The Intellectual-Historical Context of Marx’s Thought on Justice

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the debate surrounding the relationship between Marx and justice has become a focal point in Chinese academic circles. Some scholars, relying on Marx’s fierce critique of “fair distribution” in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, assert that he completely rejected the category of normative justice; other researchers, drawing on his advocacy of “free individuality” and “human emancipation,” interpret a higher-order pursuit of justice. This seemingly contradictory interpretation in fact stems from a neglect of the complex intellectual-historical context behind Marx’s thought on justice. Only by returning to that intellectual-historical context can we accurately grasp the dual character of Marx’s thought on justice, which combines “critique of reality” with “construction of ideals.”

21世纪以来，围绕马克思与正义关系的争论已成为我国学术界的焦点。部分学者依据《哥达纲领批判》中马克思对“公平分配”的激烈批判，断言他彻底拒斥规范性正义范畴；另一些研究者则从其对“自由个性”“人的解放”等的倡导中，解读出更高阶的正义追求。这种看似矛盾的阐释，实则源于对马克思正义思想背后复杂思想史语境的忽视。唯有回归思想史语境，方能准确把握马克思正义思想兼具“现实批判”与“理想构建”的双重特质。

Critique of Reality and Construction of Ideals

现实批判与理想构建

Marx’s thought on justice exhibits a distinct dual orientation: first, it deconstructs juridical concepts such as “justice” and “rights” in the bourgeois context as ideological illusions; second, in its conception of a future society, it outlines a picture of “substantive justice” that transcends the traditional category of justice. This tension is not a logical flaw in the theory but the inevitable result of a dual response to social reality and intellectual tradition.

马克思的正义思想呈现出鲜明的双重面向：其一，将资产阶级语境下的“正义”“权利”等法权概念解构为意识形态幻象；其二，在对未来社会的构想中勾勒出超越传统正义范畴的“实质正义”图景。这种张力并非理论上的逻辑漏洞，而是其对社会现实与思想传统进行双重回应的必然结果。

The edge of Marx’s “critique of reality” is directed straight at the illusory nature of bourgeois “formal justice.” In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, he profoundly exposes the ideological essence of the Lassallean demand for a “fair distribution of the products of labor,” asserting that unless the capitalist mode of production is fundamentally transformed, any scheme of distribution is merely a patch on the given economic relations, capable neither of eliminating the opposition between labor and capital nor of changing the fact that surplus value is appropriated without compensation. Since bourgeois “justice” is always tied to “exchange of equivalents” and “equality of rights,” the seemingly neutral juridical categories in fact serve the ideological function of defending private property.

马克思的“现实批判”锋芒，直指资产阶级“形式正义”的虚妄性。在《哥达纲领批判》中，他深刻揭露拉萨尔派“公平分配劳动产品”主张的意识形态本质，认定若不从根本上变革资本主义生产方式，任何分配方案都只是对既定经济关系的修补，既无法消除劳动与资本的对立，也不能改变剩余价值被无偿占有的事实。由于资产阶级的“正义”始终与“等价交换”“权利平等”相绑定，看似中立的法权范畴实则服务于为私有制辩护的意识形态功能。

Its dimension of “construction of ideals,” in the conception of communism, displays a persistent pursuit of “substantive justice.” This new type of justice no longer relies on external norms such as “fairness” and “rights” but takes “the free and full development of the human person” as its core purpose. In the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), the third major form of human social development, the form of “free individuality,” is precisely the concretization of this substantive justice. In this form, individuals are completely freed from the enslavement of the division of labor, the opposition between mental and manual labor dissolves, and labor itself is elevated from a means of subsistence to “life’s prime want.” Social relations are no longer mediated by things; each person is an end in themselves, and their uniqueness is fully respected. “Justice” is thus internalized from an external goal that must be deliberately pursued into the natural result of the humanization of social relations.

其“理想构建”层面，则在共产主义构想中展现出对“实质正义”的执着追求。这种新型正义不再依赖“公平”“权利”等外在规范，而是以“人的自由全面发展”为核心旨归。在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中，人类社会发展的第三大形态即“自由个性”形态，正是此种实质正义的具象化。在此形态下，个体彻底摆脱分工的奴役，脑力与体力劳动的对立消解，劳动本身从谋生手段升华为“生活的第一需要”。社会关系不再以物为中介，每个人皆为目的本身，其独特性将获得充分尊重。“正义”也因此从需要刻意追求的外在目标，内化为社会关系人道化之后的自然结果。

The dual character of Marx’s thought on justice stems both from a profound insight into capitalist reality and from the dual nourishment of the European political intellectual tradition. At the level of reality, the unfolding of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-to-late 19th century gradually exposed the inner contradictions of capitalism; the “freedom, equality, and justice” proclaimed by the bourgeoisie degenerated into a fraud in the cruel reality of capital accumulation. Workers, under the illusion of “exchange of equivalents,” suffered substantive exploitation. This sharp opposition between formal justice and substantive injustice constituted the real basis of Marx’s critique. In terms of intellectual history, Marx stood precisely at the intersection of two great European political traditions: the realist tradition inaugurated by Hobbes gave him a real dimension for analyzing social order, while the rationalist tradition opened by Spinoza provided him with the philosophical foundation for value norms. It was precisely through the creative transformation of these two traditions that Marx was able, while exposing the essence of bourgeois justice as ideology, to point humanity toward a higher direction of justice.

马克思正义思想的双重特质，既源于对资本主义现实的深刻洞察，也得益于欧洲政治思想传统的双重滋养。就现实层面而言，19世纪中后期，工业革命的不断展开逐渐暴露了资本主义的内在矛盾，资产阶级宣扬的“自由、平等、正义”在资本积累的残酷现实中沦为欺世盗名。劳动者在“等价交换”的假象下承受实质性剥削，这种形式正义与实质不公的尖锐对立，构成了马克思批判的现实基础。就思想史来看，马克思恰处在欧洲两大政治传统的交汇点：霍布斯开创的现实主义传统赋予其分析社会秩序的现实维度，斯宾诺莎开启的理性主义传统则为其提供了价值规范的哲学基础。正是通过对这两大传统的创造性转化，马克思才得以在揭露资产阶级正义意识形态本质的同时，为人类指明了更高阶的正义方向。

The Dialectical Sublation of the European Political Intellectual Tradition

对欧洲政治思想传统的辩证扬弃

Modern European political thought contains two main traditions: the realist tradition represented by Hobbes, which asks “how is the real order constructed,” and the rationalist tradition represented by Spinoza, which mainly explores “how is the ideal life to be realized.” On the basis of dialectically sublating these two traditions, Marx carried out a synthetic innovation.

欧洲近代政治思想存在两大主要传统，即以霍布斯为代表的现实主义传统，追问“现实秩序如何构建”，以及以斯宾诺莎为代表的理性主义传统，主要探求“理想生活如何实现”。马克思在辩证扬弃这两大传统基础上，对其进行了综合创新。

Marx subjected the Hobbesian tradition to a fundamental critique. Hobbes asserted that “without a state there is no justice”; Marx also emphasized that “without a specific mode of production, there is no specific justice.” Under the capitalist system, the principle of justice necessarily unfolds around the logic of capital accumulation; norms such as “exchange of equivalents” and “private property rights” are essentially the legal expression of relations of production. To talk about fairness in abstraction from the mode of production is precisely, as Hobbes criticized, to “mislead people with fictitious concepts.” But Hobbes regarded the state of nature as a “war of all against all,” taking it as the eternal nature of humanity, thereby eternalizing the bourgeois order. Marx, using historical materialism, revealed the historical transitoriness of this “nature” and “order.” He pointed out incisively that the mutually competing individuals in Hobbes’s account are not abstract natural persons but the historical product of the capitalist commodity economy; the positive legal order Hobbes extolled is not the ultimate form of humanity but the political instrument of bourgeois rule. Through this historicizing reading, Marx broke the non-historical mythologization of the capitalist order in the Hobbesian tradition, pulling the question of justice from the framework of “eternal reason” back into the horizon of “historical development,” making it a historical category that evolves with changes in the mode of production.

马克思对霍布斯传统实施了根本性批判。霍布斯断言“无国家则无正义”，马克思也强调“无特定生产方式，则无特定正义”。资本主义制度下，正义原则必然围绕资本增殖逻辑展开，“等价交换”“私有财产权”等规范本质上是生产关系的法律表达。脱离生产方式空谈公平，恰如霍布斯所批判的“用虚构概念误导人们”。但霍布斯将“一切人对一切人的战争”这一自然状态视为人类永恒本性，从而把资产阶级秩序永恒化。马克思则运用历史唯物主义，揭示出这种“本性”与“秩序”的历史暂时性。他精辟地指出，霍布斯笔下相互竞争的个体并非抽象自然人，而是资本主义商品经济的历史产物；其推崇的实证法秩序也非人类终极形态，而是资产阶级统治的政治工具。通过这种历史化解读，马克思打破了霍布斯传统对资本主义秩序的非历史化神话，将正义问题从“永恒理性”的框架拉回“历史发展”的视野，使其成为随生产方式变革而演进的历史范畴。

Spinoza, on the basis that “man is part of the whole of nature,” put forward the revolutionary concept of “positive freedom,” holding that freedom is not, as in Hobbes, “absence of external impediments,” but the achievement of self-perfection through rational knowledge of one’s own nature. Marx, for his part, established “free individuality” as the ultimate goal of justice. In *Capital*, this value ideal is concretized in the conception of the “realm of freedom”: when labor is no longer governed by external ends and individual development replaces the enslavement of the division of labor, humanity can truly realize Spinoza’s “rational freedom,” and social relations can attain substantive justice. The key to Marx’s transformation of the Spinozist tradition lies in finding a real path for realizing “free individuality.” Spinoza’s “rational freedom” ultimately remained in the sphere of speculation; Marx, by contrast, emphasized that realizing this freedom requires first transforming the capitalist mode of production. He sharply criticized the successors of the Spinozist tradition (such as the Young Hegelians) for reducing “human emancipation” to “intellectual emancipation,” pointing out clearly in *The German Ideology* that “‘emancipation’ is a historical act, not an intellectual act,” and that it “is brought about by the state of industry, commerce, agriculture, and intercourse.” In Marx’s view, the “rational harmony” Spinoza longed for could be realized only on the basis of abolishing the wage-labor system and eliminating the enslaving division of labor. Only when the means of production are no longer monopolized by capital and labor returns to its essence as “free activity” can individuals shake off “dependence on things” and truly achieve the “harmony between man and nature, and between man and society” that Spinoza pursued. This transformation turned Spinoza’s value ideal from a philosophical speculation into a real goal achievable through historical practice.

斯宾诺莎以“人是自然整体的一部分”为基础，提出了“积极自由”的革命性概念，认为自由并非霍布斯式的“无外在阻碍”，而是通过理性认识自身本性，实现自我完善。马克思则将“自由个性”确立为正义的终极目标。在《资本论》中，这一价值理想被具体化为“自由王国”的构想：当劳动不再受外在目的支配、个体发展取代分工奴役时，人类才能真正实现斯宾诺莎意义上的“理性自由”，社会关系也才能达至实质正义。马克思对斯宾诺莎传统的改造，关键在于为“自由个性”找到了现实的实现路径。斯宾诺莎的“理性自由”终究停留在思辨领域，马克思则强调，实现这种自由必须首先变革资本主义生产方式。他严厉批判斯宾诺莎传统的后继者（如青年黑格尔派）将“人的解放”简化为“思想解放”，在《德意志意识形态》中明确指出：“‘解放’是一种历史活动，不是思想活动”，它“是由工业状况、商业状况、农业状况、交往状况促成的”。在马克思看来，斯宾诺莎向往的“理性和谐”，唯有在废除雇佣劳动制、消灭奴役性分工的基础上才可能实现。只有当生产资料不再被资本垄断，劳动回归其“自由活动”的本质时，个体才能摆脱“物的依赖性”，真正达成斯宾诺莎所追求的“人与自然、人与社会的和谐”。这种改造，使斯宾诺莎的价值理想从哲学思辨转化为可以通过历史实践实现的现实目标。

Returning to the Intellectual-Historical Context

回归思想史语境

The absence of the intellectual-historical context is precisely the crux of the contemporary “paradox of Marx’s view of justice.” Some scholars, citing the apparent opposition between Marx’s “critique of justice” and his “pursuit of justice,” question the consistency of his theory, either misinterpreting his critique of bourgeois justice as a negation of all value of justice or equating the conception of “free individuality” with traditional utopianism. The root of these misreadings lies in neglecting Marx’s profound connection with the intellectual-historical tradition. When we understand his critique of justice within the Hobbesian realist tradition, we can grasp that he does not negate justice itself but refuses to absolutize bourgeois justice; when we link “free individuality” with Spinoza’s “positive freedom,” we can recognize that his conception is not a fantasy but a historicizing development of the rationalist tradition. The value of intellectual-historical research lies in providing a “historical coordinate system,” enabling scholars to transcend the interpretive dilemma of either/or on the basis of grasping the origins and development of Marx’s thought on justice.

思想史语境的缺失，正是当代“马克思正义观矛盾论”的症结所在。有学者以马克思“批判正义”与“追求正义”的表面对立为由，质疑其理论一致性，或将其对资产阶级正义的批判曲解为对一切正义价值的否定，或将“自由个性”的构想等同于传统乌托邦。这些误读的根源在于忽视了马克思与思想史传统的深刻关联。当我们在霍布斯现实主义传统中理解其正义批判，就能把握到他并非否定正义本身，而是拒绝将资产阶级正义绝对化；当我们将“自由个性”与斯宾诺莎“积极自由”相联系，就能认识到其构想并非空想，而是对理性主义传统的历史化发展。思想史研究的价值在于提供“历史坐标系”，使学者在把握马克思正义思想源流的基础上超越非此即彼的解读困境。

The study of intellectual history likewise provides rich methodological resources for the contemporary expansion of Marx’s thought on justice. In confronting new issues such as “global justice” and “justice in the digital age,” returning to the context of intellectual history can uncover the key to linking classical theory with contemporary reality. When analyzing new phenomena such as global capital flows and platform-economy exploitation, one must proceed from the root cause of “changes in the mode of production,” avoiding the trap of superficial discussions of “distributive justice.” In constructing a conception of justice for the digital age, the core purpose should be “the digital liberation of the human person,” while remaining vigilant against the new forms of constraint that technological alienation imposes on “free individuality.” For example, when exploring the justice demands of platform workers, if one starts only from “wage fairness,” one will inevitably repeat the mistakes of the Lassalleans. [5]5 The Lassalleans, followers of the German socialist Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864), advocated for achieving socialism through state-sponsored workers’ cooperatives and fair wages within the existing state framework, a position Marx and Engels criticized as reformist and as ignoring the necessity of abolishing the capitalist mode of production. Only by drawing on Marx’s intellectual-historical method—analyzing both the restructuring of the mode of production by the platform economy and attending to the “reconstruction of subjectivity” of workers in the digital age—can one put forward a conception of justice that truly accords with the spirit of Marxism.

思想史研究同样为当代马克思正义思想的拓展提供了丰厚的方法论资源。面对“全球正义数字时代正义”等新议题，回归思想史语境可以找到衔接经典与现实的钥匙。在分析全球资本流动、平台经济剥削等新现象时，必须从“生产方式变革”的根源出发，避免陷入“分配正义”的表层讨论；构建数字时代正义观时，应以“人的数字化解放”为核心旨归，警惕技术异化对“自由个性”的新型束缚。例如，探讨平台劳动者正义诉求时，若仅从“工资公平”切入，势必重蹈拉萨尔派的覆辙。唯有借鉴马克思的思想史方法，既分析平台经济对生产方式的重构，又关注劳动者在数字时代的“主体性重建”，才能提出真正契合马克思主义精神的正义方案。

Grasping the intellectual-historical core of Marx’s thought on justice can provide us with a guide to action. On the one hand, we must inherit the tradition of real-existing critique in Marx’s thought on justice, clearly recognizing that solving the problem of justice is inseparable from a fundamental critique of the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, we must uphold the ideal-constructive value pursuit of Marx’s thought on justice, taking “the free and all-round development of the human person” and “the realization of free individuality” as the ultimate goals of the practice of justice. Only in this way can we, while criticizing the illusions of justice in contemporary capitalism, point the way toward constructing a more rational social order.

把握马克思正义思想的思想史内核能为我们提供行动指南。一方面，我们需继承马克思正义思想的现实批判传统，清醒认识到解决正义问题离不开对资本主义生产方式的根本批判。另一方面，我们需坚守马克思正义思想的理想构建价值追求，将“人的自由全面发展”“自由个性的实现”作为正义实践的终极目标。唯其如此，才能在批判当代资本主义正义幻象的同时，为构建更合理的社会秩序指明方向。

(The author is a professor at the School of Marxism, Shenzhen University)

（作者系深圳大学马克思主义学院教授）