How Non-Productive Platforms Participate in the Distribution of Surplus Value

Introduction

引 言

The platform economy, formed by the development of internet information technology and the artificial intelligence revolution, is shaping a new pattern of human production and life, and has become an important engine of economic development.

互联网信息技术发展和人工智能革命形成的平台经济，正在塑造人类生产生活的新样态，并成为经济发展动力的重要引擎。

It is generally believed that platforms, by constructing network effects to facilitate transactions, interactions, or exchanges between different user groups, are a business model that obtains benefits by providing a venue to broker transactions. The platform itself is not a new thing, but due to the application of internet technology, digital platforms have broken through the constraints faced by traditional platforms in terms of geography, time, transaction scale, and information communication, gaining entirely new scale, content, efficiency, and influence. Using the platform’s target object and use function as classification criteria, Srnicek’s five-part classification of platforms is currently widely applied, namely: the first is advertising platforms, whose function is mainly to extract and analyze data generated by platform users, then provide digital services such as analysis results or advertising; the second is product platforms, where platforms use digital technology to transform traditional goods into digital goods and services, collecting rent or subscription fees in the process of providing services to consumers; the third is lean platforms, where platforms outsource a large number of services and functions, profiting by providing digital information services and data products as means of production; the fourth is cloud platforms, mainly providing rental services for cloud platform analysis capabilities; the fifth is the industrial Internet of Things, where information enterprises build internet connection services that can be provided to traditional manufacturing industries. In addition, domestic scholar Qu Jiabao classified platforms according to the capital accumulation methods of enterprises; Xie Fusheng et al. also classified platforms by combining enterprise charging models and types of traded goods.

一般认为，平台通过构建网络效应来促进不同用户群体之间的交易、互动或交换，是一种通过提供场所撮合交易获取利益的商业模式。平台本身不是一个新事物，但由于互联网技术的应用，数字平台突破了传统平台面临的地域、时间、交易规模、信息沟通等方面的约束，获得了全新的规模、内涵、效率和影响力。按照平台的针对对象和使用功能为分类标准，斯尔尼塞克对平台的五分法目前被广泛运用，即：第一种是广告平台，其功能主要是对平台用户产生的数据进行提取和分析，然后提供分析结果或广告宣传等数字服务；第二种是产品平台，平台利用数字技术将传统商品转化为数字商品和服务，在平台为消费者提供服务的过程中收取租金或订阅费；第三种是精益平台，平台将大量服务和职能外包，通过提供数字信息服务和作为生产资料的数据产品获利；第四种是云平台，主要提供云平台分析能力的出租服务；第五种是工业物联网，信息企业构建能够为传统制造业提供互联网的链接服务。此外，国内学者曲佳宝根据企业资本积累方式对平台进行了分类;谢富胜等结合企业收费模式和交易商品类别也对平台进行了分类。

Platform enterprises are enterprises that take digital platforms as their core assets and business models. Up to now, the main types of enterprises include four kinds: the first is transaction-type platform enterprises, which mainly facilitate the transaction of goods or services, such as Alibaba (B2B/B2C), JD.com, Didi Chuxing, Meituan, Amazon, etc.; the second is innovation-type platform enterprises, which mainly build a technology foundation and ecosystem, provide basic technologies and tools, allow third parties to develop complementary products or services on top of them, and empower all industries, including industrial internet platforms, artificial intelligence and Internet of Things platforms, basic software and system platforms, etc., such as Changhong’s CHiM industrial internet platform, Huawei’s AI large model, Tencent’s AI large model, Huawei’s HarmonyOS, Microsoft’s Windows, Apple’s iOS system, Google’s Android system, etc.; the third is content/social platform enterprises, which mainly promote content creation, sharing, and social interaction, such as WeChat, Douyin, Weibo, Facebook, YouTube, etc.; the fourth is hybrid platform enterprises, where many large platforms are developing towards a hybrid type, such as WeChat being both a social platform and integrating payment, mini-programs (innovation platform), e-commerce (transaction platform) and other functions, JD.com platform has developed into logistics and express delivery services plus “JD Manufacturing”, and Alibaba Group has gathered diversified businesses from advertising platforms to cloud computing platforms.

平台企业是指以数字化平台为核心资产和商业模式的企业。截至目前，主要企业类型包括四种：第一种是交易类平台企业，主要促进商品或服务的交易，比如阿里巴巴(B2B/B2C)、京东、滴滴出行、美团、亚马逊等；第二种是创新类平台企业，主要通过构建技术底座和生态系统，提供基础技术和工具，允许第三方在其之上开发互补的产品或服务，赋能千行百业，有工业互联网平台、人工智能与物联网平台、基础软件与系统平台等，比如长虹的CHiM工业互联网平台、华为的AI大模型、腾讯的AI大模型、华为的鸿蒙系统、微软的Windows、苹果的iOS系统、谷歌的Android系统等；第三种是内容/社交类平台企业，主要促进内容创作、分享和社交互动，比如微信、抖音、微博、Facebook、YouTube等；第四种是混合类平台企业，许多大型平台都在向混合型发展，比如微信既是社交平台，又集成了支付、小程序(创新平台)、电商(交易平台)等功能，京东平台已发展为物流快递服务加“京东制造”,阿里巴巴集团集合了从广告平台到云计算平台的多样化业务。

The platform economy refers to a new economic system and economic form centered on platform enterprises, based on digital technology, composed of data-driven, platform-supported, and network-coordinated elements. China’s “14th Five-Year Plan” defines the platform economy as: an economic form in which internet platforms coordinate and organize the allocation of resources.

平台经济是指以平台企业为核心，基于数字技术，由数据驱动、平台支撑、网络协同所构成的新经济系统和经济形态。我国“十四五”规划将平台经济定义为：由互联网平台协调组织资源配置的一种经济形态。

Compared with the traditional economy, the platform economy exhibits some new economic characteristics. From the positive side, first, it improves the efficiency of matching supply and demand and reduces costs. Algorithms have greatly improved the accuracy and speed of supply-demand matching, significantly reducing search costs, information costs, and contract costs. Second, it stimulates innovation and entrepreneurial vitality. It provides low-threshold entrepreneurial and employment opportunities for a large number of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises and individuals (such as online store owners, delivery riders, content creators). In particular, open platforms (such as the App Store) have spawned a huge application development ecosystem. Third, it can optimize resource allocation, activate and efficiently utilize idle social resources (such as vacant rooms, private cars, personal time), and promote the development of the “sharing economy”. Fourth, it creates consumer welfare. It provides consumers with unprecedented rich choices, lower prices, greater convenience, and personalized experiences. Fifth, it promotes the digital transformation of industries. Industrial internet platforms (such as Haier COSMOPlat, Rootcloud) are reshaping the production and management models of traditional manufacturing. From the negative or challenging perspective, first, it brings new monopolies and concentration of market power. Strong network effects easily lead to a “winner-takes-all” situation, forming market monopolies, suppressing competition and innovation, such as super-platform enterprises maliciously swallowing up other small and medium-sized enterprises, stifling the innovation potential of other enterprises. Second, data privacy and security issues urgently need regulation. Platform enterprises collect large amounts of user data, posing risks of data abuse, privacy leakage, and security. Third, algorithmic ethics and transparency issues. Algorithmic “black boxes” may lead to price discrimination (big data-enabled price discrimination against existing customers), biased content recommendations, and unfair assessments of workers (such as riders). Fourth, the issue of protecting workers’ rights and interests. Under the gig economy model, issues such as labor protection and social insurance for platform workers (such as riders, ride-hailing drivers) are prominent. Fifth, tax and regulatory challenges. The cross-regional and cross-domain characteristics of platforms pose huge challenges to traditional tax and industry regulatory systems based on geography. In addition, disorderly competition between different platform enterprises and the lack of social responsibility of platform enterprises themselves can lead to many behaviors that cross legal boundaries, infringe on user rights, and disrupt social order.

与传统经济相比，平台经济表现出了一些新的经济特征。从积极的方面看，一是提升供需匹配效率，降低成本。算法极大地提高了供需匹配的精准度和速度，显著降低了搜索成本、信息成本和契约成本。二是激发创新与创业活力。为大量中小微企业和个人(如网店店主、外卖骑手、内容创作者)提供了低门槛的创业和就业机会。尤其是开放平台(如App Store)催生了庞大的应用开发生态。三是能优化资源配置，激活并高效利用了社会闲置资源(如空闲房间、私家车、个人时间),推动了“共享经济”的发展。四是创造消费者福利。为消费者提供了前所未有的丰富选择、更低价格、更高便利性和个性化体验。五是推动产业数字化转型。工业互联网平台(如海尔COSMOPlat、树根互联)正在重塑传统制造业的生产和管理模式。从消极或者挑战视角看，一是带来新的垄断与市场权力集中。强大的网络效应容易导致“赢家通吃”的局面，形成市场垄断，压制竞争和创新，如超级平台企业对其他中小企业的恶意吞并，扼杀其他企业的创新可能。二是数据隐私与安全问题亟须规制。平台企业收集大量用户数据，存在数据滥用、隐私泄露和安全风险。三是算法伦理与透明度问题。算法“黑箱”可能导致价格歧视(大数据杀熟)、内容推荐偏见以及对劳动者(如骑手)的不公平考核。四是劳动者权益保障问题。在零工经济模式下，平台从业者(如骑手、网约车司机)的劳动保障、社会保险等问题突出。五是税收与监管挑战。平台的跨地域、跨领域特性对传统的基于地域的税收和行业监管体系构成了巨大挑战。此外，不同平台企业之间的无序竞争以及平台企业自身社会责任缺失会导致诸多突破法律底线、侵害用户权益以及破坏社会秩序的行为。

In summary, platform enterprises are representative economic organizations in the era of the digital economy, creating huge commercial value by building multilateral markets and utilizing network effects. The platform economy is a new economic paradigm centered on these platforms, which has greatly promoted economic growth and social progress, but has also brought severe challenges such as monopolies, privacy leaks, and algorithmic “black boxes”. Under such circumstances, a concrete analysis of the value operation laws and surplus value distribution of the platform economy is very necessary to promote the stable development of China’s platform economy.

总之，平台企业是数字经济时代的代表性经济组织，通过构建多边市场并利用网络效应创造巨大的商业价值。而平台经济则是围绕这些平台形成的新经济范式，它极大地推动了经济增长和社会进步，但也带来了垄断、隐私泄露、算法“黑箱”等严峻挑战。在这样的情况下，对平台经济的价值运行规律和剩余价值分配进行具体分析，对于推动我国平台经济的平稳发展是十分必要的。

I. The Source of Value in the Platform Economy

一、平台经济的价值来源

For the source of value in the platform economy, the basic analytical framework of Marxist political economy can be adopted, by examining the respective roles played by the platform economy in production and exchange (or circulation), value creation and value transfer, to gain a thorough understanding.

对平台经济的价值来源，可以采用马克思主义政治经济学的基本分析框架，通过考察平台经济在生产与交换(或流通)、价值创造与价值转移中各自发挥哪些作用，窥得一个究竟。

(1) Productive Platforms and Non-Productive Platforms

(一)生产性平台与非生产性平台

From the perspective of contribution to the real economy, economic platforms can theoretically be divided into “productive platforms” and “non-productive platforms”. The core lies in judging whether the platform’s main economic activity is to create new social value (increment), or mainly to optimize and redistribute existing value (stock), or even to extract excess profits through a monopoly position (decrement).

从对实体经济的贡献来看，理论上可以将经济平台划分为“生产性平台”与“非生产性平台”,核心在于判断平台的主要经济活动是创造新的社会价值(增量),还是主要优化和重新分配已有的价值(存量),甚至可能通过垄断地位汲取超额利润(减量)。

First, let us look at productive platforms. This type of platform is deeply integrated into the real economy chain, directly enhancing production efficiency and resource allocation efficiency through digital means, and creating new value. They are a key force in creating new industries, promoting industrial upgrading, and achieving high-quality development. Their core characteristics include: First, empowering the real economy. They focus on serving the primary and secondary industries and producers, enhancing their core capabilities in R&D, production, manufacturing, and supply chain management. Second, raising total factor productivity. By providing services such as technology, data, and finance, they help traditional enterprises reduce costs, increase efficiency, improve quality, and innovate. Third, creating incremental value. Their activities directly lead to the emergence of new products, new services, and new processes, expanding the total economic output. Fourth, generating a new technology-intensive economy. This includes economies built on hard-core technologies such as the Industrial Internet, artificial intelligence, big data, and the Internet of Things. The main types of productive platforms include the previously mentioned industrial Internet platforms, B2B industrial e-commerce platforms, R&D and collaborative innovation platforms, and digital technology empowerment platforms. Haier COSMOPlat (empowering enterprises to achieve mass customization), Rootcloud’s Rootcloud platform (providing equipment connection and data analysis services), and Siemens MindSphere (an industrial IoT operating system) are typical industrial Internet platforms; their role is to connect industrial equipment, optimize production processes, enable predictive maintenance, and coordinate supply chains. Alibaba (1688.com), GCL Group, and Ouyeel (steel industry) are typical B2B industrial e-commerce platforms; their role is to connect upstream and downstream industries, reduce the cost of raw material procurement and product sales, and improve supply chain efficiency. GitHub in the software field and the Apollo open platform in the autonomous driving field are typical R&D and collaborative innovation platforms; their role is to aggregate global intellectual resources, share technical tools, and accelerate technological innovation and product R&D. Cloud computing service providers such as Alibaba Cloud, Huawei Cloud, and Tencent Cloud are digital technology empowerment platforms; their role is to provide enterprises with computing power, data, and AI capabilities, lowering the threshold and cost of digital transformation. Productive platforms are a model of the “integration of digital and real economies” and represent the development direction of the platform economy. They can strengthen and optimize the real economy, enhance the nation’s competitiveness in the global industrial chain, are the core driving force of the digital economy, and are the focus of policy encouragement and support.

首先，来看生产性平台。这类平台深度融入实体经济链条，通过数字化手段直接提升生产效率和资源配置效率，创造新的价值，是创造新产业、推动产业升级和高质量发展的关键力量。其核心特征包括：一是赋能实体经济。专注于服务第一、第二产业和生产者，提升其研发、生产、制造、供应链管理等核心能力。二是提升全要素生产率。通过提供技术、数据、金融等服务，帮助传统企业降本、增效、提质、创新。三是创造增量价值。其活动直接导致新产品、新服务、新工艺的产生，扩大了经济总量。四是生成新的技术密集型经济。包括建立在工业互联网、人工智能、大数据、物联网等硬核技术之上的经济体。生产性平台的主要类型包括前面提到的工业互联网平台、B2B产业电商平台、研发与协同创新平台、数字技术赋能平台等。海尔卡奥斯COSMOPlat(赋能企业实现大规模定制)、树根互联的根云平台(提供设备连接、数据分析服务)、西门子MindSphere(工业物联网操作系统)是典型的工业互联网平台，其作用是连接工业设备，优化生产流程，预测性维护，供应链协同。阿里巴巴(1688.com)、国联股份、欧冶云商(钢铁行业)是典型的B2B产业电商平台，其作用是打通产业上下游，降低原材料采购和产品销售成本，提升供应链效率。软件领域的GitHub、自动驾驶领域的Apollo开放平台是典型的研发与协同创新平台，其作用是汇聚全球智力资源，共享技术工具，加速技术创新和产品研发。阿里云、华为云、腾讯云等云计算服务商是数字技术赋能平台，其作用是为企业提供算力、数据和人工智能能力，降低数字化转型的门槛和成本。生产性平台是“数实融合”的典范，代表着平台经济的发展方向。它们能够做强做优实体经济，提升国家在全球产业链中的竞争力，是数字经济的核心驱动力，也是政策鼓励和支持的重点。

Second, let us look at non-productive platforms. The activities of this type of platform are mainly concentrated in the fields of circulation, consumption, social interaction, and entertainment. Their core value lies in optimizing transaction matching and distribution efficiency, but they themselves do not directly participate in the production and creation of material products. Their core characteristics: First, focusing on the transaction and consumption link. They mainly serve end consumption, optimizing the circulation and matching of goods, services, information, and content. Second, optimizing stock value. They mainly redistribute existing consumption and attention by improving information symmetry and convenience, rather than creating entirely new material products. Third, being capital- and data-intensive. Their expansion is highly dependent on capital investment and the accumulation of user data, easily forming a “winner-takes-all” monopoly pattern. Fourth, potentially causing social problems. If regulation is inadequate, they can easily lead to disorderly expansion of capital, data abuse, deterioration of the content ecosystem, and squeezing of the real economy’s profits. The main types of non-productive platforms include: traditional e-commerce and O2O platforms, social and content platforms, and gig economy platforms. Taobao, JD.com, Meituan (in-store business), and Pinduoduo are typical enterprises of traditional e-commerce and O2O platforms; their role is to efficiently match goods/services with consumers, greatly facilitating daily life, but their main optimization is of the “transaction” itself. WeChat, Douyin, and Facebook are typical representatives of social and content platforms; their role is to meet people’s needs for social interaction, entertainment, and information acquisition, mainly distributing users’ “attention” and “time.” Didi, Meituan Waimai (rider side), and Uber are typical representatives of gig economy platforms; their role is to efficiently match labor with short-term demand, providing employment flexibility. The value sources or revenue models of non-productive platforms mainly include: First, transaction commissions, i.e., extracting a certain percentage fee from each successful transaction (e.g., Meituan, Didi). Second, advertising revenue, i.e., charging merchants fees to display advertisements to users more precisely (e.g., Google, ByteDance). Third, subscription services, i.e., charging users or merchants periodic fees for advanced features or services (e.g., Amazon Prime, LinkedIn Premium). Fourth, value-added services, providing additional services such as data analysis, cloud computing, and financial loans (e.g., Alibaba Cloud, Ant Group) and charging service fees.

其次，来看非生产性平台。这类平台活动主要集中在流通、消费、社交和娱乐领域，其核心价值在于优化交易匹配和分配效率，但本身不直接参与物质产品的生产创造。其核心特征：一是聚焦交易与消费环节，主要服务于终端消费，优化商品、服务、信息和内容的流通与匹配。二是优化存量价值，主要通过提高信息对称性和便捷性来重新分配已有的消费和注意力，而非创造全新的物质产品。三是资本与数据密集型，其扩张高度依赖资本投入和用户数据积累，容易形成赢家通吃的垄断格局。四是可能引发社会问题，如果监管不力，容易导致资本无序扩张、数据滥用、内容生态恶化、挤压实体经济利润等问题。非生产性平台的主要类型包括：传统电商与O2O平台、社交与内容平台、零工经济平台等。 淘宝、京东、美团(到店业务)、拼多多等是传统电商与O2O平台的典型企业，其作用是高效匹配商品/服务与消费者，极大便利了生活，但其主要优化的是“交易”本身。微信、抖音、Facebook等是社交与内容平台的典型代表，其作用满足人们的社交、娱乐和信息获取需求，主要分配的是用户的“注意力”和“时间”。滴滴、美团外卖(骑手端)、Uber等是零工经济平台的典型代表，其作用是高效匹配劳动力与短期需求，提供了就业灵活性。非生产性平台的价值来源或收入模式主要包括：一是交易佣金，即从每笔成功交易中抽取一定比例的费用(如美团、滴滴)。二是广告收入，即向商家收取费用，以便更精准地向用户展示广告(如谷歌、字节跳动)。三是订阅服务，即向用户或商家收取定期费用以获取高级功能或服务(如亚马逊Prime、LinkedIn Premium)。四是增值服务，提供数据分析、云计算、金融贷款等额外服务(如阿里巴巴云、蚂蚁金服)收取服务费用。

In summary, we can see that productive platforms mainly serve the supply side or producers; their core value is creating incremental value and enhancing production efficiency. They primarily leverage new quality productive forces such as the Industrial Internet, the Internet of Things, AI, and cloud computing to perform economic functions like empowerment, innovation, and production and manufacturing. Non-productive platforms mainly serve the demand side or consumers; their core value is optimizing stock distribution and enhancing transaction efficiency. They primarily use recommendation algorithms, payment systems, and user interface services to perform economic functions like matching, circulation, and consumption. However, the classification of platforms as productive or non-productive should be viewed dialectically. Non-productive platforms have greatly improved the consumer experience, created convenience, activated idle resources, and spawned a large number of new types of jobs. Their “non-productivity” is a neutral description in the economic sense, not a moral critique. The key lies in their development model. Healthy non-productive platforms truly reduce social transaction costs through technological innovation, create win-win situations for sellers and consumers, and abide by the rules. Alienated non-productive platforms, if they use their dominant market position to extract excess profits from both producers and consumers through practices such as “choosing one of two,” [3]3 “Choosing one of two” (二选一) refers to a practice by dominant platform companies requiring merchants to operate exclusively on their platform, prohibiting them from listing on competing platforms. big data-enabled price discrimination against existing customers, and exorbitant commissions, then they become extractive/rent-seeking platforms that will suppress the vitality of the overall economy. In particular, many large platforms are developing into mixed types. For example, JD.com has both a B2C business serving consumers (non-productive) and a powerful intelligent supply chain and logistics system serving brand owners (productive). Meituan has both an in-store business connecting consumers and merchants (non-productive services) and empowerment businesses serving merchants, such as unmanned delivery and catering SaaS systems (productive services). Therefore, one must avoid absolutizing the classification of productive and non-productive.

综上分析，我们可以看出，生产性平台主要服务供给端或生产者，其核心价值是创造增量价值，提升生产效率，主要通过工业互联网、物联网、AI、云计算等新质生产力，发挥赋能、创新、生产制造等经济功能。非生产性平台主要服务需求端或消费者，其核心价值是优化存量分配，提升交易效率，主要通过推荐算法、支付系统、用户界面服务，发挥匹配、流通、消费等经济功能。但对于平台的生产性与非生产性划分要辩证看待。非生产性平台极大地改善了消费体验，创造了便利，激活了闲置资源，并催生了大量新型就业岗位。其“非生产性”是一个经济学意义上的中性描述，而非道德批判。关键在于其发展模式，健康的非生产性平台通过技术创新真正降低社会交易成本，为卖家和消费者创造共赢，并遵守规则。异化的非生产性平台如果利用市场支配地位，通过“二选一”、大数据杀熟、高昂佣金等方式从生产者和消费者两端汲取超额利润，那么就变成了汲取性/分利性平台，会抑制整体经济的活力。尤其是许多大型平台向混合型发展。比如京东既有面向消费者的B2C业务(非生产性),也有强大的智能供应链和物流体系服务于品牌商(生产性)。美团既有连接消费者与商家的到店业务(非生产性服务),也有无人配送、餐饮SaaS系统等服务于商家的赋能业务(生产性服务)。因此，要避免把生产性与非生产性分类绝对化。

(2) New Changes in Labor under the Digital Economy

(二)数字经济下的劳动新变化

Under the digital economy, forms of labor, supported by information technology, have undergone a series of changes. From the perspective of the laborer, the subject of labor presents a more diverse form in the digital economy. While digital technology has dismantled the rigid boundaries of traditional labor forms, it has also given rise to new types of digital labor models. Whether it is the transportation service of ride-hailing drivers or the digital production of online content creators, these are new changes brought about by digital technology empowering traditional labor. New types of digital labor allow laborers to break through the constraints of time and space, no longer confined to fixed working hours and locations, exhibiting the characteristic of capital to transcend all spatial boundaries in its expansion. The object of labor in the digital economy also undergoes multiple transformations, the most important of which is the inclusion of user data as a new type of labor object in the production process, becoming an important raw material for platform capital accumulation. Furthermore, the means of labor in the digital age are gradually transforming into a combination of information technology and digital devices. Whether in traditional manufacturing or new technology industries, the renewal of the means of labor has been achieved through the empowerment of digital technology.

数字经济下的劳动形式在信息技术的加持下呈现出了一系列变化。从劳动者视角看，劳动主体在数字经济下呈现出更加多元的形态。数字技术在瓦解了传统劳动形态刚性边界的同时，也催生出了新型数字化劳动模式。无论是网约车司机的运输服务，还是网络内容创作者的数字化生产，都是数字技术赋能传统劳动带来的新变化。新型数字化劳动使得劳动者得以突破时间和空间的限制，不再局限于固定的工作时间与地点，展现出了资本所具有的超越一切空间界限扩张的特性。劳动对象在数字经济下也呈现出多重转化，其中最为重要的变化便是用户数据作为新型劳动对象被纳入生产过程中，成为平台资本积累的重要原料。除此之外，劳动资料在数字时代也逐渐转化为信息技术和数字设备的结合，无论是传统制造业还是新型科技产业，都通过数字技术赋能实现了劳动资料的更新。

In 2000, the Italian scholar Tiziana Terranova first proposed the concept of digital labour. She termed as digital labour the construction of basic internet hardware infrastructure, the production of terminal products, network operation and maintenance, as well as the behaviours of users receiving messages and creating content when using social media. Later, Christian Fuchs systematically organised the relevant concepts in *Digital Labour and Karl Marx*. At present, the academic community divides the concept of digital labour into a narrow sense and a broad sense. Broadly defined digital labour includes paid digital labour under the form of employment and unpaid digital labour under the form of non-employment, while narrowly defined digital labour refers only to the paradigm of data-information labour within social media or the internet domain that uses digital technology as its terminal.

2000年，意大利学者蒂兹纳·特拉诺瓦首次提出数字劳动(Digital Labour)这一概念。他把互联网基础硬件设施建设、终端产品生产、网络运行维护以及用户使用社交媒体时的接收消息与内容创造等行为都称为数字劳动。后来，克里斯蒂安·福克斯在《数字劳动与卡尔·马克思》中将相关概念进行系统整理。目前，学界将数字劳动的概念分为狭义与广义。广义数字劳动包括雇佣形式下的有酬数字劳动和非雇佣形式下的无酬数字劳动，而狭义数字劳动仅指以数字技术为终端的社交媒介或互联网领域内的数据信息劳动范式。

Below, we conduct some in-depth analysis of the labour that provides information technology, the labour that provides digital commodities, and the labour that provides digital services.

下面，我们对提供信息技术的劳动、提供数字商品的劳动、提供数字服务的劳动做一些深入分析。

First, the labour that provides information technology. In the era of the digital economy, the labour of platform construction has a dual historical character: it is both the material foundation of digitalised relations of production and the implicit precondition of the valorisation process. This part of labour is often contained in the labour of software engineers required in the early stage of platform establishment and the technical labour needed for maintenance during the subsequent operation process; it mainly uses internet information technology to provide software and hardware support for the construction of internet platforms. From an abstract perspective, the labour of platform construction only provides a carrier foundation for subsequent exchange and creates conditions for the production of new value. If the platform, after construction, is partially or wholly leased for profit—such as cloud computing platforms—then this labour directly participates in the production process of value and surplus value, belongs to the necessary conditions for the continuous conduct of the production process, and can be called productive labour.

首先，提供信息技术的劳动。在数字经济时代下，平台构建的劳动具有双重历史特性：它既是数字化生产关系的物质基础，又是价值增殖过程的隐性前提。这一部分劳动往往包含于平台建立初期所需的软件工程师的劳动以及后期在运行过程中所需要维护的技术劳动，主要运用互联网信息技术为互联网平台的搭建提供软硬件层面的支持。从抽象角度来看，平台构建的劳动只是为后续交换提供了载体基础，也为新价值生产创造了条件。若是平台在构建完成后进行部分或整体出租以盈利，如云计算平台，那么这种劳动就直接参与到了价值和剩余价值的生产过程中，属于生产过程持续进行的必要条件，可以被称为生产劳动。

Second, the labour that provides digital services. Digital services are economic activities that use digital means to provide customers with added value in various forms, such as convenience, comfort, efficiency improvement, or health. The platform economy can mainly provide two types of services: first, providing more efficient and convenient sales services for platform merchants, typical representatives being various online shopping platforms and food delivery platforms; second, providing various types of advertising information pushes for platform clients, such as the Baidu browser platform and the WeChat platform. This type of digital service bears the typical characteristics of commercial capital, specifically manifested in not participating in the production of products but being extremely dependent on industrial capital. This characteristic is similar to commercial capital; the activities of commercial capital depend on the operation of productive capital, and its value realisation depends on the production of commodities. Similar to commercial capital, the role of labour participating in the provision of digital services in the platform economy mainly lies in accelerating the circulation speed of existing commodities. Circulation itself does not create new value; it only accelerates the realisation of value, and therefore cannot produce surplus value. The profit it obtains mainly comes from the division of industrial profit. Marx once pointed out: "Commercial capital can realise profit only because industrial capital does not realise all the surplus value or profit in the price of the commodity." [4]4 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume 3, Chapter 16. Commercial capital itself does not increase the value of these commodities by even a single iota. Therefore, this type of labour also does not produce any new value or surplus value.

其次，提供数字服务的劳动。数字服务是以数字化手段为客户提供便利、舒适、效率提升或健康等各种形式附加值的经济活动。平台经济主要能提供的服务有二：一是为平台商户提供更高效便利的销售服务，典型代表为各种网络购物平台以及外卖平台；二是为平台客户提供各类广告信息推送，如百度浏览器平台和微信平台。这类数字服务带有典型的商业资本特征，具体表现为并未参与产品的生产，但对产业资本极度依赖。这一特点与商业资本类似，商业资本的活动依赖于生产资本的运作，它的价值实现依赖于商品的生产。与商业资本类似，参与数字服务提供的劳动在平台经济中的作用主要在于加快已有商品的流通速度，流通本身并不创造新价值，它只是加快价值的实现，因而不能生产出剩余价值，其获得的利润主要来源于对产业利润的分割。马克思曾指出：“商业资本之所以能实现利润，只是因为产业资本在商品的价格中实现的并非全部的剩余价值或利润”。商业资本本身没有增加这些商品哪怕一丝一毫的价值。因此，这种类型的劳动也不会产生任何新增价值或剩余价值。

Finally, the labour that directly provides digital commodities. Regarding the labour that provides digital commodities, there is considerable discussion in the academic community. Some Western scholars insist on the "audience commodity theory," especially those in the school of political economy of communication. The American Tim O'Reilly proposed that the current internet society has entered the Web 2.0 era, characterised by decentralisation, openness, and flattening. Compared with the Web 1.0 era, the biggest feature of the 2.0 era is the shift from the traditional "one-to-many" one-way traditional media output to deep user participation, generating and publishing content in a "many-to-many" content dissemination output method, that is, UGC content. Social media is a typical representative of this change, such as Facebook and Twitter. Against this background, the political economy of communication proposed the "audience commodity theory," arguing that media capitalists exploit and occupy the "attention" of audiences by using various media channels to share additional profits brought by accelerating capital turnover speed from industrial capitalists. However, this theory actually has relatively large logical flaws. Marx emphasised that productive labour should possess the characteristic of "purposiveness," while users' spontaneous content production behaviours (such as social interaction, content publishing) do not take the production of data elements to achieve valorisation as their direct purpose. At the same time, the precise delivery of advertisements to audiences can only promote the acceleration of commodity circulation speed, thereby accelerating the capital turnover and valorisation process. But this part of the operation still belongs to the field of circulation; that is, as Harvey said, the "spatial fix" strategy of digital platforms alleviates the crisis of capital overaccumulation by accelerating information flow, but it itself does not create new use value. The behaviour of industrial capitalists purchasing advertising delivery services from media capitalists is essentially to accelerate the accumulation of industrial capital's surplus value by shortening commodity circulation time, rather than releasing the value contained in the data itself. The above two points fully demonstrate that the labour of users spontaneously creating data cannot be called productive labour, and therefore does not produce surplus value for the platform. Actual data also confirms this view. For example, the famous social platform Meta (Facebook) had advertising revenue accounting for 97.5% in 2022; the core source of profit for digital platforms remains the transfer of surplus value from traditional industrial sectors.

最后，直接提供数字商品的劳动。对于提供数字商品的劳动，学界讨论颇多。一部分西方学者坚持“受众商品论”,其中以传播政治经济学学派尤甚。美国人蒂姆·奥莱利(Tim O`Relliy)提出，现在的互联网社会已经进入了网络2.0时代，其特征便是去中心化、开放化和扁平化。相比于网络1.0时代，2.0时代最大特点在于由传统的“一对多”的单方面传统媒体输出转向了用户深度参与，生成发布内容的“多对多”式的内容传播输出方式，也即UCG内容。社交媒体便是这种变化的典型代表，如脸书(Facebook)、推特(Twitter)。传播政治经济学在这一背景下提出“受众商品论”,认为媒体资本家通过使用各种媒体媒介剥削占有受众的“注意力”以从实业资本家手中分享提高资本流转速度带来的额外利润。但这种理论实际上存在较大的逻辑纰漏。马克思强调，生产劳动应具备“目的性”特点，而用户的自发内容生产行为(如社交互动、内容发布)并不是以生产数据要素从而实现价值增殖为直接目的。同时，受众被精确投放广告只能推动商品流动速度加快，进而实现资本流转和价值增殖过程的加速。但这一部分操作仍然属于流通领域的操作，即如哈维所说，数字平台的“空间修复”策略通过加速信息流动缓解资本过度积累危机，但其本身不创造新的使用价值。实业资本家向媒体资本家购买广告投放服务的行为，实质是通过缩短商品流通时间实现产业资本剩余价值的加速积累，而非释放数据自身所含价值，以上两点充分说明用户自发创造数据的劳动不能称之为生产劳动，也就没有为平台生产剩余价值。现实数据也印证了这一观点。比如，著名社交平台Meta(Facebook)2022年广告收入占比达97.5%,数字平台利润的核心来源仍是传统产业部门的剩余价值转移。

To clarify this issue, two basic concepts need to be defined: what are digital products and digital commodities. Digital products refer to raw data information that has not undergone capitalisation processing (such as user browsing traces, social interaction content); their essence is the unconscious by-product of digital behaviour. Digital commodities refer to exchangeable data packets formed after labour subjects process and integrate digital products. The theoretical basis for this distinction remains Marx's labour theory of value, namely, that only labour explicitly aimed at valorisation can be incorporated into the value creation system of capitalist relations of production.

要理清这一问题，需要明确两个基本概念：何为数字产品和数字商品。数字产品指的是未经资本化处理的原始数据信息(如用户浏览痕迹、社交互动内容),其本质是数字行为的无意识附带产品。数字商品则是指劳动主体对数字产品进行加工、整合后形成的可交换数据包。这一区分的理论依据仍然是马克思的劳动价值论，即只有以价值增殖为明确目标的劳动，才可能被纳入资本主义生产关系的价值创造体系。

Based on this, one can better distinguish the nature of labour related to digital commodities. Data spontaneously created by users or data traces left behind (such as UGC content), i.e., digital products, are important elements in the production of data commodities. But this kind of content is not the result of conscious labour, but rather an "accidental spillover," and therefore does not produce value. Once digital products are processed by workers employed by the platform economy and transformed into digital commodities, they then possess surplus value. First, from the specific form of labour, "all labour is, on the one hand, the expenditure of human labour-power in the physiological sense; and in this attribute of equal or abstract human labour, it forms the value of commodities." [5]5 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Section 2. The mental and physical expenditure of digital workers not only creates specific use values that satisfy user needs (such as data analysis, content production) but also forms the exchange value basis of commodities through the objectification of socially necessary labour time. On this point, it can be said that digital commodities satisfy the basic characteristics of commodities. Second, at the level of relations of production, the platform achieves substantive control over the processing process through labour contracts. Through algorithmic monitoring, performance indicators, and data scoring systems, the platform forces the living labour of digital workers to continuously invest in the valorisation process. Digital workers not only labour under the strict supervision of the platform, but their labour results are also expropriated by the platform. And when digital commodities realise their "salto mortale" [6]6 "Salto mortale" (deadly leap) is Marx's metaphor in *Capital* for the risky transformation of a commodity into money through sale. through market exchange, the surplus value condensed within them is gratuitously appropriated by capital. That is to say, this kind of labour produces surplus value and exchanges it with capital, achieving valorisation for capital. Therefore, it can be said that platforms producing digital commodities create new value.

基于此，就可以更好地分辨与数字商品相关的劳动的性质。用户自发创造数据或者遗留下的数据痕迹(如UCG内容),即数字产品，是数据商品生产的重要要素。但这种内容并非有意识劳动的结果，而是一种“偶然性溢出”,因而并没有产生价值。而一旦数字产品经过平台经济雇佣的工人的加工转化为数字商品后其便拥有了剩余价值。其一，从劳动的具体形式来看，“一切劳动，一方面是人类劳动力在生理学意义上的耗费；就相同的或抽象的人类劳动这个属性来说，它形成商品价值”。数字劳工的脑力与体力支出，既创造了满足用户需求的具体使用价值(如数据分析、内容生产),又通过社会必要劳动时间的物化形成了商品的交换价值基础，在这一点上，可以说数字商品满足了商品的基本特征。其二，在生产关系层面，平台通过劳动契约实现了对加工过程的实质性控制。平台通过算法监控、绩效指标与数据评分体系，迫使数字劳工的活劳动持续投入价值增殖过程。数字劳工不仅在平台的严密监管下劳动，其劳动成果也被平台剥夺。而当数字商品通过市场交换实现其“惊险的跳跃”时，凝结其中的剩余价值便被资本无偿占有。也就是说这种劳动生产出了剩余价值并且与资本相交换，为资本实现了价值增殖。因此，可以说生产数字商品的平台创造了新的价值。

Based on the above analysis, the following understanding can be reached: not all digital platforms can produce new value or surplus value; only when the digital labor involved in the platform falls within the category of productive labor, such as participation in the production of digital commodities, can the platform directly earn surplus value. Therefore, when a digital platform can directly engage in surplus-value production, providing value-added services and data commodities, it is called a productive platform; when a digital platform mainly participates in the subsequent realization of surplus value, it is called a non-productive platform. In theory, the concepts of productive platform and non-productive platform are absolutely mutually exclusive, but in reality, specific platforms that exist often possess both productive and non-productive characteristics.

根据以上分析，可以得出以下认识：并非所有数字平台能够生产新价值或剩余价值，只有当平台涉及的数字劳动属于生产性劳动范畴时，如参与数字商品生产，平台才能够直接赚取剩余价值。因此，当数字平台能够直接进行剩余价值生产，提供增殖服务和数据商品时，称之为生产性平台；当数字平台主要是参与剩余价值后续的实现环节，则称之为非生产性平台。在理论上，生产性平台和非生产性平台的概念具有绝对的互斥性，但现实中存在的具体平台往往兼具生产性与非生产性。

II. How Non-Productive Digital Platforms Participate in the Distribution of Surplus Value

二、非生产性数字平台如何参与剩余价值分配

Productive platforms can create new value through the labor of employed data workers; how then do non-productive platforms obtain their surplus value? In the era of digital capitalism, although non-productive platforms do not directly participate in the production of surplus value, their value-extraction mechanism has achieved a breakthrough from the traditional paradigm. From the perspective of traditional political economy, commercial capital obtains value transfer from industrial capitalists by facilitating commodity circulation, while landowners collect differential rent by virtue of monopolistic property rights; these two forms of value distribution have clear boundaries. However, non-productive platforms, by constructing a multilateral market architecture, can both act as commercial capital to accelerate commodity circulation and act as monopolists of virtual space to collect digital rent. This dual value-capture mechanism constitutes a new modality of capital accumulation for such platforms.

生产性平台可以通过雇佣的数据工人劳动创造新价值，那非生产性平台如何得到其剩余价值呢?在数字资本主义时代，非生产性平台虽没有直接参与剩余价值的生产，但其价值攫取机制实现了对传统范式的突破。传统政治经济学视域下，商业资本通过助力商品流通从产业资本家手中得到价值让渡，土地所有者凭借垄断性产权收取级差地租，两种价值分配形式具有清晰的边界。然而，非生产性平台通过构建多边市场架构，既能作为商业资本加速商品流通，又能作为虚拟空间垄断者收取数字地租，这种双重价值捕获机制构成了此类平台资本积累的新模态。

(I) Non-Productive Platforms Are the Development of Commercial Capital in the Digital Era

(一)非生产性平台是商业资本在数字时代的发展

The profits earned by non-productive platforms bear a strong character of commercial profit. Commercial capital refers to capital specialized in the buying and selling of commodities. It is "older than the capitalist mode of production; in fact, it is the oldest free form of existence of capital in history." [7]7 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chapter 20. Commercial capital is not confined to capitalist relations of production but has existed since the emergence of the commodity economy. The process of socialization of production spurred by the modern industrial revolution drove commercial capital to complete a morphological transformation; the capital function in the circulation process acquired an independent form and, through the social division of labor, became fixed as the specific function of a special capital, whereby commodity capital was transformed into specialized commercial operating capital. Commercial capital serves commodity circulation; it is the independence and differentiation of this function. Independent commercial capital reacts back on the production sphere by shortening circulation time, accelerating capital turnover, and other mechanisms. This division of capital is directly driven by the continuous development of productive forces and ultimately reacts back on the development of productive forces.

非生产性平台赚取的利润带有极强的商业利润性质。商业资本指专门经营商品买卖的资本。它是“比资本主义生产方式古老，实际上它是资本在历史上最古老的自由的存在方式”。商业资本并不局限于资本主义生产关系，而是自商品经济出现后便存在。近代工业革命催生的生产社会化进程，推动商业资本完成形态上的蜕变，流通过程中的资本职能获得独立形态，并通过社会分工固化为特殊资本的特有职能，商品资本遂转化为专业化的商业经营资本。商业资本服务于商品流通，是这种功能的独立与分化。独立的商业资本通过缩短流通时间、加速资本周转等机制反作用于生产领域。这种资本分工由生产力的不断发展直接推动，并最后反作用于生产力的发展。

In the era of the digital economy, non-productive platforms, while fully inheriting the characteristics and functions of commercial capital, further reconstruct the operational paradigm of traditional commercial capital by relying on network information technology. Leveraging digital technologies such as big data, cloud computing, and intelligent algorithms, they continuously centralize and integrate the information resources they collect, thereby constructing point-to-point precise transaction networks, greatly enhancing their ability to accelerate the speed of capital turnover. From a specific perspective, the promotional effect of non-productive platforms on commercial efficiency is multi-dimensional. Non-productive platforms greatly eliminate the problem of information asymmetry existing between supply and demand. Based on algorithm-driven intelligent matching mechanisms, platforms transform the discrete supply-side information and demand-side preferences in traditional markets into clear interactive interfaces, significantly reducing the information search costs of market entities. At the same time, non-productive platforms have also established mature credit guarantee mechanisms. By intervening in the market as a third party, they reshape the trust production model of market transactions. Taking the "Alipay" system of the Taobao platform as an example, the platform, as the transaction leader, establishes a deferred payment settlement and two-way evaluation system, transforming the transaction relationship dominated by personalized trust in traditional commerce into an institutionalized governance structure based on algorithmic credit scores, effectively safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of both parties to the transaction. In addition, non-productive platforms have built dynamic pricing models based on big data algorithms, achieving flexible control over the allocation of resources across time and space, effectively optimizing the circulation speed of platform resources. Typical representatives include some e-commerce retail platforms that dynamically adjust prices using real-time attention data on related commodities.

在数字经济时代下，非生产性平台在充分继承商业资本特点和功能的前提下进一步凭借网络信息技术重构了传统商业资本的运行范式。其依托大数据、云计算及智能算法等数字技术，将所收集的信息资源不断集中整合从而构建起了点对点的精准交易网络，极大增强了自身加速资本周转速度的能力。从具体层面来看，非生产性平台对商业效率的促进作用是多维度的。非生产性平台极大地消除了供需两端存在的信息不对称问题。平台基于算法驱动的智能匹配机制，将传统市场中离散的供给端信息与需求端偏好转化为明确的交互界面，显著降低市场主体的信息搜寻成本。同时，非生产性平台还建立起了成熟的信用保障机制，其作为第三方介入市场，重塑了市场交易的信任生产模式。以淘宝平台的“支付宝”系统为例，平台作为交易主导者建立起延迟支付清算与双向评价制度，将传统商业中由人格化信任主导的交易关系，转化为基于算法信用积分的制度化治理结构，有效保证了交易双方的合法权益。除此之外，非生产性平台还基于大数据算法搭建了动态定价模型，实现了跨时空资源配置的弹性化控制，有效优化了平台资源的流通速度。典型代表有部分电商零售平台利用相关商品实时关注数据动态调整价格。

The above mechanisms fully demonstrate that non-productive platforms effectively link commodity transactions across different times and spaces and greatly enhance the efficiency of matching supply and demand, presenting the typical characteristics and functions of commercial capital. They are a derivative of commercial capital in the digital era.

以上机制充分表明，非生产性平台有效串联了不同时间与空间下的商品交易并极大地提升了供需匹配的效率，呈现出了商业资本的典型特质与功能，是商业资本在数字时代下的衍生。

(II) The Source and Characteristics of Digital Rent Collected by Non-Productive Platforms

(二)非生产性平台收取数字地租的来源与特征

Capitalist ground rent is the concrete expression of private land ownership in the sphere of value distribution, the economic form through which land ownership is realized. It is rooted in the special natural monopoly of land as a means of production, representing the landowner's appropriation, through the monopoly of scarce natural elements, of the surplus value created by direct producers without compensation.

资本主义地租是土地私有产权在价值分配领域的具象化表达，是土地所有权借以实现的经济形式，其根植于土地作为生产资料的特殊自然垄断性，代表着土地所有者通过对稀缺自然要素的垄断，无偿占有直接生产者创造的剩余价值。

In the era of the digital economy, as virtual space becomes a new site of production and exchange, platform capital becomes the new rent collector. Jathan Sadowski points out: "Landlords extract rent through land ownership; platforms extract data rent through data ownership and control." [8]8 Jathan Sadowski, "The Internet of Landlords: Digital Platforms and New Mechanisms of Rentier Capitalism," *Antipode*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2020, p. 563. Non-productive platforms in the digital economy have sufficient conditions for collecting digital rent. From the perspective of scarcity, although virtual space appears to be an infinitely expandable resource, with the continuous development of the platform economy, the entire industry is often monopolized by a few leading enterprises. The development of the platform economy itself carries a tendency toward natural monopoly, just as Cédric Durand states, the first reason driving monopoly is "what economists call natural monopoly conditions, that is, the market structure itself is the result of the interaction of three factors—network complementarities, economies of scale, and sunk investment." [9]9 Cédric Durand, *Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism*, trans. by David Broder, London: Verso, 2020, p. 78. These characteristics mean that in the process of development, the platform economy will inevitably gradually form a situation where a few monopolistic leading enterprises occupy an absolute dominant position in the market. Taking Meta and Google as examples, the two occupy a 68% share of the global digital advertising market, and their platforms have become necessary channels for enterprises to reach consumers. This platform-level monopoly confirms Marx's assertion on ground rent, namely, "It (ownership) is not the cause of the creation of this surplus profit, but the cause of its transformation into the form of ground rent." [10]10 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chapter 38. When certain production conditions are monopolized by a few people, and their supply cannot be increased through competition, surplus profit is transformed into rent. From the perspective of the organic composition of capital, the organic composition of capital (C/V) in the platform economy is generally lower than that in traditional sectors such as manufacturing, which also provides a precondition for the generation of rent.

在数字经济时代下，随着虚拟空间成为新型生产与交易场所，平台资本成为新的收租人。贾森·萨多夫斯基(Jathan Sadowski)指出：“地主通过土地所有权抽取租金，平台通过数据所有权和控制权抽取数据租金。”数字经济下的非生产性平台具有收取数字地租的充足条件。从稀缺性来看，尽管虚拟空间似乎是无限扩张的资源，但随着平台经济的不断发展，整个行业往往被几个龙头企业垄断。平台经济的发展本身带有自然垄断的趋势，就如塞德里克·迪朗所说，推动垄断的第一个原因是“经济学家所说的自然垄断状况，即市场结构本身是三种要素作用的结果——网络互补性、规模经济和沉没投资”。以上特性使得平台经济在发展过程中必然逐渐形成少数垄断龙头企业占据市场绝对主导地位。以Meta与Google为例，两者占据全球数字广告市场68%份额，其平台已成为企业触达消费者的必要通道。这种平台层面的垄断印证了马克思对地租的论断，即“它(所有权)不是使这个超额利润创造出来的原因，而是使它转化为地租形式的原因”。当某些生产条件被少数人独占，且其供给无法通过竞争增加时，超额利润便转化为地租。而从资本有机构成角度来看，平台经济的资本有机构成(C/V)一般低于制造业等传统部门，这也为地租的产生提供了前置条件。

The ground rent collected by the platform economy can also be divided, following Marx, into relative rent and absolute rent. First, analyze relative rent. The formation mechanism of relative rent (differential rent) is always closely related to differences in the nature of the means of production, such as differences in conditions like land fertility and factors of production, which lead to differences in actual land output, and thus to differences in the rent that can be collected on different plots of land. As Marx revealed in Volume III of *Capital*: “Its origin is the limited extent of the best land, and the fact that equal amounts of capital must be invested on different classes of land, which yield unequal products for equal amounts of capital.” Efficiency differences also exist between platforms. In the digital age, the sources of user data, information collection tools, and big-data algorithms possessed by a platform can all be regarded as intangible assets of the platform enterprise, the core competitiveness for its survival and development. Cédric Durand argues that it is precisely these intangible assets that form the differential rent obtained by the platform, and points out: “Intangible assets are generally scalable, such as software or organizational experience. Once the initial investment is made, they can be replicated at negligible marginal cost, so returns to scale tend toward infinity… This differentiated benefit constitutes the key to understanding the peculiarity of the current competitive logic.” There are qualitative and quantitative differences in the intangible assets owned by different enterprises, which in turn lead to differences in their efficiency. The technological efficiency gap between digital platforms shapes the basis for the emergence of a new type of differential rent. At this point, the relative gains obtainable by different platforms also diverge. Leading platforms, by virtue of the advanced nature of their data infrastructure, can achieve a value-capture capability far exceeding the industry average. This productivity difference in “virtual land” enables platforms occupying the technological high ground to continuously extract surplus profits, just like high-quality land, and exhibits the characteristic of increasing returns. Furthermore, the digital differential rent mechanism greatly influences the outcome of value distribution. When a platform is at a disadvantage in the intergenerational replacement of technology, the additional income it can bring to platform users shows a diminishing marginal trend, and the rent it can collect will be relatively small, while enterprises at the tail end of the industry cannot obtain this portion of rent at all. Even within the camp of monopoly platforms, due to differences in parameters such as algorithm iteration speed and ecosystem completeness, a revenue gradient similar to the “better land providing more rent” in land management will still form, thereby creating sufficient conditions for the collection of relative rent.

平台经济收取的地租也可以依照马克思的标准分为相对地租和绝对地租。首先，分析相对地租。相对地租(级差地租)的形成机制始终与生产资料的性质差异紧密相关，如土地肥力、生产要素等条件之间的差异，导致土地实际产出存在不同，进而使得不同土地上能收取的地租存在差异。正如马克思在《资本论》第三卷所揭示的：“它的产生是由于最好土地面积有限，是由于等量资本必须投在对等量资本提供不等量产品的不同的各级土地上。”平台之间也存在效率差异。在数字时代下，平台所拥有的用户数据来源、信息收集工具和大数据算法等都可视为平台企业所具有的无形资产，是平台生存发展的核心竞争力。塞德里克·迪朗认为，这种无形资产恰恰形成了平台所获得的级差地租，并指出：“无形资产通常具有可扩展性，比如软件或组织经验。一旦最初的投资完成，就可以以微不足道的边际成本复制它们，因此规模收益趋向于无限……这种差异化的受益构成了理解当前竞争逻辑的特殊性的关键。”不同企业所拥有的无形资产存在质与量上的差异，进而导致了其效率上的差异。数字平台间的技术效率鸿沟塑造了新型级差地租的产生基础。此时，不同平台所能获得的相对收益也会出现不同。头部平台凭借其数据基础设施的先进性，能够实现远超行业平均水平的价值捕获能力。这种“虚拟土地”的生产力差异，使得占据技术高地的平台如同优质地块般持续获取超额利润，并呈现收益递增的特征。进一步地说，数字化的级差地租机制极大地影响了价值分配的结果。当平台处于技术代际更替的劣势地位时，其能为平台用户带来的额外收入呈现边际递减趋势，所能收取的租金也会相对较少，而处于行业末尾的企业则无法获得这部分地租。甚至即便是垄断平台阵营内部，由于算法迭代速度、生态体系完备性等参数差异，仍会形成类似于土地经营中“较好土地提供较多地租”的收益梯度，从而为相对地租的收取创造出充足条件。

Second, analyze absolute rent. Marx revealed in Volume III of *Capital* that the basis for the existence of absolute rent lies in the organic composition of capital in a particular production sector being persistently lower than the social average. This allows the sector to create, by absorbing surplus living labor, an amount of surplus value higher than the average profit, thereby providing a source of rent for the landowner. The internet platform industry also shares this characteristic. After a platform is built and begins operation, its main expenditure is on labor, so its organic composition is generally lower than the social average organic composition of capital. At the same time, the organic composition of the industrial capital attached to it is often lower than the social average organic composition of capital. The digital platform economy allows industrial capital to substantially reduce its fixed capital investment, such as expenditure on site rental. Compared with physical merchants, online merchants on the platform, by using the digital space provided by the platform, have relocated their business premises and achieved a lower organic composition of capital, which also creates conditions for obtaining surplus profits to pay rent.

其次，分析绝对地租。马克思在《资本论》第三卷中揭示，绝对地租的存在基础在于特定生产部门的资本有机构成长期低于社会平均水平，这使得该部门能够通过吸纳超额活劳动创造出高于平均利润的剩余价值量，进而为土地所有者提供租金来源。互联网平台行业也具有相同的特征。在平台建设完毕进行运营后，平台主要支出在于人力支出，因此其有机构成一般低于社会平均资本有机构成。同时依附于其上的产业资本有机构成往往低于社会平均资本有机构成。数字平台经济使得产业资本能够大幅减少自己的固定资本投入，如场地租赁费用。与实体商户相比，平台上的网络商户借助平台提供的数字空间实现了经营场所的转移，并拥有了更低的资本有机构成，也为获得超额利润支付地租创造了条件。

Compared with traditional ground rent, the new digital ground rent also exhibits two entirely new characteristics: First, digital ground rent has achieved a transformation from finite to infinite. Digital ground rent, parasitic on virtual space, breaks through the constraints of finite physical space to which traditional ground rent is subject, achieving the infinite plunder of valorized value. The digital services provided by non-productive platforms are non-rivalrous and infinitely replicable, which makes the marginal cost of their reproduction process approach zero. For example, a shopping platform may have a large number of merchants joining every day, but the platform does not need to provide any additional services specifically for them, essentially achieving zero input. This provides the basis for non-productive platforms to more conveniently harvest the surplus value generated by merchants. Second, the value-extraction mechanism of digital ground rent shows an important trend toward evolving into an ecological ground rent form. Because the platform itself requires high user stickiness, it will inevitably strive to form its own ecological model during expansion to ensure user dependence. Currently, the ecological expansion of platforms is mainly achieved through horizontal business expansion (e.g., extending from core e-commerce to fintech and cloud computing services). A typical case is JD.com entering the food delivery market by leveraging its own logistics advantages. On the one hand, this mechanism improves the platform’s ability to serve customers; on the other hand, it also enables the platform to more effectively ensure its dominant position in the circulation sphere.

相较于传统地租，数字新型地租也呈现出两种全新特征：第一，数字地租实现了从有限到无限的转变。寄生于虚拟空间的数字地租突破了传统地租所受到的有限物理空间的约束，实现了增殖价值的无限掠夺。非生产性平台提供的数字服务具有非竞争性和可无限复制性，这使得其再生产过程的边际成本趋近于零。如购物平台每天会有大量商家进驻，但平台无需为其专门提供任何额外服务，基本实现了零投入。这为非生产性平台更便捷收割商户产生的剩余价值的过程提供了基础。第二，数字地租的价值攫取机制呈现出了向生态地租形态演进的重要趋势。由于平台本身要求较高的用户黏性，因而其在扩张时必然会力图形成自有生态模式以保证用户依赖度。目前，平台的生态扩张主要通过横向业务扩张(如从核心电商延伸至金融科技、云计算服务),较为典型的案例有京东凭借着自身物流优势进入外卖市场。这一机制一方面提高了平台对客户的服务能力，另一方面也使平台能更有效保证自身在流通领域的支配地位。

(3) The Profits Obtained by Non-Productive Platforms Have the Dual Nature of Commercial Profit and Ground Rent

(三)非生产性平台所获取利润兼具商业利润和地租性质

The rent of non-productive platforms embodies the symbiotic characteristic of commercial profit and capitalist ground rent. From the attribute of commercial profit, platform rental income originates essentially from monopolistic intervention in the commodity circulation process — the platform, through algorithmic matching, traffic allocation, and rule-setting, builds a virtual trading space to aggregate supply and demand, promotes the acceleration of the circulation cycle of industrial capital, and thereby deeply participates in the value realization link. The commissions, service fees, etc., it collects can be regarded as an extension of commercial profit in the digital age. As for its ground rent nature, enterprises rely on technological barriers and network effects to deeply occupy the platform’s virtual space elements, and the rent they obtain can in turn be regarded as the surplus income from the monopolistic possession of “digital space,” possessing the composite characteristics of differential rent and monopoly rent. This symbiotic logic cumulatively reflects the new contradictions of digital capitalism: the platform both participates in value distribution as a circulation intermediary and forms a new type of ground rent exploitation through the monopolistic possession of the means of production, ultimately deepening the dual control over producers and consumers under the logic of capital valorization.

非生产性平台租金体现了商业利润与资本主义地租共生的特性。从商业利润属性看，平台租金收入本质上源于对商品流通过程的垄断性介入——平台通过算法匹配、流量分配和规则制定，搭建虚拟交易空间聚合供需双方，促进产业资本加速流通循环，进而深度参与价值实现环节，其收取的佣金、服务费等可视为商业利润在数字时代的延伸。而就其地租性质而言，企业依靠技术壁垒和网络效应深度占有平台虚拟空间要素，其所得租金又可以视为对“数字空间”垄断性占有的超额收益，具有级差地租和垄断地租的复合特征。这种共生逻辑叠加折射出数字资本主义的新矛盾：平台既作为流通中介参与价值分配，又通过占有垄断生产资料的占有方式形成新型地租剥削，最终在资本增殖逻辑下深化了对生产者和消费者的双重控制。

Taking business commission as an example, business commission is an important form of earning revenue for non-productive platforms and the most direct manifestation of the income obtained by the platform economy. Specifically, the platform does not deduct business fees in a single lump sum; rather, according to the strategic needs of the platform’s ecological development, it adopts different forms of deduction at different stages, and there is a transformation in the nature of the deduction between these stages.

以业务抽成为例，业务抽成是非生产性平台赚取收益的重要实现形式，是对平台经济获取收益的最直接体现。具体来看，平台抽取业务会费并不是直接一次性抽取的，而是根据平台生态发展的战略需要，在不同阶段采取不同形式的抽取，这之间便存在着抽取性质的转化。

First, consider the case of a single platform and a single producer. In the initial stage, the platform will basically charge a certain fee for joining the platform. For example, when merchants enter a food delivery platform (such as Meituan and Ele.me), they are required to pay an entry fee, including store rent, operation and maintenance fees, marketing fees, handling fees, and so on. This is the basic form of deduction, i.e., an entry threshold fee. Since the platform has not yet begun to serve the merchant at this point, and the merchant must pay the fee simply to enter the platform, this fee reflects the nature of the platform enterprise as a data virtual landlord, collecting absolute ground rent from other production manufacturers.

首先，考虑单个平台和单个生产商的情况。在开始阶段，平台基本上都会抽取一定的进驻平台的费用。比如，商家在进入外卖平台(如美团和饿了么)时都需要缴纳入驻费用，包括店铺租金、运营维护费、营销费和手续费等等。这是基础的抽取形式，即入会门槛费。由于此时平台并没有开始为商家服务，商家只是进入平台就需要缴纳费用，所以这种费用体现出了平台企业的数据虚拟地主的性质，收取了其他生产厂商的绝对地租。

As business proceeds, the platform begins to charge commissions for each transaction conducted. A relatively pure case is where the platform charges an entry fee in advance and subsequently only charges users a fee based on the transactions it facilitates. For example, the fee Meituan charges merchants is split into a technical service fee (commission) and a fulfillment service fee. The technical service fee is the fee charged by the platform for services such as information display, technical services, traffic support, and operational guarantees provided to the merchant when the merchant operates on the food delivery platform and completes a transaction — i.e., the actual commission. This portion of the technical service fee is charged purely for the platform’s use of its own big-data matching capabilities to facilitate transactions, and is therefore pure commercial profit. However, in many cases, the two are not clearly distinguished. To enhance their own competitiveness, some platforms adopt a strategy of lowering their threshold fees to attract more merchants. For instance, to build a platform business ecosystem, some platforms often start by offering free entry and various promotional services, but they make up for this loss by increasing the commissions charged on subsequent business transactions.

随着业务进行，平台开始对每一次开展的业务收取佣金。较为纯粹的一种情况是，平台事先收取了入驻费用，后续只根据促成的交易对于使用者进行费用的收取，比如美团对商户收取的费用被拆分为技术服务费(佣金)和履约服务费，其中技术服务费是商家在外卖平台进行经营并达成交易时，平台基于向商家提供的信息展示、技术服务、流量支持及运营保障等服务所收取的费用，即实际佣金。这部分技术服务费用完全是出于平台运用自身的大数据匹配能力进行交易促成的情况而收取的，也就是纯粹的商业利润。但很多时候，这二者之间并不会进行明显区分。部分平台为了提升自身竞争力会采取降低自身门槛收费的策略以吸引更多的商户进入，如一些平台为了形成平台商业生态，往往开始实行免费入驻，还提供各种宣传服务等，但会将这部分损失放到后续开展业务佣金进行补齐。

Next, consider the situation where the number of merchants and platforms has increased. At this point, efficiency differences exist among different platforms. This creates room for the formation of differential rent. Differential rent causes the fees that merchants pay when using different platforms to also differ; high-efficiency platforms, as discussed earlier, charge more in commissions. A typical example can be seen among China’s major online shopping platforms, such as Taobao, JD.com, and Pinduoduo. For the same commodity, the price on JD.com is relatively higher, meaning the platform takes a larger cut, because JD.com, compared with the other two platforms, can provide better delivery services and ensure that the supplier’s goods reach the customer more perfectly and promptly. At this point, the supplier’s revenue per unit of time increases, and this portion of revenue is also transferred to the platform in the form of commission fees. This also explains why better platforms can charge higher commission fees.

其次，考虑增加了商户和平台数量的情况。此时，不同平台之间存在着效率差异。级差地租由此有了形成的空间。级差地租使得商户在使用不同平台时需要缴纳的费用也产生差异，高效率的平台如前文所述会收取更多的佣金。一个典型的例子体现在我国的主要网购平台，如淘宝、京东、拼多多之间。同一件商品京东价格相对较高，即平台进行了更多的抽成，这是因为京东相较于其他两个平台能提供更好的快递服务，能保证供货商的商品可以更完美更及时地送到顾客手中。此时，供货商单位时间内能得到的收益会增加，而这一部分收益也会以抽成费用的形式让渡给平台。这也能说明更好的平台能收取更多的抽成费用。

It is worth noting that in the actual platform economy, commercial profit and differential rent always exist attached to absolute rent. This is because commercial profit and differential rent come from the platform’s facilitation of transactions, that is, they must depend on the realization of the platform’s functions, and at this point they inevitably enter the virtual space monopolized by the platform. Some platforms, in order to increase their appeal, may choose to reduce this portion of rental income as much as possible, but at this point we can only say that absolute rent is zero, not that it does not exist.

值得注意的是，在现实的平台经济中，商业利润和级差地租总是依附于绝对地租存在的。这是因为，商业利润和级差地租来自平台对交易的促进，也就是必须要依附于平台功能实现，此时就必然进入了平台垄断的虚拟空间内。有些平台为了增加吸引力会选择将这部分租金收入尽可能地降低，但此时我们只能说绝对地租为0,而不能说其不存在。

Finally, actual demand has given rise to multiple forms of business fee deductions. Tiered rent collection is a typical method. This indicates that the platform economy has further spawned what Marx called the third type of rent in the digital economy era: monopoly rent. A relatively typical example is platforms charging different commission rates based on enterprise size. At this point, because the platform occupies a monopolistic position in the market, it can collect more profit than the sum of the previous three types. A more advanced form of this rent is dynamic collection, where the enterprise adjusts the collection ratio for merchants dynamically based on market information data. For example, food delivery platforms dynamically adjust the commission ratio based on factors such as merchant size, product category, and degree of competition. For instance, a certain milk tea shop may enjoy a lower commission in the early stage of the platform; as sales volume rises, the platform classifies it as a “hot category,” and the commission ratio may increase. This is a precise extraction of surplus value. The above components constitute the main components of the profits collected by non-productive platforms.

最后，现实需求催生出了多种形式的业务抽成。分档收取租金就是一种典型方式。其表明平台经济进一步衍生出了数字经济时代下马克思所说的第三类地租：垄断地租。较为典型的就有平台根据企业规模收取不同的佣金抽取比例。此时，平台由于占据了市场中垄断地位能够收取比前三者加总更多的利润。这种地租更为高级的形式是动态收取，即企业根据市场信息数据来动态调整对于商户的收取比例。如外卖平台会根据商家规模、品类、竞争程度等因素动态调整抽成比例。例如，某奶茶店在平台初期可能享受较低抽成，随着销量上升，平台将其归类为“热门品类”,抽成比例可能会提高。这是对剩余价值的精准抽取。以上组成部分构成了非生产性平台收取利润的主要构成部分。

III. The Source of Power for Non-Productive Platforms’ Value Appropriation

三、非生产性平台价值占有的权力来源

In the digital economy era, the value-augmentation logic of non-productive platforms exhibits characteristics entirely different from those of productive platforms. Although this type of platform does not directly participate in the creation of new value in the sphere of material production, it has constructed a mechanism for appropriating and sharing the value created by the productive sector by reshaping the power relations in the sphere of circulation. The reason non-productive platforms can master the power of value redistribution lies in their possession of multiple powers, including the usufructuary right to data elements, which effectively allows them to control core functions such as information matching, credit evaluation, and transaction matching in commodity circulation, thereby achieving two-sided monopoly control over both the producer side and the consumer side.

在数字经济时代下，非生产性平台的价值增殖逻辑呈现出与生产性平台截然不同的特点。这类平台虽未直接参与物质生产领域的新价值创造，却以重构流通领域的权力关系路径，构建起了对生产性部门创造价值的占有与共享机制。非生产性平台之所以能掌握价值再分配的权力，在于其拥有包括数据要素的用益权等多项权力，实质上控制了商品流通中的信息匹配、信用评估与交易撮合等核心职能，对生产者端和消费者端实现了双向垄断控制。

The foundation for the platform to obtain this monopoly position lies in realizing the separation of ownership and usufructuary rights over digital products. Data ownership should originally belong to the data producer, but within the framework of the platform economy, this right of individual users is effectively usurped by the platform. Viewed from the perspective of historical materialism, the separation of ownership and usufructuary rights is not a new phenomenon. This is because, with the deepening of the division of labor and the spread of large-scale socialized production, the separation of property ownership and actual control rights has become a typical feature of the modern economy. The development of the platform economy is precisely the continuation and deepening of this historical trend in the digital era.

平台获取这一垄断地位的基础，在于实现了数字产品所有权和用益权的分离。数据所有权本应归属于数据生产者，但在平台经济的框架下，个体用户的这项权益实际上被平台所架空。从历史唯物主义视角审视，所有权与用益权的分离并非新现象。因为，随着分工的深化和社会化大生产的普及，财产所有权与实际控制权的分离成为现代经济的典型特征。平台经济的发展正是这一历史趋势在数字时代的延续与深化。

The inherent non-rivalrous and replicable characteristics of data elements first preset the conditions for the separation of their power structure. In the digital economy era, an individual’s single piece of data does not meet the quantitative conditions for generating economic benefits, and individuals still face relatively high costs and technical barriers in utilizing their own data. However, when massive amounts of data are aggregated on platform enterprises, they can often form strong scale effects and network effects, thereby fully stimulating the potential of data elements. This characteristic leads to the fact that the relevant powers over data are naturally neglected by individuals but valued by platform enterprises. At the same time, “the non-exclusive characteristics of data, such as replicability and shareability, are unique advantages of the development of the digital economy; exclusive data property rights would diminish the value of data.” Under such circumstances, the data ownership held by individuals inevitably gives way de facto to the convenience of platform economic activities. In addition, other reasons, such as the huge base of data elements required for the operation of the platform economy and the fact that data elements in circulation have multiple attributes—private, public, and platform—also make it difficult to protect individual possession rights over data elements.

数据要素固有的非竞争性与可复制性特质，先为其权力结构分离预设了条件。在数字经济时代，个体的单一数据并不满足产生经济效益的数量条件，且个体对自身数据的利用依旧面临较高的成本和技术门槛。然而，当海量数据聚集于平台企业时，往往能形成强大的规模效应与网络效应，从而充分激发数据要素潜能。这种特性导致关于数据的相关权力天然被个体忽视，而被平台企业重视。同时，“数据可复制、可共享等非排他性特征是数字经济发展的独特优势，独占性的数据财产权会减损数据价值的发挥”。在这样的情况下，个体拥有的数据所有权必然会事实让位于平台经济活动的便利性。除此之外，平台经济运行下所需数据要素的庞大基数和数据要素在流通中所具有的兼具私人、公共和平台等多重权属的特性等原因,也都使得保护数据要素的个人占有权困难重重。

Therefore, in the digital economy era, the ownership and usufructuary rights of individual data elements gradually separate with the development and operation of the digital economy. This trend of separation provides the elemental foundation for the development of non-productive platforms. The platform further amplifies this trend through a “data enclosure movement.”

因此，在数字经济时代下，个人数据要素的所有权与用益权随着数字经济的发展运转逐渐分离。这种分离趋势为非生产性平台的发展提供了要素基础。而平台则进一步通过“数据圈地运动”将这一趋势放大。

In this movement, platform enterprises, using the legal guise of user agreements, transform digital traces such as user behavior and social relationships into privatized means of production. This “digital enclosure movement” is essentially a contemporary form of what David Harvey describes as “accumulation by dispossession”[n]—platforms, under the cover of technological neutrality, achieve the privatization of public data resources through user agreements and algorithmic technology. Platform users are forced, during use, to sign a series of user agreements and contracts, transferring the usufructuary rights of the data elements they produce to the platform, retaining only formal data ownership. “The ‘micro-fences’ of platform capitalism are essentially a physical extension of data colonialism—it no longer needs to enclose land, but directly encloses user behavior and data through code and agreements.” At the same time, platforms further build technological high walls, using their own exclusive power to ensure the realization of their own power. In their book *The Algorithmic Trap*[n], Zaráchi and Stucke point out: although platforms often exhibit a state of co-opetition, the core of their relationship remains competition; they compete with each other to seize the market and exclude competitors, “the most important function is to restrict potential competitors… to prevent them from gaining momentum and truly growing into rivals of those super-platforms.” At the level of hardware technology, platform enterprises use proprietary big data algorithms to collect and process data traces, which are highly non-replicable and exclusive, forming technological barriers that are difficult to replicate; at the level of institutional arrangements, platforms use user agreements and intellectual property protection systems to ensure their absolute control over data flow within the platform. This control includes both the unlimited expansion of the scope of data collection and the unilateral determination of the methods of data use.

在这种运动中，平台企业借助用户协议的合法性外衣，将用户行为、社交关系等数字痕迹转化为私有化生产资料。这种“数字圈地运动”实质是大卫·哈维所述“剥夺性积累”的当代形态——平台以技术中立性为掩护，通过用户协议和算法技术，实现了对公共数据资源的私有化占有。平台使用者在使用过程中被迫签订一系列的用户使用协议与合同，将自己生产的数据要素的使用权让渡给平台，仅仅保留形式上的数据所有权。“平台资本主义的‘微围栏’,本质是数据殖民主义的物理延伸——它不再需要圈占土地，而是通过代码和协议直接圈占用户的行为与数据”。与此同时，平台进一步构建起技术高墙，运用自身排他性权力，保证自身权力的实现。扎拉奇和斯图克在其著作《算法的陷阱》中指出：平台间尽管时常表现出一种竞合的状态，但其关系的核心仍在于竞争，彼此竞争抢夺市场，排斥竞争对手，“最重要的功能在于限制潜在竞争者……以防后者成了气候，真正成长为那些超级平台的对手”。硬件技术层面，平台企业使用专有的大数据算法对数据痕迹进行收集加工，具有极强的不可复制性和排他性，构成了难以复制的技术壁垒；在制度安排层面，平台借助用户协议与知识产权保护制度保证了自身对平台内数据流动的绝对控制权。这种控制权既包含对数据采集范围的无限扩展，也体现在对数据使用方式的单方面决定。

At this point, under the inherent trend of separation of ownership and usufructuary rights of data elements and the driving force of the platform, the platform has achieved control over the core resource of data elements, and thereby also occupies a dominant position over both the user side and the client side. This is an important condition for the platform to realize the redistribution of total social value.

此时，在数据要素所有权与用益权的固有分离趋势以及平台的推动作用下，平台实现了对数据要素这一核心资源的把控，同时也由此占据了对用户端和客户端的双重主导地位。这是平台实现对社会总价值再分配的重要条件。

In addition to the above main mechanisms, two important characteristics of the platform economy itself have also promoted the formation of platform monopoly patterns. First, the development model of the platform economy is often accompanied by the emergence of a "two-sided monopoly" situation. For individual users of the platform, the platform locks users into its own closed ecosystem through behavioral design and path dependence reinforcement. Research by Zullak and Stuck points out that the services provided by super-platforms cause users to voluntarily give up the opportunity to independently examine external options, thereby limiting their access to external options, and ultimately gradually trapping them in the "ecological cage" constructed by the super-platform. At the same time, because massive amounts of personal data have been acquired and analyzed by the platform, the "virtual assistant provided by the platform has grown into a reliable personal butler in the process of interacting with users, which also invisibly raises users' switching costs." This makes consumers highly dependent on and habitual in using the platform they are on, making it difficult to switch platforms; for merchants using the platform, after investing substantial costs such as data access fees and traffic purchase fees, the cost of switching platforms also gradually rises, forming a "voluntary bundling" relationship with the platform. At this point, both parties coexist parasitically on the platform, yet in turn construct the platform ecosystem, further strengthening their own dependence on the platform and further consolidating the platform's monopoly position.

除上述主要机制外，平台经济本身具有的两大重要特点也推动了平台垄断格局的形成。其一，平台经济的发展模式往往伴随着“双向垄断”状况的出现。对于平台的个体用户而言，平台通过行为设计与路径依赖强化，将用户锁定于自身封闭生态。扎拉克和斯图克的研究指出，超级平台提供的服务会使用户自愿放弃独立考察外部选择的机会，进而限制其接触外部选择的机会，最终逐渐将其困在超级平台构建的“生态牢笼”中。同时，由于海量个人数据已被平台获取分析，平台提供的“虚拟助手已在与用户的互动过程中成长为一个可靠的私人管家，这也在无形之中抬高了用户的转换成本”。这使得消费者对使用的平台具有较强的依赖性和使用惯性，很难实现平台迁移；而对使用平台的商户而言，在投入大量经费如数据接入费、流量赎买费等成本后，转移平台的成本也会逐渐上升，形成对平台的“自愿捆绑”关系。此时双方共同寄生于平台，却又反过来构建起了平台生态，进一步加强了自身对平台的依赖，使得平台的垄断地位进一步巩固。

Second, competition within the platform economy itself carries the characteristics of "winner-takes-all" and "polarization," with a strong zero-sum game nature, meaning there is a very strong positive feedback between the development of the platform economy and its market monopoly position. To gain a larger market share, platform enterprises often continuously improve their algorithmic capabilities and related service quality; when an enterprise obtains a larger market share, the larger quantity of data and information elements it acquires and their scale cost effects in turn promote further expansion by the enterprise, ultimately leading the enterprise to continuously develop toward a monopoly position. In this process, platform enterprises in the market also gradually differentiate, with relatively disadvantaged enterprises gradually falling into a vicious cycle of "lower service quality—fewer users—fewer data element resources—even lower service quality," forcing them to exit, which ultimately leads the market to inevitably become an oligopolistic monopoly pattern. The reduction in the number of platform providers shrinks the consumption set of platform users, forcing them to accept unreasonable demands from the platform, which further reinforces the platform's monopoly position.

其次，平台经济中的竞争本身带有“赢者通吃”和“两极分化”特征，具有较强的零和博弈性质，即平台经济的发展和其市场垄断地位之间具有极强的正向反馈。为了获得更大的市场份额，平台企业往往会不断提升自身的算法能力和相关服务质量；而当企业得到了更多的市场份额时，其得到的更大量的数据信息要素及其规模成本效应又会反过来促进企业进行更大范围的扩张，最后导致企业不断向着垄断地位发展。而在这一过程中，市场中的平台企业也会逐渐分化，相对劣势的企业会逐渐陷入“服务质量低—使用客户减少—数据要素资源减少—服务质量更低”的恶性循环，不得不退出，这也导致市场最后必然变为寡头垄断的格局。平台提供者的减少使得平台使用者消费集缩小，不得不接受平台的不合理要求，这也进一步加固了平台的垄断地位。

The value appropriation system of non-productive platforms also endogenously produces multiple structural contradictions. From within the platform economy, to expand market power and preserve their monopoly position, non-productive platforms engage in extensive disorderly competition with rivals, thereby disrupting the normal market resource allocation system and ultimately causing a massive waste of resources. Typical examples include the customer-grabbing wars between Meituan and Ctrip. The regulatory authorities in Sanya City once summoned platforms such as Meituan and Ctrip, pointing out that they used non-compliant vehicles to attract customers at low prices and engaged in false advertising to disrupt market order, harming consumer rights. Such disorderly competition does not bring significant benefits to platform enterprises but leads to a waste of social resources. From the external perspective, this value appropriation system is bound to increase the burden on other social production sectors. From the perspective of producers, the platform's appropriation of more surplus value forces the production sector to cede part of its income as platform rent, which imposes additional cost burdens on the production sector, compresses its profit margins, and makes its operations more difficult. At the same time, the platform's monopoly position also puts other enterprises at a disadvantage in cooperation negotiations with the platform, forcing them to accept more unreasonable terms, such as in the procurement contracts of Tmall Supermarket, which clearly assign more responsibilities and obligations to the party being procured from. From the perspective of workers, the burden caused by the platform's excessive appropriation of surplus value ultimately falls on workers. Meituan's system algorithm once caused an uproar: it compressed each delivery rider's time to the extreme, forcing riders to risk endangering their health and violating legal regulations to complete delivery tasks. The existence of this appropriation mechanism severely harms the interests of ordinary workers.

非生产性平台的价值占有体系也内生性地生产出多重结构性矛盾。从平台经济内部来看，非生产性平台为了扩张市场势力并保存自己的垄断地位，会与对手展开大量无序竞争，进而打乱正常市场资源配置体系，最终造成大量资源的浪费。较为典型的有美团和携程的抢客大战。三亚市监管部门就曾约谈美团、携程等平台，指出其通过不合规车辆低价揽客、虚假宣传扰乱市场秩序，损害消费者权益。这样的无序竞争不会为平台企业带来显著收益，却会导致社会资源的浪费。从外部来看，这种价值占有系统势必也会加重其他社会生产部门的负担。从生产方来看，平台占有更多剩余价值会使得生产部门不得不出让部分收益作为平台租金，这会为生产部门带来更多成本负担，压缩其利润空间并使其经营更加困难。同时平台的垄断地位也会使其他企业在与平台进行合作谈判中处于不利地位，被迫接受更多不合理条款，如天猫超市购销合同中明显为被采购方划归了更多的责任与义务。从劳动者的角度来看，其平台多占剩余价值造成的负担最后也会落到劳动者身上。美团的系统算法曾引起轩然大波：其将每个骑手的时间压缩到了极致，迫使骑手不得不冒着损害生命健康和违反法律规定的风险来完成配送任务。这种占有机制的存在严重损害了普通劳动者的利益。

Furthermore, from a long-term perspective, non-productive platforms, as structural intermediary organizations in the circulation sphere, are highly dependent on the continuous expansion of the commodity capital cycle. Currently, the platform economy is in its early stage of development. This new model has achieved market expansion by activating potential consumer demand, and this consumption increment in turn feeds back to the platform, providing support for its maintenance and development. When the marginal propensity to consume declines as stock demand is exhausted, the platform economy will also enter a mature stage.

除此之外，基于长期主义视角审视，非生产性平台作为流通领域的结构性中介组织，其存续高度依赖于商品资本循环的持续扩张。目前平台经济处在发展的初期，这一新兴模式通过激活潜在消费需求实现了市场扩容，而这种消费增量又反哺于平台，为其维持和发展提供了支撑。当边际消费倾向随存量需求耗竭而递减时，平台经济也将进入成熟期。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

Currently, the global trends and policy directions of the platform economy are shifting from encouraging platform enterprises to transition from "model innovation" in "non-productive" fields to "technological innovation" in "productive" fields, to better serve the high-quality development of the real economy. Future healthy development requires finding a balance between encouraging innovation and standardizing regulation, guiding platform enterprises from the "wild growth" of pursuing traffic and scale toward high-quality development that pursues technological innovation, value creation, and social responsibility.

当前，平台经济的全球趋势和政策导向正由鼓励平台企业从“模式创新”的“非生产性”领域向“技术创新”的“生产性”领域转型，更好地服务于实体经济的高质量发展。未来的健康发展需要在鼓励创新和规范监管之间找到平衡，引导平台企业从追求流量和规模的“野蛮生长”,转向追求技术创新、价值创造和社会责任的高质量发展。

First, regulate the existing foundation of data privatization monopoly. The capitalized appropriation of data elements is an inevitable phenomenon brought about by the development of non-productive platforms and a necessary condition for their expansion. However, if the current "digital enclosure movement" is allowed to develop unchecked, it will inevitably bring a series of problems such as market monopoly and disorderly competition. Whether the scale and scope of this data element appropriation can be limited to a reasonable range is an important proposition for guiding the development of the platform economy. On the one hand, it is necessary to re-establish and improve the public information resource attributes of users' raw data, achieving communication and sharing of information resources, such as mandating leading platforms to open non-core data interfaces to small and medium-sized enterprises, preventing a single enterprise from forming a monopoly position through this means. On the other hand, strengthen the definition of data resources occupied by platforms, distinguish between platform core data assets and general information resources, and strictly limit the coverage of exclusive data property rights under the premise of ensuring enterprises' technological innovation returns, avoiding regulatory policies from weakening market competition vitality.

首先，规制现有数据私有化垄断基础。数据要素的资本化占有是非生产性平台发展带来的必然现象，也是其发展扩张的必要条件。但如果任由目前的“数字圈地运动”肆意发展，那么必然会带来市场垄断、无序竞争等一系列问题。能否将这种数据要素占有的规模、范围限制在一个合理的范围内是引导平台经济发展的重要命题。一方面，需要重新确立完善用户原始数据的公共信息资源属性，实现信息资源间的沟通共享，如强制龙头平台向中小企业开放非核心数据接口，避免单一企业借此形成垄断地位。另一方面，加强对平台占有数据资源的界定，区分平台核心数据资产与一般信息资源，在保障企业技术创新收益的前提下，严格限定排他性数据产权的覆盖范围，避免规制政策削弱市场竞争活力。

Second, establish and improve a transparent platform public system and regulatory matrix. From the perspective of platform profit extraction, because non-productive platforms occupy vertical control over the production end and consumption end and horizontal market dominance, they can rely on this monopoly position to levy compound rents exceeding reasonable limits on other social production sectors. For example, many platforms currently have problems with "black-box" commission structures and disproportionate commission ratios. This is essentially an excessive appropriation of value created by other social production sectors, ultimately suppressing social production efficiency and reducing people's sense of happiness and fulfillment. In response, legal and administrative means should be used to force platforms to disclose the proportion of technical service costs and land rent income components within commission structures, establishing a complete and transparent platform commission public system. At the same time, establish a multi-actor collaborative regulatory matrix, integrating the triple forces of platform self-discipline, industry peer checks, and user supervision, forming a whole-process monitoring of rent extraction.

其次，建立完善透明的平台公开系统和监管矩阵。从平台利润获取的角度来看，由于非生产性平台占据生产端与消费端的纵向控制权及横向市场支配地位，其可以凭借这种垄断地位对其他社会生产部门征收超过其合理限度的复合租金。如目前大量平台存在抽成结构“黑箱”化，抽成比例失范的问题。这实际上是对社会其他生产部门所创造价值的过度占有，最终将抑制社会生产效率，降低人民的幸福感获得感。对此应当运用法律与行政手段强制平台披露佣金构成的技术服务成本与地租收益等部分占比，建立完善透明的平台抽成公开系统。同时，建立多主体协同的监管矩阵，整合平台自律、同业制衡与用户监督的三重合力，形成对租金提取的全过程监控。

Finally, through secondary distribution, make platform enterprises assume more social responsibility. From the perspective of social value distribution, in response to the excess value appropriation already realized by platform capital, correct its distribution distortion through secondary distribution. By establishing a special adjustment fund, extract funds proportionally from audited land rent income, improve the social insurance and worker protection systems for platform workers, and reduce the overall social losses caused by value distribution imbalance.

最后，通过二次分配让平台企业承担更多社会责任。从社会价值分配角度出发，针对平台资本已实现的超额价值占有，通过二次分配矫正其分配扭曲。通过设立专项调节基金，从经审计确认的地租性收益中按比例提取资金，完善平台从业者的社会保险和劳动者保障制度，减少价值分配失衡带来的社会整体损失。

About the authors: Lin Guangbin, Professor, School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics; Xiong Youcheng, Master's student, School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics.

作者简介：林光彬，中央财经大学经济学院教授；熊佑澄，中央财经大学经济学院硕士研究生。