A Reconsideration of Mao Zedong’s Dialectics

Mao Zedong’s dialectics possesses great originality, but this originality has long been largely overlooked. The reason for this neglect is rooted in both the French materialist and Hegelian interpretations of Marx’s dialectics. Within these two types of interpretation, a series of original concepts in Mao’s dialectics cannot be incorporated, so they can only be “trimmed” to fit the “shoes” of the established interpretations. However, Mao’s highly original dialectics is not only a tremendously innovative contribution to Marxist dialectics but also opens up an extremely broad theoretical horizon for the deep adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the creation of a Chinese-style system of Marxist dialectics. For Chinese people who are now striving to explore the path of constructing a philosophy and social sciences system with Chinese characteristics, this is a rare theoretical treasure that urgently needs to be re-examined, recognized, and deeply mined.

毛泽东的辩证法具有极大的独创性，但这种独创性长期以来却在很大程度上被忽视了。其所以被忽视，当又缘于对于马克思辩证法的法国唯物主义式阐释和黑格尔主义式阐释。在这两类阐释中，由于毛泽东辩证法的一系列独创性的概念无法被纳入其中，便只能“削”其独特之“足”以适既定之“履”了。然而，毛泽东这种极具独创性的辩证法不仅是对马克思主义辩证法之巨大创新性贡献，更为马克思主义深度中国化，创造中国式的马克思主义辩证法体系开放了一个极其宽广的理论视域。对于现今正在奋力探讨构建中国特色哲学社会科学之路的国人来说，这是一份不可多得的理论宝藏，亟待重新探查认识并予以深度开采。

Mao Zedong’s Dialectics Is a Dialectics of Practical Wisdom

毛泽东辩证法是一种实践智慧辩证法

The fundamental reason why the originality of Mao Zedong’s dialectics has long been overlooked and forcibly incorporated into French materialist and Hegelian interpretations is that Mao’s dialectics is a dialectics of practical wisdom, while previous interpretations of Marx’s dialectics, whether French materialist or Hegelian, have all been confined to the traditional perspective of dialectics as theoretical wisdom. Such a prevalent interpretive horizon naturally cannot comprehend the uniqueness of Mao’s dialectics, and thus can only subject it to a certain kind of trimming to facilitate its incorporation into the prevalent interpretations. Admittedly, in recent years many commentators have discussed Mao’s dialectics of practical wisdom, but such discussions often talk about practical wisdom in an overly general and broad manner, without distinguishing practical wisdom from theoretical wisdom. Consequently, the distinction between the dialectics of practical wisdom and the dialectics of theoretical wisdom they discuss remains vague. Clearly, such general discussions are far from sufficient to clarify the major innovativeness of Mao’s dialectics and the possibility of a significant shift in the horizon of Marxist dialectics. Therefore, we must first clarify in what sense Mao’s dialectics is a dialectics of practical wisdom.

毛泽东辩证法的独创性之所以长期被忽视，被强行纳入法国唯物主义阐释和黑格尔主义阐释之中，其根本缘由在于毛泽东的辩证法乃是一种作为实践智慧的辩证法，而既往对于马克思辩证法的阐释，无论是法国唯物主义式的，还是黑格尔主义式的，都是囿于传统的作为理论智慧的辩证法视野。这样的流行阐释视野自然也就无法理解毛泽东辩证法的独特性，从而只能对之施以某种削除，以方便纳入流行阐释之中。诚然，近年来亦有不少论者讨论毛泽东的实践智慧辩证法，但这类讨论往往过于笼统宽泛地谈论实践智慧，而没有将实践智慧与理论智慧加以区别，所谈论的实践智慧辩证法与理论智慧辩证法的区别也就仍然处于模糊之中。显然，这种笼统的讨论远不足以澄清毛泽东辩证法重大的创新性及其对马克思主义辩证法之视域重大改变的可能性。因此，我们必须首先澄清毛泽东辩证法在何种意义上是一种作为实践智慧的辩证法。

This requires starting from the distinction between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom. The clear distinction between these two kinds of wisdom began with Aristotle. Aristotle divided human activities into three basic modes: contemplation or theory, practice, and making or production. The fundamental difference among them lies in the difference of their object domains: the object of contemplation or theory is “eternal things” that “exist of necessity and unconditionally,” while the corresponding modes of activity, “making and practice, both deal with things that are variable.” [1]1 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Chapters 3-4, and *Metaphysics*, Book VI, Chapter 1. However, given that in modern and contemporary philosophy, especially in the philosophy of Hegel and Marx, the hierarchical distinction between practice and making in Aristotle (the end of the former lies within the activity, while the end of the latter lies outside the activity) no longer holds, and making or material productive labor is regarded as the most basic form of human practice, Aristotle’s threefold division of human activities can be simplified into a twofold division of theory and practice. In this way, the contrast between theory and practice based on the eternity versus variability of their objects becomes even more apparent. Since the fundamental difference between theory and practice lies in the difference between the eternity and variability of their respective objects, the fundamental difference between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom is naturally rooted in this. Since the object of theory is eternal and unchanging, theoretical wisdom, as the grasp of such an object, naturally has its mode of grasping, i.e., categories or concepts, also eternal and unchanging. Since the object of practice is variable, practical wisdom, as the grasp of such an object, naturally must have its mode of grasping also possess a certain variability or non-eternity. In other words, dialectics as theoretical wisdom is the grasp of eternal objects through unchanging categories; dialectics as practical wisdom is the grasp of variable things through a certain mode.

这又须从关于实践智慧与理论智慧的区别开始。这两种智慧的明确区分始于亚里士多德。亚里士多德把人类活动划分为思辨或理论、实践、创制或制作三种基本方式。其间的根本区别在于对象域的不同：思辨或理论的对象是“出于必然而无条件存在”的“永恒的东西”，与之相对的活动方式“创制和实践两者都以可变事物为对象”。但鉴于在近现代哲学中，特别是在黑格尔和马克思哲学中，亚里士多德那里实践与创制之间的等级性区别（前者的目的在活动之内，后者的目的在活动之外）不再成立，创制或物质生产劳动被视为最基本的人类实践方式，则亚里士多德的人类活动三分法便可简化为理论与实践的两分。这样，便更显明了理论与实践基于其对象之永恒性与可变性之间的对比。既然理论与实践的根本区别在于各自对象的永恒性与可变性之别，那么，理论智慧与实践智慧之间的根本性区别自然也就根源于此。理论的对象既然是永恒不变的，则理论智慧作为对于这种对象之把握，其把握方式即范畴或概念自然也就是永恒不变的；而实践的对象既然是可变的，则实践智慧作为对于这种对象之把握，其把握方式自然也就必须具有某种可变性或非永恒性。换言之，作为理论智慧的辩证法就是以不变的范畴对于永恒性对象的把握；而作为实践智慧的辩证法就是以某种方式对于可变事物的把握。

Having understood this, it is not difficult to see in what sense Mao’s dialectics is a dialectics of practical wisdom, fundamentally different from dialectics as theoretical wisdom. Let us begin by looking at *On Contradiction*, the concentrated expression of Mao’s dialectics. According to Aristotle’s distinction between theory and practice based on the eternity versus variability of objects, we can see that *On Contradiction* first posits a variable world. This is manifested by what Althusser called the “three very remarkable new categories” of Mao’s dialectics of contradiction, namely, “the distinction between principal contradiction and secondary contradictions,” “the distinction between the principal aspect and the secondary aspects of a contradiction,” and “the theory of the uneven development of contradiction.” [2]2 Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, Chapter 3, “Contradiction and Overdetermination.” Since “a big thing, in the process of its development, contains many contradictions,” [3]3 Mao Zedong, *On Contradiction* (August 1937). this reveals that the world that *On Contradiction* takes as its object is a world of “the many” or “the manifold,” which cannot be reduced to “the one” or a single, holistic “one-all.” For only in a heterogeneous world of “the manifold” can multiple contradictions coexist, can there be the distinction between principal and secondary contradictions, can there be the distinction between the principal and secondary aspects of a contradiction, and can there be the “uneven development of contradictions” caused by changes in the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction, i.e., the change of things. Conversely, if one posits its object as “the one” or “the one-all,” then any genuine change is logically impossible.

明了了这一点，我们就不难看出毛泽东的辩证法在何种意义上是一种与作为理论智慧的辩证法截然不同的、作为实践智慧的辩证法。这里从毛泽东辩证法之集中表达的《矛盾论》看起。根据亚里士多德基于对象之永恒性与可变性而对于理论与实践的区分，我们看到，《矛盾论》正是首先设定了一个可变的世界。这一点是由阿尔都塞称之为毛泽东矛盾辩证法的“三个十分值得瞩目的新范畴”，即“主要矛盾和次要矛盾的区别”“矛盾的主要方面和次要方面的区别”以及“矛盾的不平衡发展理论”而显现出来的。既然“一个大的事物，在其发展过程中，包含着许多的矛盾”，那么，这便显明，《矛盾论》作为其对象的世界，是一个不能归结为“一”或单一的整全的“一—全”的“多”或“杂多”的世界。因为只有在异质性的“杂多”世界中，才可能有多种矛盾并存，才会有主要矛盾与次要矛盾的分别，才会有矛盾主要方面与矛盾次要方面的分别，才会有由于主要矛盾及矛盾的主要方面的变化，导致的“矛盾的不平衡发展”亦即事物的变化。而如果与之相反，设定其对象为“一”或“一—全”，则任何真正的变化在逻辑上都是不可能的。

And since the object of practice is a variable world of “the manifold,” the dialectics of practical wisdom, as the grasp of it, is the grasp of the conditions for the change of actual things in the object. And since the object is variable, the mode of grasping it must correspondingly adapt to this variability. It should be noted here that the dialectics of practical wisdom does not grasp the variable object by using variable categories and concepts, in contrast to the dialectics of theoretical wisdom, which grasps eternal objects with eternal categories and concepts. For this would cause the words representing concepts to lose their determinacy, thereby making it impossible to grasp the object. Therefore, adapting to the variability of the object requires not a change in the concepts themselves, but allowing categories and concepts with determinate meanings to accommodate the change of the object. This is what is expressed by the two pairs of corresponding categories—principal contradiction and secondary contradictions, principal aspect and secondary aspects of a contradiction—and the “uneven development” in which they “exchange their positions.” [4]4 Mao Zedong, *On Contradiction*, Section on “The Particularity of Contradiction.” We can see that, unlike the pairs of opposing categories in theoretical dialectics, such as the universal and the particular, essence and appearance, necessity and freedom, which are only suitable for describing unchanging objects, the conceptual categories of principal contradiction and secondary contradictions, principal aspect and secondary aspects of a contradiction, and the uneven development of contradiction are precisely suitable for describing the development and change of things. It is precisely through the “uneven development” in which these corresponding pairs of categories “exchange their positions” that the change of things is presented.

而既然实践的对象为可变的“杂多”的世界，则作为对其进行把握的实践智慧辩证法便是对于对象的现实事物变化的条件的把握。而既然对象是可变化的，则对其进行把握的方式也就相应地须是适应这种可变化性的。这里须注意的是，实践智慧辩证法对于可变的对象的把握，并不是与理论智慧辩证法之以永恒不变的范畴概念把握永恒性的对象相对，而以变化的范畴概念把握对象。因为这会使表征概念的词语失去确定性，从而无法实现对于对象之把握。因而，适应对象的可变性，所需要的便不是概念自身的变化，而是让具有确定意涵的范畴概念能够容纳对象的变化。这便是主要矛盾与次要矛盾、矛盾主要方面与次要方面这两对对应范畴及其在发展中“互易其位置”的“不平衡发展”所表示的。我们看到，不同于理论辩证法中的普遍与特殊、本质与现象、必然与自由等只适应于描述不变对象的诸对立范畴，主要矛盾与次要矛盾、矛盾主要方面与次要方面，以及矛盾的不平衡发展这类概念范畴正适用于描述事物的发展变化的。正是借助于这些对应范畴概念之间“互易其位置”的“不平衡发展”，事物的变化也就被呈现了出来。

The dialectics of practical wisdom is naturally not satisfied with merely describing the change of things; rather, through the understanding of the conditions for the change of things, it seeks to intervene in the change of things in order to achieve the fundamental mission of Marxism, which aims at changing the world. Mao’s analysis in *On Contradiction* of the universality and particularity of contradiction and their relationship, especially his analysis of the “uneven development” in which the principal contradiction and secondary contradictions, and the principal aspect and secondary aspects of a contradiction, “exchange their positions,” precisely provides the practical subject of the Chinese revolution with a complete set of methodological principles of practical wisdom for guiding actions to change the world.

作为实践智慧的辩证法自然并不满足于只是描述事物的变化，而是通过对于事物变化条件的认识，寻找介入事物变化，以便达致以改变世界为鹄的的马克思主义的根本使命。毛泽东在《矛盾论》中对于矛盾普遍性与特殊性及其关系的分析，特别是对于主要矛盾与次要矛盾、矛盾主要方面与次要方面之间“互易其位置”的“不平衡发展”的分析，正是为中国革命的实践主体提供的一整套用于指导改变世界的行动的实践智慧的方法论原理。

Clearly, only in the above sense can we say that Mao’s dialectics is a dialectics of practical wisdom distinct from the dialectics of theoretical wisdom.

显然，只有在上述意义上，我们才能够说毛泽东的辩证法是一种区别于理论智慧辩证法的实践智慧辩证法。

The Roots of Mao Zedong’s Dialectics in the Chinese Mode of Thinking

毛泽东辩证法的中国思维方式根基

In the history of Western philosophy, although Aristotle had long ago proposed the concept of practical wisdom and provided a fairly systematic description of it (in a certain sense, Aristotle’s relevant analysis can also be regarded as a dialectics of practical wisdom), it was the dialectics of theoretical wisdom that occupied a dominant position in the history of Western philosophy, especially in modern and contemporary Western philosophy. In contrast to the changeable world posited by practical wisdom, the object of the dialectics of theoretical wisdom in mainstream Western philosophy since Plato is, in the final analysis, a world of “the One-Whole.” Whether it is Plato’s “Idea” as the origin, the Christian “God” as creator, or Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit,” all are unique, originary existences, while the real world of the “many” is reduced to a derivative of that “unique” existence. Under the dominance of this dialectics, even when confronting the realm of practice, it is constructed in the manner of theoretical dialectics. This raises a question: how did Mao Zedong’s dialectics of practical wisdom come to appear within the sequence of Marxist philosophy, which originates from the Western tradition?

在西方哲学史上，虽然亚里士多德早就提出了实践智慧这一概念，并对之做了颇为系统的描述（在某种意义上亦可认为亚里士多德的有关分析也是一种实践智慧的辩证法），但在西方哲学史上，特别是近现代哲学史上，占支配地位的却是理论智慧的辩证法。与实践智慧所设定的可变性世界相反，在柏拉图以来的主流西方哲学中，作为其理论智慧辩证法对象的是一个归根到底为“一—全”的世界。无论是柏拉图作为本原的“理念”，基督教创世的“上帝”，黑格尔的“绝对精神”，都是独一的本原性存在，而现实的“多”的世界则被归结为那“独一”存在的派生物。在这种辩证法的支配下，即便是面对实践领域，亦是以理论辩证法的方式来建构的。这样一来，便提出了一个问题，那就是毛泽东的这种实践智慧的辩证法何以会出现在源于西方传统的马克思主义哲学序列之中？

The answer to this question can only be that the Chinese traditional mode of thinking has deeply Sinicized Marxism. If this is so, it implies that the Chinese traditional mode of thinking has a certain affinity with the dialectics of practical wisdom, or, in other words, that the Chinese traditional mode of thinking is more suited than the Western mode of thinking to grasping objects of change and more suited to constituting concrete practical wisdom rather than abstract theoretical wisdom. There have been many discussions of the differences or distinctions between Chinese and Western modes of thinking, but Zhang Dongsun’s formulation seems more precise: Chinese philosophy “emphasizes discussing Becoming rather than Being”; the consequence is that “Western philosophy always directly asks what lies behind a thing; whereas the Chinese only discuss the mutual relations between one image and other images. For example, one yin and one yang, one closing and one opening. In short, Western

对此问题，答案似乎只能是，中国传统思维方式对于马克思主义的深度中国化。若果如此，则意味着中国传统思维方式与实践智慧辩证法有着某种切近性，或者说，中国传统思维方式较之西方的思维方式，更为适合于把握变化的对象，更适合于构成具体性的实践智慧，而不是抽象性的理论智慧。关于中西方思维方式的差异或不同，人们已多有论述，但张东荪说法似更为精当些：中国哲学“注重于讲Becoming而不注重于Being”；由此造成的是“西方人的哲学总是直问一物的背后；而中国人则只讲一个象与其他象之间的互相关系。例如一阳一阴一阖一辟。总之，西方人是直穿入的，而中国人是横牵连的……中国人的思想以为有象以及象与象之间有相关的变化就够了”。一为“直穿入”，一为“横牵连”，这一对比可以说十分形象地表明了中西思维方式的差异。既然“西方人的哲学总是直问一物的背后”的“直穿入”的，那么，这一追问便必定是要将呈现为“杂多”的万事万物之本原归结为某种“一—全”，如“理念”“绝对精神”等，而将万事万物视为是为这“一—全”的派生或“建构”。显然，这正是理论智慧辩证法把握对象的基本方式。而中国思维方式既然是“只讲一个象与其他象之间的互相关系”的“横牵连”的，则这一思考的前提便只能是多种矛盾或事物并存的“杂多”的世界，而思考的目的也不是将之归结为不变的某种存在，而只是为了把握其变化，即“Becoming”，以便把握时机，顺势而为，以有效地改变世界。不难看出，毛泽东的主要矛盾、矛盾主要方面，以及矛盾的非平衡发展理论，正是根源于以上描述的中国思维方式。而这也就说明了何以实践智慧辩证法在西方未能得到发展，而在中国哲学之中，特别是在身兼政治家与哲学家的毛泽东那里获得了巨大发展。

Mao Zedong’s Dialectics: A Major Contribution to Marxist Philosophy

毛泽东辩证法对于马克思主义哲学的巨大贡献

Mao Zedong’s creative development of a dialectics of practical wisdom, rooted in the Chinese mode of thinking, can be said to have greatly expanded the horizon of Marxist dialectics. This expansion not only means that it has added the fundamental and important dimension of a dialectics of practical wisdom, but also implies that, on the basis of this contribution, it may be possible to construct a Chinese-style system of Marxist dialectics. This assertion naturally requires explanation.

毛泽东根基于中国思维方式对于实践智慧辩证法的创造性发展，可以说在很大程度上扩展了马克思主义辩证法的视域。这一扩展不仅意味着为之增添了实践智慧辩证法这一根本性的重要方面，而且更意味着基于这一贡献还可能创建一种中国式的马克思主义辩证法体系。这一断言自然需要说明。

The key to understanding this assertion lies first of all in clarifying the nature of the dialectics in Marx’s *Capital*. There is no doubt that Marx’s dialectics is a practical philosophy oriented toward changing the world. However, the dialectics of *Capital* is not directly a dialectics of practical wisdom; rather, it is a materialistically transformed Hegelian dialectics of theoretical wisdom. What does this mean? The crux lies in two aspects. On the one hand, this dialectics acknowledges that the “real subject” or the real world, as a world where multiple contradictions coexist and develop and change, “still retains its independent existence outside the mind,” and that the “concrete totality” achieved through the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, “as a totality of thoughts, as a thought-concrete, is in fact a product of thinking and conception.” This means that the “thought-concrete” or the “one-all” is merely a construct of thought, not the “self-synthesis, self-deepening, and self-movement” of reality itself. On the other hand, and more importantly, Marx’s philosophy is oriented toward changing the world, but it is oriented toward “effectively changing the world,” not toward reckless action regardless of consequences. This requires that the action of changing the world have an objective scientific basis. Science, however, is always to some extent an abstract grasp of the real world, that is, an abstract grasp of the essential determinations of the object. The world that *Capital* seeks to grasp is undoubtedly the real world of “manifold” things, but for such a “manifold” world, science cannot grasp it directly; it must use “the power of abstraction” to construct it into a mathematized theoretical model before it can be scientifically described. Specifically, for the capitalist mode of production that *Capital* aims to describe, Marx first abstracts the capitalist mode of production as the “general illumination” [5]5 “General illumination” (普照的光) is a metaphor Marx uses in the *Grundrisse* to describe how a dominant mode of production colors and determines all other relations of production in a given social formation. from the situation where multiple relations of production coexist, and then, taking as the standard “changes that can be determined with the precision of natural science,” distinguishes the “material … changes in the economic conditions of production” from “ideological forms,” so as to construct a mathematized system of value theory and surplus-value theory under the most simplified conditions. After constructing such an abstract theoretical system, the factors previously abstracted away are gradually added back, and a reconstruction is carried out on the basis of the capitalist relations of production as the “general illumination.” This is the application of the materialist dialectics of theoretical wisdom in *Capital*.

理解这一断言的关键首先在于澄清马克思《资本论》的辩证法性质。毋庸置疑，马克思的辩证法是指向改变世界的实践哲学，然而，《资本论》的辩证法却并不直接就是一种实践智慧的辩证法，而是一种唯物主义地改造了的黑格尔的理论智慧辩证法。此话怎讲？这其中的关键在于，一方面，这种辩证法承认“实在主体”或现实世界之为多种矛盾并存并发展变化的世界“仍然是在头脑之外保持着它的独立性”，而从抽象到具体所达到的“具体总体作为思想总体、作为思想具体，事实上是思维的、理解的产物”，这就意味着这里“思想具体”或“一—全”只是思维的构造，而非实在自身的“自我综合、自我深化和自我运动”。另一方面，更为重要的是，马克思的哲学是指向改变世界的，但它所指向的是“有效地改变世界”，而不是不论后果的胡乱行动。这便要求改变世界的行动具有客观的科学依据。而科学则总在某种程度上是对于现实世界的抽象把握，即抽象地把握对象的本质性规定。《资本论》所要把握的世界无疑是现实的“杂多”的世界，但对于这样的“杂多”世界，科学是无法直接地把握的，而必须用“抽象力”将之建构为一个数学化的理论模型，方能够对之进行科学描述。具体对于《资本论》所要描述的资本主义生产方式来说，马克思先是将资本主义生产方式这一“普照的光”从多种生产关系并存的状况中抽象出来，进而以“可以用自然科学的精确性指明的变革”为标准，将“生产的经济条件方面所发生的物质的……变革”从“意识形态的形式”中区别出来，以便能够在最为单纯的条件下建构起一个数学化的价值理论和剩余价值理论体系。建构起这样一个抽象的理论体系之后，再将先前抽象掉的因素逐步增添进来，并基于资本主义生产关系这一“普照的光”再行重构。这便是《资本论》中唯物主义的理论智慧辩证法之运用。

The mode of grasping the object through such a dialectics of theoretical wisdom pursues the goal of capturing the essential determinations of things with precision, and then gradually ascending from the abstract to the concrete to achieve a comprehensive grasp of complex real things. However, this process of ascending from the abstract to the concrete is extremely difficult for objects that are “manifold” in reality; complete concreteness is even harder to attain, and more importantly, even if a relatively concrete grasp can be achieved, it requires a very long time. The fact that the creation of *Capital* took nearly forty years and was still unfinished is clear proof of this. Of course, science can advance step by step, but real practice cannot wait for the completion of a comprehensive scientific theory; it often urgently requires a plan of action. Under such conditions, one can only grasp the object and form a plan of action through the dialectics of practical wisdom. This is because the dialectics of practical wisdom does not reconstruct the object after abstracting its essential determinations; rather, it directly regards the object as a complex existence composed of multiple contradictions, identifies the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the contradiction, and then seizes the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the contradiction, adopting corresponding means of intervention to achieve the goal of changing the world. In this process, abstract scientific theory can also constitute a certain objective boundary in some way. Clearly, for Marxism, which aims at effectively changing the world, such a dialectics of practical wisdom is a significant supplement to the dialectics of theoretical wisdom found in *Capital*.

这样一种理论智慧辩证法的把握对象的方式，所追求的目标是以精确的方式抓住事物的本质性规定，然后逐步从抽象上升到具体，达到对现实复杂事物的全面性把握。但这种从抽象上升到具体的进程，对于现实“杂多”性的对象来说，是极其困难的，全然的具体更是难以达致，且更为要紧的是，即便能够达到比较具体的把握，也需要十分漫长的时间。《资本论》的创作历经近四十载，而尚未完成，便是明证。当然，科学是可以逐步地推进的，但现实实践却不可能等待科学的整全性理论的完成，而是往往迫在眉睫地需要行动方案。在这种条件下，便只能以实践智慧辩证法的方式去把握对象，形成行动方案。这是因为实践智慧辩证法并不是在抽象出本质规定后再行重构对象的方式，而是直接把对象视为多种矛盾构成的复杂存在，从中找出主要矛盾、矛盾主要方面，并进而抓住主要矛盾和矛盾主要方面，采取相应的介入手段以实现改变世界之目标。在这当中，科学的抽象理论亦可以某种方式构成某种客观性的界限。显然，对于以有效地改变世界为鹄的的马克思主义来说，这样一种实践智慧的辩证法是对于《资本论》中的理论智慧的辩证法的一个意义重大的补充。

In this way, within Marxist philosophy, there are two kinds of dialectics: the dialectics of theoretical wisdom and the dialectics of practical wisdom. The former is applicable to the domain of constructing scientific theory, while the latter is applicable to the domain of forming practical action plans. Thus, although the two are different, they are not contradictory; rather, they constitute a structure of synergy and complementarity. Moreover, the two kinds of dialectics of wisdom have a relationship of mutual determination and mutual promotion. On the one hand, the scientific theory constituted by the dialectics of theoretical wisdom imposes a boundary or limiting effect on practical wisdom—that is, theoretical wisdom has a certain constructive effect on practical wisdom. On the other hand, the grasp of the complex real world by the dialectics of practical wisdom may constitute the basis for further abstract examination by the dialectics of theoretical wisdom—that is, theoretical wisdom can be regarded as an abstract construction of practical wisdom. Therefore, based on this relationship of mutual determination and mutual promotion, we can construct a system of Marxist dialectics that includes both theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. In this system, because of the foundational status of practical wisdom relative to theoretical wisdom, and because of the grounding of this dialectics of practical wisdom developed by Mao Zedong in the Chinese mode of thinking, such a system of dialectics is a Chinese-style system of Marxist dialectics.

这样一来，在马克思主义哲学中，便有了两种辩证法：理论智慧辩证法与实践智慧辩证法。这两种辩证法一者适用于科学理论建构的领域，另一者则适用于现实的行动方案形成的领域，因而，两者虽然不同，但却并不矛盾，而是构成了一种协同互补的结构。不仅如此，两种智慧辩证法之间还具有相互规定、相互促进之效果关系。一方面，理论智慧辩证法所构成的科学理论，对于实践智慧存在一种界限或限定作用，亦即理论智慧对于实践智慧存在某种建构作用；另一方面，实践智慧辩证法对于复杂现实世界的把握，可能构成理论智慧辩证法进一步抽象考察之基础，亦即可将理论智慧视为实践智慧之抽象构造。因此，基于这种相互规定、相互促进的关系，我们就能够建构起一种包含理论智慧与实践智慧的马克思主义辩证法体系。在这一体系中，由于实践智慧对于理论智慧的基础性地位，且由于毛泽东所发展的这种实践智慧辩证法的中国思维方式之根基，这样一种辩证法体系便是一种中国式的马克思主义辩证法体系。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗