies in Marx inverting alienation from the conceptual sphere to the real sphere, thereby turning it into alienated labor.

异化劳动是马克思把在观念中发生的异化颠倒到人的现实的活动中的结果。在异化劳动中存在着人与人的劳动的对立，对象化的生产过程使人的“活劳动”转变为固定在产品中的“死劳动”,劳动作为活动一旦转变为劳动的结果就与劳动者对立了起来，成为来自于劳动者却又异于劳动者的产物。马克思认为异化劳动表现为劳动者与自己的劳动产品相异化、劳动者与自己的劳动活动相异化、人与自己的类本质相异化、人与人之间相异化四个方面。第一，在异化劳动下，劳动产品一经生产出来就与劳动者相分离且劳动者又需要劳动产品以满足自身的生活所需，所以他就不得不把劳动视作满足自身生活需要的手段，他首先要满足异化劳动的需要，然后才能满足人的需要；第二，异化劳动作为结果是外在于劳动者的劳动产品，这根本在于异化劳动的活动过程是劳动者被支配和统治的过程，在异化劳动中劳动者要以否定自身的方式生产不属于自己的劳动产品，所以整个异化劳动活动都不属于劳动者自己；第三，异化劳动改变了人的类意识，让人把自身的类本质视作谋生的手段，不再以自由地实践来把自己和他人看作一样的类，人与人之间既否定着自己的类本质同时也否定着对方的类本质；第四，人与人之间的相互否定关系使得人与人相异化。因此，就马克思的异化劳动与黑格尔的异化概念之间的相互关系来说，首先，异化劳动生产着从人与劳动产品之间到人与人之间的对立关系，这种对立关系恰恰与概念的异化中的对立环节相一致，只不过一个是观念领域的概念对立，另一个是现实生活领域的人的对立。其次，异化劳动的发生过程与概念的异化生产过程如出一辙。在异化劳动中对象化生产出来的是劳动产品，而在概念的异化中对象化生产出来的是另一个概念；劳动产品一旦被生产出来就脱离了劳动者成为异己存在，新概念一旦从旧概念中异化生产出来就与其分离且相互对立；异化劳动作为被生产出来的产品反过来奴役着劳动者，成为有统治地位的一方，异化生产的新概念一旦形成就使得辩证法走向“正-反-合”中“反”的阶段，这时异化生产的新概念就成为矛盾的主要方面。最后，黑格尔的概念异化过程会生成“纯粹的普遍物”,使得异化着的概念重新扬弃异化而成为精神；马克思的异化劳动则从人的现实生产关系出发，认为人通过奴役和剥削发生的生产会在生产社会化的进程中被扬弃，从而达到人的类本质的复归和共产主义的实现。异化与异化劳动有着结构的同一性，其区别根本在于马克思把异化从观念领域颠倒到现实领域从而成为异化劳动。

Marx enters into the inversion of the dialectic through alienated labor, but this is merely an inversion of key concepts; in the subsequent text he elevates this inversion to the level of Hegel’s dialectic and the whole of Hegel’s philosophy. Marx holds that the Young Hegelians lacked an understanding of the problems of the dialectic, and that only Feuerbach adopted a serious, critical attitude toward Hegel’s dialectic, yet his critique remained stuck at an intuitive understanding of the negative, without penetrating into the negative as a dialectical moment; he even took the affirmation contained in the negation of the negation as something still indeterminate in itself. Therefore, Marx emphatically stresses the affirmative significance of the negation of the negation, while at the same time distinguishing this movement from Feuerbach’s identical process. He argues that Hegel “treats the negation of the negation as the true and only positive thing” and regards the negation of the negative as “the activity of self-realization”; in fact, this provides “an abstract, logical, speculative expression” for the movement of actual history—a history that is not the history of man as already human but the history of man’s becoming human. He endows the negation of the negation with the practical meaning of human activity, rather than treating it merely as a moment in the movement of the Idea, as Hegel does. Hence the concept’s dialectic only abstractly reflects the practical essence of actual human beings. Some scholars regard Hegel’s dialectic as “a summary of the laws of objective things” and Marx’s dialectic as “the law of the movement of things themselves,” precisely because practical activity itself merges into objective things to become “the real,” thereby shifting the negation of the negation from the purely conceptual sphere into actual activity. Marx reduces the essence or species-being of actual human beings to labor; he agrees with Hegel’s use of objectification and the sublation of objectification to describe the process of human production, while at the same time understanding actual human beings as “the result of their own labor,” grasping the historical movement in which man produces himself through the entire process of alienated labor and the sublation of alienated labor. Consequently, there is first an inversion of the starting point: in Hegel, the beginning of the “one-many-one” dialectical structure, i.e., the logical Idea as the “one,” is inverted by Marx into the activity of actual human beings as the “many.” Second, there is an inversion of the entire field of dialectical movement: Marx shifts the negative process of the whole dialectic from the conceptual sphere into actual life. Alienated labor serves not only in reality as the fundamental cause of man’s creation of an objectified life, but also as the fundamental precondition for the elimination of that objectified life; for man to achieve the free exercise of his species-being, he must first bring about the alienation of his species-being, using alienated labor as the mediating negative to reach the negation of the negation—labor that has sublated alienation and returned to man himself. In this way, the negation of the negation in Hegel’s dialectic is inverted from the conceptual sphere into reality. Yet here Marx’s inversion of the dialectic is not yet complete. First, Marx’s dialectical structure is not yet complete. He has only determined the real starting point of the dialectic and the real field in which the negation of the negation or dialectical movement occurs, but the structure of the actual dialectic has not yet taken shape. Second, the dialectical view of alienated labor and the sublation of alienated labor actually remains within an idealist conception of history; in his understanding of the necessity of sublating alienated labor, Marx still stands from the humanist perspective of man’s return to his own essence. How private property is necessarily sublated and how communism is necessarily realized have not yet found their basis in the sphere of material production. The problem of “how the real negation of the negation is necessary” was not fully resolved until Marx, in *Capital*, maturely applied historical materialism to analyze capitalist society.

马克思通过异化劳动切入辩证法的颠倒，但这仅仅是对关键概念的颠倒，他在后文中继续把这种颠倒上升到对黑格尔辩证法和整个黑格尔哲学的高度。马克思认为，青年黑格尔派对于辩证法的问题缺乏认识，只有费尔巴哈对黑格尔辩证法采取了严肃的、批判的态度，但他的批判仅仅停留在对否定的直观的理解上，没有深入作为辩证环节的否定，甚至把作为否定的否定所包含的肯定认作是对自身的尚不确定。因此，马克思着重强调了否定之否定的肯定意义 ,同时更把这种运动与费尔巴哈的同一过程相区别，他认为黑格尔“把否定的否定看成真正的和唯一的肯定的东西”,并且把对否定的东西的否定看作“自我实现的活动”,实际上是为现实历史的运动找到了“抽象的、逻辑的、思辨的表达”,这种历史不是人已成为人的历史而是人之成为人的历史。他对否定之否定赋予了人的实践意义，而非像黑格尔那样仅仅视作为观念运动的环节，因此概念的辩证法只是抽象地反映了现实的人的实践本质。有学者把黑格尔辩证法视作“对客观事物的规律总结”,把马克思辩证法视作“事物自身的运动规律”,就是因为实践活动本身融汇于客观事物成为“实在”,进而使得否定之否定从纯粹的观念领域融汇到现实活动中。马克思把现实的人的本质或类本质归结为劳动，他赞同黑格尔用对象化与对象化的扬弃来描述人的生产过程，同时把真正的人理解为“自己的劳动的结果”,以异化劳动和异化劳动的扬弃的全过程来理解人生产自身的历史运动。于是，首先是出发点的颠倒，在黑格尔那里“一多一”的辩证结构的开端即作为“一”的逻辑观念被马克思以作为“多”的现实的人的活动所颠倒；其次是整个辩证运动领域的颠倒，马克思把整个辩证法的否定过程从观念领域颠倒到现实生活中。异化劳动不仅在现实中作为人创造对象化生活的根本原因，同时也作为消除对象化生活的根本前提，人要实现对自己的类本质的自由运用首先就要实现人的类本质的异化，以异化劳动作为否定的中介来达到否定之否定的扬弃了异化的、回归到人自身的劳动。如此黑格尔辩证法中的否定之否定就从概念领域颠倒到现实中。但是在这里马克思对辩证法的颠倒尚未完成。首先，马克思的辩证结构尚未完成。他仅仅确定了辩证法的现实的开端以及否定之否定或辩证运动发生的现实领域，而现实的辩证法的结构尚未形成。其次，对于异化劳动与异化劳动的扬弃的辩证观点实际上停留在一种唯心史观中，马克思在对异化劳动扬弃的必然性的理解上，依然站在人回归自身本质的人本主义视角上,私有财产如何必然地扬弃与共产主义如何必然地实现尚未在物质生产领域找到根据，“现实的否定之否定如何必然”这一难题直到马克思在《资本论》中成熟地运用历史唯物主义分析资本主义社会才彻底解决。

3 The Implications of “Inversion” in the Construction of Historical Materialism

3 历史唯物主义构建中的“颠倒”意蕴

The completion of Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic is the formation of historical materialism. Compared with the stage of the *Manuscripts* [n4], the formation of historical materialism involves a twofold transcendence. On the one hand, on the basis of shifting the starting point of the dialectic and the dialectic’s self-negating movement from the conceptual sphere to the sphere of social life, Marx completely inverts Hegel’s “one-many-one” dialectical structure into “many-one-many,” achieving its own completeness in dialectical structure. Hegel’s dialectic starts from the “one” in the conceptual sphere and ends by turning back to the “one” of spirit, while the intermediate moment of the sensuous “many” is merely the mediation of the dialectical movement of thought; Marx, by contrast, starts from the “many” of sensuous life and returns to the actual “many,” with the moment of the conceptual “one” serving merely as the mediation of the actual dialectical movement. On the other hand, in historical materialism Marx finds a real theoretical support for the dialectical movement of history itself: the dialectical movement in which history negates itself and moves forward no longer takes the return of man’s essence or the “negation of the negation” as its fundamental driving force, but rather the development of man’s needs for production and life. That is to say, the driving force of historical development also shifts from the conceptual “one” to the actual “many.” The “negation of the negation” becomes merely a phenomenal law of historical development, no longer serving as the logical premise of historical development. This puts an end to Hegel’s circular reasoning of “taking the cause as the effect” and “taking the effect as the cause,” and by taking the actual production and life needs of real human beings as the foundation of historical materialism, Marx’s dialectic differs from the closed circularity of Hegel’s system and becomes open and inclusive. At this point, Marx’s dialectic has completely inverted Hegel’s dialectic from four aspects—starting point, field, structure, and driving force. The dialectic thus completely inverted is historical materialism, and the inversion itself constitutes a thorough transformation of the philosophical worldview.

马克思对黑格尔辩证法颠倒的完成是形成历史唯物主义。历史唯物主义的形成相较于《手稿》阶段有两方面的超越。一方面，马克思在将辩证法的开端和辩证法自否定运动从观念领域转移到社会生活领域的基础上,把黑格尔“一多一”的辨证结构彻底颠倒为“多一多”,在辩证法结构上取得了自身的完整性。黑格尔辩证法是在“一”的观念领域中出发又转回到“一”的精神中结束，而中间感性的“多”的环节只是思想的辨证运动的中介；马克思则从感性生活的“多”出发又回归到现实的“多”中，观念的“一”的环节只是现实的辩证运动的中介。另一方面，马克思在历史唯物主义中为历史的辨证运动本身找到了现实的理论支撑，历史否定自身而向前的辨证运动不再以人的本质回归或“否定之否定”作为根本动力，而是以人的生产生活需要的发展，这就是说历史发展的动力也从观念的“一”转变为了现实的“多”。“否定之否定”仅仅成为了历史发展的现象规律，而不再作为历史发展的逻辑前提，由此终结了黑格尔循环论证式的“以因为果”和“以果为因”,以现实的人的生产生活需要作为历史唯物主义的根基使得马克思辨证法区别于黑格尔圆圈的封闭环绕而变得开放包容。至此，马克思的辩证法从开端、领域、结构与动力四个方面彻底颠倒了黑格尔辩证法，这样彻底颠倒后的辩证法就是历史唯物主义，而颠倒本身则是对哲学世界观的彻底变革。

Marx’s “many-one-many” dialectical structure is fully completed in *Theses on Feuerbach* (hereinafter *Theses*). Before the *Theses*, Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic remained only at the two aspects of the dialectic’s starting point and the field of dialectical movement; the movement’s trajectory and overall structure had not yet been fully critiqued, and the “one-many-one” structure had not yet been completely inverted. This is because Marx’s critique of the concept of the “one” was not yet complete; he himself stood partly in a humanist position and partly with a materialist tendency. Marx accomplishes this work in his critique of Feuerbach’s intuitive sensuousness. In the *Theses*, Marx thoroughly explores the relationship between the conceptual “one” and the actual “many,” and determines that one must start from the actual “many” and ultimately return to the actual “many,” treating the conceptual “one” as the mediating moment of the actual dialectical movement. This is to invert the relationship between “actual movement” and “speculative movement”: it is not the mystical “speculative movement” that determines “actual movement,” but “actual movement” that determines “speculative movement.” Marx merges the conceptual “one” with the actual “many”; he criticizes idealism for grasping only the conceptual aspect and the active aspect of human beings, while materialism grasps only the purely objective, intuitive aspect and loses activity. He proposes practice, which combines the conceptual and the actual, the “one” and the “many,” activity and objectivity, as the philosophical principle. Marx establishes the fundamentality of the actual “many”: whether the conceptual “one” is true must be tested by entering into the actual “many”; moreover, when the conceptual “one” narrates the rationality of theory on its own behalf, this rationality can find its roots in the actual “many”; finally, Marx shifts the aim and purpose of philosophy from the conceptual “one” to the actual “many.” It is precisely thus that Marx’s dialectical structure establishes the “many” as its endpoint. The “many-one-many” structure is not only the structure of actual dialectical movement but also the structure of practical activity: starting from the “many” of existence, of immediate sensuous life, without stopping at the intuitive form, while at the same time using the conceptual “one” to abstractly and actively reflect the “many,” thereby forming human thought; man then, through objectifying practical activity, reproduces the conceptual “one” of thought back into reality, turning it into a new “many.” In this way, nature-in-itself, through human practice, becomes humanized nature endowed with man’s intrinsic measure, and the “many-one-many” practical structure simultaneously becomes the objectifying structure between man and nature.

马克思的“多一多”辩证结构在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》(以下简称《提纲》)中彻底完成。在《提纲》之前，马克思对于黑格尔辩证法的颠倒，仅仅停留在辩证法开端和辨证运动的领域两方面，对于辩证法的运动脉络、整体结构尚未完整批判，“一多一”的结构也还没有被完全颠倒，这是因为马克思对于“一”的观念的批判尚未完全，其本身既处于人本主义的立场，又有着唯物主义倾向。马克思在对费尔巴哈的直观感性的批判中完成了这一工作。在《提纲》中马克思彻底探讨了观念的“一”与现实的“多”之间的关系，并确定要从现实的“多”出发，最终回到现实的“多”中去，把观念的“一”当作现实的辩证法的运动中介，这就是把“现实运动”和“思辨运动”之间的关系做了颠倒，不是神秘主义的“思辨运动”决定“现实运动”,而是“现实运动”决定“思辨运动”。马克思把观念的“一”与现实的“多”相融合，他批判唯心主义仅仅抓住了观念的方面和人的能动方面，而唯物主义则仅仅抓住了纯粹客观的、直观的方面而丧失了能动性，提出了以观念与现实、“一”与“多”、能动性与客观性相结合的实践为哲学原则。马克思确立了现实的“多”的根本性，观念的“一”是否为真理要进入到现实的“多”中去检验；不仅如此，当观念的“一”自己为自己述说理论的合理性时，这种合理性都能在现实的“多”中找到根源；最后，马克思扭转了哲学的旨趣和目的从观念的“一”变为现实的“多”,正是如此马克思的辩证结构确立了“多”的结尾。“多一多”的结构不仅是现实的辩证运动的结构，同时也是实践活动的结构，从存在、从直接的感性生活的“多”出发而不仅仅停留于直观形式，同时以观念的“一”对“多”进行抽象地、能动地反映从而形成人的思维，人再以对象化的实践活动把思维的观念的“一”重新生产到现实中去变成新的“多”。这样，自在自然通过人的实践成为被赋予了人的内在尺度的人化自然，“多一多”的实践结构也同时成为了人与自然之间的对象化结构。

The final link in the inversion of the dialectic is to find a material driving force for real dialectical movement and real negation. As long as the agency of the dialectic of real life cannot be scientifically explained, and the agency of practical activity cannot find a real basis, the dialectic still cannot be thoroughly inverted from the realm of ideas into reality, and negation, as the core of the dialectic, remains a mystical agency. In *The German Ideology*, Marx examined the process of the formation of human history from the perspective of real social life. First, he discovered that the premise of human existence is the ability to satisfy life needs such as food, drink, shelter, and clothing, and the practical activity of material production that can satisfy life needs becomes “the first historical act,” “and indeed, this is a historical act that people must engage in every day and every hour from thousands of years ago to the present day simply in order to maintain life; it is the basic condition of all history.” Second, “the first need itself that has been satisfied, the activity of satisfying it, and the instruments already acquired for satisfying it give rise to new needs, and the emergence of this new need is the first historical act.” Third, apart from the activity of material production, man also produces man himself, “that is, procreation.” Fourth, the reproduction of man not only produces individuals but also reproduces the social relations that individuals possess; thus both the quantity and quality of human society are active in the reproduction of man. The activity and change of human society simultaneously cause the overall needs of humanity to undergo quantitative and qualitative changes. Fifth, human consciousness and language are formed out of the need for interpersonal communication in the practical activity of material production. Sixth, the division of labor initially arises from the division of labor between the sexes; later, due to “natural endowment, need, contingency,” a social division of labor spontaneously forms. The formation of the social division of labor causes different social groups to participate in different practices of material production, so that the social structure is fixed in stable productive activity. In sum, Marx takes the needs of real human beings as the fundamental driving force of the dialectical movement of social life, thereby stimulating the incongruity between productive forces and relations of production, giving rise to contradictory movement. Marx found the fundamental driving force of the dialectical movement of real society, and, taking the sensuous needs of production and life as the “many,” inverted the mystically tinged “substance as subject” in the conceptual dialectic, so that the dialectic in terms of agency was inverted from abstract ideas to social reality. Finally, the dialectic thoroughly inverted from the “one” to the “many” is historical materialism.

辩证法颠倒的最后一个环节是为现实的辨证运动、现实的否定找到物质的动力。只要现实生活的辩证法的能动性不能被科学地说明，实践活动的能动性找不到现实的依据，辩证法就依然不能从观念领域彻底颠倒到现实中，作为辩证法内核的否定就依然是一种神秘主义的能动性。在《德意志意识形态》中，马克思从现实的社会生活的角度出发考察了人类历史形成的过程。第一，他发现人类生存的前提就是能够满足吃喝住穿等生活需要，而能够满足生活需要的物质生产实践活动就成为了“第一个历史活动”,“而且，这是人们从几千年前直到今天单是为了维持生活就必须每日每时从事的历史活动，是一切历史的基本条件。”第二，“已经得到满足的第一个需要本身、满足需要的活动和已经获得的为满足需要而用的工具又引起新的需要，而这种新的需要的产生是第一个历史活动。”第三，人在物质生产活动之外同时生产着人自身，“即繁殖”。第四，人的再生产不仅生产着个人，同时也再生产着个人所具有的社会关系,如此人类社会的量与质就都在人的再生产中活动着。人类社会的活动变化也同时使得人类的需要总体发生着量与质的变化。第五，人类意识和语言是出于物质生产实践活动中人与人的交往需要而形成的。第六，分工起初是性行为的分工，后来由于“天赋、需要、偶然性”自发形成了社会分工。社会分工的形成使得不同社会集团参与不同的物质生产实践，于是社会结构在稳定的生产活动中固定下来。总的来说，马克思以现实的人的需要作为社会生活辨证运动的根本推动力，来激发生产力与生产关系之间的不协调，从而发生矛盾运动。克思找到了现实社会辩证运动的根本动力，并以作为“多”的感性的生产生活需要颠倒了观念的辩证法中带有神秘主义色彩的“实体即主体”,使得辩证法在能动性上从抽象观念颠倒为社会现实。最后，彻底从“一”颠倒为“多”的辩证法就是历史唯物主义。

4 Conclusion

4 结 语

In summary, Marx did not merely “invert” Hegel’s dialectic in a formal sense, as traditionally understood, but realized a dual transformation from theoretical framework to theoretical purport. From Hegel’s abstract philosophical dialectical framework of “one-many-one” to Marx’s concrete historical dialectical structure of “many-one-many,” this process is a leap from the realm of ideas to the realm of real life. Marx unified the dialectic with man’s real productive activity, taking man’s needs of production and life as the driving force of historical development, thereby finding a solid real support for the dialectical movement of history. In terms of theoretical purport, when human needs become the premise of the movement of the dialectic, “man” steps forward from behind thought. This inversion of Marx’s laid the theoretical foundation for guiding the liberation of the proletariat, realizing the free and comprehensive development of man, and thereby promoting the “modernization of man.”

综上所述，马克思并非如传统理解那样仅从形式上对黑格尔辩证法进行“颠倒”,而是实现了从理论框架到理论旨趣的双重转换。从黑格尔“一多一”的抽象哲学辩证法框架，到马克思“多一多”的具体历史辩证法结构，这一过程是从观念领域向现实生活领域的跨越。马克思将辩证法与人的现实生产活动相统一，以人的生产生活需要作为历史发展的动力，为历史的辩证运动找到了坚实的现实支撑。在理论旨趣上，当人的需要成为辩证法的运动前提时，“人”就从思想的背后站了出来。马克思的这种颠倒为指导无产阶级解放、实现人的自由全面发展，进而推动“人的现代化”夯实了理论地基。

[Authors’ affiliation: Party School of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the CPC (Jilin Provincial Academy of Governance)]

[作者单位：中共吉林省委党校(吉林省行政学院)]

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗