Rethinking the Theoretical Origins and Logical Process of Marx’s First Intellectual Transformation

In the study of the history of the development of Marx’s philosophical thought, the theoretical origins and logical process of Marx’s first intellectual transformation have always been an important issue attracting considerable attention. Research on this issue can be roughly divided into two approaches: one is the interpretive path initiated by Lenin, which makes qualitative judgments from the perspective of philosophical logic and political stance. This path was initially rigidly interpreted within the framework of Soviet dogmatism as a “one-transformation theory,” and was subsequently severely rejected and neglected in the critical process of Western Marxism. It was not until Chinese Marxist scholars represented by Sun Bokui, in their own efforts to break free from the Soviet dogmatic model, creatively proposed a “two-transformation theory” that it regained new theoretical vitality. The other approach is an interpretive path that analyzes from the perspective of research objects and theoretical themes, such as the shift from the critique of the state to the critique of civil society, or from the critique of political alienation to the critique of economic alienation. While these interpretive paths indeed provide a basic theoretical framework for deeply grasping the development process of the young Marx’s philosophical thought, consensus has not yet been reached on certain specific issues. For example, under the influence of which figures did Marx turn to what kind of materialism and communism at this time? In the past, academic circles usually focused on Marx’s intellectual relationship with Hegel and Feuerbach, while relatively neglecting the potential influences of Proudhon, Hess, and Engels on Marx at different levels. This has also led to either an overly general approach or a descent into specific debates over “natural materialism,” “juridical materialism,” or “anthropological materialism” regarding the logical process and qualitative judgment of Marx’s intellectual transformation. A re-examination and exploration of these issues will help to more accurately grasp the diverse theoretical background and complex logical process of Marx’s first intellectual transformation.

在马克思哲学思想发展史研究中，马克思实现第一次思想转变的理论渊源和逻辑进程始终是一个备受关注的重要问题。对于这一问题的研究大致可分为两种路径：一种是由列宁所开启的从哲学逻辑和政治立场角度进行质性判断的解读路径。这一路径最初在苏联教条主义的框架下被僵化地解读为“一次转变论”，随后在西方马克思主义的批判过程中遭到严重拒斥和忽视，直到以孙伯鍨先生为代表的中国马克思主义学者在同样寻求打破苏联教条主义模式的过程中独创性地提出“两次转变论”，才得以重新焕发出新的理论生命力。另一种是从研究对象和理论主题角度加以分析的解读路径，如从国家批判到市民社会批判，从政治异化批判到经济异化批判等。这些解读路径的确为我们深入把握青年马克思的哲学思想发展过程提供了基础理论框架，但在一些具体问题上仍未达成共识。譬如，此时马克思究竟受到哪些人物的影响而转向何种唯物主义和共产主义？过去学界通常围绕马克思与黑格尔、费尔巴哈的思想关系加以探讨，而相对忽视了蒲鲁东、赫斯和恩格斯对马克思产生的不同层面的潜在影响，这也导致在马克思思想转变的逻辑进程和质性判断上要么过于笼统，要么陷入“自然唯物主义”“法权唯物主义”或“人本学唯物主义”的具体争论中。对这些问题的重新反思和探究，将有助于更准确地把握马克思实现第一次思想转变的多元理论背景和复杂逻辑进程。

The Diverse Theoretical Background of Marx’s First Intellectual Transformation

马克思第一次思想转变的多元理论背景

As is well known, Marx’s first intellectual transformation manifested in philosophical logic as a shift from idealism to materialism. In the past, we usually interpreted this transformation as Marx using Feuerbach’s materialism to overcome and transcend Hegel’s speculative idealism. However, it is necessary to further ask: what kind of Feuerbach’s materialism did Marx actually accept? In a letter to Ruge in March 1843, Marx explicitly criticized Feuerbach for “emphasizing nature too much and politics too little,” indicating that Marx did not endorse Feuerbach’s natural materialism, and therefore could only have tended to accept Feuerbach’s anthropological materialism. Nevertheless, at this time Marx was primarily concerned with socio-political issues, whereas Feuerbach’s anthropological materialism focused on the religious sphere. How, then, did Marx extend it to the socio-political and economic fields?

众所周知，马克思第一次思想转变在哲学逻辑上表现为从唯心主义转向唯物主义。过去，我们通常将这一转变解读为马克思借助费尔巴哈的唯物主义克服和超越黑格尔的思辨唯心主义。然而，需要进一步追问的是，马克思究竟接受了费尔巴哈的何种唯物主义？马克思在1843年3月致卢格的信中明确批评费尔巴哈“强调自然过多而强调政治太少”，这表明马克思并不赞同费尔巴哈的自然唯物主义，因而只可能倾向于接受费尔巴哈的人本学唯物主义。不过，此时马克思主要关注的是社会政治问题，而费尔巴哈的人本学唯物主义却侧重于宗教领域，那么马克思又是如何将其拓展到社会政治经济领域的呢？

In fact, the contemporaneous Proudhon, Hess, and Engels had already delved into the socio-political and economic fields before Marx, and had transcended Feuerbach’s narrow religious horizon and philosophical approach at different levels, thereby exerting complex potential influences on Marx’s intellectual transformation. Specifically, Proudhon, in *What is Property?*, relatively early established a latent social materialist thought and a utopian socialist vision within the context of political economy. On the one hand, Proudhon believed that society is the sum total of various relations, among which socio-economic relations constitute the core driving force of historical development, and that property plays a decisive role in the family, religion, military organization, and political system. On the other hand, Proudhon, from the perspective of a theory of human nature, profoundly exposed the falsity of bourgeois juridical concepts and political-economic categories. For instance, the premise of bourgeois equality and property rights is precisely inequality in property and status, and thus they are essentially a form of theft and fraud. From this, he proposed a free society that synthesizes communism and private property. Although this vision had a utopian socialist character, Proudhon’s critique of bourgeois political and juridical rights from the perspective of human nature undoubtedly had a significant intellectual impact on Marx, who was then encountering the problems of material interests and communism for the first time, providing ideological guidance for Marx’s turn toward the study of political history and the critique of bourgeois juridical rights. Hess was relatively early in combining Feuerbach’s anthropological materialism with Proudhon’s critique of political and juridical rights. Moreover, Hess’s critique of alienation took the lead in shifting from the critique of political alienation to the critique of economic alienation, thereby relatively early completing a progressive expansion of Feuerbach’s anthropological materialism. In *The Philosophy of Action*, Hess extended the critical logic of anthropological alienation to the political sphere, developing a critique of political alienation. He argued that the foundation of the political state and civil society is not reason and law, but egoistic individuals; the political state is merely a tool for the ruling class to extract the sweat and blood of the people. In this sense, bourgeois freedom and equality are merely another form of enslavement. In *On the Essence of Money*, Hess further extended the critical logic of anthropological alienation to the economic sphere, proposing a critique of money alienation. He emphasized that money in the secular world is the product of the alienation of the human species-essence of social intercourse, and a hallmark of human slavery. In response, he proposed an ethical communist vision, arguing that only through the union of love and reason can political alienation and money alienation be sublated. Although Hess had not yet escaped the mold of utopian socialism, his approach of political and economic alienation undoubtedly provided Marx with a direct and important philosophical-methodological reference. Under Hess’s influence, Engels was relatively early in attempting to combine Feuerbach’s humanist critique with the critique of bourgeois political economy, and, relying on more solid empirical research and studies of political economy, established a more distinct revolutionary communist stance. In *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy*, Engels, starting from objective reality, exposed the brutality of bourgeois private property. For example, under bourgeois private property, competition among people places them in a condition of mutual hostility and enslavement. At the same time, Engels, from a humanist perspective, severely criticized the falsity and contradictions of bourgeois political economy. For instance, he criticized the hypocrisy and inconsistency of Smith’s theory of free trade as thoroughly damaging to free human nature. He actively advocated for the abolition of private property, competition, and the opposition of interests, and emphasized that the periodic economic crises triggered by blind competition would inevitably lead to social revolution. These views became a motivating factor for Marx’s turn toward a firm revolutionary communist stance.

实际上，同时期的蒲鲁东、赫斯和恩格斯已经先于马克思深入到社会政治经济领域，并在不同层面上超越了费尔巴哈的狭隘宗教视域和哲学理路，从而对马克思的思想转变产生复杂的潜在影响。具体而言，蒲鲁东在《什么是所有权》中较早地在政治经济学语境中确立起隐性社会唯物主义思想和空想社会主义构想。一方面，蒲鲁东认为，社会是各种关系的总和，其中社会经济关系构成历史发展的核心动力，所有权对家庭、宗教、军事组织和政治制度起着决定性作用。另一方面，蒲鲁东从人性论角度深刻揭露了资产阶级法权观念和政治经济学范畴的虚假性。譬如，资产阶级平等权和所有权的前提恰恰是财产和等级上的不平等，因而在本质上是一种盗窃和欺诈。由此，他提出一种将共产制和私有制综合起来的自由社会。尽管这种构想带有空想社会主义色彩，但蒲鲁东从人性论角度对资产阶级政治法权的批判，无疑会对初次遭遇物质利益和共产主义难题的马克思产生较大的思想触动，为马克思转向政治历史研究和资产阶级法权批判提供了思想引导。赫斯较早将费尔巴哈的人本学唯物主义与蒲鲁东的政治法权批判结合起来。而且，赫斯的异化批判思想率先实现了从政治异化批判向经济异化批判的转变，从而较早地完成了对费尔巴哈人本学唯物主义的递进式拓展。赫斯在《行动哲学》中将人本学异化批判逻辑拓展到政治领域而发展出政治异化批判。他认为，政治国家和市民社会的基础并不是理性和法律，而是利己主义的个人，政治国家只是维护统治阶级榨取人民血汗的工具，在此意义上，资产阶级的自由平等只是另一种奴役。在《论货币的本质》中，赫斯进一步将人本学异化批判逻辑延展到经济领域而提出货币异化批判。他强调，世俗世界中的货币是人的交往类本质发生异化的产物，是人类奴隶制的标志。对此，他提出一种伦理共产主义构想，认为只有通过爱与理性的联合才能扬弃政治异化和货币异化。尽管赫斯仍未摆脱空想社会主义的窠臼，但其政治异化和经济异化的思路无疑为马克思提供了直接而重要的哲学方法论参照。恩格斯在赫斯的影响下较早地尝试将费尔巴哈的人本主义批判与资产阶级政治经济学批判结合起来，并凭借更为扎实的实证研究和政治经济学研究而确立了更为鲜明的革命共产主义立场。在《国民经济学批判大纲》中，恩格斯从客观现实出发揭露了资产阶级私有制的残酷性。譬如，在资产阶级私有制下，人与人之间的竞争使人们处于相互敌对和奴役的状况之中。同时，恩格斯从人本主义视角严厉批判了资产阶级政治经济学的虚假性和矛盾性。譬如，他批判斯密的自由贸易理论的伪善性和不一贯性彻底损害了自由人性。他积极主张消灭私有制、竞争和利益对立，并强调盲目竞争所引发的周期性经济危机必然会带来社会革命。这些观点成为马克思转向坚定的革命共产主义立场的促动因素。

The Complex Logical Process of Marx’s First Intellectual Transformation

马克思第一次思想转变的复杂逻辑进程

Based on a background of multiple theoretical supports and his own theoretical exploration, Marx’s first intellectual transformation underwent a complex process of logical evolution. As is well known, the starting point of Marx’s philosophical thought was a philosophy of self-consciousness and a rationalist conception of the state heavily tinged with Hegelian speculative idealism and bourgeois Enlightenment thought. During the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, Marx encountered for the first time the dual problems of material interests and communism. On the one hand, from the perspective of “state reason and state ethics,” Marx sharply criticized the phenomenon of “material interests gaining the upper hand” as a form of “vulgar materialism”; this was his negation and rejection, based on a Hegelian objective-idealist rational conception of the state, of the “materialist” fact centered on private interests. On the other hand, although Marx maintained a reserved attitude toward the various communist and socialist currents of the time, he particularly and rigorously held that the works of Proudhon and others “must by no means be criticized on the basis of a superficial, momentary imagination,” but must be criticized only through long and in-depth study. This indicates that Proudhon’s critique of political right had already attracted Marx’s attention and prompted a wavering in his existing political stance. This dual problem impelled Marx, during the *Kreuznach Notebooks* period, to turn to an in-depth study of European and American political history. In his research, Marx recognized that private property had historically always constituted the core element of the political state, and that the state and law fundamentally aimed to safeguard the private interests of the ruling class. This historically reconfirmed the critiques of modern civil society and private property made by Proudhon and Hess, laying an important foundation for Marx’s first intellectual transformation. On this basis, in the contemporaneous *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx established the implicit social-materialist idea that “civil society determines the state.” However, considering the overall context of this text, at this time Marx understood civil society mainly from the perspective of political right and private interests, and had not yet touched upon civil society as objective economic relations in the context of political economy. Therefore, Marx generally held a negative and critical attitude toward civil society, and thus did not endorse the fact that “civil society determines the state.” Consequently, this social materialism was not a dominant materialist stance that Marx consciously established at this time. The author believes that Marx’s dominant philosophical logic at this time was a logic of political alienation critique based on Feuerbachian humanist materialism, which likely came from Hess’s influence. Specifically, Marx regarded the family, civil society, and the state as “the objectification of the essence of man,” and, on the basis of criticizing bourgeois democracy and political right, advocated the establishment of a “true democracy.” This clearly abandoned bourgeois revolutionary democracy in terms of political stance, but had not yet explicitly put forward communist propositions.

基于多元理论支援背景和自身理论探索，马克思第一次思想转变经历了一个复杂的逻辑嬗变过程。众所周知，马克思哲学思想的起点是带有强烈的黑格尔思辨唯心主义和资产阶级启蒙思想底色的自我意识哲学和理性主义国家观。在《莱茵报》时期，马克思首次遭遇到关于物质利益和共产主义的双重难题。一方面，马克思从“国家理性与国家伦理”的角度尖锐批判“物质利益占上风”现象是一种“下流的唯物主义”，这是他基于黑格尔式的客观唯心主义理性国家观对以私人利益为核心的“唯物主义”事实的否定和拒斥。另一方面，马克思虽然对当时的各种共产主义和社会主义思潮持保留态度，但特别严谨地认为对待蒲鲁东等人的著作“决不能根据肤浅的、片刻的想象去批判”，而必须通过长期深入的研究来加以批判。这表明，蒲鲁东的政治法权批判已经引起马克思的关注，并促使他既有的政治立场开始出现动摇。这种双重难题促使马克思在《克罗伊茨纳赫笔记》时期转向对欧美政治历史的深入研究。马克思在研究中认识到，私有财产在历史上始终构成政治国家的核心要素，国家和法在根本上旨在维护统治阶级的私人利益。这从历史角度再度确证了蒲鲁东和赫斯对现代市民社会和私有财产的批判，为马克思第一次思想转变奠定了重要基础。在此基础上，马克思在同时期的《黑格尔法哲学批判》中确立了“市民社会决定国家”的隐性社会唯物主义思想。不过，结合该文本的整体语境来看，此时马克思主要是从政治法权和私人利益的角度来理解市民社会，尚未触及政治经济学语境中作为客观经济关系的市民社会。因此，马克思在总体上对市民社会持否定和批判态度，故而不认同“市民社会决定国家”这一事实。所以，这种社会唯物主义并非此时马克思自觉确立的居于主导地位的唯物主义立场。笔者认为，此时马克思的主导性哲学逻辑是基于费尔巴哈式的人本学唯物主义的政治异化批判逻辑，而这很可能来自赫斯的影响。具体而言，马克思将家庭、市民社会和国家看作“人的本质的客体化”，并在批判资产阶级民主制和政治法权的基础上倡导建立一种“真正的民主制”。这就在政治立场上明确抛弃了资产阶级革命民主主义，但还未明确提出共产主义的主张。

In *On the Jewish Question*, under the influence of Proudhon and especially Hess, Marx achieved a transformation from a humanist critique of political alienation to a critique of economic alienation, and initially outlined the germ of a communist idea based on humanist materialism. First, Marx continued along the logic of the humanist critique of political alienation to profoundly criticize the historical limitations of bourgeois political emancipation, emphasizing that political emancipation cannot bring about human emancipation, but rather splits man into the private individual (*citoyen*) and the citizen (*bourgeois*). Next, like Proudhon and Hess, Marx exposed one by one the falsity of bourgeois right, arguing that so-called human rights, freedom, equality, property, and security are all merely means to maintain the egoistic principle of civil society. Therefore, the root of political alienation lies in civil society, and the critique and transcendence of political alienation must penetrate into the critique of civil society. Consequently, Marx’s logic of alienation critique advanced further to the level of economic alienation critique, which was likely inspired by Hess’s humanist critique of money alienation. Marx pointed out that in civil society, money becomes the god of actual need and self-interest, becomes the essence of human labor alienated from man, and compels man to worship it. Human emancipation consists in liberating mankind from “the Jewish spirit.” And only when real individuals recognize the social forces inherent in themselves, and organize these social forces to overcome real division, thereby becoming species-beings, can human emancipation be truly realized. Here, Marx truly established the philosophical foundation of humanist materialism at the level of economic alienation critique, and on this basis initially expressed a communist stance. In the *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx further elaborated his philosophical communism and proletarian revolutionary stance from the perspective of humanist materialism. Marx pointed out: “The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses… The root of man is man himself.” The “theory” here refers to Feuerbachian humanist materialism, which holds that “man is the highest essence of man”; the “masses” refer to the proletariat, the product of the industrial movement; these two constitute respectively the head and the heart of human emancipation. It can be seen that Marx thoroughly forged humanist materialism into the philosophical foundation and spiritual weapon of the proletarian revolution, while simultaneously regarding the proletariat as the material weapon of humanist philosophy, thereby internally combining philosophical logic with political stance. This clear revolutionary tendency likely came from Engels’s influence.

在《论犹太人问题》中，马克思在蒲鲁东特别是赫斯的影响下实现了从人本主义政治异化批判向经济异化批判的转变，并初步勾勒了基于人本学唯物主义的共产主义思想萌芽。首先，马克思继续沿着人本主义政治异化批判逻辑深刻批判了资产阶级政治解放的历史局限性，强调政治解放并不能带来人的解放，而是使人分裂为市民和公民。接着，马克思像蒲鲁东和赫斯一样逐一揭露了资产阶级法权的虚假性，所谓人权、自由、平等、财产和安全等都只不过是为了维护市民社会的利己主义原则。因此，政治异化的根源在于市民社会，对政治异化的批判和超越必须深入到对市民社会的批判。于是，马克思的异化批判逻辑进一步推进到经济异化批判层面，而这很可能受到赫斯的人本主义货币异化批判的启发。马克思指出，在市民社会中，金钱成为实际需要和自私自利的神，成为同人相异化的人的劳动的本质，并使人向它顶礼膜拜。人的解放就是使人类从“犹太精神”中解放出来。而只有当现实的个人认识到自身所固有的社会力量，并将这种社会力量组织起来克服现实的分裂，从而成为类存在物的时候，人的解放才能真正实现。这里，马克思在经济异化批判的层面上真正确立起人本学唯物主义的哲学基础，并在此基础上初步表达了共产主义立场。马克思在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中进一步从人本学唯物主义出发明确阐述了他的哲学共产主义和无产阶级革命立场。马克思指出：“批判的武器当然不能代替武器的批判，物质力量只能用物质力量来摧毁；理论一经掌握群众，也会变成物质力量……人的根本就是人本身。”这里的“理论”是指主张“人是人的最高本质”的费尔巴哈式的人本学唯物主义，“群众”则是指作为工业运动之产物的无产阶级，两者分别构成了人的解放的头脑和心脏。可见，马克思彻底将人本学唯物主义锻造为无产阶级革命的哲学基础和精神武器，同时将无产阶级看作人本主义哲学的物质武器，从而将哲学逻辑与政治立场内在地结合起来。这种明确的革命倾向很可能来自恩格斯的影响。

In summary, during the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* period, Marx initially achieved a synchronous transformation of philosophical logic and political stance: in philosophical stance, he turned to Feuerbachian humanist materialism; in political stance, he turned to a revolutionary communism based on humanist materialism. Of course, at this time Marx achieved this transformation mainly at a general level, and had not yet truly established a complete theoretical system. For example, Marx’s humanist materialism and its logic of alienation critique at this time still mainly remained at the level of alienation of intercourse, with money alienation as its prototype; it had not yet penetrated to the level of alienation of labor, nor had it yet drawn on Hegel’s dialectic of negativity to fully elucidate the philosophical-methodological foundation for sublating total alienation, nor had it demonstrated the essential connection and real path between sublating alienation and realizing communism. These tasks were precisely completed during the *Paris Manuscripts* period.

总之，马克思在《德法年鉴》时期初步实现了哲学逻辑和政治立场的同步转变：在哲学立场上转向费尔巴哈式的人本学唯物主义，在政治立场上转向基于人本学唯物主义的革命共产主义。当然，此时马克思主要是在一般层面上实现了这种转变，还未真正建立起完整的理论体系。譬如，此时马克思的人本学唯物主义及其异化批判逻辑还主要停留在以货币异化为雏形的交往异化层面，尚未深入到劳动异化层面，更没有借鉴黑格尔的否定辩证法充分阐明扬弃总体异化的哲学方法论基础，也没有论证扬弃异化同实现共产主义的本质关联和现实路径，而这些工作正是在《巴黎手稿》时期完成的。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗