Does “Civil Society” Exist in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*?

In 1885, Engels wrote in his essay “On the History of the Communist League”: “It is not the state that conditions and determines civil society, but civil society that conditions and determines the state.” In the past, we have often located this thesis as representing the intellectual state of the young Marx in 1843–1844, namely, that he had completed his first materialist turn. However, we have overlooked the preceding sentence of Engels’s thesis, namely, “In the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (1844).” That is to say, Engels believed that Marx had put forward a view consistent with “civil society conditions and determines the state” in “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction” and “On the Jewish Question,” thereby turning from idealism to materialism. Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether Engels’s thesis is accurate, we must first consider: As a manuscript that Engels had not yet seen at the time, Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* extensively discusses the relationship between civil society and the state. What does “civil society” refer to as Marx uses it here?

1885年，恩格斯在《关于共产主义者同盟的历史》一文中写道：“决不是国家制约和决定市民社会，而是市民社会制约和决定国家。”过去，我们常常将这一论断定位为青年马克思1843—1844年的思想状态，即完成了第一次唯物主义转变。然而，我们却忽略了恩格斯这一论断的上一句话，即“在《德法年鉴》（1844年）里”。也就是说，恩格斯认为马克思是在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》和《论犹太人问题》中提出了与“市民社会制约和决定国家”相一致的看法，从唯心主义转向唯物主义。如果暂且不论恩格斯这一论断准确与否，那么我们需要首先思考：作为恩格斯当时尚未看到的手稿，马克思的《黑格尔法哲学批判》大量探讨了市民社会与国家的关系。马克思在这里使用的“市民社会”是指什么？

First, does the concept of “civil society” exist in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*? The answer seems obvious: Marx certainly used this concept. However, the issue is not so simple; Marx’s use of the concept of “civil society” in this manuscript exhibits a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, Marx does not necessarily use the concept of “civil society” to express what he has in mind as “civil society.” Since the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* is a manuscript, not a work Marx prepared for publication, its wording is not particularly rigorous. For example, Marx says: “Hegel here sets up an insoluble antinomy. On the one hand, external necessity; on the other hand, immanent end. The universal ultimate end of the state and the particular interests that individuals ought to have are unified. That is, the individual’s duty toward the state and the individual’s rights are identical in themselves.” If we analyze this passage in isolation from the manuscript, Marx is here criticizing the relationship of unity between the state and the individual. But if we examine it in conjunction with Hegel’s *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, we find that Hegel is here discussing the relationship between the state and civil society; Marx has quietly replaced “civil society” with “individual,” and this “individual” actually refers to individual rights. Although this imprecise use of concepts poses considerable challenges for researchers’ reading, it precisely highlights the framework of Marx’s subconscious knowledge. In his conception at this time, “civil society” is actually constituted by individual rights, and it is from this that Marx’s antinomy between state and civil society arises. Marx’s undergraduate legal studies still lingered in his mind, while Hegel’s *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, which is not strictly legal in the jurisprudential sense, provided Marx with a medium for transitioning from jurisprudence to philosophy. On the other hand, Marx used more than one concept of “society” in the manuscript. In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, both “Gesellschaft” and “” appear, both translated into Chinese as “society.” The “” Marx used is spelled “” in the 2005 German orthography reform; this word is a French loanword, equivalent to the English word “society.” In 18th- and 19th-century Germany, it was used mainly within and to describe the aristocratic class, and was even once equated with the aristocratic academic society “Akademie.” Marx’s use of this word in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* is not limited to the noun; he also uses the adjective “social,” and even employs the seemingly historical-materialist expression “socialen Daseins” (social determinate being). So how does Marx actually view this concept of “society”? Examining the context in which Marx uses this word, we can see that Marx generally pairs it with “estate” (der Stand), “separation” (trennen), and “distinction” (unterschieden). Although it has a certain structural character, it expresses the separation of high society from what Marx calls civil society. Therefore, “die ” carries a certain pejorative connotation and must never be conflated with civil society or the social determinate being of historical materialism. Marx’s direct use of the concept of “society” in the sense of civil society follows Hegel’s usage in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, namely, “Gesellschaft.” The Chinese translation of “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” has taken multiple forms, such as civil society, society of property-owners, and bourgeois society. Based on the internal developmental changes in Marx’s thought, it should be translated as “civil society.”

第一，《黑格尔法哲学批判》中存在“市民社会”概念吗？这个答案看似是显而易见的，马克思当然使用了这个概念。但是，这个问题并非这么简单，马克思在这一手稿中对“市民社会”概念的使用存在一定的模糊性。一方面，马克思不一定使用“市民社会”概念来表达他头脑中的“市民社会”。由于《黑格尔法哲学批判》是一部手稿，而非马克思整理出版的著作，所以其在用词上并不是特别严谨。譬如，马克思说“黑格尔在这里提出了一个无法解决的二律背反。一方面是外在必然性，另一方面是内在目的。国家的普遍最终目的和个人应该存在的特殊利益之间是统一的。也就是说，个人对于国家的义务和个人的权利在其自身是相同的”。如果孤立地从手稿去分析这段话，马克思在这里批判的是国家和个人的统一性关系，但是如果结合黑格尔《法哲学原理》来看，就会发现黑格尔在这里论述的是国家与市民社会的关系，马克思悄然将“市民社会”转换成了“个人”，而这里的“个人”其实指的是个人权利。这种概念的不严谨使用虽然对研究者的阅读提出了较大的挑战，却恰恰凸显了马克思的潜意识知识框架。在他此时的观念中，“市民社会”其实是由个人的权利所构成的，由此才构成马克思认为的国家与市民社会的二律背反。马克思本科学习的法律专业依然在其头脑中挥之不去，而黑格尔非严格法学意义的《法哲学原理》则为马克思提供了一个从法学过渡到哲学的中介。另一方面，马克思在手稿中用了不止一种“社会”概念。在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中出现了“Gesellschaft”和“”，二者中文的翻译皆为“社会”。马克思使用的“”在2005年的德语新正字法中拼写为“”，该词是法语外来词，也就是现在英语词汇中的“society”。而在18—19世纪的德国，主要是在贵族阶级内部以及对贵族阶级的描述中使用该词，甚至一度将该词等同于贵族的学术团体“Akademie”。马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中对这个词的使用不仅仅限于名词，还使用了形容词“social”，甚至出现了令人迷惑的貌似历史唯物主义的词语“socialen Daseins”（社会的定在）的表述。那么，马克思究竟如何看待“”这个社会概念？结合马克思使用这个概念的上下文，我们可以看出，马克思一般将这个词与“等级”（der Stand）、“分离”（trennen）、“区别”（unterschieden）连用，虽然具有一定的结构性，却表达了上层社会与马克思口中的市民社会的分离。因此，“die ”具有一定的贬义性质，绝不可将其与市民社会及历史唯物主义中的社会定在混淆。而马克思在市民社会的含义上对“社会”概念的直接使用沿用了黑格尔《法哲学原理》中的用法，即“Gesellschaft”。“bürgerliche Gesellschaft”在中译的过程中出现了多种译法，如市民社会、有产者社会、资产阶级社会。以马克思思想的内在发展变化为根据，应将其翻译为“市民社会”。

Second, does the “civil society” in the Hegelian philosophical sense exist in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*? The above points out that Marx’s spelling of the German concept “civil society” follows the usage in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. But is Marx really continuing to speak on Hegel’s basis? When we study the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* together with the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, we find that Hegel’s discussion of the family and civil society occupies sections 158–256 of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, whereas in the extant *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx begins his excerpts from section 261, the chapter on “The State.” Regarding this issue, although it is not difficult to see from the extant manuscript that its first page begins with the part Marx marked as “II,” based on the length of parts “II,” “III,” and “IV” of the manuscript, it can be inferred that the lost part “I” was also no more than five pages in length and could not have contained an in-depth discussion of the voluminous chapter on “Civil Society” in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Therefore, the claim by some scholars that Marx’s discussion of the chapter on “Civil Society” in the manuscript has been lost is likely untenable. Corresponding to this view, Marx says in his commentary on section 303 of the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*: “We will continue to study this later in the chapter on ‘Civil Society.’” Regardless of whether Marx’s subsequent research plan on the chapter on “Civil Society” was realized, it is clear that the manuscript of the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* does not contain an in-depth analysis of “civil society.” However, when we step outside this concept to analyze Marx’s transcendence of civil society, we see the strong Hegelian speculative coloring that occupies Marx’s mind. Marx believes that in the reality of modern society, civil society ought to replace the feudal political state and therefore the “feudal state” and its institutions should be abolished and replaced by civil society. In his view, modern German society still contains remnants of medieval feudal politics, namely, the political state, yet Hegel presents the opposition between civil society and the political state as an opposition within the political state itself, attempting to incorporate civil society into the grand system of the state. How does Marx resolve this contradiction? Consistent with Hegel’s logic: “Civil society is the real political society.” It can be seen that Marx’s method of resisting feudal autocracy is to abolish the political state, and the way to abolish the political state is through civil society’s transcendent replacement of the elements of the political state in reality. In simple terms, this means incorporating the factors of the political state that conform to modern society into the grand system of civil society. Completing the Hegelian system from the opposite side of Hegel is the real completion of the logic of political society—the historical mission of civil society.

第二，《黑格尔法哲学批判》中存在黑格尔哲学意谓上的“市民社会”吗？上文中指出，马克思对“市民社会”这一德语概念的拼写沿袭了《法哲学原理》的用法，但是，马克思真的是在黑格尔的基础上继续言说吗？当我们将《黑格尔法哲学批判》与《法哲学原理》放到一起去研究时，可以发现黑格尔关于家庭和市民社会的论述在《法哲学原理》的158—256节，而在现存的《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思却是从261节的“国家”章开始摘抄的。针对这个问题，虽然从现存的手稿中不难发现，现存手稿的第一页是从马克思标注的第“Ⅱ”部分开始的，但是根据手稿第“Ⅱ”“Ⅲ”“Ⅳ”部分的篇幅，可以推断遗失的第“Ⅰ”部分篇幅也在5页之内，不可能对《法哲学原理》中篇幅巨大的“市民社会”章有深入探讨，因此有学者提出的马克思关于“市民社会”章的讨论手稿存在遗失问题，恐怕难以成立。与此观点对应的是，马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》对303节的评论中说道：“关于此，我们在之后的‘市民社会’一章中再继续研究。”且不论马克思说的之后对“市民社会”章的研究计划是否实现，明显可以看出的是，《黑格尔法哲学批判》手稿中并没有对“市民社会”的深入分析。然而，当我们跳出这一概念去分析马克思对市民社会的超越时，却又会看到占据马克思头脑的浓厚的黑格尔思辨色彩。马克思认为，在现代社会的现实中，市民社会应当取代封建政治国家而存在，因此“封建国家”及其制度是应该被市民社会所取消和替代的。在他看来，现代德国社会中仍然存在中世纪封建政治的残余成分即政治国家，黑格尔却将市民社会与政治国家的对立说成是政治国家内部的对立，企图将市民社会纳入国家的大体系之中。而马克思是如何解决这个矛盾的呢？与黑格尔逻辑一致的是：“市民社会是现实的政治社会。”可以看出，马克思试图反抗封建专制的方法是取消政治国家，而取消政治国家的办法就是通过市民社会在现实中对政治国家的成分进行超越性替代。简单来说，就是将政治国家中符合现代社会的因素纳入市民社会的大体系之中。从黑格尔的对立面完成黑格尔式的体系，是政治社会逻辑的现实完成——市民社会的历史使命。

Third, does “civil society” in the sense of “economic base” exist in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*? First, judging from Marx’s reading notes, at this time Marx had not yet systematically studied political economy. Although Hegel’s “civil society” is developed on the basis of the “system of needs” in the context of Smith’s economics, it was difficult for Marx at this point to grasp its meaning in terms of economic relations. Second, judging from Marx’s use of this concept in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx says: “He [Hegel] proceeds from the relation of private right and private welfare, i.e., the spheres of the family and civil society, to the state.” It can be seen that Marx directly equates the family and civil society with private right and private welfare, and here “private right” does not refer to the rights of all people, but to the individual rights of civil society as opposed to the material interests obtained by feudal monarchy through contingency. Although Marx mentions the concept of private property in this manuscript, and even describes private property as the pillar and foundation of the state, the state referred to here is not the state in the general sense, but the feudal state. It can also be seen from the excerpts in the *Kreuznach Notebooks* that the concept of “property” used by Marx at this time still remained at the level of abstract legal possession and direct empirical intuition. Finally, since Marx’s “civil society” based on legal right is a non-structural, intuitive representation of a civil association, although it borrows Feuerbach’s terminology of “inversion,” can it accomplish a materialist inversion of Hegel? In *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, civil society is composed of citizens with private interests, or rather a civil association. Within this association, bonds among citizens are formed through the natural foundation of marriage, the social stipulation of contract, and the life-foundation of property (in the legal sense, not in the process of production and exchange). Civil society is thus established in Marx’s mind on this intuitive, abstract basis. It can be seen that this civil society is a non-structural, flattened association, whereas Hegel not only provides a structural description of civil society itself, but also meticulously designs the entire systemic structure of the organization and political administration of the state, as well as the two-way mediation between state and civil society. Marx attempts to directly invert the structural system of the state through a flattened civil association. The inverted subject and predicate do not constitute an equivalent relation; simply replacing “state” with “civil” cannot accomplish the inversion of Hegel’s structural system of “state—civil society—family,” nor can it successfully apply Feuerbach’s materialist method of inversion, merely spinning in circles within abstract legal right. Therefore, as Marx recalls in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*: “The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.” It is in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* that the concept of “civil society” truly begins to emerge.

第三，《黑格尔法哲学批判》中存在“经济基础”意义上的“市民社会”吗？首先，从马克思的读书笔记来看，此时的马克思还没有系统地研究政治经济学，尽管黑格尔的“市民社会”是在斯密经济学语境中的“需要体系”之上展开的，但是这个时候的马克思很难把握到其经济关系的含义。其次，从马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中对这一概念的使用来看，马克思说：“他（黑格尔）说的是从私人权利和私人幸福，也就是家庭和市民社会的领域到国家的关系出发的。”可以看出，马克思将家庭和市民社会直接等同于私人权利和私人幸福，且这里的“私人权利”并非指所有人的权利，而是与封建王权通过偶然性获得的物质利益相对峙的市民社会的个体权利。尽管马克思在这一手稿中提到了私有财产的概念，甚至把私有财产说成是国家的支柱和基础，但这里所说的国家并不是一般意义上的国家，而是指封建国家。从《克罗伊茨纳赫笔记》的摘录中也可以看出，马克思此时所使用的“财产”概念还停留在抽象的法权占有和现实直观的层面上。最后，由于马克思基于法权的“市民社会”是一种非结构性的市民团体表象直观，虽然借鉴了费尔巴哈关于“颠倒”式的用语，但是他是否能够完成对黑格尔的唯物主义颠倒呢？在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，市民社会是由具有私利的市民组成的，或者说是一个市民团体，在这个团体之中，通过婚姻的自然基础、契约的社会规定、财产（法权意义上的，非生产和交换过程当中的）的生活基础形成市民与市民的纽带，市民社会也依据这种直观、抽象的基础建立在马克思的心中。可以看出，这种市民社会是一个非结构性的扁平化团体，而黑格尔不仅对市民社会本身的描述是结构性的，而且对国家的组织和政治施行，以及国家与市民社会双向中介的整套体系结构，进行了细致入微的设计。马克思试图通过扁平化的市民团体对结构化的国家体系完成直接颠倒，颠倒的主语和谓语不构成对等关系，直接将“国家”替换成“市民”，无法完成对黑格尔结构化的“国家—市民社会—家庭”体系的颠倒，也无法成功运用费尔巴哈唯物主义的颠倒方法，仅仅只能在抽象的法权上转圈。因此，正如马克思在《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》中的回顾：“对市民社会的解剖应该到政治经济学中去寻求”，在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，“市民社会”概念才开始真正浮出水面。

Fourth, does humanist “civil society” exist in *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*? By this time, Marx had already begun to accept Feuerbach’s humanist materialism, and the logic of humanism gradually came to dominate Marx’s thinking. However, the “civil society” in Marx’s writing at this time is not entirely humanist in nature. In Marx’s view, the political state in Germany at that time was a remnant of feudal society and did not conform to the principles of true civil society. The first task of civil society is to sublate the political state. Only after completing the transcendence and replacement of the (feudal) political state can civil society become a real driving force and precondition. Only on this basis can Marx’s humanist logic formally take the stage. As Marx says: “The member of civil society, in his political significance, frees himself from his estate, from his real private position; it is here that he first steps forth as a human being.” After shedding the historical factor of political estates, the non-structural civil society is composed of people with private interests. In other words, this is the completion of individualism in reality, as Marx calls it. Private right and private interest constitute the driving force and precondition of real life, which is consistent with Marx’s view, already recognized during his *Rheinische Zeitung* period, that “interest carried the day over right by a majority of votes.” However, civil society’s transcendence of the political state is only the first step. More importantly, Marx here proposes a logic for the future development of civil society. After completing the real revolutionary mission of “civil society,” Marx then turns to argue that in a future society, this civil society of private interests itself can also be sublated once again. Apart from the essential determinations of human nature, all the determinations that civil society imposes on humanity are external to humans. Activity and labor are merely means for humans within civil society, while “the individual’s existence is the ultimate end.” Therefore, the logic of Marx’s mission for civil society and his vision for the future can be summarized as follows: civil society is composed of people with private interests in reality; this civil society of private interests will necessarily transcend and replace the political state in history; after this transcendence is completed, civil society will also sublate the external bond between civil society itself and the individual, thereby eliminating the problem of civil society’s own totality and the predominance of “vulgar materialism.” Ultimately, the “true human being” is manifested. This is an important expression of Marx’s humanist materialist thought at this time.

第四，《黑格尔法哲学批判》中存在人本主义的“市民社会”吗？此时的马克思已经开始接受费尔巴哈的人本主义的唯物主义，人本主义逻辑逐渐在马克思的头脑中占据主导地位。但是，此时马克思笔下的“市民社会”并非全部都具有人本主义性质。在马克思看来，当时德国的政治国家是封建社会的残余，不符合真正的市民社会的原则。市民社会首先要做的就是对政治国家进行扬弃，只有在完成对（封建）政治国家的超越和替代后，市民社会才能成为现实的动力和前提。也只有在此基础上，马克思的人本主义逻辑方能正式登场。正如马克思所说：“市民社会的成员在政治意义上摆脱他自己的等级，摆脱了他的现实的私人地位，在这里，他自己才作为人的意义而出场。”在摆脱了政治等级的历史因素之后，非结构性的市民社会由具有私利的人组成。换言之，也就是马克思口中的个人主义在现实中的完成。私人权利、私人利益构成了现实生活的动力和前提，这与马克思在《莱茵报》时期就认识到的“利益以多数票胜过了法”具有观点上的一致性。然而，市民社会超越政治国家只是第一步，更重要的是马克思在这里提出了面向未来的市民社会发展逻辑。在完成了“市民社会”的现实革命使命后，马克思转而又认为，在未来社会中，这种私利的市民社会本身也是可以再次被扬弃的。除了人性的本质规定，市民社会给予人类的必要性规定都是外在于人的，活动和劳动都只是人在市民社会之中的手段，而“个人的生存是最终的目的”。因此，可以总结出马克思对市民社会使命与未来设想的逻辑：市民社会是由现实中具有私利的人组成的，具有私利的市民社会现实必将在历史中超越和替代政治国家，在超越完成之后，市民社会也将扬弃市民社会本身与个人之间的外在纽带，从而取消市民社会本身的整体性与“下流的唯物主义”占上风的问题。最终，“真正的人”被彰显，这正是此时马克思人本主义的唯物主义思想的重要体现。

Online Editor: Paul

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