The War of Resistance Against Japan and the Theoretical Foundation of the First Historic Leap in Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context
田克勤:抗日战争与马克思主义中国化第一次历史性飞跃的理论奠基
From the September 18th Incident in 1931 to Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945, the 14-year War of Resistance Against Japan was an important component of the New Democratic Revolution led by the Communist Party of China, and during this period China became the main Eastern battlefield of the World Anti-Fascist War. At the historical juncture of commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War, a profound analysis of the objective demands the War of Resistance placed on the Party’s advancement of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, an in-depth study of the Party’s understanding and practice regarding the three fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution—the united front, armed struggle, and Party building—under the conditions of the War of Resistance, as well as the Party’s elevation of its understanding of the New Democratic Revolution, and a systematic exposition of the internal relationship of mutual achievement between the War of Resistance and adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, all hold extremely important theoretical and practical value for comprehensively grasping the significant position of the War of Resistance in the CPC’s process of advancing the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context, scientifically understanding the laws of development of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, deeply elucidating the great significance of the victory in the War of Resistance, inheriting and promoting the great spirit of the War of Resistance, and comprehensively advancing the building of a strong country and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization.
自1931年九一八事变至1945年日本宣告无条件投降,长达14年的抗日战争是中国共产党领导的新民主主义革命的一个重要组成部分,该时期的中国成为世界反法西斯战争的东方主战场。在纪念中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年的历史节点上,深刻分析抗日战争对党推进马克思主义中国化提出的客观要求,深入研究抗日战争条件下党在统一战线、武装斗争、党的建设这三个中国革命基本问题上的认识与实践以及党对新民主主义革命认识的升华,系统阐述抗日战争与马克思主义中国化相互成就的内在关联,对于全面把握抗日战争在中国共产党推进马克思主义中国化发展进程中的重要地位,科学理解马克思主义中国化的发展规律,深入阐释抗日战争胜利的伟大意义,传承和弘扬伟大抗战精神,以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业具有极为重要的理论和现实价值。
I. The War of Resistance Against Japan and the CPC’s Theory of the United Front
一、抗日战争与中国共产党的统一战线理论
General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan was a great war of arduous struggle waged “under the banner of the Anti-Japanese National United Front initiated and established by the Communist Party of China.” Faced with the aggressive acts of Japanese imperialism aiming to turn China into its colony, what policies and strategies the Chinese people should adopt to resist became a question that urgently needed to be answered by all forces in Chinese society at the time. Based on the profound changes occurring among various domestic classes in the process of the deepening national crisis from the September 18th Incident to the North China Incident and then to the Xi’an Incident, the Communist Party of China was the first to raise the banner of resisting Japanese imperialist aggression, formally proposed and actively promoted the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front based on the second round of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC, thereby providing the political prerequisite for advancing the War of Resistance. At the same time, the CPC integrated the basic principles of Marxism on the united front with the concrete realities of the War of Resistance, forming a complete set of policies and strategies to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which laid an important foundation for the smooth advancement of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.
习近平总书记指出,中国人民抗日战争是“在中国共产党倡导建立的抗日民族统一战线旗帜下”进行的艰苦卓绝的伟大战争。面对日本帝国主义要变中国为其殖民地的侵略行径,中国人民应当采取什么样的政策策略进行抵抗,成为当时中国社会各方面力量亟须回答的问题。基于从九一八事变到华北事变再到西安事变国内各阶级在民族危机日益加深的进程中发生的深刻变化,中国共产党率先举起抗击日本帝国主义侵略的旗帜,正式提出并积极推动建立了以国共第二次合作为基础的抗日民族统一战线,为推进抗日战争提供了政治前提。与此同时,中国共产党把马克思主义关于统一战线的基本原理同抗日战争具体实际结合起来,形成了一整套巩固、扩大抗日民族统一战线的政策策略,为马克思主义中国化的顺利推进奠定了重要基础。
1. The Rise of the Sino-Japanese National Contradiction Raised New Demands for a United National Resistance
1.中日民族矛盾上升提出了全民族联合抗日的新要求
After the September 18th Incident, and especially after the North China Incident, as “Japanese imperialism sought to change the whole of China from a semi-colonial state shared by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan alone,” the Sino-Japanese national contradiction surpassed the domestic class contradiction and gradually rose to become the principal contradiction, and all classes and political forces within the country underwent new changes. The broad masses of the people, including workers and peasants, unanimously demanded resistance to Japan, giving rise to a nationwide upsurge in the movement to resist Japan and save the nation, represented by the December 9th Movement; the national bourgeoisie changed its political attitude, shifting from siding with the counter-revolution to proposing resistance to Japan and demanding democracy; and divisions began to appear within the Kuomintang, with the emergence of anti-Japanese figures such as Ma Zhanshan, Cai Tingkai, and Feng Yuxiang. The emergence of these circumstances made it possible for the CPC to exploit contradictions within the counter-revolutionary camp. Mao Zedong pointed out: “To sum up the issue of class relations, it is this: on the basis of the fundamental change that Japanese imperialism has invaded China proper, the interrelations among China’s various classes have changed, the forces of the national revolutionary camp have expanded, and the forces of the national counter-revolutionary camp have weakened.” This required the Party to adjust the united front policies and strategies that had been in place since the Agrarian Revolutionary War and to establish a new united front suited to the development of the situation in the War of Resistance.
九一八事变特别是华北事变以后,伴随“日本帝国主义要把整个中国从几个帝国主义国家都有份的半殖民地状态改变为日本独占的殖民地状态”,中日民族矛盾超越了国内阶级矛盾而逐步上升为主要矛盾,国内一切阶级和政治力量都发生了新的变化。包括工人、农民在内的广大人民群众一致要求抗日,出现了以“一二·九”运动为代表的全国性抗日救亡高潮;民族资产阶级改变政治态度,发生了从附和反革命到提出抗日、要求民主的转向;国民党内部开始发生分化,涌现出马占山、蔡廷锴、冯玉祥等抗日人物。这些情况的出现,使中国共产党有了利用反革命阵营内部矛盾的可能。毛泽东指出:“把这个阶级关系问题总起来说,就是:在日本帝国主义打进中国本部来了这一个基本的变化上面,变化了中国各阶级之间的相互关系,扩大了民族革命营垒的势力,减弱了民族反革命营垒的势力。”这就要求党必须调整土地革命战争以来的统一战线政策策略,建立与抗日战争形势发展相适应的新的统一战线。
As early as shortly after the September 18th Incident, the Communist Party of China raised the anti-Japanese banner, issued numerous declarations and resolutions, denounced the aggressive crimes of Japanese imperialism, exposed the non-resistance policy of the Kuomintang reactionaries, proposed “to drive Japanese imperialism out of China through a national revolutionary war,” and called on the people of the whole country to rise up in armed opposition to Japanese imperialism. In January 1933, when the Japanese aggressors encroached on Chahar and the passes of the Great Wall, the Party, in the name of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, issued a declaration expressing its willingness to unite with any armed forces to resist Japan under three conditions: “(1) immediately cease attacks on the Soviet areas; (2) immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the people (freedom of assembly, association, speech, strike, publication, etc.); (3) immediately arm the people and establish armed volunteer corps to defend China and strive for China’s independence, unification, and territorial integrity.” However, from the reality at the time, the Chiang Kai-shek clique stubbornly adhered to its position of “suppressing the communists,” and coupled with the deep influence of “Left” dogmatism on the Central Committee of the CPC, the conditions for realizing the Anti-Japanese National United Front were not yet present. Nevertheless, the Party Central Committee sent Party cadres such as Zhou Baozhong and Zhao Yiman to the Northeast to strengthen Party organizational forces, established united fronts with multiple volunteer corps and actively carried out work to unite and educate them, gradually transforming the independent and scattered anti-Japanese armed forces into the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army under the Party’s direct leadership, which became the main anti-Japanese armed force in the Northeast. The resistance of the Chinese people amidst the white mountains and black waters became the starting point of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan and also lifted the curtain on the World Anti-Fascist War.
早在九一八事变后不久,中国共产党就举起抗日旗帜,发表多次宣言和决议,声讨日本帝国主义的侵略罪行,揭露国民党反动派的不抵抗政策,提出“以民族革命战争驱逐日本帝国主义出中国”,号召全国人民起来武装反对日本帝国主义。1933年1月,党在日本侵略者向察哈尔和长城各口进犯时,又以中华苏维埃临时中央政府和中国工农红军革命军事委员会的名义发表宣言,提出愿意在“(一)立即停止进攻苏维埃区域,(二)立即保证民众的民主权利(集会、结社、言论、罢工、出版之自由等),(三)立即武装民众创立武装的义勇军,以保卫中国及争取中国的独立统一与领土的完整”等三个条件下同任何武装部队联合抗日。但从当时的现实来看,蒋介石集团顽固地坚持“剿共”立场,加上中共中央深受“左”倾教条主义影响,抗日民族统一战线尚不具备实现的条件。尽管如此,党中央派遣周保中、赵一曼等党员干部到东北,加强党组织力量,同多支义勇军建立统一战线并积极开展团结教育工作,逐步将独立、分散的抗日武装改造为党直接领导下的东北抗日联军,成为东北主要抗日武装力量。中国人民在白山黑水间的抵抗,成为中国人民抗日战争的起点,同时揭开了世界反法西斯战争的序幕。
2. The Establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front Based on the Second KMT-CPC Cooperation
2.以第二次国共合作为基础的抗日民族统一战线的建立
In January 1935, the Party Central Committee convened the Zunyi Conference during the Long March, which centrally resolved the then-decisive issues of military affairs and organization, opening a new stage in which the Party independently solved the practical problems of the Chinese revolution. During the conference, Mao Zedong, in a speech at a mass meeting of the entire county of Zunyi, pointed out that “the Communist Party is willing to unite with all sectors of the people and all armies within the country to resist Japan together,” and after the joining of forces of the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army, the policy of “marching north to resist Japan” was put forward. After the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, at the Wayaobu Conference, focused on analyzing the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie and the possibility of exploiting contradictions within the landlord-comprador camp, criticized the “Left” closed-doorism that had long existed within the Party, which regarded the intermediate forces as the most dangerous enemy, and emphasized that “all this indicates that the revolutionary situation is changing from partial to national, from a state of imbalance gradually to a certain state of balance,” and that “the Party’s task is to merge the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie throughout the country into a unified national revolutionary front,” thereby formally establishing the CPC’s strategy of building an Anti-Japanese National United Front, laying an important foundation for promoting the second round of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC and formally establishing the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
1935年1月,党中央在长征途中召开遵义会议,集中解决了当时具有决定性意义的军事和组织的问题,开启了党独立自主解决中国革命实际问题的新阶段。会议期间,毛泽东在遵义全县民众大会上的讲话中指出,“共产党愿意联合国内各界人民、各方军队一致抗日”,而在红一、四方面军会师后即提出了“北上抗日”的方针。中央红军到达陕北以后,党中央和毛泽东在瓦窑堡会议上着重分析了民族资产阶级的两面性和利用地主买办营垒内部矛盾的可能性,批判了党内长期存在的把中间势力看作最危险的敌人的“左”倾关门主义,强调“所有这些都指明,革命的阵势,是由局部性转变到全国性,由不平衡状态逐渐地转变到某种平衡状态”,“党的任务就是把红军的活动和全国的工人、农民、学生、小资产阶级、民族资产阶级的一切活动汇合起来,成为一个统一的民族革命战线”,进而正式确立了中国共产党建立抗日民族统一战线的策略,为促成国共两党第二次合作,正式建立抗日民族统一战线奠定了重要基础。
In contrast to the CPC’s active adaptation to the already arrived new upsurge in the movement to resist Japan and save the nation, the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek clique, representing the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, ignored Japan’s deepening aggression, still relied on the power of the state, pursued the erroneous policy of “first internal pacification, then external resistance,” not only repeatedly compromised and made concessions to Japanese aggression but also intensified its “encirclement and suppression” campaigns against the main forces of the Red Army; not only did it make slow progress in preparing for resistance, but it also persisted in suppressing anti-Japanese democratic movements everywhere. The Xi’an Incident demonstrated that the reactionary and state-harming policies pursued by Chiang Kai-shek were opposed not only by the CPC and the vast majority of the people but also by patriotic forces within the Kuomintang itself. The peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident “became the pivot of the turn of the situation,” greatly accelerating the process of the second KMT-CPC cooperation.
与中国共产党积极顺应已经到来的抗日救亡新高潮相反,代表大地主大资产阶级利益的国民党蒋介石集团却置日本不断深入侵略于不顾,仍然凭借国家政权力量,奉行“攘外必先安内”的错误方针,不但对日本的侵略一再妥协退让,还加紧对红军主力部队的“围剿”;不但在抗日准备上进展缓慢,还坚持镇压各地抗日民主运动。西安事变说明,蒋介石推行的反动误国政策,既为中国共产党及大多数人民所反对,也为国民党内部爱国力量所反对。西安事变的和平解决“成了时局转换的枢纽”,大大加快了第二次国共合作的进程。
In order to promote a shift in the policy of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in February 1937, putting forward demands that the Kuomintang realize “the cessation of all civil war, the concentration of national strength for united resistance against foreign aggression,” “the convening of a representative conference of all parties, groups, circles, and armies to concentrate the nation’s talent for the common salvation of the country,” and “the rapid completion of all preparations for the War of Resistance against Japan,” while also making guarantees such as “the nationwide cessation of the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National Government,” “the renaming of the Soviet Government as the Special Region Government of the Republic of China, and the renaming of the Red Army as the National Revolutionary Army, directly under the guidance of the Nanjing Central Government and the Military Affairs Commission.” These fully demonstrated that the CPC was already well prepared in policy to shift from civil war to the War of Resistance against Japan. These necessary concessions, made on principle and conditionally, were the inevitable result of the Party’s continuous efforts to promote the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and were also an important step in bringing about Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. “Without this step, the establishment of cooperation between the two parties would inevitably have been delayed.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 123. Thereafter, the Party not only continued to press forward with contacts and negotiations with the Kuomintang side, but also set forth the fighting tasks for the new situation of “consolidating peace, striving for democracy, and realizing resistance against Japan,” calling for the Party to win a position of leadership in the national war through arduous work and exemplary action. The Lugouqiao Incident [9]9 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 79. shattered Chiang Kai-shek’s illusion of seeking peace with Japan, forcing him to issue a statement that in effect recognized the legal status of the Communist Party of China, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front based on the second Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was thus established.
中国共产党为了推动国民党政策的转变,于1937年2月发出致国民党五届三中全会的电报,提出要求国民党实现“停止一切内战,集中国力,一致对外”“召集各党各派各界各军的代表会议,集中全国人才共同救国”“迅速完成对日抗战之一切准备工作”等要求,同时作出“在全国范围内停止推翻国民政府之武装暴动方针”“苏维埃政府改名为中华民国特区政府,红军改名为国民革命军,直接受南京中央政府与军事委员会之指导”等保证,充分表明中国共产党在政策上已经做好由国内战争转向抗日战争的充分准备。这些有原则有条件的必要让步是党不断推动建立抗日民族统一战线的必然结果,也是促成国共合作的重要步骤,“如果没有这一步骤,则两党合作的建立势将推迟”。此后,党不仅继续抓紧同国民党方面的接触与谈判,而且规定了新形势下“巩固和平、争取民主、实现抗战”的斗争任务,号召以艰苦的工作与模范的行动取得党在民族战争中的领导地位。卢沟桥事变粉碎了蒋介石对日求和的迷梦,迫使他发表了实际上承认中国共产党合法地位的谈话,以第二次国共合作为基础的抗日民族统一战线得以建立。
3. The Systematization of the Policy and Tactics of the Anti-Japanese National United Front
3.抗日民族统一战线政策和策略的系统化
During the War of Resistance against Japan, the Communist Party of China consciously linked the path of China’s revolutionary development with “the question of correctly handling the establishment of a united front with the bourgeoisie or being forced to split it,” systematically summed up the experience and lessons of establishing a united front with the bourgeoisie and other classes since the Party’s founding, comprehensively expounded the necessity and possibility of establishing and consolidating a united front in the course of the Chinese revolution, and constructed the basic framework of a Sinicized Marxist theory of the united front.
在抗日战争中,中国共产党自觉地将中国革命发展道路与“正确地处理同资产阶级建立统一战线或被迫着分裂统一战线的问题”联系起来,系统总结了自党成立以来同资产阶级和其他阶级建立统一战线的经验教训,全面阐述了在中国革命进程中建立巩固统一战线的必要性和可能性,构建起中国化的马克思主义统一战线理论的基本框架。
First, because the greatest oppression is national oppression, the national bourgeoisie in China can, to a certain extent and for a certain period, participate in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. “The proletariat should, within this definite period, establish a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it as far as possible.” Second, because of the economic and political weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, it may vacillate and turn traitor in another historical environment. Therefore, “the content of the Chinese revolutionary united front cannot remain consistent throughout, but must undergo changes,” meaning that the national bourgeoisie can participate in the united front in one period but cannot participate in another. Third, because the various groups of the comprador big bourgeoisie have different imperialist backers, when the main thrust of the revolution is directed against a particular imperialism, “groups of the big bourgeoisie belonging to other imperialist systems may also, to a certain extent and within a certain period, participate in the struggle against that imperialism.” Therefore, the Chinese proletariat should establish a possible united front with such groups of the big bourgeoisie and maintain it as far as possible under conditions favorable to the revolution. Fourth, because the comprador big bourgeoisie, even when participating in the united front, remains reactionary and resolutely opposes the development of the proletariat and its party, it must be restricted. “They will adopt disruptive policies of deception, enticement, ‘dissolution,’ and attack, and use these policies as preparations for their capitulation to the enemy and for splitting the united front.” Fifth, because the firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, the worker-peasant alliance constitutes the foundation of the revolutionary united front. Sixth, the urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally. These six regularities in understanding were both a distillation of the Party’s experience in leading the revolutionary united front and provided guidance for establishing, consolidating, and expanding the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
一是由于最大的压迫是民族压迫,因此在一定时期、一定程度上中国的民族资产阶级能够参加反帝反封建斗争,“无产阶级在这种一定的时期内,应该同民族资产阶级建立统一战线,并尽可能地保持之”。二是由于中国民族资产阶级在经济上、政治上的软弱性,在另一种历史环境中可能动摇变节,因此“中国革命统一战线的内容不能始终一致,而是要发生变化的”,即民族资产阶级在某一时期能够参加统一战线,在另一时期则不能参加。三是由于具有买办性的大资产阶级的各个集团以不同的帝国主义为背景,在革命锋芒主要反对某一个帝国主义的时候,“属于别的帝国主义系统的大资产阶级集团也可能在一定程度上和一定时期内参加反对某一个帝国主义的斗争”,因此中国无产阶级应同这样的大资产阶级集团建立可能的统一战线,并在有利于革命的一定条件下尽可能地保持之。四是由于具有买办性的大资产阶级在参加统一战线时仍然是反动的,坚决反对无产阶级及其政党的发展,因此对其要加以限制,“要采取欺骗、诱惑、‘溶解’和打击等等破坏政策,并以这些政策作为它投降敌人和分裂统一战线的准备”。五是由于无产阶级坚固的同盟者是农民,因此工农联盟构成革命统一战线的基础。六是城市小资产阶级也是可靠的同盟者。这六条规律性认识,既是党领导革命统一战线经验的升华,也为建立、巩固和扩大抗日民族统一战线提供了引领。
At the same time, the Party also clearly recognized that to always maintain leadership of the united front and ensure the completion of revolutionary goals and tasks, it was necessary to “preserve the independence of parties and classes, preserve independence and initiative within the united front,” and adopt a policy of both unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie. The Anti-Japanese National United Front led by the Communist Party of China should adhere to “both unity and independence,” opposing both “Left” closed-doorism and Right opportunism. Mao Zedong pointed out: “If our Party does not know how to unite with the bourgeoisie during a certain period, the Party cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not know how to wage a resolute and serious ‘peaceful’ struggle with the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, the Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and the revolution will fail; and if our Party is forced to split with the bourgeoisie and does not wage a resolute and serious armed struggle against it, the Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will fail.” It was precisely because the Party correctly analyzed and properly handled its relations with the bourgeoisie during the War of Resistance against Japan that the Anti-Japanese National United Front could be established and continuously consolidated and developed, realizing the Sinicization of the Marxist theory of the united front and laying an important foundation for the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and even for the victory of the New Democratic Revolution.
与此同时,党还清醒地认识到,要始终掌握统一战线的领导权并确保革命目标和任务的完成,就必须“保存党派和阶级的独立性,保存统一战线中的独立自主”,同资产阶级采取既联合又斗争的策略方针。中国共产党领导的抗日民族统一战线应坚持“既统一,又独立”,既反对“左”倾关门主义,又反对右倾机会主义。毛泽东指出:“如果我们党不知道在一定时期中同资产阶级联合,党就不能前进,革命就不能发展;如果我们党不知道在联合资产阶级时又同资产阶级进行坚决的、严肃的‘和平’斗争,党在思想上、政治上、组织上就会瓦解,革命就会失败;又如果我们党在被迫着同资产阶级分裂时不同资产阶级进行坚决的、严肃的武装斗争,同样党也就会瓦解,革命也就会失败。”正是由于党在抗日战争中正确分析并妥善处理同资产阶级的关系,抗日民族统一战线才得以建立并不断巩固和发展,实现了马克思主义统一战线理论的中国化,为抗日战争胜利乃至新民主主义革命胜利奠定了重要的基础。
II. The War of Resistance against Japan and the CPC’s Theory of Armed Struggle
二、抗日战争与中国共产党的武装斗争理论
What form of struggle to adopt to win victory in the War of Resistance was a major issue facing both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party after the formal establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, systematically summed up the experience and lessons of opening up the new revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, [10]10 Mao Zedong, “Introducing *The Communist*” (October 1939), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 288. deeply analyzed the actual conditions of both China and Japan, integrated the basic principles of Marxism on armed struggle with the concrete realities of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war led by the Party, elucidated the laws of development of the War of Resistance against Japan, creatively put forward the idea of a people’s war and a complete set of strategic and tactical principles, and greatly developed the Marxist theory of seizing state power by armed force.
以什么样的斗争方式争取抗战胜利,这是抗日民族统一战线正式建立以后国共两党共同面对的重大问题。以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人系统总结土地革命战争时期开创农村包围城市、武装夺取政权革命新道路的经验教训,深入分析中日两国的实际情况,将马克思主义关于武装斗争的基本原理同党领导的抗日游击战争具体实际相结合,阐明了抗日战争的发展规律,创造性提出了人民战争的思想和一整套战略战术原则,极大地发展了马克思主义关于武装夺取政权的理论。
1. The War of Resistance against Japan Required China to Implement a Line of Total Resistance
1.抗日战争要求中国必须实行全面抗战的路线
The realization of the second Kuomintang-Communist cooperation marked the formal establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and also the basic formation of a pattern of joint resistance by the entire nation. However, from the very beginning, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had fundamental differences on the question of how to resist Japan. Under the pressure of objective circumstances, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek initially adopted a relatively positive attitude toward the War of Resistance, successively organizing campaigns such as the Battle of Shanghai, the Battle of Xuzhou, and the Battle of Wuhan, putting up relatively active resistance, and showing some political progress, such as recognizing the legal status of the Communist Party, releasing political prisoners, and promulgating programs, decrees, and regulations beneficial to the War of Resistance. However, even while participating in the War of Resistance, they still adhered to their reactionary position as the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, and did not fundamentally abandon their basic policy of oppressing the people. Because they feared that the vigorous development of the mass anti-Japanese national salvation movement would get out of control, and especially feared that the CPC-led popular resistance would endanger their rule, they consistently pursued a line of partial resistance that relied solely on the government and the army to fight the war. When the Japanese army was pressing heavily on the border, this line of partial resistance tied the hands of the people participating in the War of Resistance and created many difficulties for the war effort. In contrast, from the very beginning of the all-nation War of Resistance, the Communist Party of China put forward the political proposition of implementing a line of total resistance, emphasizing the need to mobilize the masses and launch an all-people’s War of Resistance involving the entire population.
第二次国共合作的实现,标志着抗日民族统一战线的正式建立,也标志着全民族共同抗战格局的基本形成。但是,国共两党在如何抗日的问题上从一开始就存在根本分歧。国民党蒋介石在客观形势的逼迫下起初对抗战采取了比较积极的态度,先后组织淞沪会战、徐州会战、武汉会战等战役,进行了较为积极的抵抗,表现出政治上的某些进步,如承认共产党的合法地位、释放政治犯、颁布有利于抗战的纲领、法令和条例等。但是,他们即使参加抗战也仍然坚持其大地主大资产阶级的反动立场,没有从根本上抛弃压迫人民的基本主张,因为害怕群众抗日救亡运动的蓬勃发展会失去控制,尤其害怕中国共产党领导人民抗战会危及统治,从而始终实行只依靠政府和军队抗战的片面抗战路线。在日军重兵压境之时,这种片面抗战路线束缚了人民参与抗战的手脚,给抗战带来了不少困难。与之不同,中国共产党在全民族抗战一开始就提出了实行全面抗战路线的政治主张,强调要放手发动群众,开展全国人民总动员的全民族抗日战争。
As early as July 1936, when answering Edgar Snow’s question “under what conditions can China defeat and destroy Japanese imperialism,” Mao Zedong preliminarily set out the three conditions necessary for victory in the War of Resistance: “first, the completion of the Chinese united front against Japan; second, the completion of the international united front against Japan; and third, the rise of the revolutionary movement among the Japanese people and the peoples of Japan’s colonies.” Among these three conditions, “the great unity of the Chinese people is the primary one.” [1]1 Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (1937). In Mao’s view, how long the War of Resistance would last depended mainly on the strength of the Chinese united front against Japan. If the strength of the united front could not be rapidly assembled, the war would be prolonged and the people would have to endure a very painful period. This in effect clearly raised the issue of the protracted and arduous nature of the War of Resistance. Mao stressed that only by uniting the entire Chinese people and fully mobilizing the masses could Japanese imperialism be defeated. The “Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation” of the Chinese Communist Party put forward important political propositions such as “overthrow Japanese imperialism,” “general mobilization of the whole nation for war,” “general mobilization of the entire people,” “reform of the political structure,” and “national unity in resisting Japan,” clarifying the necessary conditions for realizing total resistance against Japan. The “CCP Central Committee’s Decision on the Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks” stressed that “this war of resistance should be seen as a hard and protracted war,” and that the central key to winning the War of Resistance lay in “developing the already launched war of resistance into a total war of the entire nation.” This marked the formation of the Party’s line of total resistance against Japan.
早在1936年7月毛泽东就在回答斯诺“在什么条件下,中国能战胜并消灭日本帝国主义”的问题时初步回答了抗日战争要取得胜利必备的三个条件:“第一是中国抗日统一战线的完成;第二是国际抗日统一战线的完成;第三是日本国内人民和日本殖民地人民的革命运动的兴起”,三个条件中“中国人民的大联合是主要的”。在毛泽东看来,抗日战争要打多久,主要是看中国抗日民族统一战线的力量。如果抗日民族统一战线的力量不能迅速集聚,那么战争就会延长,人民就要经历一个很痛苦的时期,这实际上明确提出了抗日战争的长期性、艰苦性问题。毛泽东强调,只有团结全国人民、充分发动群众,才能战胜日本帝国主义。《中国共产党抗日救国十大纲领》提出了“打倒日本帝国主义”“全国军事的总动员”“全国人民的总动员”“改革政治机构”“抗日的民族团结”等重要政治主张,明确了实现全面抗战的必要条件;《中共中央关于目前形势与党的任务的决定》强调“应该看到这一抗战是艰苦的持久战”,争取抗战胜利的中心关键在于“使已发动的抗战发展为全面的全民族的抗战”,这标志着党的全面抗战路线已经形成。
2. China Must Adhere to the General Strategic Policy of Protracted War
2.中国必须坚持持久战的战略总方针
To mobilize and organize the masses to participate in the War of Resistance, it was necessary to clearly set forth the military strategic policy for the war. At the beginning of the nationwide War of Resistance, faced with the invasion of Japanese imperialism, both the “theory of national subjugation” and the “theory of quick victory” had considerable currency. How exactly would the War of Resistance unfold? Would China win final victory in the War of Resistance? How could final victory be achieved? These fundamental questions concerning the future and destiny of the War of Resistance urgently awaited answers and solutions from the Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong scientifically summed up the experience of the nationwide War of Resistance, refuted various erroneous views then prevalent, and systematically expounded the Party’s general strategic policy of protracted war.
要动员和组织人民群众参加抗日战争,就必须明确提出抗战的军事战略方针。在全民族抗战之初,面对日本帝国主义的入侵,“亡国论”和“速胜论”都很有市场。抗日战争究竟会按照怎样的方式进行?中国是否会赢得抗战的最后胜利?如何才能取得最后的胜利?这些事关抗日战争前途命运的根本问题亟待中国共产党人来回答和解决。毛泽东科学总结全国抗战经验,批驳了当时流行的种种错误观点,系统阐明了党的持久抗战的战略总方针。
Mao Zedong first seized on the different characteristics of the national conditions of China and Japan, scientifically foreseeing the bright prospect that “Japan will be defeated and China will be victorious.” Mao pointed out: “The Sino-Japanese war is not just any war; it is a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1930s. The basis of the entire problem lies here.” [2]2 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 113. In this war, the two sides had four basic contradictory characteristics: the enemy is strong and we are weak; the enemy is retrogressive and we are progressive; the enemy is small and we are large; the enemy receives little support and we receive much support. As for Japan, its “strong point is the strength of its war-making power, while its weak points lie in the retrogressive and barbarous nature of its war, in its insufficiency in manpower and material resources, and in the meagerness of its international support.” As for China, its “weak point is the weakness of its war-making power, while its strong points lie in the progressive and just nature of its war, in its being a large country, and in the abundance of its international support.” As Mao pointed out: “These characteristics prescribe and determine all political policies and military strategy and tactics on both sides, and prescribe and determine the protracted nature of the war and the fact that final victory belongs to China and not to Japan.” [3]3 Ibid., p. 114.
毛泽东首先抓住中日两国国情的不同特点,科学预见了“日本必败,中国必胜”的光明前途。毛泽东指出:“中日战争不是任何别的战争,乃是半殖民地半封建的中国和帝国主义的日本之间在二十世纪三十年代进行的一个决死的战争。全部问题的根据就在这里。”在这场战争中,双方存在着相互矛盾的四个基本特点:敌强我弱,敌退步我进步,敌小我大,敌寡助我多助。就日本而言,其“长处是其战争力量之强,而其短处则在其战争本质的退步性、野蛮性,在其人力、物力之不足,在其国际形势之寡助”。就中国而言,其“短处是战争力量之弱,而其长处则在其战争本质的进步性和正义性,在其是一个大国家,在其国际形势之多助”。正如毛泽东指出的:“这些特点,规定了和规定着双方一切政治上的政策和军事上的战略战术,规定了和规定着战争的持久性和最后胜利属于中国而不属于日本。”
Mao Zedong also proposed that the War of Resistance would go through three stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive. He pointed out that through these three stages, the balance of forces between China and Japan would undergo obvious changes, that is, China would move from inferiority in the defensive stage to parity in the stalemate stage and then to superiority in the counter-offensive stage. In this process, the stalemate stage “is the transitional stage of the entire war and will also be the most difficult period, yet it is the pivot of the transformation.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 137. China’s future and destiny “are not determined by whether the big cities are lost in the first stage, but by the degree of effort of the entire nation in the second stage. If we can persist in the war of resistance, persist in the united front, and persist in the protracted war, China will gain the strength to turn from weakness to strength in this stage.” [5]5 Ibid., p. 138. At the same time, Mao also pointed out that “the deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses of the people” and that “such a great national revolutionary war cannot be won without universal and thorough political mobilization.” [6]6 Ibid., pp. 147, 148. These important theses fully embodied Mao’s ideological viewpoint that “the soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory,” reflected the historical materialist view that the masses are the creators of history and the subjects of practice, and clarified the only correct path to win final victory in the protracted War of Resistance.
毛泽东还提出,抗日战争要经过战略防御、战略相持、战略反攻三个阶段。他指出,通过这三个阶段,中日两国在力量对比上会发生明显的变化,即中国从防御阶段的劣势发展到相持阶段的平衡再到反攻阶段的优势。在这个过程中,相持阶段“是整个战争的过渡阶段,也将是最困难的时期,然而它是转变的枢纽”。中国的前途命运,“不决定于第一阶段大城市之是否丧失,而决定于第二阶段全民族努力的程度。如能坚持抗战,坚持统一战线和坚持持久战,中国将在此阶段中获得转弱为强的力量”。同时,毛泽东还指出,“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源,存在于民众之中”;“如此伟大的民族革命战争,没有普遍和深入的政治动员,是不能胜利的”。这些重要论断,充分体现了毛泽东关于“兵民是胜利之本”的思想观点,反映出群众是历史的创造者和实践主体的唯物史观,明确了争取持久抗战最终胜利的唯一正确道路。
3. China Must Launch and Persist in Extensive and Protracted Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare
3.中国必须开展和坚持广大而持久的抗日游击战争
The War of Resistance was a national liberation war carried out under the conditions of a united front formed between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. On the one hand, the Chinese Communist Party urged the Kuomintang to implement a line of total resistance against Japan; on the other hand, it set an example by itself, modeling the line of total resistance against Japan. In military struggle, the Chinese Communist Party transformed the regular forces, which had been used in a concentrated manner in the later period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, into dispersed anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, completing in a timely manner the military strategic transformation from mobile warfare in the later period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War to anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare.
抗日战争是在国共两党结成统一战线的情况下进行的一场民族解放战争。中国共产党一方面力促国民党实行全面抗战路线,另一方面则身体力行,模范践行全面抗战路线。在军事斗争上,中国共产党把土地革命战争后期集中使用的正规军转变为分散使用的抗日游击军,适时完成了从土地革命战争后期的运动战向抗日游击战争的军事战略转变。
Generally speaking, guerrilla warfare is a tactical issue, but the particularity of the Sino-Japanese war gave anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare an important strategic position. In the War of Resistance, China was a large but weak country, while Japan was a small but strong country. Although China was weak, it had a vast territory, a large population, and many soldiers; although Japan was strong, its forces were insufficient, “leaving many empty areas in the occupied territories. Therefore, anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare was mainly not an inner-line operation cooperating with the regular forces in campaigns, but an independent operation on the outer line. Moreover, because of China’s progress, that is, the existence of a strong army led by the Communist Party and the broad masses of the people, anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare was not small-scale but large-scale.” [7]7 Ibid., p. 124. “Thus China’s anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare burst out of the bounds of tactics and knocked at the door of strategy, demanding that the question of guerrilla warfare be examined from the perspective of strategy.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 123. After the war of resistance entered the stalemate stage, Mao Zedong, based on changes in the domestic and international situation and the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, theoretically elucidated the important strategic position of guerrilla warfare in the entire process of the War of Resistance. He pointed out that guerrilla warfare “is the best and therefore the necessary form of struggle for the armed masses of the people in a backward country, in a large semi-colonial country, over a long period, to defeat the armed enemy and create their own positions.” [9]9 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 79. He proposed incorporating anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare into “the general concept of armed struggle,” closely linking it with the Party’s political line and Party building, and regarding it as an important magic weapon for the Party’s growth and strengthening. He stressed that “in China, without armed struggle, there would be no position for the proletariat, no position for the people, no position for the Communist Party, and no victory for the revolution.” [10]10 Mao Zedong, “Introducing *The Communist*” (October 1939), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 288.
一般说来,游击战争是战术问题,但中日战争的特殊性使抗日游击战争具有了重要的战略地位。在抗日战争中,中国是大而弱的国家,日本是小而强的国家。中国虽弱,但地大、人多、兵多;日本虽强,但兵力不足,“在占领区留了很多空虚的地方,因此抗日游击战争就主要地不是在内线配合正规军的战役作战,而是在外线单独作战;并且由于中国的进步,就是说有共产党领导的坚强的军队和广大的人民群众存在,因此抗日游击战争就不是小规模的,而是大规模的”,“于是中国抗日的游击战争,就从战术范围跑了出来向战略敲门,要求把游击战争的问题放在战略的观点上加以考察”。在抗战进入相持阶段以后,毛泽东根据国内外形势变化和敌我力量对比,从理论上阐明了游击战争在抗日战争全过程中的重要战略地位,指出游击战争“就是在落后的国家中,在半殖民地的大国中,在长时期内,人民武装队伍为了战胜武装的敌人、创造自己的阵地所必须依靠的因而也是最好的斗争形式”;提出要将抗日游击战争纳入“武装斗争的总概念”,并将其与党的政治路线和党的建设密切联系起来,作为党发展壮大的重要法宝,强调“在中国,离开了武装斗争,就没有无产阶级的地位,就没有人民的地位,就没有共产党的地位,就没有革命的胜利”。
Mao Zedong’s profound understanding of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and even people’s war realized the integration of the basic Marxist theory of armed struggle and military strategy with the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution, especially the War of Resistance. It raised the Party’s understanding of armed struggle to a new level, enriched and developed the Chinese revolutionary path in the process of launching anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, opening up enemy rear areas, and establishing anti-Japanese democratic base areas, and was of extremely great significance for ultimately winning the War of Resistance.
毛泽东关于抗日游击战争以至人民战争的深刻理解,实现了马克思主义关于武装斗争和军事战略的基本理论同中国革命特别是抗日战争具体实际相结合,把党对武装斗争的认识提高到一个新的水平,在开展抗日游击战争、开辟敌后战场、建立抗日民主根据地的过程中丰富和发展了中国革命道路,对最终夺取抗日战争胜利具有极为重要的意义。
III. The War of Resistance and Party Building
三、抗日战争与党的建设
The War of Resistance, as a protracted national revolutionary war, was carried out under conditions where the Communist Party of China already existed, and it was also carried out in the process of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete reality of China. During the War of Resistance, the Party insisted on using the basic principles of Marxism to analyze and solve practical problems of the war, continuously deepened its understanding and grasp of Marxism, of China’s concrete reality, and of the integration of the basic principles of Marxism with China’s concrete reality, and achieved major breakthroughs in Party building. This enabled the Party to become, while being the vanguard of the Chinese working class, also the vanguard of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, and enabled the Party to win the support and affection of the broad masses while also achieving its own maturity in ideology, politics, and organization.
抗日战争作为一场旷日持久的民族革命战争,是在中国已经有了共产党的情况下进行的,又是在马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的过程中进行的。在抗日战争中,党坚持运用马克思主义基本原理分析和解决抗日战争中的实际问题,不断深化对马克思主义、对中国具体实际、对马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的理解和把握,在党的建设方面取得重大突破,使党在作为中国工人阶级先锋队的同时也成为中国人民和中华民族的先锋队,使党在赢得广大群众拥护和爱戴的同时也实现自身在思想上、政治上、组织上的成熟。
1. The Formal Proposal of the Thesis of “Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context”
1.“马克思主义中国化”命题的正式提出
During the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party of China “had generally learned to use the ideological weapon of Marxism-Leninism to combat erroneous ideas within the Party on two fronts, opposing both Right opportunism and ‘Left’ opportunism” [11]11 This is a quotation from the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party” adopted at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in 1945., and it continuously consolidated and strengthened itself in ideological, political, and organizational respects, thereby laying important subjective conditions for the Party’s theoretical innovation. Under these conditions, Mao Zedong, in his report “On the New Stage” at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee [12]12 The Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC was held in Yan’an from September to November 1938., put forward to the entire Party the urgent task of strengthening the study of Marxist theory, formally proposed the scientific proposition of “adapting Marxism to the Chinese context,” and systematically expounded its basic connotations and requirements, achieving an important breakthrough in the Party’s understanding of the first integration of Marxism with China’s actual conditions.
抗日战争期间,中国共产党“一般地已经学会了使用马克思列宁主义的思想斗争的武器,从两方面反对党内的错误思想,一方面反对右倾机会主义,又一方面反对‘左’倾机会主义”,并在思想、政治、组织等方面不断巩固壮大,为党的理论创新奠定了重要的主体条件。在这一条件下,毛泽东在党的扩大的六届六中全会《论新阶段》的报告中向全党提出加强马克思主义理论学习的紧迫任务,正式提出“马克思主义的中国化”的科学命题,并对其基本内涵和要求作了系统阐释,实现了党对马克思主义与中国实际第一次结合的重要认识突破。
Mao Zedong pointed out: “To guide a great revolutionary movement toward victory, without revolutionary theory, without historical knowledge, and without an understanding of the actual movement, victory cannot be achieved.” First, it is necessary to adopt a scientific attitude toward Marxism. Marxism is not an abstract dogma but a guide to action. In studying Marxism, one should not merely learn its phrases but grasp its basic standpoints, viewpoints, and methods for analyzing and solving problems. Therefore, “the task of studying theory universally and deeply is a major problem for us that urgently needs to be solved and can only be solved with focused effort.” Second, it is necessary to study Chinese history and analyze and summarize it using Marxist methods. Mao Zedong pointed out, “Today’s China is a development of historical China; we are Marxist historicists and should not cut off history”; “Communists are internationalist Marxists, but Marxism must be realized through national forms”; “To talk about Marxism apart from China’s characteristics is merely abstract, empty Marxism”; only by rooting Marxism in the soil of Chinese history and culture can a “Chinese style and Chinese manner that the common people of China love to see and hear” be formed. Finally, it is necessary to understand the current realities of China and strive to reveal the laws of the Chinese revolution. Applying Marxism to guide the Anti-Japanese War requires understanding both China’s actual conditions and those of foreign countries, especially the actual conditions of Japanese imperialism; “if anyone refuses to make serious and meticulous studies of these, he is not a Marxist.”
毛泽东指出:“指导一个伟大的革命运动使之向着胜利,没有革命理论,没有历史知识,没有实际运动的了解,就不能有胜利。”首先,必须以科学的态度对待马克思主义。马克思主义不是抽象的教条,而是行动的指南。学习马克思主义,不应当只是学习词句,而要掌握其分析和解决问题的基本立场、观点、方法。所以,“普遍地深入地研究理论的任务,对于我们,是一个亟待解决并须着重致力才能解决的大问题”。其次,必须学习中国历史并用马克思主义的方法加以分析和总结。毛泽东指出,“今天的中国是历史的中国之一发展,我们是马克思主义的历史主义者,我们不应该割断历史”;“共产党员是国际主义的马克思主义者,但马克思主义必须通过民族形式才能实现”;“离开中国特点来谈马克思主义,只是抽象的空洞的马克思主义”;只有使马克思主义根植于中国历史和文化土壤,才能形成“为中国老百姓所喜闻乐见的中国作风与中国气派”。最后,必须了解当前中国的实际并努力揭示中国革命规律。运用马克思主义指导抗日战争,要求既懂得中国的实际,也了解外国的实际特别是日本帝国主义的实际,“如果有人拒绝对于这些作认真的过细的研究,那他就不是一个马克思主义者”。
With the continuous progress of the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, deeply expounded the connotations and requirements of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities, providing ideological guidance for the CPC to direct the Anti-Japanese War and the entire Chinese revolution.
伴随抗日战争的持续推进,以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人深入阐释马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的内涵和要求,为中国共产党指导抗日战争和整个中国革命提供了思想引领。
2. The Application of the Principle of “Integrating the Theory of Marxism-Leninism with the Practice of the Chinese Revolution”
2.“马克思列宁主义的理论和中国革命的实践相结合”原则的运用
After the Anti-Japanese War entered the stage of stalemate, contradictions and conflicts among the various forces within the Anti-Japanese National United Front gradually emerged, and the nationwide united resistance faced a serious crisis. To this end, the CPC held high the clear banner of fighting the war to the end, and through strengthening its own building, it continuously seized the historical initiative in leading the Anti-Japanese War. In the article “Introducing The Communist,” Mao Zedong explicitly put forward the fundamental principle of “integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution” and applied this principle to analyze the three basic issues of the Chinese revolution: the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. He emphasized that “correctly understanding these three issues and their interrelations is equivalent to correctly leading the entire Chinese revolution,” enabling the Party to gain a deeper, more comprehensive, and more complete understanding of the question of what path the Chinese revolution should take. This fully reflected the Party’s maturity in ideology and theory, elevating the Party’s understanding of the laws governing the Anti-Japanese War and the entire Chinese revolution.
在抗日战争进入相持阶段以后,抗日民族统一战线内部各方力量之间的矛盾冲突逐渐暴露,全民族共同抗战面临严重危机。为此,中国共产党高举抗战到底的鲜明旗帜,并通过加强自身建设不断掌握领导抗日战争的历史主动。在《〈共产党人〉发刊词》一文中,毛泽东明确提出“马克思列宁主义的理论和中国革命的实践相结合”的根本原则,并运用这一原则分析统一战线、武装斗争、党的建设等中国革命中的三个基本问题,强调“正确地理解了这三个问题及其相互关系,就等于正确地领导了全部中国革命”,使党在中国革命走什么样的道路这个问题上获得了更为深刻、全面和完整的认识,充分反映了党在思想理论上的成熟,使党对抗日战争和整个中国革命规律的认识得到升华。
In light of the new situations and new problems the Party had faced since the Anti-Japanese War, Mao Zedong insisted on linking the Party’s political line to strengthen its own building, realizing the integration of the basic principles of Marxist theory on proletarian party building with the specific realities of the CPC’s own building. Under the conditions of the Anti-Japanese War, “the environment in which the Party finds itself and the tasks it bears are very different from those of the past period of the domestic revolutionary war; the current environment is much more complex, and the current tasks are much more arduous.” Although “the Party’s organization has stepped out of its narrow circle and become a nationwide large party,” the Party also faced problems such as many new organizations not yet being consolidated, a large number of new Party members and new cadres not understanding or understanding little of the unity of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, and “the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, constantly attempting to undermine our Party.” Building a Marxist party that was completely consolidated in ideology, politics, and organization became a major problem urgently needing resolution.
毛泽东结合抗日战争以来党面临的新情况和新问题,坚持联系党的政治路线加强自身建设,实现了马克思主义关于无产阶级政党建设基本原理同中国共产党自身建设具体实际相结合。在抗日战争的条件下,“党所处的环境,党所负的任务,现在和过去国内革命战争时期有很大的不同,现在的环境是复杂得多,现在的任务是艰巨得多了”。尽管“党的组织已经从狭小的圈子中走了出来,变成了全国性的大党”,但党也面临着许多新组织还不巩固,大批新党员新干部对马克思列宁主义的理论和中国革命的实践之统一的理解还不懂得或懂得不多,再加上“资产阶级特别是大资产阶级却时时刻刻在企图破坏我们的党”等问题,建设一个思想上、政治上、组织上完全巩固的马克思主义政党成为一个亟待解决的重大问题。
In view of this, the Party Central Committee explicitly proposed the task of advancing Party building as a “great project,” emphasizing placing ideological building in the primary position of Party building, linking the Party’s political line to strengthen Party building, and creating entirely new forms such as the Yan’an Rectification Movement [13]13 The Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942–1945) was a Party-wide campaign of Marxist education and ideological rectification aimed at overcoming subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes. and cadre education, vigorously carrying out the Party’s organizational building and work style building, enabling the Party to achieve unprecedented growth, unity, and solidarity during the Anti-Japanese War. “Once the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, it gives the Chinese revolution an entirely new complexion and produces the entire historical stage of the new-democratic revolution.” This also enabled the CPC to develop new work styles, namely, “the style of integrating theory with practice, the style of maintaining close ties with the masses, and the style of self-criticism.”
鉴于此,党中央明确提出要推进党的建设这项“伟大的工程”的任务,强调把思想建设摆在党的建设首位,联系党的政治路线加强党的建设,并创造了延安整风和干部教育等全新的形式,大力开展党的组织建设和作风建设,使党在抗日战争中逐步达到空前的壮大与团结统一。“马克思列宁主义的普遍真理一经和中国革命的具体实践相结合,就使中国革命的面目为之一新,产生了新民主主义的整个历史阶段。”这也使中国共产党产生了新的工作作风,即“理论和实践相结合的作风,和人民群众紧密地联系在一起的作风以及自我批评的作风”。
3. Theoretical Elucidation of the Basic Standpoints, Viewpoints, and Methods of Marxism in the Chinese Context
3.中国化的马克思主义基本立场、观点、方法的理论阐释
The Party’s understanding of Marxism, of China’s specific realities, and of the theoretical achievements of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, as well as their basic standpoints, viewpoints, and methods, underwent a process of development. At the same time, due to the rapid development of the Chinese revolutionary situation, the Party had not promptly and thoroughly ideologically cleared away the subjectivism, especially dogmatism, that had caused great harm to adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. Therefore, after the Anti-Japanese War entered the stage of stalemate, the Party, through the Rectification Movement, thoroughly eliminated non-Marxist ideas represented by subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes [14]14 “Party stereotypes” (党八股) refers to a rigid, formulaic, and dogmatic style of writing and speech within the Party, criticized during the Yan’an Rectification Movement., and established the basic standpoints, viewpoints, and methods of seeking truth from facts, the mass line, and independence and self-reliance.
党对马克思主义、对中国具体实际、对马克思主义中国化理论成果及其基本立场、观点、方法的认识经历了一个过程。同时,由于中国革命形势的迅速发展,党未及时在思想上对那些曾经给马克思主义中国化带来极大危害的主观主义特别是教条主义思想进行彻底清理。因此,在抗日战争进入相持阶段以后,党通过整风运动彻底清除了以主观主义、宗派主义、党八股为代表的非马克思主义思想,确立了实事求是、群众路线、独立自主的基本立场、观点、方法。
Seeking truth from facts is the fundamental method for the Party to carry out all work. Mao Zedong creatively gave a new explanation of “seeking truth from facts.” He said: “‘Facts’ are all things that exist objectively, ‘truth’ is the internal connection of objective things, that is, regularity, and ‘seeking’ is our studying it.” This profoundly elucidated the ideological line of proceeding from objectively existing facts to explore scientific truth, integrating the Marxist dialectical materialist and historical materialist world outlook and methodology into the discourse of “seeking truth from facts,” which has national characteristics, reflecting the essence of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities.
实事求是是党开展各项工作的根本方法。毛泽东创造性地对“实事求是”作了新阐释。他说:“‘实事’就是客观存在着的一切事物,‘是’就是客观事物的内部联系,即规律性,‘求’就是我们去研究。”这深刻阐明了从客观存在的事实出发去探寻科学真理的思想路线,使马克思主义辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义世界观和方法论融入“实事求是”这一具有民族特色的话语,体现了马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的精髓。
The mass line is the basic path for the Party to advance adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. In response to the long-standing problems of leadership methods such as subjectivism, bureaucracy, and formalism that seriously divorced the Party from the masses, Mao Zedong pointed out: “The more arduous the struggle, the more necessary it is for the leadership of Communists to be closely combined with the demands of the broad masses, and the more necessary it is for the general calls of Communists to be closely combined with individual guidance, so as to thoroughly smash subjectivist and bureaucratic leadership methods.” In Mao Zedong’s view, serving the people wholeheartedly means never being divorced from the masses for a moment; proceeding from the interests of the people, not from the interests of individuals or small groups; and being responsible to the people is consistent with being responsible to the Party’s leading organs. He emphasized, “All words and actions of Communists must conform to the greatest interests of the broadest masses of the people and be supported by the broadest masses of the people as the highest standard.” These important understandings fully demonstrate that the Party’s mass line had already taken on a complete scientific form and theoretical content, becoming the fundamental method for the Party to achieve the unity of the subjective and the objective, and of theory and practice, in all work.
群众路线是党推进马克思主义中国化的基本路径。针对党内长期存在的主观主义、官僚主义、形式主义等严重脱离群众的领导方法问题,毛泽东指出:“斗争愈是艰苦,就愈是需要共产党人的领导和广大群众的要求密切地相结合,愈是需要共产党人的一般号召和个别指导密切地相结合,而彻底粉碎主观主义的和官僚主义的领导方法。”在毛泽东看来,全心全意为人民服务,一刻也不能脱离群众;一切从人民的利益出发,而不是从个人或小集团的利益出发;向人民负责和向党的领导机关负责是一致的。他强调,“共产党人的一切言论行动,必须以合乎最广大人民群众的最大利益,为最广大人民群众所拥护为最高标准”。这些重要认识充分表明,党的群众路线已经具有完备的科学形态和理论内容,成为党在一切工作中实现主观与客观、理论与实践相统一的根本方法。
Independence and self-reliance were the foothold for the ultimate victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan. During the war, Mao Zedong criticized the military approach of relying solely on foreign aid for resistance and the political practice of abandoning the principle of independence and self-reliance, emphasizing that the resistance should mainly depend on China’s own strength. He stressed, “We do not yet have foreign aid. Even if we were to have it in the future, the means of subsistence can only be supplied by ourselves; not the slightest bit of subjectivism is permissible here.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “Economic and Financial Problems,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 115. The Chinese original is from Mao Zedong, “Economic and Financial Problems,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 891. Particularly when the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines faced severe difficulties, Mao Zedong put forward the slogan “Let us take care of ourselves and ensure ample food and clothing,” and led the people in developing agricultural production and other productive undertakings, implementing production self-sufficiency as far as possible in the organs, schools, and troops of the base areas. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the principle of independence and self-reliance was fully applied and developed along with the Party’s work in various fields. The Party’s application of this principle underwent a process of development from the military sphere to the political sphere and then to the economic sphere, laying an important foundation for the victory of the war and even for the entire Chinese revolution, and forging it into the spiritual gene of the Chinese nation and the Chinese Communists.
独立自主是抗日战争最终取得胜利的立足点。在抗日战争中,毛泽东批评了在军事上单纯依赖外援进行抗战的主张、在政治上丧失独立自主原则的做法,强调抗战应主要依靠中国自己的力量。他强调,“我们还没有外援。就是假定将来有了外援,生活资料也只能由我们自己来供给,这是一点主观主义也来不得的”。特别是在敌后抗日根据地面临严重困难时,毛泽东提出“自己动手,丰衣足食”的口号,并努力领导人民发展农业生产和其他生产事业,尽可能地实行根据地的机关、学校、部队的生产自给。在抗日战争中,独立自主原则伴随着党各方面工作的展开而得到充分运用和发展。党对独立自主原则的运用先后经历了从军事领域到政治领域再到经济领域的发展过程,为抗战胜利乃至整个中国革命胜利奠定了重要基础,熔铸成中华民族和中国共产党人的精神基因。
IV. The War of Resistance Against Japan and the Party’s Understanding of the Entire Chinese Revolution
四、抗日战争与党对整个中国革命的认识
The War of Resistance Against Japan was a special stage of the new-democratic revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party, providing historical space for the Party to grasp the laws of the Chinese revolution. At the same time, the complex and volatile situation of the war required the Chinese Communist Party to systematize the rich experience of the Chinese revolution, continuously clarify the Party’s program and propositions, so as to better guide the War of Resistance and the Chinese revolution. The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, adhered to applying Marxism to an in-depth analysis of China’s basic national conditions, continuously revealed the historical characteristics of China’s social conditions and the Chinese revolution, creatively put forward the concept of “New Democracy,” correctly handled the relationships between new democracy and old democracy, and between new democracy and socialism, proposed “building a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation,” [16]16 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 339. elucidated the nature and prospects of the Chinese revolution, provided the correct answer to “Whither China?” and made theoretical preparations for the victory of the new-democratic revolution.
抗日战争是中国共产党领导的新民主主义革命的一个特殊阶段,为党把握中国革命规律提供了历史空间;同时,纷繁复杂的抗战形势也要求中国共产党将丰富的中国革命经验系统化,不断明确党的纲领和主张,以便更好地指导抗日战争和中国革命。以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人坚持运用马克思主义深入分析中国基本国情,不断揭示中国社会条件和中国革命的历史特点,创造性地提出“新民主主义”概念,正确处理新民主主义与旧民主主义、新民主主义与社会主义之间的关系,提出“建设一个中华民族的新社会和新国家”,阐明中国革命的性质和前途,为“中国向何处去”给出了正确答案,为新民主主义革命的胜利作了理论上的准备。
1. The Proposal of the Concept of “New Democracy”
1.“新民主主义”概念的提出
Correctly recognizing, understanding, and grasping China’s historical and social conditions, as well as the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, is the basic prerequisite for advancing the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context. Closely integrating the reality of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao Zedong pointed out, “In present-day China, the Japanese-occupied areas are colonial society; the Kuomintang-controlled areas are basically still a semi-colonial society; and whether in the Japanese-occupied areas or the Kuomintang-controlled areas, it is a society where the feudal and semi-feudal system predominates.” [17]17 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 305. This further articulated the understanding of “present-day China’s national conditions” as a “colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society,” further enriching and developing the Marxist theory of social formations, and establishing the Party’s formulation of the line, principles, and policies for the new-democratic revolution on the basis of a scientific analysis of China’s social nature and actual national conditions.
正确认识、理解和把握中国的历史状况和社会状况、中国革命的特点和规律,是推进马克思主义中国化的基本前提。紧密结合抗日战争实际,毛泽东指出,“现在的中国,在日本占领区,是殖民地社会;在国民党统治区,基本上也还是一个半殖民地社会;而不论在日本占领区和国民党统治区,都是封建半封建制度占优势的社会”,把对“现时中国的国情”的认识进一步表述为“殖民地、半殖民地、半封建的社会”,进一步丰富和发展了马克思主义关于社会形态的理论,将党制定新民主主义革命的路线、方针和政策建立在对中国社会性质和现实国情的科学分析之上。
Based on this “important central point” and “the most essential general law” of modern Chinese society, Mao Zedong closely linked the great practice of the War of Resistance Against Japan with in-depth reflection on the basic issues of the Chinese revolution, enabling the Party’s understanding of the laws of development of the Chinese revolution to become more comprehensive and systematic. First, in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, imperialist national oppression was the greatest oppression; imperialism colluded with domestic feudal forces and the reactionary bourgeoisie hostile to the people to jointly oppress the Chinese people. This determined that imperialism, feudalism, and the comprador bourgeoisie allied with them were the main targets of the Chinese revolution. Second, the exceptional strength of the targets of the Chinese revolution determined the cruelty and protracted nature of the Chinese revolution, and determined that the Chinese revolution must take the special path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force. Third, since the enemies of the Chinese revolution were mainly imperialism and the feudal landlord class, the basic tasks of the Chinese revolution were the national revolution against imperialism and the democratic revolution against feudalism and comprador forces; these two tasks were both distinct from and unified with each other. Fourth, the socio-economic status of the various classes in Chinese society determined that the motive forces of the Chinese revolution should be based on the most revolutionary and most class-conscious proletariat, include the peasantry, which constituted the vast majority of the national population and had a natural and reliable connection with the proletariat, the various petty bourgeoisie outside the peasantry, and the national bourgeoisie, which could participate in the revolution within a certain period. Mao Zedong’s analysis of the targets, tasks, and motive forces of the Chinese revolution was a brilliant model of applying the basic principles of Marxism to the practice of the Chinese revolution and solving the problems of the Chinese revolution, providing an ideological prerequisite for accurately grasping the nature and prospects of the Chinese revolution.
立足近代中国社会性质这一“重要的中心的一点”和“总的最本质的规律”,毛泽东把抗日战争伟大实践同对中国革命基本问题的深入思考紧密联系起来,使党对中国革命发展规律的认识更为全面、更为系统。其一,在半殖民地半封建的中国,帝国主义的民族压迫是最大的压迫,帝国主义与本国封建势力、同人民为敌的资产阶级反动派互相勾结,共同欺压中国人民,这就决定了帝国主义、封建主义以及与它们勾结的买办资产阶级是中国革命的主要对象。其二,中国革命对象的异常强大,决定了中国革命的残酷性和长期性,决定了中国革命必须走农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的特殊道路。其三,既然中国革命的敌人主要是帝国主义和封建地主阶级,那么中国革命的基本任务就是反对帝国主义的民族革命和反对封建主义和买办势力的民主革命,这两大任务既互相区别又互相统一。其四,中国社会各阶级的社会经济地位,决定了中国革命的动力应以最革命、最觉悟的无产阶级为基础,包括占全国人口绝大多数、与无产阶级有着天然和可靠联系的农民阶级,农民以外的各种小资产阶级,以及在一定时期内可以参加革命的民族资产阶级。毛泽东关于中国革命对象、任务、动力的分析,是将马克思主义基本原理运用于中国革命实践、解决中国革命问题的光辉典范,为准确把握中国革命性质和发展前途提供了思想前提。
On this basis, Mao Zedong creatively put forward the concept of “New Democracy,” giving a scientific name to the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary activities of the masses led by the proletariat since the May Fourth Movement. [18]18 The May Fourth Movement (1919) was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal political and cultural movement initiated by Chinese students and intellectuals, often regarded as the starting point of the new-democratic revolution. In Mao Zedong’s view, the Chinese revolution was a national revolution to overthrow imperialism and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal forces; therefore, “the nature of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist, but bourgeois-democratic.” However, “the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is no longer the old, ordinary type of bourgeois-democratic revolution, but a new, special type of bourgeois-democratic revolution. This kind of revolution is developing in China and all colonial and semi-colonial countries, and we call it the new-democratic revolution.” [19]19 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 343. This kind of revolution “is a transitional stage between ending the colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society and establishing a socialist society,” [20]20 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 316. both “clearing the way for capitalism” and “creating a premise for socialism.” [21]21 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 343. Because the new-democratic revolution occurred after the First World War and the October Revolution in Russia, and resolutely opposed imperialism, it became linked with the world revolution and thus became a part of the world proletarian movement and socialist revolution, with its future development inevitably being socialism. The proposal of the concept of “New Democracy” was a brilliant model of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities, an important theoretical achievement of the Chinese Communist Party in advancing the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context, and marked a new height in the Party’s understanding of the laws of the Chinese revolution.
在此基础上,毛泽东创造性地提出“新民主主义”概念,使五四运动以来无产阶级领导下的人民大众反帝反封建的革命活动有了科学的称谓。在毛泽东看来,中国革命是为了推翻帝国主义的民族革命和推翻封建势力的民主革命,因此“现阶段中国革命的性质,不是无产阶级社会主义的,而是资产阶级民主主义的”;但“现时中国的资产阶级民主主义的革命,已不是旧式的一般的资产阶级民主主义的革命”,“而是新式的特殊的资产阶级民主主义的革命。这种革命正在中国和一切殖民地半殖民地国家发展起来,我们称这种革命为新民主主义的革命”。这种革命“是为了终结殖民地、半殖民地、半封建社会和建立社会主义社会之间的一个过渡的阶段”,既“替资本主义扫清道路”,又“替社会主义创造前提”。由于新民主主义革命发生在第一次世界大战和俄国十月革命之后,且坚决反对帝国主义,与世界革命发生了联系,因而成为世界无产阶级运动和社会主义革命的一部分,其发展前途必然是社会主义。“新民主主义”这一概念的提出,是把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的光辉典范,是中国共产党推进马克思主义中国化的重要理论成果,标志着党对中国革命规律的认识达到新高度。
2. The Dual Tasks of the Chinese Revolution and the “Two-Step” Strategy
2.中国革命的双重任务及“两步走”的战略
In the context of accurately grasping the era of the proletarian socialist revolution and the national liberation movements of colonial and semi-colonial countries, Mao Zedong scientifically delineated the two stages of development of the Chinese revolution, clarifying that the Chinese revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party included the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the present stage (the new-democratic revolution) and the proletarian-socialist revolution of the future stage (the socialist revolution).
在准确把握无产阶级社会主义革命和殖民地半殖民地民族解放运动的时代背景下,毛泽东科学划分了中国革命的两个发展阶段,明确了中国共产党领导的中国革命包括现在阶段的资产阶级民主主义性质的革命(新民主主义革命)和将来阶段的无产阶级社会主义性质的革命(社会主义革命)。
For a considerable period after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the understanding of the relationship between the dual missions and tasks of the Chinese revolution among the main leaders of the Party Central Committee was inaccurate; this was also the key reason for the repeated occurrence of “Left” and Right errors since the Party’s founding. “Some naive Communists think that we have only the task of the democratic revolution at the present stage and not the task of the socialist revolution at the future stage, or that the present revolution or the agrarian revolution is already the socialist revolution.” [22]22 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 316. These two views either severed the connection between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, falling into the error of the “theory of two-stage revolution,” or confused the distinction between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, falling into the error of the “theory of one-stage revolution,” both of which had caused great harm to the Chinese revolution. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, how to correctly understand the historical status of the war, how to accurately grasp the relationship between the war and the entire Chinese democratic revolution, how to understand and grasp the relationship between new democracy and socialism, and how to counter the reactionary propaganda of “one party, one leader, one doctrine” [23]23 This slogan was promoted by the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek to assert its monopoly on political power and ideology, rejecting the CPC’s role and the principle of multi-party cooperation. advocated by the die-hard Kuomintang faction became urgent theoretical and practical issues to be resolved.
在中国共产党成立后的一个相当长的时期里,党中央主要领导人对中国革命双重使命任务之间关系的认识是不准确的,这也是党成立以来反复发生“左”、右倾错误的关键所在。“有些幼稚的共产党员,以为我们只有在现在阶段的民主主义革命的任务,没有在将来阶段的社会主义革命的任务,或者以为现在的革命或土地革命即是社会主义的革命。”这两种观点要么割裂了民主主义革命与社会主义革命的联系,陷入“二次革命论”的误区;要么混淆了民主主义革命与社会主义革命的区别,陷入“一次革命论”的误区,曾对中国革命造成巨大伤害。在抗日战争中,如何正确认识抗日战争的历史地位,如何准确把握抗日战争与整个中国民主革命的关系,如何认识和把握新民主主义与社会主义的关系,反击国民党顽固派鼓吹的“一个政党、一个领袖、一个主义”的反动宣传,成为当时亟待解决的理论和实践问题。
Mao Zedong pointed out: “Only by clearly distinguishing the democratic revolution from the socialist revolution, while also recognizing their interconnection, can one correctly lead the Chinese revolution.” In his view, the New Democratic Revolution, including the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the socialist revolution were two successive but qualitatively different stages in the process of the Chinese revolution. Only after completing the former stage could one proceed to the latter, that is, “the democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution.” Regarding the former stage, the basic task of the Chinese people was to carry out a bourgeois-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat to overthrow the exploitation and oppression of imperialism and feudalism, fundamentally change the semi-colonial and semi-feudal social form, clear the way for the development of capitalism, and establish a state power of a New Democratic nature under the leadership of the proletariat and the joint dictatorship of various revolutionary classes. Regarding the latter stage, because the Chinese revolution was situated in an international environment of “capitalism in decline and socialism on the rise,” combined with special conditions such as the weakness and compromise of the Chinese bourgeoisie and the strength and revolutionary thoroughness of the proletariat, this state power of a New Democratic nature would inevitably continue to develop forward, ultimately transforming through the socialist revolution into a state power of a socialist nature. That is to say, the Chinese revolution could neither be accomplished in one fell swoop nor allow a bourgeois dictatorship to be inserted between the two stages; it could only develop from the New Democratic Revolution to the socialist revolution and establish a socialist society. This was Mao Zedong’s profound explanation of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution and also a prospect for the future of the Chinese revolution, which was proven by the development of the situation after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan.
毛泽东指出:“只有认清民主主义革命和社会主义革命的区别,同时又认清二者的联系,才能正确地领导中国革命。”在他看来,包括抗日战争在内的新民主主义革命和社会主义革命是中国革命过程中前后相继但又性质不同的两个阶段,只有完成了前一阶段才可能去完成后一阶段,即“民主主义革命是社会主义革命的必要准备,社会主义革命是民主主义革命的必然趋势”。就前一个阶段而言,中国人民的基本任务是在无产阶级的领导下开展推翻帝国主义、封建主义剥削压迫的资产阶级民主革命,从根本上改变半殖民地半封建的社会形态,为资本主义发展扫清道路,建立起无产阶级领导的、各革命阶级联合专政的新民主主义性质的国家政权;就后一个阶段而言,由于中国革命处于“资本主义向下没落,社会主义向上生长”的国际环境,加上中国资产阶级的软弱和妥协、无产阶级的强大和革命彻底性等特殊条件,这种新民主主义性质的国家政权必将继续向前发展,经过社会主义革命最终转变为社会主义性质的国家政权。也就是说,中国革命既不能毕其功于一役,也不容在两个阶段中间横插一个资产阶级专政,只能经由新民主主义革命发展到社会主义革命,建立社会主义社会。这是毛泽东对中国革命特点的深刻阐释,也是对中国革命发展前途的展望,为抗日战争胜利后的局势发展所证明。
3. The Establishment of the Direction and Basic Goals for the “New Society and New State of the Chinese Nation”
3.“中华民族的新社会和新国家”前进方向和基本目标的确立
As an important stage of the New Democratic Revolution, the War of Resistance Against Japan took as its basic goal the development of a new politics, a new economy, and a new culture of a New Democratic nature, starting from the basic requirement of reforming the old politics, old economy, and old culture of the Chinese nation. This pointed out the direction and basic goals of the Chinese revolution.
抗日战争作为新民主主义革命的一个重要阶段,其基本目标是从革新中华民族的旧政治、旧经济、旧文化的基本要求出发,发展新民主主义的新政治、新经济、新文化,这就指明了中国革命的前进方向和基本目标。
First, develop New Democratic politics.
第一,发展新民主主义的政治。
Due to the semi-colonial and semi-feudal social nature of modern China, the national bourgeoisie possessed both revolutionary and compromising characteristics. The task of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution could only be led by the most thoroughly revolutionary proletariat and completed through a revolutionary united front with the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. This stipulated that the transitional state form after the victory of the New Democratic Revolution could neither be “the old form, the European-American form, the bourgeois dictatorship, the capitalist republic” nor “the Soviet form, the proletarian dictatorship, the socialist republic,” but could only be a New Democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of various revolutionary classes led by the proletariat. The corresponding form of government would be the system of people’s congresses implementing democratic centralism.
由于近代中国半殖民地半封建的社会性质,民族资产阶级兼具革命性和妥协性,反帝反封建的民主革命任务只能由最具革命彻底性的无产阶级领导,并同农民阶级、城市小资产阶级、民族资产阶级组成革命的统一战线来完成,这便规定了新民主主义革命胜利后的过渡的国家形式既不可能是“旧形式的、欧美式的、资产阶级专政的、资本主义的共和国”,也不可能是“苏联式的、无产阶级专政的、社会主义的共和国”,而只能是无产阶级领导下各革命阶级联合专政的新民主主义共和国,与之相适应的政体则是实行民主集中制的人民代表大会制度。
Second, develop New Democratic economy.
第二,发展新民主主义的经济。
The fundamental purpose of the revolution was to change the comprador and feudal relations of production and clear obstacles for the development of productive forces. Because China’s economy was very backward, the development of national capitalism was an inevitable historical result of the Chinese revolution. However, “the entire outcome of the Chinese revolution is: on the one hand, the development of capitalist factors, and on the other hand, the development of socialist factors.” That is, confiscating large-scale industry, large-scale commerce, and large banks to establish a socialist state-owned economy; allowing the development of private capitalist economy beneficial to the national economy and people’s livelihood; changing feudal land ownership into peasant ownership, allowing the existence of rich peasant economy, and developing a cooperative economy with socialist factors on the basis of “land to the tiller.”
革命的根本目的是改变买办的封建的生产关系,为生产力发展扫清障碍。由于中国经济十分落后,发展民族资本主义是中国革命不可避免的历史结果,但“中国革命的全部结果是:一方面有资本主义因素的发展,又一方面有社会主义因素的发展”,即没收大工业、大商业、大银行,建立社会主义性质的国营经济;允许有利于国计民生的私人资本主义经济的发展;变封建土地所有制为农民所有制,允许富农经济存在,在“耕者有其田”的基础上发展具有社会主义因素的合作经济。
Third, develop New Democratic culture.
第三,发展新民主主义的文化。
In China, imperialist colonial culture and feudal decadent culture formed a cultural alliance to oppose China’s new culture. The culture of a New Democratic nature that gradually emerged after the May Fourth Movement was “a culture of the masses, led by the proletariat, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal.” It not only opposed the oppression of imperialism and advocated the independence and dignity of the Chinese nation, but also waged a resolute struggle against all feudal and superstitious ideas, “against all ideas that oppose resistance, oppose unity, and oppose progress,” advocated the democratization of culture, “served the more than ninety percent of the working and laboring masses of the entire nation, and gradually became their culture,” representing the forward direction of China’s advanced culture.
在中国,帝国主义的殖民文化和封建主义的腐朽文化结成文化同盟,反对中国的新文化。五四运动后逐步出现的新民主主义性质的文化是“无产阶级领导的人民大众的反帝反封建的文化”,不仅反对帝国主义的压迫,主张中华民族的独立和尊严,而且同一切封建思想和迷信思想、“同一切反抗战、反团结、反进步的思想”进行坚决斗争,主张文化的民主化,“为全民族中百分之九十以上的工农劳苦民众服务,并逐渐成为他们的文化”,代表着中国先进文化的前进方向。
Conclusion
结 语
The great victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan has already proven with irrefutable evidence that Marxism is a cognitive tool and powerful ideological weapon for the Chinese people to understand and transform the world. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Communists, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, profoundly grasped the reality of the War of Resistance, the Party’s historical position, and the scientific essence of Marxism. They achieved their own development and growth while always maintaining the overall situation of the War of Resistance, realized theoretical innovation in promoting the integration of the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities, and laid the ideological and theoretical foundation for winning the great victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the ultimate victory of the New Democratic Revolution. At the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War, deeply grasping the internal correlation of mutual achievement between the War of Resistance Against Japan and the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context requires us to profoundly understand the important conclusion that “the reason why the Communist Party of China works and why socialism with Chinese characteristics works is ultimately because Marxism works, and because the Marxism adapted to the Chinese context and the needs of the times works.” We must unswervingly promote the integration of the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with the excellent traditional Chinese culture, adhere to the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and continuously write a new chapter in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.
中国人民抗日战争伟大胜利的事实已经雄辩地证明,马克思主义是中国人民认识世界、改造世界的认识工具和强大思想武器。在抗日战争中,以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人深刻把握抗日战争的实际、党的历史方位和马克思主义的科学真谛,在始终维护抗战大局中实现自身的发展壮大,在推进马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合中实现理论创新,奠定了夺取抗日战争伟大胜利和新民主主义革命最终胜利的思想理论基础。在中国人民抗日战争胜利和世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年的时间节点上,深刻把握抗日战争与马克思主义中国化相互成就的内在关联,要求我们深刻理解“中国共产党为什么能,中国特色社会主义为什么好,归根到底是马克思主义行,是中国化时代化的马克思主义行”这一重要结论,坚定不移推进马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合、同中华优秀传统文化相结合,坚持以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导,不断谱写马克思主义中国化时代化新篇章。
Author’s Brief Introduction: Tian Keqin, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor at the Faculty of Marxism, Northeast Normal University.
作者简介:田克勤,东北师范大学马克思主义学部教授、博士生导师。
Notes
- The September 18th Incident (1931): A Japanese military attack on Mukden (now Shenyang) that marked the beginning of Japan’s full-scale invasion of Northeast China and is conventionally regarded as the start of the 14-year Chinese War of Resistance. ↩
- The North China Incident (1935): A series of Japanese provocations and demands in North China, including the He-Umezu Agreement, which extended Japanese control over Hebei and Chahar provinces. ↩
- The Xi’an Incident (1936): The kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to force him to form a united front with the CPC against Japan; its peaceful resolution led to the second KMT-CPC cooperation. ↩
- The December 9th Movement (1935): A large-scale student-led protest in Beijing and other cities demanding that the Kuomintang government resist Japanese aggression and stop the civil war. ↩
- Ma Zhanshan, Cai Tingkai, Feng Yuxiang: Kuomintang military figures who resisted Japanese aggression at various points in the 1930s, often in defiance of Chiang Kai-shek’s non-resistance policy. ↩
- The Wayaobu Conference (December 1935): A key CPC Politburo meeting that formally adopted the strategy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and criticized “Left” closed-doorism. ↩
- “First internal pacification, then external resistance”: The Kuomintang policy of prioritizing the elimination of the CPC and other domestic opponents over resisting Japanese invasion. ↩
- The Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was held in February 1937. It marked a shift in Kuomintang policy from “first internal pacification, then external resistance” toward a more united front approach, though it did not yet fully commit to war with Japan. ↩
- The Lugouqiao Incident (also known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) of July 7, 1937, was a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops near Beijing that triggered the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). ↩
- The Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937) refers to the period of civil war between the CPC and the Kuomintang, during which the CPC established rural base areas and developed the strategy of encircling cities from the countryside. ↩
- Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (1937). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 113. ↩
- Ibid., p. 114. ↩
- Ibid., p. 137. ↩
- Ibid., p. 138. ↩
- Ibid., pp. 147, 148. ↩
- Ibid., p. 124. ↩
- Ibid., p. 123. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 79. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Introducing *The Communist*” (October 1939), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 288. ↩
- This is a quotation from the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party” adopted at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in 1945. ↩
- The Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC was held in Yan’an from September to November 1938. ↩
- The Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942–1945) was a Party-wide campaign of Marxist education and ideological rectification aimed at overcoming subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes. ↩
- “Party stereotypes” (党八股) refers to a rigid, formulaic, and dogmatic style of writing and speech within the Party, criticized during the Yan’an Rectification Movement. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Economic and Financial Problems,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 115. The Chinese original is from Mao Zedong, “Economic and Financial Problems,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 891. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 339. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 305. ↩
- The May Fourth Movement (1919) was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal political and cultural movement initiated by Chinese students and intellectuals, often regarded as the starting point of the new-democratic revolution. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 343. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 316. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 343. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 316. ↩
- This slogan was promoted by the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek to assert its monopoly on political power and ideology, rejecting the CPC’s role and the principle of multi-party cooperation. ↩
- The May Fourth Movement refers to the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal political and cultural movement that began on May 4, 1919, in China, often seen as a watershed between the old and new democratic revolutions.