What Is the “Matter” of the Materialist Conception of History?

In discussions of the basic principles of Marxist philosophy, a question frequently arises: how exactly should we understand the “matter” of the materialist conception of history? A common answer is: the matter discussed in the materialist conception of history is not the generally existing thing on the empirical level, but rather concrete historical social relations. The resolution of this question fundamentally points to the methodological essence of the materialist conception of history, but it does not exhaust the whole problem. Following this line of thought on the understanding of matter in the materialist conception of history, we will discover that dialectical materialism and historical materialism form an organic whole. To fully and accurately grasp the methodological requirements of the materialist conception of history, one must inevitably transcend the question of “what exactly is the matter of the materialist conception of history” itself, return to actual social-historical life, and seek a scientific answer to the question of the relationship between thinking and being in the practice of changing the world.

在马克思主义哲学基本原理的讨论中经常提到一个问题，唯物史观的物到底该如何理解？一个常见的回答是：唯物史观所讨论的物并非经验层面上的一般实存之物，而是具体的历史的社会关系。这一问题的解答，从根本上指向了唯物史观的方法论本质，但是并未穷尽问题的全部。沿着唯物史观中物的理解这一问题深入思考，我们将发现：辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义是一个有机整体，完整准确把握唯物史观的方法论要求，势必超越唯物史观的“物到底为何”的问题本身，回到现实的社会历史生活，在改变世界的实践中寻求思维和存在关系问题的科学解答。

In the works of Marx and Engels, they often summarized their method as the materialist conception of history and historical materialism. This theory transcended the speculative idealism represented by Hegel and the old materialism, or intuitive materialism, represented by Feuerbach. In this process, we can see that Marx and Engels themselves did not specifically raise and answer the question of what exactly the matter of the materialist conception of history is; rather, they used it to describe “the general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*” (1859). Reviewing the course of Marx and Engels’ explorations, the establishment and development of the materialist conception of history did not directly depend on the advancement of the understanding of matter, but was grounded in the deepening of the investigation of social history.

在马克思恩格斯的著作中，他们往往将自己的方法概括为唯物史观和历史唯物主义。这种理论超越了以黑格尔为代表的思辨唯心主义和以费尔巴哈为代表的旧唯物主义，或直观的唯物主义。在此过程中，我们可以看到：马克思恩格斯自己并未专门提出并回答到底什么是唯物史观的物的问题，而是用其来描述自身在研究中“所得到的、并且一经得到就用来指导我的研究工作的总的结果”。回顾马克思恩格斯的探索历程，唯物史观的确立和发展并非直接依赖于物的理解的推进，而是立足于社会历史考察的深化。

To better elucidate the formation process of the materialist conception of history, it is necessary to briefly review the historical evolution of the concept of materialism. Although, in the sense of tracing intellectual origins, we trace materialism back to the naive materialism of ancient Greece, the emergence and widespread use of this concept occurred after the 17th century. In other words, the explicit use of the concept of materialism is directly related to what we often call the second form of materialism, namely, mechanical materialism. Of course, the rise of this trend of materialism itself had its fellow traveler: empiricism. Engels, in *The Condition of England. The Eighteenth Century*, and Marx and Engels, in *The Holy Family*, provided analysis and explanation of this. After the mid-19th century, along with the evolution of capitalist society and the development of natural science, a vulgar materialism cloaked in the guise of science exerted an increasingly broad influence. Against this background, Engels not only revealed the erroneous essence of this vulgar materialism by criticizing Feuerbach’s “half-way materialism” in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, but also specifically criticized abstract economic determinism in his late letters on historical materialism. Entering the 20th century, apart from the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of materialism, a theoretical orientation interpreting materialism through dialectical critique emerged within Western Marxism and contemporary radical philosophical discourse, while in the context of Western analytic philosophy, a trend of thought known as physicalism formed around the mind-body problem.

为了更好地阐明唯物史观的形成过程，有必要先简单回顾一下唯物主义概念的历史演进。尽管我们在思想溯源的意义上，会将唯物主义追溯到古希腊时期的朴素唯物主义，但是就这个概念的提出和广泛使用来说，唯物主义的出现是在17世纪后。或者说，唯物主义概念的明确使用本身与我们常说的唯物主义的第二种形态，即机械唯物主义的出现直接相关。当然，这种唯物主义思潮的兴起本身有其同路人，这就是经验论。对此，恩格斯在《英国状况。十八世纪》中、马克思恩格斯在《神圣家族》中都给出了分析和说明。19世纪中叶之后，伴随资本主义社会的演进以及自然科学的发展，一种披着科学外衣的庸俗唯物主义影响日益扩大。在此背景下，恩格斯不仅在《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》中，通过批判费尔巴哈的“半截子的唯物主义”来揭示这种庸俗唯物主义的错误本质，而且在晚年关于历史唯物主义的通信中专门批判了抽象的经济决定论。进入20世纪，除马克思列宁主义的唯物主义阐释外，在西方马克思主义以及当代激进哲学话语中，形成了以辩证批判来阐释唯物主义的理论路向，在西方分析哲学语境中，则围绕心身关系问题形成了所谓的物理主义思潮。

The materialist conception of history or historical materialism we discuss, of course, refers to the scientific worldview and methodology formed by Marx and Engels in their critique of the capitalist mode of production. Mechanical materialism has no direct successive relationship with the formation of this method, and vulgar materialism is its direct object of opposition.

我们所讨论的唯物主义历史观或历史唯物主义，指的当然是马克思恩格斯在批判资本主义生产方式中所形成的科学世界观和方法论。机械唯物主义与这一方法的形成并无直接承接关系，庸俗唯物主义则是其直接反对的对象。

In the early intellectual development of Marx and Engels, as members of the Young Hegelian movement, they were once influenced by Feuerbach’s *The Essence of Christianity* in the sense of religious and political critique, “all became Feuerbachians for a moment,” [2]2 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886). and found 18th-century French materialism and British empiricism as their theoretical comrades and fellow travelers. However, in the formation of the materialist conception of history, they relied mainly on the discovery of “economic facts” through the study of political economy and the reality of industrial capitalism; the key turning point was moving toward “the real science of real men and their historical development.” [3]3 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886). In this sense, the primary meaning of “materialism” in the expression “materialist conception of history” is the rejection and critique of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, Feuerbach’s humanism, and the metaphysics of political economy, emphasizing a return to the actual process of material production to understand the structural composition of human society and its historical unfolding. In the second half of the 19th century, faced with vulgar materialism and the bourgeois ideology it concealed, Marx and Engels’ critique aimed to oppose the abstractness and idealist essence of this materialism itself, and, in the sense of summarizing, defending, and propagating their own theory, emphasized the fundamental distinction between historical materialism and these vulgar materialisms. During the same period, the concept of “dialectical materialism” proposed by Dietzgen also represented the defense of Marxism by Marx and Engels’ comrades and students and their critique of various erroneous views. It is in this sense that it is not difficult to understand: Marx and Engels did not specifically discuss what exactly the matter in the materialist conception of history is. After Engels distinguished the two camps of materialism and idealism through the resolution of the question of the relationship between thinking and being in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, he also specifically pointed out that the name “materialism” “has no other meaning.” [4]4 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886).

在马克思恩格斯早期的思想发展中，作为青年黑格尔派运动的成员，他们在宗教和政治批判的意义上曾经受到费尔巴哈《基督教本质》的影响，“一时间都成为费尔巴哈派”了，并且找到了18世纪法国唯物主义和英国经验论作为自己的理论战友和同路人。但是在唯物史观的形成过程中，他们主要依据的是政治经济学研究和工业资本主义现实对“经济事实”的发现，关键的转折点是走向“现实的人及其历史发展的科学”。在这个意义上，唯物主义历史观这一表述中的唯物主义，首要的含义是对黑格尔的思辨哲学、费尔巴哈的人本学、政治经济学的形而上学的拒斥和批判，强调的是回到现实的物质生产过程中去，理解人类社会的结构构成及其历史展开。19世纪下半叶，面对庸俗唯物主义及其掩盖着的资产阶级意识形态，马克思恩格斯的批判意在反对这种唯物主义本身的抽象性和唯心主义本质，并且在总结捍卫传播自身理论的意义上，强调了历史唯物主义同这些庸俗唯物主义的根本区别。同时期，狄茨根所提出的“辩证唯物主义”概念，也代表了马克思恩格斯的战友和学生对马克思主义的捍卫以及对种种错误观点的批判。正是在这个意义上，不难理解：马克思恩格斯并未专门讨论过唯物史观中的物究竟是什么的问题，恩格斯在《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》中，通过对思维和存在关系问题的解答来区分唯物主义和唯心主义两大阵营后，也专门指出唯物主义这个名称“没有什么其他的含义”。

Does this mean, then, that the materialist conception of history does not discuss what matter actually is? Obviously, we cannot abstractly answer “no.” Within the horizon of the materialist conception of history and historical materialism, various different kinds of matter are certainly discussed, but these discussions do not answer what the matter of the materialist conception of history is by abstractly explaining methodological principles; rather, within the concrete unfolding of historical materialism, they differentiate the different uses of matter. In other words, Marx’s differentiation of the different uses of matter can precisely be regarded as a typical case of the materialist conception of history discussing what matter actually is and clarifying its own methodological requirements. In Marx’s works, there are roughly four categories of matter.

这样一来，唯物史观就不讨论物到底是什么了吗？显然，我们不能抽象地回答说“没有”。在唯物史观和历史唯物主义的视域中，当然讨论了各种不同的物，但是这些讨论并不是在抽象地说明方法论原则时回答什么是唯物史观的物，而是在历史唯物主义的具体展开中，辨析了物的不同用法。换句话说，马克思关于物的不同用法的区分，恰恰可以被视为唯物史观讨论物到底是什么，澄清自身方法论要求的典型案例。在马克思的著作中，大致存在四类物的范畴。

The first category, strictly speaking, should not be counted as a category of matter, but because it is directly related to the discussion in this article and constitutes the terminological expression of the concept of materialism, we will provisionally list it alongside the following three categories. This category is “matter” (Material) or “stuff” (Stoffe). The former is used more as an adjective in Marx’s works, such as “material life,” “materialist conception of history,” etc.; the latter is used in *Capital* in its literal sense of material or stuff.

第一类在严格的意义上，不应当被算作物的范畴，但是因为与本文讨论直接相关，且构成了唯物主义概念的术语表达，我们权且将其与后三类并列。这一类范畴就是“物质”（Material）或“质料”（Stoffe），前者在马克思的著作中更多是作为形容词使用，如物质生活、唯物主义历史观，等等，后者在《资本论》中就是在其字面含义质料或材料的意义上来使用的。

The second category, or second concept, is a common word frequently used in German from Marx’s time to the present day, namely, “thing” (Ding). In Chinese, perhaps “东西” (dongxi) is the most vivid translation: there is a thing that exists, but what this thing is depends on the presentation of a specific cognitive framework. This category is used in the concept of Kant’s “thing-in-itself” (Ding an sich) often mentioned in the history of philosophy. In *Capital*, the category “thing” appears frequently, but its most brilliant presence is the expression “reification” (Verdinglichung) mentioned in the section “The Trinity Formula” in Volume III of *Capital*.

第二类或者说第二个范畴是马克思的时代到今天的德语中经常使用的一个常见词，即物（Ding）。在中文中，可能“东西”是最传神的翻译，有一个东西存在，但这个东西是什么则依赖于特定的认识构架的呈现。在哲学史上经常提到的康德“物自体”（Ding an sich）概念中使用的就是这个范畴。在《资本论》中，物这个范畴经常出现，但是其最高光的存在就是《资本论》第三卷中“论三位一体公式”一节提到的“物化”（Verdinglichung）这一表达。

The third category, or the third concept, is another expression for “thing” that frequently appears in German, namely “Sache” (thing/affair). Borrowing from the translation innovations of Japanese scholars, it can also be rendered as “thing-image” (物象). Because Lukács used the concept “reification” (Versachlichung) in *History and Class Consciousness*, the category of “Sache” has received considerable attention in contemporary Marxist philosophical research. Scholars generally emphasize the relational dimension behind this concept to distinguish it from the previously mentioned “Ding” in the sense of a mere object. Returning to the intellectual context of Marx and classical German philosophy, this category has a specific usage: the concept of “right in rem” (物权) in private property relations, which is complementary and opposed to “personality” (Person). Starting from this usage, we can more genuinely understand the formulation in *The German Ideology* and *Capital* that “the relation between persons is invertedly manifested as the relation between things.” That is to say, in private property relations, the relations between personal rights are expressed through the relations between rights in rem.

第三类或者说第三个范畴则是德语中经常出现的另外一个物的表达，这个范畴就是“事物”（Sache）。借用日本学者的翻译创造，也可以将其表述为“物象”。由于卢卡奇在《历史和阶级意识》中曾经使用了“物化”（Versachliuchung）这个概念，事物这个范畴在今天的马克思主义哲学研究中得到了较多的关注，学界普遍强调这个概念背后的关系维度以区别于前面所提到的“东西”意义上的物。回到马克思以及德国古典哲学的思想语境中去，这个范畴有一个特殊的用法，这就是私有财产关系中与“人格”（Person）相反相成的“物权”概念。从这一用法出发，我们可以更加真切地理解《德意志意识形态》和《资本论》中提到的“人与人的关系颠倒地表现为物与物的关系”的说法。也就是说，在私有财产关系中，人格权之间的关系是通过物权之间的关系表现出来的。

The fourth category, or the fourth concept, is often translated as “thing” in Chinese, but in German it should be literally rendered as “object” (Gegenstand). Considering the use of expressions such as object, objectification, and objectivity in Marx’s works, as well as their presence in the works of Hegel and Feuerbach, this category itself has no unique meaning; it can only be understood and interpreted within the unfolding of specific relations. In this sense, we see that whether in the study of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* or in discussions of the *Grundrisse*, categories such as object and objectification are frequently invoked as key terms.

第四类或者说第四个范畴在中文中往往被翻译为“物”，但在德语中从字面来看应当被直译为“对象”（Gegenstand）。考虑到对象、对象化以及对象性这些表达在马克思著作中的使用，以及在黑格尔和费尔巴哈著作中的存在，这个范畴本身并没有自身独特的含义，而必须在特定的关系展开中才能获得自身的理解和阐释。在这个意义上，我们看到无论是《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的研究，还是《政治经济学批判大纲》的讨论，对象与对象化一类的范畴都是经常被提起的关键词。

Based on the above distinctions, it can be seen that in the works of Marx and Engels, the discussion of “things” is not directly related to materialism or historical materialism. However, in Marx’s mature works, the use of Ding, Sache, and Gegenstand, as the concrete application of historical materialism, vividly embodies the methodological requirements of historical materialism. This is most concentratedly demonstrated in *Capital*. Let us take a brief illustration from Section 4 of Chapter 1 of Volume 1 of *Capital*, “The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof.” As mentioned earlier, precisely because of the concept of reification and the critique of fetishism, this section has become one of the most focused fragments in scholarly research on the philosophical method of *Capital*. In this section, Marx interweaves the three different categories of Ding, Sache, and Gegenstand when analyzing commodities, while also using the category “matter” (Stoffe) in the sense of the material existence of commodities. A careful analysis shows that Marx’s use of different categories here has a clear intention: to constantly remind the readers of *Capital* that when you face “the immense accumulation of commodities in bourgeois society,” besides seeing the physical form of commodities, you must also pay attention to the social relations behind the commodities, avoiding falling into the fetishistic notions that political economists cannot escape. In this sense, although the value of a commodity or the social labor it contains is an “ideal thing” (ideelles Ding), the social relations through which this “ideal thing” exists and is manifested are a genuine, real objective existence. Although grasping this objective existence cannot rely on a microscope but must employ the power of abstraction, in our practical activities, objective social-historical reality has already constituted an existence prior to our thinking.

基于上述区分，可以看到：在马克思恩格斯的著作中，物的讨论与唯物主义、唯物史观并不存在直接的关联。但在马克思成熟时期的著作中，东西（Ding）、事物（Sache）、对象（Gegenstand）的使用本身，作为历史唯物主义具体运用的展开，却鲜明地体现了唯物史观的方法论要求。这一点在《资本论》中得到了最为集中的展现。我们不妨以《资本论》第一卷第一章第四节《商品的拜物教形式及其秘密》为例，做一简单说明。如前所述，恰恰是因为物化概念以及拜物教批判，这一节成为学界研究《资本论》哲学方法最为关注的片段之一。在这一节中，马克思在分析商品时交叉使用了东西（Ding）、事物（Sache）、对象（Gegenstand）三个不同的范畴，同时也在商品的物质存在意义上使用了质料（Stoffe）这个范畴。仔细分析，马克思在这里对不同范畴的使用是有其明确用意的，这就是在不断提醒《资本论》的读者：当你面对“资产阶级社会中庞大商品的堆积”时，除了看到商品的实物形态，还必须关注商品背后的社会关系，避免陷入政治经济学家无法跳出的拜物教观念。在这个意义上，尽管商品的价值或包含的社会劳动是一个“观念的物（Ding）”，但这种“观念的物”所由已存在并呈现出来的社会关系却是一个的的确确的现实的客观存在。尽管要把握这种客观存在不能靠显微镜，而必须运用抽象力，但是在我们的实践活动中，客观的社会历史现实已经构成先于我们思维的存在了。

In summary, answering the question of what the “matter” of historical materialism is does not lie in directly finding a “that-which-is-material” that constitutes a materialism, but rather in grasping the methodological essence of this theory through its unfolding and application. It is in this sense that Engels explicitly raised the fundamental question of philosophy, namely the relation between thinking and being. In opposing the idealist tendencies of empirio-criticism, Lenin emphasized that matter is an objective reality that can be reflected by human consciousness but does not depend on human consciousness. On the basis of grasping the methodological essence of historical materialism, and integrating the excellent traditional Chinese culture, Mao Zedong used “seeking truth from facts” (实事求是) to summarize the worldview and methodology of Marxist philosophy. Today, as we uphold historical materialism, we should all the more delve into the actual social-historical process, and in the course of great practice, consciously discern the idealist essence of various erroneous ideological trends, grasping the objective material reality that constitutes the premise of our thinking.

综上所述，回答唯物史观中的物到底是什么的问题，并不在于直接性地找到构成一种唯物主义的“所唯之物”，而是在这种理论的展开和运用中，去把握这种理论的方法论本质。正是在这个意义上，恩格斯明确提出哲学的基本问题，即思维和存在的关系问题。列宁在反对经验批判主义的唯心主义倾向过程中，强调物质是能够为人的意识所反映，但不以人的意识为转移的客观实在。毛泽东在把握了唯物史观的方法论本质的基础上，结合中华优秀传统文化，用实事求是来概括马克思主义哲学的世界观和方法论。今天，我们坚持唯物史观，更应当深入现实的社会历史进程中去，在伟大实践的进程中，自觉辨析各种错误思潮的唯心主义本质，把握作为我们思维前提的客观物质实在。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗