Zhou Enlai’s Prediction and Response to the Outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941

The outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 marked a new stage in the world anti-fascist war. The situation in the Pacific was closely linked to the situation of China’s all-out War of Resistance against Japan. The Chinese Communist Party always paid close attention to the evolution of the Pacific situation, promptly assessed the situation and made responses. Zhou Enlai, then head of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, keenly analyzed the shifting balance of forces between the fascist and anti-fascist camps at the time and made an accurate prediction of the outbreak of the Pacific War. This article, based on relevant documents, explores the process by which Zhou Enlai observed the international situation and adopted corresponding measures before and after the outbreak of the Pacific War.

1941年太平洋战争的爆发，标志着世界反法西斯战争进入了新阶段。太平洋局势与中国全民族抗战局势密切相关，中国共产党对太平洋局势演变始终给予高度关注并及时研判形势、作出应对。时任中共中央南方局负责人的周恩来敏锐分析当时法西斯和反法西斯两大阵营力量消长状况，对太平洋战争的爆发作出了准确预判。本文拟以相关文献为依据，探讨周恩来在太平洋战争爆发前后观察国际局势以及相应采取应对举措的过程。

1. Closely Following New Diplomatic Developments between Japan and the United States

一、密切关注日美两国外交新动向

After Japan launched its full-scale war of aggression against China, it put forward an aggressive plan to establish a so-called “New Order in Greater East Asia,” attempting to further expand its sphere of influence in Asia and the Pacific. Japan’s accelerated aggression directly threatened the interests of Western countries, especially the United States, in the Asia-Pacific region. After the second Konoe Cabinet [n1] was formed in July 1940, Japan began to systematically implement its southward advance strategy and formally concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In July and September 1940, the United States announced bans on the export of aviation gasoline, scrap iron and steel to Japan, demonstrating its intention and capability to restrain Japan’s southward advance. The diplomatic conflict between Japan and the United States thus became increasingly serious. However, before the end of 1941, Japan had not yet made up its mind to formally go to war with the United States. The United States, for its part, having adopted a policy of aiding Britain, placed its military focus on the Atlantic and Europe. To avoid direct military conflict, Japan and the United States began multiple rounds of negotiations. Amid the turbulent Pacific situation, Zhou Enlai combined the latest diplomatic developments of Japan and the United States to conduct an in-depth analysis of the specific policies of the two countries.

日本发动全面侵华战争后，提出建立所谓“大东亚新秩序”的侵略计划，企图进一步拓展其在亚洲和太平洋的势力范围。日本加速侵略的步伐直接威胁到西方国家特别是美国在亚太地区的利益。1940年7月第二届近卫内阁（1940年7月22日，日本米内光政内阁下台。同日，此前曾担任过日本首相的近卫文麿第二次组阁上台。）成立后，日本开始有计划地执行南进策略，并与德国和意大利正式缔结三国军事同盟。美国在1940年7月和9月分别宣布对日本禁止输出航空机用汽油、废铁和钢铁，以表明其牵制日本南进的意图和能力。日美两国的外交冲突遂日趋严重。但在1941年底前，日本尚未下定决心与美国正式开战。而美国亦由于采取援英方针，将其军事重心放在大西洋和欧洲。为避免发生直接军事冲突，日美开始多轮谈判。在太平洋局势波谲云诡之际，周恩来结合日美最新外交动态深入分析了两国具体政策。

On April 16, 1941, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, agreeing to conduct formal negotiations based on a previously reached Japan-U.S. understanding plan. Although Hull clearly put forward four relatively strict principles toward Japan during the talks, the content of this understanding plan included a large number of provisions favorable to protecting Japan’s vested interests from its aggression against China and infringing on China’s sovereignty and interests. For example, it stipulated: “According to the agreement between Japan and China, Japanese troops will withdraw from China, China’s independence will be respected, no repar

1941年4月16日，日本驻美国大使野村吉三郎与美国国务卿赫尔会谈，决定以先前达成的日美谅解方案为基础举行正式谈判。虽然赫尔在会谈中明确提出了对日本相对较为严厉的四条原则，但该谅解方案的内容包括了大量有利于保护日本侵略中国既得利益、侵害中国主权和利益的内容，例如其中规定：“根据日中之间的协定，日军撤出中国，尊重中国的独立，不要求赔偿，蒋政权和汪政权合并，承认满洲国等。在这些条件下，美国劝告蒋政权实行和平。”此时在中国，1941年初震惊中外的皖南事变爆发，国民党政府发动第二次反共高潮，中国抗日民族统一战线面临前所未有的严峻形势，周恩来对日美谈判的妥协性保持高度警惕意识，担心日美谈判很有可能将再次动摇国民党政府的抗日态度。5月20日，周恩来向毛泽东汇报：“据莫斯科电，美正就中日战争同日本商谈劝和条件”，国民党政府“随着困难增加而来的靠美和降日的空气，恐将会得到更大的反映，这是今后值得注意的一个趋势”。

On May 25, Zhou Enlai published a signed editorial in the *Xinhua Daily* titled “On the Current War Situation,” in which he offered a detailed analysis of the foreign strategies of Japan and the United States. Regarding the United States, Zhou pointed out that it sought to maximize its own national interests in the global war situation at the time, “striving for how to enter direct participation in the war advantageously.” Delaying a direct conflict between Japan and the United States in the Pacific to avoid fighting a two-front war was one of the important conditions the United States had to consider. However, the development of the global war situation “would not allow the United States to calculate so precisely,” and the United States had already “gradually and actually entered the war.” Regarding Japan, Zhou believed that while actively preparing for a southward military advance, it was simultaneously intensifying the implementation of a so-called “two-faced policy” toward China, Britain, the United States, and the Dutch East Indies (the Dutch East Indies: Indonesia, before its independence, was invaded by Dutch colonists in the late 16th century, and a colonial government was formally established in 1800, called the Dutch East Indies, abbreviated as the Dutch East Indies). On the one hand, Japan attempted both to blockade China through military offensives and to divide China by spreading rumors; on the other hand, it both intensified diplomatic offensives against Britain, the United States, and the Dutch East Indies and attempted to reach a temporary compromise with Britain and the United States through threatening postures. Based on this, Zhou Enlai concluded that “the development and coordination of these policies will inevitably make blockading China and securing economic interests in the South Seas its current central focus.”

5月25日，周恩来在《新华日报》发表代论《论目前战局》，对日美两国的对外策略作了细致分析。关于美国，周恩来指出其在当时的世界战局中意图最大程度谋求本国利益，“所争取的是如何有利的进入直接参战”，推迟日美两国在太平洋直接发生冲突以避免两洋作战成为美国所要考虑的重要条件之一，但世界战局发展“不容美国的算盘打得那样精”，美国已经“一步一步的实际参战了”。关于日本，周恩来认为其在积极准备武力南进的同时，加紧对中国和英、美、荷印（荷印，印度尼西亚在独立前于16世纪末遭荷兰殖民者侵入，1800年正式设立殖民政府，称荷属东印度，简称荷印。）等国实施所谓“两面政策”，一方面既企图通过展开军事进攻封锁中国，又企图通过散播谣言分化中国；另一方面既加紧对英、美、荷印等国开展外交攻势，又通过采取威胁姿态企图与英美暂时妥协。周恩来据此认为，日本“这些政策的发展和配合，它必然以封锁中国和取得南洋的经济利益为目前中心”。

In June 1941, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, the line between the world’s fascist and anti-fascist camps became increasingly clear. Zhou Enlai wrote a commentary article calling on Britain and the United States to stand on the correct anti-fascist position and establish a common front with the Soviet Union. Zhou Enlai timely proposed that the status and role of the United States in the East should be reassessed: “In the past, because we understood that the United States was unwilling to fight a two-front war and wanted to deal with Germany first and then Japan, we only hoped that the United States would impose an embargo on Japan and make no further compromises. Now, however, it is even more possible to completely abandon any thought of compromise with Japan, impose a thorough embargo on Japan, and strengthen aid to us.” Mao Zedong also telegraphed Zhou Enlai, stating that at present, “toward Britain and the United States, the main approach is to win them over, and criticism can be reduced.” At the same time, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, the Nationalist government hoped that war would also break out soon between the Soviet Union and Japan, so as to reduce its own pressure in the war against Japan and facilitate its continued anti-communist activities. Therefore, it sought to “provoke Japan into attacking the Soviet Union, hoping to profit from the conflict.” In response, Zhou Enlai suggested to the CPC Central Committee that it “adopt a countermeasure of emphasizing united resistance against Japan, drawing Britain and the United States to aid China, and implementing an embargo to sanction Japan.”

1941年6月，苏德战争爆发后，世界法西斯阵营与反法西斯阵营的界限愈加清晰，周恩来撰写评论文章，呼吁英美等国应站在反法西斯的正确立场上与苏联建立共同阵线。周恩来适时提出，要重新审视美国在东方的地位和作用，“过去，我们因为了解美国不愿两洋作战，要先对德后对日，故也只望美国对日禁运，不再妥协，而现在则更有可能断绝一切对日妥协的念头，彻底对日禁运，加强对我的援助了”。毛泽东也致电周恩来，认为当前“对英、美主要是拉，批评可减少”。与此同时，国民党政府在苏德战争爆发后希望苏日之间也能够早日爆发战争，以减轻其对日作战的压力，同时便利其继续实施反共活动，因此设法“挑动日本进攻苏联，企图坐收渔利”。为此周恩来建议中共中央“采取强调团结抗日，拉英美援华，实行禁运以制裁日本的对策”。

On July 3, Zhou Enlai telegraphed Mao Zedong, analyzing the recent diplomatic strategy of the United States toward Japan: “It is estimated that the U.S. policy of using concessions such as recognizing Japan’s economic privileges in China to prevent Japan from using force to advance southward will not easily succeed. The possibility of ‘delaying’ is greater, and pressuring China remains the main approach.” Shortly thereafter, on July 28, Japan invaded southern French Indochina, and the U.S. government subsequently announced a full oil embargo against Japan. It was thus evident that the U.S.-Japan negotiations had not eased the situation in the Pacific. On the contrary, because Japan was determined to break through the encirclement and blockade by the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands (in 1941, the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands formed a united front against Japan in the Pacific), the likelihood of conflict in the Pacific greatly increased. On September 2, Zhou Enlai delivered a special report at a meeting of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, stating that the United States was then pursuing a policy of luring Japan away from the Axis powers; if this failed, it would use negotiations as a means of delay. However, neither scenario was favorable to China’s War of Resistance. On September 14, Zhou Enlai delivered an important speech at a meeting of the Southern Bureau on the latest developments in U.S.-Japan negotiations, estimating that a U.S.-Japan compromise was possible, but “a full compromise is still some way off,” and he believed that Japan would not abandon either its southward or northward advance. Subsequently, the U.S.-Japan negotiations gradually reached an irreconcilable impasse, all of which fully verified the correctness of Zhou Enlai’s judgment on the progress of U.S.-Japan diplomacy.

7月3日，周恩来致电毛泽东，就近期美国对日本所实施的外交策略进行分析：“估计美以承认日本在中国的经济特权等为条件使日本不用武力南进的政策不易成功，‘拖’的可能更大，压迫中国仍是主要的。”紧接着日本在7月28日入侵法属印度支那南部，美国政府随后宣布对日本全面实行石油禁运。可见日美谈判并没有使太平洋局势出现缓和迹象。相反，由于日本决心突破美、英、中、荷的包围封锁（1941年，美国、英国、中国、荷兰4国组成了太平洋抗日联合阵线。），太平洋爆发冲突的可能性大为增加。9月2日，周恩来在中共中央南方局会议上作专门报告，提出美国当时采取拉拢日本脱离轴心国的政策，如果不成功就用谈判的方式进行拖延，但这两种情形都不利于中国抗战。14日，周恩来在南方局会议上针对日美谈判最新进展发表了重要讲话，估计日美有妥协的可能，但“全面妥协还有所待”，认为日本对南进北进都不会放弃。之后日美谈判也逐渐进入不可调和的僵局，这些都充分验证了周恩来关于日美外交进展的判断是正确的。

II. Timely Exposure of the “Oriental Munich Conspiracy”

二、及时揭露“东方慕尼黑阴谋”

In September 1938, Britain, France, and other countries, in order to reach a compromise with German and Italian fascism, did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of Czechoslovakia, concluding the so-called “Munich Agreement.” The CPC believed that this agreement “would lead the fascist countries into launching larger-scale adventurous wars” and, in connection with the reality of China’s War of Resistance, maintained a high degree of vigilance against attempts by domestic and international forces of compromise to brew an “Oriental Munich Conspiracy.” In early 1939, Britain, the United States, and other countries, in order to compromise with Japan, attempted to convene a “Pacific International Conference” that would sacrifice China’s interests. In June, in response to the strong signals of compromise emanating from the Anglo-Japanese negotiations, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee issued a special directive emphasizing “opposition to any form of Oriental Munich.” Although the “Pacific International Conference” was ultimately not convened, the rhetoric of sacrificing China’s interests to appease Japan and pursue a policy of compromise and inducement to surrender persisted and continued to ferment.

1938年9月，英、法等国为与德、意法西斯达成妥协，不惜牺牲捷克斯洛伐克的利益，达成所谓“慕尼黑协定”。中国共产党认为该协定“将引导法西斯各国进行更大规模的冒险战争”，并联系中国抗战实际对国际国内妥协势力企图酝酿“东方慕尼黑阴谋”保持高度警惕。1939年初，英美等国为与日本妥协，企图召开牺牲中国利益的“太平洋国际会议”。6月，为应对当时英日谈判释放的强烈妥协信号，中共中央书记处发布专门指示强调“反对任何形式的东方慕尼黑”。虽然“太平洋国际会议”最终未能召开，但这种牺牲中国利益、迎合日本的妥协和诱降政策的论调却一直存在着并不断发酵。

By April 1941, Japan and the United States were again actively plotting to carry out the “Oriental Munich阴谋” [2]2 The “Oriental Munich阴谋” (Oriental Munich plot) refers to a perceived scheme by Japan, the United States, and Britain, analogous to the 1938 Munich Agreement, to sacrifice Chinese interests to appease Japan and secure a compromise, thereby allowing the Western powers to focus on Europe and potentially turning Japan against the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party., seeking mutual compromise at the expense of China through negotiations, which aroused strong discontent and concern among the Chinese military and civilian population. On April 18, the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out in its political intelligence analysis that the Anglo-American countries were currently actively seeking compromise with Japan while adopting a passive attitude toward aiding China, “and even if Japan merely promises not to go to war with Britain and the United States and not to attack Singapore, they would sacrifice China and the Dutch East Indies without hesitation.” Mao Zedong, in order to expose the “Oriental Munich阴谋,” specially drafted an intra-Party directive, clearly stating that “a new Oriental Munich阴谋, in which Japan and the United States compromise, sacrifice China, and create a situation for opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, is brewing among Japan, the United States, and Chiang Kai-shek.” On May 31, Mao Zedong telegraphed Zhou Enlai, stating that in the West, Britain and the United States were adopting a policy of pressuring Germany to oppose the Soviet Union, while in the East they were adopting a policy of Britain, the United States, Japan, and China reaching a compromise to jointly oppose the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, and that “the tension in the current situation is unprecedented.” The “Oriental Munich阴谋” also deepened the CPC leaders’ concerns about the danger of the Kuomintang government surrendering. In a telegram sent to Georgi Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, at the end of May, the CPC Central Committee emphasized: “The contradictions between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek remain very sharp, but Japan’s dual policy toward the Kuomintang (pressure and enticement) and the capitulationist activities of the pro-Japanese clique and the diehards will inevitably intensify.” In early June, during a conversation with Soviet Ambassador to China Alexander Panyushkin, Zhou Enlai clearly pointed out that the danger of the “Oriental Munich” was increasing daily, and Panyushkin expressed agreement.

到了1941年4月，日美又一次积极谋划施行“东方慕尼黑阴谋”，通过谈判企图以牺牲中国来求得相互妥协，引发中国军民的强烈不满和担忧。4月18日，中共中央在政治情报分析中指出，英美国家当前积极谋求对日妥协而采取消极援华的态度，“甚至只要日本答应不同英美开战，不攻击新加坡，他们即牺牲中国与荷印，亦将在所不惜”。毛泽东为揭露“东方慕尼黑阴谋”专门起草了党内指示，明确指出，“日美妥协，牺牲中国，造成反共、反苏局面的东方慕尼黑的新阴谋，正在日美蒋之间酝酿着”。5月31日，毛泽东致电周恩来，称英美在西方采取迫德反苏的方针，在东方则采取英、美、日、华达成妥协共同反共反苏的方针，“时局之紧张空前未有”。“东方慕尼黑阴谋”也再度加深了中共领导人对国民党政府投降危险的担心。中共中央在5月底给共产国际执行委员会总书记季米特洛夫的电报中强调：“日本和蒋介石之间的矛盾依然很尖锐，但是日本对国民党的两面政策（施压和诱骗）以及亲日派和顽固派的投降活动必然会加强。”周恩来在6月初同苏联驻华大使潘友新谈话时，明确指出当时的“东方慕尼黑”的危险正日益增加，潘友新对此也表示同意。

At the critical moment when the rhetoric of the “Oriental Munich阴谋” was rampant, Zhou Enlai analyzed the situation at the time from the two levels of the mainstream and the undercurrent, elucidating the international environment in which the “Oriental Munich阴谋” was taking shape. On June 1, Zhou Enlai published “On the Undercurrents in the Current Situation” in the *Xinhua Daily*, pointing out that the mainstream of the world war was “the imperialist war moving toward expansion and prolongation, Britain and Germany heading toward a decisive battle, the United States step by step entering actual participation in the war, and the Japanese bandits awaiting an opportunity to advance southward”; the mainstream of the Sino-Japanese War was “the Japanese bandits unfolding a military offensive centered on blockading China, and our entire nation’s military and civilian population adhering to the national policy of united resistance and preparing to use our own strength to drive Japanese imperialism out of China.” Zhou Enlai proposed vigilance against the undercurrents surging in the current situation: in the West, there was an undercurrent of Anglo-German compromise to jointly oppose the Soviet Union, with “the United States being the pivot in this issue,” but the growth of this undercurrent would become increasingly difficult as the Soviet Union’s strength grew; in the East, there was a new undercurrent replacing “direct Sino-Japanese compromise,” namely, the Japan-U.S. “attempt or recognition of the United States as an intermediary to mediate the Sino-Japanese war.” This undercurrent not only had its political foundation within Japan but was also endorsed by a few important politicians in the United States. Zhou Enlai believed that the temporary compromise sought by Japan was merely a smokescreen deliberately released to facilitate its southward advance. He pointed out, “As long as the possibility of Germany cutting off the Suez Canal and blockading the Mediterranean increases day by day, the Japanese bandits’ preparations for armed southward advance will also become increasingly active, and a temporary easing of tensions with the United States will become the smokescreen for their final launch of armed southward advance.”

在“东方慕尼黑阴谋”论调甚嚣尘上的关键时刻，周恩来从主流和暗流两个层面分析了当时的局势，阐明了“东方慕尼黑阴谋”形成的国际环境。6月1日，周恩来在《新华日报》发表《论时局中的暗流》，指出世界战争的主流，是“帝国主义战争正走向扩大和持久，英德走向决战，美国一步一步的进入实际参战，日寇则伺机南进”；中日战争的主流，是“日寇正展开以封锁中国为中心的军事进攻，我全国军民正坚持团结抗战的国策，准备用自己的力量驱逐日本帝国主义出中国”。周恩来提出要警惕当时时局中涌动着的暗流，在西方存在英德妥协共同反苏的暗流，“美国是这个问题中的枢纽”，但这种暗流的增长将随着苏联实力的增强愈发困难；在东方存在代替“中日直接妥协”的新暗流，即日美“企图或承认以美国为中介来调解中日战事”，这股暗流不仅在日本国内有其政治基础，而且也被美国国内少数重要的政治家所赞同。周恩来认为，日本所谋求的暂时妥协不过是为了南进而有意释放的烟幕，他指出，“只要德国切断苏伊士封锁地中海的可能一天天的增加，日寇武力南进的准备也会一天天的积极，对美暂时和缓，将成为他最后发动武力南进的烟幕”。

On June 8, Zhou Enlai published another commentary article specifically discussing Japan’s so-called “dual policy,” analyzing the multiple aims of Japan’s pursuit of the “Oriental Munich阴谋”: at the military level, first seeking to trap China while actively preparing for armed southward advance; at the political level, shifting to making the United States the central target for resolving the China and Pacific issues. Zhou Enlai believed that “the latter is more insidious than the former, and although it is still an undercurrent at present, on the part of the Japanese bandits, this undercurrent is already growing and is no longer entirely a smokescreen but has its political foundation.” How to respond to Japan’s “dual policy”? Zhou Enlai proposed, “We must not only understand the purpose, primary and secondary aspects, and focus of this policy of the enemy, but also understand the complexity and changes in the domestic and international environment the enemy faces, as well as the interconnections and influences between the enemy’s two policies of invading China and advancing southward.” On this basis, he advocated using a “tit-for-tat policy” to counter the aggressive measures Japan adopted under different conditions.

6月8日，周恩来再次发表评论文章专门讨论日本实施的所谓“两面政策”，剖析日本推行“东方慕尼黑阴谋”的多重企图，即在军事层面先谋求困住中国，同时积极准备武力南进；在政治层面则转到以美国为中心对象来解决中国和太平洋问题。周恩来认为，“后者较前更为毒辣，虽然在目前还是暗流，但在日寇方面，这种暗流已在增长，已非完全烟幕作用，而是有其政治基础的”。如何应对日本的“两面政策”？周恩来提出，“不仅要了解敌人这种政策的目的、主从和重心，并且还要了解敌人所处的国内国外环境的复杂和变化，以及敌人在侵华和南进两政策中的相互联系和影响”，在此基础上用“针锋相对的政策”回击日本在不同条件下采取的侵略举措。

In order to smash the “Oriental Munich阴谋,” the CPC called on all parties, especially the United States, not to harbor illusions about compromise with Japan. In its “Manifesto on the Fourth Anniversary of the War of Resistance,” the CPC Central Committee stated that Japan’s “danger of opposing the Soviet Union has indeed grown, but its policy of annihilating China will never be abandoned, and its ambition to advance southward to invade Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and Australia still exists.” On the same day, Zhou Enlai published a commemorative article, “The Fourth Year of July 7th,” in the *Xinhua Daily*, arguing that the international environment had undergone “unprecedented changes” in the past four years and that Japan, facing multifaceted difficulties, had “lost many opportunities.” Zhou Enlai estimated that, with the armed southward advance temporarily shelved, Japan still had the will to reach economic compromises with the United States and Britain, and that some people in the United States and Britain still harbored illusions about Japan, thus creating certain difficulties in aiding China. Zhou Enlai also objectively analyzed the negative impact of U.S. negotiations with Japan, pointing out that the United States must not sacrifice the national interests of Pacific countries, including China. He argued that, especially after the signing of the Atlantic Charter, U.S. negotiations with Japan were “an unwise move” that would “weaken vigilance in the Pacific” and “carry the danger of being greatly deceived by the Japanese bandits.”

为了粉碎“东方慕尼黑阴谋”，中国共产党呼吁各方尤其是美国不应对日本妥协存有幻想。中共中央在《为抗战四周年纪念宣言》中指出，日本“反苏之危险固已增长，灭华之方针则决不放弃，南进以侵犯英、美、荷、澳之野心，亦依然存在”。同日，周恩来在《新华日报》发表纪念文章《“七七”四年》，认为四年来国际环境发生“空前的变化”，日本面临多方面的困难，已“失去许多机会”。周恩来估计，日本在武力南进暂时搁置的情况下，仍存在和美英等国取得经济妥协的意愿，美英等国还有人对日本抱有幻想，因而在援助中国时还存在若干困难。周恩来还客观分析了美国同日本谈判所造成的消极影响，指出美国绝不能牺牲包括中国在内的太平洋各国的民族利益，特别是在《大西洋宪章》签署后，美国同日本谈判是“一件不智之举”，将“减弱太平洋上的戒备”，“有上日寇大当的危险”。

In the process of exposing and smashing the “Oriental Munich阴谋,” Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized the extreme importance of adhering to an independent stance in the War of Resistance and called on the entire nation’s military and civilian population to unite in resisting the powerful enemy. In Zhou Enlai’s view, China’s nationwide War of Resistance had persisted for four years, and China had become an important force in the world anti-fascist camp; the Japan-U.S. negotiations must not affect China’s determination to persist in the War of Resistance. Zhou Enlai pointed out that there were two erroneous views within the country: some people held wavering ideas about the War of Resistance, “impatient with protracted resistance, wavering in the face of enemy enticement to surrender, responding to enemy and puppet provocations, and harboring illusions about international mediation”; others held a view of waiting for victory, “waiting for the enemy to retreat without striving to prepare for a counteroffensive, waiting for foreign aid without emphasizing self-reliance, waiting for the enemy to advance north or south while neglecting our own vigilance, and waiting for a favorable change in the world situation, thus being swayed by others’ joys and sorrows and losing an independent spirit.” Zhou Enlai particularly pointed out that China must adhere to the principle of independent resistance while not opposing “utilizing the contradictions among the imperialist powers,” but it must never passively “place its hopes on and wait for a conflict in the Pacific.”

在揭露和粉碎“东方慕尼黑阴谋”的过程中，周恩来反复强调坚持独立自主抗战立场的极端重要性，号召全国军民团结一致抵御强敌。在周恩来看来，中国的全国性抗战已经坚持了4年，中国已经成为世界反法西斯阵营的重要力量，日美谈判绝不能影响中国坚持抗战的决心。周恩来指出国内存在两种错误论调：一部分人对于抗战存在动摇观念，“对于长期抗战，有些不耐；对于敌人诱降，发生动摇；对于敌伪挑拨，表示响应；对于国际调解，发生幻想”；另一部分人对于抗战则存在等待胜利的观念，“等待敌人撤退，而不努力准备反攻；等待外援，而不重视自力更生；等待敌人南进或北进，而疏忽我们自己的警戒；等待有利于我的世界变局，因而悲喜随人，失去独立自主的精神”。周恩来还特别指出，中国既要坚持独立自主的抗战原则，同时也不要反对“运用帝国主义中间的矛盾”，但决不能被动地“寄其希望和等待太平洋上的冲突”。

III. A Profound Assessment of the Strategic Impact of the Japanese Cabinet Reshuffle

三、深刻研判日本内阁改组的战略影响

On April 13, 1941, after Japan and the Soviet Union signed the Neutrality Pact, Japan began discussing measures to accelerate its southward advance, and countries generally believed that “the possibility of Japan advancing southward was greater.” However, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War on June 22, the possibility of Japan advancing northward increased. At the same time, the differences in the Japan-U.S. negotiations gradually became public and acute. In response to the negotiation proposal submitted by Japan on May 11, the United States formally submitted a counter-proposal on June 21. Regarding this U.S. counter-proposal, a divergence arose within the Japanese cabinet between Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who advocated continuing negotiations with the United States, and Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, who advocated terminating negotiations. The Konoe cabinet then resigned en masse. On July 18, the Konoe cabinet was re-established with a new foreign minister. The Japanese cabinet reshuffle sparked renewed debate within China over whether Japan would advance north or south. Zhou Enlai calmly pointed out: “Now the Japanese bandits’ cabinet has been reshuffled again. Regardless of whether they are actively preparing to advance north, advance south, or advance in both directions, their policy of annihilating China will never change in the slightest, and they will first launch a westward advance. Therefore, we cannot ‘argue every day about whether the enemy will advance north or south, hope every day that the enemy will advance north or south, or even wait every day for the enemy to advance north or south to solve our difficulties.’”

1941年4月13日，日本和苏联签订中立条约后，开始商讨加速南进的举措，各国也普遍认为“日本南进的可能性更大些”。但6月22日苏德战争爆发后，日本北进的可能性增大。与此同时，日美谈判中的分歧逐渐公开化、激烈化。针对日本5月11日提交的谈判议案，美国在6月21日正式提交反对议案。而针对美国这份反对议案，日本内阁中主张与美国继续谈判的首相近卫文麿等人与主张终止谈判的外相松冈洋右发生分歧，近卫内阁于是进行总辞职。7月 18日，更换外相人选的近卫内阁再次上台。日本内阁改组使中国国内在日本会北进还是南进这一问题上再次议论纷纷。周恩来冷静指出：“现在日寇内阁又改组了，不管其是在积极准备北进，或者南进，或者南北并进，但其灭华之方针决不会有任何变更，而且还会先来个西进”，因此，不能“天天争论于敌人究竟北进还是南进，天天希望敌人北进或是南进，甚至天天等待敌人北进或是南进以解决我们困难”。

Soon thereafter, another major change occurred in Japan’s domestic political situation. During negotiations with the United States, Japan was unable to reach a unified position on the core issue of withdrawing troops from China. Within Japan, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who advocated continued negotiations with the United States, was deeply at odds with Army Minister Hideki Tojo and others who insisted on an immediate decision for war or peace. On October 16, the Konoe cabinet resigned en masse because it could not bear responsibility for deciding whether to go to war. On October 18, the Tojo cabinet came to power. Mao Zedong characterized the Tojo cabinet as “a military cabinet that directly prepares for war.” [3]3 The “military cabinet” refers to a Japanese cabinet dominated by active-duty military officers, reflecting the growing influence of the military in Japan’s political decision-making during the 1930s and early 1940s. Combining the domestic war of resistance situation, the Soviet-German war situation, and the progress of Japan-U.S. negotiations, Zhou Enlai predicted that after the new cabinet took office, Japan would inevitably launch new aggressive moves.

不久，日本国内的政治局势再次发生大的变化。日本与美国谈判时，在关于从中国撤兵这一核心议题上始终无法达成统一意见。在日本内部，主张与美国继续谈判的首相近卫文麿，与主张即刻作出和战决策的的陆相东条英机等人存在严重分歧。10月16日，近卫文麿内阁由于无法对是否决定开战负责而进行了总辞职。10月18日，东条英机内阁上台。毛泽东将东条英机内阁定性为“直接准备战争的军人内阁”。周恩来结合国内抗战局势、苏德战争局势、日美谈判进展等，预判新内阁上台后日本必将有新的侵略动向。

On October 19, Zhou Enlai published “The New Crisis in the Pacific” in the *Xinhua Daily*, making a scientific assessment of the adventurist actions Japanese militarists were about to take. Zhou Enlai believed that the Tojo cabinet’s coming to power heralded the arrival of a new crisis in the Pacific: “The scope of the new crisis will by no means stop at a northward advance; the Japanese bandits will inevitably take the occupation of Siberia, the swallowing of the South Pacific, and the resolution of the ‘China Incident’ as their coherent policy.” Zhou Enlai pointed out that the new Japanese cabinet’s assumption of power was the fuse for a new Pacific crisis, which would “push Japan one step further into total war.” It is noteworthy that although Zhou Enlai considered a Japanese northward advance the most likely possibility at the time, he simultaneously emphasized in the article: “Regardless of whether the new Tojo cabinet, after its formation, begins with a northward advance, or first continues negotiations with the United States, or even first makes a southward advance gesture, or first starts by pressuring or even inducing China to surrender, or first begins by resolving its domestic contradictions, its adventurist policy of establishing a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ by force is unshakably determined.” [4]4 The “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was a propaganda concept used by Imperial Japan to justify its expansionist and colonial policies in Asia and the Pacific under the guise of liberating Asian peoples from Western imperialism. Zhou Enlai’s prediction was intended to call on the world anti-fascist camp to be vigilant against the adventurist actions Japanese militarists were about to implement. At the end of the article, Zhou Enlai specifically mentioned that the United States, separated by two oceans, had not yet been directly affected by the flames of war, but “now there is no longer a haven of peace outside the war.” The isolationists within the United States “seek only private gain and feel neither the nation’s crisis nor humanity’s catastrophe.” “Now the Japanese bandits are about to make new adventures in the Pacific. If the United States still stands idly by, then the flames of war in Europe and Asia will merge into one. An isolated United States can never, caught in a pincer attack between the two oceans, preserve the history of its glorious war of independence.”

10月19日，周恩来在《新华日报》发表《太平洋的新危机》，对日本军国主义分子将要采取的冒险行动作了科学研判。周恩来认为，东条英机内阁上台预示着太平洋新危机的到来，“新危机的范围，决不会止于北进，日寇必然是以占领西伯利亚、囊括南太平洋、解决‘中国事变’为其连贯的方针”。周恩来指出日本新内阁上台是太平洋新危机的导火线，将“置日本于全面战争之更进一步”。值得注意的是，周恩来在文章中虽然认为当时日本北进的可能性最大，但同时强调，“不管东条新阁组成后，是先从北进开始，或是先行继续对美谈判，甚至先作南进姿态，或是先从压迫甚至诱降中国入手，或是先从解决其国内矛盾开始，其以武力建立‘东亚共荣圈’的冒险方针，是确定不移的了”。周恩来的预判意在呼吁世界反法西斯阵营应当警惕日本军国主义分子即将实施的冒险行动。在文章最后周恩来特别提到，美国由于隔着两大洋，暂时还没有受到战火的直接影响，但“现在已没有战争以外的世外桃源了”，美国国内的孤立派“只图私利，感觉不到国家的危急，人类的浩劫”，“现在日寇又要在太平洋作新的冒险了，如果美国仍然放任不管，则欧亚的烽火连成一片，孤立的美国决不能在两洋的夹攻之中，再保持其光荣的独立战争的历史了”。

At that time, the U.S. government was also eager to understand the new trends after the new Japanese cabinet took office. In late October, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew reported to the U.S. Secretary of State, mentioning that Tojo would maintain his stable position in the military while also working to bring Japan-U.S. negotiations to a successful conclusion. However, by the end of November, the United States and Japan still had major differences on core issues such as China, and the likelihood of a breakdown in U.S.-Japan negotiations increased sharply. In fact, American personnel were not entirely unaware of Japan’s intention to launch a Pacific war. One month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Grew expressed concern in his report to the U.S. Secretary of State, believing that “Japan’s actions might inevitably lead to armed conflict with the United States, and this could be a dangerous and dramatic surprise attack.” But the U.S. government believed that Japan, bogged down in the Chinese theater and lacking sufficient war resources, could not directly attack the United States in the short term, and thus let down its guard. At this time, some Chinese Communist Party members working in Hong Kong also believed that Japan, relying on the United States for important strategic materials such as oil and cotton, “could not fight without the United States, so it would not dare to touch the United States.” However, Zhou Enlai, based on changes in the situation, promptly predicted that the Pacific War might break out. To this end, before the Pearl Harbor attack, Zhou Enlai specifically contacted Zhang Youyu, who was carrying out united front and cultural work in Hong Kong, stating that war between Japan and the United States might be imminent and requiring him to make corresponding preparations. [5]5 Zhang Youyu (1899–1992) was a Chinese legal scholar and political figure who served as a member of the Chinese Communist Party and worked in Hong Kong on united front and cultural activities during the War of Resistance against Japan.

彼时美国政府也急于了解日本新内阁上台后的新动向。10月下旬，美国驻日大使格鲁向美国国务卿报告时提及：东条英机将保持他在军队中的稳定地位，同时也将致力于使日本与美国的谈判圆满结束。但是到11月底，美国和日本在中国等核心问题上仍存在较大分歧，美日谈判破裂的可能性陡然增加。事实上，美方人员对日本企图发动太平洋战争并非完全没有觉察。在珍珠港事件爆发前一个月，格鲁在向美国国务卿的报告中就曾表示过忧虑，认为“日本采取的行动可能不可避免使其与美国发生武装冲突，而这可能是具有危险性和戏剧性的突然行动”。但美国政府认为，日本陷于中国战场，战争资源供给不足，短期内不可能对美国直接发动攻击，因此放松了警惕。此时在香港工作的部分中共党员也认为日本依赖美国提供石油、棉花等重要战略物资，“离开美国就打不下去，所以不敢碰美国”。但周恩来却根据局势变化，及时预判到太平洋战争可能爆发。为此，周恩来在珍珠港事件爆发前曾专门联系正在香港执行统战、文化工作的张友渔，提出日美之间可能将要爆发战争，并要求其做好相应准备。

IV. Actively Assessing and Responding to the Impact of the Pacific War’s Outbreak on China

四、积极研判和应对太平洋战争爆发对中国的影响

On December 8, 1941 (December 7 local time in Hawaii), Japan launched a surprise attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, and the Pacific War broke out. The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee immediately convened a meeting to specifically discuss the situation after the outbreak of the Pacific War and countermeasures. The Central Secretariat sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai and others, proposing that the Chinese Communist Party’s policy toward Britain and the United States should be to establish a “broad, sincere, anti-Japan and anti-Germany united front.” The Party was to make new deployments in a timely manner in areas such as foreign exchanges, guerrilla warfare, work in Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese work. On December 9, the CPC Central Committee issued a declaration, formally stating the Chinese Communist Party’s political stance on the outbreak of the Pacific War and calling on Chinese military and civilians to mobilize all forces to defeat Japanese fascism. The outbreak of the Pacific War made the Chinese Communist Party realize that it must seize the opportunity to establish a broader international anti-Japanese united front, thereby securing more favorable resources to improve China’s war of resistance situation. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee immediately issued the “Directive on the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front” and the “Directive on Launching the Pacific Anti-Japanese National United Front and Work Among Overseas Chinese,” calling for the establishment of a broad united front of Pacific nations against Japan and fascism, emphasizing that “the united front with Britain and the United States is of particularly great significance.” In accordance with the Central Committee’s directive, Zhou Enlai promptly wrote to the British and American ambassadors to China, “expressing that they would fight side by side with their countries.” To accurately and promptly convey the spirit of the CPC Central Committee’s directive on the outbreak of the Pacific War, Zhou Enlai delivered a situation report on the outbreak of the Pacific War at the Salvation Room of the Eighth Route Army Office in Chongqing. The Southern Bureau also dispatched personnel to provincial special committees in a timely manner to convey the Central Committee’s directives and the Southern Bureau’s deployments. [6]6 The Southern Bureau was the CPC’s regional leadership organ in the Kuomintang-controlled areas during the War of Resistance, responsible for united front work, intelligence, and organizing Party activities in southern China, with its headquarters in Chongqing.

1941年12月8日（夏威夷当地时间为12月7日），日本突袭美国海军基地珍珠港，太平洋战争爆发。中共中央政治局随即召开会议，专门讨论太平洋战争爆发后的时局以及应对策略。中央书记处致电周恩来等人，提出中国共产党对英美的政策应是，建立“广泛的、真诚的、反日反德的统一战线”，党要在对外交往、游击战争、香港工作、华侨工作等方面及时作出新部署。中共中央于12月9日发表宣言，正式表明中国共产党关于太平洋战争爆发的政治立场，呼吁中国军民动员一切力量打倒日本法西斯。太平洋战争的爆发让中国共产党意识到必须顺势建立更加广泛的国际抗日统一战线，从而争取更多有利资源以改善中国抗战状况。因此，中共中央立即发出《关于太平洋反日统一战线的指示》《关于开展太平洋反日民族统一战线及华侨工作的指示》，呼吁建立太平洋各民族反日反法西斯的广泛统一战线，其中强调“对英美的统一战线特别有重大的意义”。按照中央指示要求，周恩来第一时间致函英国和美国驻华大使，“表示将与他们国家并肩作战”。为及时准确传达中共中央关于太平洋战争爆发的指示精神，周恩来在八路军驻重庆办事处救亡室作关于太平洋战争爆发的形势报告。南方局也派工作人员及时赶赴各省特委传达中央的指示和南方局的部署。

After the Pearl Harbor attack, the future direction of the Pacific theater became a key issue of common concern for all parties. On December 14, Zhou Enlai published “The Pacific War and the World War Situation” in the *Xinhua Daily*, systematically expounding the basic grounds for the inevitable ultimate victory of the world anti-fascist war, as well as the weaknesses and difficulties existing in the world anti-fascist camp. Regarding the direction of the war situation, Zhou Enlai believed that the Pacific War in its initial stage would be similar to the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War, the Anglo-German War, and the Soviet-German War, “there will be some setbacks,” but such initial setbacks “are by no means cause for pessimism.” As long as the countries and nations along the Pacific coast were mobilized to persist in the war of resistance, the unfavorable situation in the early stages of the war could be changed. In terms of response measures, Zhou Enlai emphasized that the Pacific War was a protracted war, not a war of quick decision. Japan’s strategic fulcrum was “to rapidly defeat the dispersed main forces of the Anglo-American navies and air forces one by one, so as to swallow up the aforementioned Pacific sphere of activity and plunder its rich resources.” Accordingly, Zhou Enlai proposed targeted measures such as “cannot rashly take the offensive,” “to defeat Japan, the navy is primary, with the air force and army only supplementary,” and “must first consolidate the defense of fortresses within the South Pacific circle.” To deeply understand and grasp the intrinsic connection between the Pacific War and the world war situation, Zhou Enlai pointed out that it was necessary to further recognize the basic characteristics of the world anti-fascist war, summarizing them as long-term nature, unevenness, comprehensiveness, consistency, stage-by-stage nature, and primary-subordinate nature. Proceeding from the essential laws revealed by the world war situation, Zhou Enlai also specifically pointed out that China’s nationwide war of resistance played a key role in pinning down Japanese forces, organizing counteroffensives, and international cooperation, emphasizing that the Pacific anti-Japanese war must use China to “promote the unity of Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, and other countries and nations in the Pacific, and closely link with all anti-aggression countries and nations in the world.” The subsequent development of the Pacific war situation verified the correctness of these predictions and strategies proposed by Zhou Enlai.

珍珠港事件爆发后，太平洋战局的未来动向成为各方普遍关心的重点议题。12月14日，周恩来在《新华日报》发表《太平洋战争与世界战局》，系统阐述了世界反法西斯战争必将取得最终胜利的基本依据，以及世界反法西斯阵营存在的弱点和困难。在战局走向方面，周恩来认为，太平洋战争在初期将和中日战争、英德战争、苏德战争初期类似，“会有若干挫败”，但这种初期的挫败“决不足以悲观”，只要动员起太平洋沿岸的国家和民族坚持抗战，就能够改变战争初期的不利局面。在因应举措方面，周恩来强调太平洋战争是持久战而不是速决战，日本的战略基点是“迅速的各个击破英美分散的海空军主力，以便囊括上述的太平洋活动圈，掠取其中丰富的资源”，据此周恩来提出了“不能冒取攻势”，“解决日本，海军为主，空军陆军只能为辅”，“须先巩固南太平洋圈内要塞的守卫”等针对性措施。为了深刻认识和把握太平洋战争和世界战局的内在关联，周恩来指出，必须进一步认识世界反法西斯战争的基本特点，并将其概括为长期性、不平衡性、全面性、一致性、阶段性和主从性。从世界战局呈现的本质规律出发，周恩来还特别指出，中国全民族抗战在牵制日军、组织反攻、国际合作等方面起到了关键作用，强调太平洋的反日战争必须以中国来“推动英美荷澳及太平洋上其他国家、民族的联合，并密切与世界所有反侵略国家和民族的联系”。此后太平洋战局的发展验证了周恩来作出的这些预判和提出的上述策略的正确性。

Shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War, Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese army. Patriotic figures, cultural figures, and relevant staff of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong urgently needed to be evacuated. Zhou Enlai was deeply concerned about the personnel trapped in Hong Kong and carefully planned the withdrawal. On December 9, Zhou Enlai cabled Liao Chengzhi, analyzing the situation in the early stages of the Pacific War. He believed that the Philippines “would not hold,” that Singapore “might be defensible for a time,” and estimated that the only retreat routes for staff in Hong Kong were “Guangzhou Bay, Dongjiang, and Malaya.” He also instructed Liao Chengzhi to “strive as quickly as possible to negotiate cooperation with the British General Staff.” On December 20, Zhou Enlai again cabled Liao Chengzhi, inquiring about how the cultural figures in Hong Kong were to be settled, whether they had already been evacuated, and whether there were any means of contact with Singapore and the Philippines. In late December, Zhou Enlai also cabled Liao Chengzhi, Pan Hannian, and Liu Shaowen, proposing that patriotic figures in Hong Kong be taken to Macau, then transferred to Guangzhou Bay, and finally concentrated in Guilin. He also requested that personnel be sent to assist Soong Ching-ling, He Xiangning, Liu Yazi, Zou Taofen, Liang Shuming, and others in evacuating Hong Kong. Ultimately, under the cover of the Chinese Communist Party’s underground organizations and the Dongjiang Column, two to three hundred patriotic and cultural figures in Hong Kong, along with their family members and attendants—amounting to over a thousand people in total—successfully completed a safe transfer.

太平洋战争爆发后不久，香港即被日军侵占，在香港的爱国人士、文化界人士和中国共产党的有关工作人员急需转移，周恩来对困留在香港的人员十分关心，精心筹划撤退事宜。周恩来于12月9日致电廖承志，对太平洋战争初期局势进行分析，认为菲律宾“将不保”，新加坡“或可守一时”，估计在港工作人员的退路“只有广州湾、东江和马来亚”，并要求廖承志“尽速争取与英参谋部谈判合作事宜”。12月20日，周恩来再次致电廖承志，询问在香港的文化界人士如何安置、是否已经撤出、新加坡和菲律宾有无联络办法等问题。12月下旬，周恩来还曾致电廖承志、潘汉年、刘少文，提出将在港爱国人士接到澳门，转广州湾后集中至桂林，并要求派人帮助宋庆龄、何香凝、柳亚子、邹韬奋、梁漱溟等人撤离香港。最终在中共地下组织和东江纵队的掩护下，在港的爱国人士和文化界人士二三百人，连同家属和随从人员共计千人以上成功实现了安全转移。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

The international situation in 1941 was complex and rapidly evolving. The Soviet-German War and the Pacific War broke out in succession, profoundly reshaping the pattern of the Second World War in a short period. Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, Zhou Enlai extensively collected and collated information from various sources in Chongqing. Proceeding from the reality of China’s all-out War of Resistance and the overall situation of the world anti-fascist war, he deeply analyzed the internal mechanisms and evolutionary trends of the world war situation, accurately predicted the outbreak of the Pacific War, and made many important decisions by assessing the situation. Zhou Enlai also published a series of commentary articles in newspapers such as the *Xinhua Daily*, conveying to the national military and civilian population—especially the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas—the Chinese Communist Party’s analysis and stance on the current situation. He made predictions about the early trends of the Pacific War, providing a strategic basis for the Party Central Committee to establish the central tasks for 1942 as “accumulating strength, restoring vitality, consolidating the interior, and consolidating the Party, government, military, and people.” Zhou Enlai’s process of predicting and responding to the outbreak of the Pacific War once again confirms that the Chinese Communist Party is adept at grasping the historical trend, scientifically analyzing changes in the international situation, and responding effectively and in a timely manner. It is precisely for this reason that the Chinese Communist Party was able to become the mainstay of China’s all-out national War of Resistance.

1941年国际局势纷繁复杂、快速演变，苏德战争、太平洋战争先后爆发，第二次世界大战的格局在短时间内受到深刻重塑。在党中央领导下，周恩来在重庆广泛搜集整理各方信息，从中国全民族抗战实际和世界反法西斯战争全局出发，深入论证世界战局的内在机理及其演进趋势，准确预判了太平洋战争的爆发，并审时度势采取了许多重要决策。周恩来还在《新华日报》等报刊公开发表一系列评论文章，向全国军民特别是国统区民众传达了中国共产党对时局的分析和立场，作出关于太平洋战争初期走势的预判，为中共中央确立1942年的中心任务为“积蓄力量，恢复元气，巩固内部，巩固党政军民”提供了策略依据。周恩来预判和应对太平洋战争爆发的历程再次验证：中国共产党善于把握历史大势，科学分析国际形势变化并及时有效应对，也正因如此，中国共产党才能成为中国全民族抗日战争的中流砥柱。

(Author: Li Tian, Doctoral Student, Center for Moral Education Research and School of Marxism, Tsinghua University)

（作者：黎田，清华大学高校德育研究中心、马克思主义学院博士生）

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