The Factual Turn in Contemporary Epistemology

Epistemology within the contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophical tradition is a highly active and rapidly developing field of research. A clear example is that, not long after the so-called "value turn," epistemology is now considered to be undergoing a factual turn. So, what exactly is the factual turn? What factors have contributed to this turn? Why has it only emerged in the last twenty-plus years? Does such a turn truly exist? Next, we will analyze these questions one by one.

当代英美分析哲学传统的知识论是一个十分活跃且发展迅速的研究领域。一个明显的例证是，在发生所谓的“价值转向”后时隔不久，知识论又被认为正在经历一场事实转向。那么，究竟什么是事实转向？哪些因素促成了这一转向？为什么迟至最近二十多年才出现？真的存在这样的转向吗？接下来，我们将逐一分析这些问题。

What Is the Factual Turn

何为事实转向

It is generally believed that only when we believe something based on good reasons and evidence is our belief justified, warranted, and reasonable. The ensuing question is: what can serve as reasons for belief? Traditional epistemologists mostly hold that what can play the role of reasons for belief are the internal mental states of the believing subject, such as perceptual experiences or other beliefs. For example, when someone asks you why you believe there is a brown table in front of you, you might naturally reply because you see a brown table. That is, your visual experience can serve as a reason for your belief; when asked why you believe Xiao Ming is not at home, the reason you can give is that you believe he has gone to work at this time. Taking mental states as reasons for belief has its plausibility. Clearly, good reasons certainly support a belief and make holding such a belief reasonable, but only what is accessible to the believing subject can affect the reasonableness of their belief; something completely unknown to the subject does not influence the reasonableness of their belief. For instance, you see raindrops hitting the window, which makes it reasonable for you to believe it is raining outside, even though in reality a film crew is shooting a scene creating the appearance of rain. This situation is unknown to you, so it does not affect the reasonableness of your earlier belief. Mental states are easily accessed and known by the subject, and thus are naturally regarded as the unquestionable choice for reasons for belief.

一般认为，只有当我们基于好的理由和证据而相信一件事情的时候，我们的信念才是有根据的、得到辩护的（justified）和合理的。随之而来的问题是，哪些东西可以充当信念的理由？传统知识论者大多认为，能够扮演信念的理由角色的是信念主体内在的心理状态，如知觉经验或其他信念。举例来说，当别人问你为什么相信面前有一张棕色的桌子的时候，你可能会很自然地回答说因为你看到了一张棕色的桌子。也就是说，你的视觉经验可以作为你的信念的理由；在被追问为什么相信小明不在家的情况下，你可以给出的理由是：你相信这个时候他上班去了。把心理状态作为信念的理由有其合理性。因为，很显然，好的理由肯定是支持信念的，会使持有这样的信念变得合理，但是只有那些信念主体可以达及的东西，才是造成主体的信念合理与否的东西，一个完全不为主体所了解的东西不会对他的信念的合理性构成影响。例如，你看到有水滴拍打在窗户上，这会使你相信外面在下雨合理，尽管实际情况是外面有剧组在拍戏，制造了下雨的情景。但这个情况并不为你所知悉，所以不影响你前面那个信念的合理性。心理状态很容易为主体所了解和知悉，于是被理所当然地视为信念理由的不二之选。

Simply put, the factual turn in epistemology refers to a trend in recent epistemological research, shifting from the original common view that subjective mental states provide reasons and evidence for belief to an increasing emphasis that reasons can only be factive things. Literally, something being factive means it conforms to the facts. More precisely, factive things entail facts; from them, one can infer what the actual situation is. It should be noted that while facts are certainly factive, besides facts, there are other factive things. True perceptual experience is factive; from the fact that I indeed see the table is brown, it follows that "the table is brown" is true, i.e., "the table is brown" is a fact. Knowledge is also factive, because according to the traditional analysis of the concept of knowledge, knowledge is justified true belief; my knowing something entails that this thing is true, is a fact. Conversely, belief and ordinary perceptual experience are not factive. For example, I might believe that someone likes me, but from this belief it does not follow that she really likes me; I might just be wishful thinking. Again, a stick partially submerged in water looks bent; from this visual experience, it does not follow that the stick is bent. Traditional epistemologists took non-factive mental states like belief and perceptual experience as reasons for belief. In recent years, more and more people have disagreed with this approach, instead arguing that reasons for belief can only be factive things—namely, facts, true perceptual experience, or knowledge. This is what is called the factual turn in epistemology.

简单来说，知识论的事实转向是指近些年知识论研究中表现出来的一种趋势，从原来的普遍认为主观的心理状态为信念提供理由和证据，转为越来越强调：理由只能是事实性的（factive）东西。从字面上来看，一个东西是事实性的，就意味着它是符合事实的。更精确的说法是，事实性的东西蕴含着事实，从其中可以得出实际情况是什么样子。需要注意的是，虽然事实肯定是事实性的，但除了事实以外，还有其他事实性的东西。真实的知觉经验是事实性的，从我确实看到桌子是棕色的，可以得出“桌子是棕色的”是真的，也即“桌子是棕色的”是事实。知识也是事实性的，因为按照传统对知识概念的分析，知识就是得到辩护的真信念，我知道一件事情蕴含着这件事情是真的、是事实。相反，信念和一般的知觉经验并不是事实性的。例如，我可能会相信某个人喜欢我，可是从我的这个信念并不能得出她真的喜欢我，我可能只是一厢情愿。再如，部分浸没在水里的筷子看起来是弯的，从这一视觉经验得不出筷子是弯的。传统知识论者把信念和知觉经验这样的非事实性的心理状态作为信念的理由，近些年开始有越来越多人不同意这种做法，而是认为信念的理由只能是事实性的，即事实、真实知觉经验或知识，这就是所谓的知识论中的事实转向。

Causes of the Factual Turn

事实转向的成因

The emergence of the factual turn was not an overnight event; in fact, it has been a cumulative process. It is generally believed that three forces have jointly driven this turn: epistemological disjunctivism, knowledge-first epistemology, and factualism in the philosophy of action.

事实转向的出现不是一朝一夕的事情，实际上有一个日积月累的过程。一般认为，有三种力量共同推动了这一转向，分别是知识论析取主义、知识优先的知识论和行动哲学中的事实主义。

Epistemological disjunctivism holds that veridical perceptual experience and non-veridical perceptual experience (such as illusions and hallucinations) have different cognitive significance. Specifically, only veridical perceptual experience can provide justification for belief. When a cognitive subject has a veridical perceptual experience, such as actually seeing a person, his visual experience provides him with a good reason to believe there is a person in front of him. However, if it is merely an illusion or hallucination—for instance, what is actually in front of him is a tree or nothing at all—then the perceptual experience of seeming to see a person does not provide a reason for his belief, not even a poor one. The difference between veridical and non-veridical perceptual experience lies in the fact that in the former, the external world is directly presented; when you actually see a person, there really is a person in front of you. In other words, veridical perceptual experience is factive, while non-veridical perceptual experience is non-factive. Compared with non-veridical perceptual experience, the cognitive superiority of veridical perceptual experience in being able to provide justification for belief is embodied in its factivity, i.e., its ability to reflect the facts.

知识论析取主义主张，真实的知觉经验与不真实的知觉经验（如错觉和幻觉）具有不同的认知意义。具体来说，只有真实的知觉经验才能够为信念提供辩护。当一个认知主体具有真实的知觉经验的时候，如他确实看到了一个人，他的视觉经验就为他相信面前有一个人提供了好的理由。但是，如果只是一种错觉或幻觉，如他前面其实是一棵树或者什么都没有，那么看起来有一个人这样的知觉经验就不会为他的信念提供理由，甚至连差一点的理由都算不上。真实的与不真实的知觉经验的差别在于：在前者中，外部世界被直接呈现出来，当你确实看到一个人的时候，你面前真的有一个人。换句话说，真实的知觉经验是事实性的，不真实的知觉经验则是非事实性的。与不真实的知觉经验相比，真实的知觉经验具有的能够为信念提供辩护这一认知上的优越性，就体现在其事实性上面，即能够反映事实。

The knowledge-first principle proposed by Timothy Williamson has had a broad influence. Reversing the traditional analysis of knowledge, he no longer understands knowledge through concepts like belief and justification, but instead treats knowledge as an unanalyzable primitive concept and uses it as a basis to explain the justification of belief. The traditional approach analyzes knowledge as justified true belief; Williamson reverses the order of explanation, attempting to use the concept of knowledge to explain or account for related concepts such as belief, justification, and evidence. He argues that knowledge, and only knowledge, can provide justification for belief, and further derives the principle that knowledge, and only knowledge, constitutes the evidence for belief (E=K). That is, everything a person knows, and only what they know, constitutes their total evidence. He also points out that knowing is a factive mental state. That is, in this mental state, what we know is fact; from knowing p, it follows that p is true, p is a fact.

威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）提出的知识优先原则具有广泛的影响力。他一反传统对知识的分析，不再借助信念、辩护等概念来理解知识，而是把知识作为不可分析的原初的概念，并以之为基础来解释信念的辩护。传统的做法是把知识分析为得到辩护的真信念，威廉姆森颠倒了解释顺序，试图用知识这个概念来解释或说明信念、辩护、证据等相关概念。他主张，知识且只有知识能为信念提供辩护，进而得出知识且只有知识构成信念的证据这条原则（E=K）。或者说，一个人知道的所有东西且只有他知道的东西，构成他的证据总体。他还指出，知道是一种事实性的心理状态。也就是说，在这种心理状态中，我们知道的是事实，从知道p，可以推出p是真的，p是事实。

Compared with epistemology, the field of the philosophy of action has already undergone a factual turn earlier. There is a famous distinction in the philosophy of action between normative reasons (or justificatory reasons) and motivating reasons. Normative reasons are reasons for someone to do something; these reasons support doing it. The reason someone actually acts on is the motivating reason. A group of philosophers have long held that facts, rather than the agent's beliefs or desires, are the normative or good reasons for action. Reasons are facts themselves, not beliefs about facts. Jonathan Dancy argues that motivating reasons must at least have the potential to be normative reasons; since normative reasons are facts, motivating reasons must also be facts, not mental states like beliefs or desires. Furthermore, some philosophers of action believe that the view on reasons for action can be extended to reasons in all domains. Further still, whether it is reasons for action as practical reasons or reasons for belief as cognitive reasons, they are all facts.

与知识论相比，行动哲学领域已先一步经历了事实转向。行动哲学里有一个著名的区分，就是规范性理由（或者辩护性理由）与动机性理由。规范性理由是让某人做某件事的理由，这个理由是支持这样做的；某人做某件事情实际上出于的那个理由就是动机性理由。早已经有一批哲学家认为事实而非行动者的信念或欲望才是行动的规范性的或好的理由。理由是事实本身，而不是关于事实的信念。丹西（Jonathan Dancy）认为，动机性的理由也必须至少有成为规范性理由的可能，既然规范性理由是事实，那么动机性理由也必须是事实而不能是信念或欲望这样的心理状态。此外，一些行动哲学家认为，关于行动理由的看法可以扩展到所有领域的理由。进一步说，不管是作为实践理由的行动的理由，还是作为认知理由的信念的理由，它们都是事实。

Resistance Encountered by the Factual Turn

事实转向遇到的阻力

Whether the reasons for belief are true perceptual experiences, knowledge, or facts, they share a common feature: they are all factual. We cannot help but ask why traditional epistemology has long treated non-factual mental states as reasons for belief, and only changed in the last twenty-odd years. It is generally believed that this situation is related to philosophers’ historical reflections on skeptical scenarios. We can imagine a world ruled by a Cartesian demon, a world completely different from our actual world in objective circumstances, but where my twin brother in that world, due to the demon’s manipulation, has the same perceptual experiences as I do. For example, when I see that the table is brown, he also has the perceptual experience that the table is brown. Based on the same perceptual experience, we both form the belief that the table is brown. His belief is obviously false, because in the environment he inhabits the table is not brown or there is no table at all. So, do the two of us have the same reason to believe that the table is brown, or is it equally rational for us to form that belief? Many philosophers tend to give an affirmative answer. Clearly, my twin brother and I are equally rational; it is just that my situation is good and his is bad. If our beliefs are equally rational, and are based on the same reason, and the only thing we have in common is having the same mental state, then it seems that the reason for our beliefs can only be our mental state. Moreover, our greatest difference lies precisely in the different facts of the external world in which we each find ourselves, so the possibility of factual things serving as reasons for belief appears to be ruled out.

不管信念的理由是真实的知觉经验、知识，还是事实，它们有一个共同特征，即都是事实性的。我们不禁会问，为什么长期以来传统知识论一直把非事实性的心理状态作为信念的理由，直到最近二十多年才发生改变呢？一般认为，这种情况的出现，与历史上哲学家们对怀疑论情境的思考有关。我们可以设想一个由笛卡尔式的恶魔统治的世界，这个世界与我们的现实世界在客观环境上完全不同，但是我在那个世界的孪生兄弟由于恶魔的操控与我具有相同的知觉经验。例如，当我看到桌子是棕色的时候，他也具有桌子是棕色的知觉经验。基于同样的知觉经验，我们都形成了桌子是棕色的这一信念。他的信念显然是假的，因为他所身处的环境中桌子不是棕色的或者根本就没有桌子。那么，我们两个人是否有同样的理由相信桌子是棕色的，或者我们形成那样的信念是否同样合理？很多哲学家倾向于给出肯定的回答。显然，我和我的孪生兄弟都同样理性，只不过我的处境好，他的处境坏罢了。如果我们的信念同样合理，而且是基于同样的理由，并且我们之间共同的地方只是具有相同的心理状态，那么看起来，我们的信念的理由就只能是我们的心理状态。此外，我们最大的差异恰恰表现在各自身处的外部世界中的事实不同，所以事实性的东西作为信念理由的可能性看起来就可以被排除了。

Recently, some philosophers have pointed out that the beliefs of the cognitive subject in a skeptical scenario cannot be justified. My twin brother does not need to be blamed because his belief is false, but this does not mean that his belief is justified or rational. Being justified and being exempt from blame are two different things. The truth or falsity of the proposition we believe affects the rationality of the belief. Therefore, people in epistemically good situations and those in bad situations, although they may believe the same thing, are not both rational and do not have the same reasons for belief. It can be said that distinguishing justification from excuse has, to some extent, removed a key obstacle to the factual turn in epistemology.

近来一些哲学家指出，怀疑论情境下的认知主体的信念并不能得到辩护。我的孪生兄弟虽然不需要因为他的信念是假的而受到责备，但这并不意味着他的信念是得到辩护的或合理的。能够得到辩护与无需责备是两码事。我们相信的命题的真假会影响到信念的合理性。因此，处于认知上好的情况下与坏的情况下的人，虽然可能相信同一件事情，但并不都是合理的，并不具有相同的信念理由。可以说，区分辩护与免责在一定程度上为知识论的事实转向消除了一项关键障碍。

Of course, there are voices questioning whether epistemology has truly undergone a so-called factual turn. As we have already seen, among the philosophers who support the factual turn, there are different views on what constitutes a reason for belief, with at least the options of true perceptual experience, knowledge, and facts emerging. Some also hold a pluralist view, arguing that since reasons must play multiple roles, they cannot be borne by a single thing. It is evident that the factual turn is not a uniform, monolithic philosophical movement; there are internal disagreements, and details remain to be refined. However, philosophers advocating the factual turn share a basic consensus: only factual things can constitute reasons for belief.

当然，对于知识论是否真的出现了所谓的事实转向，并不是没有质疑的声音。正如我们已经看到的，在支持事实转向的哲学家中间，对于什么东西构成了信念的理由，有着不同的看法，至少出现了真实的知觉经验、知识和事实这几个选项。也有人持多元论的看法，认为既然理由要扮演多种角色，就不能由一种东西来承担。可见，事实转向并不是一个步调一致、整齐划一的哲学运动，它的内部存在着分歧，细节上也有待完善。但是，倡导事实转向的哲学家有一个基本共识，那就是只有事实性的东西才能构成信念的理由。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗