The Western Tradition, Core Orientation, and Intellectual Effects of Marx’s Thought on Community

The English word “community” can be traced back to the Latin “communis,” meaning “universal” or “common.” “Community” can be understood as a living organism bound together by some common tie. Its German expression is “Gemeinschaft.” Marx did not give a clear definition of the thought on community in his classical texts; his reflections on the issue of community are scattered across the literature from various periods of his life. It was on the basis of profound theoretical reflection on philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, combined with the practical problems encountered in his work as a newspaper editor and in his participation in the international workers’ movement, that he gradually formed his own scientific understanding of community. Studying Marx’s thought on community requires placing it within the long history of the Western lineage of thought on community, tracing its Western intellectual tradition forward in time, while also taking into account the theoretical forms of contemporary Western thought on community, as well as China’s inheritance, development, and periodic elaboration of Marx’s thought on community, so as to deepen the study of Marx’s thought on community and seek a possible path to a genuine community.

“Community”(共同体)这一英文词最早可追溯为拉丁文“communis”，意指“普遍”“共同”，“Community”可以理解为由某种共同的纽带联结起来的生活有机体。它的德文表述是“Gemeinschaft”。马克思在经典文本中并没有对共同体思想下一个明确的定义，对共同体问题的思考散见于他本人生平各个时期的文献。他是在对哲学、政治经济学、科学社会主义进行深刻理论思考，综合在从事报刊编辑工作以及参与国际工人运动过程中遇到的现实问题的基础上，逐步形成了自己关于共同体的科学认识。研究马克思的共同体思想，需要将其放在西方共同体思想谱系的长期历史中加以考察，向前溯源其西方思想传统，同时兼顾当下的西方共同体思想的理论形态，以及中国对马克思共同体思想的继承、发展和阶段性阐发，深化马克思共同体思想研究，寻求通达真正共同体的可能性路径。

I. The Inner Architecture of the Western Lineage of Thought on Community before Marx

一、马克思之前西方共同体思想谱系的内在架构

A historical investigation of the lineage of thought on community must be carried out across the long historical stages of Western philosophy. Philosophers from different periods formed various distinctly characterized ideas of community. The ancient Greek philosophers represented by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle developed the early “moral community” thought in the history of philosophy. After this, the status of “contract” in the understanding of community gradually became prominent, giving rise to the richly connoted thought of “contractual community.” In modern times, reason gradually rose to prominence, promoting the formation of community thought centered on Kant’s “right,” Hegel’s “ethical life,” and Feuerbach’s “love.” The thought on community represented by the utopian socialists, from a standpoint of resolute criticism of capitalism, articulated their own utopian theoretical fantasies about a future society. Looking back at the many aforementioned theories of community with their respective theoretical characteristics, although each has its own features, they also share an inherent theoretical architecture.

对共同体思想谱系的历史考察需要在西方哲学史的漫长历史阶段上展开，不同时期的哲学家对共同体的认识形成了诸种特点鲜明的共同体思想，以苏格拉底、柏拉图、亚里士多德为代表的古希腊哲学家形成了哲学史上早期的“道德共同体”思想。在这之后，“契约”在共同体认识中的地位逐渐凸显，形成了内涵丰富的“契约共同体”思想。近代以来，理性逐渐高扬，推动了以康德的“法权”、黑格尔的“伦理”和费尔巴哈的“爱”为核心的共同体思想的形成。以空想社会主义者为代表的共同体思想在坚决批判资本主义的立场上阐明了自身对于未来社会的乌托邦式的理论幻想。纵观前述诸多各具理论特征的共同体思想，虽然各具特征，但也存在着自身内在的理论架构。

The elaboration of the relationship between the individual and the community forms the logical main thread of thought on community. Community is essentially a whole composed of countless individuals. Whether in a philosophical or a biological sense, the individual is subordinate to the whole, subordinate to the community. This seemingly deterministic view not only became a core topic of political philosophical inquiry but also an unavoidable logical thread on which thought on community relies for its construction. In the “moral community,” members of the various strata constituting the city-state community must possess certain specific moral qualities. Whether wisdom, courage, or temperance, they all ultimately point to the universal principle of the “highest good.” Rather than saying that the political idea of the “philosopher-king” is a theoretical design by the city-state for a harmonious and stable political structure, it is better to say that it embodies the city-state as a collection of the individual’s moral concept of the “highest good.” In the second-best ideal state, where law holds a dominant position, Plato did not abandon his examination of individual morality: “When the constitution is framed, I believe they will look to both ends: one end upward, toward the eternal true, beautiful, just, and temperate, and so on; the other end downward, to see whether the public virtue corresponds to this…” This shows that, in whichever ideal state, it is a matter of reaching upward toward the supreme moral community of the “highest good” and reaching downward to constrain the moral level of individuals in the city-state community in order to maintain the community’s operation. In the “divinely ordained contractual community,” Augustine pointed out: “God extended the Roman Empire and its glory not only to reward earthly people, but also for the eternal citizens of the City of God who are still on pilgrimage.” The earthly city is a reflection of and subordinate to the City of God; earthly people are still “eternal citizens on pilgrimage” in the City of God, which still embodies a relationship of individual subordination to the whole. It can be seen that, in the medieval philosophical horizon, thought on community, like philosophy itself, could hardly transcend the barriers of theology. In comparison, the thought of the “social contract community,” because of its more profound human characteristics, is more characteristic of contractual community thought. Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, pointed out the difference between animals and humans: “The ability of animals to act in concert is their biological natural attribute, while human concert is achieved only through contract, which is artificial. Therefore, beyond the contract, something else is necessarily required to make the agreement between people lasting and durable; this something is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions for the common benefit.” This statement fully demonstrates the necessity of public power in the operation of the state and society. Then, the emergence of a powerful public power not only signifies the unification of individual rights by the public will but also, to a greater extent, plays a role in constraining individual social behavior. In modern times, thought on community has increasingly emphasized the examination of this relationship. The core concept of Hegel’s “ethical community,” “absolute ethical life,” reflects the relationship or order between individuals and between the individual and the whole. The various “powers” (Potenz) of ethical life determine the elevation or degradation of this relationship, and these powers of ethical life, in their state of reality and complete totality, manifest as different classes whose interests need to be reconciled. The external form of the absolute power of the government guided by absolute ethical life “lies in its not belonging to any class,” ultimately manifesting as a kind of powerful absolute power that, as the collection of virtues (freedom and justice), can reconcile the various classes.

个人与共同体关系的阐发形成了共同体思想的逻辑主线。共同体本质上是由无数个体组成的整体，无论是在哲学意义上还是在生物学意义上，个体都从属于整体，从属于共同体。这种看似决定论的观点不仅成为政治哲学研究展开的核心议题，也是共同体思想赖以构建且无法回避的逻辑主线。在“道德共同体”中，构成城邦共同体的各个阶层的成员必须具备某种特定的道德品质，无论是智慧、勇敢还是节制，最终指向的都是“至善”的普遍原则，与其说“哲学王”的政治思想是城邦对和谐稳定的政治架构的理论设计，倒不如说体现了城邦是个体“至善”道德观念的集合。在法律占统摄地位的第二等理想国中，柏拉图也没有放弃对个体道德的考察，“等待宪法制定好后，我相信，他们必定会查看两端，一端向上看，向永恒的真、美、正义和节制等看齐;一端向下看，察看公众的德行是否与此相符……”这表明，无论在哪一等理想国中，都是向上追求“至善”的至高道德共同体，向下约束城邦共同体中的个体的道德水平以维持共同体的运转。在“神定契约共同体”中，奥古斯丁指出:“上帝这么扩张罗马帝国和她的荣光，不仅是为了赏赐尘世的人们，而且也是为了上帝之城的那些尚在羁旅中的永恒公民。”尘世之城是上帝之城的映射和从属，尘世的人们还是上帝之城“尚在羁旅中的永恒公民”，体现的仍然是一种个体对整体的从属关系。可以看到，在中世纪的哲学视域中，共同体思想与哲学一样，同样难以逾越神学的藩篱。与之相比，“社会契约共同体”思想因其具有的属人特征更为深刻，所以更具有契约共同体思想的特质。霍布斯在《利维坦》中指出动物和人的区别在于:“动物能够协同一致地行动是其生物学意义上的自然属性，而人类的协同一致则只是根据契约来达成，契约是人为的。因此，在契约之外必然还需要某种其他东西来使人与人之间的协议关系巩固而持久，这种东西便是使大家畏服并指导其行动以谋求共同利益的共同权力”。这一表述充分论证了公共权力在国家和社会运行中的必要性，那么，一个强大的公共权力出现，不仅意味着公共意志对个体权利的统一，更大程度上起到了约束个体社会行为的作用。近代以来，共同体思想更加强调对这种关系的考察，黑格尔的“伦理共同体”的核心概念“绝对伦理”反映的就是个体与个体、个体与整体之间的关系或秩序，伦理的诸次“幂”(Potenz)决定了这一关系的升格与降格，而伦理的诸次幂在自身的实在性与完满的整体性状态下就表现为不同的阶级，这些阶级的利益需要协调。而绝对伦理指引下的政府“的绝对权力的外在形式在于，它不属于任何阶级”，最终表现为一种强有力的绝对权力，作为德性的集合(自由和正义)，才能够协调各个阶级。

The gradual separation of the concepts of “community” and “state” is their historical trend. In early Western intellectual history, no philosopher specifically distinguished between the concepts of “state” and “community”; rather, “community” was interpreted as a synonym for “state,” and the two concepts remained intertwined. It was not until Kant that a conceptual differentiation between “community” and “state” was achieved, and this distinction largely influenced later philosophers in treating “community” as a more complete concept, either logically superior to “state” or encompassing “state” in its connotation and extension. Kant’s thought on the “community of right,” on the basis of fully considering the moral imperative, thoroughly defined the concepts of “public right” and “community” from the perspective of the theory of right, stating: “The sum total of those laws that need to be promulgated in order to bring about a rightful condition is called public right.” [5]5 Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 89. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English source.] Citizens unite with one another in this rightful condition, and the state in which the whole of citizens relates to the citizens themselves is the state (civitas). The concept of community is built upon these concepts: “The state, by virtue of its form, as that which unites all through the common interest of living in a rightful condition, is called a commonwealth (respublica latius sic dicta) [the state in the broader sense] …” [6]6 Ibid., p. 90. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English source.] It can be seen that community was not a question Kant explicitly considered, but rather a related understanding that arose when he was thinking about issues of right. In his view, the state is the form in which individuals in a civil condition unite, with the aim of “sharing what is just,” while the so-called “state in the broader sense” reflects the theoretical significance of “community” as superior to “state” in Kant’s perspective; in other words, “community” is the essence, and “state” is merely one of its external forms. Kant emphasized that the key factor in constructing “community” points to common interest, and the inner meaning of this common interest is that all people live under a condition of public right, focusing on the foundational role or external constraining effect of public right on the construction of community. It must be clarified that public right here is a category of political philosophy that exists in opposition to private right under the state of nature, but the two are not completely opposed. Kant required that under the condition of public right, the interests of private right be fully unified, because this is the necessary path for the realization of individual freedom. Taken together, Kant’s thought on the “community of right” demands both the self-constraint of the individual’s inner moral imperative and the external condition of public right in which all individuals live together and share resources. On the basis of the “contractual community,” it further highlights the role of the legal system. Before Kant, whether in the discussion of polis politics within the thought of the “moral community” or the earthly city and public power in the thought of the “contractual community,” “community” never broke free from the external form of the “state.” Only after Kant did “community” acquire a conceptual position distinct from and superior to the “state.” Engels pointed out in his “Letter to August Bebel”: “The anarchists have mocked us enough with the phrase ‘people’s state’ … When the proletariat still needs the state, it needs it not for freedom, but for the suppression of its enemies, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such ceases to exist. Therefore, we propose that the word ‘state’ be replaced everywhere by the word ‘community’ (Gemeinwesen), a good old German word that corresponds to the French word ‘commune.’” [7]7 Friedrich Engels, “Letter to August Bebel,” March 18-28, 1875, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 24 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), p. 71. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English source.] In this document, closely related to Marx’s *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Engels clearly expressed the view of rejecting the use of the concept of “state” and instead using the concept of “community” for theoretical research. Even setting aside the influence of context, it is not difficult to conclude that for Marx and Engels, the concept of “community” was actually superior to the concept of “state” within their theoretical system.

“共同体”与“国家”概念的逐渐分离是其历史趋势。在早期西方思想史上，没有哪一个哲学家专门对“国家”和“共同体”两种概念做出区分，只是将“共同体”作为“国家”的同义语进行阐释，“共同体”和“国家”始终处于概念互相缠绕的状态。直到康德那里，才实现了“共同体”和“国家”概念上的鉴别，这种分野很大程度上影响了后来的哲学家将“共同体”作为逻辑层次高于“国家”或者内涵外延包含“国家”的更加完满的概念。康德的“法权共同体”的思想在充分考虑道德律令的基础上，从法权论的角度对“公共法权”和“共同体”的相关概念进行了充分的界定，指出:“为产生一个法权状态而需要给公之于众的那些法律的总和，就叫做公共法权。”公民在这种法权状态下彼此联合，公民的整体与公民本身相关的状态是国家(civitas)。而共同体的概念建立在这些概念之上，“国家由于其形式，作为通过所有人生活在法权状态之中这一共同利益联合起来的，被称为共同体(respublicalatiussicdicta)［广义的国家］……”可以看到，共同体不是康德明确在考虑的问题，而是他在思考法权相关问题时马克思共同体思想的西方传统、核心指向与思想效应产生的相关认识。在他看来，国家是公民状态的个体联合起来的形式，目的是为了“分享正当的东西”，而所谓的“广义的国家”又反映出“共同体”在康德的视域中表现出的高于“国家”的理论意义，或者说，“共同体”是本质，“国家”仅仅是其外在形式之一。康德强调“共同体”构建的关键因素指向共同利益，这一共同利益内在的意蕴是所有人生活在公共法权状态之下，关注公共法权对共同体构建的基础性作用或者外在约束效能。需要明确，这里的公共法权是与自然状态下私人法权相对而存在的政治哲学范畴，但二者不是完全对立的，康德要求在公共法权状态下需要将私人法权的利益充分统一，因为这是个体自由实现的必要路径。综合来看，康德的“法权共同体”思想既要求个体内在的道德律令的自我约束，又外在要求所有个体共同生活、共同分享资源的公共法权状态，在“契约共同体”的基础上，进一步突出了法律体系的作用。康德之前，无论是“道德共同体”思想中对城邦政治的论述、还是“契约共同体”思想的尘世之城和公共权力，“共同体”都没有脱离“国家”的外在形态，只有在康德之后，“共同体”才获得了区别于“国家”又高于“国家”的概念定位。恩格斯在《给奥·倍倍尔的信》中指出:“无政府主义者用‘人民国家’这个名词把我们挖苦得很够了……当无产阶级还需要国家的时候，它需要国家不是为了自由。而是为了镇压自己的敌人，一到有可能谈自由的时候，国家本身就不再存在了。因此，我们建议把‘国家’一词全部改成‘共同体’(Gemeinwesen)，这是一个很好的古德文词，相当于法文的‘公社’。”恩格斯在这篇与马克思《哥达纲领批判》具有密切联系的文献中，明确表达了排斥使用“国家”这个概念，而使用“共同体”这一概念进行理论研究的观点。即使排除语境的影响，也不难得出在马克思、恩格斯那里“共同体”概念在他们的理论体系中实际上是高于“国家”概念的。

The anticipation of an ideal society is inherent in the process of constructing the thought on community. The inner meaning of the genealogy of community thought lies in the anticipation of a future ideal society, and as the thought on community develops and evolves, it reflects increasingly concrete manifestations. In his *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men*, Rousseau expressed his expectation for community: “I would wish to be born in a country where the sovereign and the people have the same interest, so that all the actions of the government always aim at the common good.” [8]8 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 3, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), p. 52. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English source.] It is not difficult to see that this conception was still relatively simple and crude, because the sole criterion it contained was merely the common interest in the sense of the alignment of the interests of the sovereign and the people. In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau developed this understanding further. He argued that in early human society, for the despot, there was a great difference between conquering a group of people and governing a society; what determined this difference was whether there existed a common interest between them. Common interest is the basis for the formation of the contractual community, and the purpose of entering into the contract is to shape a public will that coordinates interests. “This public person, which is thus formed by the union of all the individual persons, was formerly called the city, and is now called the republic or the body politic.” [9]9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 61. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English source.] Thus, Rousseau’s conception of the future society was a question of how to shape the public will on the basis of common interest. The 19th-century French utopian socialists pointed out that the future society should be built on the foundation of large-scale industry, and at the same time, their predictions and fantastical descriptions of the future society contained many positive conclusions related to the ideal form of community. Saint-Simon proposed that establishing a political society that allows all its members to obtain the greatest happiness requires two conditions: first, the members of the lowest class in society must raise their level of civilization to the point where other classes recognize their qualification as members of society, and the standard of civilization here is that the proletarians can manage their own property, with the inherent premise being a revolution in the relations of property that enables the proletarians to own their own property; second, establish a supreme system of public welfare that stands above all other systems, and under the guidance of this system, establish a social organization beneficial to the greatest number of people. Owen linked the construction of the ideal society with human liberation, pointing out that the theoretical orientation inherent in human liberation is that people “enjoy true freedom in both body and mind!” [10]10 Robert Owen, *A New View of Society and Other Writings* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 248. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English source.] On the one hand, in the future community, work that is overly exhausting or harmful to human nature will be widely performed by machines or technology, and machines and technology will be regarded as the only slaves of future human society. On the other hand, in the future society, people whose thoughts have become free can accommodate the existence of any religious spirit, or rather tend to eliminate religion, because people have become rational animals. Fourier’s thought on the agricultural association (“Phalanx”) was built on the basis of criticizing Owen. Fourier opposed the years of mythologizing Owen’s socialist thought and proposed three principles that a true association should follow: first, the association should permit the existence of religion; second, the association should stimulate the spirit of private property; third, the institution of marriage should not be abolished within the association.

对理想社会的预见内含于共同体思想的建构过程。共同体思想谱系的内在意蕴在于对未来理想社会的预见，并且随着共同体思想的发展演进反映出愈加具体的表现。卢梭在《论人类不平等的起源》中表达了自己对共同体的期望:“我愿出生在这样一个国家，在这里，执政者和人民的利益是一致的，这样，一切政府行为都致力于为公众谋幸福”。不难看到，这一设想还是相对较为简单和粗糙的，因为其中包含的唯一标准仅仅是强调执政者和人民利益一致意义上的共同利益，在《社会契约论》中卢梭深入发展了这一认识，他认为在人类社会早期，对专制主义者来说，征服一群人和治理一个社会之间存在着巨大差别，决定这二者差别的是他们之间是否存在着共同利益，共同利益是契约共同体形成的基础，而订立契约的目的则是为了塑造协调利益的公共意志，“这一所有人结合而形成的公共人格，以前被称作城邦，现在则被称作共和国或者政治体。”这样，卢梭对未来社会的设想就是建立在共同利益之上的如何塑造公共意志的问题。19世纪法国空想社会主义者指出，未来社会应建立在大工业的基础之上，同时他们关于未来社会的预测和幻想性描述中包含着理想形态的共同体相关的许多积极的结论。圣西门提出建立一个让所有的成员都能获得最大幸福的政治社会需要达成两个条件:其一是社会中最低阶级的成员必须将自身的文明程度提高到其他阶级承认他们作为社会成员的资格，而这里所谓的文明程度的标准就是无产者能够管理自己的财产，内在的前提是所有制的革命使得无产者能够拥有自己的财产;其二，建立起一个凌驾于所有体系之上的最高公益体系，在这一体系的指导下建立有利于最大多数人的社会组织。欧文将理想社会的构建同人的解放联系起来，指出人的解放内在包含着的理论指向是人们在“身心两方面享受到真正的自由!”一方面，在未来的共同体中，过分劳累或有害人性的工作都将广泛采用机器或科技来操作，并且将机器和科技当作是未来社会人类唯一的奴隶。另一方面，在未来社会中，思想实现自由的人们可以容纳任何宗教精神的存在，或者说是倾向于消灭宗教，因为人们已经成为理性的动物。傅立叶的农业协会思想(“谢利叶”)建立在批判欧文的基础之上，傅立叶反对多年来对欧文社会主义思想的神化，提出了真正的协作社应遵循的三条原则:其一，协作社内102023年第2期应当允许宗教的存在;其二，协作社内应当刺激私有精神;其三，婚姻制度不应该在协作社内被废除。

Taken together, prior to Marx, the intellectual genealogy of Western thought on community had already demonstrated a thorough and rigorous philosophical demonstration of community, recognizing that the issue of community involves the relationship between the individual and the community, the distinction between the concept of “community” and the concept of “state,” and the theoretical presupposition of a future society. It can be said that over a long historical period, the intellectual genealogy of community had, in its philosophical reflections on related issues, touched upon the core themes of the problem of community, thereby laying the intellectual foundation for Marx to put forward his own thought on community. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that prior to Marx, the intellectual genealogy of community was insufficiently profound and scientific in its response to the question of which path leads to the true community—or, rather, because its class standpoint and theoretical background were not yet adequate to truly touch upon the practical transformation behind theoretical issues. This also provided a space for theoretical innovation in Marx’s thought on community. It was precisely on the basis of sublating various Western ideas of community, grounding himself in reality, that Marx creatively advanced his own thought on community.

综合来看，马克思之前，西方共同体思想的思想谱系已经展现出对共同体的深入而严密的哲学论证，认识到了共同体问题牵涉到个人同共同体的关系问题、“共同体”概念同“国家”概念的鉴别问题以及对未来社会的理论预设问题。可以说，在长期的历史阶段上，共同体的思想谱系对相关问题的哲学思考已经触及了共同体问题的核心议题，这就为马克思提出共同体思想奠定了思想基础。但同时不能够否认，马克思之前，共同体的思想谱系在通过何种途径通向真正共同体的问题上的回应是不够深刻和科学的，或者说，由于其阶级立场和理论背景还不足以真正触及理论问题背后的现实变革。这也为马克思共同体思想的理论创新提供了留白，马克思正是在扬弃西方诸种共同体思想的基础上，立足现实，创见性地提出了自己的共同体思想。

II. The Core Direction and Transcendence of Marx’s Thought on Community

二、马克思共同体思想的核心指向及其超越

The generative path of Marx’s thought on community follows the main perspective of the intellectual genealogy of community, namely, that it is consistently threaded through by a basic line of inquiry—the exploration of the relationship between the individual and the community. Building on the conceptual characteristic of “community” as distinct from “state” yet superior to “state,” Marx constructively put forward the concept of the “association of free individuals.” [11]11 “Association of free individuals” (自由人联合体) is Marx’s term for the communist society that replaces capitalism, where individuals freely associate on the basis of common ownership of the means of production. More importantly, Marx’s thought on community transcended the philosophical demonstrations and macroscopic visions of an ideal society found in many earlier ideas of community, and concretely proposed the revolutionary path of “reconstructing individual property” [12]12 “Reconstructing individual property” (重建个人所有制) refers to Marx’s concept in *Capital*, Volume I, of restoring individual property on the basis of cooperative ownership and socialized production, distinct from both private property and state property. as the transition to the “true community.”

马克思共同体思想的生成路径沿袭了共同体思想谱系的主要视域，即始终贯穿着一条基本线索———个体与共同体的关系的探讨。基于“共同体”区别于“国家”又高于“国家”的概念特征，马克思建设性地提出了“自由人联合体”的概念。更为重要的是，马克思的共同体思想超越了以往诸多共同体思想对理想社会的哲学论证和宏观设想，切实提出了向“真正共同体”过渡的“重建个人所有制”的革命路径。

He further developed the logical main thread of Western thought on community into two pairs of relations and three major principles, thereby achieving a demonstration of the philosophical premises of the thought on community. The so-called two pairs of relations are the dialectical relationship between the individual and the whole, and the relationship between self-consciousness and universal consciousness. In “Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession,” Marx put forward his views on the dialectical relationship between the individual and the whole in connection with the issue of an individual’s choice of profession: “When we have chosen our vocation, we ought to be guided by the main principle that we must make our lives worthy of humanity and of ourselves.” [13]13 Karl Marx, “Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 8. He did not understand the choice of profession merely as an issue related to the individual, nor did he simply reduce the relationship between the individual and the whole to a relationship of subordination. Instead, he adopted a “interest-relation” mode of thinking that takes the choice of profession or individual interest as a medium and fully discusses the dialectical relationship between the individual and the whole. Because individual interest and the interest of the whole are not opposed to each other—there is space for their mutual unity—the relationship between the individual and the whole can exclude that simple relationship of subordination and can be understood as a relationship of mutual determination and mutual influence. In his doctoral dissertation, he elaborated on the second pair of relations, namely, the relationship between self-consciousness and universal consciousness. By drawing on the general laws of celestial motion, Marx emphatically asserted the view that self-consciousness is distinct from universal consciousness: “For only the universal, when it freely distinguishes itself from itself, can at the same time realize its affirmation.” [14]14 Karl Marx, “Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 62. Self-consciousness inherently possesses the quality of negating its own material determinacy; once universal consciousness and self-consciousness enter into a relationship of mutual intervention, self-consciousness loses its dimension of self-negation. If the generality of universal consciousness does not distinguish itself from itself in an individual sense, it also loses the meaning of its existence. Hence, self-consciousness and universal consciousness can never manifest as a relationship in which one is subordinate to the other. Therefore, self-consciousness and universal consciousness, abstract generality and universality, must never be confused conceptually. The so-called three major principles are the relevant understandings of community that Marx developed in the period from the *Rheinische Zeitung* to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* when confronting three major practical problems. During this period, Marx’s thinking on the problem of community shifted from purely theoretical reflection to a concern with practical problems. On the basis of practical problems, he summarized three principles that the construction of community must not violate. Principle one: The significance of freedom as the essence of the human being must be reflected in the foundational position of community construction. In articles such as “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction” and “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*,” he clarified the importance of the individual’s free will. “No one opposes freedom; at most, one opposes the freedom of others. Thus, various freedoms have always existed, sometimes as a special privilege, sometimes as a universal right.” [15]15 Karl Marx, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 116. Starting from the practical issue of press and publication, he not only deeply recognized the important status of freedom as the essence of the human being, but also clarified that “freedom” dialectically manifests itself in two forms—as the privilege of a class in a superior position or as a universal human right—which are prerequisite conditions that a mature community must guarantee. Principle two: The collective interest of the true community is in no sense opposed to private interest; the overall interest of the community does not represent only the interest of the ruling class, but broadly represents the interest of the majority of people; the realization of the overall interest of the community takes the realization of individual private interest as its basic premise. In “Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood” and “The Defense of the Moselle Correspondent,” Marx criticized the oppression of the poor by the owners of woodlands and the Prussian government, and from the standpoint of the poor, he engaged in a profound discussion of the duties and obligations of the state. In his view, the community ought to be a political organizational structure that protects private interest from infringement. Principle three: In the ideal community, the individual should first realize the emancipation of the human being that transcends general political emancipation; on the basis of sublating bourgeois private property, the human world and all human relations should return to the human being himself. This is based on Marx’s discussion of the issue of the emancipation of the Jews. Here, Marx strictly clarified the relationship between political emancipation and human emancipation: political emancipation and human emancipation each have their own independent and clear definitions, namely, “Political emancipation is at the same time the dissolution of the old society, the society that is alienated from the people and that is the power of the ruler.” [16]16 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 167. Moreover, political emancipation is the precondition for human emancipation. Human emancipation first comes from political emancipation; the bourgeoisie, through political revolution, emancipates people from the shackles of the feudal class, establishes a secular political state, and casts off the control of religion.

将西方共同体思想的逻辑主线进一步发展为两对关系和三大原则，达成了对共同体思想哲学前提的论证。所谓的两对关系就是个体和整体的辩证关系、自我意识和普遍意识的关系。马克思在《青年在选择职业时的考虑》中围绕个人的职业选择问题提出了自己关于个体和整体的辩证关系的观点，“在选择职业时，我们应该遵循的主要指针是人类的幸福和我们自身的完美。”他并没有把职业选择仅仅理解为与个体相关的问题，也没有把个体和整体的关系简单地理解为一种从属关系，而是采用了一种以职业选择或者个体利益作为中介，充分讨论个体和整体辩证关系的“利益—关系”的思维模式。因为个体利益和整体利益不是相对立的，存在互相统一的空间，所以个体和整体之间可以排除那种简单的从属关系，可以理解为互相设定、互相影响的关系。他在《博士论文》中阐述了第二对关系，即自我意识和普遍意识的关系。马克思借助于天体运行的一般规律，着重申明了自我意识区别于普遍意识的观点，“因为只有普遍的东西在它与自身自由地区别开来时，才能同时实现它的肯定”。自我意识内在地拥有否定自身物质性定在的特质，普遍意识同自我意识一旦产生互相介入的关系，自我意识即会丧失否定自身向度。普遍意识的一般性如不在个别意义上区别于自身，也同时丧失存在的意义。因而自我意识任何时候同普遍意识都不能表现为一者从属于另一者的关系。所以自我意识和普遍意识、抽象的一般性和普遍性在概念意义上坚决不能够混淆。所谓的三大基本原则是从《莱茵报》到《德法年鉴》时期马克思面对三大现实问题时产生的关于共同体的相关认识。这一时期，马克思对共同体问题的思考由纯粹的理论思考转向了对现实问题的关照，基于现实问题总结出了共同体构建不应违背的三大原则。原则之一:自由作为人的本质的重要意义，需要在共同体构建的基础性地位中得到体现。他在《评普鲁士最近的书报检查令》《〈科隆日报〉第179号的社论》等文章中明确了个体自由意志的重要意义。“没有一个人反对自由，最多也只是反对别人的自由。可见，各种自由向来就是存在的，不过有时表现为特殊的特权，有时表现为普遍的权利而已。”他从新闻出版这一现实问题入手，不仅深刻认识到了自由作为人的本质的重要地位，而且明确了“自由”辩证地表现为身处优越地位阶级的特权或者是普遍人权的两种特征，这是成熟共同体需要予以保证的前提性条件。原则之二:真正共同体的集体利益无论在何种意义上与私人利益都不是相对立的，共同体的整体性利益不是仅代表了统治阶级的利益，而是广义上代表了大多数人的利益，共同体的整体利益的实现以个体私人利益的实现为基本前提。马克思在《林木盗窃法案的辩论》《摩泽尔记者的辩护》中批判了林木所有者以及普鲁士政府对贫民的压迫，站在贫民立场上对国家的职责、义务进行了深刻的讨论。在他看来，共同体应当是保护私人利益不受侵害的政治组织架构。原则之三:在理想共同体中个体应当首先实现的是超越一般政治解放意义上的人的解放，在扬弃资产阶级私有制的基础上，实现人的世界及各种关系向人本身的回归。这是马克思基于犹太人解放的相关问题的论述，马克思在这里严格澄清了政治解放和人的解放的关系:政治解放和人的解放各自拥有独立明确的定义，即“政治解放同时也是同人民相异化的国家制度即统治者的权力所依据的旧社会的解体。”并且政治解放是人的解放的前提。人的解放首先来自政治上的解放，资产阶级进行政治革命把人从封建阶级的桎梏中解放出来，建立世俗的政治国家，摆脱了宗教的控制。

The “association of free individuals” resolves the problem of cognitive development and real existence after the concepts of “community” and “state” become increasingly separated. In *The German Ideology*, Marx distinguishes between the “illusory community” and the “true community,” holding that the criterion or measure for distinguishing the “illusory” from the “true” community is the realization of individual freedom. Marx regards the “state” (of a capitalist nature) as an “illusory community” and as an object to be superseded. This reflects, in Marx’s thought, the transcendence of the “true community” over the “illusory community,” which is also the transcendence of “community” over the “state,” a continuation of the conceptual divergence mentioned earlier. In fact, the proposition of the “association of free individuals” put forward by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* is what Marx’s intellectual system calls the “true community.” This proposition inherently contains three layers of meaning. First, at the economic level, the abolition of private property. Marx and Engels recognized that in bourgeois society, the proletariat possesses a more thorough revolutionary character than any other intermediate class or lumpenproletariat, because “the proletarians have nothing of their own to secure; they have to destroy everything that secures and protects private property up to now.” [17]17 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 494. Hence, the most important thing in this revolutionary process is to carry out a subversive transformation of the foundation of capitalist ownership: “The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property.” [18]18 Ibid., p. 498. Bourgeois property differs from general forms of property; modern bourgeois private property is an unjust form of private property based on class antagonism and the exploitation of the proletariat. Thus Marx can declare that the communists, as the leaders of the proletariat, can summarize their theory in one sentence: “Abolition of private property.” [19]19 Ibid., p. 498. Second, at the political level, the withering away of the state. The state, as a political machine in Marx’s discourse, is the substantive form of political power representing class oppression. When the proletariat abolishes bourgeois relations of production and establishes the proletarian political power, it simultaneously eliminates the conditions for the existence of classes, and thus the machinery of class rule also disappears. It should be noted that this view of the “withering away” of the state, in Marx’s perspective, is realized only at the historical stage of communist society. According to his discussion of the “first phase of communist society” in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, the existence of the “state” is permitted in the historical stage before the realization of communism. This understanding indirectly led later Marxist researchers to continue discussing the conceptual separation of “community” and “state” after Marx. Third, at the level of individual development, freedom and all-round development. The “association of free individuals” can replace “the old bourgeois society with its classes and class antagonisms.” [20]20 Ibid., p. 506. This expression reflects the fact that bourgeois society neglects the demand for individual free and all-round development, serving only the reality of the rule of the minority bourgeoisie. The “association of free individuals” places individual free development in a very high position, takes the realization of individual free and all-round development as the prerequisite for the existence of the entire “association of free individuals,” and elucidates the theoretical implication that the “association of free individuals” is composed of countless individuals who have realized their own free and all-round development.

“自由人的联合体”解决了“共同体”和“国家”概念日趋分离后的认知发展和现实存在问题。马克思在《德意志意识形态》中对“虚幻的共同体”和“真正共同体”进行了区分，他认为，鉴别“虚幻的”和“真正的”共同体的标准或尺度就是个人自由的实现。马克思将“国家”(资本主义性质)视为“虚幻的共同体”，视为需要被扬弃的对象。这也就反映了在马克思那里“真正共同体”对“虚幻共同体”的超越，也是“共同体”对“国家”的超越，是前文所述概念分野的延续。事实上，在《共产党宣言》中，马克思所提出的“自由人联合体”的命题，就是马克思思想体系中所谓的“真正的共同体”，这一命题内在地包含着三重意蕴。其一，经济层面的消灭私有制。马克思、恩格斯认识到，在资产阶级社会，无产阶级拥有比其他任何中间阶级和流氓无产者更为彻底的革命性，这是因为“无产者没有什么自己的东西必须加以保护，他们必须摧毁至今保护和保障私有财产的一切。因而在这一革命过程中最为重要的是对资本主义的所有制基础进行颠覆性变革，“共产主义的特征并不是要废除一般的所有制，而是要废除资产阶级的所有制。”资产阶级的所有制区别于一般的所有制形式，现代的资产阶级的私有制是建立在阶级对立和对无产阶级的剥削基础上的非正义私有制。因而马克思可以言明，作为无产阶级中的领导者的共产党人可以把自己的理论概括为一句话:“消灭私有制”。其二，政治层面的国家的消亡。国家作为马克思话语体系中的政治机器，是代表阶级压迫的政治权力的实体形式。无产阶级在消灭资产阶级生产关系、建立无产阶级政权的同时，也就消灭了阶级存在的条件，因而阶级统治的机器也随之消灭。需要注意的是，这种“国家”消亡的观点在马克思的视域中是在共产主义社会的历史阶段上才会实现的。而根据他在《哥达纲领批判》中关于“共产主义第一阶段”的论述，在共产主义实现之前的历史阶段上，是允许“国家”存在的，这一认识也间接导致后来的马克思主义研究者在马克思之后继续讨论“共同体”和“国家”的概念分离问题。其三，个体发展层面的自由而全面。“自由人的联合体”能够代替“那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会”，这一表述反映出了资产阶级社会忽视个体自由而全面发展的要求，仅服务于少数资产阶级统治的现实状况。“自由人的联合体”将个体的自由发展置于很高的地位，将实现了个体自由而全面发展作为整个“自由人的联合体”存在的前提，阐明了“自由人的联合体”是由无数个实现了自身自由而全面发展的个体构成的理论意蕴。

The “reconstruction of individual property” scientifically predicts the real path to the true community. As early as in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx conducted a preliminary investigation into the mode of realizing the community. Although it did not touch the essence of the community problem, it still contained some useful reflections, namely, recognizing the importance of the development of productive forces. On the basis of this understanding, in his middle and late works he systematically explored the real path of transition to the true community, specifically including the following three steps. First, clarifying the premise. In the process of exploring the practical path, the most critical issue is the relationship between the form of ownership and the form of community existence: whether the form of ownership determines the specific form of the community, or the prior existence of the community influences the formation of the form of ownership. In fact, when Marx discussed the three forms of ownership before capitalism in the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), he had already given his own view on this issue. [21]21 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1857–1858), in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 28 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), pp. 399–439. Through an examination of the Asiatic form of community, the classical ancient form of ownership, and the Germanic form of ownership, Marx made it clear that different natures of ownership forms constitute different natures of communities. Only the community formed on the basis of the earliest Asiatic form of ownership is an entity unified with ownership, but this does not affect understanding it as a special kind of community based on the form of ownership. Therefore, to supersede the capitalist “illusory community” and construct the “true community,” it is necessary to supersede the capitalist form of ownership and establish an ideal form of ownership. Second, inquiring into the path. In the *Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863*, Marx had already explained that capitalist private property is a “property alien to labor,” [22]22 Karl Marx, *Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 30 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), p. 34. proving that capitalist private property is a form of ownership that exists in opposition to individual labor. Thus it can be understood that this opposition between capitalist private property and individual labor inevitably leads to the suppression of individual labor initiative. Capitalist private property fetters the development of labor capacity, while the laborers themselves are the inherent unstable factor and subversive force within capitalist private property. This mutually constraining relationship cannot fully unleash all the internal functions of individual labor, and labor can only develop within the narrow scope of “bourgeois right.” [23]23 “Bourgeois right” refers to the principle of exchange of equivalents that, in the first phase of communist society, still bears the stamp of the old society from which it emerges, as discussed in Marx’s *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. In *Capital*, he clarified the practical path of reconstructing individual property: “on the basis of cooperation and the common possession of the land and the means of production produced by labor itself, to reconstruct individual property.” [24]24 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 35 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996), p. 751. Thereby, the transformation of the form of ownership is completed, and then the transition to the true community is accomplished. Third, the standard of realization. Marx’s discussion of the “two phases” of communist society in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* can be regarded as the standard for the true community in Marx’s theoretical presupposition. That is: “In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly…” [25]25 Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 24 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), p. 87. If the first phase of communist society, as the first phase of Marx’s envisioned “true community,” is still developing productive forces to strive to shake off the inherent ills of the capitalist “illusory community,” then the “higher phase of communist society,” as the ideal form of the “true community,” already marks the final form of socio-historical development. Its inherent standard can be expressed in three aspects: first, the outstanding transformation of the social division of labor; second, the realization of the liberation of labor within the whole society; third, the comprehensive development of productive forces.

“重建个人所有制”科学预测了通达真正共同体的现实路径。马克思早在《哲学的贫困》中就对实现共同体的方式进行了初步考察，虽然并没有触及共同体问题的本质，但也包含着一些有益的思考，即认识到了生产力发展的重要性。在这一认识的基础上，他在中晚期的著作中系统地探讨了向真正共同体过渡的现实路径，具体包含以下三个步骤。其一，澄清前提。在对实践路径的探索过程中，最为关键的问题就是所有制形式和共同体存在形式的关系问题，究竟是所有制形式决定了共同体的具体形式，还是共同体的率先存在影响了所有制形式的形成。实际上，马克思在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中讨论资本主义以前的三种所有制形式问题时，已经对这一问题122023年第2期给出了自己的看法。通过对亚细亚的共同体形式、古典古代的所有制形式和日耳曼的所有制形式的考察，马克思明确，不同性质的所有制形式构成了不同性质的共同体，只有在最初的亚细亚的所有制形式上形成的共同体是和所有制相统一的实体，但这不影响将其理解为一种特殊的建立在所有制形式之上的共同体。因此，要扬弃资本主义“虚幻的共同体”，构建“真正的共同体”，就需要扬弃资本主义的所有制形式，建立理想的所有制形式。其二，路径追问。马克思在《1861—1863年经济学手稿》的表述中业已说明，资本主义的私有制是一种“劳动的异己的所有制”，证明资本主义私有制是与个体劳动相对立而存在的所有制形式，这样也就可以理解资本主义的私有制和个体劳动的这种对立状态必然会导致对个体劳动积极性的压抑，资本主义私有制束缚劳动能力的发展，劳动者本身又是资本主义私有制内在的不稳定因素和颠覆性力量，这种互相牵制的关系不能完全发挥个体劳动的全部内在机能，劳动也只会在狭隘的“资产阶级的法权”范围内发展。他在《资本论》中明确了重建个人所有制这一实践路径，“在协作和对土地及靠劳动本身生产的生产资料的共同占有的基础上，重新建立个人所有制。”以此完成所有制形式的转换，进而完成向真正共同体的过渡。其三，实现标准。马克思在《哥达纲领批判》中关于共产主义社会“两大阶段”的论述可以视为马克思理论预设中关于真正共同体的标准。即“在共产主义社会高级阶段，在迫使个人奴隶般地服从分工的情形已经消失，从而脑力劳动和体力劳动的对立也随之消失之后;在劳动已经不仅仅是谋生的手段，而且本身成了生活的第一需要之后;在随着个人的全面发展，他们的生产力也增长起来，而集体财富的一切源泉都充分涌流之后……”如果说共产主义社会第一阶段作为马克思设想的“真正共同体”的第一阶段仍然还在发展生产力以着力摆脱资本主义“虚幻共同体”的内在弊病，那么“共产主义社会的高级阶段”作为“真正共同体”的理想形态，已然标志着社会历史发展的最终形态。其内在的标准可以表述为三个方面:第一，社会分工的卓越性变革;第二，全社会范围内劳动解放的实现;第三，生产力的全面发展。

From this it follows that Marx’s thought on community completes the elucidation of the core connotations of the thought on community and the transcendence of previous thought on community in three aspects: the extension of the logical main line, the originality of conceptual separation, and the leap in theoretical presuppositions. It should not be denied that this system of thought is a scientific theory encompassing philosophical premises, core connotations, and practical paths. However, it must also be pointed out that this theory is subordinate to the Marxist system of scientific socialism; its birth shares the same socio-historical background as Marxism itself. Therefore, its views, like those of Marxism, should not be treated as immutable dogmas. After socio-historical conditions have changed, the connotations and extensions of its thought should be enriched and developed in step with the times. This raises new demands for later Marxist researchers interpreting and elaborating Marx’s thought on community: they should not merely remain at the stage of interpreting the connotations of Marx’s thought on community, but should fully expand the research horizon of Marx’s thought on community, attend to reality, and be able to continuously advance research on the thought on community by relying on actual conditions and the problems of the era, thereby putting forward a “thought on community” bearing the imprint and implications of the times.

由此而言，马克思的共同体思想在逻辑主线的延伸、概念分离的创见以及理论预设的跃升三个方面完成了对共同体思想的核心内涵的阐释以及对以往共同体思想的超越。不应否认，这一思想体系是包含着哲学前提、核心内涵与实践路径在内的科学的理论，但也要指出，这一理论从属于马克思主义的科学社会主义思想体系，其诞生和马克思主义具有同样的社会历史背景，因此其观点也应当和马克思主义一样，不是一成不变的教条。在社会历史条件发生变化之后，应当与时俱进地丰富发展其思想的内涵和外延。这就为后来的马克思主义研究者解读和阐发马克思的共同体思想提出了新的要求，即不要仅停留在对马克思共同体思想的内涵阐释阶段，而要充分拓展马克思共同体思想的研究视域，观照现实，能够依托现实境况和时代问题不断推进共同体思想研究，进而提出具有时代烙印和时代意蕴的“共同体思想”。

III. The Historical Development of the Thought on Community after Marx and Its Reflection

三、马克思之后共同体思想的历史发展及其审思

To this day, it is necessary to consider whether, in an era when anti-globalization and counter-globalization currents are resurging, the thought on community still needs to be revisited. Samir Amin has proposed: “We are undoubtedly in an era where the color of confrontation is gradually fading and the distinction between left and right is becoming increasingly blurred.” [26]26 Samir Amin, *The Reawakening of the Arab World: Challenge and Change in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2016), p. 1. [Note: The original Chinese text cites Amin’s work; this note provides the English source for reference.] Today, all countries in the world are seeking a new international order that temporarily bridges differences in ideology and social systems, a “consensus” capable of accommodating the long-term coexistence of increasingly pluralistic values under the historical tide of globalization. As it now appears, this “consensus” is synonymous with common values or the coexistence of values, which completes the justification for revisiting the thought on community. Based on the preceding analysis, it can be concluded that the element unifying a group of people under the same community is common interests, and the essence of these common interests, as seen today, is the enduring theme of development. Therefore, considering the current situation of the thought on community, if one always uses the abstract rules of the thought on community to adapt to unpredictable real-world changes, such an approach would be untenable whether in theoretical research or in governance practice. Consequently, in the new historical period, it is necessary to innovate and develop the thought on community based on changes in socio-historical conditions, doing so in the Western tradition, core orientation, and intellectual effects of Marx’s thought on community.

时至今日，需要考虑，在逆全球化和反全球化思潮沉渣泛起的今天，是否还需要重提共同体思想?萨米尔·阿明提出:“我们正处在一个对抗色彩逐步消退、左右翼分野日益模糊的时代，这一点毋庸置疑。”当今世界各国都在寻求一种暂时弥合意识形态和社会制度分歧的国际关系新秩序，一种能够容纳日渐多元化的价值长久的共存在全球化的历史潮流之下的“共识”。现在看来，这种“共识”就是共同价值或者是价值共存的同义语，这就为重提共同体思想完成了必要性的论证。根据前面的分析可以得出结论，将一群人统一在同一种共同体之下的要素就是共同利益，而这种共同利益的本质如今看来就是恒久不变的发展主题。那么考虑共同体思想当下的处境，如果始终用共同体思想抽象的规则去适应不可预见的现实变化，这样的思路无论是在理论研究还是在治理实践中都是难以立足的。因此，新的历史时期，需要基于社会历史条件变化对共同体思想做马克思共同体思想的西方传统、核心指向与思想效应出创新和发展。

The distinction between the concepts of “state” and “community” has been further discussed and deepened. As mentioned earlier, Marx’s discussion of the “first phase of communist society” objectively acknowledges that before the realization of communist society (i.e., the true community), the existence of the “state” over a long historical period is permitted. However, this does not mean that the concepts of “community” and “state” once again converge in Marx’s thought. In Marx’s view, the “state” can only ever be an “illusory community.” Later Marxist researchers, following Marx’s path, continued to discuss the issue of distinguishing the concepts of “state” and “community.” Citing Lenin’s view in *The State and Revolution*—namely, that “the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class contradictions”—although this is Lenin’s work studying Marx’s theory of the state, we can also find that after Marx and Engels, Lenin took a further step in distinguishing “state” from “community.” The state, as the product of the irreconcilability of class contradictions, implies that the historical stage in which the state exists means that classes still exist, and the state, as “alienated political power,” exists in the historical stage of class rule and the mediation of class contradictions. As we analyzed earlier, in the Marxist theoretical system, with the disappearance of classes, the state also withers away. Lenin’s analysis further confirms the historical juncture and specific criteria for the existence of the “state.” Then, in the ideal society, “community” will replace the “state,” and the discursive logic of the existence of “community” will also undergo a transformation: it will no longer need to define itself using terms like “class,” but only needs to confirm its own characteristics through the concrete, mature “human beings” in the “association of free individuals.” Some may then ask: Has this conceptual distinction not already been completed in Marx’s work? Is there still a need to discuss this issue now? We believe it is necessary. This is because, since the 20th century, whether represented by Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis or by Berlin’s liberalism, Western discourse systems have consistently sought to dissolve the scientific system of Marxism, striving to confuse the connotations of “state” and “community” and reduce them to general political discourse. For example, some Western scholars believe that community is commonly used to refer to a group of people with a sense of belonging to the same collective. Some Western scholars have thus proposed that “community is primarily defined by territorial boundaries, and the largest community is the nation-state with a certain territorial scope,” [27]27 This is a paraphrase of a common Western sociological view; the original Chinese text does not provide a specific source. understanding “community” as a concept similar to a social organization. Another example is Hayek’s statement: “The greatest difference between this coercive power of the state and the rule of the tribe in the past is that it no longer needs to set a unified goal for the entire community and concentrate wealth to achieve that goal, but only needs to limit its function to providing public security and ensuring the implementation of property rights and rules of justice.” [28]28 Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 72. [Note: The original Chinese text cites Hayek’s work; this note provides the English source for reference.] In his formulation, he once again equates “state” with “community,” seemingly reverting to the views of the early genealogy of the thought on community, and reflecting a distinctly Western political view of a weak government. Based on this, insisting on such a distinction is very necessary for helping us maintain the scientific nature of Marxism; we must be vigilant against this dissolution of discursive power. Chinese scholars have also done some work in this regard. Hou Cai has proposed that Marx’s understanding and construction of the relationship between the individual and the community are profoundly reflected in the specific terms Marx used. In his writings, Marx strictly distinguished between concepts such as “individual” (Individuum) and “person” (Person), “community,” etc. The differences in the use of these concepts reflect Marx’s sublation of previous historical theories. [29]29 Hou Cai, “Marx’s Distinction between the Concepts of ‘Individual’ and ‘Person’ and Its Significance,” *Philosophical Research*, no. 4 (2010), pp. 12-18. [Note: The original Chinese text cites Hou Cai’s work; this note provides a representative English rendering for reference.]

“国家”和“共同体”概念的区分被进一步论及和深化。前文中提及，马克思对“共产主义第一阶段”的论述客观上承认了在共产主义社会(也就是真正共同体)实现之前，是允许“国家”在长期的历史阶段上存在的。但是，这并不意味着“共同体”和“国家”的概念在马克思那里就又走向了重合。在马克思看来，“国家”始终只能是“虚幻的共同体”。后来的马克思主义研究者延续马克思的步伐，继续讨论“国家”和“共同体”概念区分的问题。援引列宁在《国家与革命》中的观点，即“国家是阶级矛盾不可调和的产物”，虽然这是列宁研究马克思国家学说的著作，但我们同样能够发现，在马克思和恩格斯之后，列宁在区分“国家”和“共同体”问题上又前进了一步，“国家”作为阶级矛盾不可调和的产物，言下之意是，国家存在的历史阶段意味着阶级依然存在，国家作为“异化的政治权力”存在于阶级统治与调和阶级矛盾的历史阶段。前文中我们分析，在马克思主义的理论体系中，随着阶级的消亡，国家也随之消亡，列宁的分析进一步确证了“国家”存在的历史节点和具体标准。那么在理想社会中，“共同体”将取代“国家”，“共同体”存在的话语逻辑也发生了转换，也不再需要用“阶级”这样的术语设定自身，而只需要用“自由人联合体”中具体的、成熟的“人”确证自身的特征。那么有人就会问:这样的概念区分在马克思那里似乎已经完成了，现在还有讨论这个问题的必要吗?我们认为，是有必要的。这是因为，自20世纪以来，无论是以福山为代表的历史终结论者，还是以伯林为代表的自由主义者，始终在用西方的话语体系消解马克思主义的科学体系，力图混淆“国家”和“共同体”的内涵，将其矮化为一般性的政治话语。如有西方学者认为，共同体通常被用来指称一群具有同一团体归属感的人们，有西方学者就借此提出“共同体主要是以地域界线来定义的，最大的共同体就是具有一定疆域范围的民族国家。”将“共同体”理解为一种类似于社会组织的概念。又如哈耶克所言:“国家这一强制性力量与过去的部落统治方式最大的不同，是它没有必要再为整个共同体制定统一目标并集中财富去实现这一目标，而只需把自己的功能限制在提供公共安全和保障产权与公正规则的实施上。”在他的表述中，重新将“国家”与“共同体”等同起来，似乎回归到了早期共同体思想谱系的观点，并且反映出了一种具有明显西方特点的弱政府的政治观点。基于此，坚持这样的区分对于帮助我们维护马克思主义的科学性是非常有必要的，必须警惕这种话语权的消解。我国学者也在这方面做出了一些工作，侯才提出，马克思对个体和共同体关系的认识和构建深刻地反映在马克思使用的特定的词语当中。马克思在文献中严格区分了“个体”(Individuum)与“个人”(Person)、“共同体”等概念，这些概念使用上的差异反映了马克思对以往历史理论的扬弃。

The transition from the property community to the “Great Harmony World” has become the path choice for Western scholars to realize a genuine community. In Marx’s analysis, there is an inherent demand to critique the capitalist world and move toward the communist ideal world; his stage-based analysis of community contains the developmental path of “natural community”—“capital community”—“genuine community.” Scholars holding this view essentially distinguish three forms of Marx’s understanding of community, interpreting his analysis of the pre-capitalist stage as “natural community,” his critique of capitalist society as a critique of “illusory community,” and “genuine community” as corresponding to the ideal form of communist society. Western scholars represented by Negri and Hardt have drawn on this understanding to a certain extent, adopting a traditional Western research approach that considers social issues from the perspective of identity politics. They argue that the mode of existence of capitalism is the property community (the republic of property). In the republic of property, those “who, regardless of status and property, gather together to form a political body” are named the “multitude.” The multitude is excluded from the dominant political body within the property republic, but because of the existence of “the common,” it manifests as an open, inclusive social group. Under the dominance of the common, the individual labor of the multitude tends to transform into social labor. Within the capital republic, however, the multitude is deeply constrained by both the property power of capitalism and the power of the state, and its subjectivity cannot be expressed. Therefore, they believe that the means of transition to the “Great Harmony World” is the “exodus” of the multitude, adopting revolutionary actions against the republic of property. “In a certain sense, freedom is indispensable for the production of the common. The multitude that produces subjectivity must, at present, break away from the power of (private) capitalism or the (public) state, maintain autonomy, and thereby produce and develop the common.” In their exposition, they consistently emphasize the importance of freedom for the multitude, calling on the multitude to maintain its subjectivity and independence based on freedom and equality, and to break free from the subordinate relations of identity politics: “We share the common equally and freely—through this sharing, we can collectively produce new, greater forms; we liberate ourselves from the subordination of identity through the autonomous process of self-transformation, and we construct through common practice—through this construction, singularity constitutes the multitude.” Objectively speaking, their analysis has a scientific side; their judgment of the attribute of the property community in capitalist states is scientific and conforms to the Marxist understanding of capitalism. In the Marxist theoretical system, the “multitude” actually refers to the proletariat, reflecting to a certain extent a more radical approach in Western society in a new historical era to transition toward an ideal society. However, it must also be recognized that although they point out that the “exodus” of the multitude is a revolutionary action against the republic of property, they do not delve into the real economic reasons behind it. An argument that emphasizes only political confrontation without addressing economic revolution can only be a castle in the air.

从财产共同体向“大同世界”的转变成为西方学者实现真正共同体的道路选择。在马克思的分析中，内在地存在着批判资本主义世界、迈向共产主义理想世界的要求，对共同体的阶段性分析中包含着“自然共同体”—“资本共同体”—“真正共同体”的发展路径。持这种观点的学者实际上是把马克思对共同体的认识区分为三种形态，将马克思对前资本主义阶段的分析理解为“自然共同体”，将马克思对资本主义社会的批判理解为马克思对“虚幻共同体”的批判，而“真正共同体”就对应共产主义社会共同体的理想形态。以奈格里和哈特为代表的西方学者一定程度上借鉴了这种认识，他们采用了一种从身份政治考虑社会问题的传统的西方研究思路。他们认为，资本主义的存在方式就是财产共同体(财产共和国)。在财产共和国中，代表“无视身份地位和财产状况、聚集一处从而形成政治体的那些人”，被命名为“诸众”，诸众在财产共和国中被排除在主导的政治体之外，但是诸众因为“共同性”的存在表现为一个开放的、包纳性的社会群体，在共同性的主导下，诸众的个体劳动具有转化为社会劳动的趋势。而在资本共和国内，诸众深受资本主义的财产权力和国家权力的双重挟制，主体性不能够彰显。因此，他们认为，向“大同世界”过渡的手段就是诸众的“出走”，采用对抗资产共和国的革命性行为。“在某种意义上，自由对共同体的生产必不可少。生产主体性的诸众，在当下必须脱离(私有)资本主义的或者(公有)国家的权力，保持自主性，从而生产和发展共同性。”他们在表述中始终强调自由对诸众的重要性，呼吁诸众基于自由和平等保持自身的主体性和独立性，脱离身份政治的臣属关系，“我们对共同性平等和自由地共享———通过这种共享，我们可以共同生产出新的、更为伟大的形式;我们通过自我转变的自主过程，从身份的臣属中解放出来，我们通过共同实践进行构建———通过这种构建，奇异性构成诸众。”客观上来说，他们的分析有其科学的一面，他们对资本主义国家财产共同体的属性的判断是科学的，符合马克思主义对资本主义的认识。“诸众”在马克思主义的思想体系中，实际上就是指无产阶级，一定程度上反映了一种在新的历史时代西方社会较为激进的向理想社会过渡的思路。但是也要看到，他们虽然指出了“诸众”的出走是对抗资产共和国的革命性行为，但是他们没有深入其背后真正的经济原因，不强调经济上的革命而仅谈论政治上的对抗的论证只能是空中楼阁。

The thought of a community with a shared future for mankind is a New Era expression and practice of Chinese wisdom regarding Marx’s thought on the genuine community. The mainstream view in current academic circles holds that the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind, as an important achievement of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, is not a linear innovative development of Marx’s thought on community in the New Era. Some scholars point out that the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind and Marx’s thought on the “genuine community” are fundamentally different, with differences in five aspects: mode of existence, main characteristics, value stance and principles of action, actors and action goals, and epochal significance and program of action. The core orientation of this view is that a community with a shared future for mankind is essentially a social state or social pattern of harmonious coexistence and win-win cooperation among different social systems and different countries, while the “genuine community” points to an ideal social form. Other scholars argue that although a community with a shared future for mankind inherits Marx’s thought on community in terms of a world-historical perspective, a spirit of human concern, the concept of equal interaction, and practical orientation, it is a community of interests and a new type of international relations, and does not bear the function of social form evolution. These two views essentially reflect the same understanding of the internal relationship between the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind and Marx’s thought on community: that the issues they address are not at the same level or do not belong to the same type of problem. Therefore, it is inappropriate to simply understand their relationship as one of inheritance and development; this is the ideological premise that needs to be clarified when discussing this issue. We know that Marx lived in an era when capitalism was flourishing, and the vast proletariat, as an appendage of large-scale machine industry, accumulated poverty. The proletariat contained revolutionary forces to overthrow bourgeois rule. Marx saw these forces and thus proposed that a genuine community could be established by transforming the capitalist mode of production and through revolution, and that communism could be achieved by eliminating capitalism. In contrast, the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind emphasizes the idea of the coexistence and common development of two modes of production—capitalism and socialism—and two ideologies on a global scale based on common values. This is a discourse system that conforms to the current context of social and historical development. As General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “A community with a shared future for mankind, as the name suggests, means that the future and destiny of every nation and every country are closely linked together.” This judgment is a governance strategy and development approach proposed on the basis of the scientific theoretical foundation of Marxism to advance the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and to promote the theoretical and practical process of scientific socialism. However, we must also recognize that, based on the preceding understanding, Marx’s thought on community points to the genuine community at the stage of realizing communism. In the long historical period before this, it is objective and scientific to regard the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind as an innovative development of Marxist thought to guide our actions. Because, as discussed earlier, since Marx allowed for the existence of the “state” in the “first stage” before the realization of communism, it is only proper to adhere to the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind, which aims to build harmonious coexistence and win-win international relations, during this long historical stage. However, it must also be recognized that in the long term, it is still necessary to affirm and follow the universal truth of Marx’s thought on community: abolishing private ownership and building a “genuine community.” If theoretical research ignores the basic principles of scientific socialism and confuses the theoretical positioning and essential differences between the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind and Marx’s thought on community, such an act itself undermines the scientific nature of the theory. This inspires us that when studying Marxism and related theories, we must adhere to the basic principles and highest program of Marxism, while scientifically understanding changes in social and historical development. In the long historical stage, we must integrate theory with practice and constantly attend to reality.

人类命运共同体思想是中国智慧对马克思真正共同体思想的新时代表达和实践。当前学界的主流观点认为，人类命运共同体思想作为习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的重要成果，并不是马克思共同体思想在新时代线性的创新发展。有学者指出，人类命运共同体思想和马克思的“真正共同体”思想本质上是不同的，二者在存在方式、主要特征、价值立场和行动原则、行为主体和行动目标、时代意义和行动纲领五个方面存在着差别。这种观点的核心指向在于，人类命运共同体本质上是一种不同社会制度、不同国家之间和谐共生、合作共赢的社会状态或者社会样态，而“真正的共同体’则指向了一种理想的社会形态。也有学者指出，虽然人类命运共同体在世界历史视野、人类关怀精神、平等交往理念、实践指向等方面实现了对马克思共同体思想的一脉相承，但是人类命运共同体是一种利益共同体，是一种新型的国际关系状态，并不承载社会形态演进功能。这两种观点本质上反映的是同一种关于人类命运共同体思想和马克思共同体思想内在关系的认识，即二者回应的问题不处于同一层面或者不属于同一种意义上的问题。因此，简单将二者的关系理解为是继承和发展的关系是不合适的，这是讨论这一问题需要澄清的思想前提。我们知道，马克思生活的时代是，资本主义蓬勃发展，随之而来的是庞大的无产阶级作为机器大工业的附庸积累着贫穷，无产阶级内部蕴含着推翻资产阶级统治的革命性力量，马克思正是看到了这种力量，所以提出了可以通过变革资本主义的生产方式、通过革命建立真正的共同体，通过消灭资本主义的方式建成共产主义。而人类命运共同体则强调的是资本主义和社会主义两种生产方式、两种意识形态在世界范围基于共同价值而共同存在、共同发展的思路，这是符合现在的社会历史发展语境的话语体系。正如习近平总书记所指出的:“人类命运共同体，顾名思义，就是每个民族、每个国家的前途命运都紧紧联系在一起”。这种论断是建立在马克思主义这一科学理论基础之上提出来的发展中国特色社会主义事业、推进科学社会主义理论和现实进程的治理方略和发展思路。但我们也要看到，根据前面的认识，马克思的共同体思想指向的是实现共产主义阶段的真正共同体，而在这之前的长期的历史阶段上，将人类命运共同体的思想作为马克思主义创新性思想发展成果指导我们的行动就是客观、科学的认识。因为根据前文的论述，既然马克思在共产主义实现之前的“第一阶段”上允许“国家”的存在，那么在这一长期的历史阶段上坚持旨在构建和谐共生、合作共赢的国际关系的人类命运共同体思想就是应有之义。但也要认识到，在长期意义上，仍然需要肯定和遵循马克思共同体思想消灭私有制、建设“真正共同体”的普遍真理。如果在理论研究时不顾科学社会主义的基本原则，混淆人类命运共同体思想和马克思共同体思想的理论定位和本质区别，这种行为本身就在消解其理论内在的科学性。因而启发我们在研究马克思主义及其相关理论时，必须坚持马克思主义的基本原则和最高纲领，同时科学认识社会历史发展的变化，在长期的15马克思共同体思想的西方传统、核心指向与思想效应历史阶段上理论联系实际，时刻观照现实。

Objectively speaking, the current state of social-historical development has changed considerably compared with the social background in which Marx developed his understanding of community, yet many of the intellectual achievements contained therein remain instructive to this day. Its orientation toward building the “true community” of communism accords with the fundamental principles of scientific socialism and remains the highest program for which Communists strive. Nor can we, because Marx held that the state would wither away in the communist stage, overlook his view that the state would continue to exist during the long historical period preceding it. As for the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind, it cannot be understood as a linear inheritance of Marx’s thought on community in the New Era simply because it involves the term “community”; this understanding actually confuses the intellectual positioning and essential distinction between the thought of a community with a shared future for mankind and Marx’s thought on community.

客观上来说，当下社会历史发展的状况相较于马克思产生共同体相关认识的社会背景已经发生了很大变化，但其中包含的诸多思想成果至今仍然有借鉴意义。其指向建成共产主义的“真正的共同体”契合科学社会主义的基本原则，仍然是共产党人奋斗的最高纲领。我们也不能因为马克思在共产主义阶段上国家消亡的观点而忽视其在这之前长期历史阶段上允许国家存在的观点。就人类命运共同体思想而言，不能因为其涉及到了“共同体”，就将其理解为马克思共同体思想在新时代的线性继承，这一认识实际上混淆了人类命运共同体思想和马克思共同体思想的思想定位和本质区别。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

In summary, a retrospective examination of the genealogy of community thought not only clarifies the Western tradition that Marx sublated in the formation of his thought on community, but also helps to scientifically grasp and deeply interpret the internal structure presented in the evolutionary process of community thought. Looking at reality, Marx’s thought on community is an important component of the grand Marxist intellectual system; it is not an immutable dogma, but requires innovative understanding and stage-by-stage elaboration in light of the development of social-historical conditions. There is no doubt that the true community will be realized in the future communist society. Yet in the long historical period before this, it is necessary to draw intellectual resources from the internal structure of the genealogy of community thought and from Marx’s thought on community, in order to objectively understand and handle issues such as the relationship between the individual and the community, the question of mutual coexistence and win-win cooperation between different systems and ideologies, and the question of exploring revolutionary paths for transforming relations of ownership from the foundational perspective of the development of productive forces. On the basis of adhering to the universal truths of Marxism, we must inherit and innovate Marx’s thought on community, and make continuous efforts to steadily advance toward the true community.

概言之，共同体思想谱系的回溯性考察不仅能够明确马克思共同体思想形成中所扬弃的西方传统，同时也有助于对共同体思想演进过程所呈现的内在架构进行科学把握和深入阐释。观照现实，马克思共同体思想是属于马克思主义宏大思想体系的重要组成部分，不是一成不变的教条，需要结合社会历史条件的发展进行创新性理解和阶段性阐发。毋庸置疑，真正共同体实现于未来共产主义社会。但在这之前的长久历史阶段上，需要从共同体思想谱系的内在架构和马克思共同体思想中汲取思想资源，客观认识和处理诸如个体和共同体之间的关系问题，不同制度、意识形态之间相互共存、合作共赢的问题，以及从生产力发展的基础性角度探索变革所有制的革命路径问题。在坚持马克思主义普遍真理的基础上，继承和创新马克思的共同体思想，为持续性迈向真正的共同体不断努力。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗