The Normative Dimension of Marxism

In the theoretical system of Marxism, although concepts such as “practicality,” “class character,” “criticalness,” “revolutionary nature,” “scientificity,” “empirical nature,” and “new materialism” are used to describe its basic properties, there are no terms like “normativity,” “normative dimension,” or “normativism.” At present, in order to respond to the criticisms and misunderstandings of Western Marxism and some Western scholars, and to expand the horizon of Marxist research, it is very necessary to introduce and employ these terms.

在马克思主义的理论系统中，用于描述其基本性质的虽有“实践性”“阶级性”“批判性”“革命性”“科学性”“实证性”“新唯物主义”等概念，但却并没有“规范性”“规范性维度”“规范主义”这样的词汇。当前，为了回应西方马克思主义和一些西方学者的批评与误解，并扩展马克思主义研究视域，很有必要引入和运用这些词汇。

The German Frankfurt School scholar Habermas believes that the normative foundation of Marxism is unclear. There are also views in foreign academic circles that deny the normative dimension and normative content of Marx’s thought and Marxism. In response to this, Chinese Marxists must offer a reply. The author believes that not only does Marxism possess normative content and dimensions, but its normative foundation is also relatively clear.

德国法兰克福学派学者哈贝马斯认为，马克思主义的规范基础是不明确的。国外学界也有观点否定马克思的思想和马克思主义的规范性维度和规范性内容。对此，中国的马克思主义者必须作出回应。笔者认为，马克思主义不仅存在着规范性的内容和维度，而且它的规范基础是比较明确的。

1 What is the Normative Dimension

1 何为规范性维度

To elucidate the normative dimension of Marxism, it is first necessary to clarify what the “normative dimension” is. There are two terms in the fields of philosophy and social science: normativism and descriptivism, also called the normative dimension and the descriptive dimension. For example, in economics, political science, sociology, and law, there exists a debate between normativism and positivism (also called descriptivism). The divergence between the scientistic school and the humanistic school in philosophy also has a tinge of the opposition between positivism and normativism. So, what is the normative dimension or approach? Many explanations at home and abroad seem unclear and incomplete. The author believes that starting from a perspective of “what ought to be” based on a certain set of values, making positive or negative evaluations of corresponding states of what is, and then proceeding to maintain, correct, or reconstruct them—this dimension or approach is the normative dimension.

为了阐发马克思主义的规范性维度，首先必须说清楚什么是“规范性维度”。哲学社会科学领域有两个术语：规范主义和描述主义，也叫规范性维度和描述性维度。例如，在经济学、政治学、社会学和法学等领域，都存在规范主义与实证主义（也叫描述主义）之争。哲学中的科学主义学派与人文主义学派的分歧，也有实证主义与规范主义对立的色彩。那么，什么是规范性维度或进路？国内外诸多解释似乎都不甚明晰、周全。笔者认为，从基于某种价值观的“应然观”出发，对相应的实然性存在，作出肯定或否定的评价，继而进行维护、矫正或重构，这个维度或进路就是规范性的维度。

Why is a dimension starting from a certain perspective of what ought to be considered the normative dimension? Because universally applicable requirements of what ought to be are norms. For example: “Must serve the people wholeheartedly” is a basic norm that public officials should universally abide by. Norms, or universal requirements of what ought to be, arise from corresponding values. Mencius said: “Fish is what I desire; bear’s paw is also what I desire. If I cannot have both, I will forsake fish and take bear’s paw. Life is what I desire; righteousness is also what I desire. If I cannot have both, I will forsake life and take righteousness.” [1]1 Mencius, *Gaozi I*. Here, he lists three valuable things—fish, bear’s paw, and righteousness—evaluates and ranks them; this is Mencius’s value system. From this value system, the necessary choice of what ought to be follows: if multiple values cannot be obtained simultaneously, one should take righteousness and forsake the rest.

为什么从某种应然观出发的维度，就是规范性维度？因为具有普遍性的应然要求就是规范。例如：“必须全心全意为人民服务”这一应然要求，就是国家公职人员应该普遍遵守的基本规范。而规范或者说普遍的应然性要求则产生于相应的价值观。孟子说：“鱼，我所欲也；熊掌，亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍鱼而取熊掌者也。生，亦我所欲也；义，亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍生而取义者也。”在此，他列出了鱼、熊掌和义这三种有价值的东西，并加以评价和排序，这就是孟子的价值观。从这种价值观出发必然得出这样的应然抉择：多种价值若不能兼得，就应该取道义而舍其他。

During the Spring and Autumn period, [2]2 The Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) was a period in Chinese history marked by the decline of the Zhou royal house and the rise of regional states. Confucius, based on the Zhou rites’ stipulation that “the Son of Heaven uses eight rows of dancers for ritual music, feudal lords six rows, high officials four rows, and lesser officials two rows,” [3]3 A reference to the hierarchical regulations of ritual music in the Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–256 BCE). vehemently denounced the transgression of the Lu nobleman Jisun: “Eight rows of dancers performing in the courtyard—if this can be tolerated, what cannot be tolerated?” [4]4 Confucius, *Analects*, Book 3, “Eight Rows” (Bayi). The dimension from which he condemned and criticized the transgressions of Jisun and his ilk is, in modern terms, the normative dimension. The norm underlying this dimension was the Zhou rites (the social normative system of the time), and its value foundation was Confucius’s reverence for the hierarchical relationships based on patriarchal blood ties in the Zhou dynasty. In his words: “The Zhou looks back upon the two preceding dynasties; how rich and refined its culture is! I follow Zhou.” [5]5 Confucius, *Analects*, Book 3, “Eight Rows” (Bayi). In Confucius’s view, the chaos of titles and social order was the cause of the world’s disorder, so he sought to correct the chaos of “a ruler not acting as a ruler, a minister not acting as a minister, a father not acting as a father, a son not acting as a son” and “the people having nowhere to place their hands and feet” [6]6 Confucius, *Analects*, Book 13, “Zilu.” through “rectifying names,” demanding “do not look at what is contrary to ritual, do not listen to what is contrary to ritual, do not speak what is contrary to ritual, do not act contrary to ritual.” [7]7 Confucius, *Analects*, Book 12, “Yan Yuan.” This dimension is the dimension of using norms to correct deviance, abbreviated as the normative dimension.

春秋时期，孔子根据周礼的“天子礼乐用八佾，诸侯六佾，卿大夫四佾，士二佾”，痛斥鲁国大夫季孙氏的僭越行为：“八佾舞于庭，是可忍也，孰不可忍也？”他谴责、批判季孙氏之流僭越行为的维度，用现在的话来说就是规范性维度。这一维度所依据的规范就是周礼（当时的社会规范系统），其价值观基础就是孔子对周代以宗法血缘关系为基础的等级关系的尊崇，用他的话来说就是：“周监于二代，郁郁乎文哉！吾从周。”在孔子看来，名分纲纪乱了是天下大乱的原因，所以他力图通过“正名”来矫正“君不君、臣不臣、父不父、子不子”和“民无所措手足”的乱象，要求“非礼勿视，非礼勿听，非礼勿言，非礼勿动”。这个维度就是以规范矫治失范的维度，简称规范性维度。

This normative dimension also exists widely in daily life. For example, on a bus, if a young person does not give up their seat for an elderly person nearby, another passenger might say to the young person, “You should give this elderly person your seat.” This passenger proceeds from the requirement of what ought to be—“one should give up seats for the elderly, weak, sick, disabled, pregnant, and young on buses”—to criticize and correct the actual situation of the young person’s unwillingness to yield the seat. Here, the judgment of what ought to be is a moral norm.

这种规范性维度，在日常生活中也是广泛存在的。例如，在公交车上有年轻人不给身边的耄耋老人让座，另一乘客就对这位年轻人说，“你应该给这位老人让座”。这位乘客是从“在公交车上应为老弱病残孕幼让座”这一应然要求出发，去批评、矫正年轻人不肯让座这一实然状况的。在此，应然判断就是道德规范。

The normative dimension exists not only in philosophy, social science, and social activities but also in the natural sciences and engineering technology. For instance, at the acceptance inspection of a construction project, inspectors use national or industry technical standards as norms to check project quality, issue a verdict of substandard quality, and order the construction unit to rectify the issues. This is also a normative dimension, and the value system underlying it is the banner slogan often hung high at construction sites: “A project of a century’s duration, quality first.” Therefore, the view of some scholars, such as Habermas, that the natural sciences and technology lack a normative dimension is one-sided.

规范性维度不仅存在于哲学社会科学和社会活动之中，也存在于自然科学和工程技术领域。例如，在某建筑工程验收的场合，验收人员把国家或行业的技术规范作为标准，去检查工程质量，给出质量不合格的鉴定，并责令工程建设单位整改。这也是规范性维度，作为其基础的价值观就是许多建筑工地都高高挂起的横幅大标语：“百年大计，质量第一。”所以，有些学者如哈贝马斯等认为自然科学和技术缺乏规范性维度，是有片面性的。

The other dimension opposed to this normativity is called by some scholars the descriptive dimension, by others the explanatory dimension, and by still others the empirical dimension. The author believes that the term “cognitive dimension” can unify these three expressions. The descriptive dimension makes assertions and descriptions about things themselves. For example: “This summer, the highest temperature in a certain place reached 45 degrees Celsius, and many rivers dried up to their beds.” The explanatory dimension explains events and changes through the investigation and grasp of causal relationships. For example: “Why did the temperature in a certain place reach 45 degrees Celsius this summer? What are the reasons?” The empirical dimension requires providing empirical evidence for assertions and explanations. For example, providing reliable evidence for the assertion and explanation of high temperatures in a certain place. The descriptive, explanatory, and empirical dimensions are three stages of people’s cognition of things, so they can be collectively called the cognitive dimension.

与这种规范性相对的另一种维度，学者们有的称之为描述性维度，有的称之为解释性维度，还有的称之为实证性维度。笔者认为，可用“认知性维度”把这三种表述统一起来。描述性维度对事物本身有所断定，有所描述。例如“今年夏天某地最高气温达45摄氏度，江河多处干涸见底”。解释性维度通过对因果关系的考察和把握，来解释事态和事变。例如“为什么今年夏天某地的气温会高达45摄氏度？原因是什么？”实证性维度要求对断定和解释提供经验性证据。例如，对某地出现高温天气的断言及其解释提供可靠证据。描述性维度、解释性维度和实证性维度是人们对事物认知的三个阶段，所以可统称为认知性维度。

The normative dimension and the cognitive dimension are, in the final analysis, two ways of dealing with things. The former is “viewing things from the perspective of the self,” the latter is “viewing things from the perspective of the things themselves.” The former looks at things “from the side of the subject,” taking the subject as the measure of all things to praise or blame, maintain or change existing things. The latter looks at things according to their original appearance, striving to understand things objectively. These two ways of dealing with things are interdependent. When people have completed the cognition of things, especially after understanding the causal relationships of events, they will consider the positive or negative value of things and events (e.g., some apples are rotten, bitten by insects) for the parties involved (here it is negative value; a total loss of apples would reduce the farmer’s income), and then decide on their actions toward this state (i.e., decision-making and practical operation: should spray pesticides and act immediately). It can be seen that the normative dimension of dealing with things includes not only the dimension of evaluation but also the dimension of practical operation and practice. The academic community usually regards the normative dimension and the descriptive dimension as two methods and two paths of academic research, calling the former the normativist method or path, and the latter the descriptivist or positivist method or path. This view, which neglects the practical and operational aspects of the normative dimension, is one-sided.

规范性维度与认知性维度，说到底就是对待事物的两种方式。前者是“以我观物”，后者是“以物观物”。前者是“从主体的方面”去看待，把主体作为万物的尺度去臧否、维护或改变现存的事物。后者则是按照事物的本来面貌去看待，力图客观地认识事物。对待事物的这两种方式是相互依存的。当人们完成了对事物的认知，特别是在完成事变的因果关系的认识后，就会考虑事物和事变（如有些苹果烂了，虫咬的）对当事人的或正或负的价值（在此是负价值，苹果绝收会减少果农收入），然后决定人们对这种状态的作为（即决策和实操：应喷洒农药并马上行动起来）。可见，对待事物的规范性维度，不仅包含评价的维度，而且包含实操、实践的维度。学界通常把规范性维度和描述性维度看作学术研究的两种方法、两种路径，称前者为规范主义的方法或路径，称后者为描述主义或实证的方法或路径。这种见解，忽视了规范性维度的实操和实践的方面，是有片面性的。

At the same time, we should also see that treating the activities of the cognitive dimension and the activities of the normative dimension as two processes that succeed each other and cycle back and forth is done for the convenience of research and exposition. From a genetic perspective, the most primordial activity of human beings is certainly normative activity driven by desire and need, that is, activity that contacts or changes the external world according to one’s own value scale to satisfy one’s own needs, rather than purely cognitive activity. However, in any normative activity carried out in accordance with subjective requirements, such as in the processes of gathering and hunting, people directly come into contact with the objects of activity, such as mountains, rivers, plants, wild fruits, and wild animals, thereby gaining awareness of the various properties of the objects of activity and their interconnections. It is only after mental labor is separated from physical labor that the separation of normative activity and cognitive activity occurs, that the debate over which comes first arises, and that Hume’s problem is posed. Hume asked: How do we derive “what ought to be” from “what is,” how do we derive norms from facts? The author believes that in history and in reality, these two activities were originally two-in-one, occurring simultaneously in the process of practice; there is simply no situation where one is logically prior to the other, or where one derives from the other. If we observe the activity of a newborn, we will also find that its first activity is certainly not the activity of recognizing the breast, but the active

同时，我们还应看到，把认知性维度的活动和规范性维度的活动，看成两个先后继起、循环往复的过程，是为了研究和叙述的方便。从发生学的角度看，人类最优先的活动，肯定是有欲、有求的规范性活动，即按自己的价值尺度去接触或改变外部世界以满足自己需要的活动，而不是单纯的认知性活动；但在任何按主体性要求而开展的规范性活动中，如采摘和打猎的过程中，人们都会直接接触到活动的对象，如山川、草木、野果、野兽等，从而获得关于活动对象的各种性状及其联系的觉知。只是在脑力劳动从体力劳动中分离出来之后，才有规范性活动和认知活动的分离，才有谁先谁后的争论，才有休谟问题的提出。休谟问道：我们是怎样从“是什么”导出“应如何”的，是怎样从事实导出规范的？笔者认为，在历史和现实中，这两种活动原本就是二位一体、同时发生在实践过程中的；根本就没有一个何者逻辑在先，谁导出谁的情况。如果我们观察新生儿的活动，也会发现它的第一个活动肯定不是认识乳房的活动，而是因饥饿而主动索求和吮吸乳房，进而发生了对乳房的感知。至于有了主体意识以后才产生的从“是什么”到“应如何”的通道，无论是类还是个体，都是在实践中经过反复摸索、试错而建立起来并传递下来的，而且也只有经过实践筛选，才能传递下去。在这期间，与其说是推理在起作用，不如说是基于活动和实践而建立起来的模仿和联想的机制在起作用。例如初民们最初的种植活动就是对自然界植物“是怎样生长”的过程的人工模仿。那时，“应该怎样”就是对“是怎样”的模仿和再造，是对自然的因果关系的模仿和再造，是从简单的模仿和再造到复杂的模仿和再造，直至各种复杂的模仿和再造的任意组合。休谟倒是论述了联想和重复的作用，这是他的贡献，但是他离开人类解决生存问题的劳动与实践，抽象地来思考这个问题，因而就难免陷入困惑之中。

2 The Normative Dimension of Marxism

2 马克思主义的规范性维度

Some Western scholars hold that the normative foundation of Marxism is unclear. Habermas states: “Marx’s theory of society has from the outset lacked a certain clarity in its normative foundations. Marx believed that the ingenious technique he employed—the materialist transformation of Hegelian logic—had already resolved the problem of the normative foundations of social theory.” Habermas repeatedly expressed this view in works such as *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, *Reconstruction of Historical Materialism*, and *The Theory of Communicative Action*. In the debate within domestic and international academic circles over whether Marx addressed issues of justice and morality, a group of scholars—such as the American scholars Allen Wood and Richard Miller—also argue that Marx did not concern himself with questions of justice and morality, nor did he place importance on critique grounded in and premised upon justice and morality. This effectively denies the normative dimension and normative content of Marx’s thought and of Marxism.

有一些西方学者认为，马克思主义的规范基础是不明确的。哈贝马斯说：“马克思主义社会理论的规范基础方面，从最初起就是缺乏某种明晰性。马克思相信自己运用的巧妙的手法，即通过对黑格尔逻辑的唯物主义改造，已经解决了社会理论的规范基础问题。”哈贝马斯在《交往与社会进化》《重建历史唯物主义》《交往行为理论》等著作中，多次表达了这个观点。在国内外学界关于马克思谈不谈正义和道德问题的争论中，有一派学者，如美国学者艾伦·伍德、米勒等也认为：马克思不关注正义和道德问题，不重视以正义和道德为根据和前提的批判。这实际上也是否定马克思的思想和马克思主义的规范性维度和规范性内容。

Habermas contends that to carry out a critique of society, one must proceed from a foundation or standpoint. This foundation or standpoint, as the basis of critique, must be either naturalistic or normative. Marx’s critique of capitalism, he argues, proceeds from the negativity of dialectical logic—i.e., dialectics—and from his description of the laws of capitalist development. Hence, its standpoint or foundation is naturalistic or objectivistic, not normative. Habermas says: “Marx believed that… by forcibly declaring that materialism had taken possession of Hegel’s logical method, he had solved this problem (i.e., become a ‘critical’ theory).” “Marx equated normativity and subjectivity with things that can be perceived and controlled, treating them as identical in nature—both objectified or ‘reified’.” Marx “equated critique with natural science.” In other words, Marx objectified and natural-scientized his theory, thereby dissolving the normative foundation of his critique.

哈贝马斯认为，要开展对社会的批判，必须从一个基础或立足点出发，这个基础或立足点，作为批判的根据，要么是自然主义的，要么是规范主义的；马克思对资本主义的批判是从辩证逻辑即辩证法的否定性和他对资本主义发展规律的描述出发的，所以其立足点或基础是自然主义或客观主义的，而不是规范主义的。他说，“马克思曾认为，他……强行宣布唯物主义占有了黑格尔的逻辑学方法，就似乎解决了这个问题（即成了‘批判的’理论）”“马克思把规范性和主体性与可以感知和可以控制的事物相提并论，认为它们的性质是一样的，都是客观化或‘具体化’的”，马克思“把批判和自然科学等量齐观”。也就是说，马克思把他的理论客观化、自然科学化，从而消解了其批判的规范基础。

Habermas asserts that Marx “thought… it was enough to critique… the normative content of bourgeois theory, i.e., the normative content of modern natural law and political economy,” and that Marx “must not have specifically studied this problem”—namely, the problem of the normative foundations of social theory. Consequently, Marx’s social theory loses its normative foundation, or at least remains unclear: “When bourgeois ideals… lose their efficacy, the norms and values that immanent critique seemed able to employ also cease to exist.” This means that Marx negated the normative content of bourgeois theory, yet lacked his own research into the normative foundations of social theory. Thus, he did not proceed from some clear norm or value to critique capitalism, but instead, by means of materialist dialectics and in accordance with the inevitable tendencies of historical development, naturalistically negated capitalism.

哈贝马斯断言，马克思“认为……批判……资产阶级理论的规范内容，即现代自然法和政治经济学的规范内容……就够了”，而马克思又“必定没有专门研究过这个问题”即社会理论的规范基础问题，于是马克思的社会理论就失去规范基础，至少是不明确的，即“当资产阶级的理想……失去作用时，内在批判似乎能够使用的规范和价值也就不存在了”。这也就是说，马克思否定了资产阶级理论的规范内容，而自己对社会理论的规范基础又缺乏研究，所以他不是从某种清晰的规范和价值出发，去批判资本主义的，而是借助唯物辩证法并根据历史发展的必然趋势，自然主义地否定资本主义的。

I cannot agree with this view. I maintain that the normative foundation and normative dimension of Marx’s thought and of Marxism do exist and are relatively clear. Before and after the transformation of Marx’s worldview, the normative foundations—or normative dimensions—on which his critique relied were different. For example, his critique of the Prussian censorship system during his *Rheinische Zeitung* period, and his critique of the bourgeoisie that suppressed the workers during the Paris Commune period, relied on different normative foundations. The former stood on the ground of the rising bourgeoisie, the latter on the ground of the working class. Moreover, after the completion of his worldview transformation, in different historical periods, or in the same period when dealing with different objects, the normative foundations or dimensions of Marx’s social critique also varied. For instance, during the Opium War, his critique of the British colonizers and his critique of the corrupt Qing dynasty had different starting points: the former stood on the ground of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, the latter on the ground of “modernity.” However, regardless of the differences across periods, two commonalities run through them all: first, taking the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the working people, and the proletarian values that express those interests, as the value cornerstone, and taking the grasp of the objective laws and developmental tendencies of history as the scientific cornerstone, fusing these two cornerstones to form the revolutionary ideal (the view of what ought to be) of Marxism concerning how the future society and its economy, politics, and culture should be; second, proceeding from a revolutionary ideal distinct from the fantasies of utopian socialism, appealing to both theoretical weapons and material weapons (the workers’ movement), to evaluate, critique, and deconstruct the actual state of capitalist society and bourgeois ideology (including its normative content), and to strive for the construction of socialism and communism.

对此笔者不敢苟同。笔者认为马克思的思想和马克思主义的规范性基础、规范性维度是存在的，而且比较明确。在马克思世界观转变前后，他的批判所依据的规范基础或者说规范性维度是不一样的。例如，他在莱茵报时期对普鲁士书报检查制度的批判，和他在巴黎公社时期对镇压工人的资产阶级的批判，二者所依据的规范性基础是有区别的。前者站在新兴资产阶级的立场上，后者站在工人阶级的立场上。而在世界观转变完成之后的各个不同历史时期，或在同一时期对待不同对象，马克思社会批判的规范性基础或维度也是有差异的。例如，鸦片战争期间，他对英国殖民者的批判，和他对腐朽的清王朝的批判，二者的出发点就是不一样的，前者是站在中华民族、中国人民的立场上，后者则是站在“现代性”的立场上。但是，不管各时期的差异有多大，有两个共性贯穿始终：一是以无产阶级和劳动人民的根本利益和作为该利益之表达的无产阶级价值观为价值基石，以对历史的客观规律和发展趋势的把握为科学基石，融合这两大基石而形成马克思主义关于未来社会及其经济、政治、文化应如何的革命理想（应然观）；二是从有别于空想社会主义之空想的革命理想出发，既诉诸理论武器也诉诸物质武器（ 工人运动），对资本主义社会的实然状态，和资产阶级的意识形态（包括其规范性内容）进行评价、批判和解构，为社会主义、共产主义的建构而奋斗。

The first commonality refers to the foundation, basis, and starting point from which Marxists engage in critique and construction—it is the goal of Marxists’ struggle. The second commonality refers to the actual objects and their ideologies that Marxists’ theoretical and practical activities must critique, and the new world that Marxists must construct. This is the normative foundation or normative dimension of Marxism and of Marxists’ social critique and social construction—that is, the normativity of Marxism. This normative foundation or normative dimension is the unity of Marxist values and the view of what ought to be (the revolutionary ideal). The basis of this foundation is the organic unity of the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the objective laws of history. Its characteristics are the unity of theoretical critique and “material” critique, the unity of moral critique and critique by force of arms. Its theoretical contribution and practical achievement lie in transforming socialism from utopia into science, from ideal into reality.

第一个共性说的是马克思主义者从事批判和建构的基础、依据和出发点，是马克思主义者的奋斗目标；第二个共性说的是马克思主义者的理论活动与实践活动所要批判的实然对象及其意识形态，和马克思主义者所要建构的新世界。这就是马克思主义和马克思主义者的社会批判和社会建构的规范性基础或规范性维度，也就是马克思主义的规范性。这个规范基础或规范性维度是马克思主义的价值观和应然观（革命理想）的统一；这个基础的基础是无产阶级的根本利益和历史发展规律的有机统一；其特点是理论的批判和“物质”的批判的统一，道德的批判和武器的批判的统一；其理论上的贡献和实践中的成就是使社会主义从空想变成科学，从理想变成现实。

Thus it can be seen that the normativity, normative foundation, and normative dimension of Marxism refer to Marxism’s value pursuit and lofty ideals; they refer to Marxism’s class character, practical character, critical character, revolutionary character, constructive character, and their relationship with its scientific character; they refer to the unity of Marxism’s value measure and scientific measure, and the unity of its ought-measure and objective measure, in understanding and transforming the world. It is from this foundation that Marxists proceed to critique and deconstruct capitalism, and to praise and construct socialism and communism. It can also be said that this is a logical progression and practical process that, based on the interests of the proletariat and a scientific view of history, proceeds from Marxism’s values and ought-conception, critiques everything that violates the interests of the proletariat and the laws of history, upholds everything that conforms to the interests of the proletariat and the laws of history, and builds a “community of free individuals” that accords with the laws of history and the interests of the proletariat and all humanity.

由此可见，马克思主义的规范性、规范基础和规范性维度，说的就是马克思主义的价值追求和远大理想，说的就是马克思主义的阶级性、实践性、批判性、革命性、建设性及其与科学性的关系，说的就是马克思主义认识世界、改造世界的价值尺度和科学尺度的统一、应然尺度与客观尺度的统一。马克思主义者就是从这一基础出发去批判、解构资本主义，颂扬、建构社会主义和共产主义的。也可以这样说：这是一个以无产阶级利益和科学历史观为基础，从马克思主义的价值观和应然观出发，批判违背无产阶级利益和历史规律的一切，维护符合无产阶级利益和历史规律的一切，建设符合历史规律和无产阶级及全人类利益的“自由人联合体”的逻辑进路和实践过程。

Marx provided a fairly full exposition of this dimension in which the subject treats the object with its own value measure and ought-measure. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, his critique of the alienation of labor and the alienation of man took as its basis and starting point the stark contrast between how labor, as the essence of man, “ought to be” and how capitalist labor actually “is.” In the same work, he also pointed out: “An animal builds only according to the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to produce according to the standard of any species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Hence man also builds according to the laws of beauty.” Here, the inherent standard is the value standard, and the standard of beauty is the unity of the subject’s standard and the object’s standard. In the *Theses on Feuerbach* of 1845, Marx criticized old materialism for not understanding the object “from the side of the subject” and not from the side of practice; this is precisely the normative dimension of the subject, and it highlights the practical element within the normative dimension. In *Capital* of 1867, Marx pointed out: “What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labor process, a result emerges which had already existed in the worker’s imagination at the beginning, that is, had already existed ideally.” That is to say, before construction begins, the architect forms a conceptual model of the building (such as a blueprint) in his mind; can blueprints and models be imagined arbitrarily? No, they can only be designed by the architect according to certain technical norms and technical standards. This is the dimension of technical norms in conceptual design and practical operation. Therefore, although Habermas criticized Marx with good intentions and sought to remedy what he saw as the inadequacy of Marxism’s normative foundation, the author believes that this criticism is clearly inconsistent with the facts, and moreover, Habermas denies the normative dimension of science, technology, and engineering.

对于主体以自己的价值尺度、应然尺度去对待客体的这一维度，马克思是有过比较充分的论述的。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，他对劳动异化和人的异化的批判，就是把作为人之本质的劳动本来“应如何”而资本主义劳动的实际“却如何”的巨大反差，作为依据和出发点的。在该书里，他还指出：“动物只是按照它所属的那个种的尺度和需要来建造，而人懂得按照任何一个种的尺度来进行生产，并且懂得处处都把内在的尺度运用于对象；因此，人也按照美的规律来构造。”在此，内在的尺度就是价值尺度，美的尺度就是主体尺度和客体尺度的统一。在1845年《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中，马克思批判旧唯物主义对客体“不是从主体方面去理解”，不是从实践去理解，这就是主体的规范性维度，而且突出了规范性维度中的实践要素。在1867年的《资本论》中，马克思指出：“最蹩脚的建筑师从一开始就比最灵巧的蜜蜂高明的地方，是他在用蜂蜡建筑蜂房以前，已经在自己的头脑中把它建成了。劳动过程结束时得到的结果，在这个过程开始时就已经在劳动者的想象中存在着，即已经观念地存在着。”也就是说，建筑师在施工之前，就在头脑里形成了建筑的观念模型（如图纸）；图纸和模型能够随心所欲地想象出来吗？不能，它只能是建筑师根据一定的技术规范和技术标准设计出来的。这就是观念设计和实践操作的技术规范维度。所以，哈贝马斯尽管是抱着善意来批评马克思的，并力图弥补他所谓的马克思主义规范基础不明确的不足，但笔者认为他的这一批评显然是不合乎实际的，况且他还否认了科学技术工程的规范性维度。

It must be emphasized that the normativity of Marxism and its scientific character are two qualities that are both essentially distinct and mutually interdependent. The normativity of Marxism, or its values and ought-conception (ideals) that embody its class character, and the critical, revolutionary, and constructive character based on them, would fall into the rut of utopian socialism and ethical socialism if separated from its scientific character and from the grasp of the laws of historical development. Marxists, for their part, never speak glibly of value neutrality, never claim that their research is unrelated to values or interests, but openly declare that their doctrine is the ideological weapon of the proletariat. On this, Marx said: “Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy.” Engels also gave a brilliant summary in his book *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*: “The more ruthlessly and disinterestedly science proceeds, the more it finds itself in harmony with the interests and aspirations of the workers. The new school, which discovered the key to the understanding of all social history in the development of labor, was from the outset directed primarily to the working class and found in it the sympathy which it neither sought nor expected from official science.” That is to say, Marxism is a science; as a science, it is oriented toward the working class, it shares the feelings of the working class, and it is the unity of scientific character and class character (the foundation of normativity). In short, the normativity of Marxism is interdependent with its scientific character, and Marxism as a science serves the fundamental interests of the proletariat.

必须强调的是，马克思主义的规范性与它的科学性是既有本质区别又相互依存的两种性质。马克思主义的规范性，或者说它的体现其阶级性的价值观与应然观（理想），和以之为基础的批判性、革命性、建构性，离开了它的科学性，离开了对历史发展规律的把握，就会陷入空想社会主义和伦理社会主义的窠臼；而马克思主义者也从不奢谈价值中立，从不标榜自己的研究与价值无涉、与利益无涉，而是公开宣布自己的学说是无产阶级的思想武器。对此，马克思是这样说的：“哲学把无产阶级当作自己的物质武器，同样，无产阶级也把哲学当作自己的精神武器。”恩格斯在《路德维希·费尔巴哈与德国古典哲学的终结》一书中也有过精辟的概括，他说：“科学越是毫无顾忌和大公无私，它就越符合工人的利益和愿望。在劳动发展史中找到了理解全部社会史的锁钥的新派别，一开始就主要是面向工人阶级的，并且从工人阶级那里得到了同情，这种同情是它在官方科学那里既没有寻找也没有期望过的。”也就是说，马克思主义是科学，作为科学，他是面向工人阶级的，是与工人阶级情感相通的，是科学性和阶级性（规范性之根基）的统一。总之，马克思主义的规范性是与科学性互相依存的，而马克思主义作为科学又是为实现无产阶级的根本利益服务的。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗