Object Dialectics: The Essence of Machine and Human
刘梓臣:对象辩证法:机器与人的本质
In discussions on the definition or essence of the human being, there are two opposing theoretical judgments within the materialist camp: one is Marx’s view that “free, conscious activity is precisely the species-character of the human being,” and the other is La Mettrie’s view that “the human being is a machine.” With the development of capital economy and technology, the human being is alienated into a machine, making it approach reality to a certain extent. The species-essence of the human being that Marx spoke of, as well as the social relations of the human being, are thereby challenged. Moreover, with the development of technology, the possibility that “the machine is the human being” will also emerge.
在对于人的定义或本质的讨论中,唯物主义阵营有两个对立的理论判断,一是马克思认为“自由的有意识的活动恰恰就是人的类特性”,另一个则是拉美特利“人是机器”的观点。随着资本经济和技术的发展,人被异化成为机器,使其在某种程度上趋近现实。马克思曾说的人的类本质以及人的社会关系都随之受到挑战。更为甚者,随着技术的发展“机器是人”的可能性也将呈现。
Technology as Tool
作为工具的技术
Marx held that the first premise of all human existence and history is the production of material life itself. In order to satisfy their own needs for material production, science and technology first appear as tools in labor. For Marx, the human being is not an abstract concept but a concrete existence. Labor practice is the essential need of human development; practice constitutes the human mode of life; science and technology exist as a part of practice for the human being to achieve free and comprehensive development.
马克思认为,一切人类生存和历史的首要前提就是生产物质生活本身。人为了满足自身物质生产需要,科学技术首先作为劳动中的工具而出现。在马克思那里,人不是一个抽象概念,而是一个现实性存在。劳动实践是人发展的本质需要,实践构成了人的生活方式,科学技术是人为了实现自由而全面的发展作为实践的一个部分而存在的。
Starting from human labor practice, Marx believed that the species-essence of the human being is the foundation of all development and application of science and technology. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx also stated: “If industry is conceived as the open revelation of the human essential powers, then the human essence of nature or the natural essence of the human being can also be understood.” Industry, i.e., technology, embodies the relationship between the human being and nature; the essence of technology is the essence of the human being or the manifestation of the human essential powers; industry is the open revelation of the human essential powers. The machine, as its carrier, appears as the human tool and intermediary of labor, and its essence is the externalization of the human essential powers. To meet the needs of their own production and development, the human being gradually makes the machine an important component of production activities, i.e., the means of production. The human being occupies the subject position, and the machine occupies the object position; at this time, the machine is an existence that increases production efficiency and liberates the productive forces. Marx pointed out: “The production process became the application of science, and science, conversely, became a factor of, a function of, the production process.” At this time, all development of new technology still exists only as the development of human production tools; science and technology are incorporated into production activities, and technological revolutions have a huge driving effect on the productive forces — “science and technology are the primary productive forces.” [1]1 “Science and technology are the primary productive forces” is a thesis advanced by Deng Xiaoping in 1988, later incorporated into the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Technology is one of the most fundamental and important practical activities of the human being in the pursuit of free activity.
马克思从人的劳动实践出发,认为人的类本质是所有科学技术发展和应用的基础。马克思在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中也提道:“如果把工业看成人的本质力量的公开展示,那么自然界的人的本质,或者人的自然本质,也就可以理解了。”工业,即技术,体现了人与自然的关系,技术的本质就是人的本质或人的本质力量的表现,工业是人本质力量的公开展示。机器作为其载体表现为人的劳动工具和中介,其本质是人的本质力量的外化。人为了满足自身生产发展的需求,使机器逐步发展成为生产活动中的重要组成部分,即生产资料。人处于主体地位,机器处于客体地位,机器在此时是提高生产效率、解放生产力的存在。马克思指出:“生产过程成了科学的应用,而科学反过来成了生产过程的因素即所谓职能。”此时,所有新技术的发展还仅仅作为人的生产工具的发展,科学技术被纳入生产活动,技术革命对生产力产生巨大的推动作用——“科学技术是第一生产力”。技术是人类追求自由活动的一种最基本的、最重要的实践活动。
The Human Being as Machine
作为机器的人
With the development of large-scale industry, technology and capital become intertwined and further bound and fettered by capital. Science and technology can influence and act upon the material means of production of a specific society; even the materialized product of science and technology — the machine — becomes something that, together with the exploiters, exploits the laborers, rather than a means and tool for realizing human liberation. Technology becomes an autonomous force with autonomy and relative independence. Marx once said: “In our age, everything seems pregnant with its contrary. … All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and stultifying human life into a material force.” Science promotes instrumental rationality but blocks the meaning of human existence; the human being falls into dependence on technology; alienated labor, human alienation, and technological alienation coexist. Human labor is no longer irreplaceable; the field of human self-consciousness and real life simultaneously undergo alienated dislocation; the human being becomes an appendage of the machine.
随着大工业的发展,技术与资本互相缠绕,进一步被资本捆绑束缚,科学技术可以影响和作用于特定社会的物质生产资料,甚至科学技术的物化产物——机器也成为了同剥削者一起剥削劳动者的事物,而非实现人的解放的手段和工具。技术变成一种具有自主权、相对独立的自主力量。马克思曾说:“在我们这个时代,每一种事物好像都包含有自己的反面。……我们的一切发现和进步,似乎结果是使物质力量具有理智生命,而人的生命则化为愚钝的物质力量。”科学张扬了工具理性,却屏蔽了人的生存意义,人陷入了对技术的依赖,异化劳动、人的异化以及技术异化并存。人的劳动不再是无可替代的,人的自我意识领域和现实生活同时发生异化错位,人成为机器的附属品。
Alienation in the field of self-consciousness spreads from the sphere of production. In production practice, technology changes from a tool into a means for capital to rule and exploit the producers, causing us to become increasingly enslaved, reified, and dehumanized. An important manifestation of technological alienation here is: technology exhibits an extreme development in the aspect of understanding and transforming the objective world — the separation of science and technology from the humanities. Technology and labor are no longer tools for pursuing human freedom and liberation, no longer embody humanistic spirit; instead, they contain more material wealth and the logic of capital. This means that technology intensifies our alienation into higher animals that one-sidedly pursue material wealth; the human being gradually becomes homogenized, i.e., the human being is one-sidedly reduced to a one-dimensional person. [2]2 “One-dimensional person” (单向度的人) is a reference to Herbert Marcuse’s concept of the “one-dimensional man,” describing a person reduced to a single dimension of thought and behavior under advanced industrial capitalism.
自我意识领域中的异化是由生产领域蔓延而来的。在生产实践中,技术由工具变成了资本统治和剥削生产者的手段,导致我们越来越奴隶化、物化和非人化。这里技术异化的一个重要表现是:技术在认识与改造客观世界的方面存在极端化的发展情况——科技与人文相分离。技术和劳动不再是追求人的自由解放的工具,不再蕴含人文精神,相反其中更多的是物质财富和资本逻辑。这就意味着,技术加剧我们异化成片面追求物质财富的高级动物,人逐渐趋同,亦即人被片面化为单向度的人。
Alienation in real life occurs as technology integrates into life practice. The virtual and the real were originally a binary opposition, but with the rapid development of science and technology, technology eliminates the binary opposition between the virtual and the real. The main source of human cognition shifts from personal experience or perception to mass media or the virtual world; the boundary between the virtual and the real is blurred at this point. Humanity enters a “hyperreal” world composed of sign-codes; the true real gradually fades and disappears. Questioning the fusion of the virtual and the real is questioning “what it means to be human.” “The essence of the human being is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” When human social relations become virtual, mechanical, and one-dimensional, then the human being will be alienated by mechanized production into a component of the machine.
现实生活中的异化是随着科技融入生活实践发生的。虚与实原本是二元对立,但随着科学技术的迅速发展,技术消除了虚与实的二元对立。人们认知的主要来源由亲身经历或感受转变为大众媒体或虚拟世界,虚与实的边界在这时被模糊。人类进入了由符码组成的“超真实”世界,真正的真实逐渐模糊消失。对虚与实的融合的质疑就是对“何以为人”的疑惑。“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物,在其现实性上,它是一切社会关系的总和。”当人的社会关系变为虚拟的、机械的、单向度的,那么人将被机械化的生产异化为机器的组成部分。
Marx, Heidegger, and Marcuse all criticized this. Heidegger questioned the essence of technology, holding that modern technology has become a “enframing” [3]3 “Enframing” (Gestell) is Heidegger’s term for the essence of modern technology, which reduces the world to a “standing-reserve” (Bestand) for human use. that fetters people. Both Marx and Marcuse base their critiques on the critique of capitalism and on human alienation, ultimately aiming at the realization of human liberation. Marcuse criticizes technology itself starting from the abstract essence of the human being, while Marx starts from practice, holding that alienated labor is precisely the alienation of the human essence; alienated labor inverts this relationship, turning the human being’s own essence into merely a means for maintaining their own survival. The essence of technological alienation is actually the rule of capital over the human being; therefore, technology dehumanizes the human being. In sum, technology originally existed as a tool for the human being to transform nature, but now it gradually alienates into the purpose of the human being; the irreplaceable self-consciousness and individual real needs in original labor practice are also gradually blurred by technological alienation; human living labor is no longer irreplaceable in material production activities; it is no longer the human being creating the machine, but the machine creating the human being.
马克思、海德格尔、马尔库塞对此都有所批判。海德格尔对技术的本质进行追问,认为现代技术已经变为一种“限制”束缚着人们。马克思和马尔库塞都是以对资本主义的批判和以人的异化为基础,最终以实现人的解放为目标。马尔库塞从人的抽象本质出发批判技术本身,而马克思从实践出发,认为异化劳动也就是人本质的异化,异化劳动把这种关系颠倒过来,自己的本质变成仅仅维持自己生存的手段。技术异化的本质其实是资本对人的统治,因此技术使人非人化。总的来说,技术原本作为人改造自然的工具而存在,但如今逐渐异化成为人的目的,原本劳动实践中不可替代的自我意识与个人现实需求也都逐渐被技术异化模糊,人的活劳动在物质生产活动中不再是不可替代的,不再是人创造机器,而是机器创造人。
The Machine as Human Being
作为人的机器
In the era of the Industrial Revolution, the degree of human dependence on machines was low; they could only replace part of human labor. After the third scientific and technological revolution, most of people’s production and social interaction activities rely on machines such as smartphones and computers to be completed; thinking is expressed and transmitted through machines; smartphones become better memory storage tools than the human brain; when facing problems, rational thinking guided by personal knowledge systems gradually shifts to mechanical online searches; human activities are all attached to machines; algorithms are more intelligent than humans in some aspects; machines and networks are linked together to become a second human brain, becoming the site of conscious activity. All of the human being’s life activities are carried out along with the activities of machines and are gradually replaced by machines; intelligent machines have become the key to the human being’s realization of self-worth. Marx pointed out that the mode of existence of a species lies in the form of its life activity: “The human being maintains its own survival in the process of actively transforming nature using tools; therefore, practice constitutes the nature of the human being’s special life activity, i.e., constitutes the human being’s mode of existence.” If, when the “cyborg” [4]4 “Cyborg” (赛博格) refers to a cybernetic organism, a being with both organic and biomechatronic body parts, a concept from Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto.” arrives, machines and artificial intelligence become the practitioners of all material production, becoming an independent existence that can be separated from the human being; and the human being becomes a tool ruled by machines, completely alienated into a part of the machine, with the human being no longer having production practice — will the human world still have any meaning?
在工业革命时代,人对机器的依赖程度较低,仅能替代人的部分劳动。第三次科技革命之后,人们的大部分生产和社会交往活动依托智能手机、电脑等机器来完成,思维通过机器表达传递;智能手机成为比人脑更好的记忆储存工具;面对问题,个人知识体系指导下的理性思考逐渐转向机械的网络搜索;人的活动都依附于机器之上,算法在某些方面比人更智能,机器和网络联结起来成为第二个人脑,变成意识活动的场所。人全部的生命活动伴随着机器的活动而进行,并逐渐被机器所取代,智能机器已经成为人实现自我价值的关键所在。马克思指出,一个物种的存在方式就在于其生命活动的形式,“人是在利用工具积极改造自然的过程中维持自己的生存的,因此,实践构成了人类的特殊的生命活动的性质,即构成了人的存在方式”。若当“赛博格”到来时,机器和人工智能成为所有物质生产的实践者,成为可以脱离人的独立存在;而人成为被机器统治的工具,被彻底异化成为机器的一部分,人再无生产实践,人的世界是否还有意义可言?
On the question of human ontology, Descartes held that “I think, therefore I am,” but this is merely a logical argument. Heidegger believed that the focus of Being is human existence; only through the being that is “man” can one reach “Being,” and man’s Being is existence. Zhao Tingyang argues that “I act, therefore I am”; “my action” is the ontological proof of “my being.” Man exists because he performs some deed (to do); it is through action (to do) that man acquires meaning. Marx also clearly stated in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*: “The whole character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life-activity, and the species-character of man is precisely free, conscious activity.” [5]5 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 276. Translation slightly modified. Under the premise that practice constitutes man’s mode of life and practice creates the world, when machines completely replace man in carrying out all material production, man’s “doing” (to do) is reduced to a minimum, the world is no longer created by man, and man’s existence becomes utterly meaningless—indeed, one could say man ceases to exist. The human world will also vanish, and the meaning of both the world and man begins to dissolve.
在人的存在论问题上,笛卡尔认为“我思故我在”,但这仅是一个逻辑论证。海德格尔认为存在的重点是人的生存,只有经由作为存在者的“人”才能通向“存在”,人的存在就是生存。赵汀阳认为“我行故我在”,“我行”才是“我在”的存在论证明,人之所以存在是因为人去做了某种行为(to do),人是因为行动(to do)才有了意义。马克思也在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中明确指出:“一个种的全部特性、种的类特性就在于生命活动的性质,而人的类特性恰恰就是自由的自觉的活动。”在实践构成了人的生活方式、实践创造世界的前提下,当机器完全代替人完成全部的物质生产活动的时候,人的“有为”(to do)缩减到最小,世界不再是由人所创造的,那么人的存在也就变得毫无意义,甚至可以说人不复存在。属人的世界也将消失,世界以及人的意义开始消解。
From this perspective, then, the extreme one-dimensional development of science and technology may ultimately lead not to “the liberation of man” but to “the dissolution of man.” Marx proposed in the *Communist Manifesto*: “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” [6]6 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506. Although Marx and Engels did not explicitly specify the concrete practical pathways and methods for reaching the ideal society, it is clear that the one-dimensional development of technology cannot achieve the “association of free individuals.” The nature of instrumental technology depends on the social system and its application; the adaptability of social application becomes the key point for reflection.
那么从这个角度上来说,科技单向度的极度发展,最终走向可能不是“人的解放”而是“人的消解”。马克思在《共产党宣言》中提出:“代替那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的,将是这样一个联合体,在那里,每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件。”尽管马克思和恩格斯并没有明确指出通向理想社会的具体实践途径和方法是什么,但显然技术的单向度发展并不能达到“自由人联合体”。工具技术的性质取决于社会制度与应用,社会应用的适应性成为思考的关键之所在。
Web editor: Paul
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Notes
- “Science and technology are the primary productive forces” is a thesis advanced by Deng Xiaoping in 1988, later incorporated into the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. ↩
- “One-dimensional person” (单向度的人) is a reference to Herbert Marcuse’s concept of the “one-dimensional man,” describing a person reduced to a single dimension of thought and behavior under advanced industrial capitalism. ↩
- “Enframing” (Gestell) is Heidegger’s term for the essence of modern technology, which reduces the world to a “standing-reserve” (Bestand) for human use. ↩
- “Cyborg” (赛博格) refers to a cybernetic organism, a being with both organic and biomechatronic body parts, a concept from Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto.” ↩
- Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 276. Translation slightly modified. ↩
- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506. ↩