The Distinction between "Substance" and "Subject" from the Perspective of Historical Materialism

"Substance" is an ancient concept in Western philosophy. That "substance" received attention should first be credited to Socrates. On the basis of dialogical dialectics, he no longer confined himself to tracing the origins of nature, laying the foundation for substance ontology, while also establishing the importance of the "subject" in ethics. Unfortunately, in the modern period, although Descartes, Bacon, and others also pondered and explored the "subject," they all made the "subject" tend toward a correspondence theory, requiring that the cognition of the "subject" must fully conform to the "object" and be subject to the highest, unmoved "substance." As for the specific state of the "subject," it seemed irrelevant. The classical German philosophers rethought the Enlightenment's promotion of humanism. From Kant's "Copernican revolution," which demarcated epistemology, to Hegel's logical demonstration that "substance is subject," all were rethinking and re-founding the status of the "subject" under the illumination of the Enlightenment's light on the "subject." Kant's promotion of the "subject" is embodied in the assertion that "man gives laws to nature." Through the construction of a "tribunal of understanding," the reflection of the subject and the activity of self-consciousness gained ontological importance. The pinnacle of reflection on the subject is Hegel. His theory that "subject is substance," on the one hand, integrates "history" into logic, and on the other, elevates the dimension of freedom of the "subject" within real social relations. However, the "subject" in Hegel's system remains "substantial," not a truly real subject, let alone reaching the subject of the "self-activity of the real subject" expressed by Marx in historical materialism, or the proletarian subject with agency and class character situated in historical practice—this is precisely the subject of appearance with a specific historical orientation. The relationship between "substance" and "subject" is manifested in the continuous transcendence of "substance" by the "subject," reflected in the constant decline of the status of "substance" and the constant rise of the status of the "subject." From the perspective of historical materialism, this process of transcendence is a paradigm shift from substance as being, substance as subject, to real subject and subject of appearance.

“实体”是一个西方哲学的古老概念。“实体”受到重视，应当首先归功于苏格拉底。他在问答辩证法的基础上，不再拘泥于对自然本原的溯源，奠基了实体本体论，同时也确定了“主体”在伦理学上的重要性。遗憾的是，到了近代，尽管笛卡尔、培根等也思考和探索“主体”,但都使“主体”趋向符合论，要求“主体”的认知必须完全符合“客体”并受制于最高的不动的“实体”。至于“主体”具体是什么状态，显得无关紧要。德国古典哲学家们重新思考了启蒙精神对人本主义的弘扬。从康德的“哥白尼革命”为认识论划界，到黑格尔对“实体即主体”的逻辑学论证，都是在启蒙运动对“主体”之光的弘扬下重新思考和奠基“主体”地位。康德对“主体”的弘扬体现在“人为自然立法”的论断中，通过“知性法庭”的建构，使主体的反思和自我意识的能动性得到了本体论层面的重视。对主体进行反思的最高峰是黑格尔。他的“主体即实体”论一方面把“历史”融入逻辑学，另一方面高扬“主体”在现实社会关系中的自由向度。然而，“主体”在黑格尔的体系中依然是“实体”性的，而非真正的现实主体，更无法企及马克思在唯物史观中表述的“实在主体的自我活动”之主体和处于置身性的历史实践中的具有能动性和阶级性的无产阶级主体，这正是具有特定历史方位的出场主体。“实体”与“主体”的关系体现在“主体”对“实体”的不断超越上，体现为“实体”地位的不断下降和“主体”地位的不断上升。以唯物史观的视域来看，这一超越过程即从实体本体、实体主体到现实主体和出场主体的范式转换过程。

I. Substance as Being: Observing Changes in the Status of the "Subject" from the History of the Concept of "Substance"

一、实体本体：从“实体”概念发展史看“主体”地位变化

The emergence of the concept of "substance" simultaneously signifies the emergence of the metaphysics of presence. By tracing its conceptual history, we can pursue the origin, development, and paradigm shifts of Western metaphysics. Substance, from being, to category, to essence, reflects the rising status of the subject and a gradual shift from the paradigm of an "abstract" system to a "concrete" real paradigm. It is not until Hegel treats "substance as subject" as the highest moment that the concept of "substance" and the logic of the metaphysics of presence in the entire Western system of thought reach their peak.

“实体”概念的产生同时意味着在场形而上学的产生。通过它的概念史回溯，我们可以追寻西方形而上学的源起、发展以及范式变革。实体从本体、范畴再到本质，体现了主体的地位上升和从“抽象”体系范式到“具体”现实范式的逐步转换。直到黑格尔将“实体即主体”作为一种最高环节，使得整个西方思想体系中的“实体”概念和在场形而上学的逻辑达到顶峰。

(A) Aristotle: The Highest Substance is God

(一)亚里士多德：最高实体是神

Aristotle's "substance" occupies the first place among his ten categories, which is related to his definition of philosophy. Aristotle's philosophy has a clear conciliatory character; he neither agrees with Plato's separation of "matter" and "idea," nor with naive materialism's treatment of "matter" as the highest being. Aristotle believed that philosophy must seek truth, seek origins, seek universality, and seek ultimate causes; therefore, it necessarily possesses wholeness and infinity, which is consistent with later rationalism, especially Hegel's rationalist system. "Thus, the first philosophy, which takes 'being as being' as its object of study, must take the study of substance as its core. This study centered on substance is Aristotle's 'theory of being' or 'ontology,' later called ontology, usually translated in Chinese as '本体论'." Therefore, "substance" is "being."

亚里士多德的“实体”居于其十大范畴之首，这与他对哲学的定位有关。亚里士多德的哲学具有明显的调和意味，他并不赞同柏拉图把“物质”与“理念”相分离，也不赞同朴素唯物主义把“物质”作为最高本体。亚里士多德认为哲学需要求真、求源、求普遍、求终极原因，因此，它必然具有整体性和无限性，这与后来的理性主义是一脉相承的，尤其是黑格尔的理性主义体系。“所以， 以 ‘作为存在的存在 ’为研究对象的第一哲学必须以对实体的研究为核心。这种以实体为核心的研究也就是亚氏的 ‘是论’或 ‘存在论’, 后人称之为ontology, 中文通常译为 ‘本体论’”。因此，“实体”就是“本体”。

Regarding the classification of "substance," besides primary substance, he also distinguished secondary substance, i.e., the "species" and "genus" that conform to the definition of primary substance and are dependent on primary substance itself. Its purpose remains to explore the essence and commonality of things present. Scientific knowledge, moral ethics, logical methods, etc., all converge into "substance." The lofty status of "substance" makes the "subject" its appendage. The highest substance, transcending both primary and secondary substance, is "God," which opens the door to the unity of rationalism and mysticism.

关于“实体”的分类表述，除了第一实体，他还区分了第二实体，即符合第一实体规定并依附于第一实体本身的“种”和“属”,其目的依然是探究在场事物的本质与共性。科学知识、道德伦理、逻辑方法等全部汇聚到“实体”中。“实体”的崇高地位使“主体”成为其附庸，凌驾于第一实体与第二实体之上的最高实体是“神”,这为理性主义和神秘主义的统一敞开大门。

(B) Descartes: Substance is God, and also Thought and Extension

(二)笛卡尔：实体是神，也是思维和广延

With the rise of the Enlightenment, an era of great ideological transformation also began. When Descartes' dualism appeared, it sparked fierce controversy. Theologians accused Descartes of materialist tendencies, while materialists considered Descartes a mystic. In fact, such debate is of little significance. Descartes distinguished Aristotle's "substance" of motion from the unmoved "substance," changing the approach of first taking the "subject" as the center and starting point before discussing "substance." Therefore, what is first determined is not the essence of the concept or the substrate of motion, but the "substance" of the "I" as subject itself. The reason the "substance" of the "I" can be confirmed and is self-evident is "I think." Body and mind are both peculiar to the "subject," but belong to different categories of "substance." After excluding the "substance" of "I think," what remains in the world? That is the material substance with "extension" and the "substance" that is different from both and can unify them to operate harmoniously—"substance" is still God. As the self-evident starting point of "I think," Descartes uses a new term to express it: "innate ideas." Beyond "I think" and "extension," there is the "substance" of "heaven."

启蒙运动的兴起，思想大变革的时代也随之开启。当笛卡尔的二元论出现的时候，曾引起激烈争论。神学主义指责笛卡尔的唯物主义倾向，唯物主义则认为笛卡尔是神秘主义。事实上，这种争论的意义不大。笛卡尔把亚里士多德关于运动的“实体”和不动的“实体”进行区分，改变了先以“主体”为中心和出发点，再谈论“实体”。因此，首先确定的不是概念的本质或运动的基质，而是主体的“我”这一“实体”本身，“我”的“实体”能够被确证的原因以及能够不证自明的原因是“我思”;身、心都是“主体”所特有的，但属于不同的“实体”类别。排除“我思”这一“实体”之后，世界上还剩下什么呢?那就是具有“广延”的物质实体以及与这两者都不相同的并且能够把两者统摄起来使其和谐运转的“实体”,“实体”依旧是神。作为不证自明的出发点之“我思”,笛卡尔用一个新的词汇来表述：“天赋观念。”在“我思”和“广延”之外，还有“天”之“实体”。

Although Descartes took the "substance" of the thinking "subject" as the center and starting point and developed the method of universal doubt, he ultimately ended up in the same place as Aristotle. "Substance" remained the gravitational center of metaphysics. Although the thinking of the "subject" and material extension formed a dualistic parallel logical framework, they were ultimately subsumed by the highest substance. Thus, although the status of the "subject" was elevated, it remained obscure.

笛卡尔虽然把思维“主体”之“实体”作为中心和出发点，并发展了普遍怀疑的方法，但最终还是与亚里士多德殊途同归。“实体”依旧是形而上学的引力中心，“主体”思维与物质广延尽管是二元平行的逻辑框架，最终还是被最高实体统摄。所以，“主体”地位尽管得到提升，但是依然晦暗。

(C) Spinoza: Substance is Self-Cause

(三)斯宾诺莎：实体是自因

After Descartes' "substance" of thought, extension, and "God," Spinoza initiated the exploration of the element of "self-cause" in "substance." Substance, nature, and God possess a "trinitarian" unity. Like Aristotle and Descartes, he also believed that "substance" is the highest thing, the essential thing, an independent existence grounded in itself. However, unlike Descartes, not only does "God" have substantiality, but nature also has substantiality. Nature and "God" both possess the highest characteristics of "substance," so there is no issue of one having higher status. "Substance" is "substance" because it is "self-cause," an uncreated thing, infinite and perfecting itself in supremacy. Only "nature" and "God" can be the cause of themselves and thus become "substance."

在笛卡尔的思维、广延和“神”之“实体”后，斯宾诺莎开启了“实体”的“自因”要素的探讨。实体与自然、神具有“三位一体”的统一性。与亚里士多德、笛卡尔一样，他也认为“实体”是最高的东西、本质的东西，是自己依据自己的独立存在。然而，与笛卡尔不同的是，不仅“上帝”具有实体性，自然也同样具有实体性。自然与“神”,两者都具有最高的“实体”特征，因而并不存在谁地位更高的问题。“实体”之所以是“实体”,因为它是“自因”,是非创造物，是无限的且在至上中完善着的东西。只有“自然”与“神”能够使自己成为自己的原因，才能成为“实体”。

The most distinctive feature of Spinoza's definition of "substance" is reflected in his geometric ethics. According to the principle of geometric formulas, i.e., the deductive method, one first determines unchanging eternal truths, then deduces other truths from one truth. "Substance is self-cause" means it is the most fundamental, self-evident proposition requiring no proof; only through it can other truth propositions be deduced step by step. The first thing deduced is "attributes" (including "thought" and "extension"). "Attributes" are not "self-cause"; they depend on "substance" for existence. Then, from "attributes," various specific, changing, and particularly limited "modes" are deduced, mainly those related to humans: spirit, mind, body, and human social relations. This places "nature" and "God" on an equal footing, thereby reducing the importance of "man." In summary, humans can only be secondary beings deduced from "substance," and therefore must be governed by "nature" and "God."

斯宾诺莎对“实体”的规定，最显著的特征体现在他的几何伦理学上。按照几何学公式原理即演绎法，首先确定不变的永恒真理，再通过一个真理推论出其他真理。“实体是自因”意味着它是最根本的，不需要证明的“自明性”命题，只有通过它才可以一步步推导出其他真理性命题。第一步被推导出来的东西即为“属性”(包括“思维”与“广延”)。“属性”不是“自因”,它需要依附“实体”存在，再由“属性”推导出具有各种各样具体性变化的、特殊的受限制的“样态”,主要是与人相关的“样态”:精神、心灵、躯体以及人类社会关系等。这样把“自然”与“神”置于平等地位，也就降低了“人”的重要性。概言之，人只能是被“实体”推论出来的次生物，因此，不得不受到“自然”和“神”的统治。

(D) Leibniz: Substance is Moving Cause

(四)莱布尼茨：实体是动因

“Substance” was also one of Leibniz’s most concerned issues. He believed that the world is composed of “monads” in the ontological realm and external “matter” in the realm of phenomena, and that “monads” and “matter” are “pre-established harmonious.” Therefore, they are not incapable of unification as Cartesian dualism holds, but can achieve logical consistency through “pre-established harmony.” How are the two levels of “substance” unified with each other through “pre-established harmony”? Leibniz believed that it must rely on motion. He not only unified Plato’s theory of Ideas and the theory of origins of naive materialism, but also unified the “final cause” and “efficient cause” in Aristotle’s “substance,” thereby incorporating the factors of “subject” practice and will “force.” Because it incorporated demonstrable principles of mathematics and physics, the theoretical system possessed a precise chain of causal logic; thus, his theory of unity was more persuasive than previous philosophical theories. Through this, Leibniz also compensated for the deficiencies of formal logic. By adding the principle of sufficient reason, he achieved logical consistency between philosophy and the axioms of mathematics and physics through the “force” of motion, proving that “substance” is the motion of “entelechy,” a “monad” with “force,” and a “future contingent event.”

“实体”也是莱布尼茨最为关心的问题之一。他认为世界由本体论领域内的“单子”和现象界领域内的外部“物质”构成，“单子”和“物质”又是“前定和谐”的，因此，它们不是笛卡尔二元论所认为的那样无法统一，而是能够以“前定和谐”的方式实现逻辑上的一致。“实体”的两个层次如何通过“前定和谐”相互统一呢?莱布尼茨认为，必须依靠运动。他不仅把柏拉图的理念论和朴素唯物主义的本原论进行统一，而且把亚里士多德“实体”中的“目的因”“动力因”也进行统一，这便结合了“主体”实践和意志“力”的因素。由于结合了可论证的数学、物理学的原理而使得理论体系具有精确的因果逻辑链，因此，他的这种统一性理论比以往的哲学理论更具说服力。莱布尼茨借此还弥补了形式逻辑的不足，通过增加充足理由律，使哲学与数学、物理学的公理通过运动的“力”实现了逻辑一致，证明了“实体”是“隐德来希”的运动，是有“力”的“单子”,是“未来的偶性事件”。

The “force” in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not only Newton’s but also Leibniz’s. In this way, Leibniz lowered “substance” from abstract entities like God and self-cause, which are detached from worldly affairs, to a more realistic “substance” with a motive cause. This is precisely the dynamic factor that can only be brought about by the free will of the “subject” and its practical tension. Neither Descartes’ mental substance and extended substance, nor Spinoza’s “substance,” paid attention to the “efficient cause” and “final cause” in Aristotle’s concept of substance. If the “efficient cause” is lacking, the theory of substance will degenerate into a rigid and abstract system, lacking demonstrability in actual motion; it will also be unable to explain the basis for the development and change of things. If the “final cause” is lacking, it is impossible to understand the reasons for the development and change of things; the system of substance is merely a theodicy. Based on this, in “pre-established harmony,” “substance” can develop and change only because it possesses the “motive cause” of the “subject’s” “force,” but the “subject” has still not become independent from “substance.”

黑格尔的《精神现象学》的“力”不仅是牛顿的，而且是莱布尼茨的。这样，莱布尼茨就使“实体”从“神”、自因之类不食人间烟火的抽象物下降为更具现实性的具有动因的“实体”,这正是“主体”的自由意志及其实践张力才能带来的动力因素。无论是笛卡尔的心灵实体和广延实体，抑或斯宾诺莎的“实体”,都没有重视亚里士多德实体概念中的“动力因”和“目的因”。如果缺乏“动力因”,将导致实体理论沦为僵硬抽象的体系，不具备在现实运动中的可被论证性；同样无法说明事物发展变化的根据。如果缺乏“目的因”,则无法理解事物发展变化的原因；实体的体系不过是神证论。基于此，在“前定和谐”中，“实体”因为具有“主体”之“力”的“动因”才能发展变化，但是“主体”依然没有从“实体”中独立出来。

II. Substance-Subject: The Unity of Subject and Substance in Abstract “Reality”

二、实体主体：主体与实体在抽象“现实”中的统一

Kant’s comprehensive critique takes the three Critiques as its main thread. The appearance of the category of “reality” in the First Critique undoubtedly gave the category of “substance” a more profound and specific determination. In Kant’s table of categories of the understanding, “reality” and “substance” appear in the same sequence, meaning that the status of abstract “substance” declines, while the status of concrete “reality” rises. “Reality,” which previous metaphysicians had placed in footnotes, now becomes a member of the “tribunal of the understanding.” However, Kant’s dialectics stops short before the contradiction of “antinomies,” causing the precious “reality” to dissipate into the pure phenomenal world, and the “contradictions” of dialectics dissolve into the table of categories of the understanding.

康德的全面批判以三大批判为主线。在第一批判中“现实”范畴的出现，无疑使“实体”范畴得到了更为深刻和具体的规定。在康德知性范畴表中，“现实”与“实体”在同一序列中出现，意味着抽象“实体”的地位下降，具体“现实”的地位上升。被以往的形而上学家们放在脚注的“现实”而今成为“知性法庭”的一员。但是康德的辩证法却在“二律背反”的矛盾面前止步，使得宝贵的“现实”流失于纯粹的现象界，辩证法的“矛盾”消融于知性的范畴表。

(I) Substance is a Category

(一)实体是范畴

While opposing formal logic, Kant made a new determination of “substance”: substance is a category of the understanding, belonging to the epistemology of man legislating for nature, not to ontology. This conclusion is subversive. Kant’s epistemological turn lowered “substance” from ontology to cognition. Formal logic only cares about correctness, ignoring truth; it only cares about forming a rigorous system of judgments, ignoring whether human cognitive ability can reach such a system. Kant took the human factor into account, elevating the status of the human “subject.” He believed that the way to cognize the “object” is the combined effect of “sensibility + understanding.” Sensibility provides content, understanding provides form. Understanding without sensibility is empty; sensibility without understanding is blind. Understanding is the guiding light, using a priori categories of space and time (transcendental aesthetic) to determine the content of experience, then through transcendental logic first determining the scientificity of the “object” (transcendental analytic), and then reflecting on the scope of human cognitive ability (transcendental dialectic). This is a logic concerning “objectivity,” and also a logic of scientific epistemology; “a priori” does not consider the relationship between thought and the “object.” Therefore, “transcendental” is a logic that is prior to experience yet inseparable from experience, orderly from low to high.

康德在反对形式逻辑的同时，对“实体”作出新的规定：实体是知性范畴，隶属于为自然立法的人的认识论，而非本体论。这个结论是有颠覆性的。康德的认识论转向使“实体”从本体下降为认识。形式逻辑只关心正确性，无视真理性；只关心形成判断的严密体系，无视人的认识能力是否可以达到这种体系。康德把人的要素考虑进来，抬高了人的“主体”地位。他认为认识“对象”的方式是“感性+知性”的共同作用。感性认识提供内容，知性认识提供形式。知性无感性则空，感性无知性则盲。知性是指路明灯，用先天的时空范畴(先验感性论)规定着经验的内容，进而通过先验逻辑首先确定“对象”的科学性(先验分析论),进而反思人的认识能力范围(先验辩证论)。这是关于“对象性”的逻辑，同时也是科学的认识论逻辑，“先天”则不考虑思维与“对象”之间的关系。因此，“先验”是先于经验却又离不开经验的逻辑，从低到高、秩序井然。

“Transcendental logic,” according to different categories of “objectivity,” uses a priori creative imagination (the “self-consciousness” of the subject) to determine the “time schema” through the transcendental character of imagination towards time, and then synthesizes different categories, forming a system of categories with four different levels: “quantity,” “quality,” “relation,” and “modality.” “Transcendental analytic” includes two levels: “conceptual analysis” and “principle analysis.” The former concerns the a priori “categories” of the subject; the latter concerns the “principles” followed when making judgments, or rather, the “medium” that must be used to make judgments is the “time schema,” which is a manifestation of the transcendental apperception ability, i.e., the manifestation of the “subject’s” “self-consciousness.”

“先验逻辑”根据不同的“对象性”范畴，通过先天的具有创造力的想象力(主体的“自我意识”),用想象力对时间的先验特性规定“时间图形”(schema),进而对不同范畴进行综合，形成了依次具有“量”“质”“关系”“模态”四个不同层次的范畴体系。“先验分析”包括了“概念分析”和“原理分析”两个层次。前者事关主体的先天性“范畴”;后者事关进行判断时遵循的“原理”,或者说，进行判断所必须借助的“中介”是“时间图形”,这是先验统觉能力的体现，亦即“主体”的“自我意识”的体现。

By having “man” legislate for nature, Kant echoes the spirit of the Enlightenment, elevating the status of the “subject” to a new height above “substance” for the first time—a groundbreaking achievement of epoch-making significance. However, the dialectics manifested in the table of categories of the understanding, such as the torrents of thought concerning communicativity, reality, and historicity, are all blocked by the dam of contradiction of “antinomies.” Hegel profoundly pointed out: Kant’s deduction of the unknowable reason (as the opposite of the understanding) from the cognizable understanding is extremely absurd; it can only lead to a chasm and opposition between theory and practice, morality and nature, individual and society. In summary, Kant discusses “substance” and “subject” from the perspective of individual epistemology, elevating the “subject” (the seat of the “tribunal of the understanding”) above “substance” (merely a category) for the first time—this is a milestone; but the problem of “antinomies” can only be solved by elevating the discussion of the individual “subject” to actual “society” and understanding “contradiction” as the key to unlocking the lock.

康德通过“人”为自然立法，呼应启蒙精神，把“主体”的地位首次提升到高于“实体”的崭新高度，这是一个具有划时代意义的创举。但是，在知性范畴表中体现出来的辩证法，例如交往性、现实性、历史性等思想洪流，都被“二律背反”的矛盾大坝阻挡了。黑格尔深刻地指出：康德在可认识的知性中推论出(作为知性的对立面的)无法被认知的理性，这是非常荒谬的，这只能导致理论与实践、道德与自然、个人与社会的鸿沟和对立。综合来看，康德站在个人认识论的角度谈论“实体”和“主体”,首次把“主体”(“知性法庭”所在地)提升到高于“实体”(仅仅是范畴)的地位，这是一个里程碑；但必须把对个体“主体”的探讨上升到现实“社会”,把“矛盾”理解为开锁的钥匙，才能解决“二律背反”难题。

(II) Substance is Essence

(二)实体是本质

Hegel, by reinterpreting Kant’s “antinomies,” excavated the negative driving “force” hidden in “contradiction,” and thereby further elevated “reality” to the “objective spirit” above “subjective spirit,” making the unity of “subject” and “substance” in “reality” possible. Although this unity possesses a complete metaphysical system, it makes “reality” into essence, endowing it with demonstrable moments. Hegel transformed “substance” at the level of “society.” In the *Science of Logic*, it belongs to the “Doctrine of Essence”; in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it belongs to “objective spirit,” both higher than the “Doctrine of Being” and “subjective spirit.” This is a major advance over Kant’s philosophy. “Substance” is no longer merely subordinate to the subject’s epistemology as Kant thought, nor is it limited to a member of the table of categories; rather, it is an essential moment of absolute Idea. Because “substance” possesses the capacity for self-reflection, it has the ability for self-construction. “This identity-with-self in its negation is now substance. It is substance as this unity in its negation or in contingency, so it is substance as self-related.” [4]4 G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, vol. 2, trans. Yang Yizhi (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1976), p. 3. [Translator’s note: This is a translation of the Chinese edition; the English equivalent is from Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 409.] Substance is essence, specifically the process of development, construction, and generation of reality, contradiction, and subject within substance, along with its speculative process of unification, enabling “the logic of the thing itself” to move toward “the thing of logic itself,” [5]5 Sun Lin, “The Logic of the Thing Itself and the Thing of Logic Itself: A Study of Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*,” *Philosophical Research*, no. 3 (2022). ultimately returning to absolute substance, i.e., absolute spirit. Substance as essence has the following three levels:

黑格尔则通过康德的“二律背反”重新理解，发掘深藏于“矛盾”中的否定性的推动“力”,进而把“现实”进一步提升至高于“主观精神”的“客观精神”中，使“主体”与“实体”在“现实”中统一成为可能。尽管这种统一具有完整的形而上学体系，却使“现实”成为本质，具有了可被论证的环节。黑格尔站在“社会”层面对“实体”进行改造，在《逻辑学》中属“本质论”,在《精神现象学》中属“客观精神”,都高于“存在论”与“主观精神”,这是对康德哲学的一大进步。“实体”不再像康德所认为的那样仅仅隶属于主体认识论，也不再是局限于范畴表中的一个成员，而是绝对理念必不可少的本质环节，“实体”因为具有自我反思能力而具有了自我建构的能力，“有在其否定中与自身的这种同一，现在就是实体。实体是作为在其否定中或作为在偶然中的这个统一，所以它是作为自身对比的实体”。实体是本质，具体说来是现实、矛盾和主体在实体内部的发展、建构、生成的过程及其思辨的统一过程，使“事物本身的逻辑”走向“逻辑本身的事物”[3],最终回归绝对实体即绝对精神。作为本质的实体有以下三个层次：

First, substance is “reality.”

第一，实体即“现实”。

This is the “substance’s” practical interactivity, internal reflectiveness, and “subjective purposiveness.” In the *Science of Logic*, substance appears in the “Doctrine of Essence.” If “actuality” is “essence,” then substance, which manifests as “essence,” is also “actuality.” The reasons are as follows: First, actuality is ethical substance and its interaction. Ever since Hegel mentioned the famous proposition in both the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* and the chapter on “Actuality” in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, “actuality” has been inseparable from “rationality.” So what is rationality? It must be manifested in the interactive process of ethical substance. The law and morality discussed in the *Philosophy of Right* are also necessary stages of ethical substance; therefore, “substance” in its actual interactive links is “actuality” and “essence.” Second, the “substance” split by Descartes into a mind-body dualism possesses an essential reflective link. Substance is essence; it is not only actual and interactive but also continuously self-reflective at every stage of ethical substance. This reflection achieves effective interaction in ethical substance through “self-consciousness that recognizes.” “Substance” is no longer dualistic or mechanically embedded in a supreme deity. “Substance” and “self-consciousness” achieve self-integration through reflection. Third, “substance” is not self-caused but is a generation and construction toward “entelechy.” After surveying the entire history of philosophy, Hegel unearthed the most core and precious element hidden in Aristotle’s concept of substance: “entelechy.” The earlier “nous” (Anaximander’s seed) and “soul” (Plato’s Idea) can also be regarded as expressions of “entelechy.” Thus, “substance” cannot be separated from purpose. Hegel’s “substance” possesses the reflective “force” of “self-consciousness,” which is a re-creation of Aristotle’s original concept. “Substance” cannot be self-caused; the only thing that can serve as self-cause is that which drives substance to develop and advance continuously—this is nothing other than “entelechy” within “actuality.” In fact, Hegel’s “absolute spirit” is driven by “entelechy,” which Marx identifies as the dialectical force of “negativity.”

这是“实体”的现实交往性、内部反思性和“主体目的性”。在《逻辑学》中，实体出现在“本质论”中，如果“现实”就是“本质”,那么体现为“本质”的实体也就是“现实”。原因在于：其一，现实是伦理实体及其交互作用。自从黑格尔在《法哲学原理》序言和《小逻辑》“现实”一章中都提到那个著名的命题，“现实性”便与“合理性”如影随形。那么，什么是合理性呢?这不得不体现于伦理实体的交往过程中。《法哲学原理》探讨的法律、道德，也是伦理实体的必经环节，因此“实体”在其现实交往环节中就是“现实”和“本质”。其二，被笛卡尔拆分为心物二元的“实体”具有本质的反思环节。实体是本质，不仅仅是现实的、交往的，同样也是在伦理实体的每一个环节中都在不断地自我反思。这种反思在伦理实体中以“承认的自我意识”而实现有效的交往。“实体”就不再是二元论的，或者被机械地嵌入最高神中的东西。“实体”与“自我意识”通过反思进行了自我融合。其三，“实体”不是自因，而是向着“隐德来希”的生成、建构。黑格尔在纵观古今哲学史之后，发掘了隐藏在亚里士多德实体概念中最为核心和宝贵的东西，是“隐德来希”。它在此之前的“努斯”(阿那克西曼德的种子)、“灵魂”(柏拉图的理念),也都可以视作是关于“隐德来希”的表达。可见，“实体”不能与目的相分离。黑格尔的“实体”具有“自我意识”的反思“力”,这是对亚里士多德原始概念的重新创造。“实体”不能是自因，唯一可以作为自因的东西是促使实体向其不断发展前进的，那不是别的，就是在“现实”中的“隐德来希”。其实，黑格尔的“绝对精神”就是由“隐德来希”推动的，被马克思指认为“否定性”的辩证力量。

Second, substance is “contradiction.”

第二，实体是“矛盾”。

This is the self-movement and self-unfolding of “substance.” All previous metaphysicians avoided or denied “contradiction”; only Hegel made “contradiction” the core of dialectics and creatively understood “substance” as “contradiction.” Hegel’s relation of substance is to some extent modeled on Kant’s exposition, but the conclusion is quite different. The relations of substance, causality, and reciprocity in essence are in fact relations of contradiction. This is by no means the relation of a single substance, but the social interactive relations between “substance” and “substance.” Therefore, the transformation from atomistic individual substance to ethical substance indicates that “substance” is a relation established in the process of “objectifying activity” within social interaction. Hence, Hegel’s ethical substance is relational substance; what arises from this is necessarily the movement of contradiction in social history. Thus, “substance” is also contradictory substance, the unity of actual substance, essential substance, and contradictory substance, which can then develop into absolute substance. Contradiction is actuality and essence. At the same time, because “contradiction” is also the unfolding and development of “self-consciousness”—that is, the process of gradually achieving independent self-consciousness, recognizing self-consciousness, and infinite self-consciousness through the dialectics of contradiction—so “contradiction” is also the essence of “self-consciousness.” “Self-consciousness” and “substance” achieve unity in “contradiction,” mutually recognizing and acknowledging each other for the common “entelechy,” thereby driving historical development and progress. In the objective world of interaction, “substance” must resolve the contradictions between “substances” through actual “substance” itself. Law, morality, and ethics are the actual progressive stages through which social contradictions achieve recognition and consensus. The substantive relation as “contradiction” is the “social” interactive relation between people in the process of interaction. The actual “contradictions” of “ethical substance” are ultimately resolved through mutual “recognition” between social interactive “subjects”; “substance” is precisely “subject.”

这是“实体”的自我运动与自我展开。以往所有的形而上学家都在回避或否定“矛盾”,唯有黑格尔把“矛盾”作为辩证法的核心，并把“实体”创造性地理解为“矛盾”。黑格尔的实体关系在某种程度上是仿造康德的样式论述的，但结论却大不相同。本质中的实体关系、因果关系和协同关系，事实上都是矛盾关系。这绝不是单个实体的关系，而是“实体”与“实体”之间的社会交往关系。因此，从原子式个人实体到伦理实体的转变说明，“实体”是建立在社会交往的“对象化活动”过程中的关系。因而，黑格尔的伦理实体是关系实体，由此产生的必然是社会历史中矛盾的运动，因此，“实体”也就是矛盾实体，是现实实体、本质实体和矛盾实体的统一，进而才能发展为绝对实体。矛盾是现实和本质。同时，由于“矛盾”也是“自我意识”的展开与发展，即通过矛盾辩证法逐步实现的独立的自我意识、承认的自我意识和无限的自我意识的过程，所以“矛盾”也是“自我意识”的本质。“自我意识”与“实体”在“矛盾”中获得了统一，为了共同的“隐德来希”相互承认，相互认可，进而推动历史的发展和进步。在交往的客观世界中，“实体”必须通过现实的“实体”本身才能解决“实体”间的矛盾。法律、道德、伦理是社会矛盾达成承认和共识的现实进阶过程，作为“矛盾”的实体关系是处于交往过程中的人与人的“社会”交往关系，“伦理实体”的现实“矛盾”最终通过社会交往“主体”间的相互“承认”来解决，“实体”正是“主体”。

Third, substance is subject.

第三，实体即主体。

This is the construction of the historical subject within “substance.” Hegel’s “substance” is based on “objectifying movement,” which must involve the participation of “subject.” The relation between “subject” and “subject” in social interaction is thus manifested as the relation of “ethical substance,” and “ethical substance” becomes the socialized interactive subject, having three levels: “family,” “civil society,” and “state.” Hegel demonstrates the possibility and actuality of “substance is subject” through the “Doctrine of Essence” in logic; this is self-coordination and self-development within the unity of opposites. Through this historical self-progression, it ultimately rises to absolute spiritual substance. Using the history of spirit as the foundation of metaphysics indeed shows a surpassing of all previous traditional metaphysics; however, it merely sublates metaphysics of presence into historical metaphysics, still revolving within the system of metaphysics of presence.

这是“实体”中的历史主体的建构。黑格尔的“实体”是以“对象化运动”为基础的，这种“对象化运动”则必须由“主体”参与。处于社会交往之中的“主体”与“主体”之间的关系也就体现为“伦理实体”的关系，“伦理实体”也就成为社会化的交往主体，它具有“家庭”“市民社会”与“国家”三个层次。黑格尔通过逻辑学的“本质论”环节论证了“实体即主体”的可能性与现实性，这是在对立统一中的自我协调与自我发展，通过这一具有历史性的自我进展，最终上升为绝对的精神实体。以精神的发展史作为形而上学的基础，确实体现出对以往所有传统形而上学的超越态势，然而，只是把在场形而上学扬弃为历史形而上学，依旧打转于在场形而上学的体系之中。

Regrettably, therefore, the “substance is subject” that Hegel demonstrates in the link of “actuality” is ultimately governed and controlled by absolute substance. “Subject” is absolutized and substantialized. Whether it is subjective substance, ethical substance, or historical substance, all are ultimately the logical products of absolute substance’s self-alienation, sublation, and return. In this sense, Hegel created “substance” but also solidified it; he created the interactive subject of “actual” social historicity, but also destroyed the social-historical actuality of the interactive subject. These are precisely Marx’s points of critique.

所以遗憾的是，黑格尔在“现实”环节中所论证的“实体即主体”,最终还是受到了绝对实体的统摄与掌控。“主体”被绝对化和实体化了。无论是主体实体、伦理实体，还是历史实体，最终都是绝对实体的自我异化、扬弃、回归的逻辑产物。从这个意义上来说，黑格尔创造了“实体”,同时也凝固了“实体”;他创造了具有社会历史性的“现实”的交互主体，同时也毁灭了交互主体的社会历史性的现实性，这些正是马克思的批判原点。

III. The Appearing Subject: A Leap from the Abstract to the Concrete

三、出场主体：从抽象到具体的飞跃

Marx did not establish historical materialism overnight; his critique of “substance” and “subject” was also gradually deepened. In the pre-historical-materialist period, Marx adopted Feuerbach’s view of the “real man,” that is, the sensuously intuitive, objective “man,” to interrogate the broken chain of Hegel’s “substance is subject” (“substantive subject”), reflecting on the metaphysics of presence of the “substantive subject,” achieving a transition from abstract reason to actual sensuousness, and pointing out three links of the “actual subject”: popular reason, civil society, and species-essence; correspondingly, he conceived three levels from the perspective of “subject”: rational subject, political subject, and species-subject. In the historical-materialist period, Marx broke through the grand system, logic, substance, purity, and capitalized subject of the metaphysics of presence, continuing Hegel’s “objective subject” focus on specific historical actual fields, thereby summoning the true “historical subject” to appear and emerge. The “historical subject” is not abstract reason or species-essence, but the specific “appearing subject” with agency (neglected by materialism) and class character (neglected by idealism) within a specific historical field. He further concretized the abstract “substantive ontology,” “substantive subject,” and “actual subject” of the pre-historical-materialist period into the “proletariat” and “laborer” subject, analyzed their field of existence, critiqued their class differences, explored their path of liberation, and planned the grand blueprint of their historical development.

马克思建立唯物史观并非一蹴而就，对“实体”和“主体”的批判也是逐步深化的。在前唯物史观时期，马克思采纳了费尔巴哈的“现实的人”即感性直观的、有对象性的“人”的观点，来考问黑格尔“实体即主体”(“实体主体”)的中断链，对“实体主体”的在场历史形而上学进行反思，实现了从抽象理性到现实感性的过渡，指出“现实主体”的三个环节：人民理性、市民社会、类本质；并相应地从“主体”角度进行三个层次的构思：理性主体、政治主体、类主体。在唯物史观时期，马克思则突破了在场形而上学的宏大体系、逻辑、实体、纯粹、大写的主体等思辨产物，延续黑格尔“对象性主体”对特定的历史现实场域的关注，进而呼唤真正的“历史主体”现身出场。“历史主体”不是抽象的理性或类的本质，而是在特定历史场域中特定的具有能动性(被唯物主义忽略)和阶级性(被唯心主义忽略)的“出场主体”,并进一步把前唯物史观中抽象的“实体本体”“实体主体”“现实主体”等具体化为“无产阶级”和“劳动者”主体，分析其生存场域，批判其阶级差异，探讨其解放路径，规划其历史发展的宏伟蓝图。

(1) The Pre-Historical-Materialist Period: A Trilogy of Critique of the “Substantive Subject”

(一)前唯物史观时期：对“实体主体”的批判三部曲

1. Popular Reason: Critique of “Abstract Substance”

1.人民理性：对“抽象实体”的批判

In his doctoral dissertation, Marx’s critique of mechanical motion and the Democritean atomism characterized by causal necessity was in fact a rejection of all notions of substance based on correspondence theory and fatalism, and an elevation of the free will and rationality of human beings endowed with the agency of “swerve.” During the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, Marx opposed the law of abstract substance with “popular rationality” [Volksvernunft], advocating from an objective perspective for the toiling “people” at the bottom. “Popular rationality” has, first, “popular character” [Volkstümlichkeit], and second, “rationality.” “Popular character” refers to Marx’s determination in political life to seek well-being for the people; “rationality” is Marx’s use of Hegel’s logical method of dialectical rationality to critique positive law on the basis of rational natural law. Therefore, “popular rationality” embodies the logic of the concretization of “rationality” in real social life, and is the first station where Marx “descended” from Hegel’s heavenly absolute rationality to the human world. “The objectivity of thought lies in its ‘popular character’ … on the one hand, it effectively weakens the pure subjectivity or abstract individuality of ‘self-consciousness,’ and on the other hand, it effectively prevents ‘rationality’ from retreating into the ‘Absolute’ or ‘God’ of speculative thinking.”[3]3 "天赋观念" (innate ideas): Descartes' doctrine that certain ideas (e.g., of God, self, mathematical truths) are inherent in the mind from birth, not derived from sensory experience. According to “popular rationality,” Marx uncovered the fundamental reason for the opposition between philosophy and religion, and then, through the path of “critique of religion—critique of legal philosophy—political critique,” sought to realize human liberation through the practical power of the “people” as subject. “Popular rationality” was the initial response to the questions of the age: “Questions are the watchwords of the age, the most actual cries expressing the inner state of the age itself.” Through the exposition of “popular rationality,” a preliminary foundation was laid, establishing Marx’s lifelong determination to pursue the happiness and liberation of the “people.” However, during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, this “rational subject” remained an abstract principle.

马克思在博士论文中对机械运动以及具有因果必然性的德谟克利特原子论的批判，实际上反对的是一切符合论和宿命论的实体观念，弘扬了具有“偏斜”之能动性的人的自由意志和理性。《莱茵报》时期，马克思以“人民理性”反对抽象实体的法，以客观性视域为底层劳动“人民”呐喊。“人民理性”,一是具有“人民性”,二是具有“理性”。“人民性”是指马克思在政治生活中为人民谋福祉的决心，“理性”是马克思运用黑格尔辩证理性的逻辑方法以理性自然法批判实在法的依据。因此，“人民理性”体现了“理性”在现实社会生活中的具体化逻辑，是马克思从黑格尔天国的绝对理性“下降”到人间的第一站。“思想的客观性在于它的‘人民性’……一方面有力地削弱了‘自我意识’的纯粹主观性或抽象个别性，另一方面也有效地防止了‘理性’之退回思辨思维的‘绝对’或‘上帝’”[3]。根据“人民理性”,马克思发掘了哲学与宗教对立的根本缘由，继而通过“宗教批判—法哲学批判—政治批判”的路线以“人民”的主体实践力量来实现人的解放。“人民理性”是对时代问题的最初回应，“问题是时代的格言，是表现时代自己内心状态的最实际的呼声”。通过对“人民理性”的论述而获得了初步奠基，奠定了马克思毕其一生所追寻的“人民”幸福和解放的决心，但在《莱茵报》时期，这种“理性主体”依然是抽象的原则。

2. Civil Society: Critique of the State as “Abstract Substance”

2.市民社会：对“抽象实体”的国家的批判

The attempt of “popular rationality” proved so powerless in the face of cold, harsh reality that Marx recognized that even the most perfect system could not solve real-world problems—this was the greatest flaw in Hegel’s thought: no matter how meticulous the logical system in the mind, it cannot replace living, vital reality. Influenced by Feuerbach’s idea of the sensuously intuitive, objective, and real “human being,” Marx undertook a deep critique of the sphere of “ethical substance” in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. Under the baptism of “the human being is the highest essence for the human being,” he moved toward a second excavation of the “real human being.” The “real human being” was now explicitly endowed with the social-relational character of political economy, manifested in the decomposition of “civil society” within Hegel’s ethical substance and in the initial divergence between Marx and Feuerbach. The concept of “civil society” originates from Hegel; it comprises three moments—“the system of needs and labor,” “the administration of justice,” and “the police and the corporations”—and is ethical substance for-itself. In *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction*, Marx proposed using “human emancipation” to critique the bourgeois false “political emancipation,” liberating the “human being” from religion—the “opium” of the “people”—and from the political theory and political reality of abstract substance, thereby completing the human “species-being.” At this point, Marx focused more on the political-philosophical elements of “civil society,” especially the critique of law. The “people” were no longer bound by “rationality” and appeared for the first time as an objective, real concept. In *On the Jewish Question*, Marx made an accurate judgment of the egoistic essence of “civil society” and the ultimate destination of “private property,” giving the “real human being” a clear goal of liberation, replacing “political emancipation” with “human emancipation.” At this time, although the critique of political economy had not yet formally taken the stage, it can be said to have already manifested itself in a value form. *The Holy Family* focused on analyzing the “mass” subject opposed to abstract speculative “spirit,” deepening the critique of this abstract entity “spirit” into the class antagonisms of real society, penetrating the real contradiction between “reaping without labor” and “laboring without reaping,” and striking directly at the crux of the contradictions of the capitalist system. At this stage, Marx’s exploration of the “real human being” made new progress: “the concern with ‘popular subjectivity’ had moved from the abstract to the real.” This real society was “civil society,” which laid the foundation for the publication of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereinafter referred to as the *Manuscripts*), first resolving the problem of alienation at the political and legal levels, and then at the level of political economy. Marx’s exploration of the politics and law of “civil society” led to this conclusion: “civil society” determines the political state, not, as Hegel held, the political state determining “civil society.” The light of the state as abstract substance cannot illuminate the reality shrouded in the dense fog of alienation.

“人民理性”尝试在冰冷严酷的现实面前是如此苍白无力，这使马克思认识到再完美的体系也无法解决现实的难题，这是黑格尔思想的最大弊端：头脑中再缜密的逻辑系统也无法替代活生生的有生命的现实。马克思受到费尔巴哈的感性直观的、有对象性的、现实的“人”的思想影响，对黑格尔《法哲学原理》中的“伦理实体”领域进行深入批判，在“人是人的最高本质”的洗礼下，走向了对“现实的人”的第二次探掘。“现实的人”明确地被赋予了政治经济学的社会关系特质，体现为对黑格尔伦理实体中的“市民社会”的分解，以及马克思与费尔巴哈的最初差异。“市民社会” 概念来源于黑格尔，它具有“劳动和需要的体系”“司法”以及“警察和同行公会”三个环节，是自为的伦理实体。在《黑格尔法哲学批判(导言)》中，马克思提出以“人的解放”批判资产阶级虚假的“政治解放”,把“人”从“人民”的“鸦片”即宗教中解放出来，从抽象实体的政治理论和政治现实中解放出来，进而完成人的“类本质”。马克思此时更多关注于“市民社会”中的政治哲学要素，尤其关注对法的批判。“人民”不再被“理性”捆绑，首次以客体性的现实概念出现。在《论犹太人的问题》中，马克思对“市民社会”的利己主义本质和“私有财产”的最终归途进行了准确的判断，使“现实的人”有了明确的解放目的，以“人的解放”替代“政治解放”。此时，政治经济学批判尽管还没有正式登台，但可以说，已经以一种价值形态体现出来。《神圣家族》侧重分析了与抽象思辨的“精神”相对立的“群众”主体，对“精神”这一抽象实体的批判深入到现实社会的阶级对立中，透视“不劳而获”和“劳而不获”的现实矛盾，直击资本主义制度矛盾这一要害。在此阶段，马克思对“现实的人”的探索有了新的进展，“关注‘人民主体性’的问题已经从抽象走向现实”。这个现实社会是“市民社会”,这为《1844年经济学哲学手稿》(以下简称《手稿》)的问世奠定基础，先行解决了政治和法律层面的异化问题，进而解决政治经济学层面的异化问题。马克思对“市民社会”的政治、法律的探索得出了这一结论：“市民社会”决定政治国家，非黑格尔的政治国家决定“市民社会”。抽象实体的国家之光，无法照进被异化浓雾笼罩的现实。

3. Species-Being: Critique of “Self-Consciousness” as “Abstract Substance”

3.类本质：对“抽象实体”的“自我意识”的批判

After political critique and legal critique, Marx’s further deepening of the “real human being” was built upon the critique of political economy. The atomism of the doctoral period, the political writings of the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, and the reflections and critiques of religion, politics, and legal philosophy in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* period could not explain the origin of classes or the pathological roots of capitalist modernity. In the *Manuscripts*, Marx continued to seek a path of self-development for the “real human being” through the critique of political economy, using the alienation of objective labor to critique Hegel’s metaphysical system for its undifferentiated, simplistic understanding of alienation and objectification. “Self-consciousness” and “substance” are unified in Hegel’s logic; this “self-consciousness” necessarily manifests as abstract substance. Because abstract substance cannot clarify the alienated state of living, sensuous objective activity. In the process of production, sensuous “objective activity” is “objective labor.” However, because the pre-existing field—society premised on private property and capital—objective labor necessarily leads to fourfold alienation, and alienated objective labor in turn gives rise to private property, thereby forming class antagonism. “The human being indeed displays all his species-powers … and treats these powers as objects, and this is first possible only in the form of alienation.” In a specific field, “objective labor” is the source of alienation, but also the path to transcend it; the human being realizes species-being through labor. Therefore, only after alienation is sublated can one speak of the identity of alienation and objectification. Their difference is fundamental, yet it was overlooked by Hegel. In the *Manuscripts*, the “real human being” sublates the self-movement of “self-consciousness” and becomes living species-activity in the real field. Through the existence of “species,” the “real human being” here rises to comprehensive infinity, acquiring a universal essence. At this point, the “real subject” appears as a “species-subject” possessing both substantiality and abstractness, with abstract “species-being” as the final form of the “species-subject.” Therefore, Marx had not yet escaped the cage of abstract metaphysics at this stage.

在政治批判和法律批判之后，马克思对“现实的人”的继续深化建基于政治经济学批判之上。博士时期的原子论，《莱茵报》时期的政论和《德法年鉴》时期的宗教、政治、法哲学反思与批判，都无法解释阶级的起源和资本现代性的病态根源。马克思在《手稿》中以政治经济学批判继续为“现实的人”找寻自我发展之路，通过对象性劳动的异化来批判黑格尔的形而上学体系对异化和对象化运动不加区分的简单理解。“自我意识”与“实体”在黑格尔的逻辑学中是统一的，这一“自我意识”必然呈现为抽象实体。因为抽象实体无法澄清活生生的感性的对象性活动的异化状态。在生产过程中的感性的“对象性活动”是“对象性劳动”,但是，由于先在场域即以私有制和资本为前提的社会，对象性劳动必然走向四重异化，异化的对象性劳动又导致私有财产的产生，进而形成阶级对立。“人确实显示出自己的全部类力量……并且把这些力量当作对象来对待，而这首先又只有通过异化的形式才有可能”。在特定场域中，“对象性劳动”是异化的根源，同样也是超越异化的路径，人通过劳动实现类本质。因此，只有在异化被扬弃后，才能谈论异化和对象化相一致的问题。它们的差异是根本性的，却被黑格尔忽略了。在《手稿》中，“现实的人”扬弃了“自我意识”的自我运动，成为现实场域中活生生的类活动。由于“类”的存在，“现实的人”在此上升到了全面的无限性，获得了普遍本质。此时“现实主体”呈现为具有实体性和抽象性的“类主体”,以抽象性的“类本质”为“类主体”的最终形式。因此，此时的马克思尚未逃离抽象的形而上学牢笼。

(II) The Period of Historical Materialism: The Scientific Critique of the “Substance-Subject” by the “Emergent Subject”

(二)唯物史观时期：“出场主体”对“实体主体”的科学批判

Hegel’s substance, although it elevates the status of the subject to the same level as substance and completes the unity of substance and subject in “actuality,” nevertheless subjects both substance and subject, as well as history and development, to the ultimate absolute Idea as absolute substance. This substance is merely a re-created revival of Aristotle’s “substance” and Plato’s “Idea,” and is in essence a rational theology. Its mode of thinking remains that of metaphysics of presence. What constitutes the true “historical subject” has already been obscured under the shadow of the absolute Idea. Therefore, the “historical subject” must be unconcealed from the dark metaphysical system of presence, so that its logic of emergence from non-presence to presence can be clarified. In 1845, Marx re-examined his own theory. After reflecting on the metaphysical theories of various thinkers and his own early work, he elevated his earlier research on the “abstract” “actual subject” to the “concrete” “actual subject,” namely the historical “emerging subject”: elevating abstract practice to concrete, situated communicative practice, i.e., “the self-activity of the real subject.” On the one hand, this clarifies its scientific connotation; on the other, it demonstrates its developmental path, initiating a critique of the “substance ontology” and “substance subject” of the metaphysics of presence, as well as Marx’s own early “abstract” “actual subject.” The fundamental characteristic of historical materialism, as Marx said when sublating Hegel, is: “Remove concept and substance; retain history and development.”

黑格尔的实体，尽管把主体的地位提高到与实体相同的地位，完成了实体与主体在“现实”中的统一，但无论是实体还是主体，历史还是发展，都受制于最终的绝对理念这一绝对实体。该实体不过是亚里士多德的“实体”和柏拉图的“理念”再创造后的复活体，本质是理智神学。其思维模式依然是在场形而上学的。什么是真正的“历史主体”,在绝对理念的笼罩下，已然被遮蔽。因而必须把“历史主体”从阴暗在场的形而上学体系中解蔽，使其从不在场到在场的出场逻辑澄明。1845年，马克思对自己的理论进行再审视，在反思各理论家和自己早期的形而上学理论后，在此前“抽象的”“现实主体”的研究基础上，上升为“具体的”“现实主体”,此即历史的“出场主体”:把抽象实践上升为具体的置身性的交往实践，即“实在主体的自我活动”。一方面明确其科学内涵，另一方面论证其发展路径，开启了对在场形而上学“实体本体”“实体主体”以及马克思早期“抽象的”“现实主体”的批判。唯物史观的根本特征，正如马克思对黑格尔进行扬弃时所说的那样：“去掉概念和实体，要历史和发展。”

1. Broad Historical Materialism: Accurately Laying the Foundation for the General Scientific Connotation of the “Emerging Subject”

1.广义唯物史观：准确奠基“出场主体”的一般科学内涵

Broad historical materialism refers to Marx’s scientific worldview and methodology concerning historical development, primarily embodied in two key texts written in 1845: *Theses on Feuerbach* (hereinafter *Theses*) and *The German Ideology* (hereinafter *German Ideology*), co-authored with Engels. *Theses*, centered on actual, situated, socialized practice, clearly defines the essence of the human being: in its actuality, it is the “ensemble of all social relations.” This is a definition of the relational nature of the social subject. If one departs from “situated communicative practice” and the “social relations” it constructs, the understanding of the human being remains a superficial appearance, a reenactment of the Hegelian “substance subject.” The analysis of the sum total of the social subject’s relations aims to summon the true historical “emerging subject” through the social relations formed by social communicative practice. *German Ideology* further confirms the source of the human essence: taking the pre-existing field and actual human beings as the premise of history, and the activity of actual human beings as the starting point of history, it then demonstrates the mode of production, living conditions, self-activity, and value orientation of the situated historical emerging subject, ultimately achieving the free and comprehensive development of each “emerging subject.” This historical “emerging subject” is the “proletariat,” which possesses class character and agency.

广义唯物史观是指马克思关于历史发展的科学世界观与方法论，主要体现在1845年创作的《关于费尔巴哈提纲》(以下简称《提纲》)和与恩格斯合写的《德意志意识形态》(以下简称《形态》)两个主要文本之中。《提纲》以现实的置身性场域的社会化的实践为核心，明确指出了人的本质：在其现实性上，是“一切社会关系的总和”。这是对社会主体的关系性质的界定。倘若离开“置身的交往实践”及其构建的“社会关系”,对人的理解就依然是浮于虚空的表象，依然是黑格尔式的“实体主体”重演。对社会主体的关系总和的剖析，是为了通过由社会交往实践形成的社会关系来呼唤真正的历史“出场主体”。《形态》进一步确证了人的本质之源泉：以先行在场的场域及现实的人为历史的前提，以现实的人的活动为历史的出发点，进而论证了置身性的历史出场主体的生产方式、生存现状、自我活动、价值取向等，最终实现每一个“出场主体”都能自由而全面的发展。这个历史的“出场主体”就是具有阶级性和能动性的“无产阶级”。

2. Concrete Historical Materialism: Scientifically Demonstrating the Concrete Developmental Path of the “Emerging Subject”

2.具体唯物史观：科学论证“出场主体”的具体发展路径

Broad historical materialism creates the universal, general historical emerging subject: the proletariat. However, the “proletariat” must still be further concretized into the historical field, i.e., the site of “actual” social relations—the world history of capitalism—in order to further uncover the secret of the inevitable demise of capitalism and the inevitable victory of communism. This is a leap from “theoretical generality” to “theoretical concreteness.” In the latter half of his life, Marx devoted himself to the critique of political economy, combining it with philosophy to deepen universal, broad historical materialism into concrete historical materialism. In the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), Marx points out that the “concrete” is the starting point of actuality and the endpoint of thought, parting ways with Hegel on the issue of the “concrete” in actuality. By re-examining “labor” in “civil society,” through situated historical practical activity, Marx repositions the concrete actual subject, excavates the “twofold character” of situated “objectified labor,” and thereby reshapes the “actuality” that Hegel’s “absolute” “abstraction” had diluted into thin air. He then reflects on all previous “actual subjects” of the “abstract substance” of the metaphysics of presence, concretizing them into the “emerging subject” possessing both reification and emancipation, i.e., the “laborer,” to realize the dialectical leap from actual concreteness to theoretical generality, and then to theoretical concreteness. “Actuality” must be concrete actuality; “concreteness” must be judged through actual, situated subjective labor and its twofold character. This is also the point of integration between philosophy and the critique of political economy. The historical emerging subject of concrete historical materialism, i.e., the critique of political economy, is the bearer of “objectified labor”: the “laborer.” Marx’s deep excavation of “labor” and its bearer not only discovers that “labor” has two aspects—“concrete labor” and “abstract labor”—but also, on this basis, uncovers the “surplus labor” that is the secret of capitalist exploitation. The twofold character of actual concrete labor is thus manifested as: on the one hand, reified labor; on the other, liberating labor that breaks through reification. In fact, reified labor is the substantive labor of capitalist society; all labor can be subjected to precise measurement, used in exchange to complete equivalent exchange. When its substantiality and reification are sublated, human society breaks through “civil society” and moves toward “human society,” i.e., communist society. The twofold character of labor implies the twofold character of its bearer. Only by distinguishing reified substantive labor from non-reified subjective labor can one truly grasp the twofold character of the “historical subject” that has been reified and substantiated, and only then can one break through reification and summon the true historical “emerging subject.” Therefore, “the contemporary significance of the method of *Capital*… reveals to us the truly historical viewpoint, the viewpoint of social actuality, and the viewpoint of the self-activity of the real subject.” [16]16 Sun Lin, “The Contemporary Significance of the Method of *Capital*: A Study of Marx’s Critique of the Metaphysics of Presence,” *Jilin University Journal of Social Sciences*, 2012, no. 2. The twofold character (reification and revolution) hidden within the actual subject can only enable the “actual subject” to self-transform into a liberating subject within concrete actual history, i.e., to sublate the reified dimension within the actual subject and develop the agential, revolutionary dimension. Only then can the actual subject escape the dream of the metaphysics of presence and become a truly free and liberated “emerging subject” within a specific historical field.

广义唯物史观创造了普遍的、一般的历史出场主体：无产阶级。但“无产阶级”仍需进一步具体化到历史场域即“现实”的社会关系的发生地——资本主义世界历史中，才能进一步揭开资本主义必然灭亡、共产主义必然胜利的秘密。这是一个从“理论一般”到“理论具体”的飞跃。马克思在其后半生致力于政治经济学批判，把它与哲学相结合，使普遍的、广义的唯物史观进一步深化为具体的唯物史观。马克思在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中指出，“具体”是现实的起点，也是思维的终点，他与黑格尔在现实的“具体”问题上分道扬镳。马克思通过重新审视“市民社会”中的“劳动”,通过置身性的历史实践活动把具体的现实主体重新定位，发掘置身性的“对象化劳动”的“两重性”,来重塑被黑格尔的“绝对”的“抽象”稀释为稀薄空气的“现实”,进而对以往所有在场形而上学的“抽象实体”的“现实主体”进行反思，具体化为同时具有物化性和解放性的“出场主体”即“劳动者”,来实现从现实具体到理论一般，再到理论具体的辩证飞跃。“现实”必须是具体的现实，“具体”则必须通过现实的置身性的主体劳动及其两重性来判断，这也是哲学与政治经济学批判的结合之处。具体唯物史观即政治经济学批判的历史出场主体就是“对象化劳动”的载体：“劳动者”。马克思对“劳动”及其承载者的深层次发掘，不仅发现了“劳动”具有“具体劳动”和“抽象劳动”两个方面，而且在此基础上发掘出资本剥削秘密的“剩余劳动”。现实的具体劳动的两重性在此就体现为：一方面是物化劳动，另一方面是突破物化的解放劳动。事实上，物化劳动就是资本社会的实体劳动，一切劳动都可以处于精确的计量之中，运用在交换中完成等价交换。当其实体性和物化被扬弃时，人类社会也就突破了“市民社会”,走向了“人类社会”即共产主义社会。劳动的两重性意味着其载体的两重性。把物化的实体劳动与非物化的主体劳动相区分，才能真正把握被物化和实体化了的“历史主体”的两重性特征，才能突破物化，呼唤真正的历史的“出场主体”。因此，“《资本论》方法的当代意义……它把真正历史的观点、社会现实的观点，以及实在主体之自我活动的观点启示给我们”。深藏于现实主体之中的两重性(物化与革命),只有使“现实主体”在具体的现实历史中自我突破为解放主体，即扬弃现实主体之中的物化向度，发扬具有能动性的革命向度，才能使现实主体摆脱在场形而上学的迷梦，成为在特定历史场域中真正自由和解放的“出场主体”。

4. Conclusion

四、结语

Marx makes the historical “emerging subject” of historical materialism not only a character in the drama but also its author. The “emerging subject” is situated within history while also possessing the capacity to construct history. This unity is a power that no “substance” or “subject” of any modern metaphysical system can attain. The “proletariat” and the “laborer” are the bearers and creators of history, and this is also the reason why contemporary China still needs Marx’s historical materialism. “The Chinese developmental logic of historical materialism is precisely the worldview and methodology that reveals the basis for existence, essence, trend, and future outcome of the Chinese developmental path of new modernity.” [17]17 Sun Lin, “The Chinese Logic of Historical Materialism,” *Guangming Daily*, November 16, 2020. In contemporary China, to truly grasp the importance of the historical “emerging subject” is to adhere to a “people-centered” approach, “always taking the people’s standpoint as the fundamental standpoint, taking seeking happiness for the people as the fundamental mission, and adhering to the fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly.” [18]18 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Marx,” *People’s Daily*, May 5, 2018. Being “people-centered” is the inheritance and promotion of the emerging subject of Marx’s historical materialism in the contemporary era, the vital tension of the Chinese logic of historical materialism, the internal driving force of the world logic of historical materialism, and the worldview and methodology of contemporary China and the world.

马克思使得唯物史观的历史“出场主体”不仅是剧中人，更是剧作者。“出场主体”处于历史之中，同时也具备了建构历史的能力，这种统一是任何现代形而上学体系的“实体”或“主体”都无法企及的力量。“无产阶级”和“劳动者”是历史的承载者和创造者，也是当今中国依然需要马克思唯物史观的缘由。“唯物史观的中国发展逻辑就是揭示新现代性的中国发展道路的存在根据、本质、趋势和未来结局等根本问题的世界观和方法论”[14]。在当代中国，切实把握历史“出场主体”的重要性，就是要坚持以“人民”为中心，“始终把人民立场作为根本立场，把为人民谋幸福作为根本使命，坚持全心全意为人民服务的根本宗旨”。以“人民”为中心，是马克思唯物史观出场主体在当代的传承与弘扬，是唯物史观中国逻辑的生命张力，是唯物史观世界逻辑的内在驱动，是当代中国和世界的世界观与方法论。

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