The Critical Dimensions of Young Marx’s Concept of Perceptual Consciousness

Through the critical appropriation of Feuerbach’s principle of perceptual objectivity and Hegel’s principle of rational activity, the young Marx put forward the concept of objective activity. For the young Marx, objective activity is “the activity of objective natural beings,” a conscious and purposive activity, signifying “the subjectivity of objective essential forces.” In his inquiry into this subjectivity itself, the young Marx developed the concept of perceptual consciousness, revealing the primordial existence of consciousness. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereinafter referred to as the *Manuscripts*), grounded in human objective activity, the young Marx elucidated the dual critical dimensions of the concept of perceptual consciousness.

通过对费尔巴哈哲学的感性对象性原则和黑格尔哲学的理性能动性原则的批判吸收，青年马克思提出了对象性活动的概念。在青年马克思那里，对象性活动是一种“对象性的自然存在物的活动”，是一种自觉的有意识的活动，意味着“对象性的本质力量的主体性”。对于这种主体性本身的探讨，青年马克思提出了感性意识概念，揭示了意识的本源性存在。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》（以下简称《手稿》）中，立足于人的对象性活动，青年马克思阐释了感性意识概念的双重批判向度。

Critique of “Pure Consciousness”

对“纯粹意识”的批判

Within the entire tradition of rational metaphysics, linking “the perceptual” with “consciousness,” or using the categories of “the perceptual” and “consciousness” together, is illegitimate, implying a contradiction. For “the perceptual” signifies externality and passivity, while “consciousness” signifies internality and activity; their orientations are entirely different. But in the young Marx’s view, objects, reality, and the perceptual should not be understood or grasped from the form of the object or intuition, but rather from the side of the subject. That is, the perceptual itself contains a principle of subjectivity; it cannot be understood merely as something external. The young Marx’s concept of “perceptual consciousness” directly targets the concept of “pure consciousness” in the tradition of rational metaphysics, fundamentally exposing the illusory nature of pure consciousness.

在全部理性形而上学传统中，把“感性”与“意识”相关联，或者说，把“感性”和“意识”这两个范畴连用是非法的，意味着一种矛盾。因为“感性”意味着一种外在性和受动性，而“意识”则意味着一种内在性和主动性，它们的指向是完全不同的。但在青年马克思看来，对对象、现实和感性不应从客体的或者直观的形式去理解和领会，而应从主体的方面去理解和领会。也就是说，感性本身就包含了一种主体性原则，它不能被仅仅理解为一种外在性的东西。青年马克思提出的“感性意识”概念径直针对的就是理性形而上学传统的“纯粹意识”概念，是对纯粹意识虚妄性的根本揭露。

In the *Manuscripts*, the young Marx explicitly states that the mode of existence of “pure consciousness,” or what exists for pure consciousness, is knowledge. Knowledge is the “sole act” and the “sole objective relation” of pure consciousness. Through further analysis and examination of this pure consciousness, the young Marx points out that, for pure consciousness, the object is something negative and self-sublating, signifying “a nothingness,” and this nothingness of the object is precisely the “non-objective, i.e., abstract self-confirmation” of pure consciousness itself. Therefore, knowledge, as the sole act and sole object of pure consciousness, has no existence of its own. That is, this pure consciousness has no real object outside itself; it has only “the semblance of an object, a cloud of obfuscation.” Because this pure consciousness, through externalization and the sublation of externalization, dissolves the object into itself, turning the object into a nothingness, and this object turned into nothingness can only become the “non-objective, i.e., abstract self-confirmation” of pure consciousness. This pure consciousness, lacking a real object, dwells only within consciousness, existing only within itself. Having discerned the illusory nature of pure consciousness, the young Marx further states that consciousness is never pure; it is interwoven with the perceptual and material from the very beginning, a “conscious existence.” The existence of this consciousness is not within consciousness itself, but outside it; this existence outside consciousness itself is the real life process of perceptual human beings.

在《手稿》中，青年马克思明确指出，“纯粹意识”的存在方式，或者说对纯粹意识而言，某种东西的存在方式就是知识。知识是纯粹意识的“唯一的行动”和“唯一的对象性的关系”。通过对这种纯粹意识的进一步分析和考察，青年马克思指出，由于对纯粹意识而言，对象是一种否定的和自我扬弃的东西，意味着“一种虚无性”，而对象的这种虚无性恰恰就是纯粹意识本身的“非对象性的即抽象的自我确证”，所以，知识作为纯粹意识的唯一的行动和唯一的对象，它没有其自身的存在。也就是说，这种纯粹意识在其自身之外没有真正的对象，有的只是“对象的外观、障眼的云雾”。因为这种纯粹意识通过外化和对外化的扬弃把对象消融于自身之中，使得对象变成了一种虚无性，而这种变为虚无性的对象也只能沦为纯粹意识的“非对象性的即抽象的自我确证”。这种没有真实对象的纯粹意识，只是寓居于意识的内部，只是在其自身中的存在。在洞悉了纯粹意识的虚妄性之后，青年马克思进一步指出，意识从来都不是纯粹的，它从一开始就与感性的物质交织在一起，是一种“被意识到了的存在”。意识的这种存在不在意识自身的内部，而在其外部，这一在意识自身外部的存在就是感性的人的现实生活过程。

In understanding and grasping the real life process of perceptual human beings, the young Marx criticized the way the tradition of rational metaphysics grasps this real life process through a categorical logic and categorical consciousness. This mode of grasping places the non-rational real life process within abstract rational categories, stripping away the perceptual content and perceptual basis of the real life process, and replacing them with abstract facts constructed by abstract rational categories. In the *Manuscripts*, the young Marx severely criticized the practice of political economists who, using a series of economic categories (such as wages, wage labor, money, exchange, capital, etc.), assume what ought to be deduced as “facts having a historical form.” In the young Marx’s view, such “economic facts” constructed by abstract rational categories deeply conceal the real perceptual conflicts and struggles of interest between capitalists and workers represented by capital and wage labor. The young Marx’s critique of political economy aims to expose the perceptual sources and perceptual basis of these abstract economic categories and the “economic facts” constructed by this categorical logic and categorical consciousness.

在对感性的人的现实生活过程的理解和把握中，青年马克思批判了理性形而上学传统以一种范畴逻辑和范畴意识对感性的人的现实生活过程的把握方式。这一把握方式是把非理性的现实生活过程置放于抽象的理性范畴之中，并对现实生活过程的感性内容和感性基础进行抽离，而代之以由抽象的理性范畴建构的抽象事实。在《手稿》中，青年马克思就曾严厉地批判国民经济学家用一系列经济学范畴（如工资、雇佣劳动、货币、交换、资本等）把应当加以推论的东西假定为一种“具有历史形式的事实”的做法。在青年马克思看来，这样一种由抽象的理性范畴所构筑的“经济事实”把资本和雇佣劳动所代表的资本家和工人之间真正的感性利益冲突和斗争深深地掩蔽了。而青年马克思对国民经济学的批判，就是要披露这些抽象的经济学范畴，以及由这些范畴逻辑和范畴意识所构筑的“经济事实”的感性来源和感性基础。

Unlike the entire tradition of rational metaphysics, which uses abstract rational categories to grasp the real life process of perceptual human beings, the young Marx advocates grasping the real life process of human beings through perceptual consciousness. Because this perceptual consciousness is “interwoven with the language of real life,” it is an intuition in the world of objects created by human objective activity; it is a pre-conceptual, pre-rational, pre-thinking, and pre-knowledge consciousness, unprocessed and unfiltered by any concepts, categories, thinking, or knowledge. Unlike the illusory nature of pure consciousness, perceptual consciousness, as the language of real life, “has a perceptual character,” manifesting as “vibrating layers of air, sounds,” a real existence in the perceptual world, signifying the perceptual intercourse between human beings. Compared with the illusory nature of pure consciousness, the perceptual reality of perceptual consciousness is the authentic mode of existence of consciousness, signifying the perceptual social existence of consciousness. On this basis, the young Marx further states that all history is history preparing for “making ‘man’ the object of perceptual consciousness.” Making “man” the object of perceptual consciousness means the objectification and actualization of the human essence, meaning that man can feel his own existence and essence in the world of objects created by his own perceptual objective activity.

与全部理性形而上学传统运用抽象的理性范畴对感性的人的现实生活过程进行把握不同，青年马克思主张用感性意识对人的现实生活过程进行把握。因为这种感性意识是“与现实生活的语言交织在一起的”，是在人的对象性活动所创造的对象世界中的直观，它是一种前概念、前理性、前思维和前知识的意识，没有经过任何概念、范畴、思维和知识的加工和过滤。与纯粹意识的虚妄性不同，感性意识作为现实生活的语言，它“具有感性的性质”，表现为一种“振动着的空气层、声音”，是一种在感性世界中的现实性存在，表征着人与人之间的感性交往。与纯粹意识的虚妄性相比，感性意识的感性现实性是意识的本真存在方式，表征着意识的感性社会存在。在此基础上，青年马克思进一步指出，全部历史就是“为了使‘人’成为感性意识的对象”而做准备的历史。使“人”成为感性意识的对象意味着人的本质的对象化和现实化，意味着人可以在由自己的感性对象性活动所创造出来的对象世界中感受到自己的存在和本质。

Critique of “Abstract Species-Consciousness”

对“抽象类意识”的批判

Besides critiquing the concept of “pure consciousness,” the young Marx’s concept of “perceptual consciousness” also critiques Feuerbach’s concept of “species-consciousness.” In the tradition of rational metaphysics, the species is the object of rational thought; grasping the species has always belonged to abstract thinking, because what the senses can grasp are always the concrete, the individual, and the particular. Feuerbach, however, points out that the species is not the object of rational thought, but the object of perceptual intuition; it is not a rational existence, but a perceptual existence. Although we can grasp the species through a series of abstract conceptual categories, this species is first of all an object of perceptual intuition; its premise of existence is perceptual. For Feuerbach, human existence is a perceptual existence; the mutual intuition of human beings makes them aware that they are species-beings. And consciousness, as an intuition of man in the world of objects, is itself an intuition of the species, an intuition of the species to which man belongs. This consciousness of the intuition of the species is species-consciousness, and this species-consciousness is also perceptual.

除了批判“纯粹意识”概念，青年马克思的“感性意识”概念还批判了费尔巴哈的“类意识”概念。在理性形而上学的传统中，类是理性思维的对象，对类的把握向来从属于抽象思维，因为感官所能把握到的向来都是具体的、个别的和特殊的东西。费尔巴哈却指出，类不是理性思维的对象，而是感性直观的对象，它不是一种理性存在，而是一种感性存在。虽然说我们可以通过一系列抽象的概念范畴去把握类，但这个类首先是感性直观的对象，它存在的前提是感性的。在费尔巴哈那里，人的存在是一种感性存在，人与人彼此间的直观，使其领会到自己是一种类存在物。而意识作为一种人在对象世界中的直观，它本身就是对类的直观，是人对自己所属的类的直观。这种对类的直观的意识就是类意识，这种类意识也是感性的。

In the young Marx’s view, Feuerbach’s self-proclaimed perceptual species-consciousness, although not a pure consciousness, is understood abstractly. Where Feuerbach defines the premise for grasping species-existence as perceptual intuition, the young Marx reveals the foundational significance of perceptual objective activity for perceptual intuition. For the young Marx, not only is man’s capacity for perceptual intuition continuously generated in objective activity, but even the species, which Feuerbach regards as the object of perceptual intuition, is created through human objective activity. The young Marx explicitly states that the species, as the essence of man, is not, as Feuerbach understands it, an “internal, mute generality which naturally unites the many individuals,” but rather “the ensemble of all social relations.” This “ensemble of social relations” signifies the fundamental opposition between the reality of the species as essence, or “the real species-essence,” as understood by the young Marx, and the abstractness of the species as essence, or “the abstract species-essence,” as understood by Feuerbach. That is, although Feuerbach established species-consciousness on the perceptual level, he understood it abstractly and, setting aside the historical process, understood this “generality which unites the many individuals” as something natural and given.

在青年马克思看来，费尔巴哈自诩为感性的类意识，虽然不是一种纯粹意识，但却被抽象化理解了。在费尔巴哈把对类存在领会的前提规定为感性直观的地方，青年马克思揭示了感性的对象性活动之于感性直观的前提性意义。在青年马克思那里，不仅人的感性直观的能力是在对象性活动中不断生成的，就连费尔巴哈所谓的作为感性直观之对象的类也是通过人的对象性活动创造的。青年马克思明确指出，作为人的本质的类，不是费尔巴哈所理解的一种“内在的、无声的把许多个人自然地联系起来的普遍性”，而是“一切社会关系的总和”。这一“社会关系的总和”表征着青年马克思所理解的作为本质的类的现实性或者说“现实的类本质”，与费尔巴哈所理解的作为本质的类的抽象性或者说“抽象的类本质”的根本对立。也就是说，费尔巴哈虽然把类意识在感性的层面上确定了下来，但他却对其进行了抽象化的理解，并且撇开历史进程将这种“把许多个人联系起来的普遍性”理解为一种自然的、既定的东西。

In response to this, young Marx critically points out that the universality which Feuerbach understands as linking many individuals together is not a product of nature, but a product of human objective activity; the species-consciousness that Feuerbach understands is not a perceptual species-consciousness, but an abstract species-consciousness. In young Marx’s view, human intuition of the species is carried out in the objective world created by human objective activity; it is not a product of ideas and concepts, but a product of people’s actual perceptual communicative activity, and is people’s comprehension that “they themselves are social beings”; human species-consciousness is a consciousness of social being, it is not “abstract perceptual consciousness, but human perceptual consciousness,” and is people’s confirmation of “their own actual social life.”

对此，青年马克思批判指出，费尔巴哈所理解的把许多个人联系起来的普遍性不是自然的产物，而是人的对象性活动的产物；费尔巴哈所理解的类意识不是一种感性的类意识，而是一种抽象的类意识。在青年马克思看来，人对类的直观是人在其对象性活动所创造的对象世界中进行的，它不是一种思想观念的产物，而是人们现实的感性交往活动的产物，是人对“自己是社会存在物”的领会；人的类意识是一种社会存在的意识，它不是“抽象的感性意识，而是人的感性意识”，是人对“自己的现实的社会生活”的确证。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗