Artificial Intelligence and the Realization of General Intellect

General Secretary Xi Jinping, during the 20th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, emphasized the need to adhere to self-reliance and self-strengthening, highlight application-oriented guidance, and promote the healthy and orderly development of artificial intelligence. As a strategic technology leading a new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, artificial intelligence has profoundly changed the mode of human production and life, and is reshaping the entire economic and social structure at an unprecedented speed. Faced with the new situation of the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence technology, Marx’s concept of “general intellect” provides an important perspective for examining the epochal development of artificial intelligence. The generalizing trend of intellect or intelligence itself, as represented by the concept of “general intellect,” is becoming a reality with the “approach of the singularity” of artificial general intelligence. As a contemporary objectified form of general intellect, artificial intelligence not only practically sublates the natural intellectual form of general intellect but also potentially creates a bridge connecting human intelligence and the intelligence of things, thereby constituting the basic premise for current reflections on the relationship between human intelligence and artificial intelligence. Through the prism of “general intellect,” we can gain some insights for responding to the many challenges that the era of artificial intelligence brings to human society.

习近平总书记在中共中央政治局第二十次集体学习时强调，坚持自立自强，突出应用导向，推动人工智能健康有序发展。人工智能作为引领新一轮科技革命和产业变革的战略性技术，深刻改变了人类生产生活方式，正在以前所未有的速度重塑整个经济社会结构。面对当下人工智能技术快速演进的新形势，马克思的“一般智力”概念为我们审视人工智能的时代性发展提供了重要视角。“一般智力”概念所表征的智力或智能本身的一般化趋势，正在随着通用人工智能的“奇点临近”而成为现实。人工智能作为一般智力的当代对象化形态，不仅实际地扬弃了一般智力的自然智能形式，而且潜在地创造了联结人的智能和物的智能的沟通桥梁，并由此构成了当下思考人类智能与人工智能之间关系的基本前提。透过“一般智力”的思想棱镜，可以为我们回应人工智能时代给人类社会所带来的诸多挑战提供一定启示。

I. The Origin of the “General Intellect” Problem

一、“一般智力”问题的缘起

In the section “Fixed Capital and the Development of the Social Productive Forces” of the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), when Marx discusses the process by which the means of labor, after “entering the production process of capital,” ultimately develop into an automated system of machinery, he describes the impact of general intellect on human social life and its historical process by manifesting itself as machinery (systems). Among these, the following classic passage has attracted the most attention from domestic and international academia: “Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a *direct force of production*, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process.”

在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》的“固定资本和社会生产力的发展”一节中，马克思在谈到劳动资料在“加入资本的生产过程以后”,最终发展成为自动化的机器体系的过程时，曾经描述了一般智力通过将自身表现为机器(体系),对于人类社会生活及其历史进程所产生的影响。其中，最为国内外学界所关注的莫过于下面的经典段落：“自然界没有造出任何机器，没有造出机车、铁路、电报、自动走锭精纺机等等。它们是人的产业劳动的产物，是转化为人的意志驾驭自然界的器官或者说在自然界实现人的意志的器官的自然物质。它们是人的手创造出来的人脑的器官；是对象化的知识力量。固定资本的发展表明，一般社会知识，已经在多么大的程度上变成了直接的生产力，从而社会生活过程的条件本身在多么大的程度上受到一般智力的控制并按照这种智力得到改造。它表明，社会生产力已经在多么大的程度上，不仅以知识的形式，而且作为社会实践的直接器官，作为实际生活过程的直接器官被生产出来。”

Around this passage and the key concept it introduces—“general intellect”—domestic and international academia have engaged in extensive and in-depth discussion. It is worth affirming that these discussions have greatly enriched our understanding of Marx’s concept of “general intellect”; whether gains or losses, they must be seriously addressed in the current academic context. However, on the one hand, it should be pointed out that existing discussions have, to a certain extent, neglected Marx’s critical context of capitalism. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx explicitly states that the automatic system of machinery, as a means of labor, “appears not only materially as a means of labor, but also as a specific form of capital existence determined by the total process of capital—as fixed capital.” That is to say, Marx attempts to study the automatic system of machinery *as fixed capital*, rather than the automatic system of machinery itself. Therefore, discussing the problem of general intellect cannot be separated from the real context of capitalist relations of production and reduced to a purely technical-philosophical problem. In this regard, as some domestic scholars have noted, when the Italian autonomist and cognitive capitalism schools named the section “Fixed Capital and the Development of the Social Productive Forces” as the “Fragment on Machines,” they precisely overlooked the dimension of social relations contained within it. On the other hand, even considering the technical problem itself, the rich possibilities inherent in Marx’s concept of “general intellect” have been obscured by the techno-instrumentalist stance in existing discussions. Taking Paolo Virno’s view as an example, his criticism that “Marx overlooked the way in which ‘general intellect’ manifests itself as living labor” stems from his belief that “general intellect,” entirely equated with fixed capital and “‘scientific power’ objectified in the machine system,” stands in opposition to living labor. Under post-Fordist conditions, however, “general intellect,” as a conceptual system and logical structure irreducible to fixed capital, plays a decisive role, manifesting itself as the interaction of multiple living subjects. In other words, the true “‘general intellect’ includes formal and informal knowledge, imagination, ethical propensities, mentalities, and ‘language games’”; these activities all actually express human subjectivity. In fact, not only does Virno have a certain misunderstanding of Marx’s concept of “general intellect,” but with the development of the latest scientific technologies such as artificial intelligence, the series of human subjective behaviors Virno lists are also being reproduced by intelligent machines as “things.” Against this background, it is necessary for us, on the basis of clarifying the original meaning of Marx’s concept of “general intellect,” to further analyze Marx’s concept of “general intellect” in light of the historical conditions of the era of artificial intelligence.

围绕这一段落以及其中提出的关键词——“一般智力”概念，国内外学界展开了广泛而深入的讨论。值得肯定的是，这些讨论极大地丰富了我们对于马克思“一般智力”概念的理解，无论是得是失，都需要在当前的学术语境中加以认真对待。然而，一方面，应当指出现有讨论在一定程度上忽视了马克思的资本主义批判语境。在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中，马克思明确指出，自动的机器体系作为劳动资料，“不仅从物质方面来看表现为劳动的资料，同时还表现为由资本的总过程决定的特殊的资本存在方式——表现为固定资本”。也就是说，马克思试图研究的是作为固定资本的自动机器体系，而不是自动机器体系本身。所以，讨论一般智力问题，不能脱离资本主义生产关系的现实语境，而将之窄化为纯粹的技术哲学问题。就此而言，正如国内部分学者所说，当意大利自治主义和认知资本主义流派将“固定资本和社会生产力的发展”这一节命名为“机器论片断”时，恰恰忽视了其中包含的社会关系维度。另一方面，即便仅就技术问题本身而言，马克思“一般智力”概念所蕴含的丰富可能性，却也被现有讨论中的技术工具论立场所遮蔽了。以保罗·维尔诺的观点为例，他之所以会批评“马克思忽略了‘一般智力’将自身表现为活劳动的方式”,是因为他认为完全等同于固定资本和“对象化在机器系统中的‘科学力量’”的“一般智力”是同活劳动相对立的。而在后福特制的条件下，“一般智力”作为不能被简化为固定资本的概念体系和逻辑结构起着决定性作用，它表现为多个活生生的主体的相互作用。换言之，真正的“‘一般智力’包括正式和非正式的知识、想象、道德倾向、心理和‘语言游戏’”,这些活动都实际地表现着人的主体性。事实上，不仅维尔诺对于马克思的“一般智力”概念存在一定的误解，而且随着人工智能等最新科学技术的发展，维尔诺所列举的一系列专属于人类的主体行为也正在被作为“物”的智能机器所复现。在此背景下，我们有必要在对马克思的“一般智力”概念进行正本清源的基础上，结合人工智能时代的历史条件，进一步分析马克思的“一般智力”概念。

II. Rethinking Marx’s Conception of General Intellect

二、重思马克思对于一般智力的设想

In the section “Fixed Capital and the Development of the Social Productive Forces” of the *Grundrisse*, Marx, based on the use of the automatic system of machinery in 19th-century capitalist industrial society, conceived the possibility of general intellect, that is, using the concept of “general intellect” to depict the generalizing trend of intellect or knowledge itself. This trend is embodied in the following three different levels.

在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》的“固定资本和社会生产力的发展”一节中，马克思基于19世纪资本主义工业社会对自动的机器体系的使用设想了一般智力的可能性，也就是通过“一般智力”概念刻画了智力或知识本身的一般化趋势。这一趋势体现在以下三个不同的层面。

1. General Intellect as General Capacity

1.作为通用能力的一般智力

In Marx’s view, the substance of general intellect is knowledge. Therefore, general intellect originates from human cognitive capacity and is the objectification of human cognition. However, just as the theory of knowledge in philosophical research is often equivalent to epistemology in content, making it difficult to strictly distinguish them, general intellect, manifested as knowledge, as objectified human cognition, does not lose its dynamism or oppose the principles of human cognition or activity simply by manifesting itself only in objectified forms (as Virno claims). General intellect itself manifests as an automated process, as “self-acting” and automatic knowledge; it “possesses skill and strength, it is itself the virtuoso, it has a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting within it.” Therefore, although general intellect, due to its objectified nature, “appears to the worker as an external, alien thing” and thereby causes the real subsumption of labor under capital, this does not mean that general intellect itself is lifeless, merely a passive or inert material phenomenon; it is equally “living” and dynamic, a “value-for-itself.”

在马克思看来，一般智力的实质是知识。所以，一般智力来源于人的认识能力，是人的认识的对象化。然而，正如哲学研究中的知识论往往在内容上等同于认识论，因而很难被严格地区分开,表现为知识的一般智力作为对象化的人类认识，同样没有因为将自身仅仅表现为对象化的形态(如维尔诺所说),而丧失了能动性，同人类认识或活动的原则相对立。一般智力本身就表现为自动化的过程，是“自行运转”的、自动的知识，它“具有技能和力量，它本身就是能工巧匠，它通过在自身中发生作用的力学规律而具有自己的灵魂”。因此，尽管一般智力由于其对象化的性质而对于工人来说“表现为外在的异己的东西”,并进而造成了劳动对资本的实质从属，但这并非意味着一般智力本身是无活力的，只是被动的或惰性的物质现象，它同样是“活的”、能动的，是“自为存在的价值”。

On this basis, Marx points out that general intellect is not only knowledge but also “general social knowledge,” that is, because of its socialized character it possesses generality, i.e., universality. Analogous to the twofold character of the labor embodied in commodities—the unity of concrete labor, which is “the expenditure of human labor-power in a special form and with a definite aim” and produces use-value, and abstract labor, which is “the expenditure of human labor-power in the physiological sense” and forms the value of commodities—intellect itself is likewise the unity of particularity and generality. The former manifests itself as particular forms of concrete knowledge and skills, applied in various specific professional contexts, such as certain literary and artistic knowledge, scientific knowledge, engineering knowledge, and so on; the latter is precisely what Marx calls general intellect. It does not refer to “the scientific literacy of the individual worker” but rather to “a more general attitude of thought,” namely “linguistic ability, learning ability, memory ability, the capacity for abstraction and association, and the tendency toward self-reflection,” i.e., “the capacity for thought itself,” which is universally applicable to all situations in human society. However, the universality possessed by general intellect as “intellect in general” does not come from the transcendental structure of human cognitive faculties as Kant maintained, but is rooted in human social intercourse activities; “it is life that determines consciousness,” because “this abstract determination itself is likewise a product of historical conditions.” It is precisely through the historical accumulation of social knowledge that the most universal forms of general intellect emerge. In this regard, “general intellect,” like “labor,” is “a modern category.”

在此基础上，马克思指出，一般智力不仅是知识，而且是“一般社会知识”,也就是由于其社会化的性质而具有一般性，即通用性。类似于体现在商品中的劳动的二重性，即作为“人类劳动力在特殊的有一定目的的形式上的耗费”、生产使用价值的具体劳动与作为“人类劳动力在生理学意义上的耗费”、形成商品价值的抽象劳动的统一,智力本身同样是特殊性与一般性的统一。前者表现为特殊形式的具体知识和技能，其应用于各种特定的专业场景，如一定的文艺知识、科学知识、工程知识等；而后者正是马克思所说的一般智力，它并非意指“劳动者个人的科学素养”,而是“更一般的思维态度”,“这就是语言能力、学习能力、记忆能力、抽象和联系能力以及自我反思的倾向”,即“思想能力本身”,其通用于人类社会的全部情景。然而，作为“智力一般”的一般智力所具有的通用性，并非来自康德所主张的人的认识能力的先验构造，而是根基于人的社会交往活动，“是生活决定意识”,因为“就这个抽象的规定性本身来说，同样是历史条件的产物”。正是通过社会知识的历史积累，最为通用的一般智力形式才得以涌现。就此而言，“一般智力”和“劳动”一样，都“是现代的范畴”。

2. General Intellect as General In-Itself

2.作为一般自在的一般智力

Since pure intellect in-itself is difficult to grasp directly and can only be expressed indirectly through certain mediating forms, just as value itself manifests itself as exchange-value (the value-form) in the process of exchange, general intellect likewise has its form of expression, namely the “objectified power of knowledge” embodied in the automatic system of machinery. These “natural materials of the organs of the human will realized in nature” serve as “direct productive forces”; they are material forces capable of transforming the world, not naturally occurring in nature but artificially produced. It is precisely in the objectified system of machinery that humanity proves the existence of its own intellect. Relatedly, in his later years Engels gave a definition of the concept of “practice” in his essay *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*: “The most convincing refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice, namely experiment and industry.” The reason practice is defined by Engels as experiment and industry is that it is precisely in experiment and industry that humanity proves its cognition, i.e., the power of knowledge: experiment objectifies humanity’s understanding of nature, thereby reproducing natural processes; moreover, industry can reproduce and transform natural processes in accordance with human purposes, producing new products. It is precisely through experiment and industry that humanity achieves “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change,” bringing about the objectification of its own intellectual power. Therefore, the automatic system of machinery, as a product of industry, is the result of development “along with the accumulation of social knowledge and the accumulation of the productive forces as a whole.”

由于纯粹自在的智力本身是难以被直接把握的，而只能通过一定的中介形式来得到间接的表现，因此，就像价值本身在交换过程中将自己表现为交换价值(价值形式),一般智力也同样有它的表现形式，即作为自动的机器体系的“对象化的知识力量”。这些“在自然界实现人的意志的器官的自然物质”作为“直接的生产力”,是能够改造世界的物质力量，它不是在自然界中自然发生的，而是人为制造出来的。正是在对象化的机器体系中，人证明了自己的智力的存在。与之相关，恩格斯晚年在《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》一文中曾给“实践”概念下过一个定义：“对这些以及其他一切哲学上的怪论的最令人信服的驳斥是实践，即实验和工业。”实践之所以被恩格斯定义为实验和工业，是因为正是在实验和工业中，人证明了自己的认识，即知识的力量：实验将人对自然界的认识予以对象化，从而再现了自然的过程；不仅如此，工业还能依照人的目的对自然的过程加以复现和改造，制造出新的产品。正是通过实验和工业，人实现了“环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致”,造成了自身知识力量的对象化。因此，自动的机器体系作为工业的产物，是“随着社会知识的积累、整个生产力的积累而发展”的结果。

Thus, although general intellect originates from human cognitive faculties, it is not exclusively human but potentially possesses a general character that transcends the boundary between humans and things. With the development of the automatic system of machinery, “it is no longer the worker who interposes a modified natural thing as a middle link between himself and the object; rather, the worker interposes the natural process, which he has transformed into an industrial process, as a means between himself and the inorganic nature he dominates. The worker no longer plays the principal role in the production process; instead, he stands beside the production process,” and the machine replaces the human as the subject of the labor process. In other words, “the history of the species is linked to the self-consciousness with which natural science and technology automatically transform into the social subject (general intellect) controlling the material life process.” Just as under capitalist conditions value itself becomes an “automatic subject,” the birth of general intellect also marks the “subjectivization” of intellect itself as it detaches from humans, manifesting itself as the automatic system of machinery. “The epoch-making changes in technological development show how all the organic activities of the human body included within the sphere of tool activity—first the activity of the executive organs, then the activity of the sensory organs, the generation of human bodily energy, and finally the activity of the control organ (the brain)—are step by step transferred to the instruments of labor… In the end, the entire labor process will be separated from humans and linked only to the instruments of labor.” The reason for this lies in the fact that general intellect has acquired an in-itself character, as if it appears as an independent “subject.” Thus, through the concept of “general intellect,” Marx identifies the generalizing trend of intellect itself as represented by the automatic system of machinery, which makes “the entire production process no longer subordinate to the worker’s direct skill, but rather manifests itself as the technological application of science.”

因此，一般智力尽管来自人类的认识能力，但并非专属于人类，而是潜在地具有跨越人和物界限的一般性质。随着自动的机器体系的发展，“这里已经不再是工人把改变了形态的自然物作为中间环节放在自己和对象之间；而是工人把……由他改变为工业过程的自然过程作为中介放在自己和被他支配的无机自然界之间。工人不再是生产过程的主要作用者，而是站在生产过程的旁边”,机器取代人成为劳动过程的主体。换言之，“类的历史是同自然科学和技术自动转化为社会主体(一般智力)控制物质生活过程的自我意识相联系的”。就像资本主义条件下价值本身成了“自动的主体”,一般智力的诞生也标志着智力本身脱离人而实现了“主体化”,即表现为自动的机器体系。“技术发展中的划时代的变革表明，工具活动的活动范围内所包括的人的全部机体活动——首先是执行器官的活动，然后是感觉器官的活动、人的机体能量的产生，最后是控制器官(大脑)的活动——是怎样一步步地转移到劳动资料上的……最后，全部劳动过程将脱离开人并且只和劳动资料相联系。”之所以如此，就在于一般智力取得了自在性，好像表现为独立的“主体”。由此，马克思便通过“一般智力”概念标识了自动的机器体系所表征的智力本身的一般化趋势，它使得“整个生产过程不是从属于工人的直接技巧，而是表现为科学在工艺上的应用”。

3. The Capitalist Application of General Intellect

3.一般智力的资本主义应用

What Marx focuses on is not general intellect itself, but the capitalist application of general intellect. The birth of general intellect, i.e., the transformation of the instruments of labor into the system of machinery, is a process of the development of fixed capital. Therefore, in the section “Fixed Capital and the Development of the Social Productive Forces” in the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), Marx is not expounding a purely technical-philosophical problem; rather, he treats the examination of general intellect as a link in the overall critique of capitalism.

马克思所关注的并非一般智力本身，而是一般智力的资本主义应用。一般智力的诞生，即劳动资料转变为机器体系，是固定资本的发展过程。所以，在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》的“固定资本和社会生产力的发展”一节中，马克思并不是在阐释一个纯粹的技术哲学问题，而是将对于一般智力的考察视作整个资本主义批判的一个环节。

First, from the history of the formation of general intellect, the automatic system of machinery is the realization of capital’s necessary tendency to “increase labor productivity and negate necessary labor to the greatest extent,” and is “the most adequate form of fixed capital.” This is because the negation of necessary labor can maximize the scope of surplus labor, thereby extracting surplus value on a larger scale. Therefore, according to the necessary tendency of capital’s self-valorization, since “the less labor a machine contains, the smaller the value it adds to the product. The smaller the value it transfers, the higher its productive efficiency, and the closer its service approaches that of natural forces,” “hence large-scale industry must master its own specific means of production, i.e., the machine itself, and must produce machines by machines,” thereby bringing about the automation of the production of the automatic system of machinery.

其一，从一般智力的形成史看，自动的机器体系是“提高劳动生产力和最大限度否定必要劳动”的资本必然趋势的实现，是“固定资本的最适当的形式”。这是因为，对必要劳动的否定可以最大程度地扩大剩余劳动的范围，因而能更大范围地攫取剩余价值。所以，根据资本增殖的必然趋势，由于“机器本身包含的劳动越少，它加到产品上的价值也就越小。它转移的价值越小，它的生产效率就越高，它的服务就越接近自然力的服务”,“因此，大工业必须掌握它特有的生产资料，即机器本身，必须用机器来生产机器”,从而造成自动的机器体系生产的自动化。

Second, from the current state of development of general intellect, the automatic system of machinery brings about the real subsumption of labor under capital. “Insofar as the system of machinery develops along with the accumulation of social knowledge and the accumulation of the productive forces as a whole, it is not labor but capital that represents general social labor.” “In the system of machinery, knowledge appears to the worker as something external and alien, while living labor is subsumed under objectified labor that acts independently.” In this regard, this not only means that science and technology will become an important link in maintaining the reproduction of capitalist relations of production—“all sciences are pressed into the service of capital”—but also actually brings about the opposition between science and technology and human beings, leading workers to oppose machinery.

其二，从一般智力的发展现状看，自动的机器体系造成了劳动对资本的实际从属，“从机器体系随着社会知识的积累、整个生产力的积累而发展来说，代表一般社会劳动的不是劳动，而是资本”,“在机器体系中，对工人来说，知识表现为外在的异己的东西，而活劳动则从属于独立发生作用的对象化劳动”。就此而言，这不仅意味着科学技术将成为维持资本主义生产关系再生产的重要环节，“一切科学都被用来为资本服务”,而且还实际地造成了科学技术同人的对立，导致工人反对机器。

Third, from the perspective of the future prospects of general intellect, Marx pointed out that although “the machine system is the most suitable form of the use value of fixed capital,” this does not mean that “the social relations subordinate to capital are the most suitable and best social relations of production for the application of the machine system.” The automatic machine system itself is “the material condition for blowing up this foundation,” that is, the capitalist relations of production; it will transcend its own capitalist form of application and move toward a socialist future. Specifically, through the flourishing of general intellect, “the value objectified in the machine system appears as a premise, in comparison with which the value-creating power of individual labor capacity tends toward zero as an infinitesimal magnitude.” “Once direct labor in its immediate form ceases to be the great source of wealth,” and machine labor completely replaces human labor, then the value of the products created by the automatic machine system will not become incalculable; rather, the standard for measuring value itself will change—that is, people’s free time will replace labor time as the “measure of wealth.” In this regard, Marx predicted that the development of general intellect would reduce people’s socially necessary labor to a “minimum,” increase everyone’s free time, and labor itself would increasingly lose its character as a means of subsistence, so that people’s free time would replace their necessary labor time as the measure of value. “Then, correspondingly, because time and means have been freed up and created for all, individuals will develop in art, science, and other fields.”

其三，从一般智力的未来前景看，马克思指出，尽管“机器体系是固定资本的使用价值的最适合的形式”,但这并不意味着“从属于资本的社会关系，对于机器体系的应用来说，是最适合的和最好的社会生产关系”。自动的机器体系本身就是“炸毁这个基础”,即资本主义生产关系的物质条件，它将扬弃自身的资本主义应用形式，走向社会主义的未来。具体而言，通过一般智力的繁荣，“对象化在机器体系中的价值表现为这样一个前提，同它相比，单个劳动能力创造价值的力量作为无限小的量而趋于消失”。“一旦直接形式的劳动不再是财富的巨大源泉”,机器劳动完全取代了人类劳动，那么自动的机器体系所制造出来的产品价值并不会变得无法被计算，而是衡量价值的标准本身将得到改变，即人们的自由时间将会替代劳动时间成为“财富的尺度”。对此，马克思预言，一般智力的发展会把人的社会必要劳动降低到“最低限度”,增加所有人的自由时间，劳动本身越来越失去其谋生性质，使得人的自由时间替代人的必要劳动时间成为价值的尺度，“那时，与此相适应，由于给所有的人腾出了时间和创造了手段，个人会在艺术、科学等等方面得到发展”。

In summary, through the concept of “general intellect,” Marx described the generalizing trend of intellect itself as manifested in the use of automatic machine systems in 19th-century capitalist industrial society. On the one hand, this generalizing trend is embodied in the universality of general intellect as “general social knowledge” based on historical accumulation: it is not only applicable to a variety of specialized scenarios but also widely applicable to all specific situations in human society, thus realistically manifesting itself as “intellect in general.” On the other hand, the generalizing trend of intellect itself is also embodied in the self-subsisting generality that general intellect achieves by objectifying itself into the automatic machine system. Although it originates from human cognitive capacity, general intellect is not exclusive to humans but attains its own independent existence. Thus, “capital creates a mode of production suited to itself,” that is, “it endows production with a scientific character, while direct labor is reduced to merely one element of the production process.”

总之，通过“一般智力”概念，马克思描述了19世纪资本主义工业社会对自动化机器体系的使用所表现出的智力本身的一般化趋势。一方面，这种一般化趋势体现在一般智力作为“一般社会知识”基于历史积累所实现的通用性，它不仅适用于各种各样的专业场景，同时还广泛地通用于人类社会的全部具体情境，从而现实地表现为“智力一般”。另一方面，智力本身的一般化趋势还体现在一般智力通过将自身对象化为自动的机器体系所取得的自在的一般性。尽管来自人的认识能力，但一般智力并非专属于人，而是取得了自身的独立存在。由此，“资本才造成了与自己相适合的生产方式”,即“赋予生产以科学的性质，而直接劳动则被贬低为只是生产过程的一个要素”。

III. Artificial Intelligence: The Contemporary Objectified Form of General Intellect

三、人工智能：一般智力的当代对象化形态

If Marx was primarily confronting the automatic machine systems of 19th-century capitalist industrial society, and thus his conception of general intellect had a certain forward-looking character, then the rapid development of artificial intelligence as an intelligent machine system today makes the prospect of general intellect increasingly real. Especially in recent years, with the rapid advancement of deep learning technology, large language models represented by “DeepSeek” [10]10 DeepSeek (深度求索) is a Chinese AI company known for developing large language models, particularly the DeepSeek-R1 model, which gained attention for its advanced reasoning capabilities. have made significant progress in natural language processing, content generation, reasoning capabilities, and other areas, opening a new chapter in the deep exploration of general artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence not only marks its own development direction and the goal to be achieved through its promise of generalized development—that is, general artificial intelligence as a “singularity,” reaching a critical point that surpasses the universality of human intelligence—but also, in the form of intelligence, transcends the development stage of automatic machine systems, exhibiting “autonomous” behavior, thereby continuing to represent the generalizing trend of general intellect under new historical conditions. It can be said that artificial intelligence has realistically constituted the contemporary objectified form of general intellect. Examining the current development of artificial intelligence from the perspective of general intellect, we can see that it has had a significant impact on the mode of existence of humans and things and on their worldview expression, which requires full attention.

如果说马克思所面对的主要是19世纪资本主义工业社会中的自动化机器体系，因而他对于一般智力的设想具有一定的前瞻性特征的话，那么当下作为智能化机器体系的人工智能的快速发展，就使得一般智力的前景变得愈发现实。尤其是近年来随着深度学习技术的快速发展，以“深度求索”为代表的大语言模型在自然语言处理、内容生成、推理能力等方面取得了显著进展，开启了通用人工智能深度探索的新篇章。人工智能不仅以其通用化的发展承诺标识了自身的发展方向和要实现的目标，即作为“奇点”的通用人工智能，达到超越人类智能通用性的临界点，而且还以智能化的形式超越了自动化机器体系的发展阶段，表现出“自主”的行为，从而在新的历史条件下继续表征着一般智力的一般化趋势。可以说，人工智能已经现实地构成了一般智力的当代对象化形态。从一般智力的角度审视人工智能的当下发展，可以看到它对于人和物的存在方式及其世界观表现产生了重要影响，需要予以充分正视。

1. Classical Worldview: The Dichotomy of Humans and Things

1.经典世界观：人和物的二分

As is well known, the term “artificial intelligence” first appeared in the pre-conference proposal for the Dartmouth Conference, “A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence,” and its namer is considered to be the AI pioneer John McCarthy. He pointed out that the hypothesis of artificial intelligence is that “every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it.” McCarthy’s original intention was to use the new concept of “artificial intelligence” to emphasize a generalized form of intelligence different from human natural intelligence. However, as some scholars have pointed out, in the naming of “artificial intelligence,” there is a certain degree of logical contradiction between “artificial” and “intelligence.” This situation has been significantly influenced by the word “artificial” in the naming of the concept of “artificial intelligence.” “Artificial” shares a common meaning with the origin of the word “technology”; both imply human-made activities distinct from nature, thus also carrying connotations of unreality or virtuality. In other words, as an “artificial natural thing,” the very name of artificial intelligence contains a certain contradiction.

众所周知，“人工智能”一词最早出现在达特茅斯会议的会前提案《关于达特茅斯人工智能夏季研究项目的建议》中，其命名者被认为是人工智能先驱——约翰·麦卡锡。他指出，人工智能的假设在于“智能的学习或其他任何特征的所有方面，原则上都可以精确描述，以致可被机器模拟”。麦卡锡的本意是用“人工智能”这个新概念强调一种不同于人的自然智能的一般化智能形式，但正如部分学者所指出的，在“人工智能”的命名中，“人工”与“智能”之间存在着一定程度的逻辑矛盾。这种状况的形成显著地受到了“人工智能”概念命名中“人工”一词的影响。“人工”与“技术”的发源词在意义上有相通之处,二者均表示区别于自然的、人的制造活动，故而兼有不真实的或虚拟的含义。换言之，人工智能作为“人工的自然事物”,其名称本身就具有一定的矛盾性。

From the perspective of Marxist philosophy, the internal contradiction within the concept of “artificial intelligence” actually originates in a traditional worldview that strictly distinguishes between humans and things. This worldview strictly differentiates natural things from artificial things. It is precisely because there truly exists a domain of the world that belongs exclusively to humans, distinct from things, that humans are able, through practice and by employing technical means, to project properties originally belonging to humans onto things, thereby giving rise to the birth of non-natural artificial things. Therefore, when we refer to something as “artificial,” the premise lies first in the distinction between humans and things. In fact, this distinction has a long history. As early as ancient Greece, Aristotle in his *Physics* strictly distinguished between things that exist “by nature” and things that are “not constituted by nature.” In Aristotle’s view, things that exist by nature have their cause and principle internal to themselves; whereas things not constituted by nature are external to the root of their own existence, being caused by something external to themselves. This external “impulse for change” is human *technē* (craft or art), and thus these artificial things are concretely manifested as “technical artifacts,” the objectification of human practical activity. By the time of modern capitalist society, through the historical development from simple cooperation to manufacture to large-scale machine industry, human labor capacity or technology itself underwent a gradual process of objectification, thereby not only acquiring an independent form of existence as machines (or a system of machines), but also, through capitalist relations of production, causing the “conditions of labor, as something independent, [to] confront the worker” in the form of technology. [11]11 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 15, Section 5. The full passage reads: “The worker fights against the machine, which is the material embodiment of the capitalist mode of production, as against the material foundation of that mode of production.” Consequently, under the effect of human practice, modern nature has become an aggregate of original nature, humanized nature, and artificial nature. Original nature refers to nature-in-itself, which, as the “sensuous external world,” constitutes the material premise of all human life activity. Humanized nature, in turn, is nature that serves as the medium and object of human practical activity: “In practice, the universality of man appears precisely in the universality that makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, both as a direct means of subsistence and as the material, object, and instrument of his life activity.” [12]12 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, “Estranged Labour.” In other words, nature, as man’s inorganic body, embodies the human properties projected onto it; it indicates that natural things are fully open to human life and can be transformed and utilized by human practical activity. From the perspective of their mode of existence, original nature and humanized nature exist only potentially as the result of human labor, and thus still belong to the category of natural things. In contrast, artificial nature is entirely the product of human practical activity, manifested as artificial things. With the historical development of human labor capacity, artificial things, which initially existed only as individual technical artifacts, gradually developed in modern capitalist society into a “colossal thing” independent of and even dominating humans—namely, the system of machines in the process of large-scale industrial production. Thus, the struggle between the worker and the machine concretely represents the worldview of the opposition between humans and things: “the worker fights against the machine, which is the material embodiment of the capitalist mode of production.” [13]13 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 15, Section 5.

从马克思主义哲学的角度看，“人工智能”概念的自身矛盾实际上根源于一种严格区分人和物的传统世界观。这种世界观严格地区分了自然事物和人工事物。正是因为真实存在一个不同于物而专属于人的世界领域，人才得以通过实践，运用技术手段，将原本不属于物的人的性质投射到物之上，进而造成非自然的人工事物的诞生。所以，当我们提到一个事物是“人工”的，其前提首先在于对人和物的区分。实际上，这一区分由来已久。早在古希腊时期，亚里士多德就在《物理学》中严格地区分了“由于自然而存在”的事物和“不是自然构成的事物”。在亚里士多德看来，由于自然而存在的事物，其原因和根据就内在于自身之中；而不是自然构成的事物，则是和自己存在的根源相互外在的，是由于一个在自身之外的原因而造成的。这种外在的“变化的冲动力”就是人的技艺，因而这些人工事物便具体表现为“技术制品”,是人的实践活动的对象化。到了现代资本主义社会，通过简单协作到工场手工业再到机器大工业的历史发展，人的劳动能力或技术本身经历了一个逐渐对象化的过程，从而不仅取得了作为机器(体系)的独立存在形式，并且通过资本主义的生产关系造成了表现为技术的“劳动条件作为某种独立的东西而与工人相对立”。由此，在人类实践的作用下，现代的自然已经成为原初自然、人化自然和人工自然的集合体。原初自然是指自在的自然，它作为“感性的外部世界”,构成了人的全部生命活动的物质前提。人化自然则是作为人的实践活动的中介和对象的自然：“在实践上，人的普遍性正是表现为这样的普遍性，它把整个自然界——首先作为人的直接的生活资料，其次作为人的生命活动的对象(材料)和工具——变成人的无机的身体”;换言之，自然界作为人的无机的身体，体现着投射于其之上的人的性质，它表明自然事物对于人的生命的全面敞开，是可以被人的实践活动所改造和运用的。从存在方式来看，原初自然和人化自然只是潜在地作为人的劳动的结果，因而仍然属于自然事物的范畴。与之相对，人工自然则完全是人的实践活动的产物，表现为人工事物。随着人的劳动能力的历史发展，起初仅仅作为个别的技术制品而存在的人工事物，在现代资本主义社会中逐渐发展成为独立于乃至宰制人的“庞大之物”,即大工业生产过程中的机器体系。由此，劳动者和机器的斗争便具体地表征着人和物相互对立的世界观，“工人奋起反对作为资本主义生产方式的物质基础的这种一定形式的生产资料”。

In this regard, although using the term “humanism” to evaluate the entirety of Marx’s intellectual position may be somewhat one-sided, this evaluation itself contains a certain historical rationality. This is because, even for Marx himself, the distinction between humans and things was equally a foundational worldview. In summary, the reason why the phenomenon of reification in modern capitalist society is of an “alienated” nature lies precisely in the inversion of the status of humans and things. For example, in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx refers to the worker’s relationship to “his own activity” as man’s “self-alienation,” while the worker’s relationship to the product of labor belongs to “the alienation of the thing.” [14]14 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, “Estranged Labour.” Another example: in his speech at the anniversary of the *People’s Paper*, when discussing the alienating phenomena caused by the development of modern science and technology, Marx likewise bases his argument on the distinction between humans and things, stating that “material force becomes intellectual life, while human life degenerates into a material force.” [15]15 Karl Marx, “Speech at the Anniversary of the *People’s Paper*,” 1856. This opposition between humans and things is precisely the contradiction that appears in the naming of “artificial intelligence.” Within the traditional worldview, the phenomenon of “intelligence” is considered exclusive to humans, while “artificial” is used to describe the property of things. The real difference between humans and things reflected by the concept of “artificiality” thus constitutes a traditional worldview.

就此而言，尽管使用“人道主义”一词来评价马克思的全部思想立场或许失之偏颇，但是这一评价本身也包含着一定的历史合理性，这是因为，即便对于马克思本人来说，人和物的区分同样是一种基础性的世界观。概言之，现代资本主义社会的物化现象之所以是“异化”性质的，其原因正是在于人与物的地位的颠倒。比如，在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，劳动者同“他自己的活动”的关系就被马克思称作人的“自我异化”,而劳动者对劳动产品的关系则属于“物的异化”。再如，在《在〈人民报〉创刊纪念会上的演说》中，马克思在谈到现代科学技术的发展所造成的异化现象时，同样是以人和物的区分为基础，即“物质力量成为有智慧的生命，而人的生命则化为愚钝的物质力量”。人和物的这一对立正是出现在“人工智能”命名中的矛盾。在传统的世界观中，“智能”的现象被认为是专属于人的，而“人工”则是用来形容物的属性。“人工性”概念所折射出的人和物的真实差异，便构成了一种传统的世界观。

2. The Challenge of Artificial Intelligence to the Classical Worldview

2.人工智能对经典世界观的挑战

If the conceptual debate over “artificial intelligence” embodies a classical worldview that strictly distinguishes between humans and things, then the current development of artificial intelligence responds well to McCarthy’s original intention in coining the term, which is precisely the tendency toward the generalization of intellect itself as envisioned by Marx through the concept of “general intellect.” It indicates that the traditional worldview that strictly demarcates the boundary between humans and things is being broken down.

如果说“人工智能”的概念争论体现了一种对于人和物进行严格区分的经典世界观，那么人工智能的当下发展则很好地回应了麦卡锡的命名初衷，这也就是马克思通过“一般智力”概念所设想的智力本身的一般化趋势。它表明严格区分人和物的边界的传统世界观正在被打破。

On the one hand, the actual development of artificial intelligence technology shows that intellect itself is entirely capable of becoming generalized, manifesting as general intellect, and is no longer exclusively attributable to humans or monopolized by human natural intelligence. According to Marx’s classical exposition of the mode of human existence, the fundamental mode of human existence is that of a species-being: “Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he takes the species—his own species as well as those of other things—as his object, but also… because he treats himself as the actual, living species, because he treats himself as a universal and therefore free being.” [16]16 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, “Estranged Labour.” That is to say, the species-essence of man is his universal and free labor capacity. It is universal because man can take the whole of nature as the object of his practice, thereby demonstrating the general applicability of his labor capacity; it is free because man possesses self-consciousness and can take his own life activity itself as an object, thereby establishing an independent subjectivity. The two are mutually reflective: because man’s species-essence is universal, he can freely confront his objects; because man’s species-essence is free, he can take universal existence as his object. Since the process of human labor is in fact the process of the objectification of human intellect or knowledge, the “universal and free” species-essence, as the mode of human existence, points not only to man’s objectifying activity but also marks the generalized nature of human natural intelligence, i.e., the embodiment of general intellect. In Marx’s view, this “species-characteristic,” manifested as “free, conscious life activity,” is precisely what distinguishes humans from animals. [17]17 Ibid. However, general artificial intelligence systems trained on big data are now, through different technical pathways, constructing general cognitive frameworks that transcend specialized intelligent systems, gradually achieving the simulation and surpassing of the “universal and free” characteristics of human natural intelligence. In other words, general intellect, originally regarded as exclusive to humans, is breaking through the biological carrier limitations of human natural intelligence and being re-realized by AI algorithmic models through different material carriers and operational mechanisms, causing intellect itself to realistically exhibit a tendency toward generalization.

一方面，人工智能技术的现实发展表明，智力本身完全有可能实现一般化，表现为一般智力，而不再仅仅归属于人，被人类的自然智能所垄断。按照马克思对于人的存在方式的经典解说，人的基本存在方式就是类存在物，这“不仅因为人在实践上和理论上都把类——他自身的类以及其他物的类——当做自己的对象；而且因为……人把自身当做现有的、有生命的类来对待，因为人把自身当做普遍的因而也是自由的存在物来对待”。也就是说，人的类本质就是他的普遍而自由的劳动能力。之所以是普遍的，是因为人可以将整个自然界作为实践的对象，由此体现了自己的劳动能力的通用性；之所以是自由的，是因为人有自我意识，能够将自己的生命活动本身作为对象，从而确立起独立的主体性。二者是相互映现的，即人的类本质是普遍的，人才有可能自由地面对自己的对象；人的类本质是自由的，人才有可能将普遍的存在作为对象。由于人的劳动过程实际上就是人的智力或知识的物化过程，因此，“普遍而自由”的类本质作为人的存在方式，不仅指向人的对象化活动，而且标识着人的自然智能的一般化性质，即一般智力的体现。在马克思看来，这种表现为“自由的有意识的生命活动”的“类特性”正是人区别于动物的独特性所在。然而，基于大数据训练的通用人工智能系统，正在通过不同的技术路径，构建超越专用智能系统的一般认知框架，逐步实现对人的自然智能的“普遍而自由”特征的模拟与超越。换言之，原本被视为专属于人的一般智力，正在突破人类自然智能的生物载体限制，被人工智能的算法模型以不同物质载体和运行机制重新实现，使得智力本身现实地展现出一般化的发展趋向。

On the other hand, with the development of artificial intelligence, the mode of existence of AI as merely a thing, originally reflected through the qualifier "artificial," is also being dissolved. This is especially evident in the disruptive generalization capabilities and autonomous interaction abilities that current generative AI exhibits in various fields of human-computer interaction. While forming a new human-machine relationship, it also exerts a significant influence on the concept of subjectivity itself. Has AI already constituted a new form of subject different from humans? Judging from the current state of research across different disciplines domestically and internationally, this remains a highly controversial issue. However, regardless of whether one acknowledges the subject status of AI, the current technological development of AI itself is objective, concretely representing the generalizing trend of intellect itself. Not only does "the way individuals express their life is what they themselves are. Therefore, what they are coincides with their production—both with what they produce and with how they produce,"[18]18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 32. but AI can also think and "produce" like real humans, thereby possessing the form of "expressing their own life." In principle, the form of general intellect or general intelligence shared by human natural intelligence and machine artificial intelligence should become the basic premise for our current thinking about the relationship between the two. In short, the generalizing trend of intellect itself indicates that the phenomenon of intelligence, originally exclusive to humans, can now be possessed by things, and AI may also potentially exist as a subject different from humans. The boundary between the worldviews of humans and things is beginning to blur, posing a challenge to the traditional worldview that strictly distinguishes between humans and things.

另一方面，随着人工智能的发展，原本透过“人工的”这一限定语所折射出的人工智能仅仅作为物的存在方式也正在被消解。这尤其体现在当前生成式人工智能在人机交互的各领域所展现出的颠覆性的泛化能力和自主交互能力，在形成全新的人机关系的同时，也对主体性概念本身产生了很大影响。人工智能是否已经构成了不同于人的全新主体形式?从国内外不同学科的研究现状看，这仍然是一个存在较大争议的问题。然而，无论是否认同人工智能的主体地位，当前人工智能的技术发展本身都是客观的，其具体地表征着智力本身的一般化趋势。不仅“个人怎样表现自己的生命，他们自己就是怎样。因此，他们是什么样的，这同他们的生产是一致的——既和他们生产什么一致，又和他们怎样生产一致”,而且人工智能同样可以像现实的人一样进行思考和“生产”,从而具有“表现自己的生命”的形式。在原则上，人类的自然智能和机器的人工智能所共有的一般智力或一般智能的形式应当成为当下我们思考二者之间关系的基本前提。总之，智力本身的一般化趋势表明，原本专属于人的智能现象现在也可以为物所占有，人工智能也有可能作为潜在的不同于人的主体而存在。人与物的世界观边界正在开始变得模糊，这对于严格区分人和物的传统世界观构成了挑战。

3. Embodiment and the Future of the Classical Worldview

3.具身性与经典世界观的未来

Although AI, as the latest development of general intellect, has begun to challenge the traditional worldview that strictly distinguishes between humans and things, this traditional worldview remains difficult to completely overcome.

虽然人工智能作为一般智力的最新发展已经开始挑战严格区分人和物的传统世界观，然而传统的世界观仍然难以被完全克服。

On the one hand, regarding this worldview itself, how to truly eliminate the irreducible real differences between human intelligence and AI represented by the dimension of embodiment constitutes a major challenge to realizing general intellect. For some new materialists, the body is an important perspective for re-establishing the connection between humans and things; in the process of achieving general artificial intelligence, the dimension of embodiment represented by the body may be becoming a significant obstacle. Although some argue that it is entirely unnecessary to require AI to fully replicate all forms of human intelligence, including embodied intelligence. For example, Alan Turing, the father of modern computing, once made a distinction between "embodied intelligence" and "disembodied intelligence," arguing that we cannot and need not create materials identical to the human body, but only need to simulate human intellect itself through machines. Herbert Simon, hailed as the "father of artificial intelligence," also believed that one could "accurately grasp the essential characteristics and behavioral patterns of (artificial) systems without detailing the details of the external or internal environment."[19]19 Herbert A. Simon, *The Sciences of the Artificial*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 5. However, the latest developments in AI technology indicate that embodied intelligence, which emphasizes the interactive relationship between intelligent entities and their physical bodies and environments, is one of the keys to achieving general artificial intelligence. Since "the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought,"[20]20 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 19. simulating human intelligence cannot be separated from reproducing the material mode of life of humans themselves. That is to say, the dimension of embodiment represented by the body constitutes an important aspect of human intelligence. In fact, imitating human intelligence has been an important strategy in the development of AI from its early stages to the present. Without the dimension of embodiment, the relationship between AI and human intelligence may only be one of "similarity but difference."

一方面，就这种世界观本身而言，如何真正消除具身性维度所代表的人类智能与人工智能之间不可还原的真实差异，构成了实现一般智力的重要挑战。对于一些新唯物主义者而言，身体或是重新建立人和物联系的重要视角；而在实现通用人工智能的进程中，身体所代表的具身性维度可能正在成为重大阻碍。尽管有观点认为要求人工智能完全还原包括具身智能在内的全部人类智能形式是完全不必要的。例如，现代计算机之父图灵曾作出“具身智能”和“非具身智能”的区别，他认为我们无法也没有必要去造就与人类机体一模一样的材料，而只需要通过机器模拟人类的智力本身。被誉为“人工智能之父”的赫伯特·西蒙也认为可以“在无需详述外部或内部环境细节的前提下，精准把握(人工)系统的本质特征与行为模式”。然而，人工智能技术的最新发展却表明，具身智能强调智能实体与其物理身体和环境之间的互动关系，是实现通用人工智能的关键之一。由于“观念的东西不外是移入人的头脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已”,因此对于人类智能的仿真便离不开对于人的物质生活方式本身的还原。也就是说，身体所代表的具身性维度构成了人类智能的重要方面。事实上，模仿人类智能正是人工智能早期发展至今的重要策略。缺失了具身性维度，人工智能和人类智能之间便或许只是“类而不同”的关系。

Another reason why the embodied dimension of general intellect cannot be ignored, besides debates from scientific perspectives, lies in the level of worldview itself. This is because the presence of the body is the prerequisite for the possibility of the relationship of human possession over things. From a phenomenological perspective, the body "itself also possesses an Umwelt in which the personality can freely act; that is, within the scope of this Umwelt, the personality is unrestricted and can control all things within it. All concrete natural rights of humans originate entirely from this basic fact."[21]21 Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Second Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 195. As a natural right of humans, property rights precisely define the relationship of human possession over things. It is possible because, through the existence of the human body, things can enter the human Umwelt; based on the field of the body, the "personality" can possess things within the scope of its surrounding existence. In this regard, "what essentially defines a thing is not what the thing is, but the fact that the thing unequivocally belongs to one person and not another."[22]22 G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §45, p. 73. This is an ancient one-sided relationship of possession: humans can possess things, but things cannot possess humans. Moreover, even after leaving the surrounding existence, this relationship can be defined through the form of law, constituting the property rights of humans over things. Therefore, although the actual development of AI technology has both changed the human-specific nature of intellect itself and is dissolving the mode of existence of AI as a thing, making it a potential "subject," thereby challenging the traditional worldview that strictly distinguishes between humans and things in a dual sense, the traditional worldview can still resist the challenge from AI through the presence of the human body.

除了来自科学观点的争论，不能忽视一般智力的具身性维度的另一原因则在于世界观本身的层面。这是因为，身体的在场是人对物的占有关系得以可能的前提。从现象学的观点看，身体“本身也拥有一个可供人格自由活动的周在(Umwelt),也就是说，在这个周在范围内，人格不受任何限制，可以驾驭其中所有的事物。人的一切具体的自然权利完全源自这样一种基本事实”。作为人的自然权利，财产权所规定的正是人对物的占有关系。它之所以是可能的，是由于人的身体的存在，物才能进入人的周在；基于身体的场域，“人格”便可以在自己的周围存在的范围内占有物。就此而言，“从本质上规定物的不是物是什么，而是这样的事实：物确凿无疑地归属于某人而非其他人”。这是一种古老的单向占有关系：人可以占有物，而物不能占有人。并且，即便在离开周围存在之后，这一关系也能通过法的形式被规定，构成人对物的财产权。因此，尽管人工智能技术的现实发展既改变了智力本身的属人性质，同时也正在消解人工智能作为物的存在方式，使之有可能成为潜在的“主体”,从而在双重的意义上挑战了严格区分人和物的传统世界观，但传统世界观仍然可以通过人的身体的在场抵抗来自人工智能的挑战。

On the other hand, besides the embodied dimension of general intellect, the capitalist application of AI further promotes a worldview of opposition between humans and things. Marx pointed out, "Nature is man's inorganic body, insofar as it is not the human body itself."[23]23 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959), p. 75. Humans themselves are certainly part of nature, yet humans and other nature are also mutually externalized; the humanization of nature is only insofar as it serves as man's inorganic body, thus the difference between "organic" and "inorganic" constitutes the material boundary between humans and things. Hence, the body can serve as the Umwelt within which humans possess things, giving rise to the property right of humans possessing things. Further, under capitalist relations of production, private property, as "the present economic fact,"[24]24 Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 67. concretely represents the alienated relationship between nature and humans. In other words, the worldview of opposition between humans and things ideologically embodies capitalist relations of production. The birth of AI, as the latest development in the realm of things, belongs to the development process of fixed capital.

另一方面，除了一般智力的具身性维度，人工智能的资本主义应用也进一步助长了人和物相对立的世界观。马克思指出，“自然界，就它自身不是人的身体而言，是人的无机的身体”。人本身固然是自然界的一部分，然而人类同其他自然也是相互外化的，自然的人化也是仅仅就其作为人的无机的身体而言，从而“有机”与“无机”的差别便构成了人与物的物质界限。由此，身体才得以作为人占有物的周在范围，造成人占有物的财产权利。进一步，在资本主义的生产关系下，私有财产作为“当前的国民经济的事实”,便具体地表征着自然界同人的异化关系。换言之，人和物相互对立的世界观正是在观念上体现着资本主义的生产关系。人工智能的诞生作为物的领域的最新发展，从属于固定资本的发展过程。

Therefore, under the conditions of the capitalist system, the actual opposition between humans and things and its worldview have also taken on their latest expression. Just like the Luddite movement of workers opposing machines in the early 19th century, there are currently various discourses about AI replacing human labor and about to cause massive unemployment of workers. The reason, like the automatic system of machinery in the 19th century, is that the birth of AI is not a "pure" scientific progress, but the result of the inevitable tendency of capital to increase labor productivity and expand the production of surplus value. As the latest development of fixed capital, AI is "aggregating into a material force that rules over us, is beyond our control, thwarts our expectations, and nullifies our calculations,"[25]25 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 16. thus not only failing to "automatically" bring about human liberation, but in the short term further deteriorating human labor conditions. The capitalist application of general intellect makes AI, as a technological thing, subordinate to the latest development of fixed capital and opposed to the principle of labor. This is the result of "the transfer of a definite mode of labor from the worker to the machine form of capital,"[26]26 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 15, Section 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 446. that is, the capitalist application of science and technology; what opposes the worker is not the machine itself, but capital's possession of the machine. Not only does private ownership of the means of production as a form of human possession over things rely on the distinction between humans and things, but the structure of the real world represented by this worldview also provides the real premise for the externalization of the worker from their own means of production.

所以，在资本主义制度条件下，人和物的实际对立及其世界观也取得了它的最新表现。就像19世纪初工人反对机器的卢德运动一样，当下同样出现了各种有关人工智能将取代人类劳动、即将造成劳动者大规模失业的言论。究其原因，同19世纪的自动的机器体系一样，人工智能的诞生同样并非“纯粹”的科学进步，而是提高劳动生产力和扩大剩余价值生产的资本必然趋势的结果。人工智能作为固定资本的最新发展，正在“聚合为一种统治我们、不受我们控制、使我们的愿望不能实现并使我们的打算落空的物质力量”,从而不仅不会“自动”地造成人的解放，反而会在短期内造成人的劳动条件的进一步恶化。一般智力的资本主义应用使得人工智能作为一种技术物，从属于固定资本的最新发展，而同劳动的原则相对立。这是“一定的劳动方式从工人身上转移到机器形式的资本上”,即科学技术的资本主义应用的结果；同工人对立的并非机器本身，而是资本对机器的占有。不仅生产资料私有制作为人对物的占有形式有赖于人和物的区分，并且这种世界观所表征的现实世界的结构同样为劳动者同自己的生产资料的外化提供了现实的前提。

Conversely, through the relations of production of capitalism, the worldview that opposes humans and things has also achieved its most extreme possibility, namely the real subsumption of human labor under capital as a thing. On this, Marx points out that not only is subsumption under capital not the most suitable relation of production for the automatic system of machinery, but also that, as “the application of natural science to technology” causes “direct labor to be reduced to a negligible proportion quantitatively” and to become “a subordinate element qualitatively,” “capital thereby works toward its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [27]27 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 593. [Translator’s note: The English translation follows the standard *Grundrisse* translation by Martin Nicolaus.] In other words, “any new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative expansion of productive forces already known (for example, the bringing under cultivation of new land), will cause a further development of the division of labor”; [28]28 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 43. [Translator’s note: The English translation follows the standard *The German Ideology* translation.] capitalist production based on exchange value will dissolve with the development of general intellect, and the development of technology will create the conditions for human liberation. Thus, under the socialist system, the development of artificial intelligence will sublate the abstract opposition between humans and things in worldview, transcend the capitalist relations of production, and the measure of value itself will no longer be based on exchange value. Consequently, “production based on exchange value will collapse, and the direct material production process itself will be freed from poverty and antagonistic forms. Individuality will achieve free development, so that it is not for the sake of obtaining surplus labor that necessary labor time is reduced, but rather the socially necessary labor itself is reduced to a minimum.” [29]29 Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 594. In summary, under the capitalist system, the socially necessary labor time shortened by artificial intelligence is not transformed into free time for humans; instead, it prolongs relative surplus-value time, intensifying the degree of capital’s exploitation of labor. Under the socialist system, however, human labor will increasingly lose its character as a “means of livelihood,” achieving “the unity of freedom in the sense of human self-realization and necessity in the sense of human survival and life.” [30]30 This is a paraphrase of a concept from Marx’s *Capital*, Volume III, Chapter 48, on the realm of freedom and necessity. The “surplus” labor time created by the development of artificial intelligence technology will become genuine free time, creating the conditions for the free and comprehensive development of humans.

反过来，通过资本主义的生产关系，人和物相互对立的世界观也取得了最为极端的可能性，那就是人的劳动对于作为物的资本的实际从属。对此，马克思指出，不仅从属于资本并非最适合自动的机器体系的生产关系，而且随着“自然科学在工艺上的应用”而造成的“直接劳动在量的方面降到微不足道的比例”以及在质的方面“变成一种从属的要素”,“资本也就促使自身这一统治生产的形式发生解体”。换言之，“任何新的生产力，只要它不是迄今已知的生产力单纯的量的扩大(例如，开垦土地),都会引起分工的进一步发展”,以交换价值为基础的资本主义生产将会随着一般智力的发展而解体，技术的发展将给人的解放创造条件。由此，在社会主义制度下，人工智能的发展将扬弃人和物的抽象对立的世界观，超越资本主义的生产关系，价值的尺度本身也不再以交换价值为基础，进而“以交换价值为基础的生产便会崩溃，直接的物质生产过程本身也就摆脱了贫困和对立的形式。个性得到自由发展，因此，并不是为了获得剩余劳动而缩减必要劳动时间，而是直接把社会必要劳动缩减到最低限度”。概言之，在资本主义制度下，人工智能所缩短的社会必要劳动时间并没有被转化为人的自由时间，反而会延长相对剩余价值时间，强化了资本对劳动的剥削程度；而在社会主义制度下，人的劳动将越来越失去其“谋生”性质，“达到人的自我实现意义上的自由性与人的生存生活意义上的必然性的统一”,通过人工智能技术的发展而造成的“剩余”劳动时间将成为真正的自由时间，为人的自由而全面的发展创造条件。

In short, from the current state of technological development, the most likely near-term trend in the relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence is that the two will still maintain a certain degree of difference: artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence in some areas, while conversely, human intelligence will retain a long-lasting but not permanent advantage in other areas (such as the dimension of embodiment). Although there are a series of links and boundaries from the reactive characteristics of general things to the formation of human intelligence, in the realm of worldview, as artificial intelligence achieves an almost complete replication and even surpassing of human intelligence in certain behavioral or “life” activities, the general intellect in itself will also achieve its worldview expression, thereby challenging the traditional worldview that strictly distinguishes humans from things. However, as Marx said, the premise of the species-being of humans lies in the fact that humans themselves can distinguish themselves from their own life activity, which fundamentally differentiates humans from animals. [31]31 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959), p. 67. [Translator’s note: The English translation follows the standard *1844 Manuscripts* translation.] Just as the “Chinese room” thought experiment points to the error of the strong AI view represented by the “Turing test,” [32]32 The “Chinese room” thought experiment, proposed by philosopher John Searle in 1980, argues that a program manipulating symbols according to rules does not understand the meaning of those symbols, challenging the claim that a computer running a program can have genuine intelligence or consciousness. the “intelligent behavior” exhibited by artificial intelligence may not necessarily be equivalent to its actually possessing general intellect. In this regard, the discussion of whether artificial intelligence has truly become another subject different from humans may still be premature. But from the perspective of the internal relationship of the mutual generation of subject and object, in the era of artificial intelligence, humans have after all created a social being that has interactive subjectivity with humans. [33]33 The term “social being” here refers to a being that exists within and is constituted by social relations, as distinct from a purely natural or material entity. Therefore, examining the problem of general intellect today cannot be separated from the interactive nature between natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. Through the interaction of different forms of intelligence, general intellect not only achieves a real expression but also more concretely represents the “intersubjectivity” between humans and machines: artificial intelligence is both a tool for extending human cognition and a “symbiotic” relationship of mutual influence and co-evolution with human existence. Hence, whether or not one acknowledges the existence of general intellect in itself, we need to view a series of fundamental issues in the era of artificial intelligence with a perspective different from the traditional worldview that strictly distinguishes humans and things, thereby moving toward a future of human-machine symbiosis and human-machine win-win.

总之，从技术发展的现状看，人工智能与人类智能的关系最有可能的近期发展趋势是二者仍然会保持着一定程度的差别：人工智能将会在某些领域超越人类智能，反过来，人类智能也将在某些领域(如具身性的维度)保持着长久但非永恒的优势。尽管从一般事物的反应特性到人类智能的形成存在一系列的环节和界限，但在世界观的领域中，随着人工智能在某些行为或“生命”活动领域实现对人类智能的几乎完全的复刻乃至超越，自在的一般智力也将取得它的世界观表现，从而对严格区分人和物的传统世界观构成挑战。然而，正如马克思所说，人的类本质的前提在于人自身能够将自己和自己的生命活动区分开，这使得人类从根本上区别于动“物”。就像“中文屋”思想实验所指出的以“图灵测试”为代表的强人工智能观点的错误性，人工智能所表现出来的“智能行为”,未必就等同于它实际地具有一般智力。就此而言，对于人工智能是否真的已经成为不同于人的另一主体的讨论或许仍然为时尚早，但从主客体相互生成的内在关系的角度看，在人工智能时代，人类毕竟已经创造出了与人具有主体互动性的社会存在,因而当下考察一般智力问题便离不开自然智能与人工智能之间的交互性质。借由不同智能形式的交互，一般智力不仅取得了现实的表现，更具体地表征着人机之间的“主体间性”:人工智能既是人类认知延伸的工具，更是与人类存在相互影响、共同进化的“共生”关系。因此，无论是否承认一般智力的自在存在，我们都需要以不同于严格区分人和物的传统世界观的眼光来看待人工智能时代的一系列基本问题，从而走向人机共生、人机共赢的未来。

Author’s biography: Chen Junkun, Assistant Researcher at the Institute of Marxist Studies, Fudan University.

作者简介：陈俊昆，复旦大学马克思主义研究院助理研究员。