“To Be” or “Existence”—A Discussion on Hegel’s *Science of Logic*

In early spring of this year, He Cuixiang, a teacher from the Research Office of the History of Marxist Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told me that their study group was planning to read Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic* (commonly known as the *Lesser Logic*) and asked if I could give a lecture. I gladly accepted. The Research Office of the History of Marxist Philosophy was the office where my senior colleague Wu Yuanliang had long worked and once served as director. I have always supported the affairs of the Institute of Philosophy, and I have continued to do so since leaving it.

今年初春，中国社会科学院哲学研究所马克思主义哲学史研究室贺翠香老师对我说，她们有一个读书班，要读黑格尔的《小逻辑》，希望我可以去讲一讲。我欣然接受。马克思主义哲学史研究室是学兄吴元梁生前一直待的、任过主任的研究室。哲学研究所的事情总是要支持的，离开哲学研究所后，我一直如此。

When He Lin translated the *Lesser Logic*, he initially rendered its core concept *Sein* as “you” (有), later changing it to “cunzai” (存在), sometimes using both. Yang Yizhi, in translating the *Science of Logic* (commonly referred to as the *Greater Logic*), rendered *Sein* as “you.” Liang Cunxiu, in his retranslation of the *Lesser Logic* (titled *Logic: Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part I*), stated explicitly that he followed He Lin’s tradition and adopted the translation “cunzai.” Later, Xue Hua, in translating the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* (Part I being “Logic,” i.e., the *Lesser Logic*), also used “cunzai.” The shift from “you” to “cunzai,” then back to “you,” and finally settling on “cunzai,” reflects the research and understanding of Hegel by several generations of Chinese scholars, as well as their comprehension of the core Western philosophical concept *being*.

贺麟先生翻译《小逻辑》，最初将其核心概念Sein译为“有”，后改译为“存在”，有时二者都用。杨一之先生翻译《逻辑学》（即通常所说的《大逻辑》），将Sein译为“有”。梁存秀先生重译《小逻辑》（书名译为《逻辑学·哲学全书·第一部分》），直言遵从贺先生的传统，采用“存在”这一译语。再后，薛华先生翻译《哲学科学全书纲要》（第一部分为“逻辑学”，即“小逻辑”），亦采用“存在”一词。从“有”到“存在”，再到“有”，最后定格在“存在”，反映了我国几代学者对黑格尔的研究和认识，以及对西方哲学核心概念being的认识和理解。

I have read Hegel’s *Lesser Logic*, but I have read the *Science of Logic* more extensively. I believe that, compared to the *Lesser Logic*, the *Science of Logic* develops certain parts, but their most fundamental ideas are consistent, especially the understanding of *Sein*. The *Science of Logic* provides a more detailed exposition of *Sein*, including its system and specific content. Therefore, to grasp Hegel’s thought, especially from a research perspective, one must first read the *Science of Logic*. And to read the *Science of Logic*, one must first understand its three initial concepts. I believe that translating Hegel’s *Sein* as “cunzai” (existence) is a mistranslation; *Sein* should be translated as “shi” (是), understood in the sense of the copula. Only then can one truly comprehend Hegel. Thus, using the *Science of Logic* as my blueprint, I focused my lecture on Hegel’s three initial concepts—“shi” (是), “bu” (不), and “bian” (变)—and his related discussions.

我读黑格尔的《小逻辑》，但更多读的是《逻辑学》。我认为，相比《逻辑学》，《小逻辑》对一些部分有所发展，但是其最基本的思想是一致的，特别是关于Sein的认识是一致的。《逻辑学》中关于Sein的论述更为详细，包括它的体系和具体内容。因此，弄懂黑格尔的思想，尤其是从研究黑格尔的角度说，首先还是要读《逻辑学》。而读《逻辑学》，首先要读懂他的三个初始概念。我认为，将黑格尔所说的Sein译为“存在”是错译，应该将Sein译为“是”，在系词的意义上理解它，这样才能读懂黑格尔。所以，我以《逻辑学》为蓝本，重点讲了黑格尔的三个初始概念“是”“不者”和“变”，以及他的相关论述。

The lecture received a good response, with lively and interesting discussion. Most questions centered on whether Hegel’s *Sein* should be “shi” or “cunzai.” During the discussion, I argued that since Hegel sought the starting concept from logic, his *Sein* could only be “shi” (and “bu”), not “cunzai” (and “wu”). The opposing views were mainly two: first, that Hegel was discussing the beginning of logic, so what he meant was “cunzai”; second, that “cunzai” is the most abstract concept, hence immediate and without determination, making it the starting concept.

讲座反响不错，讨论很热烈，也很有意思。问题多集中在黑格尔所说的Sein究竟是“是”，还是“存在”上。讨论过程中，我说黑格尔从逻辑寻找出发概念，因此他说的Sein只能是“是”（和“不”），不能是“存在”（和“无”）。反对意见主要有两个：其一，黑格尔谈逻辑的开端，因此他说的是“存在”。其二，“存在”就是最抽象的概念，因此是直接的、没有规定性的，所以是出发概念。

The first opposing view clearly involves an understanding of logic. Hegel titled his work “Logic,” and of course he had his own ideas and understanding, including his intention to reform logic or to build his philosophical system on the basis of logic. But in any case, at least two points are very clear. First, Hegel explicitly states: “The beginning is logical.” This indicates that one must consider logic, and even consider only logic. Second, Hegel certainly knew what logic was—it could only be logic as it had existed since Aristotle. That is to say, Hegel could not simply discard existing logic and start anew. Therefore, starting from logic requires considering Aristotelian logic and the traditional logic based on it, and considering what kind of theory (or thing) this is. The basic sentence form of traditional logic is “S is P.” Adding quantifiers and negation yields the four types of propositions: “All S are P,” “No S are P,” “Some S are P,” and “Some S are not P,” from which the theory of syllogism is constructed. If singular propositions are included, there can also be propositions like “a is P” and “a is not P.” Starting from such a theory, one certainly cannot find “cunzai” (nor “wu”); one can only find “shi” and “bu.” Moreover, this corresponds to the “quality” aspect in logical theory, roughly aligning with one of the three categories Hegel discusses, and his discussion of the “copula” also corresponds to it.

第一个反对意见显然涉及对逻辑的理解。黑格尔的书名为“逻辑”，当然有他自己的想法和认识，包括他想改造逻辑，或者想在逻辑的基础上建立他的哲学体系。但是无论如何，至少有两点非常明确。其一，黑格尔明确说：“开端是逻辑的。”这就说明，一定要考虑逻辑，甚至只能考虑逻辑。其二，黑格尔肯定知道逻辑是什么——这只能是自亚里士多德以来的逻辑。也就是说，黑格尔不可能抛开已有的逻辑另起炉灶。所以，从逻辑出发就要考虑亚里士多德逻辑和基于它而形成的传统逻辑，考虑这是一种什么样子的理论（或东西）。传统逻辑的基本句式是“S是P”，若加上量词和否定词，就形成了“所有S是P”“所有S不是P”“有S是P”和“有S不是P”这样四种命题，然后由它们构造起三段论理论。如果加上单称命题，则还可以有“a是P”和“a不是P”这样的命题。从这样的理论出发，无疑是找不到“存在”（也找不到“无”）的，只能找到“是”和“不”，而且这也是逻辑理论中所说的“质”的方面，黑格尔所说三个范畴之一的“质”与它可以大致对应，他在论述中所说的“系词”也与它对应。

This opposing view seems to have another layer: that Hegel’s “beginning of logic” refers to something prior to logic (I believe this understanding is mistaken). This then requires clarifying two issues: first, what is this thing prior to logic, and what does it refer to? Second, even if such a thing exists, why would it be “cunzai”? More importantly, one must provide textual evidence to show that this is Hegel’s own understanding and exposition. In short, mere imagination is insufficient. Due to time constraints, I did not expand on this issue in the lecture. In fact, this involves the understanding of the relationship between logic and philosophy. In ancient Greece, when people first engaged in philosophical discussion, logic had not yet emerged. “What is it?” was the basic way people discussed problems, serving both as a mode of questioning and as a way of answering and articulating understanding. It was precisely in these discussions that people developed views and understandings of logic, eventually theorizing them and establishing the discipline of logic. The involvement of logical issues in people’s discussions is fundamentally different from their application of logical theories and methods to discuss problems. Just as a person who does not understand logic does not mean that their speech lacks logic or involves no logical issues, and certainly does not mean they violate logic.

这个反对意见似乎还有一层意思：黑格尔说的逻辑的开端指在逻辑之前的东西（我认为这样的理解是错的）。这样一来就需要说明两个问题，一个是逻辑之前的东西是什么，指的是什么东西？另一个是即便有这样的东西，为什么会是“存在”？而且更为重要的是，一定要拿出文字证据来，以此说明这是黑格尔的认识和论述。一句话，仅凭想象是不行的。因为时间关系，这个问题我在讲座中没有展开讨论。实际上，这里涉及对逻辑与哲学的关系的认识。在古希腊，人们最初进行哲学讨论时，逻辑并未产生。“是什么”是人们讨论问题的基本方式，既是提问的方式，也是回答和阐述认识的方式。正是在相关讨论中，人们产生了对逻辑的看法和认识，并将这些认识理论化，最终建立起逻辑学科。人们在讨论中涉及逻辑问题，与人们应用逻辑的理论和方法讨论问题，二者是根本不同的。正如一个人不懂逻辑，并不意味着他的谈论就没有逻辑，就不会涉及逻辑问题，更不意味着他就会违反逻辑。

The second opposing view seems to concern the understanding of the Chinese word “cunzai,” but it also involves the understanding of Hegel. In Chinese, the usage of “cunzai” is quite limited, appearing only in “cunzai mouwu” (there exists something) and “mouwu cunzai” (something exists), and its meaning is very clear, similar to “you” (to have). Thus, this word itself is a verb with a definite meaning; in medieval terms, it is a categorematic word, carrying its own meaning. Therefore, it does not conform to the characteristics Hegel describes, such as immediacy and lack of determination. In particular, it does not fit the explanation of the copula. In a sentence, for example in “S is P,” “is” has meaning because it connects S and P, or rather, P determines it. This gives it a content related to P, and thus a content unrelated to other things like Q. However, when “is” is extracted from the sentence, it is detached from the sentence, is no longer a copula, and has no meaning, because it has lost its determination. This is what Hegel calls “pure (sheer) being.”

第二个反对意见看似是对中文“存在”一词的理解，其实也涉及对黑格尔的理解。在汉语中，“存在”一词的用法很少，只有“存在某物”和“某物存在”，而且它的意思非常明确，类似于“有”。所以，这个词本身是动词，是有明确含义的；用中世纪的话说，它是范畴词，自身有含义。所以，它不符合黑格尔所说的那些特征，如直接性、无规定性。特别是，它不符合系词的说明。在句子中，比如在“S是P”中，“是”乃是有含义的，因为它将S和P联系起来，或者说，P对它做出规定。这样就使它有了一种与P相关的内容，因而也就有了一种与其他东西如Q不相关的内容。但是，把“是”从句子中抽出来，它就脱离了句子，就不再是系词，就没有含义了，因为它失去了规定性，这就是黑格尔所说的“纯（粹的）是”。

Additionally, there are two related concepts in Hegel’s works. One is *Dasein*. Scholars have discussed the *Da* in it extensively, but I believe this misses the point. The key still lies in “shi” (*Sein*). Etymologically, it is a compound word formed from *da* and *sein*, the nominal form of *ist da*, literally meaning “is there.” Because of *Da*, *Dasein* has more meaning, which aids in discussing *Sein*. Hegel explicitly states that *da* here has no spatial meaning, clearly intending to use its compositional form to explain *Sein*. This immediately highlights the logical consideration of “S is P.” Due to time constraints, I only mentioned this in the discussion without elaborating. The other related concept is *Existenz* (existence), which Hegel discusses specifically. This is a concept that emerged and was clarified in Western philosophy, especially in discussions related to *being*. Kant explicitly discusses its difference from *Sein*, and Hegel does the same. Scholars have translated it as “shicun” (实存) and “shengcun” (生存) to distinguish it from “cunzai.” This actually creates unnecessary trouble, greatly blurring or even obscuring Hegel’s relevant discussions and the distinctions he had already made. To avoid complicating the discussion, I did not touch on this concept in the lecture.

此外，黑格尔著作中还有两个相关概念。一个是Dasein。学界对其中那个Da讨论很多，我认为这是不得要领的。关键还在“是”（Sein）。从字面上可以看出，这是由da和sein组合而成的词，是ist da的名词形式，字面意思是：是在那里的。由于有Da，Dasein的意思就会更多，从而有助于讨论Sein。黑格尔明确地说，da在这里没有空间含义，显然有借助其构成方式来说明Sein的意思。这样一来，其“S是P”这种逻辑的考虑，就立即凸显出来了。限于时间，我在讨论中只是提到这一点，没有展开。另一个相关概念是Existenz（存在），黑格尔对于它有专门的论述。这是西方哲学中，尤其是在与being相关的讨论中产生并明确下来的一个概念。康德明确讨论它与Sein的区别，黑格尔也一样。学界将其译为“实存”和“生存”，为的是与“存在”相区别。这其实有些自找麻烦，结果使黑格尔的相关讨论以及本来已经做出的一些区别也极大地模糊了，甚至看不到了。为了避免讨论复杂化，我在讲座中没有谈及这个概念。

Other objections were also raised during the lecture, such as the view that “existence” makes what Hegel later says, including dialectics, seem somewhat easier to understand. I do not think so. Hegel starts from “to be,” regarding it as a pure concept; once it is determined (for instance, Dasein, or cases like “S is P”), a negation of “to be” is formed, and it is no longer pure or undetermined. And once it is explained that it is thus, this means it is not otherwise, so it inherently carries negation. Such issues can certainly be discussed, but they depart from the translation provided in the lecture and from the main content I presented, so I only touch on them briefly. In the discussion, I still emphasize the understanding of “to be.” This is Hegel’s starting concept. In my view, if the starting concept is misunderstood, everything that follows will only become increasingly off track. Furthermore, what I discussed were Hegel’s concepts of “to be,” “not,” and “becoming,” and the discussion should focus on these. That is, it should concentrate on these few passages to discuss whether what he says is “to be” or “existence.” It is not impermissible to cite discussions from elsewhere to illuminate the text at hand, but what is cited itself also requires and can be subjected to textual discussion. Within a relatively limited scope and space of discussion, I think it is best not to stray too far. This is usually the case: I always concentrate on the text under discussion, while critics always want to step outside the current text and cite more material.

讲座上还提出其他一些反对意见，比如认为“存在”使黑格尔后来所说的那些东西包括辩证法，似乎更容易理解一些。我不这样认为。黑格尔从“是”出发，认为它是纯粹的概念，而一旦对它有了规定（比如Dasein，再如“S是P”这样的情况），就形成对“是”的否定，它就不再是纯粹的、未规定的了。而一旦说明它是这样的，就意味着它不是那样的，所以它自身就带有否定。这样的问题当然可以讨论，但是脱离讲座给出的译文，脱离我讲述的主要内容，所以我只是点到为止。我在讨论中依然强调对“是”的理解。这是黑格尔的出发概念。在我看来，出发概念理解错了，后面的东西只能越来越离谱。此外，我讲的是黑格尔的“是”“不者”和“变”这几个概念，讨论就应该集中在这里。也就是说，应该集中在这几段文字来讨论他说的究竟是“是”，还是“存在”。援用其他地方的论述来说明当下的文本，不是不可以，但是所援用的东西同样是需要并可以做文本讨论的。而在一个相对有限的讨论范围和空间，我觉得最好不要走得太远。通常也是这样，我总是集中在所讨论的文本，而批评者总是想跳出当下文本，援引更多的东西。

To take it a step further, my discussion of being has spanned many years, and the texts I have cited are already very numerous, yet I have rarely seen critics engage in concrete, targeted discussion of these texts and my arguments. What can be seen and heard is always a general talk about “how the ‘one-being-throughout’ theory is” or “how the word ‘to be’ is.” Such discussion, figuratively speaking, does not “hit the point.” Someone even said to me in person that even citing 1,000 passages to explain “to be” is still induction and does not prove that “one-being-throughout” should be adopted. This is essentially the same as always citing other things in discussion—the substance is identical.

引申一步，我关于being的讨论已有多年，引用的文本也已经非常多了，但是很少看到批评者对我所引这些文本以及我的讨论展开具体的有针对性的讨论。可以看到和听到的总是一般性地谈“‘一是到底论’如何如何”“‘是’一词怎样怎样”。这样的讨论，形象地说，没有“踩在点上”。还有人当面说过，即使引用1000段话说明“是”，这也是归纳，说明不了应该“一是到底”。这与讨论中总援引其他东西来讨论其实是异曲同工，实质是一样的。

I clearly sense that the objections share a commonality: they are based on an existing knowledge structure to understand Hegel’s Sein. Because this knowledge structure is built up through reading translations filled with the word “existence,” readers resonate with “existence” in their reading and imagine they understand it. Even when confusion arises, they strive to understand and convince themselves. But this striving is likewise a mobilization of the reserves in their own knowledge structure. Given time, if something were added to the process of building this knowledge structure—such as logical theory—the result might be different.

我明显感到，反对意见有一个共性，那就是基于已有的知识结构来理解黑格尔所说的Sein。由于这种知识结构是通过阅读充满“存在”一词的译著建立起来的，因此在阅读中对“存在”会产生共鸣，自以为理解。即使出现困惑，也会竭尽全力去理解，去说服自己。但是这种竭尽全力同样是调动自己知识结构中的存储。假以时日，若是在建立知识结构的过程中增加一些东西，如逻辑的理论，结果可能就会不同。

I know that my research on metaphysics places me in a minority within the academic community. I also know that metaphysical research is not valued in China’s domestic academic circles. So when Professor He invited me to give a lecture at the Institute of Philosophy, I was genuinely delighted: that people studying Marxist philosophy would organize a reading group on Hegel’s logic is undoubtedly an academic advance. Through our exchanges, and especially seeing those young faces, I felt once again: the world ultimately belongs to them.

我知道自己研究形而上学，在学界属于少数。我还知道，形而上学研究在国内学界不受重视。所以，贺老师请我到哲学研究所做讲座，我打心眼里高兴：研究马克思主义哲学的人组织黑格尔逻辑学的读书班，这无疑是学术的进步。通过一起交流，特别是看到那一张张年轻的面容，我再次感到：世界归根到底是他（她）们的。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗