Marx’s Critique and Inheritance of the Concept of Labor in Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectic

One of the important paths through which the master-slave dialectic in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (hereinafter referred to as the *Phenomenology*) has been transmitted to later generations is realized through Marx’s critical inheritance. The *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereinafter referred to as the 1844 Manuscripts) is a key text in which Marx began to profoundly explore the concept of labor, and it was primarily influenced by Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and the concept of labor and dialectical thought contained therein. If one understands Hegel according to the previous quasi-Marxist interpretation, one might overlook the meaning of the categories related to the master-slave dialectic as Hegel used them in specific contexts. If the concepts and propositions in Hegel constitute a three-dimensional system of “stereoscopic mirror,” then when Marxism is taken as the frame of reference, they are projected onto a two-dimensional plane. Therefore, it is necessary to break the previous research logic of “interpreting Hegel through Marx,” and return to Hegel’s own terms and contexts—not those of Marx or other Marxist researchers—to elucidate the three-dimensional original form of the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology*. This clarifies the extent to which Marx was truly influenced by Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, and how he criticized and inherited the concept of labor within it.

黑格尔《精神现象学》（以下简称《现象学》）中的主奴关系思想向后世显现的重要路径之一，是通过马克思的批判继承来实现的。《1844年经济学哲学手稿》（以下简称1844年手稿）是马克思开始深刻探讨劳动概念的关键性文本，并主要受到黑格尔《现象学》一书及其中劳动概念、辩证法思想的影响。倘若按照以往准马克思主义式的解读来理解黑格尔，可能会忽略黑格尔在特定语境中使用主奴关系思想相关范畴的含义，其中的概念、命题如果在黑格尔那里是“体式镜”的三维体系，当以马克思主义为参照系时，便将其投射到了一个二维平面，因而必须打破以往“以马解黑”的研究逻辑，回到黑格尔自己的而不是马克思或者其他马克思主义研究者的术语、语境中来阐明主奴关系思想在《现象学》中的立体式原貌，由此澄清马克思究竟在何种程度上真正受到黑格尔主奴关系思想的影响，又对其中的劳动概念予以怎样的批判和继承。

I. The Interpretation of the Master-Slave Dialectic and Its Theoretical Puzzles

一、主奴关系思想的阐释及其理论谜团

The entire *Phenomenology* aims to attain the self-essence of phenomena from the phenomena themselves; its starting point is empirical, natural consciousness. The experiential process of consciousness, that is, the flux and change of self-consciousness, is fully embodied in the section on the master-slave dialectic. Hegel specifically analyzes that self-consciousness and another self-consciousness determine who becomes master and who becomes slave through a life-and-death struggle. The naturalness of the life-and-death struggle is inevitable; it is the necessary path to shedding natural attributes. The master becomes master because it transcends the natural attribute of death, although its consciousness of death has negativity without independence. The slave clings to the desire for life, remains at the level of natural attributes, and falls into a passive role. The master wins the initial life-and-death struggle but falls into difficulty through the slave’s labor; the slave becomes increasingly less subject to the master. On the basis of exposing the slave’s false subservience to the master, Hegel proposes, through the development of ethical relations, that only on the basis of mutual respect, by resolving the unequal relationship between master and slave, and by enabling the slave’s consciousness to develop into true self-consciousness, can genuine, equal mutual recognition be achieved. Hegel introduces two key elements here—labor and fear. The slave will become aware of inner thought through fear and labor, thereby attaining freedom.

整个《现象学》旨在从现象本身中达到它的自我本质，其出发点是经验的、自然意识的，而意识的经验过程，即自我意识的流动变迁，在主奴关系一节中得以充分体现。黑格尔具体分析道，自我意识和另一个自我意识通过生死斗争来决定谁为主人、谁是奴隶。生死斗争的自然性是必然的，是摆脱自然属性的必经之路，主人之所以成为主人在于它超越了死亡的自然属性，虽然其死亡意识是有否定性而无独立性的。奴隶留恋对生的渴望，停留在自然属性层面，沦为被动角色。主人在最初的生死斗争中获得胜利，却在奴隶的劳动中陷入困顿，奴隶越来越不受制于主人，在揭穿奴隶对主人的虚假性臣服基础上，黑格尔借伦理关系的发展提出，只有在互相尊重的基础上，解决主人与奴隶之间的不对等关系，使得奴隶意识发展为真正的自我意识，真实、平等的相互承认才可达成。黑格尔在此引入了两个关键性要素——劳动、恐惧，奴隶将在恐惧和劳动中意识到内在思维从而获得自由。

Labor is the restraint of desire. The slave is not so much the slave of the master as, in the face of the object of labor, the slave is the slave of its own desire. In the process of labor, it gains the power of disposition over its own product; the capacity for human rational freedom is enhanced. Before encountering universal human reason, labor is a process that humanity must undergo, in which self-consciousness suffers the rupture of its own will. First is fear. Fear makes the slave realize that external things are no longer mere things existing to satisfy desire in the natural state; they are alien existences. The slave’s naturalness begins to be interrupted, containing the possibility of being-for-itself and self-certainty. Under the domination of fear, the slave forces itself to return to itself, and thus must engage in labor. Labor enables the slave to transcend naturalness and embody its own inner essence; subjective agency is established in the slave, and the slave attains being-for-itself and initial freedom. Through forming things, labor enables the subject to maintain its independence before the object of labor. For self-consciousness as desire, this attains objectivity and persistence. In the externalizing process of laboring consciousness, consciousness enters a persistent state, thereby overcoming the disappearance of purely negative satisfaction. The slave, through the mediation of labor, attains genuine independence. Slave labor is a process of objectification. The form of the object is a relation of negation; in this relation of negation, the form of the object attains persistence. Through the relation of negation, consciousness externalizes itself in labor and becomes laboring consciousness. The form of the object is independent for the laborer; therefore, laboring consciousness exists independently. In the negativity of labor, self-consciousness intuits itself, and self-consciousness is established. This is the inner process by which slave consciousness rises to self-consciousness. Compared with fear, labor appears more important. Labor causes slave consciousness to self-disintegrate and rise to self-consciousness that is in-and-for-itself; labor is the necessary condition for slave consciousness to become self-consciousness.

劳动是欲望受限，奴隶与其说是主人的奴隶，不如说在劳动对象面前，奴隶是自身欲望的奴隶，它在劳动过程中获得了对自己的产品的支配权，人类理性自由的能力获得提高，在遇见人类普遍理性之前，劳动是人类必将经历的过程，自我意识在其中遭受自我意志的断裂。首先是恐惧，恐惧使奴隶意识到外在事物不再是自然状态下为满足欲望而存在的单纯的事物，它是异己性的存在，奴隶的自然性开始中断，蕴涵着自为存在、自我确证的可能，在恐惧的支配下，奴隶迫使自己返回自身，因而必须进行劳动。劳动使奴隶超越自然性，体现自身内在本质，主体能动性在奴隶身上确立，奴隶获得了自为存在与最初的自由。通过陶冶事物，劳动使主体在劳动对象面前保持自己的独立性，对于作为欲望的自我意识来说也就获得了客观性和持久性，在意识劳动着的外在化过程中，意识进入到持久状态从而克服了纯粹否定的满足的消逝，奴隶借助劳动这一中介获得了真实的独立性。奴隶劳动是对象化过程，对象的形式是否定关系，在否定关系中对象的形式获得持久性，意识通过否定关系在劳动中外在化自身变成了劳动着的意识，对象的形式对于劳动者来说是具有独立性的，所以，劳动着的意识是独立存在的，在劳动的否定性中自我意识直观自身，自我意识得以确立，这是奴隶意识上升为自我意识的内在过程。与恐惧相比，劳动显得更为重要，劳动使得奴隶意识自我瓦解，上升为自在自为的自我意识，劳动是奴隶意识成为自我意识的必要条件。

When Marx wrote the 1844 Manuscripts, he chose to return once again to the study of Hegel, focusing directly on the *Phenomenology*. If this were merely a coincidence of a particular research phase, it would clearly be unconvincing. Marx pointed out that the *Phenomenology* is “the true birthplace and secret of Hegel’s philosophy.” [1]1 Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 332. The phrase is Marx’s characterization of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. Beneath this aphoristic statement, Marx wrote the following excerpted note in the section “II. Self-Consciousness”: “(a) Independence and dependence of self-consciousness; lordship and bondage.” [2]2 Ibid., p. 333. This is Marx’s note, excerpting the structure of the *Phenomenology*’s section on self-consciousness. His intention is already clear in the section “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole,” which would be the most comprehensive summary and settlement of the entire content of Hegel’s philosophy, including a high evaluation of Hegel. The content under this title is largely a critique of labor. Thus, labor as the theme of critique is precisely the overall significance of critiquing Hegel’s philosophy. Interestingly, when Kojève, Sartre, Jean Hyppolite, and others vigorously claimed that the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology* had a profound influence on Marx, they found that in the 1844 Manuscripts, apart from leaving the words “lordship and bondage” in the form of notes, Marx did not provide much analysis of the master-slave dialectic. Marx discussed the *Phenomenology* as a whole, pointing out the importance of the final chapter. Although he commented on the other three chapters, none of these analyses took the master-slave dialectic as their theme.

马克思写作1844年手稿时，选择再一次回到黑格尔的研究中，聚焦点直指《现象学》，如果说这仅是某个研究阶段的巧合，显然不足为信。马克思指出《现象学》是“黑格尔哲学的真正诞生地和秘密开始”，在这句类似箴言的话语下，马克思在“Ⅱ.自我意识”部分写下这样的摘抄笔记：“(a)自我意识的独立性和非独立性，主人和奴隶。”1其意图在“对黑格尔的辩证法和整个哲学的批判”一节里已然明确，这将是对黑格尔全部哲学内容最全面的一次总结和清算，包括对黑格尔给予高度评价。此标题中的内容很大程度上都是对劳动的批判，如此说来，作为批判主题的劳动也正是批判黑格尔哲学的整体意义所在。而有意思的地方是，当科耶夫、萨特、让·伊波利特等人极力宣称《现象学》的主奴关系思想对马克思产生了深刻影响时，却发现在1844年手稿中，马克思除了以做笔记的形式留下过“主人和奴隶”的字样外，对主奴关系思想并未做过多分析，马克思将《现象学》作为一个整体进行讨论，他指出最后一章的重要性，虽然对其他三章有评析，但这些分析没有一个是以主奴关系思想为主题的。

First, simply examining Marx’s texts literally, apart from the phrase “independence and dependence of self-consciousness; lordship and bondage” in the 1844 Manuscripts—which, of course, reads more like an excerpt of the *Phenomenology*’s structure—there is simply no place where Marx discusses Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in depth. Studies like those of Kojève and Marcuse later argued that important concepts such as alienated labor proposed by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts developed the “labor” part of the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology* and resorted to ontological categories. This identification of the source of Marx’s theory of alienated labor is far too simplistic.

首先，单纯从字面上考察马克思的文本，除了在1844年手稿中有过“自我意识的独立性和非独立性，主人和奴隶”的字样外，当然这一部分更像是对《现象学》结构的摘录，马克思以浓重笔墨来探讨黑格尔主奴关系思想的地方是根本没有的，像后来科耶夫、马尔库塞那样的研究，认为马克思在1844年手稿中提出的异化劳动等重要概念是发展了《现象学》主奴关系思想涉及的“劳动”部分，并诉诸本体论范畴的探讨，这种对马克思异化劳动思想来源性的指认未免太过简单。

Second, in Löwith’s view, on the issue of labor, apart from Hegel and Marx, and a superficial attempt by E. Dühring, German philosophy did not pay much attention to exploring the economic connotations of labor and the sociological issues involved from the philosophical foundation. Hegel placed particular emphasis on the study of political economy during his Jena period. Later, in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, the exposition of the antecedents and consequences of labor was much more complete than the description in the *Phenomenology*. Yet in the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx focused his critique of labor on the *Phenomenology*. Compared with the *Philosophy of Right*, why did the *Phenomenology* become the key point of critique?

其次，在洛维特看来，在劳动问题上除了黑格尔和马克思，以及E.杜林曾做过浅显的尝试，德国哲学并没有那么留意从哲学的根基上探讨劳动的经济学内涵和涉及到的社会学问题。黑格尔在耶拿时期对国民经济学研究尤其偏重，后来的《法哲学原理》一书对劳动的前因后果的阐述要比在《现象学》中的描述完备得多，但马克思在1844年手稿中却将对劳动的批判的关注点放在了《现象学》上，与《原理》相对比，为什么《现象学》成为被着重批判的要点？

Finally, there is a dogmatic view that Marx was deeply influenced by Hegel’s exposition of slave labor and theoretically transcended the abstractness of slave labor. This assertion originates from Marx’s praise of Hegel in the 1844 Manuscripts, where Marx expresses three layers of meaning: (1) negative dialectics is the driving and creative principle; (2) Hegel’s “objectification” is the process of human self-generation; (3) the essence of labor is to produce man, and man is the result of his own labor. Hence, this dogmatic research naturally concludes that Marx pointed out the abstractness of Hegel’s labor, transformed spiritual labor into the material labor of real human beings, and gave negative dialectics a real foundation, no longer merely a critique of heaven, religion, and theology. This interpretation implies a theoretical transformation: the history of the movement of spiritual forms in the *Phenomenology* becomes the history of human generation, and the movement of consciousness equals human development. If so, Hegel is no longer Hegel; he resembles the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts period. Is this theoretical correspondence valid? To what extent was the concept of labor in the 1844 Manuscripts influenced by the concept of labor in the master-slave dialectic? What are the fundamental differences between the philosophical landscapes of Hegel and Marx, and what theoretical details remain to be uncovered?

最后，有一种教条式观点认为，马克思深受黑格尔对奴隶劳动的论述的影响，在理论上又超越了奴隶劳动的抽象性。这一断言源于1844年手稿中马克思对黑格尔的一段赞扬，在这段话里，马克思表达出三层意思：（1）否定性辩证法是推动和创造原则；（2）黑格尔的“对象化”是人的自我产生过程；（3）劳动的本质是产生人，人是自己的劳动的结果。由此，这种教条式研究顺理成章地认定，马克思指出了黑格尔的劳动的抽象性，将精神性劳动转化为现实的人的物质性劳动，否定性辩证法获得了现实的根基，不再只是针对天国、宗教和神学的批判。这种解读隐含一种理论转化，即《现象学》的精神形态运动史变成了人的生成的历史，意识运动=人的发展。如此说来，黑格尔便不再是黑格尔了，他更像巴黎手稿时期的马克思。这种理论对位是否成立？1844年手稿的劳动概念到底在多大程度上受到主奴关系思想中劳动概念的影响？黑格尔与马克思的哲学图景究竟有何不同、还有哪些理论细节有待挖掘？

II. Marx’s Reconstruction of the Concept of Labor in the Master-Slave Dialectic

二、马克思对主奴关系思想劳动概念的重构

In the view of the British Marx scholar Christopher Arthur, the quasi-Marxist interpretation of the master-slave dialectic by Kojève and others is excessive. However, if one examines Hegel’s authorial intent closely, it is understandable that the master-slave dialectic has become the focus of interpretation, because it is precisely in this section that Hegel relatively fully considers the important role labor plays in human development. Although Marx did not say much about the issue of “master and slave,” he did indeed note the particularity of labor within the master-slave dialectic; only in the discourse of his comprehensive evaluation of Hegel is the problem of “master and slave” temporarily concealed.

在英国马克思学家克里斯托弗·阿瑟看来，科耶夫等人对主奴关系思想的准马克思主义式解读是过度的。但若细究黑格尔的写作意图，主奴关系思想成为解读的焦点是情有可原的，因为正是在这一部分，黑格尔相对充分地考虑了劳动对人类发展所起到的重要作用。马克思虽未多言“主人与奴隶”的相关问题，但他的确注意到劳动在主奴关系思想中的特殊性，只不过在对黑格尔进行全面评价的话语中，“主人与奴隶”的问题暂时被隐去了。

(1) A Strict Critique of the Abstractness of Labor

（一）对劳动抽象性的严格批判

Marx initially expressed great praise for Hegel’s insights on the issue of labor, but then his tone took a sharp turn, stating that Hegel saw only the abstract spiritual side of labor. The first key problem arises here.

马克思对黑格尔在劳动问题上的洞见一开始是饱含赞扬之情的，但随后笔锋急转直下，他说黑格尔只看到劳动的抽象的精神性的一面。第一个关键问题在此出现。

1. Christopher Arthur: A Misalignment of Interpretation

1. 克里斯托弗·阿瑟：解读的错位

Slave labor has a material dimension; “shaping things” is the material production of the slave. Marx had already indicated in the 1844 Manuscripts that Hegel inherited the issue of labor from the field of classical political economy and incorporated it into the ontological horizon of philosophy. Before this, Marx had also engaged in a profound discussion of the *Philosophy of Right*, where labor is more prominently presented as material labor; Hegel directly refers to labor as the complex process of processing the materials provided by nature for a purpose. Thus, Marx could not have overlooked the material side of Hegel’s labor. Why, then, did he accuse Hegel in the 1844 Manuscripts of understanding only spiritual labor?

奴隶劳动存在物质性向度，“陶冶事物”是奴隶的物质生产。马克思在1844年手稿中就已指明黑格尔从古典政治经济学领域继承了劳动议题，并将其纳入哲学本体论视域。在此之前，马克思也对《法哲学原理》有过深刻的探讨，那里的劳动更为突出表明是一种物质性劳动，黑格尔直接指称劳动是加工自然界提供的物质的复杂过程，用以合乎目的。由此，马克思不可能忽视黑格尔劳动的物质性一面，那为何在1844年手稿中却指责黑格尔只懂得精神性的劳动呢？

In Arthur’s view, there is a misalignment here. In fact, Marx’s accusation of the abstractness of Hegel’s labor is not at all directed at the labor of the slave.[3]3 Christopher J. Arthur, “Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectic and the Myth of Marxology,” *New Left Review* I/142 (November-December 1983), pp. 67-75. Marx deliberately emphasizes that in the “Absolute Knowledge” section of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel provides the answer—the labor of negation: self-consciousness will ultimately sublate alienation within itself; religion, the state, civil society, etc., all belong to the category of alienation; only through the process of negation in the certainty of the opposite can spirit return to itself. This is the content of Hegel’s negative dialectics. It is at this level that Marx means Hegel understood only abstract spiritual labor; Hegel’s discussion of the slave’s material labor did not enter Marx’s theoretical horizon.

在阿瑟看来，这里存在错位，实际上马克思对黑格尔劳动抽象性的指责根本不是在奴隶的劳动中进行的2。马克思有意强调在《现象学》的“绝对知识”部分中黑格尔给出了谜底——否定性的劳动，自我意识终将在自身中扬弃异化，宗教、国家、市民社会等都属于异化的范畴，在对立面的确定性中，通过否定过程，精神才能复归，这是黑格尔的否定性辩证法的内容。马克思是在这个层面上表示，黑格尔所了解的只是抽象的精神性劳动，黑格尔对奴隶的物质性劳动的探讨并没有进入马克思的理论视域中。

On this basis, Arthur further points out that Hegel and Marx show consistency in their insights into the problem of alienation and in their view of the close connection between labor and self-realization. First, Hegel and Marx have always agreed that the slave realizes himself in the process of labor and must necessarily pass through a stage of alienation, except that in Hegel, alienation is implicit, occurring as a form. According to Hegel, the *Phenomenology* aims to expound the “science of the experience of consciousness”; the history it examines is the process of the transformation of spiritual forms, and alienation and the sublation of alienation are the basic forms of spirit’s self-return and self-certainty. Alienation is contained within Hegel’s exposition of labor; labor constitutes the essence of human development. But from the standpoint of modern national economists, Hegel could not see that this labor is actually a state of alienated labor existing in class society. Hence Marx says that Hegel’s criticism is merely a sham, and his positivism is false. Second, Marx and Hegel show consistency on the issue of the close connection between labor and self-realization; Marx particularly praises Hegel for seeing labor as the essential confirmation of human self-realization. In Hegel, it is the laboring slave that truly drives the progress of self-consciousness; in other words, the dialectic is advanced by the slave through labor. Through fear, the slave in labor continuously rediscovers himself and returns to himself as a being-for-self; even under conditions of inequality between master and slave, as long as the slave labors, he can still achieve self-confirmation in the result of shaping things. The divergence between Marx and Hegel appears precisely here. In Marx’s view, the unequal relationship between master and slave can be reduced to the exploitative relationship existing in real production; the worker occupies the position of the slave, and the worker’s self-consciousness can be realized only under the condition of sublating alienated labor.

就此，阿瑟还指出，黑格尔与马克思在对异化问题的洞悉上，以及劳动与自我实现两者密切关联的观点上表现出了一致性。首先，对于奴隶在劳动的过程中实现自身，且必然要经历异化阶段的观点，黑格尔和马克思从来都是一致的，只不过在黑格尔那里，异化是隐含的，是作为一种形式发生的。按照黑格尔的说法，《现象学》旨在说明“意识的经验科学”，它考察的历史是精神形态的变迁过程，异化以及异化的扬弃就是精神自我复归、自我确证的基本形式。异化被包含在黑格尔对劳动的论述当中，劳动构成了人类发展的本质，但在现代国民经济学家的立场上，黑格尔无法洞察这种劳动实际上是阶级社会存在的一种劳动异化状态，因而马克思才说黑格尔的批判主义是徒有其表的，其实证主义带有虚假性。其次，马克思同黑格尔在劳动与自我实现密切联系的问题上表现出一致性，马克思还特别赞扬黑格尔将劳动看作人对自我实现的本质性确证。在黑格尔那里，真正推动自我意识进展的是劳动着的奴隶，质言之，辩证法的推进是由奴隶通过劳动完成的，借助恐惧，奴隶在劳动中作为一种自为存在不断重新发现自己、返还自身，即使在主人和奴隶地位不对等的情形下，只要奴隶劳动，仍然能使他自己在陶冶事物的结果中实现自我确认。而马克思与黑格尔之间的分歧也恰好出现在这里，在马克思看来，主人和奴隶的不对等关系可还原为现实生产中存在的剥削关系，工人处于奴隶的位置，工人的自我意识只有在扬弃异化劳动的条件下才能实现。

Arthur’s views have attracted widespread attention in Marx scholarship. He seems to deliberately emphasize that Marx did not misinterpret Hegel, but rather that later researchers failed to identify the correct benchmark for the critique of the *Phenomenology* in the 1844 Manuscripts. This view is somewhat crude and therefore has not satisfied most Marx scholars.

阿瑟的这些观点引起了马克思学界的广泛关注，他似乎有意强调马克思并不存在对黑格尔的错误解读，而是后来研究者对1844年手稿批判《现象学》的基准点没有找对，这种观点略显粗糙，因而并未让更多的马克思学家们感到满意。

2. Sean Sayers: Marx’s “Misreading”

2. 肖恩·塞耶斯：马克思的“误读”

The premise of Marx’s “misreading” is that man and self-consciousness are equated, and Hegel’s master and slave are equated with Marx’s ruling class and ruled class. “Misreading” is not a simple erroneous interpretation but a logical deduction of theory; from the starting point, Hegel and Marx stand poles apart: one is abstract self-consciousness, the other is the real individual. The essence of Hegel’s abstract self-consciousness is a species-consciousness, which can exist only through recognition by another self-consciousness; the achievement of recognition is a speculative life-and-death struggle, and the achievement of the relationship of domination is conceptual rather than real. When the other self-consciousness, through reflective action—the shaping of labor, and the confirmation and idea of self-realization endowed by fear—completes the transformation of returning to itself, slave-consciousness becomes a kind of master-consciousness; labor enables the slave to shed natural attributes and enter a state of social attributes, establishing essentiality and subjective agency. In Marx, by contrast, labor becomes the basic measure of human society; different labor relations determine different stages of social development. The speculative nature of Hegel’s abstract self-consciousness receives no supplement of reality, because the entire transformative link on which it depends is not real; labor and fear are consciousness-based, a reflective movement of another self-consciousness to establish itself through thought. This is what Marx identifies as “abstract spiritual labor,” not the practical activity of real human beings.

马克思“误读”的前提设定是，人和自我意识是等同的，黑格尔说的主人与奴隶等同于马克思所说的统治阶级和被统治阶级。“误读”不是单纯的错误性解读，而是对理论的逻辑推演，从起点上，黑格尔与马克思的站位就是南辕北辙的：一个是抽象的自我意识，一个是现实的个人。黑格尔的抽象自我意识的本质是一个类意识，通过另一个自我意识对它的承认才能存在，承认的达成是思辨性的生死斗争，控制关系的达成是观念性的而不是现实性的。当另一个自我意识通过反思性行动——劳动的陶冶，和恐惧赋予的确认、实现自我的观念，它才完成了回复自我的转换，奴隶意识变成了某种主人意识，劳动使得奴隶摆脱了自然属性从而进入到社会属性的状态，本质性和主体能动性得以确立。而在马克思这里，劳动成为人类社会的基本衡量尺度，不同的劳动关系决定着社会发展的不同阶段。黑格尔那里的抽象自我意识的思辨性没有获得任何现实性的补充，因为它所依赖的整个转换环节都不是现实的，劳动和恐惧是意识性的，是另一个自我意识反思性的确立自身的思维运动，这就是为马克思所指认的“抽象的精神的劳动”，不是现实的人的实践活动。

Whether it is Mehring, McLellan, and others who insist that Marx at that time stood entirely on the ground of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, or, on the contrary, Cornu, R. Thomas, and others who magnify Marx’s occasional and indistinct clarification of the embryonic form of a philosophy of praxis, regardless of whether they aim to prove that Marx during his doctoral dissertation period was still trapped in the mold of Hegelianism, or that he broke free from Hegelian thinking to forge a path of practical philosophy that manifests reality, the fact that Marx was greatly influenced by Hegel’s philosophy of self-consciousness is abundantly clear. However, it must be noted that the logical starting point of Hegel’s master-slave relation is conceptual and speculative; it cannot possibly correspond to the existential state of real human beings. Therefore, Marx’s “misreading” in the 1844 Manuscripts began from this very logical starting point. Self-consciousness presents a setting of abstract man, and the critique of abstract man is Marx’s most fundamental critique of Hegel’s master-slave relation, running through the entirety of his critical theory. All movements of self-consciousness are summarized as the movement of history, which in Hegel is “abstract, logical, and speculative,” but the history of man’s real productive activity is not like this. Marx believes that from the perspective of philosophical anthropology, Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is merely a history of man’s external appendages, including the genesis of man and the genesis of man’s activity, and is also a history of thought rather than the real history of man.

无论是梅林、麦克莱伦等坚持认为当时的马克思是全然站在黑格尔思辨哲学立场上的，还是与之相反的科尔纽、鲁·托马斯等放大了马克思在其中忽隐忽现的对实践哲学雏形的廓清，不管他们是想证明博士论文时期的马克思仍处于黑格尔主义的窠臼之中，还是从黑格尔式的思考中挣脱出一条彰显现实性的实践哲学之路，马克思曾受到黑格尔自我意识哲学极大影响的事实是昭然若揭的。然而，必须注意的是，黑格尔主奴关系思想的逻辑起点是概念性、思辨性的，这不可能用来与现实的人的生存状态形成对位，所以马克思在1844年手稿中的“误读”是从逻辑起点就开始了的，自我意识呈现出对抽象的人的设定，对抽象的人的批判便是马克思对黑格尔主奴关系思想最为根底性的批判并贯穿了他批判理论之始终。自我意识的所有运动被概括为历史的运动，历史的运动在黑格尔那里是“抽象的、逻辑的、思辨的”，而人的现实生产活动的历史不是这样的。马克思认为黑格尔的《现象学》从哲学人类学视角来看，只是关于人外在附属的历史，包括人的产生、人的活动的产生，也是关于思维的历史而不是人的现实的历史。

If the meaning of speculation is not directed at “the critique of the earthly world,” then logical deduction is ultimately illusory for reality. After transforming and reforming the logical starting point of Hegel’s master-slave relation, the transcendence embodied in Marx’s “misreading” of the master-slave relation manifests in the enrichment of the reality of labor. Thus, labor no longer remains merely a general summary of objectifying activity; it also acquires a specific form of expression in reality—the substantive content contained in material production and its form. At this point, Marx’s focus turns back to critiquing the abstractness of the concept of labor in the *Phenomenology*.

思辨的意义如果不是针对“尘世的批判”，那么逻辑演绎对现实来讲终究是虚幻的。对黑格尔主奴关系思想的逻辑起始点进行改造转化后，马克思对主奴关系思想“误读”中的超越体现为对劳动现实性的充实上，由此，劳动不只停留于对对象化活动进行一般概括，它还获得了在现实中的特殊表现形式——物质生产所包含的实质内容及其形式。此时，马克思的关注点才转回到批判《现象学》中劳动概念的抽象性上。

(II) A Profound Critique of the Negative Aspect of Labor

（二）对劳动消极一面的深刻批判

In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx explicitly states that Hegel grasped only the positive side of labor and did not see its negative side. However, the labor performed by the slave itself carries the master’s domination and coercion; is this not a manifestation of the negative side of labor? A second question arises here.

马克思在1844年手稿中明确表示，黑格尔只抓到了劳动的积极的一面，没有看到劳动的消极的一面。然而，奴隶进行劳动，这件事本身就带有主人的奴役性和强迫性，它难道不是劳动消极一面的体现？第二个问题在此产生。

1. The Theory of Alienated Labor with a Humanist Facet

1. 人本主义面相的异化劳动理论

Hegel’s standpoint is that of the national economists. Marx acknowledges that they saw the positive side of labor, but the negative side of labor was overlooked, precisely because the national economists, like Hegel, only recognized the abstract spiritual activity aspect of labor. When confronting actually existing things, in investigating their essence and developmental process, they ostensibly describe real life on the basis of observation and experience, but fundamentally, intellect and concepts take precedence. This sequence of thought-investigation ends in abstraction, and the description of social reality is ultimately abstract. If living labor is meant to create wealth, yet in reality, the more one labors, the poorer the poor become, this living fact contradicts the economic principles given by the intellect. National economics does not resolve this inherent paradox; the abstract standpoint falls silent before economic facts. The positive side of conceptual labor is the affirmation of man, while the alienated side of labor in reality is the negation of man—this is the negative side of labor. From this, Marx discovers different determinations of labor. The positive determination is a theoretical presupposition, which has almost never truly appeared in human society; the negative determination returns to the earthly world, directly exposing the basic social phenomena of the earthly world. Marx himself was situated in such a historical environment. In the 1844 Manuscripts, the essence of man is man’s species-essence, man’s free and conscious activity—labor. Labor becomes the determination of man’s species-essence. This determination first acknowledges Hegel’s description of labor as objectifying activity in the master-slave relation. The acknowledgment of labor as negating human activity remains within Feuerbach’s humanism. The theory of alienated labor bearing a humanist facet is precisely the logical path of Marx’s continuation and critique of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit on the issue of the master-slave relation.

黑格尔的立场是国民经济学家的，马克思肯定他们看到了劳动的积极一面，但是劳动的消极方面却被忽略了，原因正是国民经济学家和黑格尔一样都只是承认劳动的抽象性精神活动的一面。他们面对实际存在的事物，在探究其本质和发展过程中，表面上是在观察和经验的基础上描述现实生活，根本上还是理智和概念先行，这种思想考察序列以抽象结束，对社会现实的描述最终是抽象的。如果说活的劳动是为了创造财富，但现实中越是劳动，穷人就越穷，这活生生的事实就与理智给出的经济学原理相矛盾，国民经济学并未解决这个内在悖论，抽象立场在经济事实面前失语。观念的劳动的积极一面是对人的肯定，那么现实中劳动异化的一面就是对人的否定，这就是劳动的消极的一面，马克思由此发现了劳动的不同规定，积极的规定是理论预设，它几乎不曾在人类社会真正出现过，消极的规定回到了尘世，是对尘世基本社会现象的直接揭露，马克思就身处在这样一种历史环境之中。1844年手稿中的人的本质是人的类本质，是人的自由自觉的活动——劳动，劳动成为了对人的类本质的规定。这种规定首先承认了黑格尔主奴关系思想中对劳动作为对象性活动的描述，对劳动作为否定性人类活动的承认是停留在费尔巴哈人本主义上的，带有人本主义面相的异化劳动理论也正是马克思在主奴关系思想问题上对黑格尔精神哲学的继续和批判的逻辑进路所在。

If labor remains only at the dimension of the objectification process, Marx has in fact not moved beyond Hegel’s understanding of labor. Even if Hegel’s philosophy is inverted, speculative metaphysics still belongs to an inverted speculative metaphysics. In Heidegger’s view, Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s philosophy follows Feuerbach. Inverting Hegel’s philosophy of spirit lies in grasping the root of things. Thus, Marx points out that man’s highest essence is man himself—a proposition that is far from political ontology. What Marx confirms is the fundamental movement of Western history, which is essentially still a metaphysical proposition, i.e., the peak of nihilism as identified by Heidegger. From man to man himself, to man’s highest essence, there is a lack of authoritative confirmation in between. How does the first thought transfer to the second thought? How is man suddenly determined as the root of things? In Heidegger’s view, answering these questions still requires seeking answers through the history of metaphysics. Thus, Marx’s proposition, derived by following Feuerbach, remains a metaphysical proposition. Heidegger’s view can be said to be a fundamental challenge to Marx’s philosophy. Does Marx, as Heidegger claims, inevitably return to the mold of Hegel’s metaphysics? Therefore, Marx’s analysis of the negative side of labor, which Hegel did not adequately explain, becomes very important.

如果劳动仅停留在对象化过程这个维度，马克思实际并没有走出黑格尔对劳动的理解，即使颠倒黑格尔的哲学，思辨形而上学仍然属于颠倒过来的思辨形而上学。在海德格尔看来，马克思对黑格尔哲学的颠倒是追随费尔巴哈的，颠倒黑格尔精神哲学在于抓住事物的根本，由此，马克思指出人的最高本质就是人，这是个远非政治的存在论命题，马克思确证的是西方历史的根本运动，实质上还是个形而上学命题，即海德格尔指认的虚无主义的顶峰。从人到人本身、人的最高本质，这中间缺少权威的确证，第一思想的东西如何转移到第二思想上去，人又如何被一下子确定到事情的根本上去，在海德格尔看来，回答这些疑问还要通过形而上学的历史寻找答案，那么马克思这个追随着费尔巴哈得来的命题就还是形而上学命题。海德格尔的观点可以说是对马克思哲学基础性的诘难，马克思是否如海德格尔所言，不可避免返回到黑格尔的形而上学窠臼中呢？因此，马克思对黑格尔没有充分说明的劳动的消极一面的分析显得非常重要。

2. Labor on the Dimension of Social Relations—Man’s Essential Activity

2. 社会关系维度上的劳动——人类本质性活动

On the negative side of labor, Marx excavates the level of social systems and social relations behind it. What determines the real state of labor is specific social relations. The concept of production increasingly encompasses the connotation of the concept of labor. The essence of labor analyzed from the dimension of social relations is the key to Marx’s transcendence of Hegel’s concept of labor.

在劳动的否定性一面，马克思将其背后的社会制度与社会关系层面挖掘出来，决定劳动的现实状态的是特定社会关系，生产概念越来越涵盖住了劳动概念的内涵，社会关系维度上剖析出的劳动的实质才是马克思超越黑格尔劳动概念的关键。

The mediation of the relationship of dependence between master and slave is labor, which on the explicit level exists in the form of the fetishism of relations between persons. In Marx, labor is alienated labor, the master is the capitalist, the slave is the worker, and the relation between capitalist and worker exists in the form of commodity fetishism mediated by alienated labor. This is the concrete manifestation of the master-slave dialectic in real activity, giving rise to a “master-slave” oppositional model of two groups, two classes—the opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The relation between persons is concrete social relations; the fundamental principle of the theory has not changed, only the form of the theory has been endowed with the actual content of history, and genuine materialism unfolds from its latent state. In spiritual labor, self-consciousness has the possibility of moving toward universal freedom in the interior, but in real alienated labor, history proves that there has never been any possibility that values are more important than the view of history. The poor have no choice but to survive without destroying the capitalists along with themselves; the worker appears to be controlled by the capitalist, but in reality, the capitalist, like the worker, is controlled by capital—both are appendages of things. In the abstract spiritual realm of values, self-consciousness can reduce the entire movement of objectification and its sublation to the attainment of inner identity and thus universal freedom as an absolute sublimity, but in concrete history, a conceptually satisfactory answer does not appear in the struggles of real life. In struggle as the historical science of existence, self-alienation and its sublation travel the same road; the master-slave relation is enacted in real productive activity in the fetishistic form of the exchange of things for things, of capital and commodities as equivalents. It is worth noting that Löwith [8]8 Karl Löwith (1897–1973), German philosopher and student of Heidegger, known for his work on secularization and the relationship between Hegel, Marx, and modern historical thought. believes the concept of communism was also constructed by Marx following the conclusions of Hegel’s philosophy of history: the autonomous activity of consciousness plus objectification, the dialectical unity of which results in history ultimately moving toward “reconciliation,” and absolute Idea is realized. However, Löwith’s view neglects the influence of Feuerbach’s humanism on Marx. According to the humanist view, humanism, naturalism, and communism are equivalent, and Marx accepted this. In the communist stage, alienated labor no longer exists, and man recovers his essential powers, but this is not the counterpart of the universal inner freedom of Stoicism in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. The essence of Stoicism is that no matter what the world is like, “I” can recover the authentic state, whereas communism is a generative future society realized through the necessary historical process of passing through alienation.

主人与奴隶之间依附关系的中介是劳动，显性层面上是以人与人之间关系的拜物教方式存在。在马克思那里，劳动是异化劳动，主人是资本家，奴隶是工人，资本家与工人之间的关系是以异化劳动为中介的商品拜物教方式存在，这是主奴关系思想在现实活动中的具体表现，由此形成了两个群体、两个阶级的“主-奴”对立模式——资产阶级与无产阶级之间的对立。人与人之间的关系就是具体的社会关系，理论的基本原则没有发生改变，只不过理论的形式被赋予了历史的实际内容，真正的唯物主义从潜在状态开始展开。在精神的劳动中，自我意识有走向内在普遍自由的可能性，但在现实的异化劳动中，历史证明根本没有出现过价值观比历史观还重要的可能。穷人为了生存没有选择与资本家同归于尽，工人看似被资本家控制了，实际上，资本家与工人一样，都被资本控制了，都是物的附庸。在抽象的精神的价值观中，自我意识可以将对象化及其扬弃的整个运动过程最终归结到走向内在同一性从而达到普遍自由的绝对崇高，但在具体的历史中，观念上的满意答案不会出现在现实生活的斗争中，在斗争作为存在的历史科学里，自我异化连同对它的扬弃走的都是同一条道路，主奴关系在现实生产活动中以物与物之间、资本和商品等价交换的拜物教方式演绎。值得一提的是，洛维特认为共产主义概念也是马克思按照黑格尔历史哲学的结论建构的，意识的自主活动加之对象化，其辩证统一的结果就是历史最终走向“和解”，绝对理念得以实现。不过，洛维特的观点忽视了费尔巴哈的人本主义对马克思的影响，按照人本主义的观点，人道主义、自然主义和共产主义是等同的，这也为马克思所接受。在共产主义阶段，异化劳动不复存在，人恢复自己的本质性力量，但这不是黑格尔主奴关系思想中斯多葛主义的普遍内在的自由实现的对子。斯多葛主义的本质是无论世界怎样，“我”都能恢复本真状态，而共产主义是在走过异化这个必经的历史过程中实现的生成性的未来社会。

Marx soon broke free from the humanist understanding. In his constant re-examination of the old dialectic, including the critical attitude toward the dialectic of Feuerbach, which he had once affirmed, he moved toward the path of critique of political economy, sharing the same acuity as the Young Hegelians. The occasion for taking this path was his attention to the problem of free trade and protective tariffs; he recognized that what is more fundamental than consciousness of the object is that man is man because objectifying activity itself is more fundamental than objectifying consciousness. In Lukács’s view, Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between the British Industrial Revolution, British classical economics, and philosophy and dialectics was very insightful. Marx’s concern with material interests, arising from real perplexing questions, prompted him to turn to the study of political economy, and thus truly move toward the critique of political economy. In the context of the master-slave dialectic, political economy once again connects Hegel and Marx. The weight of the critique of political economy in the 1844 Manuscripts cannot be ignored; it was precisely here that Marx recognized that the path of the spiritual realm and natural sensuousness was insufficient to answer real questions. And the method of critique of political economy is precisely dialectics. Shortly after the formation of the 1844 Manuscripts, “practice” as the programmatic content of Marx’s thought appeared in the subsequent Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology; “practice” originated in the sensuous, real activity of the object in the 1844 Manuscripts. “Practice” can no longer be named by the face and term of the old ontology; it directly connects to the dialectics-labor theme in Hegel’s Phenomenology, but it is an ontological inversion of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit.

马克思很快就挣脱了人本主义的理解，在不断审视旧的辩证法中，包括他曾肯定的费尔巴哈辩证法的批判态度，走向了政治经济学批判道路，与青年黑格尔具有一样的敏锐，走向这个道路的契机是注意到了自由贸易和保护关税的问题，他认识到比对象意识更为彻底的是人之所为人，是因为对象性活动本身比对象性意识更为根本。按照卢卡奇的观点来说，黑格尔对英国工业革命问题，对英国古典经济学和哲学、辩证法问题之间的关系理解是非常有见地的。而马克思在面对现实的苦恼的疑问产生的对物质利益的关注，促使他转变到对政治经济学的研究，进而真正走向政治经济学批判。面对主奴关系思想前后，政治经济学再一次将黑格尔和马克思连接起来。1844年手稿的政治经济学批判重心不容忽视，正是在这里马克思认识到了精神领域的和自然感性的道路不足以解答现实的疑问。而政治经济学批判的方法也正是辩证法。在1844年手稿形成不久后，“实践”作为马克思思想纲领的内容就出现于接下来的《关于费尔巴哈》和《德意志意识形态》之中，“实践”肇始于1844年手稿中的对象性的感性现实的活动。“实践”不能再以旧本体论的面相和称呼命名，它直接衔接黑格尔《现象学》中的辩证法-劳动主题，但它是存在论意义上的对黑格尔精神哲学的反转。

Marx’s affirmation of the master-slave dialectic is an affirmation of its theoretical spiritual core. Although labor in Hegel is speculative, “alienation” is the core that Hegel always grasped in the master-slave dialectic. Although the Phenomenology itself did not recognize the hidden critique within it, it contains all the elements of critique that Marx affirmed: all the activities of self-consciousness brew a critique of actual reality in the processing and preparatory work of alienation. And to achieve all these theoretical aims, Marx directly ignored the inconspicuous negative aspects of coercion and servitude contained in the slave’s labor in the Phenomenology.

马克思对主奴关系思想的认可是对其理论精神内核的认可，虽然劳动在黑格尔那里是思辨性的，但“异化”是黑格尔在主奴关系思想中始终被抓住的核心，虽然《现象学》自己没有意识到隐藏在其中的神秘的批判，但是蕴含着马克思所认可的批判包括的一切要素，自我意识的一切活动都在异化的加工和准备工作中酝酿着对现实原本进行批判。而为了达到这一切理论目的，对《现象学》中奴隶劳动包含的不起眼的强迫性、奴役性消极方面，马克思是直接忽略的。

III. Marx Beyond Hegel: Critical Inheritance and Comprehensive Transcendence of Slave Labor

三、走出黑格尔的马克思：对奴隶劳动的批判继承与全面超越

The reason Marx placed such importance on the problem of labor is that he reduced the most fundamental problem of self-consciousness to the problem of the truth of self-certainty. The attainment of self-certainty by self-consciousness relies on the negation of the negation; the affirmation within the negation of the negation is taken by Hegel as the true activity of self-realization. This summary of historical movement is conceptual; “labor,” as the crucial point for criticizing this uncritical historical movement, must become the key object of critique.

马克思之所以如此看重劳动问题，在于他将自我意识最根本的问题归结为自我确证的真理性问题。自我意识自身确定性的达成依托的就是否定的否定，在否定的否定中的肯定被黑格尔当作真正的自我实现的活动，这种对历史运动的概括是概念性的，“劳动”作为批判这种非批判的历史运动的关节点必须成为被重点批判的对象。

1. The End of Controversy

1.争议的终结

Marx’s dismissal of the slave labor described by Hegel as spiritualist is not without reason. In Hegel’s exposition, the slave’s labor “forms things” indeed directly appears as material production, but in more cases, this labor is inseparable from consciousness. First, in the sense of developing slave consciousness, slave labor possesses the objectivity of material production; unlike the master’s satisfaction, it does not vanish in an instant, and slave consciousness is thereby elevated—this is a spiritualization of labor. Second, from the determination of labor, labor is desire; the tendency toward the consciousness of labor is evident. As labor as a mediating process, in Hegel’s words, it is at the same time the simple being-for-itself of individual consciousness; labor is equivalent to self-consciousness. Finally, from the result of labor, slave consciousness returns to itself in labor, externalization is realized, and it develops into a state of persistence; the independence of self-consciousness advances to the freedom of self-consciousness, and the spiritual function of labor is manifested. From this perspective, Marx grasped a premise of Hegel’s exposition: that consciousness, with labor as the mediating process, processes and transforms things. Since it is the labor of consciousness, the abstract spiritual side of labor is unavoidable. However, Hegel would not regard such a history of the transformation of forms of consciousness as the process of man’s generation; man is by no means absolute spirit, cannot produce himself, and slave labor cannot be the expression of man’s essence. Thus, Marx’s understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness as man, seeing only the spiritual side of slave labor, is to some extent a misunderstanding of Hegel.

马克思将黑格尔描述的奴隶劳动斥之为精神论的并不是没有道理的。在黑格尔的表述中，奴隶劳动“陶冶事物”的确直接表现为物质性生产，但在更多情况下，这种劳动和意识密不可分。首先，从发展奴隶意识的意义上讲，奴隶劳动具有物质生产的客观性，与主人相比，它的满足不会转瞬即逝，奴隶意识借此提高，这是将劳动精神化了；其次，从劳动的规定性上而言，劳动是欲望，劳动的意识化倾向是明显的，作为中介过程的劳动，按照黑格尔的话说，同时是个别意识的单纯自为性存在，劳动就相当于自我意识了；最后，从劳动的结果而言，奴隶意识在劳动中返还自身，外在化得以实现，进而发展为持存状态，自我意识的独立性进阶到自我意识自由，劳动的精神性作用得以彰显。由此看来，马克思抓住了黑格尔表述的一个前提，那就是意识在劳动作为中介过程的情况下，加工改造事物，既然是意识的劳动，劳动的抽象的精神性的一面就不可避免了。不过，黑格尔并不会将这样的意识形态变迁史看作是人的产生过程，人绝不是绝对精神，不可能自己产生自己，奴隶劳动不可能是人的本质体现，那么马克思将意识、自我意识理解为人，只看到奴隶劳动的精神性的一面，多少是对黑格尔的误解。

Turning to the affirmative and negative aspects of labor, Marx acknowledges that Hegel saw the affirmative side of labor, but he does not believe that Hegel pointed out the negative side of labor. It is precisely in exposing the negative side that Marx steers the concept of labor toward alienated labor. According to Kojeve’s view, the reason Hegel overlooked the negativity of labor is that he stood on the master’s standpoint, seeing only that slave-consciousness is elevated and thereby liberated through labor. On this point, Kojeve clearly inherits Marx’s view that alienated labor enslaves people. But returning to Hegel, the situation is not like this. Slave labor is from the outset coercive; before the master, the slave has no choice but to cling to life, living in attachment to the desire for life and in absolute fear of the master. Labor is the choice the slave is forced to make under these conditions. Therefore, while this labor is affirmative in elevating slave-consciousness to the level of self-consciousness, in its genesis it is enslaving, coercive, and inherently carries the attribute of alienation. However, this alienation, in the self-elevation of slave-consciousness, quickly transforms into an affirmation through the formative activity [Bildung] on things, namely the generation of self-consciousness. Here Hegel’s expression of the negativity of labor is obscure. Thus, Marx here exhibits an intentional or unintentional neglect of the change in the immanent attributes of labor in Hegel. Is this “intentional or unintentional” a deliberate act? To resolve these multiple doubts, it is necessary to return once again to the theoretical details.

再说劳动的肯定性和否定性的一面，马克思认可黑格尔看到了劳动的肯定性的一面，但他不认为黑格尔指出了劳动的否定性的一面，也是在对否定性一面的揭露中，马克思将劳动概念引到异化劳动上去了。按照科耶夫的观点，黑格尔之所以忽视了劳动的否定性，是因为他站在了主人的立场上，只看到了奴隶意识在劳动中被提高从而解放，在这一点上，科耶夫显然继承了马克思的异化劳动奴役人的观点。而回到黑格尔，情况并不是这样的。奴隶劳动一开始就带有强制性，奴隶在主人面前不得已选择苟且偷生，活在对生命欲望的眷恋中和对主人的绝对恐惧下，劳动是它在这种状态下不得不做出的选择，所以，这种劳动在将奴隶意识提升到自我意识的层面上是具有肯定的，但从其发生上，它是奴役性的、强迫性的，是本身就自带异化属性的，只不过这种异化在奴隶意识的自我提升中，通过物的陶冶又很快转变为一种肯定性，即自我意识的生成，黑格尔在这里对劳动否定性的表达是隐晦的。那么，马克思在这里对黑格尔的劳动内在属性的变化存在有意无意的忽视，这种“有意无意”是否是一种刻意为之？为解答重重疑义，有必要再次回到理论细节。

2. The Disappearance of the Moment of Fear

2.恐惧环节的消失

In Marx’s commentary on Hegel’s labor problem, it can be clearly seen that another important condition for realizing the master-slave transformation—fear—disappears in Marx’s analysis. In Wang Jinlin’s view, this is not unrelated to Marx’s direct alignment of the process of human generation with Hegel’s progression of consciousness.[9]9 Wang Jinlin (王金林) is a contemporary Chinese scholar of Marxist philosophy. The 1844 Manuscripts focus on “man,” whose species-essence is labor; the full content of man is intimately connected with labor. Marx seems more to be offering a philosophical-anthropological reading of the Phenomenology. Hegel’s original meaning, however, is that labor and fear are equally important as factors in the externalization of consciousness, and equally crucial links in the self-certainty of self-consciousness. Here we can reexamine Arthur’s view. Arthur argues that Marx never criticized Hegel’s theory of the spirit of labor with reference to slave labor. If this is so, the disappearance of the moment of fear in Marx’s account seems understandable. But Wang Jinlin points out a more objective point: the entire discussion of labor in the Phenomenology occurs only in the section on the master-slave relation. If Marx were not criticizing Hegel’s view of labor in this section, it would be utterly unconvincing. Therefore, the disappearance of the moment of fear in Marx urgently requires further explanation. Indeed, as Heidegger says, “doing violence to the text” is a necessary major move for original thinkers, but analysis of the original textual context remains indispensable.

在马克思对黑格尔劳动问题的评述中，可以明显看到实现主奴转换的另一个重要条件——恐惧，在马克思的分析中消失了。在王金林看来，这与马克思将人的产生过程与黑格尔的意识进阶变化直接对位不无关系3。1844年手稿重点探讨的就是“人”，其类本质就是劳动，人的全部内容的彰显都与劳动息息相关，马克思更像是对《现象学》做哲学人类学的解读。而黑格尔原本的意思是，劳动与恐惧作为意识外在化的因素是同等重要的，同样是自我意识得以确证的重要环节。在此可以重新审视阿瑟的观点，阿瑟认为马克思从来就不是针对奴隶劳动来批判黑格尔劳动精神论的，这样说来恐惧环节在马克思论述中的消失似乎可以理解了，但王金林指出了更为客观的一点，整个《现象学》着重讨论劳动的部分就只发生在主奴关系思想部分，如果说马克思不是针对这部分批判黑格尔的劳动观，无论如何都无法令人信服。所以，有关恐惧一环在马克思那里的消失，亟需进一步说明。的确如海德格尔所言，“对文本施暴”是原创性思想家必有之大动作，但对原始文本境遇的分析仍是不可缺少的。

The slave’s fear has two layers: one is the fear of death in the initial life-and-death struggle; under this fear, the slave, clinging to life, becomes the master’s slave. The other is the fear of the master, who is pure being-for-self—an absolute fear of essence. It is precisely this fear that drives the slave into labor. Slave-consciousness contains within itself a purely negative aspect; it requires a process to realize the truth of being-for-self within itself. In fact, the truth does not lie in the master’s essence; slave-consciousness can experience this truth-essence within itself. Only the slave can experience the transience of all that is stable, and this consciousness of change and transience is the most essential thing for self-consciousness. The transformation of slave-consciousness into self-consciousness is precisely such a transition; it is not only universal but also actual. The slave completes this transformation in the actual labor of service, using labor to cancel its own naturalness. Thus, in Hegel’s view: first, fear is one of the necessary conditions for transforming one side of consciousness into slave-consciousness; second, fear drives the slave into actual service, making the slave realize that labor is a necessary link in canceling dependence on natural existence. Fear internally constitutes a transformative factor in the externalization of slave-consciousness. Without fear as the internalized experience of consciousness itself, slave-consciousness cannot experience the truth-essence of its pure being-for-self. In the final analysis, fear is consciousness-based rather than substantial; it is an adjunct to labor and does not itself possess the character of transforming into actuality. Therefore, such fear is actually empty. Fear is merely a factor that prompts consciousness to experience itself. Even if its content were replaced—describing fear as something urgent—the proposition of the master-slave transformation would still hold. Consequently, this kind of thing, which cannot find a foundation in philosophical ontology, and which, to a certain extent, possesses at most a value measure but no historical measure, was never a factor Marx considered. The disappearance of the moment of fear in Marx’s reconstruction of the concept of labor is inevitable. This fear, which can be described as something with a certain urgency, is not more profound in connotation than alienation itself. Alienation already appears implicitly in Hegel’s slave labor, meaning coercion and enslavement. Therefore, transforming fear into an explanation of alienation is more critical than explaining fear itself.

奴隶的恐惧包含两层：一个是一开始生死斗争中对死亡的恐惧，在这个恐惧下，奴隶贪生怕死沦为主人的奴隶；另一个是对纯粹自为存在的主人的恐惧，是对本质的绝对恐惧，正是这种恐惧，将奴隶推向劳动。奴隶意识自身包含着纯粹否定性的一面，它需要一个过程才能在自身中实现自为存在的真理，其实真理并不在主人的本质中，奴隶意识能够经验到自身内的这个真理本质。只有奴隶才能经验到一切持存东西的流转性，而这种对变化流转的意识才是自我意识最为本质的东西，奴隶意识进阶为自我意识的转化就是一种流转，它不仅是普遍性的，而且也是现实的，奴隶在提供服务的现实的劳动中完成转化，用劳动取消自身的自然性。所以，在黑格尔看来，其一，恐惧是促使意识的一方转化为奴隶意识的必要条件之一；其二，恐惧推动奴隶进行现实的服务，意识到劳动是取消对自然的存在的依赖性的必要环节，恐惧内在地构成奴隶意识外在化的转化因素，没有恐惧作为内在化意识经验自身，奴隶意识经验不到它的纯粹自为存在的真理本质。归根结底，恐惧是意识化的而不是实体性的，是劳动的附属而本身并不具有转化为现实的特性。因此，这样一种恐惧实际上是空洞的，恐惧只不过是促使意识经验自身的一个因素，如果在内容上进行代换，即使将恐惧描述为某种紧迫性的东西，主奴转化的命题已然成立，因而这种无法在哲学存在论意义上追寻到根基的东西，甚至在一定程度上讲，一种最多仅具有价值尺度而毫无历史尺度可以丈量的东西，从来都不是马克思考虑的要素，恐惧环节在马克思重构劳动概念中的消失是必然的，这种可以被描述为某种带有紧迫性的恐惧并不比异化本身的内涵深刻更多，异化在黑格尔奴隶劳动中本来就是隐性出现的，本身就是强制性、奴役性的意思，那么，将恐惧转化为对异化的说明则比说明恐惧本身更具有批判性。

3. Dialectics-Labor: A Philosophical-Anthropological Concern

3.辩证法-劳动的哲学人类学关怀

The movement of abstract thought identified in the master-slave relation unfolds internally. Identity philosophy, as pure thought, is from the actual level merely illusory identity; its dialectic is a result. For this reason, Hegel’s master-slave relation is directly designated in many expressions as the “master-slave dialectic.” In the master-slave relation, the key link for achieving a dialectic with substantive content rather than a formal method is the appearance of “labor.” Therefore, the proposition of the master-slave relation with labor as its theme is essentially dialectics. From the perspective of theoretical spirit, this identification is not unacceptable, after all Marx said that the final achievement of the Phenomenology is dialectics. Dialectics-labor obtains an interpretation of the essential truth of the theme in the Phenomenology: the dialectical character of the entire movement of consciousness, i.e., the essence of labor.

主奴关系思想中标识出的抽象思维运动是在内部展开的，同一性哲学作为纯思想，从现实层面来讲，同一性只是虚幻的同一，它的辩证法是结果。正因此，黑格尔的主奴关系思想在很多表述中被直接认定为“主奴辩证法”。在主奴关系思想中，达到具有实质内容的辩证法而不是形式方法的辩证法，实现这一结果的关键环节是“劳动”的出现，因此，以劳动作为主题的主奴关系思想的命题本质就是辩证法。从理论精神来看，这种指认尚无不可，毕竟马克思说过《现象学》的最后成果就是辩证法。辩证法-劳动在《现象学》中获得了主旨真相上的阐释，意识的整个运动过程的辩证性，即劳动的本质。

The philosophical interpretation of dialectics-labor as a principle of high generality no longer needs to take the manifest level of national economy as its foundation. For this reason, after Hegel passed through his early Jena period, economic knowledge never appeared in a direct guise. The explanation of truth at the level of principle was no longer confined to the domain of national economy, and it is understandable that it appears as a profound intellectual background in the hidden side of Hegel’s philosophy. In short, the interpretation at the level of principle of the speculative historical movement with dialectics-labor as its theme, with national economy as its hidden intellectual essence behind the scenes, is pushed to its extreme in the Phenomenology. The slave, stimulated by fear, labors continuously, throws off the slave state, curbs desire through the negativity of labor, externalizes slave-consciousness, and gains permanence in the negative relation. The negativity of labor-consciousness lies in driving and creating; hence the principle of negativity in dialectics is the principle of driving and the principle of creation. It is precisely on the basis of grasping the logical progression of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit that Marx points out the great significance of dialectics as a principle of negativity: first, it reveals the essence of labor; through the form of alienation, in the process of self-generation, man enters into an actual relation with himself. This is precisely the important reason why the 1844 Manuscripts marks Marx’s renewed critique of Hegel’s entire philosophy.

辩证法-劳动作为一种高度性原则的哲学性阐释早已不需要将国民经济学的显学层面作为自己的基础，正因此，当黑格尔走过青年耶拿时期，经济学知识便未曾以直接面相展现出来，具有原则高度的对真相的解释不再局限于国民经济学区域中，而它作为一种渊博的知识背景出现在黑格尔哲学的隐秘性的一面也就情有可原。总而言之，以辩证法-劳动为主题的思辨历史运动的原则高度性阐释，在以国民经济学作为其背后隐性的思想精髓，在《现象学》中被发挥到了极致。奴隶在恐惧的激发下不断劳动，摆脱奴隶状态，在劳动的否定性中节制欲望，奴隶意识外化自己，在否定关系中获得持久性，劳动意识的否定性在于推动和创造，因而辩证法包括的否定性原则就是推动原则和创造原则。正是在把握了黑格尔精神哲学的逻辑进路的基础上，马克思指出辩证法作为一种否定性原则的伟大意义，首先是对劳动的本质的揭示，通过异化的形式，在自我产生的过程中，人同自身发生现实关系。这也正是1844年手稿马克思重启对黑格尔整个哲学批判的重要原因所在。

Marx’s reading of the *Phenomenology* is situated from the perspective of philosophical anthropology, focusing on the existential condition of human beings. In terms of the specific characteristics of humanity, labor is the practical activity through which the subject sheds its dependence on nature; the further determination of what makes humans human is struggle, through which mutual struggle achieves genuine recognition, forming concrete social relations, and the essence of humanity is fully elucidated. The 1844 Manuscript’s [10]10 The “1844 Manuscript” refers to Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, an early work in which he critically engages with Hegelian philosophy and political economy, emphasizing a humanistic conception of labor and alienation. partial humanistic interpretation is, to some extent, a misreading of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic: Hegel never intended to explore the question of human activity in reality; labor appears more as a necessary stage for consciousness to advance to self-consciousness. Yet such a misreading possesses the value of opening up a new theory. The meaning of words presupposes some common practice; one cannot simply reduce the meaning of words to an intention to forcibly seize reality. Marx did not willfully and arrogantly distort Hegel’s philosophical texts; rather, he sought to infer from language the birthplace of words—that is, the reality within language—in order to invert the master-slave dialectic. First, the subject of Hegel’s history of the transformation of spirit and consciousness is absolute knowledge, which is in the sense of philosophical ontology, moving within the spiritual realm, a purely metaphysical theory of spirit, yet one that carries with it historical connections. What Marx uses to transcend this is to highlight the part of philosophical anthropology within it, regarding self-consciousness as human beings, and the process of the experience of consciousness becoming self-consciousness as the process of humanity’s self-creation. Second, Hegel regards objectification as objective; the manifestation of consciousness is realized through the process of objectification, the essence of which is self-consciousness objectifying itself from within—this is pure empiricism. Marx, in contrast, summarizes this process of objectification as the essence of labor, making a general determination of Hegel’s concept of labor; it is transformed into a practical activity—labor—which, from the perspective of ontology, provides the most essential determination of the specific character of humanity. The empiricist and rationalist Hegelian idealist philosophy develops, within Marx’s theoretical logic, into materialism.

马克思对《现象学》的解读是站在哲学人类学的角度，重点探讨人的生存境遇，在人的特质表现上，劳动是主体摆脱对自然的依赖的现实活动，人之为人的进一步规定则是斗争，在相互斗争中实现真正的承认，结成具体的社会关系，人的本质得到了充分的说明。1844年手稿偏人本学的解读或多或少是对黑格尔主奴关系思想的误读，黑格尔从来没有意图在现实中探讨人的活动问题，劳动更多的是作为意识进阶为自我意识的必要环节出现，但这样的误读却有着开启新理论的价值。词的含义是以某种共同的实践为前提的，不能将词的含义简单归结为一种强占现实的意向，马克思并不是无理取闹地对黑格尔哲学文本进行狂妄的篡改，他正是从语言中设法推断出词的出生地，也就是语言中的现实来对主奴关系思想部分进行反转。首先，黑格尔的精神意识变迁史的主体是绝对知识，它是哲学本体论意义上的，辗转于精神性层面，是纯粹形而上学的精神论，但其中附带着历史联系。马克思借以超越的就是彰显其中哲学人类学的部分，将自我意识看作人，意识经验为自我意识的过程就是人自我创造的过程。其次，黑格尔将对象化视为客观的，意识的彰显通过对象化过程得以实现，其实质是自我意识从内在对象化自身，这是纯经验论的。马克思则将这一对象化过程概括为劳动的本质，对黑格尔的劳动观做出了一般性规定，它被转化为现实性的行动——劳动，从存在论意义上，为人的特质做出了最为本质性的规定，经验论、唯理论的黑格尔唯心论哲学在马克思的理论逻辑中，发展成为了唯物论。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗