Marx’s Social Republic: Radical Republicanism and Socialist Political Institutions

Marx praised the heaven-storming act of the Paris Commune and was convinced that “a new point of departure of world-historical importance had been gained.” However, Marx was not so excited because of the Commune’s moderate social policies, but because of its highly popular democratic practices. These democratic practices prompted Marx to rethink what kind of political institutions were needed to achieve and sustain socialism. As he put it, the Paris Commune was “the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour.” This article will argue that this political form inherits from the republican tradition, especially influenced by its most radical and democratic elements, and will elaborate on this from three dimensions. First, Marx advocated replacing representative government with popular representation, in which representatives are constrained by imperative mandates, the right of recall, and short terms of office; second, he emphasized the supremacy of the legislative body over the executive, while criticizing the separation of powers; third, he argued for popular control over the state’s administrative and repressive institutions.

马克思盛赞巴黎公社的冲天之举，并确信“具有世界历史意义的新起点毕竟是已经取得了”。但是，马克思如此兴奋，并不是因为巴黎公社温和的社会政策，而是因为它很受欢迎的民主实践。这种民主实践促使马克思重新思考，实现与维持社会主义需要什么样的政治制度。正如他所说，巴黎公社“是终于发现的可以使劳动在经济上获得解放的政治形式”。本文将论证，这种政治形式承自共和主义传统，尤其受到其激进的和最具民主色彩的因素影响，并从三个维度进行具体阐释。第一，马克思提倡用人民代表制取代代议制政府，在人民代表制中，代表受到指令性授权、罢免权和短期任期的限制；第二，他强调立法机构具有相对于行政机构的至上地位，同时批评权力的分立；第三，他主张由人民控制国家的行政机构和镇压机构。

The fundamental reason Marx insisted on these democratic political institutions was his firm belief in the capacity of the masses for self-rule and self-management. Marx believed that the Paris Commune revealed that “ordinary workers” were capable of governing themselves “modestly, conscientiously, and efficiently,” thereby shattering the false claim that “governing privileges” should be reserved for “the ten thousand upper-class” among the wealthy elite (i.e., their so-called “natural superiors”). He also considered it an “illusion” that “administration and political management are mysteries, transcendent functions only to be entrusted to a trained caste.” That is, Marx believed that ordinary citizens possess greater political decision-making and administrative capacities than a small elite, a conviction that places him in the ranks of radical republicans, but distinguishes him from those currents within the republican tradition more inclined toward aristocracy and oligarchy.

马克思之所以坚持这些民主的政治制度，其根本原因在于他坚信大众有能力进行自我统治和自我管理。马克思认为，巴黎公社揭示了“普通的工人”有能力“虚心、诚恳而卓有成效”地自治，因此打破了这样一种虚妄的主张：“执政特权”应保留给富裕精英中的“一万个上层人”(即所谓他们的“天然尊长”)。他还认为下述看法是一种“错觉”:“行政和政治管理是神秘的事情，是高不可攀的职务，只能委托给一个受过训练的特殊阶层。”也就是说，马克思相信普通公民比少数精英拥有更强的政治决策能力和行政能力，这种信念使他可以归到激进共和主义者行列，但他不同于共和主义传统中更倾向于贵族制和寡头制的流派。

Marx repeatedly referred to this political form, which includes democratic political institutions, as the social republic. He argued that the Paris Commune had shown: “In France and in Europe, the republic can exist only as a ‘social republic’; this republic should deprive the state machine of the capitalist and landlord classes and replace it with the Commune; the Commune publicly proclaims ‘social emancipation’ as the great goal of the republic, and thereby guarantees this social transformation through the organization of the Commune.” The term “social republic” was very well known among radicals during the 1848 Revolution; it was part of the popular slogan “democratic and social republic,” a battle cry of socialists and republicans at the time, who used it to fight for a republic that would not only introduce universal male suffrage and go beyond political reform, but also solve social problems. In Marx’s analysis, the social republic (and related terms such as the “red republic” and the “labour republic”) was the form of republic pursued by the working class, distinct from the “bourgeois republic.”

马克思多次将这种包含民主政治制度的政体称为社会共和国。他认为，巴黎公社已经表明：“在法国和在欧洲，共和国只有作为‘社会共和国’才有可能存在；这种共和国应该剥夺资本家和地主阶级手中的国家机器，而代之以公社；公社公开宣布‘社会解放’是共和国的伟大目标，从而以公社的组织来保证这种社会改造”。“社会共和国”一词在1848年革命期间的激进派中非常出名，它是流行口号“民主的社会共和国”的一部分，这是社会主义者和共和主义者当时的战斗口号，他们用这个口号来争取一个既实行男性普选权又不止于政治改革，且能解决社会问题的共和国。在马克思的分析中，社会共和国(以及相关的术语如“红色共和国”“劳工共和国”)是工人阶级所追求的共和国形式，区别于“资产阶级共和国”。

This article’s discussion of the social republic will be based primarily on Marx’s *The Civil War in France* and its two lengthy drafts. Marx wrote this book to defend the Paris Commune, counter the international condemnation it faced, and promote his unique interpretation of the event. Based on Marx’s discussion of the institutional features of the Paris Commune, we can outline the rough contours of his ideal socialist political institutions. This discussion is only a fragmentary sketch of a socio-political system; it is certainly not a blueprint from which the basic institutions of a socialist polity can be directly extracted. However, there is much that is illuminating and thought-provoking in his exposition of the social republic, from which both republicans and socialists can find something valuable for thinking about how political institutions should be constructed.

本文对社会共和国的讨论将主要基于马克思的《法兰西内战》及两份很长的草稿。马克思撰写这本书是为了捍卫巴黎公社，反击其受到的国际责难，以及宣传他对该事件的独特解读。根据马克思对巴黎公社制度特征的讨论，我们可以勾勒出他理想中的社会主义政治制度的大致轮廓。这种讨论只是对一个社会政治制度的零散描绘，它当然不是一张可以直接从中找出社会主义政体基本制度的蓝图。然而，在他关于社会共和国的论述中有许多富有启发性和发人深省的内容，无论是共和主义者还是社会主义者，都能够从中找到一些有价值的东西，用于思考应当如何构建政治制度。

I. Popular Representation and Representative Government

一、人民代表制与代议制政府

When the Paris Commune revolution broke out, power in Paris first fell into the hands of the Central Committee of the National Guard, an autonomous democratic body. Marx enthusiastically described the system used by the Central Committee to elect its members, claiming that “never were elections carried out with greater conscientiousness, and never were representatives more fully representative of the electors who chose them,” and he praised the electoral mechanisms of the Commune Council. Marx believed that these measures (including imperative mandates, the recall of representatives, and short terms of office) transformed a system of unaccountability (in which representatives ruled over the people) into one in which representatives were subject to popular supervision and control.

巴黎公社革命爆发时，巴黎的权力首先落入国民自卫军中央委员会手中，这是一个自治的民主机构。马克思饱含热情地描述了中央委员会用来选举其成员的制度，声称“从来还没有过进行得这样认真仔细的选举，也从来没有过这样充分地代表着选举他们的群众的代表”,他还称赞公社委员会的选举机制。马克思认为，这些措施(包括指令性授权、对代表的罢免和短期任期)将一个不能问责的制度(在那种制度下，代表统治着人民)转变为一种代表要受人民监督和控制的制度。

The institutional mechanisms Marx accepted to constrain representatives conflict with one of the core principles of representative government. As Bernard Manin points out in his authoritative treatment of the subject, that core principle holds that representatives are, to some extent, independent of the will of the people who elect them. At the same time, Manin notes that representatives are not entirely independent of voters, because they face pressure from citizens during their term and may fail to be re-elected after it ends. This means that representatives have incentives to act in accordance with voters’ preferences, but the law does not require them to do so, granting them a certain degree of discretion. Manin outlines several constitutional mechanisms that can reduce this degree of discretion, focusing particularly on imperative mandates and the right to recall representatives. Imperative mandates require representatives to follow the will of the voters; the right of recall allows voters to sanction representatives immediately rather than waiting until the end of their term. Both measures limit the discretion of representatives, but “since the end of the eighteenth century, no representative government established has allowed imperative mandates… nor has any permanently instituted the recall of representatives.”

马克思所接受的用以约束代表的制度机制与代议制政府的核心原则之一相冲突。正如伯纳德·曼宁在关于该主题的权威论述中所指出的，那条核心原则表明，代表在某种程度上独立于选举他们的人民的意志。同时，曼宁指出，代表也并非完全独立于选民，因为他们在任期内会面临来自公民的压力，在任期结束后有可能无法连任。这意味着，代表有按照选民偏好行事的动机，但法律并不要求他们这样做，这就赋予了他们一定程度的自由裁量权。曼宁概述了几种可以减少这种自由裁量程度的宪法机制，他特别关注指令性授权和对代表的罢免权。指令性授权要求代表遵守选民的意愿，罢免权允许选民立即制裁代表而非等到其任期结束。这两项措施都限制了代表的自由裁量权，但是“自18世纪末以来建立的代议制政府中，没有一个允许指令性授权……也没有哪一个长期实行过对代表永久罢免的制度”。

However, from the French Revolution to the Paris Commune revolution, there existed a long-standing tradition of radical republicanism that challenged this ultimately victorious, largely unconstrained model of representation. In successive republican constitutional moments, we find the more radical elements of this tradition expressing an alternative understanding of representatives, viewing them merely as agents who are, to a large extent, accountable. One key radical of the French Revolution, Jean-Paul Marat, as early as 1774, advised the English people that their representatives should always act according to their instructions; otherwise, “what are our representatives but our masters?” These more radical conceptions of representation resurfaced in the Commune Council, whose members used the imperative mandates given to them by voters to justify their votes. Even after the defeat of the Paris Commune, radical republicans launched a movement to incorporate imperative mandates into the constitution of the Third Republic, but without success.

然而，从法国大革命到巴黎公社革命，存在着一个历史悠久的激进共和主义传统，该传统对这种最终获胜的、几乎不受约束的代议制模式提出了挑战。在历次共和宪政时刻，我们发现该传统中较为激进的分子表达了对代表的另一种理解，他们认为代表只是代理人，在很大程度上是可问责的。法国大革命的关键激进分子之一让-保罗·马拉早在1774年就建议英国人民，人民的代表应该永远按照人民的指示行事，否则“我们的代表不是我们的主人又是什么呢?”这些更激进的代表观在公社委员会那里再次浮现，公社委员会成员用选民给予他们的指令性授权来为自己的投票辩护。甚至在巴黎公社失败后，激进共和主义者仍发起了一场运动，试图将指令性授权纳入第三共和国宪法，但并未成功。

Marx inherited this radical constitutionalist tradition. In his defense of the Commune Council, his endorsement of imperative mandates, the right to recall representatives, and short terms of office all reflect the influence of this tradition. The Commune Council was praised because its members were “municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of Paris, responsible and revocable at short terms,” and the Commune Council also proposed that local and regional communes send delegates to a national body, in which “every delegate was at any time revocable and bound by the *mandat impératif* (formal instructions) of his constituents.” Marx also expressed disgust for representatives who “decide once every three or six years… which member of the ruling class is to represent and repress the people in parliament,” while voters could only replace them in elections held every few years. His preference for short terms of office is also evident in an 1852 article on the Chartists, in which he explicitly supported their demand for annual parliaments, pointing out that this was one of “the conditions under which universal suffrage ceases to be a mere illusion for the working class.”

马克思继承了这种激进宪政主义传统，在对公社委员会的辩护中，他赞成指令性授权、对代表的罢免权以及短期任期，这都体现了这一传统对他的影响。公社委员会受到赞扬，因为其成员是“由巴黎各区通过普选选出的市政委员组成的。这些委员对选民负责，随时可以罢免”,而且公社委员会还提出让地方和地区公社向全国性机构派遣代表，在这个全国性机构中，“每一个代表都可以随时罢免，并受到选民给予他的限权委托书(正式指令)的约束”。马克思还表达了对这样一种代表的厌恶：他们“每三年或六年决定一次……什么人在议会里代表和压迫人民”,而选民只能在几年一次的选举中更换他们。对短期任期的偏好也体现在马克思1852年一篇关于宪章派的文章中，文章明确支持他们每年一次大选的要求，指出这是“普选权不致成为劳动阶级的空想的那些条件”之一。

Marx did not spend much space elaborating on how these electoral mechanisms would ensure greater democratic accountability, but he did make an interesting analogy—comparing voters’ selection of representatives to an employer hiring workers. He commented: “Universal suffrage … was to serve the people, organized in communes, as individual suffrage serves any other employer in the search for workers and managers for his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly.” [5]5 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (MECW), vol. 22 (New York: International Publishers, 1975–2005), p. 332. This ironic point was meant to show that, just as an employer can dismiss his employees at will, so too should the people be able to recall their representatives at will. The implication of this analogy is that, just as workers are currently subject to the will of their employer, representatives will be subject to the will of the voters. If a representative deviates from the voters’ preferences, the voters can correct the mistake by immediately recalling the representative, without having to wait until the end of the representative’s term to vote them out. Therefore, it can be expected that representatives will adjust their behavior to cater to their preferences, thereby ensuring that voters do not recall them.

马克思并未花太多篇幅来具体阐述这些选举机制如何确保更大程度的民主问责，但他确实作了一个有趣的类比——将选民选择代表与雇主雇佣工人相类比。他评论道：“普选权……是为了服务于组织在公社里的人民，正如个人选择权服务于任何一个为自己企业招雇工人和管理人员的雇主一样。大家都很清楚，企业也像个人一样，在实际业务活动中一般都懂得在适当的位置上使用适当的人，万一有错立即纠正。”这个具有讽刺意味的观点意在说明，正如雇主可以按照自己的意愿解雇其雇员一样，人民也应能够按照自己的意愿罢免其代表。这种类比的言下之意是，正如工人目前受制于其雇主的意志一样，代表也将受制于选民的意志。如果一个代表偏离了选民的偏好，选民可以通过立即罢免该代表来纠正错误，而不必等到代表任期结束才投票将其赶下台。因此可以预期，代表会调整自己的行为以迎合他们的偏好，从而确保选民不罢免他们。

The accountability mechanism endorsed by Marx implies transforming representative government into popular representation. Representative government understands representation as the people ceding decision-making power to representatives, while the people’s role is weakened to deciding at the next election whether to continue or terminate the mandate. Between two elections, representatives enjoy a considerable degree of discretion in exercising the mandate, without formal participation by the people. In popular representation, representation is understood as a commission, under which representatives carry out the will of the voters. The people retain the power to intervene in representatives’ decisions by giving them formal instructions or recalling them. Marx believed that through popular representation, universal suffrage, originally merely a tool for choosing among elite representatives, would be transformed into a tool for the people to firmly hold political power. This is vividly reflected in the first draft of *The Civil War in France*, where Marx wrote: “Universal suffrage was to serve the people, organized in communes, as individual suffrage serves any other employer in the search for workers and managers for his business. … Universal suffrage, which had been abused, either as a tool for parliament to approve the sacred state power, or as a plaything in the hands of the ruling class, allowing the people to exercise it only once every few years to elect the tool of class rule under parliamentarism, was now applied to its true purpose: the election by the communes of their administrative and law-making public officials.” [6]6 Karl Marx, “First Draft of The Civil War in France,” in MECW, vol. 22, p. 490.

马克思所认可的问责机制意味着要把代议制政府转变为人民代表制。代议制政府将代表制度理解为人民将决策权让渡给代表，而人民的角色被弱化为在下次选举时决定是延续还是终止授权。在两次选举之间，代表在行使授权时拥有很大程度的自由裁量权，无需人民的正式参与。在人民代表制中，代表制度则被理解为一种委托，在这种制度下，代表贯彻选民的意愿。人民通过给予代表正式指示或罢免他们，一直保留着对代表决策进行干预的权力。马克思认为，通过人民代表制，普选权原本只是在精英代表之间作选择的工具，现在则转变为人民牢固掌握政治权力的工具。这一点在《法兰西内战》初稿中生动地体现出来，马克思写道：“普选权在此以前一直被滥用，或者被当做议会批准神圣国家政权的工具，或者被当做统治阶级手中的玩物，只是让人民每隔几年行使一次，来选举议会制下的阶级统治的工具；而现在，普选权已被应用于它的真正目的：由各公社选举它们的行政的和创制法律的公职人员”。

Some of Marx’s early political writings, especially the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, already foreshadowed his critique of representative government when discussing the Paris Commune. Hegel had rejected “appointed or authorized agents” because he believed that representatives had a “better understanding” of the public interest than the voters. Marx retorted that unconstrained representatives “are in fact representatives of particular interests”; without the formal constraint of an imperative mandate, representatives cease to be representatives of the people: “Deputies are formally appointed, but once they are actually appointed, they are no longer appointees. They should be deputies, but they are not.” [7]7 Karl Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in MECW, vol. 3, p. 119. Marx further refuted representative government’s simplification of political participation, arguing that it reduces political participation to a “single and temporary” event, an act of “excitement and impulse.”

马克思的某些早期政治著作尤其是《黑格尔法哲学批判》,已经预示了他在讨论巴黎公社时对代议制政府的批判。黑格尔曾拒绝“被委任的或得到授权的代理人”,因为他认为，对于公共利益，代表比选民有“更好的理解”。马克思反驳道，不受约束的代表“实际上是特殊利益的代表”,没有指令性授权的正式约束，代表就不再是人民的代表，“议员在形式上是被任命的，但他们一旦真正被任命，他们就不再是被任命者了。他们应该是议员，却不是议员”。马克思进一步驳斥了代议制政府简化政治参与的做法，认为它将政治参与简化为一种“单一的和临时的”事件，一种“兴奋冲动”的行为。

As some commentators have noted, Marx’s criticism of reducing popular participation merely to choosing who will lead them every few years, along with his support for another form of popular representation, bears a striking resemblance to Rousseau. In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau famously argued that representative government is equivalent to slavery, with the people having only brief freedom during elections. He believed that the English people “are free only during the election of members of parliament; as soon as the members are elected, the people are enslaved; they are nothing.” [8]8 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, book III, chapter 15. Rousseau’s critique of representation often leads to the interpretation that he believed freedom could only be realized in small city-states, where every citizen could participate directly in politics and representatives were unnecessary. But in *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, Rousseau suggested that freedom could actually be reconciled with large modern states. He argued that the inevitable corruption of legislators in a representative system could be avoided through two mechanisms: holding frequent elections and requiring legislators to “strictly follow their instructions.” [9]9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, chapter 7. Rousseau believed that without these precautions, the legislature would become a tool of enslavement.

正如一些评论家所注意到的，马克思批评把人民参与仅仅弱化为每隔几年选择由谁来领导他们，同时还支持另一种人民代表制，这都与卢梭有着惊人的相似。在《社会契约论》中，卢梭提出了一个著名的论断：代议制政府相当于奴隶制，人民只不过在选举期间有短暂的自由罢了。他认为英国人民“只有在选举国会议员期间才是自由的，议员一旦选出之后，他们就是奴隶，他们就什么也不是了”。卢梭对代议制的批评常常引起这样一种解读：他认为自由只能在小型城邦中实现，在那里每个公民都能直接进行政治参与，代表是不必要的。但在《关于波兰政府的思考》中，卢梭暗示，自由实际上是可以与大型现代国家协调的。他认为，代议制中立法者不可避免的堕落可以通过两种机制来避免：举行频繁的选举和要求立法者“严格遵守他们的意愿”。卢梭认为，没有这些预防措施，立法机构就会变成奴役的工具。

Therefore, both Marx and Rousseau were committed to imperative mandates and frequent elections as constitutional mechanisms to make representatives accountable to the people who elected them. Their similarity on this issue is not surprising, because the young Marx, in the same summer he wrote his critique of Hegel, read Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* and took notes. Both Marx and Rousseau appealed to popular representation as a way to achieve democracy and popular sovereignty in large modern polities, without resorting to the nearly unconstrained form of representation that today is completely equated with “democracy.” In contrast, defenders of representative government tend to view their preferred regime as the only alternative to Athenian direct democracy; since they insist that we cannot return to those small city-states, representative government naturally wins out. Marx and Rousseau’s advocacy of popular representation shows that representative democracy and Athenian direct democracy do not exhaust the possible ways to achieve democracy in modern states.

因此，马克思和卢梭都致力于将指令性授权和频繁选举作为宪法性机制，以使代表对选举他们的人民负责。他们在这个问题上的相似性并不令人惊讶，因为青年马克思在撰写对黑格尔的批判的同一年夏天，阅读了卢梭的《社会契约论》并做了笔记。马克思和卢梭都诉诸人民代表制，把它视为在大型现代政治体中实现民主和人民主权的方式，而没有诉诸今天已经与“民主”完全划等号的那种近乎不受约束的代议制形式。相比之下，代议制政府的捍卫者倾向于将他们偏好的政体视为雅典式直接民主的唯一替代方案，由于他们坚持认为我们无法复归那些小型城邦，代议制政府便理所当然地胜出。马克思和卢梭对人民代表制的倡导表明，代议制民主和雅典式直接民主并未穷尽在现代国家实现民主的可能方式。

II. Legislative Supremacy and the Separation of Powers

二、立法机构至上与权力分立

Marx praised the Paris Commune for merging executive and legislative powers, calling it a “working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time.” [10]10 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in MECW, vol. 22, p. 331. The Commune Council achieved this by retaining executive decision-making power for its members. The Commune established ten commissions (covering common ministerial departments such as war, finance, justice, and education), each composed of five to eight members, with the heads of the commissions elected by the members. Thus, there was no president or cabinet ministers independent of the legislature; executive functions were under the guidance and control of the legislature.

马克思称赞巴黎公社将行政权和立法权合为一体的做法，并称它已成为一个“实干的而不是议会式的机构，它既是行政机关，同时也是立法机关”。公社委员会通过将行政决策权保留给委员会成员来实现这一点。公社设立了十个委员会(涵盖战争、财政、司法和教育等常见的部级部门),每个委员会由五至八名委员组成，委员会的负责人由委员们选出。因此，没有独立于立法机构之外的总统或内阁部长，行政职能受立法机构的指导和控制。

Marx’s praise for this constitutional feature of the Commune is consistent with his long-standing suspicion of the executive branch. In analyzing the French Constitution of 1848, Marx sharply criticized it for sacrificing legislative power and granting excessive power to the executive through the presidency. He argued that this constitution merely replaced “hereditary monarchy” with “elected monarchy,” endowing the president with “all the attributes of monarchy,” including the right to pardon criminals, dissolve local and municipal councils, conclude foreign treaties, and, most fatally, the right to appoint and dismiss ministers without consulting the National Assembly. [11]11 Karl Marx, “The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850,” in MECW, vol. 10, p. 80. Marx insisted that the president’s power was further strengthened because it was personal; while the National Assembly represented “the many-sided aspects of the national spirit, the president is the incarnation of the national spirit.” [12]12 Ibid., p. 81. Marx therefore concluded that this constitution created “two heads … one is the legislative assembly, the other is the president.” [13]13 Ibid., p. 80. The constitutional position of the president enabled ambitious individuals to accumulate sufficient power to overthrow the legislature and impose their own autocratic rule, as Louis Bonaparte successfully did in the coup of 1851.

马克思对公社宪法这一特征的赞扬与他长期以来对行政机构的怀疑是一致的。在分析1848年法国宪法时，马克思严厉批评了这部宪法以牺牲立法机构权力为代价，并通过总统职位赋予行政机构过大的权力。他认为这部宪法只是用“选举产生的王权”取代了“世袭的王权”,赋予了总统“王权的一切属性”,包括赦免罪犯、解散地方和市政委员会、缔结对外条约的权利，最致命的是，它还赋予总统无需咨询国民议会即可任命和罢免部长的权利。马克思坚持认为，总统的权力因为属于个人而被进一步强化，因为虽然国民议会代表了“国民精神的多种多样的方面，而总统却是国民精神的化身”。马克思因此得出结论：这部宪法制造了“两个头脑……一个是立法议会，另一个是总统”。总统的宪法职位使得野心勃勃的个人能够积聚充足的权力，以推翻立法机构并强制实行自己的专制统治，正如路易·波拿巴在1851年政变中成功所做的那样。

Marx’s analysis of the 1848 French Constitution shares several common points with that of the radical republican Félix Pyat. Pyat was a journalist, playwright, member of the National Assembly of the French Second Republic, and later a member of the Commune. During the constitutional debates of 1848, he mounted the rostrum to denounce the proposed presidency, arguing that the president would be an “elected king” more dangerous than the “hereditary king” he replaced. Pyat presciently warned that the constitution would create a dangerous rivalry between “two heads,” with the president enjoying many advantages: “coagulating, concentrating, absorbing all power; representing the people, being the incarnation of the people.” To avoid this outcome, he insisted that “legislative power must … completely dominate executive power.”

马克思对1848年法国宪法的分析与激进共和主义者费利克斯·皮阿特的分析有几个共同点。皮阿特是一名记者、剧作家，也是法国第二共和国国民议会成员，后来成为公社委员会成员。在1848年的制宪辩论中，他登上讲坛谴责有人提议的总统职位，认为总统将是一个比他所取代的“世袭制国王”更危险的“选举产生的国王”。皮阿特有先见之明地警告说，宪法将制造“两个脑袋”之间的危险竞争，总统将具有很多优势：“凝聚、集中、吸收所有的权力；代表人民，是人民的化身”。为了避免这种结果，他力主“立法权必须……完全支配行政权”。

Both Marx and Pyat supported the supremacy of the legislature over the executive, placing them within a tradition of radical constitutional thought traceable back to the National Convention during the French Revolution and the Jacobin Constitution of 1793. In this tradition, sometimes called “parliamentary government,” “the legislative assembly elected by the people possesses indisputable supremacy over all other state organs,” and “the executive is strictly subordinate to the assembly, its servant or agent, removable at the assembly’s pleasure.” Marx’s preference for this constitutional form stemmed from his belief that the executive tends to form an alienated and irresponsible will, which in revolutionary situations means it plays a reactionary role relative to the legislature. In his assessment of the 1848 revolution, Marx argued: “In contrast to the legislative power, the executive power expresses the heteronomy of the nation rather than its autonomy …” In his analysis of the 1789 French Revolution, he stated: “The legislative power accomplished the French Revolution. Wherever it appeared as the dominant element in its particularity, it accomplished the great, fundamental, universal revolutions. Because it represented the people, the species-will, it fought not against the state system in general, but against the particular, outdated state system. The executive power, by contrast, accomplished minor revolutions, retrograde revolutions, and reactionary changes. Because it represented particular will, subjective caprice, the magical part of the will, it made revolutions not for a new constitution against the old constitution, but against the constitution.”

马克思与皮阿特都支持立法机构高于行政机构，这使他们都被归入激进宪政思想传统，该传统可追溯至法国大革命中的国民公会时期以及1793年的雅各宾宪法。在这一有时被称为“议会政府”的传统中，“由人民选举产生的立法议会对所有其他国家机构拥有无可争议的最高权力”,并且“行政机构严格从属于议会，是议会的仆人或代理人，可以由议会任意罢免”。马克思之所以偏好这种宪法形式，是由于他相信行政机构倾向于形成一种异化且不负责任的意志，在革命形势下，这意味着它相较于立法机构扮演了反动的角色。马克思在评价1848年革命时提出：“和立法权相反，行政权所表现的是国民的他治而不是国民的自治……”他在分析1789年法国大革命时指出：“立法权完成了法国的革命。在立法权就其特殊性来说作为统治要素出现的地方，它完成了伟大的根本的普遍的革命。正因为立法权代表人民，代表类意志，所以它进行斗争，反对的不是一般的国家制度，而是反对特殊的陈旧的国家制度。行政权却相反，它完成的是一些细微的革命、逆行的革命和反动的变革。正因为行政权代表着特殊意志、主观任意、意志的魔法部分，所以它进行革命，不是争取新宪法反对旧宪法，而是反对宪法。”

Parliamentary government differs from regimes with strict separation of powers, and Marx strongly criticized the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. In analyzing Article 19 of the 1848 French Constitution (which states that “the separation of powers is the first principle of a free government”), Marx pointed out: “Here we see the absurdity of the old constitutions. The condition of a ‘free government’ is not the separation of powers, but the unity of powers. Government organs cannot be too simple. The trick of swindlers is often to make government organs complicated and mysterious.” Taken in isolation, this passage may carry a troubling authoritarian tone, but if we place it within the broader context of Marx’s constitutional thought and the popular republican constitutionalism we have discussed so far, it becomes clear that his objection to the separation of powers lies in the fact that this practice erroneously concentrates power in the executive at the expense of the legislature. This in turn stems from a concern we have already sensed: that the executive has an independent tendency to escape popular control. Indeed, this critique of the separation of powers is precisely the reason its original defenders praised the doctrine. Although the separation of powers is now regarded as one of the cornerstones of democratic government, its original advocates explicitly stated that it would limit democratic influence on the constitution.

议会政府不同于实行严格权力分立的政体，马克思强烈批判了权力分立的宪法学说。马克思在分析1848年法国宪法第19条(即“权力分立是一个自由政府的首要原则”)时指出：“在这里我们看到了旧宪法的荒谬。‘自由政府’的条件不是权力的分立，而是权力的统一。政府机构不能过于简单。骗子耍的花招常常就是使政府机构复杂化，神秘化。”孤立地看，这段话可能带有一种令人担忧的威权主义色彩，但如果我们把这段话放在马克思更广泛的宪政思想背景下，放在我们迄今所讨论的人民共和宪政主义的背景下，那么很明显，他反对权力分立的理由在于，这种做法错误地以牺牲立法机构的权力为代价把权力集中在行政机构。这反过来又源于一种我们已经感受到的担忧，即行政权有一种逃脱人民控制的独立的倾向。事实上，对权力分立的这种批评正是其最初的捍卫者赞扬该学说的原因。尽管权力分立如今被视为民主政体的基石之一，但其最初的倡导者却明确提出，它会限制民主对宪法的影响。

Marx’s above remarks on the separation of powers must be understood in their contemporary context. Marx’s phrasing was likely inspired by an article by his friend Ernest Jones. Jones was a socialist republican and Chartist. Jones’s and Marx’s articles were published in May and June 1851, respectively, in Jones’s weekly *Notes to the People*. Jones’s article examined the history of Renaissance Florence, including its constitutional structure, and advanced a view strikingly similar to Marx’s: “They [the Florentines] sought security in a complex machine of government, in a complex system of ‘checks and balances’; yet the truth is that the simpler the government, the better. If the government is good, the fewer checks in its operation, the better; if the government is bad, the more complex its machine, the greater the difficulty of removing or correcting it.” Both Marx and Jones believed that the simpler the government, the better, and criticized constitutions that “make the government machine complicated.” Marx’s critique targeted the separation of powers, while Jones’s critique targeted the closely related but distinct system of checks and balances (Marx appears not to have distinguished between the two doctrines). Both preferred simple government, in contrast to Tocqueville’s judgment at the time. Tocqueville defended the bicameral legislature in the 1848 Constitution because he preferred “a somewhat complex system of checks and balances” over “a simpler theory that grants indivisible power to a homogeneous authority … placing no obstacles in the way of action.”

对于马克思上述关于权力分立的论述，需要结合当时的语境来认识。马克思的措辞很可能受到他的朋友欧内斯特·琼斯一篇文章的启发。琼斯是一位社会主义共和派和宪章派成员。琼斯和马克思的文章1851年5月和6月分别发表于琼斯的周刊《寄语人民》(Notes to the People)。琼斯的文章探讨了文艺复兴时期佛罗伦萨的历史，包括其宪法结构，并提出了与马克思惊人相似的观点：“他们(佛罗伦萨人)在一种复杂的政府机器中寻求安全，在一种复杂的‘制衡与对抗’制度中寻求安全；然而事实是政府越简单越好。如果政府是好的，其运作过程中的制衡越少越好；如果政府是坏的，其机器越复杂，移除或修正它的难度就越大。”马克思和琼斯都认为政府越简单越好，并批评使“政府机器复杂化”的宪法。马克思的批评指向权力分立，而琼斯的批评指向尽管不同但密切相关的制衡体系(马克思似乎没有区分这两种学说)。两人都偏好简单政府，这与托克维尔当时的判断形成对比。托克维尔为1848年宪法中的两院制立法机构辩护，因为他更喜欢“有点复杂的制衡体系”,而不是“更简单的理论，这种理论将不可分割的权力授予一个同质的权威……对行动没有设置任何障碍”。

A similar division existed between radical republicans and moderate republicans in the American constitutional debates. Against the complex system of checks and balances proposed by the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists advocated for a simple constitution that everyone could easily understand, suspecting that the system of checks and balances would limit democratic accountability. Indeed, the Federalists deliberately designed these checks to delay the expression of popular will through the legislature. They believed that the greatest danger to representative government was that “the legislature would have the defects of a popular assembly,” and therefore power not only had to be dispersed among different branches, but these branches also had to have the power to intervene in the legislative process. Thus, the presidential veto, the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review, and the aristocratic-style Senate’s power of check were all incorporated into the constitution to limit the power of what was considered the more democratic element of the constitution: the House of Representatives. Alexander Hamilton boasted that this system was “so complex, so ingeniously designed, that unwise or evil measures could hardly ever succeed in passing scrutiny.”

在美国制宪辩论中，激进共和派与温和共和派之间也存在类似的分歧。针对联邦党人提出的复杂的制衡体系，反联邦党人倡导实行一部所有人都能轻易理解的简单宪法，他们怀疑那套制衡体系会限制民主问责。事实上，联邦党人专门设计了这些制衡机制，旨在延迟通过立法机构来实现的民意表达。他们认为，对代议制政府来说，最大的危险是“立法机构具有了人民大会的缺陷”,因此权力不仅必须在不同分支部门之间分散，而且这些分支部门还必须拥有干预立法过程的权力。于是，总统的否决权、最高法院的司法审查权、贵族制式的参议院的制衡权，统统被纳入宪法，以限制被认为是宪法中更民主的因素——众议院——的权力。亚历山大·汉密尔顿夸耀说，这个体系“如此复杂，设计如此巧妙，以至于不明智或邪恶的措施几乎不可能成功通过审查”。

The Anti-Federalists rejected aristocratic, counter-majoritarian checks on the legislature; instead, they favored a transparent and clearly demarcated constitution in which the legislature was superior to other organs (similar to Marx’s view), because they believed it “represents the people more than the president (due to its diversity) and is more accountable to the people than the judges.” Marx’s view that “the trick of swindlers is often to make government organs complicated and mysterious” can be seen as an echo of this older radical constitutionalism.

反联邦党人拒绝对立法机构进行贵族制式的、反多数主义的制衡，相反，他们赞成一部透明且界线清晰的宪法，其中，立法机构高于其他机构(与马克思观点类似),因为他们相信它“比总统更能代表人民(因为其多样性),比法官更能对人民负责”。马克思认为“骗子耍的花招常常就是使政府机构复杂化，神秘化”,这种看法可以看做是对这种更古老的激进宪政主义的呼应。

III. Popular Control over State Organs

三、人民对国家机构的控制

In *The Civil War in France*, Marx denounces the existing state as a professionalized, hierarchical, and centralized institution that has escaped the control of citizens. Because of these characteristics, Marx considers the existing state unsuitable as an instrument for the proletarian revolution. One of the most frequently quoted sentences in this work is: “The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes.” [18]18 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (hereafter MECW), vol. 22 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986), p. 328. In the second draft of the work, this sentence is followed by an equally significant expression: “The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation.” [19]19 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, in MECW, vol. 22, p. 486. Therefore, simply taking over the existing state machinery and steering it toward socialism is unworkable; the working class must transform it into a new type of polity that no longer possesses the objectionable features of the existing state. Marx identifies five main institutions of the existing state: “the standing army, the police, the bureaucracy, the church, and the law courts.” [20]20 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 332. He discusses, with varying degrees of detail, how these state institutions should be transformed. For reasons of space and to focus on the aspects where Marx’s inheritance of radical republicanism is most interestingly presented, this article will discuss only Marx’s reflections on how to transform the first two institutions.

在《法兰西内战》中，马克思谴责现有国家是职业化、等级化和集中化的机构，已摆脱公民的控制。由于这些特征，马克思认为现有国家不适合作为工人阶级革命的工具。这本书中有一句也许是被引用得最多的话：“工人阶级不能简单地掌握现成的国家机器，并运用它来达到自己的目的。”在该书的二稿中，这句话后面还有一个同样意味深长的表述：“奴役他们的政治工具不能当成解放他们的政治工具来使用。”因此，简单地接管现有国家机器并将其导向社会主义的做法是行不通的，工人阶级必须将其改造成一种不再具有现有国家那些令人反感特征的新型政治体。马克思确定了现有国家的五个主要机构，即“常备军、警察局、官僚机构、教会和法院”。他以不同的详细程度论述了这些国家机构应如何转变。出于篇幅考虑，并为了集中关注马克思对激进共和主义的继承在哪些方面得到了最有趣的呈现，本文将只讨论马克思对如何转变前两个机构的思考。

Marx believes that the standing army should be transformed into a citizen militia. He praises the Paris Commune because its first act was “the abolition of the standing army and the substitution for it of the armed people.” [21]21 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 331. The possibility of the Paris Commune was first and foremost due to the National Guard, the citizen militia of Paris; precisely because the working class was armed and organized in the militia, it could resist the army of the Versailles government and establish its own administrative organs. The National Guard was indeed a unique institution that played a central role in the establishment and survival of the Commune. Although it was traditionally a bourgeois citizen militia organization, its ranks were increasingly composed of the working class.

马克思认为常备军应转变为公民兵，他赞扬巴黎公社，因为公社的第一个行动就是“废除常备军而代之以武装的人民”。巴黎公社之所以可能，首先要归功于国民自卫军，即巴黎的公民兵；正是因为工人阶级武装起来，并被组织在民兵中，它才能抵抗凡尔赛政府的军队并建立自己的行政机构。国民自卫军确实是一个独特的机构，它在公社建立和存续期间发挥了核心作用。虽然它传统上是一个资产阶级公民兵组织，但其队伍日益由工人阶级组成。

Marx points out four advantages of the citizen militia over the standing army. First, the citizen militia is cheaper. Marx says that abolishing the standing army eliminates “that source of taxes and state debt,” which is “the first economic condition for all social progress.” [22]22 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 332. Second, the citizen militia can form a better army. Marx considers the National Guard “the surest protection against foreign aggression” and suggests that if the Commune had been established at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, it could have “wrested the defence of the country from the traitors to the nation, and infused it with passion,” turning the struggle into a true war of “republican France.” [23]23 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, p. 490. Third, the citizen militia improves the character of soldiers. Marx believes that professional soldiers, “trained in the school of the enemies of the working class,” have developed “deep-rooted habits” (such as shooting prisoners without trial), and these habits will eventually be corrected when they join the workers’ ranks in the citizen militia. [24]24 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, p. 490. Fourth, and most importantly, the citizen militia is less likely to side with reactionary forces against popular movements. Marx denounces the standing army as a persistent danger, that is, “class rule … usurping governmental power.” [25]25 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, p. 490. He believes that the standing army is a constant source of potential reaction, providing the means for the ruling class or a leader with Caesarist ambitions to end revolutionary upheaval. Marx argues that the citizen militia is less likely to be used in this way because it is more closely connected to the people. In short, the standing army “protects the government against the people,” while the citizen militia is “the people armed against governmental usurpation.” [26]26 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, p. 490.

马克思指出了公民兵相对于常备军的四个优势。第一，公民兵更便宜。马克思说，废除常备军就废除了“这样一个捐税与国债之源”,“这是一切社会进步在经济方面的第一个必要条件”。第二，公民兵能组成更好的军队。马克思认为国民自卫军是“抵御外国侵略的最可靠的保障”,并暗示如果公社在普法战争一开始就成立，它就能“把卫国事业从卖国贼手里夺取过来，赋予它以激情”,把斗争变成一场真正的“共和主义法国”的战争。第三，公民兵能改善士兵的品格。马克思认为，职业军人在“在工人阶级的敌人的训练下”养成了“根深蒂固的习性”(例如不经审判就枪杀俘虏),当他们加入公民兵中的工人队伍时，这些习惯最终会得到纠正。第四，也是最重要的，公民兵不太可能站到反动势力一边反对民众运动。马克思斥责常备军是一种持续存在的危险，即“阶级统治……僭取政府权力”。他认为，常备军是潜在反动不绝的根源，为统治阶级或一个具有凯撒式野心的领导人提供了结束革命动荡的手段。马克思认为，公民兵不太可能被这样使用，因为它与人民联系更紧密。总之，常备军“保护政府反对人民”,而公民兵是“武装起来反对政府僭权的人民”。

In this defense of the citizen militia by Marx, we see traces of the republican tradition of the citizen militia. From Machiavelli to Rousseau, warnings were issued about the danger that professional soldiers (whether mercenaries or standing armies) pose to the existence of a republic, arguing that professional armies are detached from the people and therefore can be used by elites to suppress the people. They emphasized that arming the people enables them to defend themselves, thereby securing their domestic freedom from this threat, while also serving as a bulwark against foreign domination. Rousseau believed that standing armies “are useful only for two purposes: to attack and conquer neighbors, or to bind and enslave citizens.” He proposed that “every citizen should be obliged to serve as a soldier by duty, and not make soldiering a profession,” that the citizen militia “costs the republic very little money,” fights better than professional armies (because “a man always does better when defending his own property”), and does not harass the local populace as professional soldiers habitually do. [27]27 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 230–231. Marx’s arguments in support of the citizen militia are very similar to these positions. He focuses on ensuring that the armed forces are not detached from society, defends the National Guard as “the surest protection against foreign aggression,” and criticizes the generals who failed to properly deploy the National Guard against the Prussian army. [28]28 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, p. 490.

在马克思对公民兵所作的这种辩护中，我们看到共和主义公民兵传统的痕迹。从马基雅维利到卢梭都对职业军人(无论是雇佣兵还是常备军)对共和国存在的危险提出过警告，认为职业军队脱离人民，因此可能被精英用来镇压人民。他们强调，把人民武装起来使他们能够自我防卫，从而让自己在国内的自由免于这种威胁，同时也能充当抵御外国统治的堡垒。卢梭认为，常备军“只对两个目的有用：进攻和征服邻国，或束缚和奴役公民”,他提议“每个公民都应当根据义务服兵役，而不是把军人当作职业”,公民兵“只花费共和国很少的钱”,打仗又比职业军队打得更好(因为“一个人在保卫自己的财产时总是干得更出色”),也不会像职业军人惯常做的那样骚扰当地民众。马克思支持公民兵的论点与这些立场非常相似。他关注如何确保武装力量不脱离社会，并为国民自卫军辩护，视之为“抵御外国侵略的最可靠的保障”,批评那些未能正确部署国民自卫军以对抗普鲁士军队的将军们。

Marx’s discussion of the citizen militia in *The Civil War in France* mainly focuses on its role in defending the revolution against reactionary forces, rather than on the connection between military service and the cultivation of virtues necessary for citizens (a connection often established by republicanism). This connection appears in an earlier article by Marx, which discusses the Prussian government’s attempt in 1848 to establish a watered-down system of citizen militia. Marx condemns a Prussian government regulation stipulating that serving militiamen “should neither consider nor talk about public affairs, nor discuss or decide on them,” and must “renounce their basic political rights.” [29]29 Karl Marx, *The Prussian Counter-Revolution and the Prussian Magistracy*, in MECW, vol. 8 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), p. 364. He argues that this would cultivate citizens who reflect “the passive, will-less, and personality-less obedience of the soldier.” [30]30 Karl Marx, *The Prussian Counter-Revolution and the Prussian Magistracy*, p. 364.

马克思在《法兰西内战》中关于公民兵的讨论主要关注的是公民兵在保卫革命以抵御反动势力方面的作用，而不是服兵役与发展公民所必需的美德之间的联系(共和主义经常在二者之间建立起联系)。这种联系在马克思更早的一篇文章当中有所体现，那篇文章讨论了普鲁士政府在1848年建立一个打了折扣的公民兵制度的尝试。马克思谴责普鲁士政府的一个规定：服役的公民兵“对于公共事务既不应当考虑和谈论，也不应当讨论或作出决定”,并且必须“放弃自己的基本政治权利”。他认为这将培养出反映“士兵的那种消极的、无意志的和无个性的服从”的公民。

Turning now to the second state institution—the bureaucracy. Marx believes that the most important change to the bureaucracy is that public officials should be elected and recallable. A recurring expression in *The Civil War in France* and its drafts is: “public servants … elected, responsible to their constituents, and recallable.” [31]31 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 332. Marx thus transfers the accountability system he applies to representative bodies to the entire public administration. Although Marx is not entirely clear about how many public administrative positions will be filled by election, some of his statements undoubtedly indicate that it will be applied very broadly. For example, he says that elections apply to “all other public servants” and points out: “The Commune would free the peasants from the blood tax, give them a cheap government, and replace the notaries, lawyers, bailiffs, and other court vampires who now suck their blood with paid communal servants elected by themselves and responsible to them.” [32]32 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 335. The result of an elected bureaucracy is a significant deprofessionalization of public administration, and this deprofessionalization has far-reaching implications. Marx believes that public officials will no longer be “a trained special caste,” and “the parasitic army of the state will be removed.” [33]33 Karl Marx, *First Draft of The Civil War in France*, p. 488. Marx further argues that making public officials recallable results in genuine accountability of the bureaucracy. These ideas of Marx likely originate from the Paris Commune’s *Declaration to the French People* of April 19, 1871. [34]34 The *Declaration to the French People* was a political program issued by the Paris Commune on April 19, 1871, outlining its principles of democratic governance, including the election and recall of officials.

下面转向第二个国家机构——官僚机构。马克思认为官僚机构最重要的改变是公职人员应由选举产生并且可以被罢免。在《法兰西内战》及其草稿中反复出现的表述是“公务人员……由选举产生，对选民负责，并且可以罢免”。马克思由此将他应用于代议制的问责体系转移到了整个公共行政领域。虽然马克思并不完全清楚究竟有多少公共行政职位将通过选举产生，但是他的一些言论无疑表明它确实会应用得非常广泛。例如，他说选举适用于“其他一切公务人员”,并指出：“公社能使农民免除血税，能给他们一个廉价政府，能把现今吸吮着他们鲜血的公证人、律师、法警和其他法庭吸血鬼，换成由他们自己选出并对他们负责的领工资的公社勤务员”。官僚机构由选举产生的结果就是，公共行政在相当大范围内去专业化了，而且这种去专业化具有深远影响。马克思认为，公职人员将不再是“受过训练的特殊阶层”,并且“国家寄生虫大军将被搬掉”。马克思进一步指出，使公职人员可罢免的结果就是，我们真正可以对官僚机构进行问责。马克思的这些思想很可能源自巴黎公社1871年4月19日的《告法国人民书》。

The obvious manifestation of the deprofessionalization of the bureaucracy at the financial level is what Marx calls: “From the members of the Commune downwards, all public servants are to receive only the wages of a worker.” [35]35 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 332. In the context of the salary structure of the 19th-century French bureaucracy, this was a particularly radical demand. Limiting wages to the level of workers would be an important part of the process whereby “all the privileges and official allowances of the high dignitaries of the former state disappear along with the persons themselves.” [36]36 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, p. 332.

官僚机构去专业化在财务层面上的明显表现就是马克思所说的：“从公社委员起，自上至下一切公职人员，都只能领取相当于工人工资的报酬。”在19世纪法国官僚机构薪酬结构的背景下，这是一个特别激进的要求。把工资限制在工人的水平将是“从前国家的高官显宦所享有的一切特权以及公务津贴，都随着这些人物本身的消失而消失”过程中的重要一环。

Marx stipulated that all public offices should be filled by election and be subject to recall, and that the salaries of all public officials should be equivalent to workers’ wages. In Marx’s conception of the social republic, public functions are no longer reserved for a “specially trained stratum” but are carried out by the entire people. This deprofessionalization of the state’s administrative and repressive functions is a rarely noted aspect of Marx’s political views. This vision stands in stark contrast to the enormous expansion of the state and its professional personnel since Marx advanced this idea; it actually more closely resembles the model of ancient democratic Athens, where the system operated on a rotation principle—citizens not only had the right to choose their rulers but also had to take turns ruling and being ruled. This ideal once inspired the young Marx, who wrote admiringly: “As in Greece, the *respublica* is the real private affair of the citizens,” [37]37 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 164. The Latin term *respublica* here refers to the commonwealth or public affair. believing that these ancient republics achieved a praiseworthy substantive unity between the people and the state. Similarly, Marx praised the Commune for realizing “the reabsorption of the state power by society, as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing society.” [38]38 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 332. Thus, Marx’s commentary on the Commune represents, to some extent, a return to the classical republican ideas of his youth.

马克思规定所有公职都由选举产生并且可以罢免，所有公职人员工资都应该相当于工人的工资。在马克思的社会共和国构想中，公共职能不再保留给“受过训练的特殊阶层”,而是由全体人民来执行。对国家行政职能和镇压职能的这种去专业化，是马克思政治观点中很少被注意到的内容。这一愿景与自马克思提出这个观点以来国家及其专业人员规模的巨大扩张形成鲜明对比，它实际上更类似于古代民主雅典的模式，该体系采取轮换原则——公民不仅有权利选择自己的统治者，而且还要轮流进行统治与被统治。这一理想曾激励了年轻的马克思，他钦佩地写道：“像希腊那样，respublica是市民的现实私人事务”,认为这些古代共和国实现了值得称赞的人民和国家之间的实体性统一。与此类似，马克思还称赞公社实现了“社会把国家政权重新收回，把它从统治社会、压制社会的力量变成社会本身的充满生气的力量”。因此，马克思对公社的评论在某种程度上是对他青年时代古典共和主义思想的回归。

IV. Conclusion

四、结论

This article has elaborated, from three aspects, how Marx’s conception of socialist political institutions inherits the radical elements of the republican tradition: his support for replacing representative government with popular representation; his preference for legislative supremacy and his critique of the separation of powers; and his belief that the state’s administrative and repressive organs must be transformed by placing them under the control of the people. These three dimensions are the core elements of Marx’s idea of the social republic.

本文从三个方面阐述了马克思关于社会主义政治制度的构想如何继承共和主义传统的激进元素：他支持以人民代表制取代代议制；他偏好立法机构至上并批评权力分立；他相信必须通过将国家行政机构和镇压机构置于人民的控制之下来改造它们。这三个维度是马克思社会共和国思想的核心要素。

Although Marx did not engage in an in-depth and detailed discussion of these political institutions, his exposition of the social republic provides socialists and republicans with a thought-provoking and usable system of ideas. One of these is that socialism requires a distinctive political structure—this is perhaps the most important insight Marx offered in his discussion of the Paris Commune. Marx believed that the people of Paris “had grasped the real leadership of the revolution into their own hands, and at the same time found the means of keeping that power in the hands of the people themselves after victory, namely, by replacing the state machine, the governmental machine of the ruling class, with their own governmental machine.” [39]39 Karl Marx, “First Draft of The Civil War in France,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 483. Therefore, the Commune not only demonstrated how the people should take the revolution “into their own hands” but also showed “the means of keeping that power in the hands of the people themselves,” that is, by forging “their own governmental machine.” Using the existing “state machine, the governmental machine of the ruling class” would mean that the revolution would slip from the people’s hands and become uncontrollable. Hence, the socialist governmental machine must transform the inherited political and administrative institutions into genuinely democratic institutions. Marx believed that by doing so, the Commune “laid the foundation for a truly democratic system of the republic.” [40]40 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 336.

虽然马克思并未对这些政治制度进行深入而详细的讨论，但他对社会共和国的论述为社会主义者和共和主义者提供了一套发人深省、可供借鉴的思想体系，其中一个就是社会主义需要一套独特的政治结构——这也许是马克思在讨论巴黎公社时提出的最重要的洞见。马克思认为巴黎人民“把他们这次革命的真正领导权握在自己手中，同时找到了在革命胜利时把这一权力保持在人民自己手中的办法，即用他们自己的政府机器去代替统治阶级的国家机器、政府机器”。因此，公社不仅展示了人民应如何将革命“掌握在自己手中”,也展示了“把这一权力保持在人民自己手中的办法”,即锻造“他们自己的政府机器”,使用现有的“统治阶级的国家机器、政府机器”将意味着革命会从人民手中溜走而无法控制。因此，社会主义的政府机器必须将继承下来的政治机构和行政机构转变为真正的民主机构。马克思相信，通过这样做，公社“给共和国奠定了真正民主制度的基础”。