Reanalyzing the Intellectual Relationship between Marx and Feuerbach in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*

As a key text in Marx’s early intellectual evolution, *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* holds a special theoretical significance in the history of the development of Marxist philosophy. In his groundbreaking study *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Avineri makes an important judgment on this point: “Marx’s indebtedness to, and his struggle with, the Hegelian system are both obvious; and it can be shown that the main achievements and difficulties of Marx’s later thought – e.g., the abolition of private property, of alienation, and of the state – all stem from this book.” This judgment reveals the crucial pivotal role this text plays in the development of Marx’s philosophical thought.

《黑格尔法哲学批判》作为马克思早期思想演进的关键文本，在马克思主义哲学发展史上具有特殊的理论坐标意义。阿维纳瑞在其开创性研究《马克思的社会与政治思想》中对此作出重要论断：“马克思对黑格尔体系的受惠和讨伐都十分明显；并且，可以表明，马克思后期思想的主要成就和困境(例如私有制、异化和国家的废除)全都来自这本书。”这一论断揭示了该文本在马克思哲学思想发展中具有的重要枢纽地位。

In terms of the dimension of critique, this text mainly targets the mysticism of Hegel’s logical pantheism and the construction of the internal state system. Previous research has mostly focused on Marx’s critique of logical pantheism, pointing toward the materialist germ that “civil society determines the political state.” With the advancement of MEGA² research, academic debate around Feuerbach’s influence on the turn in Marx’s thought has become increasingly intense. Regarding the question of whether Marx in this text was entirely under the shadow of Feuerbach’s humanist materialism, two rather divergent interpretive paths have emerged. Scholars represented by Lapin argue that in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* Marx had already completed the transition from idealism to philosophical materialism, a materialism entirely different from Feuerbach’s. Scholars such as McLennan, by contrast, emphasize the Feuerbachian moment in the development of the young Marx’s thought.

就批判维度而言，该文本主要指向黑格尔逻辑泛神论的神秘主义及内部国家制度的建构。既往研究多聚焦于马克思对逻辑泛神论的批判，指向“市民社会决定政治国家”的唯物主义萌芽。随着MEGA2研究的推进，学术界围绕费尔巴哈对马克思思想转向影响的讨论愈发激烈。针对马克思在这一文本中是否完全处于费尔巴哈人本学唯物主义阴影之下的问题，形成了颇具张力的解释路径。以拉宾为代表的学者认为，马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中已经实现了由唯心主义向哲学唯物主义的转变，这是完全不同于费尔巴哈的唯物主义。而麦克莱伦等学者则强调，青年马克思思想发展中的费尔巴哈环节。

Existing research has laid an important foundation for us to re-examine the intellectual relationship between Marx and Feuerbach in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, but the interpretive divergences that exist precisely highlight the room for further exploration that remains in this field. This article argues that, while affirming the enlightening significance of Feuerbach’s thought, greater attention should be paid to the manifestation of Marx’s theoretical subjectivity in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. By revisiting this text and analyzing the intellectual relationship between the two, it is possible not only to clarify the Feuerbachian factor and reveal Marx’s theoretical subjectivity, but also to grasp the generative logic of Marxist state theory and respond to contemporary political-philosophical debates.

既有研究为我们重新审视《黑格尔法哲学批判》中马克思与费尔巴哈的思想关系奠定了重要基础，但其中存在的解释分歧恰恰凸显了该领域尚存的探讨空间。本文认为，在肯定费尔巴哈思想启示意义的同时，更应关注《黑格尔法哲学批判》中马克思理论主体性的显现。通过重温这一文本分析二者的思想关系，不仅有助于厘清费尔巴哈因素，解蔽马克思的理论主体性，而且有助于把握马克思主义国家理论的生成逻辑，回应当代政治哲学论争。

I. The Feuerbachian Factor in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* and Its Influence

一、《黑格尔法哲学批判》中的费尔巴哈因素及其影响

Although Feuerbach’s name does not appear directly in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, the traces of his thought constitute the most controversial problem in this manuscript. Althusser argues that the text was written under the problematic of Feuerbachian humanism; Avineri points out that Marx “wrote the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* in this language of Feuerbach’s and based it entirely on this transformative method”; editors regard the “inversion of subject and predicate” as Marx’s borrowing from Feuerbach and use it as important evidence for determining the writing date of this manuscript. The above views mostly rely on the correspondence between Marx, Ruge, and Feuerbach in 1843, but does this causal inference based on documentary evidence necessarily lead to the conclusion that “Marx had not yet broken through Feuerbach’s theoretical horizon”? If we combine Marx’s keen insight in the 1843 correspondence into the absence of political philosophy in Feuerbach, and the paradigm shift from the critique of religious alienation to the critique of political alienation accomplished through the “inversion of subject and predicate,” then it is necessary to re-examine the existing interpretive framework and delve deeper into the Feuerbachian factor within it.

在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中费尔巴哈的名字虽未直接出现，但其思想踪迹却构成了该手稿最富争议的难题。阿尔都塞认为，该文本是在费尔巴哈人本主义总问题下撰写的；阿维纳瑞指出，马克思“用费尔巴哈的这种语言写出《黑格尔法哲学批判》,并且使之完全建立在这种转变性的方法基础之上”的编者将“主谓颠倒法”视为马克思对费尔巴哈的借用，并以此作为确定该手稿写作时间的重要证据。上述观点多依据1843年马克思与卢格、费尔巴哈的通信，但这种基于文献实证的因果推论是否必然导向“马克思尚未突破费尔巴哈理论域”的结论?若结合1843年通信中马克思对费尔巴哈政治哲学缺位的敏锐洞察，及其在“主谓颠倒法”中完成从宗教异化批判向政治异化批判的范式转换，则有必要对既有解释框架进行重新审视，深入探讨其中的费尔巴哈因素。

(I) The Application of the “Inversion of Subject and Predicate”

(一)“主谓颠倒法”的运用

Although Feuerbach was a student of Hegel, he completely broke with Hegelian philosophy in his 1839 *Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy* and turned to materialism. The method Feuerbach employed in criticizing Hegel was precisely the “inversion of subject and predicate.” He seized upon the core logic of Hegel’s speculative philosophy to carry out his critique and concluded that “Hegelian philosophy is rational mysticism.” Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel is mainly expressed as a critique of the beginning of philosophy, namely, that Hegel takes “Being,” devoid of any determination and pure, as the beginning, and this indeterminate “Being” can also be called “Nothing.” Feuerbach argues that this “Nothing” cannot be thought, because in Hegel’s context, to be thought is to be determined, and therefore “Nothing” would not exist. Moreover, thought can only think what exists, “for it is itself an existing, actual activity.” [1]1 Ludwig Feuerbach, *Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy*, in *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*, trans. Zawar Hanfi (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 68. In the *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*, Feuerbach further criticizes the speculative philosophical mode of deduction from the abstract to the concrete, advocating that “we need only make the predicate into the subject” and “we need only invert speculative philosophy, and we obtain the unconcealed, pure, manifest truth.” [2]2 Ludwig Feuerbach, *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*, in *The Fiery Brook*, p. 154. In his view, the path from the abstract to the concrete taken by speculative philosophy is a completely inverted path, one that can never recognize the true freedom of spirit; only by starting from intuition and the essence of nature is the correct path to truth. Therefore, the relationship between being and thought can only be: “Being is the subject, thought the predicate.”

费尔巴哈虽为黑格尔的学生，却在1839年《黑格尔哲学批判》中与黑格尔哲学彻底决裂，转向唯物主义。而费尔巴哈在批判黑格尔时所采用的方法就是“主谓颠倒法”。他抓住黑格尔思辨哲学的核心逻辑学展开批判，并且得出“黑格尔哲学是理性神秘论”的结论。费尔巴哈对黑格尔的批判主要体现为对哲学的开端的批判，即黑格尔将不具有任何规定性的、纯粹的“存在”视为开端，这种无规定性的“存在”又可以被称为“无”。费尔巴哈认为，这种“无”是不可以被思维的，因为在黑格尔的语境下被思维就是被规定，那么也就不会存在“无”。而思维也只能思维存在的东西，“因为它本身就是一种存在的、现实的活动”。在《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》中，费尔巴哈进一步批判思辨哲学从抽象到具体的推演方式，主张“只要将宾词当作主词”,“只要将思辨哲学颠倒过来，就能得到毫无掩饰的、纯粹的、显明的真理”。在他看来，思辨哲学所走的从抽象到具体之路是一种完全的颠倒之路，这一道路永远无法认识精神的真正自由，只有从直观和自然的本质出发才是通往真理的正确道路。因此，存在和思维的关系只能是“存在是主体，思维是宾词”。

In March 1843, Marx wrote in a letter to Ruge: “There is only one point in Feuerbach’s aphorisms that dissatisfies me: he emphasizes nature too much and politics too little.” [3]3 Karl Marx, “Letter to Arnold Ruge, March 1843,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 400. “Feuerbach’s aphorisms” refers to the *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*, so it can be determined that Marx had read the *Preliminary Theses* when writing *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* and had borrowed the “inversion of subject and predicate.” Like Feuerbach, Marx seized upon the core logic of Hegel’s philosophy of right and employed the “inversion of subject and predicate” to critique Hegel’s political philosophy. First, Marx criticizes the deductive process by which Hegel constructs the transition from the family and civil society to the state, pointing out that this deduction reveals a logical, pantheistic mysticism. Hegel regards the state as “the actuality of the ethical Idea” and treats the state as the embodiment of universality, while the family and civil society are embodiments of particularity and individuality. However, the necessity of the transition from the family and civil society to the state does not arise from within civil society itself but is a requirement of logic. Marx points out that the correct transitional process should be: “The family and civil society constitute themselves as the state. They are the driving force.” [4]4 Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 8. Second, Marx further reveals that Hegel “everywhere makes the Idea into the subject, while the genuine, actual subject, e.g., ‘political conviction,’ is turned into the predicate.” [5]5 Ibid., p. 11. For example, in §279 of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel discusses the legitimacy of the transformation of sovereignty into monarchy, arguing that as an ideality, subjectivity, when realized in the empirical world, becomes the monarch, who possesses singularity. Marx criticizes this: “Hegel does not treat subjectivity and personality as predicates of their subjects, but instead makes these predicates into something independent and then, in a mystical way, turns these predicates into the subjects of these predicates.” [6]6 Ibid., p. 22.

1843年3月，马克思在写给卢格的信中提到，“费尔巴哈的警句只有一点不能使我满意，这就是：他强调自然过多而强调政治太少”。“费尔巴哈的警句”指的就是《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》,因此可以确定的是，马克思在撰写《黑格尔法哲学批判》时已阅读《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》,并借鉴了“主谓颠倒法”。同费尔巴哈一样，马克思抓住黑格尔法哲学的核心逻辑，并采用“主谓颠倒法”对黑格尔的国家哲学展开批判。首先，马克思批判了黑格尔建构的家庭、市民社会向国家过渡的推论过程，指出这一推论显露出逻辑的、泛神论的神秘主义。黑格尔将国家看作“伦理理念的现实”，并将国家视为普遍性的体现，而家庭和市民社会则是个别性和特殊性的体现。但是，从家庭和市民社会向国家过渡的必然性，不是从市民社会内部产生的，而是逻辑学的要求。马克思指出合理的过渡过程应该是：“家庭和市民社会使自身成为国家。它们是动力。”其次，马克思进一步揭示了黑格尔“在任何地方都把观念当作主体，而把本来意义上现实的主体，例如，‘政治信念’变成谓语”。例如，黑格尔在《法哲学原理》第279节中讨论主权转变为王权的合法性问题，他指出作为一种理想性的主观性落实到经验世界中就是具有单一性的君主。对此，马克思批判道：“黑格尔不把主观性和人格看作它们的主体的谓语，反而把这些谓语变成某种独立的东西，然后以神秘的方式把这些谓语变成这些谓语的主体。”

(II) The Similarity of Humanist Positions

(二)人本主义立场的相似性

Whether in the *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy* or in *The Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach insists that “the essence of theology is anthropology.” Through the “inversion of subject and predicate” in his critique of speculative philosophy, he aims to establish the philosophical position of “man himself who thinks.” This humanist position had an important influence on Marx. From 1843 to 1844, in his letters to Feuerbach, Marx not only enthusiastically sent Feuerbach the “Introduction” to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* but also skillfully employed Feuerbach’s concept of “man” in his correspondence.

无论是在《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》还是《基督教的本质》中，费尔巴哈都坚持“神学的本质就是人本学”。他通过“主谓颠倒法”批判思辨哲学，旨在确立“思维的人自己” 的哲学立场。这种人本主义立场对马克思产生了重要影响。1843年至1844年，在致费尔巴哈的书信中，马克思不仅热情地将《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》寄给费尔巴哈，而且还在信中熟练地运用了费尔巴哈的“人类”概念。

In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx’s emphasis on concepts such as “the individual,” “species-being,” and “popular sovereignty” also exhibits similarities with Feuerbach’s humanist materialism. In his critique of Hegel’s theory of monarchy, Marx criticizes the constitutional monarchy that Hegel extolled, pointing out that it ultimately amounts to nothing more than “*L’État c’est moi*” [n7] and seems no different from absolute monarchy. On the contrary, Marx advocates that democracy “is the solved riddle of all constitutions” and “is the truth of monarchy.” The democracy Marx advocates embodies popular sovereignty, with the people as the subject of the state. As he states, the individual monarch cannot represent the state; “only as the many does the one unconditionally possess truth.” [n8] What Marx emphasizes is the decisive position of the “many” represented by the people over the “one” represented by the monarch. In his critique of the theory of executive power, Marx likewise displays his esteem for popular democracy, opposing Hegel’s particularization of the “political state” and his reification of the individual within civil society. First, Marx points out that Hegel mystifies the selection of officials; although formally “every citizen has the possibility of becoming a state official,” the issue is not the possibility of belonging to the “universal estate,” but rather “whether this estate is capable of becoming a truly universal estate, that is, the estate of all citizens.” [n9] Second, Marx opposes relying on the estate system to prevent official abuse of power, because the estate system is itself the abuse of power; only an intermediate estate organized by the people from below can resolve this problem. In his critique of the theory of legislative power, although Marx also acknowledges that the state represents universality, he moves in a completely different direction from Hegel. Marx utterly negates the mediating role Hegel assigns to the estate element, arguing that the estate element is merely another form of “the rule of the flesh,” not the rule of reason; the representatives of each estate still proceed from their respective private interests and are utterly incapable of representing the universal will of the people. Marx advocates abolishing the estate system and allowing the people to participate directly in state affairs, including elections. In response to Hegel’s erroneous logic that denies democracy on the grounds that each individual cannot participate in state affairs alone, Marx distinguishes between the question “whether each individual has the right to participate in state affairs” and the question “whether each individual can participate in state affairs alone”; the former should be affirmed, while the latter should be denied.

在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中马克思对“个人”“类存在”“人民主权”等概念的强调，也表现出与费尔巴哈人本学唯物主义的相似之处。在批判黑格尔的王权理论时，马克思批判了黑格尔推崇的君主立宪制，指出其最终不过是“朕即国家”,与君主专制似乎并无不同。相反，马克思主张民主制“是一切形式的国家制度的已经解开的谜”、“是君主制的真理”。马克思主张的民主制体现人民主权，人民才是国家的主体。正如他所言，君主这一个体并不能代表国家，“一惟有作为许多的一才无条件地具有真理性”。马克思强调的是人民代表的“多”相较于君主代表的“一”的决定性地位。在批判行政权理论时，马克思同样表现出对人民民主制的推崇，反对黑格尔将“政治国家”特殊化、将市民社会中的人固化。首先，马克思指出黑格尔将官员选拔神秘化，虽然形式上“每个市民都有可能成为国家官员”,但问题不在于是否有成为“普遍等级”的可能性，而在于“这一等级是否有能力成为真正普遍的等级，即成为一切市民的等级”。其次，马克思反对依靠等级制来防止官员滥权，因为等级制就是滥用权力本身，只有人民自下而上组织的中间等级才能解决这一问题。在批判立法权理论时，尽管马克思也承认国家代表普遍性，但马克思却与黑格尔走向了完全不同的方向。马克思彻底否定了黑格尔赋予等级要素的中介作用，认为等级要素不过是另一种形式的“肉体的统治”,并非理性的统治，各等级代表仍然是从各自的私利出发，他们根本无法代表人民的普遍意志。马克思主张废除等级制，让人民直接参与国家事务，包括选举。针对黑格尔认为每个人不可能单独参与国家事务从而否定民主制的错误逻辑，马克思区分了“每个人有没有权利参与国家事务”与“每个人能否单独地参与国家事务”两个问题，前者应肯定，而后者应否定。

It is precisely because of the “Feuerbachian factor” manifested in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*—namely, the application of the “method of inverting subject and predicate” and the humanist standpoint—that scholars represented by Althusser have consequently argued that the Marx of 1843 still remained within Feuerbach’s humanist problematic, or, in other words, was still in the Feuerbachian stage. Therefore, before positively demonstrating the core thesis of this article—that Feuerbach’s influence on Marx was limited—it is first necessary to respond to and refute such views represented by Althusser. Only on this basis does the further argumentation presented in this article become more reasonable.

正是由于《黑格尔法哲学批判》中所体现出的“费尔巴哈因素”,即“主谓颠倒法”的运用及人本主义立场，以阿尔都塞为代表的学者由此认为，1843年的马克思仍停留在费尔巴哈的人本主义总问题之下，或者说处于费尔巴哈阶段。因此，在正面论证本文核心观点，即费尔巴哈对马克思的影响是有限的之前，必须首先回应并反驳以阿尔都塞为代表的此类观点。在此基础上，本文所做的进一步论证才更加具有合理性。

(III) A Refutation of Althusser’s View

(三)对阿尔都塞观点的反驳

In his “Feuerbach’s ‘Philosophical Manifestos,’” Althusser explicitly states that in 1843 Marx was still situated within Feuerbach’s humanist problematic, and that in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, “the young Marx was merely a Feuerbachian avant-gardist who used an ethical problematic to understand human history.” [n10] In his view, Marx’s “critique of Hegel was, in terms of its theoretical principles, nothing but a repetition, an explication, a development, and an extension of Feuerbach’s outstanding critique of Hegel, which he had conducted many times.” [n11] Although Althusser recognizes that Feuerbach rarely discussed politics, he believes that Marx merely applied Feuerbach’s theory of “human nature” to the political sphere. Furthermore, Althusser further points out that the terminology Marx used in 1843 was also borrowed from Feuerbach’s terminology, such as “alienation,” “species-being,” “the future world in philosophy,” “the realization of man is man himself,” and “the inversion of subject and object,” all of which came directly from Feuerbach. Therefore, he argues that since these terms were borrowed as a whole from Feuerbach, Marx’s theoretical categories still could not transcend Feuerbach. However, an analysis of Althusser’s argumentation reveals that both of his arguments lack sufficient persuasiveness.

阿尔都塞在《费尔巴哈的“哲学宣言”》中明确指出，马克思在1843年尚且处于费尔巴哈的人本主义总问题之下，在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，“青年马克思只是一个用伦理总问题去理解人类历史的费尔巴哈派先进分子”。在他看来，马克思“对黑格尔进行的这一批判，就其理论原则而言，无非是费尔巴哈对黑格尔多次进行的杰出批判的重复、说明、发挥和引申”。尽管阿尔都塞意识到费尔巴哈很少谈论政治，但他认为马克思只是将费尔巴哈的“人性”论应用于政治领域而已。此外，阿尔都塞进一步指出，马克思在1843年所使用的术语亦借鉴了费尔巴哈术语，如“异化”“类存在”“哲学中的未来世界”“人的根本实现就是人本身”“主客体颠倒”等，都是直接来自费尔巴哈。因此，他认为既然这些术语是作为一个整体从费尔巴哈那里借来的，那么马克思的理论范畴就依然无法超越费尔巴哈。但是，通过分析阿尔都塞的论证可以发现，他的两个论据均缺乏充分的说服力。

First, the concept of “problematic” itself lacks a clear definition. Althusser repeatedly emphasizes that early texts such as the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* should be understood against the background of Feuerbach’s problematic, yet he never clearly defines the specific content of this concept. Moreover, Althusser’s introduction of concepts such as “problematic,” “Feuerbach’s problematic,” and “new problematic” actually serves his theory of the epistemological break. He points out, “If Marx accepted Feuerbach’s entire problematic, then his break with Feuerbach—the so-called ‘settling accounts with our former philosophical conscience’—meant adopting a new problematic.” [n12] Thus, if the continuity of Marx’s thought can be adequately demonstrated, the foundation of Althusser’s theory of the break can be largely shaken, and the concept of “problematic” itself would thereby lose its meaning. Therefore, this argument of Althusser’s lacks persuasiveness.

首先，“总问题”这一概念本身缺乏清晰界定。阿尔都塞一再强调，应将《黑格尔法哲学批判》等早期文本置于费尔巴哈总问题的背景之下理解，但他始终未能明确界定这一概念的具体内涵。不仅如此，阿尔都塞提出“总问题”“费尔巴哈的总问题”“新的总问题”等概念，实际上是为他的断裂论服务的。他指出，“如果说马克思接受了费尔巴哈的整个总问题，那么他同费尔巴哈的决裂，即所谓‘把我们从前的哲学信仰清算一下’,就意味着采纳了一个新的总问题”。由此可见，若能充分论证马克思思想的连续性，便能在很大程度上动摇阿尔都塞的断裂论基础，“总问题”概念本身也就随之丧失了意义。因此阿尔都塞的这一论据是缺乏说服力的。

Second, Althusser’s conclusion that Marx’s continued use of a series of Feuerbachian concepts indicates that he had not yet surpassed the Feuerbachian stage is overly dogmatic. In fact, although Marx borrowed Feuerbach’s terminology, he endowed these terms with meanings different from those of Feuerbach. Taking the three concepts of “alienation,” “species-essence,” and “the method of inverting subject and predicate” as examples, the differences between the two can be clearly seen. “Alienation” is a core concept in Marx’s early thought, and this concept did not originate entirely from Feuerbach. Marx’s use of this concept underwent a transition from Feuerbach to Hegel, especially in the third manuscript of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, where he shifted from negating alienation to affirming it. Furthermore, although Marx uses the concept of “species-essence,” he emphasizes the sociality of the human being, whereas Feuerbach focuses on the natural attributes and natural essence of the human being; the meanings of the two are not the same. As for the “method of inverting subject and predicate,” some scholars have argued in detail that it is more likely to have originated from Bauer than from Feuerbach. [n13] Additionally, Lapin [n14] has pointed out that in his youth Marx faced the difficult problem of “how to create the backbone of scientific terminology concerning society.” He was dissatisfied with the old terminology but had not yet created new terms, so “Marx infused them with other, specific political content.” [n15] Thus, although Marx used certain Feuerbachian terms in his early stage, it cannot be concluded on this basis that he still remained in the “shadow” of Feuerbach’s problematic.

其次，阿尔都塞认为，马克思沿用费尔巴哈的一系列概念，便说明其尚未超出费尔巴哈阶段。这一结论是过于武断的。事实上，尽管马克思借用了费尔巴哈的术语，但却赋予了这些术语以不同于费尔巴哈的含义。以“异化”“类本质”“主谓颠倒法”这三个概念为例，可以清晰看出二者的差异。“异化”是马克思早期思想中的核心概念，这一概念并非完全源自费尔巴哈。马克思对这一概念的使用经历了从费尔巴哈到黑格尔的转变，尤其在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》第三手稿中，实现了从否定异化到肯定异化的转变。此外，马克思虽然使用“类本质”概念，但他强调的是人的社会性，而费尔巴哈关注的是人的自然属性与自然本质，二者的含义并不相同。至于“主谓颠倒法”,更有学者详尽论证，认为这一方法源自鲍威尔的可能性大于费尔巴哈。此外，拉宾曾指出马克思在青年时期面临着“如何创造关于社会的科学术语的基干”这一难题。他对旧的术语感到不满，但是又尚未创造出新的术语，于是“马克思为它们加入了另一些具体的政治内容”。由此可见，尽管马克思在早期阶段使用了费尔巴哈的某些术语，但并不能据此认定他仍处于费尔巴哈总问题的“阴影”之下。

II. An Analysis of the Limitedness of Feuerbach’s Influence on Marx

二、费尔巴哈对马克思影响的有限性分析

During the period when Marx was writing the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Feuerbach did exert a stage-specific influence on the development of Marx’s philosophical thought. However, existing research often overestimates the depth and scope of this influence. For example, Althusser characterizes Feuerbach’s influence as “problematic,” which implies that the questions Marx discusses in this text are fundamentally no different from those of Feuerbach, thereby obscuring the subjectivity of Marx’s theoretical construction. Having refuted Althusser’s view, this article will continue to draw on cutting-edge research to further demonstrate that Feuerbach’s influence on Marx’s thought was limited.

在马克思撰写《黑格尔法哲学批判》的过程中，费尔巴哈确实对其哲学思想发展产生了阶段性影响，然而现有研究往往高估了这种影响的深度和范围。例如，阿尔都塞将费尔巴哈的影响说成是“总问题式的”,这也就意味着马克思在这一文本中所讨论的问题，从根本上来说与费尔巴哈并无不同之处，从而遮蔽了马克思理论建构的主体性。在反驳了阿尔都塞的观点之后，本文将继续结合前沿研究进一步论证费尔巴哈对马克思思想的影响是有限的。

(I) Is Feuerbach a Key Figure for Determining the Date of Composition of the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*?

(一)费尔巴哈是判定《黑格尔法哲学批判》写作时间的关键人物吗?

At present, there are three main views in academia regarding the writing time of *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*: the first view, represented by S. Landshut, holds that the manuscript was written between April 1841 and April 1842; the second view, represented by Lapin and T. I. Oizerman, holds that the manuscript was written in the two years between 1842 and 1843 (during the period of work at the *Rheinische Zeitung*); the third view, which enjoys relatively high recognition in academia, represented by Riazanov and Taubert, holds that the manuscript was written after Marx withdrew from the *Rheinische Zeitung* in 1843.

目前学术界关于《黑格尔法哲学批判》写作时间主要存在三种观点：第一种观点，以S.朗兹胡特为代表，认为手稿写作于1841年4月至1842年4月之间；第二种观点，以拉宾和泰·伊·奥伊则尔曼为代表，认为手稿写于1842年至1843年两年间(在《莱茵报》工作期间);第三种观点学术界认可度较高，以梁赞诺夫和陶伯特为代表，认为手稿写于1843年马克思退出《莱茵报》之后。

Before the Russian-language third volume of the *Marx-Engels Archive* containing *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Riazanov, in his article “From the *Rheinische Zeitung* to *The Holy Family*,” determined, by comparing this manuscript with other works, that it was written after Marx withdrew from the editorial board of the *Rheinische Zeitung* and after he read Feuerbach’s *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*. In MEGA1 he directly noted that this manuscript was written between March and August 1843. In 1955, the second Russian edition of the *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Volume 1, further narrowed the time frame to the summer of 1843. Taubert also supported Riazanov’s view and, in MEGA2, Part I, Volume 2, published in 1982, marked its writing time as mid-March to the end of September 1843. She also provided new evidence: in a letter written “in March 1843 on a barge bound for D,” Marx told Ruge, “I am currently traveling in Holland,” and the manuscript paper is a Dutch product, hence she inferred that the manuscript began to be written in mid-March 1843. McLellan also agrees with Riazanov’s view, believing that during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period in 1842, Marx had not yet been influenced by Feuerbach, whereas *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* was clearly influenced by Feuerbach. McLellan points out, “The book was written by Marx from March to May 1843 in Kreuznach.”

在《马克思恩格斯文库》俄文版第三卷《黑格尔法哲学批判》之前，梁赞诺夫在《从〈莱茵报〉到〈神圣家族〉》一文中，通过将该手稿与其他著作对比，认定其写于马克思退出《莱茵报》编辑部并且阅读了费尔巴哈《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》之后。他在MEGA1中直接注明了这部手稿写于1843年3月至8月。1955年《马克思恩格斯全集》俄文第二版第一卷进一步将时间范围缩小至1843年夏天。陶伯特同样支持梁赞诺夫的观点，并在1982年出版的MEGA2第一部分第二卷中标注其写作时间为1843年3月中旬至9月底。她还提供了新的证据，即马克思在“1843年3月在开往D的驳船上”的一封信中告诉卢格：“目前我正在荷兰旅行”,而手稿纸张正是荷兰产品，故推断手稿开始写作的时间为1843年的3月中旬。麦克莱伦亦与梁赞诺夫看法一致，认为1842年《莱茵报》时期马克思尚未受到费尔巴哈的影响，而《黑格尔法哲学批判》则明显地受到费尔巴哈的影响。麦克莱伦指出，“该书是马克思从1843年3月到5月在克罗兹纳赫写的”。

Furthermore, the editors of MEGA2 also regard Marx’s use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” as an important basis for determining its writing time, explicitly stating: “Marx’s acceptance of Feuerbach’s *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy* (which Marx first read in the last days of February 1843) is an important marker for determining the date of the manuscript.” This acceptance is mainly reflected in Marx’s imitation of Feuerbach’s “inversion of subject and predicate” to critique the inverted relationship between civil society and the state in Hegel’s philosophy of right. But this immediately raises a problem: the determination of the writing time of *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* and the influence of Feuerbach form a circular argument that connects end to end.

此外，MEGA2编者也将马克思使用的“主谓颠倒法”视为断定其写作时间的重要依据，明确指出：“马克思接受费尔巴哈的《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》(马克思最早在1843年2月的最后几天才读到),是确定手稿写作日期的重要标志。”这一接受主要体现在马克思仿照费尔巴哈的“主谓颠倒法”,批判黑格尔法哲学中市民社会与国家的颠倒关系。但由此就引发了一个问题，即《黑格尔法哲学批判》写作时间的认定和费尔巴哈影响之间形成了一个首尾衔接的循环论证问题。

Charles Barbour, a professor at Western Sydney University in Australia, has questioned the already-consensus writing time of *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. He believes that Riazanov and others lack strong evidence for determining the manuscript’s writing time as March 1843, and proposes the view that the manuscript was written in March 1842. First, he directly targets the core basis for Riazanov’s establishment of the March 1843 date, namely that Marx’s use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* came from Feuerbach. He also points out that although Marx indeed used a similar subject-predicate structure, he did not merely invert or reverse Hegel’s treatment of these subjects and predicates, but rather developed his discussion within a more complex logical relationship. Second, Charles Barbour further points out that Marx had already established the basic paradigm for handling the problem of subject and predicate as early as in his *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy*, which predates Feuerbach’s *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy* by at least four years. On this basis, he emphasizes that in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx neither mentions Feuerbach by name nor cites any of his works. The only evidence that can prove Feuerbach’s influence on Marx is a sentence in Marx’s letter to Ruge: “The only thing I find unsatisfactory about Feuerbach is that he refers too much to nature and too little to politics.” But Charles Barbour believes this evidence is too thin to support the view that the “inversion of subject and predicate” originated from Feuerbach. Moreover, he points out that in *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*, which is generally recognized as having had an important influence on Marx, Feuerbach did not systematically discuss the “problem of the inversion of subject and predicate.” On the contrary, his earlier works *Thoughts on Death and Immortality* and *Critique of Hegelian Philosophy* discussed this theme in greater detail. But Marx had not read these texts at that time, so he would not have been influenced by them.

澳大利亚西悉尼大学教授查尔斯·巴伯就对已经达成共识的《黑格尔法哲学批判》的写作时间提出疑问。他认为，梁赞诺夫等人将手稿写作时间确定为1843年3月缺乏有力论据，并提出该手稿写于1842年3月的观点。首先，他直指梁赞诺夫确立1843年3月时间点的核心依据，即马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中使用的“主谓颠倒法”来自费尔巴哈。他还指出，尽管马克思确实使用了类似的主谓结构，但他并非仅仅颠倒或逆转黑格尔对这些主词和谓词的处理方式，而是在一个更复杂的逻辑关系中展开讨论。其次，查尔斯·巴伯进一步指出，马克思早在《关于伊壁鸠鲁哲学的笔记》中就已经确立了关于主词与谓词问题处理的基本范式，这个笔记比费尔巴哈的《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》早了至少四年。在此基础上，他强调，《黑格尔法哲学批判》中马克思既未提及费尔巴哈之名，也未引用其任何作品。唯一能证明费尔巴哈对马克思有影响的，仅是马克思致卢格的信中提及的一句“唯一不满费尔巴哈的一点在于过多的提及自然而过少的谈论政治”。但查尔斯·巴伯认为，这一证明过于单薄，难以支撑“主谓颠倒法”源自费尔巴哈的观点。此外，他还指出，在公认对马克思产生重要影响的《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》中，费尔巴哈并未系统讨论“主谓颠倒问题”。相反，其早期著作《论死亡与不朽》和《黑格尔哲学批判》才更为详细地讨论了这一主题。但是马克思彼时并未阅读过这些文本，因此不会受其影响。

(2) Was Feuerbach the sole source of Marx’s borrowing of the “inversion of subject and predicate”?

(二)费尔巴哈是马克思借鉴“主谓颠倒法”的唯一来源吗?

Like Charles Barbour, the Polish philosopher Z. Rosen also denies the uniqueness of the “inversion of subject and predicate” as originating from Feuerbach. He believes that Marx’s use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” can be traced back to the *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy*, which Marx wrote for his doctoral dissertation, and that this notebook was written earlier than Feuerbach’s *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*. In the third notebook of this work, Marx points out, “In ordinary thinking, there are always ready-made predicates separated from the subject by thought. All philosophers make predicates the subject.” This is a view Marx put forward when discussing Plutarch. During the period of his doctoral dissertation, Marx’s relationship with Bauer was very close. Compared with Feuerbach, Marx and Bauer had opportunities to exchange views on this issue through personal interaction and correspondence, whereas such opportunities were lacking between Marx and Feuerbach. In his doctoral dissertation, Marx “preferred Bauer’s theses on the antagonism between philosophy and religion, the inhuman nature of religion, and self-consciousness as a supreme value to Feuerbach’s theses.” The close relationship between Marx and Bauer continued unchanged until 1842, as can be seen from *The Last Trumpet of Judgment*. Marx’s collaboration with Bauer, and Bauer’s obvious influence on his anti-religious views, led Marx to write to Ruge on March 20, 1842, saying, “There is some conflict with Feuerbach on this issue, a conflict not over principles but over their understanding.”

与查尔斯·巴伯一样，波兰哲学家兹·罗森同样否认“主谓颠倒法”源于费尔巴哈的唯一性。他认为，马克思对于“主谓颠倒法”的运用最早可以追溯到马克思为撰写博士论文而作的《关于伊壁鸠鲁哲学的笔记》之中，而这一笔记的撰写要早于费尔巴哈的《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》。在这一笔记的第三册中马克思指出，“在通常的思维中，总是存在现成的、被思维从主体分离出来的谓语。所有哲学家都用谓语做主体”。这是马克思在讨论普卢塔克时提出的观点。《博士论文》时期，马克思与鲍威尔的关系非常亲密，相比于费尔巴哈，马克思和鲍威尔在个人交往和书信往来中有机会就这一问题交换意见，而马克思和费尔巴哈之间则缺乏这样的机会。马克思在其博士论文中“偏爱鲍威尔关于哲学和宗教之间的对抗、宗教的非人道性质、自我意识是一种至高无上的价值等论点有甚于费尔巴哈的论点”。马克思和鲍威尔之间的密切关系一直持续到1842年都没有改变，这一点可以从《末日的宣告》中看出来。马克思同鲍威尔的合作，以及鲍威尔对他的反宗教观点的明显影响，使马克思在1842年3月20日写信给卢格时说“同费尔巴哈在这个问题上有些冲突，这个冲突不涉及原则，而是涉及对它的理解”。

Although we cannot deny the influence on Marx of the “inversion of subject and predicate” used by Feuerbach in his critique of Hegel, the influence of Bauer’s views on the antagonism between philosophy and religion, as provided by Z. Rosen, on Marx is equally impossible to falsify. In particular, Marx’s use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” in the *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy* is powerful evidence refuting Riazanov’s view of Feuerbach’s “inversion of subject and predicate” as the sole source of Marx’s thought. In this way, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx cannot serve as a key argument for determining the writing of Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. At the same time, we should also reassess the nature and limits of Feuerbach’s influence on Marx.

虽然我们不能否认费尔巴哈在批判黑格尔时所使用的“主谓颠倒法”对马克思产生了影响，但是兹·罗森提供的鲍威尔关于哲学和宗教之间对抗的观点对马克思的影响同样是无法被证伪的。尤其是马克思在《关于伊壁鸠鲁哲学的笔记》中对于“主谓颠倒法”的运用，更是反驳梁赞诺夫将费尔巴哈的“主谓颠倒法”视为马克思唯一的思想来源的有力证据。如此一来，费尔巴哈对马克思的影响就无法成为确定马克思写作《黑格尔法哲学批判》的关键论据。与此同时，我们也应该重估费尔巴哈对马克思的影响的性质和限度。

(3) Was it because of Feuerbach that Marx stood on a humanist standpoint to criticize Hegel?

(三)马克思是因为费尔巴哈才站在人本主义立场批判黑格尔的吗?

McLellan points out that two factors contributed to Marx’s view of Hegel’s political philosophy. The first factor was his experience as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*; the second was Feuerbach’s *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*. In fact, Feuerbach’s *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy* cannot be regarded as a factor on a par with the experience of editing the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Before Marx faced the “difficulty of having to express an opinion on matters of material interest,” Feuerbach’s influence on Marx was essentially no different from his influence on other members of the Young Hegelians.

麦克莱伦指出，有两个因素促成了马克思对黑格尔政治哲学的看法。第一个因素是他担任《莱茵报》编辑的经历；第二个是费尔巴哈的《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》。其实，费尔巴哈的《关于哲学改造的临时纲要》并不能成为与《莱茵报》编辑经历并列的原因。在尚未面临“对物质利益问题发表意见的难事”之前，费尔巴哈对马克思的影响与对其他青年黑格尔派成员的影响并无本质不同。

Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right emerged against the background of the Young Hegelians’ critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right. Bauer and Moses Hess and others held that constitutional monarchy was no longer suited to German conditions and could not serve as the theoretical foundation of bourgeois democracy; Marx was also influenced by this. At the end of 1841, he planned to write part of a sequel to Bauer’s *The Trumpet of the Last Judgment against Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist*. Marx was responsible for writing the chapter “On Christian Art,” in which he analyzed Hegel’s doctrines on art and religion as well as certain parts of Hegel’s philosophy of right. It was later not published for various reasons, but it can be seen that his critical intention had already taken initial shape. Beyond this, analysis of Marx’s correspondence with Ruge shows that Marx had already written articles criticizing Hegel’s philosophy of right at that time. Although Feuerbach’s humanism and materialist stance exerted an important influence on the Young Hegelians and also touched Marx, because Marx had not yet been stimulated by the practical problems of the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx, like his influence on other Young Hegelians, can only be regarded as a theoretical background. The real driving force that turned Marx toward a critique of Hegel’s speculative idealism was his work experience during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, which brought him into full contact with real social life.

马克思对黑格尔法哲学的批判，诞生于青年黑格尔派批判黑格尔法哲学的背景下。鲍威尔和莫泽斯·赫斯等人认为君主立宪制已不再适应德国国情，无法作为资产阶级民主制的理论基础，马克思亦受其影响。1841年底，他计划为鲍威尔的《对黑格尔、无神论者和反基督教者的末日审判的宣言》撰写续篇的一部分。马克思负责写作《论基督教的艺术》一章，在这一章中他分析了黑格尔关于艺术与宗教的学说以及黑格尔法哲学的某些部分。后因故未出版，但可见其批判意图已初步形成。除此之外，通过分析马克思与卢格的通信可以看出，马克思在当时已经撰写了针对黑格尔法哲学批判的文章。费尔巴哈的人本学和唯物主义立场虽对青年黑格尔派产生重要影响，也波及马克思，但是此时由于马克思尚未受到《莱茵报》时期现实问题的刺激，因此费尔巴哈对马克思的影响与对其他青年黑格尔派一样，只能被视为一种理论背景。而推动马克思转向批判黑格尔思辨唯心主义的真正原因，是他在《莱茵报》期间充分地接触到现实社会生活的工作经历。

Unlike other members of the Young Hegelians, Marx, “in the face of the contradiction between philosophy and reality, changed course and sought anew a philosophy capable of explaining real life and thereby changing real life.” After formally joining the editorial board of the *Rheinische Zeitung* on October 15, 1842, Marx published several editorial articles criticizing current ills. In these articles, he focused on political issues such as the cabinet’s new decrees reported in the newspaper, the debates on the law on the theft of wood, and the poverty of the Moselle peasants, demonstrating a clear concern for reality. In “Debates on the Law on the Theft of Wood,” Marx for the first time took the standpoint of the propertyless [23]23 The term “propertyless” (无产者) here refers to the poor and dispossessed classes, anticipating Marx’s later concept of the proletariat but not yet fully developed.. At this time, Marx’s defense still belonged to moral consciousness. But against the background of clear property rights, Marx’s defense fell into a dilemma. This forced him to reflect on the issues of private property and ownership; only by fundamentally solving the problems of private property and ownership could he respond to the difficulty of expressing opinions on material interests that he faced. This also directly drove Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right. Although Hegel acknowledged the severity of the problem of poverty, he failed to provide a solution, and his rational conception of the state could not respond to real difficulties. Thus, Marx shifted the focus of his critique from the “copy” to the “original,” concentrating on the sphere of material interests. At this point, Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right had already surpassed the Young Hegelians, containing its own theoretical goals and new qualitative elements. It can be said that what led Marx onto the path of criticizing Hegel was precisely “his consistent realistic spirit and critical spirit oriented toward reality.”

与青年黑格尔派的其他成员不同，马克思在“哲学与现实的矛盾面前改弦更张，重新寻找能够解释现实生活进而能够改变现实生活的哲学”。1842年10月15日正式进入《莱茵报》编辑部后，马克思发表多篇针砭时弊的社论性文章。在这些文章中，他关注报纸新闻的内阁新法令、林木盗窃法的辩论、摩泽尔农民贫困等政治问题，表现出鲜明的现实关怀。在《关于林木盗窃法的辩论》中，马克思首次站在无产者立场，这时马克思的辩护仍然属于道德自觉。但在产权明晰的背景之下，马克思的辩护陷入一种两难境地。这迫使他反思私有制与所有权问题，只有从根本上解决私有制问题和所有权问题，才能够回应面对的对物质利益问题发表意见的难事。这也直接推动了马克思对黑格尔法哲学的批判。黑格尔虽承认贫困问题的严峻性，却未能提供解决之道，其理性国家观也难以回应现实困境。于是，马克思将批判重心由“副本”转向“原本”,聚焦物质利益领域。至此，马克思对黑格尔法哲学的批判已超越青年黑格尔派，蕴含了自身理论目标和新质要素。可以说，引导马克思走上批判黑格尔道路的，正是“他那一贯的面向现实的求实精神和批判精神”。

III. Marx’s Transcendence of Feuerbach and the Establishment of Theoretical Subjectivity

三、马克思对费尔巴哈的超越与理论主体性的确立

Through an analysis of Feuerbach’s influence on Marx and its limitations in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, what is obscured can be discovered: the subjectivity of Marx’s early theoretical construction. This subjectivity is mainly embodied in the creative use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” method and the concrete reconstruction of humanism. Rethinking the relationship between Marx and Feuerbach aims to discover the subjectivity of Marxist theoretical construction through the solidified and unchanging thick documents. It is precisely the neglect of this subjectivity that has led to views such as the “theory of rupture” and “two Marxes,” which fragment the continuity of Marxist thought. Only by reexamining the subjectivity of Marxist theoretical construction can the above misinterpretations be effectively refuted.

通过分析《黑格尔法哲学批判》中费尔巴哈对马克思的影响及其有限性，可以发现其中被遮蔽的是马克思早期理论建构的主体性。这一主体性主要体现在对“主谓颠倒法”的创造性使用及对人本主义的具体化重构之中。重思马克思与费尔巴哈思想关系，旨在透过凝固不变的厚重文献发现马克思主义理论建构的主体性。正是对这一主体性的忽视，导致了“断裂论”“两个马克思”等割裂马克思主义思想连续性的观点。唯有重审马克思主义理论建构的主体性，才能有效反驳上述误读。

(1) The Creative Use of the “Inversion of Subject and Predicate” Method

(一)对“主谓颠倒法”的创造性使用

Marx’s creative use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” method embodies the subjectivity of his theoretical construction. In terms of the use of the method, it already had a theoretical purpose different from Feuerbach’s, as stated in a letter to Ruge on March 5, 1842: the article aimed “to struggle against constitutional monarchy, this thoroughly self-contradictory and self-destructive mixture.” Marx did not, as Althusser claimed, merely apply Feuerbach’s method to a different field, but rather, as the editors of MEGA2 state, surpassed Feuerbach. This is not only because Marx supplemented Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel in the political sphere, “but also because Marx carried out a constructive critique of Hegel’s dialectics, a critique that can be said to display the symptoms of materialist dialectics.” Therefore, Marx’s creative use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” method is first embodied in inheriting the negative aspect of Hegel’s dialectics. Unlike Feuerbach, who completely negated Hegel’s speculative philosophy, Marx inherited the negative aspect of Hegel’s logic, for example, Marx’s critique of Hegel’s “theory of mutual mediation.” In Marx’s view, true extremes cannot mediate each other, because they have no common ground whatsoever, while Hegel wanted to achieve reconciliation between civil society and the political state, which reflects the conservative aspect of his dialectics. Marx, in contrast, emphasized a negativity, insisting that civil society and the political state are separated from each other.

马克思对“主谓颠倒法”的创造性使用，体现了其理论构建的主体性。在方法使用上已经有了不同于费尔巴哈的理论目的，正如在1842年3月5日给卢格的信中所言，文章旨在“同立宪君主制这个彻头彻尾自相矛盾和自我毁灭的混合物作斗争”。马克思并非如阿尔都塞所说，仅将费尔巴哈的方法运用到了不同的领域，而是正如MEGA2的编者所述，超越了费尔巴哈。这不仅是由于马克思在政治领域内补充了费尔巴哈对黑格尔的批判，“而且还由于马克思对黑格尔的辩证法进行了建设性的批判，可以说这种批判显示了唯物主义辩证法的征兆”。因此，马克思对“主谓颠倒法”的创造性使用首先就体现为继承了黑格尔辩证法的否定方面。不同于费尔巴哈彻底否定黑格尔的思辨哲学，马克思继承了黑格尔逻辑学的否定方面，例如马克思批判黑格尔的“互为中介说”。在马克思看来，真正的极端是不能互为中介的，因为它们之间并没有任何共同点，而黑格尔则想要实现市民社会与政治国家之间的和解，这体现了他辩证法的保守之处。马克思则强调了一种否定性，即坚持市民社会和政治国家是彼此分离的。

Beyond this, Marx’s creative use of the “inversion of subject and predicate” method is also embodied in concretizing the sensuous object emphasized by Feuerbach. He did not merely stop at emphasizing sensuous existence but delved into Hegel’s discussion of the internal system of the state in his philosophy of right and criticized it, thereby injecting real force into Feuerbach’s “inversion of subject and predicate” method and also achieving a transcendence of Feuerbach. Through comparison, it can be seen that Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel still remained at a relatively abstract level; he merely emphasized abstract sensuous existence, without delving into social life to find arguments against Hegel. Marx, however, went a step further than Feuerbach; he had already delved into the internal system of the state constructed by Hegel and effectively refuted it.

除此之外，马克思对“主谓颠倒法”的创造性使用，还体现在将费尔巴哈强调的感性客体具象化。他没有仅仅停留于对感性存在的强调上，而是深入到黑格尔法哲学中对于国家内部制度的论述，并且对其展开了批判，从而为费尔巴哈的“主谓颠倒法”注入了现实力量，也实现了对费尔巴哈的超越。通过对比可以发现，费尔巴哈对于黑格尔的批判仍然停留在较为抽象的层面，他仅仅强调抽象的感性存在，而没有深入到社会生活之中寻找反驳黑格尔的论据。马克思则比费尔巴哈更加前进了一步，他已经深入到黑格尔所建构的国家内部制度之中，并且对其进行了有效反驳。

(2) The Concrete Reconstruction of Humanism

(二)对人本主义的具体化重构

Althusser believed that Marx from 1842 to 1845 was still influenced by “Feuerbach’s humanist problematic” and had not yet formed his own theoretical character. Lapin, on the contrary, argued that in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* Marx had already preliminarily established a “philosophical materialist” stance and clarified that the “man” he discussed was different from Feuerbach’s “abstract man.” Lapin pointed out that Marx emphasized the social attributes of man rather than natural attributes. Marx once pointed out, “The essence of the ‘particular personality’ is not its beard, its blood, its abstract corporeality, but its social quality, and the functions of the state, etc., are merely modes of existence and activity of the social quality of man.” Lapin accordingly argued that “man’s needs are manifested not only in the sphere of private interests but also in the sphere of the interests of the whole society.” Therefore, in Lapin’s view, this quality is the fundamental difference between Marx and both 18th-century French materialism and Feuerbach, especially different from Feuerbach’s determination of the essence of man as man’s love for others. From this, it can also be seen that the fundamental difference between Marx’s materialism and Feuerbach’s materialism, or rather the different understanding of the essence of man, embodies the subjectivity of Marx’s theoretical construction.

阿尔都塞认为，1842至1845年间的马克思仍受“费尔巴哈的人本学总问题”的影响，尚未形成自身理论品格。而拉宾则相反，认为马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中已初步确立“哲学唯物主义”立场，并阐明其所讨论的“人”不同于费尔巴哈“抽象的人”。拉宾指出，马克思强调的是人的社会属性而非自然属性。马克思曾指出，“‘特殊的人格’的本质不是它的胡子、它的血液、它的抽象的肉体，而是它的社会特质，而国家的职能等等只不过是人的社会特质的存在方式和活动方式”。拉宾据此认为“人的需要不仅表现在私人利益的领域内，而且也表现在整个社会利益的领域内”。因此，在拉宾看来，这一特质是马克思既不同于18世纪法国唯物主义也不同于费尔巴哈的根本区别，尤其是不同于费尔巴哈将人的本质确定为人对他人的爱。由此也可以看出，马克思的唯物主义与费尔巴哈唯物主义之间的根本区别，或者说对于人的本质的不同理解体现了马克思理论建构的主体性。

Marx not only emphasized the social attributes of human beings, but also, in analyzing the question of legislative power, critically examined the important issue of whether the people possess legislative power. Hegel regarded legislative power as the representative of universality, constituted jointly by the princely power, the executive power, and the estates element. Regarding the provisions pertaining to the estates element, Hegel pointed out that “the mission of the estates requires them to be faithful both to the will and intention of the state and government and to the interests of particular groups and individuals.” [24]24 G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §301, Addition. The translation follows the standard English edition (ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991). In selecting the representatives who compose the estates element, Hegel quite clearly displayed an exclusion of “the people.” First, he believed that the “public consciousness” representing the majority is merely an empirical existence lacking universal significance. Second, he held that the people are “that part of the population which does not know what it wants.” [25]25 Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §301, Remark. Moreover, he thought that allowing a portion of the people into the estates element was also intended to avoid the crude outcry of the masses. Conversely, he regarded the estate possessing hereditary landed property through primogeniture as the most stable and reliable factor. Hegel’s establishment of the estates system was something Marx resolutely opposed.

马克思不仅仅强调了人的社会属性，还在分析立法权问题时，批判性检视了人民是否具有立法权这一重要问题。黑格尔将立法权视为普遍性的代表，由君主权、行政权与等级要素共同构成。在关于等级要素所具备的规定上，黑格尔指出，“各等级的使命要求它们既忠实于国家和政府的意愿和主张，又忠实于特殊集团和单个人的利益”在选取组成等级要素的各等级代表时，黑格尔十分明显地表现出对于“人民”的排斥。首先，他认为代表大多数的“公众意识”不过是一种经验的、不具有普遍意义的存在。其次，他认为人民就是“不知道自己需要什么的那一部分人”不仅如此，他认为让一部分人民进入到等级要素中也是为了避免群众的粗暴呼声。相反地，他认为具有长子继承的世袭领地财产的等级是最为稳定和可靠的因素。黑格尔等级制的设定是马克思坚决反对的。

Marx criticized Hegel’s claim concerning the mission of the estates element, namely, that universal affairs attain existence in the estates element not only in themselves but also for themselves. Marx pointed out that Hegel respected abstract concepts such as the spirit of the state while despising their actual forms, thereby manifesting logical mysticism. In Marx’s view, the estates element could not reconcile the contradiction between civil society and the state; on the contrary, it confirmed the existence of that contradiction. He criticized Hegel’s design of an upper and lower chamber as merely giving rise to a set of groups that defend particular interests. Marx advocated constructing a form of popular legislative power based on universal suffrage, thereby guaranteeing every citizen’s right to participate in democracy. In the future democracy that implements popular sovereignty, the political state representing particular interests can only be eradicated, and only then can the association of free individuals be realized.

马克思批判了黑格尔所说的等级要素的使命，即使普遍事务不仅自在地而且还自为地在等级要素中获得存在。马克思指出，黑格尔尊重国家精神等抽象概念，却鄙视其现实形式，体现了逻辑神秘主义。在马克思看来，等级要素不仅无法调和市民社会与国家的矛盾，反而确证了矛盾的存在。他批判黑格尔所设计的上下两院不过催生出一批维护特殊利益的集团。马克思主张构建一种以普遍选举权为基础的人民立法权，从而保障每个公民参与民主的权利。在贯彻人民主权的未来民主制中，代表特殊利益的政治国家只有被铲除，自由人联合体才能够得以实现。

Through analyzing Marx’s critique of Hegel’s legislative power, it can be seen that his subjectivity is manifested not only in his emphasis on “the social essence of human beings,” but also in advancing this understanding to the level of actual politics, actively striving for the rights of democracy, equality, and freedom for real people. With a realistic and critical spirit, Marx transcended Feuerbach’s humanism, overcame its abstractness, and took “real human beings” living in society as his theoretical premise, rather than an abstract “species-essence,” thereby highlighting the subjectivity of his theoretical construction. (Author’s affiliation: Peking University)

通过分析马克思对黑格尔立法权的批判，可以看出，他的主体性不仅体现在强调“人的社会本质”,而且在于将这一认知推进至现实政治层面，积极为现实的人民争取民主、平等和自由的权利。马克思以现实、批判的精神超越了费尔巴哈的人本主义，克服了其抽象性，将生活在社会中的“现实的人”作为理论前提，而非抽象的“类本质”,由此凸显了其理论建构的主体性。（作者单位：北京大学）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗