Learning from Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight

Strategic foresight is the core element of strategic leadership. The Communist Party of China is a great political party endowed with strategic thinking and rich in strategic foresight. Mao Zedong made pioneering historical contributions to the generation and forging of the CPC’s strategic foresight. In reviewing the Party’s course of struggle, General

战略远见是战略领导的核心要素。中国共产党是一个具有战略思维、富有战略远见的伟大政党。毛泽东对中国共产党战略远见的生成锻造，做出了开创性的历史贡献。习近平总书记在回顾党的斗争历程时，饱含深情地对毛泽东的战略远见高度赞誉。[1] 在波澜壮阔的中国革命和建设进程中，以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，站高谋远、总揽全局，把握大势、前瞻未来，善于以高屋建瓴的远见卓识，从全局、长远、大势上作出判断和决策，始终把握历史主动，不断赢得战略主动，领导中国人民彻底改变了自己命运和国家面貌，为实现中华民族独立和振兴、中国人民解放和幸福，做出了彪炳史册的伟大贡献。当前，面对错综复杂的国际形势，面对繁重艰巨的使命任务，深入研究和学习领悟毛泽东的战略远见，对于我们登高望远、前瞻远眺，踔厉奋发、勇毅前行，全面建设社会主义现代化国家、全面推进中华民族伟大复兴具有重大战略意义。

I. The Generative Mechanism of Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight

一、毛泽东战略远见的生成机理

Strategic foresight is an important category of strategic philosophy and the planning horizon of strategic practice. Foresight, in lay terms, means having a far-sighted vision and deep-reaching deliberation, seeing the large from the small and discerning the significant from the subtle, standing high, seeing far, planning deeply, and grasping accurately. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Communists should be the most far-sighted.”[2]2 The August 7th Meeting (八七会议) was an emergency meeting of the Chinese Communist Party held on August 7, 1927, in Hankou, which corrected the Party’s right-leaning capitulationist errors and decided on the general policy of agrarian revolution and armed resistance against the Kuomintang. Strategic foresight is a mindset for the long-term planning of overall issues, a broad vision that leads the way forward with a forward-looking eye. It is the strategic ability of a leader to, in the interaction and connection between objective reality and subjective initiative, necessity and contingency, possibility and actuality, certainty and uncertainty, perceive the strategic overall situation, grasp the essence of things, understand the general trend of development, predict the prospects of change, and indicate the direction forward in order to achieve strategic goals. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is profoundly philosophical and full of wisdom. It sets a firm direction because it embraces faith, foresees the future because it deeply understands laws, breaks through darkness because it discerns the faintest light, and ignites a prairie fire because it holds a single spark, and so on. As a great Marxist, a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist, and theorist, Mao Zedong demonstrated strategic foresight unprecedented in human history in the great practice of leading China’s revolution and construction. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is a shining hallmark of Mao Zedong Thought, an important connotation of Mao Zedong’s spiritual strength, the broad vision of Mao Zedong’s strategy and tactics, a vivid embodiment of Mao Zedong’s commanding style, a brilliant example of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic foresight, and it manifests historical and contemporary value that transcends time and remains ever fresh.

战略远见是战略哲学的重要范畴，是战略实践的谋划视野。所谓远见，通俗地讲，就是目光高远、谋虑深远，以小见大、见微知著，站得高、看得远、谋得深、抓得准。毛泽东指出：“共产党员应该作到最有远见”[2] 。战略远见是对全局问题长远谋划的思维格局，是用前瞻慧眼引领前行的宏阔视野。它是领导者为实现战略目标，在客观实在性与主观能动性、必然性与偶然性、可能性与现实性、确定性与不确定性的联系互动中洞察战略全局，抓住事物本质，把握发展大势，预测变化前景，指明前行方向的战略能力。毛泽东的战略远见，极具哲理而又充满睿智，它因心怀信仰而坚定方向，因深谙规律而预见未来，因洞见微光而冲破黑暗，因手擎星火而遂成燎原，等等。毛泽东作为伟大的马克思主义者，伟大的无产阶级革命家、战略家、理论家，在领导中国革命和建设的伟大实践中，展现出人类历史上前所未有的战略远见。毛泽东的战略远见是毛泽东思想的闪耀标识，是毛泽东精神力量的重要内涵，是毛泽东战略策略的宏阔视野，是毛泽东统帅风范的生动体现，是中国共产党战略远见的光辉典范，彰显着跨越时空、历久弥新的历史价值和时代价值。

(1) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Is the Spiritual Treasure of Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context

（一）毛泽东的战略远见，是马克思主义中国化的精神瑰宝

In the long river of human development, foresight and insight have always been the pinnacle of wisdom that people tirelessly pursue. For a nation to stand at the forefront of the times, it cannot for a moment do without theoretical thinking, nor for a moment do without correct ideological guidance. Marxism founded the world outlook of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, scientifically revealed with foresight and insight the inevitable trend of human society ultimately moving toward communism, and provided a scientific guide for the strategic foresight of revolutionary parties. When Mao Zedong first read the *Communist Manifesto* in 1920, he established a firm belief in Marxism from that point on. Mao Zedong said: “The Communist Party takes Marxism as its ideological foundation, and it sees clearly the future and the prospects.”[3]3 “Two bombs and one satellite” (两弹一星) refers to China’s development of nuclear bombs (atomic and hydrogen), intercontinental ballistic missiles, and artificial satellites, a major national defense and technology project initiated in the 1950s and 1960s. Mao Zedong was the great pioneer in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. He was adept at integrating the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with China’s actual conditions, and thus, at major historical junctures and in the face of various risks and challenges, he was able to indicate the course forward for China’s revolution and construction with a broad strategic vision, a long-term strategic perspective, and profound strategic wisdom. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight, in essence, is the intellectual crystallization of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, a profound grasp of the inherent laws of China’s revolution and construction, a theoretical self-awareness achieved by elevating practical experience to the level of law, and a rational sublimation of the understanding of the developmental trends of practice. In the Party’s early years, some comrades within the Party once dogmatized Marxism and sanctified the experience of the Russian Revolution, causing serious setbacks for the Chinese revolution. After the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the Party’s work focus shifted from the cities to the countryside, and the Chinese revolution temporarily entered a low tide. Mao Zedong “led the troops to Jinggangshan”[n] and established China’s first rural revolutionary base area. In response to the question “How long can the red flag keep flying?” Mao Zedong, in articles such as “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire,” deeply analyzed the uneven development of the socio-economic and political conditions in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, comprehensively demonstrated the reasons and conditions for the long-term existence and development of red political power, and vividly depicted an inspiring revolutionary prospect: “It is like a ship far out at sea whose masthead can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child about to be born moving restlessly in its mother’s womb.”[4]4 The Third Front construction (三线建设) was a massive industrialization and defense project from 1964 to 1980, relocating and building factories in China’s interior provinces to prepare for potential invasion. This profoundly revealed the developmental laws and inevitable victory of the Chinese revolution, inspired the fighting will of countless revolutionaries, and encouraged Chinese Communists to advance wave upon wave, bravely moving forward.

在人类发展的历史长河中，远见卓识始终是人们不懈追求的智慧巅峰。一个民族要走在时代前列，就一刻不能没有理论思维，一刻不能没有正确思想指引。马克思主义创立了辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义世界观，以远见卓识科学揭示了人类社会最终走向共产主义的必然趋势，为革命政党的战略远见提供了科学指南。毛泽东1920年第一次读到《共产党宣言》，从此树立起对马克思主义的坚定信仰。毛泽东说：“共产党是以马克思主义为思想基础的，它对于将来和前途看得清楚。”[3] 毛泽东是马克思主义中国化的伟大开拓者，善于把马克思列宁主义基本原理同中国实际相结合，因而能够在重大历史关头、各种风险挑战面前，以宏阔的战略视野、长远的战略眼光、深邃的战略智慧，指明中国革命与建设的前行航向。毛泽东的战略远见，从本质上说是马克思主义中国化的思想结晶，是对中国革命与建设内在规律的深刻把握，是把实践经验上升为规律后的理论自觉，是对实践发展趋势认识的理性升华。在党的幼年时期，党内有些同志一度把马克思主义教条化、把俄国革命经验神圣化，使中国革命遭受了严重挫折。1927年大革命失败以后，党的工作重点由城市转入农村，中国革命暂时进入低潮，毛泽东“引兵井冈”，创建了中国第一个农村革命根据地。针对“红旗到底打得多久”的疑问，毛泽东在《星星之火，可以燎原》等文章中深入分析半殖民地半封建的中国社会经济政治发展的不平衡性，全面论证了红色政权长期存在和发展的原因和条件，豪迈地描绘了一幅令人鼓舞的革命前景：“它是站在海岸遥望海中已经看得见桅杆尖头了的一只航船，它是立于高山之巅远看东方已见光芒四射喷薄欲出的一轮朝日，它是躁动于母腹中的快要成熟了的一个婴儿。”[4] 这深刻揭示了中国革命的发展规律和必胜趋势，鼓舞无数革命者的斗争意志，激励中国共产党人前赴后继，勇往直前。

(2) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Is the Cognitive Realm of Far-Sighted Strategic Thinking

（二）毛泽东的战略远见，是战略思维高瞻远瞩的认知境界

Mao Zedong’s strategic thinking was far-sighted and took the overall situation into account. In space, it focused on the whole; in time, it focused on the long term; in order of priority, it focused on the fundamental; it always grasped the direction of development and the overall trend of things. Strategic foresight is a distinctive quality of strategic thinking. It is both the fundamental embodiment of strategic thinking in the temporal dimension and a planning realm that runs through all aspects and the entire process of the strategic overall situation. Excellent traditional Chinese culture is an important source of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic foresight. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight took Chinese civilization as its spiritual lifeline, extracting the essence from excellent traditional Chinese culture and discarding the dross. The ancients emphasized foresight and insight, standing high and planning far, and extolled such ideas as “planning strategies within a command tent and winning victories a thousand miles away,” “the wise see what has not yet sprouted, the intelligent avoid danger before it takes shape,” and “preparedness ensures success, unpreparedness spells failure.” Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight integrated the essence of ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign for his own use, gathered the achievements of human civilization into one, and saw the overall situation, the long term, turning points, trends, and essence. It was a kind of political general direction, a grand mindset, a broad planning vision, and great wisdom in overall planning. Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized that leaders must have a “strategic mind”[5]5 Shelling Jinmen (炮击金门) refers to the artillery bombardment of the Kuomintang-held islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) by the People’s Liberation Army in 1958, a crisis in the Taiwan Strait., that is, the ability for strategic thinking; and that when looking at problems, one must “look from the essence, from the long term, from the strategic perspective.”[6]6 The strategy of dividing the world into three worlds (划分三个世界的战略) was Mao Zedong’s geopolitical theory from the 1970s, classifying the US and USSR as the First World, other developed countries as the Second World, and developing countries (including China) as the Third World. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight was adept at attending to each stage and the entire process from the perspective of the strategic overall situation. Mao Zedong pointed out: “The primary and foremost issue concerning victory or defeat in war is whether the overall situation and each stage are attended to well or poorly.”[7]7 Xi Jinping, speech at a symposium commemorating the 70th anniversary of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, October 23, 2020. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight was adept at discerning trends and guiding the future from the perspective of the strategic overall situation. He pointed out: “Use strategic guidelines to guide campaign and tactical guidelines, connect today with tomorrow, connect the small with the large, connect the part with the whole, and oppose taking one step at a time without looking ahead.”[8]8 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission,” March 1958. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight was adept at sizing up the situation, adapting to circumstances, and responding to changes. Mao Zedong was always able to keenly perceive the arrival of a turning point at the critical moment of historical transition and, after careful consideration, put forward the corresponding principles and policies in a concise and comprehensive manner. For example, after the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, at the critical juncture when the Chinese revolution was hanging by a thread, the Party’s August 7th Meeting[n] determined the general policy of agrarian revolution and armed uprising. Mao Zedong emphasized that “from now on, we must pay close attention to military affairs. It must be understood that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,”[9]9 Quoted in Xiao San, “The Great Beginning,” in *The Story of Mao Zedong’s Youth*. which pointed out a new way out for the Chinese Communist Party, then in a state of ideological confusion and organizational laxity, and initiated the historic transition from the failure of the Great Revolution to the rise of the Agrarian Revolutionary War.

毛泽东的战略思维，高瞻远瞩，总揽全局，在空间上着眼整体、在时间上着眼长远、在次序上着眼根本，始终把握事物发展方向和总体趋势。战略远见，是战略思维的鲜明品质，它既是战略思维在时间维度上的根本体现，又是贯通战略全局各方面和全过程的谋划境界。中华优秀传统文化是中国共产党战略远见的重要源泉。毛泽东的战略远见以中华文明为精神血脉，从中华优秀传统文化中取其精华，推陈出新。古人强调远见卓识、站高谋远，推崇“运筹帷幄之中，决胜千里之外”“明者远见于未萌，智者避危于未形”“凡事预则立，不预则废”等。毛泽东的战略远见，融古今中外精华为我所用，集人类文明成果于一体，见全局、见长远、见转折、见趋势、见本质，是一种政治大方向、思维大格局、谋划大视野、运筹大智慧。毛泽东一再强调：领导人一定要有“战略头脑”[5] ，也就是要有战略思维能力；看问题要“从本质上看，从长期上看，从战略上看”[6] 。毛泽东的战略远见，善于从战略全局上关照各阶段全过程。毛泽东指出：“战争的胜败的主要和首先的问题，是对于全局和各阶段的关照得好或关照得不好。”[7] 毛泽东的战略远见，善于从战略全局上洞察趋势、指导未来。他指出：“拿战略方针去指导战役战术方针，把今天联结到明天，把小的联结到大的，把局部联结到全体，反对走一步看一步。”[8] 毛泽东的战略远见，善于审时度势、顺势应变。毛泽东总是能够在历史转折的关键时刻，敏锐察觉转折时刻已经来临，并且在深思熟虑后提纲挈领地提出相应的方针政策。比如，1927年大革命失败，在中国革命处于命悬一线的紧要关头，党的八七会议确定了土地革命和武装起义的总方针，毛泽东强调“以后要非常注意军事。须知政权是由枪杆子中取得的”[9] ，给正处于思想混乱和组织涣散中的中国共产党指明了新的出路，开启了大革命失败到土地革命战争兴起的历史性转变。

(3) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Is the Wise Guidance of the Practice of China’s Revolution and Construction

（三）毛泽东的战略远见，是中国革命和建设实践的智慧引领

Mao Zedong pointed out: “The philosophy of Marxism holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thereby being able to explain it, but in applying that knowledge of objective laws actively to transform the world.”[10]10 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee,” August 23, 1945. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight was not merely a mode of thinking but a practical force; it not only revealed future directions and trends but also embodied the superb wisdom of turning ideals into reality and theory into practice, maturing and rising through practice. Our Party, from its founding and establishment by choosing Marxism-Leninism and communism, to opening up the correct revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force during the Agrarian Revolutionary War; from facilitating the peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident at the critical juncture of the resistance against Japan and national salvation, to implementing the correct policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, proposing and implementing the general strategic policy of protracted war and a complete set of strategic tactics for people’s war, forming the Party’s line of total resistance against Japan, and plunging the Japanese aggressors into the vast ocean of people’s war; from establishing the strategic policy of “advancing northward and defending southward” in the early stage of the War of Liberation, to breaking through the Central Plains, shifting the fight to northern Shaanxi, making a thousand-mile leap into the Dabie Mountains, gradually transitioning from active defense to strategic offense, sizing up the situation and decisively launching the strategic decisive battles of the Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin campaigns, and then making the great strategic decision to carry the revolution through to the end and liberate all of China; from making the historic strategic decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, protect our homes and defend our country in the early days of the founding of New China, to proposing the general line for the transition period, establishing the basic system of socialism, advancing socialist construction, developing the “two bombs and one satellite,”[3]3 “Two bombs and one satellite” (两弹一星) refers to China’s development of nuclear bombs (atomic and hydrogen), intercontinental ballistic missiles, and artificial satellites, a major national defense and technology project initiated in the 1950s and 1960s. carrying out the Third Front construction,[4]4 The Third Front construction (三线建设) was a massive industrialization and defense project from 1964 to 1980, relocating and building factories in China’s interior provinces to prepare for potential invasion. shelling Jinmen,[5]5 Shelling Jinmen (炮击金门) refers to the artillery bombardment of the Kuomintang-held islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) by the People’s Liberation Army in 1958, a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. promoting the restoration of all China’s lawful rights in the United Nations, and proposing the strategy of dividing the world into three worlds,[6]6 The strategy of dividing the world into three worlds (划分三个世界的战略) was Mao Zedong’s geopolitical theory from the 1970s, classifying the US and USSR as the First World, other developed countries as the Second World, and developing countries (including China) as the Third World. and so on — all these demonstrated Mao Zedong’s far-sighted foresight, strategic planning that commanded the overall situation, and visionary strategic design. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight led our Party and people to find the correct path for the new-democratic revolution, complete the tasks of opposing imperialism and feudalism, establish the People’s Republic of China, establish the basic system of socialism, realize the most extensive and profound social change in the history of the Chinese nation, achieve original theoretical achievements and tremendous successes in socialist revolution and construction, and lay the fundamental political prerequisite, valuable experience, theoretical preparation, and material foundation for all development and progress in contemporary China.

毛泽东指出：“马克思主义的哲学认为十分重要的问题，不在于懂得了客观世界的规律性，因而能够解释世界，而在于拿了这种对于客观规律性的认识去能动地改造世界。”[10] 毛泽东的战略远见不仅是思维格局，更是实践力量，既揭示未来方向和趋势，又蕴涵着把理想变为现实、把理论变为实际的高超智慧，在实践中不断成熟升华。我们党从建党立党选择马列主义、共产主义，到土地革命时期开辟农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的正确革命道路；从抗日救亡的重大关头促成“西安事变”和平解决，到实行正确的抗日民族统一战线政策，提出和实施持久战的战略总方针和一整套人民战争的战略战术，形成党的全面抗战路线，使日本侵略者陷入人民战争的汪洋大海之中；从解放战争初期确立“向北发展，向南防御”的战略方针，到中原突围，转战陕北，千里跃进大别山，逐步由积极防御转向战略进攻，审时度势果断发起辽沈、淮海、平津三大战役战略决战，再到作出誓将革命进行到底的伟大战略决策，解放全中国；从新中国成立初期做出抗美援朝、保家卫国的历史性战略决断，到提出过渡时期的总路线，确立社会主义基本制度，推进社会主义建设，研制“两弹一星”、进行三线建设、炮击金门、推动恢复我国在联合国的一切合法权利、提出划分三个世界的战略，等等，都展现出毛泽东高屋建瓴的前瞻预见、总揽全局的战略运筹和富有远见的战略谋划。毛泽东的战略远见，引领我们党和人民找到了新民主主义革命的正确道路，完成了反帝反封建的任务，建立了中华人民共和国，确立了社会主义基本制度，实现了中华民族有史以来最为广泛而深刻的社会变革，社会主义革命和建设取得了独创性理论成果和巨大成就，为当代中国一切发展进步奠定了根本政治前提和宝贵经验、理论准备、物质基础。

II. The Practical Structure of Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight

二、毛泽东战略远见的实践结构

Strategic foresight is a strategic realm formed by the integration of strategic ambition, strategic conviction, strategic prediction, strategic choice, and strategic sobriety. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight not only embodies the general elements of strategic foresight but also possesses unique Chinese characteristics, Chinese style, and Chinese manner. In the great practice of China’s revolution and construction, Mao Zedong adhered to the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, took a firm and correct political direction as the foundation, took serving the people wholeheartedly as the purpose, and took the laws of the existence and development of objective things as the basis. He thought across a thousand years and saw through ten thousand miles, stood high and saw far, discerned the minute and knew the great, reached the vast and exhausted the subtle, and ascended Mount Tai to see the world small, forming a magnificent and uniquely characteristic Marxist strategic foresight adapted to the Chinese context.

战略远见是由战略志向、战略信念、战略预见、战略抉择、战略清醒等融会而成的战略境界。毛泽东的战略远见，既体现战略远见的一般要素，又具有独特的中国特色、中国风格、中国气派。毛泽东在中国革命和建设的伟大实践中，坚持以马克思列宁主义为指导，以坚定正确的政治方向为根本，以全心全意为人民服务为主旨，以客观事物存在和发展的规律为基础，思接千载、视通万里，高瞻远瞩、见微知著，致广大而尽精微，登泰山而小天下，形成了蔚为壮观而又独具特质的马克思主义中国化战略远见。

(I) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Embodied as the Strategic Ambition of National Rejuvenation

（一）毛泽东的战略远见体现为民族复兴的战略志向

Strategic foresight takes strategic ambition as its clear guide. General Secretary Xi Jinping points out: “Only with lofty aspirations can one stand high and see far; only with the world in mind can one make great plans.”[11]11 Mao Zedong, “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong,” August 1946. After the Opium War, Western powers invaded China; the nation was humiliated, the people suffered, and its civilization was covered in dust. The Chinese nation suffered unprecedented calamities. In his youth, Mao Zedong set the lofty ambition of saving the nation from peril. From the autumn of 1909 to the summer of 1910, Mao Zedong read a pamphlet about the imperialist powers carving up China. He became deeply worried about the country’s future and began to realize that “everyone is responsible for the rise and fall of the nation.” In May 1915, Mao Zedong wrote in a poem: “To the east there are island barbarians, to the north mountains full of enemies and grudges. Who will cleanse them away? How can I shirk this humble duty?” He denounced Japan and Tsarist Russia for constantly encroaching upon and annexing China’s territory, admonishing his schoolmates to take on the responsibility of saving the nation. The young Mao Zedong, “with the scholar’s spirit, waving his arms and directing, pointing at the rivers and mountains, stirring words,” expressed both the heavenward query of “asking the vast earth, who decides its rise and fall” and the heroic spirit of “swimming in the midstream, stopping the speeding boats,” conveying the grand ambition of “transforming China and the world.” Throughout his life of struggle, from participating in the founding of the Party to the Autumn Harvest Uprising, to Jinggangshan, to the Long March, to northern Shaanxi, and then to “taking the exam to enter Beijing,” and after the founding of New China, leading our Party to propose striving to gradually build China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, modern industry, modern national defense, and modern science and technology, and leading the people in carrying out comprehensive large-scale socialist construction — all were aimed at making the country strong, the nation rejuvenated, and the people prosperous. Mao Zedong was a great man of his generation who led the Chinese people to fundamentally change their own destiny and the face of the country. Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the Chinese people firmly grasped their destiny in their own hands, the development and progress of the Chinese nation opened a new epoch, and socialist China stood tall and firm in the East.

战略远见以战略志向为鲜明导向。习近平总书记指出：“志存高远方能登高望远，胸怀天下才可大展宏图。”[11] 鸦片战争后，西方列强入侵中国，国家蒙辱、人民蒙难、文明蒙尘，中华民族遭受前所未有的劫难。毛泽东在青年时期就立下拯救民族于危难的远大志向。1909年秋至1910年夏，毛泽东读了一本关于帝国主义列强瓜分中国的小册子，对国家前途十分担忧，开始意识到“国家兴亡，匹夫有责”。1915年5月，毛泽东在诗中写道：“东海有岛夷，北山尽仇怨。荡涤谁氏子，安得辞浮贱。”痛斥日本、沙俄不断侵犯、侵吞中国疆土，告诫同窗好友要担当起救国重任。年轻的毛泽东“书生意气，挥斥方遒。指点江山，激扬文字”，既有“问苍茫大地，谁主沉浮”的仰天长问，又有“到中流击水，浪遏飞舟”的英勇气概，表达出“改造中国与世界”的宏大抱负。毛泽东一生奋斗，从参加建党到秋收起义、到井冈山、到长征、到陕北，直至“进京赶考”，再到新中国成立后带领我们党提出努力把我国逐步建设成为一个具有现代农业、现代工业、现代国防和现代科学技术的社会主义强国，领导人民开展全面大规模的社会主义建设，都是为了使国家强盛、民族复兴、人民富裕。毛泽东是领导中国人民彻底改变自己命运和国家面貌的一代伟人。在毛泽东领导下，中国人民把命运牢牢掌握在自己手中，中华民族发展进步开启了新纪元，社会主义中国巍然屹立在世界东方。

(II) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Embodied as Strategic Prediction of the Future

（二）毛泽东的战略远见体现为前瞻未来的战略预见

Strategic foresight takes strategic prediction as its key element. Mao Zedong emphasized that without prediction there is no leadership, without prediction there is nothing. Strategic prediction is a kind of political wisdom, political acumen, and political insight, enabling the Party to see light in darkness, see trends in confusion, see victory in twists and turns, see opportunities in challenges, and see risks in times of peace. At the Seventh National Congress of the Party, Mao Zedong profoundly pointed out: “Prediction means seeing the future trend in advance. If there is no prediction, can it be called leadership? I say it cannot be called leadership.” “Sitting on the command post, if you see nothing, you cannot be called a leader. Sitting on the command post, only seeing a large number of common things that have already appeared on the horizon — that is ordinary and cannot be considered leadership either. Only when, before a large number of obvious things have appeared, when the tip of the mast has just emerged, you can see that this will develop into a large number of common things and can grasp it — only then is this called leadership.”[12]12 Mao Zedong, letter to Xiao Zisheng, July 25, 1916. Mao Zedong incisively revealed the essence of strategic prediction. Strategic prediction is not only the insight and wisdom of seeing the minute and knowing the great, standing high and seeing far, but also the great talent and bold strategy of discerning trends and grasping them firmly. It is the art of leadership that organically unifies standing high and planning far with landing on the ground and grasping firmly. In the early days of the total War of Resistance Against Japan, as cities like Beiping, Tianjin, Taiyuan, Shanghai, and Nanjing fell one after another, what would the course of the war be? Could China ultimately achieve victory, and how could it achieve victory? A considerable number of people were confused and perplexed. At this critical historical moment, Mao Zedong published *On Protracted War*, analyzing factors such as the balance of power between China and Japan, pointing out that both the “theory of national subjugation” and the “theory of quick victory” were wrong, and drawing the scientific conclusion that the War of Resistance Against Japan would be a protracted war and that final victory would belong to China. During the Seventh National Congress of the Party, Mao Zedong said: “From the perspective of our Party and the immediate future prospects of the Chinese revolution, the Northeast is particularly important. Even if we lose all our existing base areas, as long as we have the Northeast, then the Chinese revolution will have a solid foundation.”[13]13 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936. After the victory of the War of Resistance, our Party seized the initiative, rapidly mobilizing 20,000 cadres and 110,000 troops to enter the Northeast. Of the 77 full and alternate members of the Central Committee elected at the Seventh National Congress, 20 were sent to work in the Northeast. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out on this matter: “What a far-sighted strategic decision this was! Later developments also proved how important this strategic decision was for the victory of the War of Liberation.”[14]14 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,” May 1938.

战略远见以战略预见为关键要素。毛泽东强调，没有预见就没有领导、没有预见就没有一切。战略预见，是一种政治睿智、政治敏锐、政治慧眼，使党在黑暗中看到光明，在迷茫中看到趋向，在曲折中看到胜利，在挑战中看到机遇，在承平中看到风险。毛泽东在党的七大上深刻指出：“预见就是预先看到前途趋向。如果没有预见，叫不叫领导？我说不叫领导。”“坐在指挥台上，如果什么也看不见，就不能叫领导。坐在指挥台上，只看见地平线上已经出现的大量的普遍的东西，那是平平常常的，也不能算领导。只有当着还没有出现大量的明显的东西的时候，当桅杆顶刚刚露出的时候，就能看出这是要发展成为大量的普遍的东西，并能掌握住它，这才叫领导。”[12] 毛泽东精辟揭示了战略预见的精髓。战略预见既是见微知著、登高望远的洞察睿智，也是看出趋势、抓住握紧的雄才大略，是站高谋远与落地抓实有机统一的领导艺术。全面抗日战争初期，随着北平、天津、太原、上海、南京等城市相继陷落，战争的进程究竟会要怎么样？中国能不能取得最后胜利，怎样才能取得胜利？相当一部分人迷惘困惑。关键历史时刻，毛泽东发表了《论持久战》，分析中日力量对比等因素，指出“亡国论”和“速胜论”都是错误的，得出抗日战争是持久战、最后胜利是中国的科学结论。党的七大期间，毛泽东说：“从我们党，从中国革命的最近将来的前途看，东北是特别重要的。如果我们把现有的一切根据地都丢了，只要我们有了东北，那末中国革命就有了巩固的基础。”[13] 抗战胜利后，我们党抢占先机，迅速调集2万干部和11万军队进入东北，七大选出的中央委员、候补中央委员总共77人，其中派往东北工作的就达20人。习近平总书记就此指出：“这是多么富有远见的战略决断！后来的发展也证明这个战略决断对解放战争胜利发挥了多么重要的作用。”[14]

(III) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Embodied as Strategic Choices of Courageous Trade-offs

（三）毛泽东的战略远见体现为勇于取舍的战略抉择

Strategic foresight is most breathtakingly displayed in strategic choices. Strategic decision-making is the “perilous leap” of a leader’s strategic practice, the “stern examination hall” for seizing the strategic initiative; what it leaves to history is either glory or disaster. In strategic activities, especially strategic confrontation, judgments of advantage and disadvantage and choices between them are extraordinarily complex. Gains and losses, advantages and disadvantages are hard to discern in the fog of war, they transform and shift in strategic games, they become bewildering and confusing amid rapid changes, and a strategic choice with a hundred advantages and not a single disadvantage simply does not exist. This requires comprehensive analysis, promoting the advantageous and avoiding the harmful, weighing and choosing. Great strategic choices are all made under conditions of uncertainty, sacrificing partial interests, daring to risk failure, daring to bear responsibility, and making correct judgments and resolute choices based on expectations of the overall and long-term interest. Mao Zedong’s weighing and choosing of this kind was an embodiment of political courage, a unity of boldness and talent, containing profound insight, keen judgment, and fearless responsibility; it was a kind of far-sighted, deep-laid plan that was both magnificent and uncanny. Mao Zedong was a great strategist who comprehensively weighed advantages and disadvantages, gains and losses, and correctly made decisions and choices. He focused on the big picture, weighed primary and secondary gains and losses, and strove to seize the initiative. He admonished commanders that being forced by the enemy into a passive position was a common occurrence, and what was important was to rapidly recover the active position. He stressed that fighting did not lie in the gain or loss of one city or one piece of territory, but in annihilating the enemy’s effective strength: preserve people, lose territory, and both people and territory are preserved; preserve territory, lose people, and both people and territory are lost. In the spring of 1947, Chiang Kai-shek, at any cost, wanted to use heavy forces to capture Yan’an. Mao Zedong decided to voluntarily abandon Yan’an. Many inside and outside the Party could not understand this. Mao Zedong said firmly: “We will use one Yan’an to exchange for the whole of China!” He devised his strategy from among the mountain ridges and gullies of northern Shaanxi, directing the military struggle in northern Shaanxi from passivity to initiative, while also leading the national war situation from strategic defense to strategic offensive. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was the most difficult decision Mao Zedong ever made. In the ten-plus days after National Day in 1950, the Central Committee repeatedly held meetings to study the matter. After many days and nights of thinking and repeatedly weighing the options, Mao Zedong made the major strategic decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, creating a magnificent and heroic historical achievement. General Secretary Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out: “The Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong, with the strategic foresight of ‘one punch opens, a hundred punches are avoided,’ and with the determination and boldness of ‘not begrudging the domestic situation being smashed to pieces and rebuilt,’ made the historic decision to resist U.S. aggression, aid Korea, and defend the homeland, avoiding the dangerous situation of the aggressor deploying troops at the nation’s gates, and safeguarding the security of New China.”[7]7 Xi Jinping, speech at a symposium commemorating the 70th anniversary of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, October 23, 2020.

战略远见在战略抉择中表现得最为惊心动魄。战略决断，是领导者战略实践的“惊险一跃”，是争夺战略主动权的“严峻考场”，它留给历史的或是辉煌，或是灾难。在战略活动特别是战略对抗中，利弊判断与取舍异常复杂。利弊得失在战争迷雾中难以看清，在战略博弈中变化转化，在瞬息万变中扑朔迷离，百利而无一弊的战略选择更不存在，这就需要全面分析、趋利避害、权衡取舍。伟大的战略抉择，都是在不确定条件下，牺牲局部利益，敢冒失败风险，敢于承担责任，对全局和长远利益预期作出的正确判断和果敢抉择。毛泽东的这种权衡取舍，是政治胆略的体现，是胆魄与才略的统一，蕴涵着深刻的洞察力、敏锐的判断力、无畏的担当力，是一种气贯长虹、出神入化的深谋远虑。毛泽东是全面权衡利弊得失、正确决断选择的伟大战略家，注重从大处着眼，权衡主次得失，力求争得主动。他告诫指挥员，被敌逼迫到被动地位的事是常有的，重要的是要迅速地恢复主动地位。他强调打仗不在于一城一地的得失，而在于消灭敌人的有生力量，存人失地，人地皆存；存地失人，人地皆失。1947年春，蒋介石不惜一切代价要以重兵攻占延安。毛泽东决定主动放弃延安，党内外很多人想不通。毛泽东坚定地说：“我们要用一个延安，换取整个中国！”他运筹帷幄于陕北的山茆沟岔之间，既指挥陕北军事斗争由被动转为主动，又领导全国战局由战略防御转为战略进攻。抗美援朝，是毛泽东一生中最难作出的决策。在1950年国庆节后十几天内，中央反复开会研究。毛泽东经过多天昼夜思考、反复权衡，作出抗美援朝的重大战略决断，创造了威武雄壮的历史伟业。习近平总书记深刻指出：“党中央和毛泽东同志以‘打得一拳开，免得百拳来’的战略远见，以‘不惜国内打烂了重新建设’的决心和气魄，作出抗美援朝、保家卫国的历史性决策，避免了侵略者陈兵国门的危局，捍卫了新中国安全。”[15]

(4) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Embodied in the Strategic Conviction of Daring to Fight and Certain to Win

（四）毛泽东的战略远见体现为敢打必胜的战略信念

The conviction of certain victory is the most precious strategic foresight. It marks the firm confidence of the weak overcoming the strong, fearless strategic boldness, and an indomitable heroic spirit. Mao Zedong said: “The conviction of victory is won through fighting, it is obtained through struggle.”[8]8 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission,” March 1958. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, facing setbacks, some comrades were dejected. Mao Zedong said: “Victory will certainly belong to us. Our strength is very small now, like a small stone; Chiang Kai-shek is like a big water vat. One day, this small stone of ours will smash that big water vat of Chiang Kai-shek’s.”[9]9 Quoted in Xiao San, “The Great Beginning,” in *The Story of Mao Zedong’s Youth*. After the victory of the War of Resistance, facing Chiang Kai-shek’s negotiation invitation, which was a false peace covering a real civil war, Mao Zedong, to protect the people’s interests, resolutely decided to go in person to Chongqing to negotiate with the Kuomintang. Before leaving, Mao Zedong said: “In the history of our Party, there has never been a case of casually handing over weapons, so there is absolutely no fear; if they want to place me under house arrest, I fear that even less.”[10]10 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee,” August 23, 1945. During the Chongqing negotiations, our Party adopted the revolutionary dual tactic of negotiating with talk and fighting with blows, waging a tit-for-tat struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. Our army, following the Party Central Committee’s policy of “tit-for-tat, fighting for every inch of ground,” launched the Shangdang Campaign against the Kuomintang’s invading forces, annihilating over 35,000 enemy troops in one stroke, effectively supporting the Chongqing negotiations. Facing the all-out civil war brazenly launched by the Kuomintang reactionaries, Mao Zedong, in an interview with the famous American female journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946, put forward: “All reactionaries are paper tigers.” At the time, some comrades in the Party and the army feared breaking with the Kuomintang because of the huge disparity in military strength. Mao Zedong profoundly pointed out: “It seems that the reactionaries look terrifying, but in fact they have no real power. Looking at the problem from a long-term perspective, truly powerful forces do not belong to the reactionaries, but to the people.”[11]11 Mao Zedong, “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong,” August 1946. In August 1949, in response to the U.S. State Department’s White Paper on “United States Relations with China,” Mao Zedong published “Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle,” profoundly revealing that the logic of the imperialists is to make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again, until their extinction. And the logic of the people is to struggle, fail, struggle again, fail again, struggle again, until victory. This profoundly elucidated the logic and law by which the people will inevitably move toward victory in struggle. Today, this logic and law still shine with the great radiance of the times.

必胜信念是最为珍贵的战略远见。它标识着以弱胜强的坚定信心、无所畏惧的战略胆魄、一往无前的英雄气概。毛泽东说：“胜利的信念是打出来的，是斗争中间得出来的。”[16] 秋收起义失败后，面对挫折，一些同志情绪低落。毛泽东说：“胜利是一定属于我们的。我们现在力量很小，好比是一块小石头，蒋介石好比是一口大水缸，总有一天，我们这块小石头，要打破蒋介石那口大水缸。”[17] 抗战胜利后，毛泽东面对蒋介石假和平真内战的谈判电邀，为保卫人民利益，毅然决定亲赴重庆与国民党谈判。临行前，毛泽东说：“我党的历史上还没有随便缴枪的事，所以绝不怕；如果要软禁，那更不怕。”[18] 在重庆谈判中，我们党采取以谈对谈、以打对打的革命两手，同蒋介石进行针锋相对的斗争，我军遵照党中央“针锋相对、寸土必争”方针，对国民党进犯军发起上党战役，一举歼敌3.5万余人，有力配合了重庆谈判。面对国民党反动派悍然发动的全面内战，毛泽东在1946年8月同美国著名女记者安娜·路易斯·斯特朗谈话时提出：“一切反动派都是纸老虎。”当时，党内军内一些同志因为悬殊的军事实力差距而害怕同国民党决裂。毛泽东深刻指出：“看起来，反动派的样子是可怕的，但是实际上并没有什么了不起的力量。从长远的观点看问题，真正强大的力量不是属于反动派，而是属于人民。”[19] 1949年8月，针对美国国务院发表的《美国同中国的关系》白皮书，毛泽东发表《丢掉幻想，准备斗争》，深刻揭示了帝国主义者的逻辑就是捣乱，失败，再捣乱，再失败，直至灭亡。而人民的逻辑则是斗争，失败，再斗争，再失败，再斗争，直至胜利。这深刻阐明了人民必将在斗争中走向胜利的逻辑和定律。今天，这一逻辑和定律仍然闪耀着伟大的时代光芒。

(5) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Embodied in Tenacious and Enduring Strategic Patience

（五）毛泽东的战略远见体现为坚韧持久的战略耐心

Foresight inspires patience; perseverance is necessary to accomplish great deeds. In 1916, in a letter to his close schoolmate Xiao Zisheng, Mao Zedong wrote: “Those who plan far must wait; those who achieve greatness must endure.”[12]12 Mao Zedong, letter to Xiao Zisheng, July 25, 1916. This is quoted from Su Shi’s “On Jia Yi”: “For a gentleman to achieve what is distant, he must wait; to accomplish what is great, he must endure.” During the revolutionary war years, Mao Zedong pointed out: “China’s war cannot but be treated with the greatest patience; it cannot but be treated as a protracted war.”[13]13 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936. “Do not be intimidated by the enemy’s bluster, do not be disheartened by difficulties that can still be endured, do not be discouraged by certain setbacks; giving necessary patience and persistence is entirely necessary.”[14]14 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,” May 1938. Mao Zedong gave an example to illustrate the necessity of patience: In the Spring and Autumn period, Lu fought against Qi. Duke Zhuang of Lu initially wanted to attack before the Qi army was exhausted, but was stopped by Cao Gui, who adopted the policy of “the enemy tires, we fight,” defeated the Qi army, and created a famous example in Chinese military history of a weak army defeating a strong army. Mao Zedong emphasized that when struggling against a strong enemy, one should execute favorable decisive battles and avoid unfavorable decisive battles. “All of the enemy’s ‘challenge letters’ and others’ ‘provocations’ should be put on the shelf, ignored, and not be moved by them in the slightest.” Be a general who “has such firmness that he can be considered a brave and wise commander.”[15]15 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936. In March 1947, the Kuomintang army launched a key offensive against northern Shaanxi and Shandong. Having learned from previous experiences of being repeatedly annihilated, they changed their tactics, concentrated their forces, and acted cautiously. The East China Field Army found it difficult to realize its determination to annihilate the enemy on multiple occasions. Accordingly, on May 4, Mao Zedong instructed: “The enemy forces are dense and difficult to attack; it is very appropriate to be patient and wait for an opportunity. As long as there is patience, there will always be a chance to annihilate the enemy.” And he advised “to have great patience.”[16]16 Mao Zedong, telegram to the East China Bureau and the East China Field Army, May 4, 1947. On May 6, he again instructed: “First, do not be impatient; second, do not divide your forces. As long as the main force is in hand, there will always be a chance to annihilate the enemy.” “When it is not good to fight, avoid the enemy’s provocations, be patient and wait for an opportunity; this is very correct.”[17]17 Mao Zedong, telegram to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin, May 6, 1947. Following the instructions of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission, the East China Field Army patiently sought an opportunity, launched the Menglianggu Campaign with the tactic of “a fierce tiger tearing out the heart,” and with the spirit of “plucking the enemy general’s head from a million troops,” under the situation of the enemy’s dense and advancing forces, used a fierce offensive to split off and completely annihilate the Reorganized 74th Division, the foremost of the five elite main forces of the Kuomintang army, from the enemy’s battle line. This played a decisive role in thwarting the Kuomintang army’s key offensive against the Shandong Liberated Area.

远见激发耐心，坚忍方成大业。1916年，毛泽东致同窗好友萧子升的信函中写道：“图远者必有所待，成大者必有所忍。”[20] 这引自苏轼的《贾谊论》：“夫君子之所取者远，则必有所待；所就者大，则必有所忍。”在革命战争年代，毛泽东指出：“中国的战争不能不以最大的忍耐性对待之，不能不以持久战对待之。”[21] “不为敌之其势汹汹所吓倒，不为尚能忍耐的困难所沮丧，不为某些挫折而灰心，给予必要的耐心和持久，是完全必要的。”[22] 毛泽东曾举例说明忍耐之必要：春秋时候，鲁与齐战，鲁庄公起初不待齐军疲惫就要出战，被曹刿阻止，采取了“敌疲我打”的方针，打胜了齐军，造成了中国战史中弱军战胜强军的有名的战例。毛泽东强调，与强敌斗争时，执行有利决战，避免不利决战。“一切敌人的‘挑战书’，旁人的‘激将法’，都应束之高阁，置之不理，丝毫也不为其所动。”做一个“有这样的坚定性，才算是勇敢而明智的将军。”[23] 1947年3月，国民党军对陕北和山东实施重点进攻，接受以往屡遭歼灭的教训，改变战法，兵力集中，行动谨慎。华东野战军多次歼敌决心难以实现。据此，毛泽东于5月4日示：“敌军密集不好打，忍耐待机，处置甚妥。只要有耐心，总有歼敌机会。”并嘱“要有极大忍耐心”[24] 。5月6日又示：“第一不要性急，第二不要分兵，只要主力在手，总有歼敌机会。”“当着不好打之时，避开敌方挑衅，忍耐待机，这是很对的。”[25] 在毛泽东和中央军委的指示下，华东野战军耐心寻得战机，以“猛虎掏心”战法发起孟良崮战役，以“百万军中取上将首级”的气概，在敌重兵密集并进的态势下，以凌厉攻势从敌阵线中分割全歼国民党军五大精锐主力之首整编第74师，对挫败国民党军对山东解放区的重点进攻起到了决定性作用。

(6) Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight Embodied in Strategic Vigilance of Being Prepared for Danger in Times of Peace

（六）毛泽东的战略远见体现为居安思危的战略警觉

Strategic foresight is embodied not only in a clear sense of direction but also in acute vigilance. The ancients stressed that “preparing against unforeseen events is the constant way of governing a state,”[18]18 A classical allusion from the *Zuo Zhuan* (Zuo’s Commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*). “be vigilant in peace and prepared for danger, and be prepared and you will have no trouble,”[19]19 A classical allusion from the *Zuo Zhuan*. “act before things arise, govern before disorder sets in,”[20]20 A classical allusion from the *Laozi*. and “the most intractable peril under heaven is that which, though outwardly peaceful and uneventful, actually harbors unforeseen dangers.”[21]21 A classical allusion from Su Shi’s essay “On the Strategy of Chao Cuo.” All these express the political foresight of taking precautions and preventing trouble before it occurs. In the practice of revolutionary struggle, Mao Zedong inherited the sense of concern from fine traditional Chinese culture and formed a distinctive political sobriety and political vigilance. In March 1944, Guo Moruo’s essay “The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty”[22]22 An essay by the Marxist historian and writer Guo Moruo (1892–1978), analyzing the fall of the Ming dynasty (1644) as a cautionary tale against corruption and complacency after victory. was published, recounting how Li Zicheng’s peasant rebel army, after capturing Beijing and overthrowing the Ming dynasty, became internally corrupt and fell into factional strife, leading to its defeat. Mao treated this essay as an important document for the Yan’an Rectification Movement.[23]23 A Party-wide ideological rectification campaign (1942–1945) that established Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology of the CPC. In November of the same year, he wrote to Guo Moruo: “We regard your ‘The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty’ as a rectification document. Small victories lead to arrogance, and greater victories lead to even greater arrogance; we suffer setbacks time and again. How to avoid this defect is truly worth our attention.”[24]24 Mao Zedong, “Letter to Guo Moruo” (November 21, 1944). In July 1945, during the “cave dialogue” with Huang Yanpei in Yan’an, Mao proposed breaking free from the cycle of the historical cycle[25]25 A concept referring to the recurring pattern in Chinese dynastic history of rise, peak, decline, and fall, which Huang Yanpei raised in his 1945 dialogue with Mao. through the path of democracy, reflecting his profound thinking on how to avoid the demise of each dynasty, the slackening of governance, and the pursuit of glory that brings disgrace. At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC, facing the imminent full victory of the War of Liberation and the Party’s impending assumption of national power, Mao foresightedly pointed out: “The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and the comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle.”[26]26 Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 5, 1949). On March 23, 1949, when the Party Central Committee set out from Xibaipo for Beiping, Mao clearly raised the historic proposition of “going to Beijing to sit for the imperial examination.”[27]27 A metaphor used by Mao to describe the CPC’s transition from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, implying that the Party would be tested by the people in governing the country. Mao’s political vigilance was a political foresight that accumulated historical depth, penetrated the laws of governance, and grasped the mechanisms of rise and fall. The great spirit of the examination has extremely important guiding significance for us to remember the ancient maxim “thrive in adversity, perish in comfort,”[28]28 A classical allusion from Mencius: “When one thrives in adversity, one perishes in comfort.” always think ahead, and be vigilant in peace.

战略远见不仅体现为明晰的方向感，也体现着敏锐的警觉性。古人强调“备豫不虞，为国常道”“居安思危，有备无患”“为之于未有，治之于未乱”“天下之患，最不可为者，名为治平无事，而其实有不测之忧”等，都体现着未雨绸缪、防患未然的为政远见。毛泽东在革命斗争实践中，传承中华优秀传统文化中的忧患意识，形成了特有的政治清醒和政治警觉。1944年3月，郭沫若的《甲申三百年祭》面世，叙述李自成农民起义军攻入北京推翻明朝以后，内部腐化并发生宗派斗争，以致陷于失败的过程。毛泽东把该文作为延安整风运动的重要文件。同年11月，又致信郭沫若：“你的《甲申三百年祭》，我们把它当作整风文件看待。小胜即骄傲，大胜更骄傲，一次又一次吃亏，如何避免此种毛病，实在值得注意。”[26] 1945年7月，毛泽东同黄炎培在延安的“窑洞对”，提出通过民主之路跳出历史周期率的支配，体现出他对如何避免历朝历代人亡政息、政怠宦成、求荣取辱等问题的深刻思考。在党的七届二中全会上，面对解放战争即将迎来全面胜利、党即将执掌全国政权的形势，毛泽东高瞻远瞩地指出：“务必使同志们继续地保持谦虚、谨慎、不骄、不躁的作风，务必使同志们继续地保持艰苦奋斗的作风。”1949年3月23日，中共中央从西柏坡起程前往北平时，毛泽东鲜明提出了“进京赶考”的历史性命题。毛泽东的政治警醒是一种厚积历史底蕴、透视执政规律、把握兴衰机理的政治远见。伟大的赶考精神，对我们铭记“生于忧患、死于安乐”的古训，常怀远虑、居安思危，有着极为重要的指导意义。

III. The Philosophical Realm of Mao Zedong’s Strategic Foresight

三、毛泽东战略远见的哲学境界

Every great thought and practice is supported by a great philosophical mindset. Philosophy is the fundamental guide to strategy, and strategy is the overall practice of philosophy. Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight shines with the light of Marxist philosophy; it is the concrete application and vivid embodiment of the broad vision of dialectical materialism and historical materialism in the practice of China’s revolution and construction, and it is the crystallization of strategic thinking and the fruit of strategic practice illuminated by the truth of Marxism. Seeking truth from facts, the mass line, and independence are the three basic aspects of the living soul of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao’s strategic foresight is the concrete unfolding and skillful application of the living soul of Mao Zedong Thought in the strategic field.

任何一种伟大的思想与实践，背后都有一种伟大的哲学思维作支撑。哲学是战略的根本性指导，战略是哲学的全局性实践。毛泽东的战略远见闪耀着马克思主义哲学光芒，是辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义宏阔视野在中国革命和建设实践中的具体运用和生动体现，是马克思主义真理光芒照耀的战略思维结晶和战略实践硕果。实事求是、群众路线、独立自主是毛泽东思想活的灵魂的三个基本方面。毛泽东的战略远见，是毛泽东思想活的灵魂在战略视野上的具体展开和娴熟运用。

(I) Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is a profound understanding of the dialectical unity of seeking truth from facts and far-sightedness

（一）毛泽东的战略远见，是对实事求是与远见卓识辩证统一的深刻领悟

In 1938, Mao Zedong first put forward the concept of seeking truth from facts, emphasizing its supporting role for far-sightedness. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC, he pointed out: “Communists should be models of seeking truth from facts and models of far-sightedness. For only by seeking truth from facts can we accomplish the determined tasks; only with far-sightedness can we not lose the direction of advance.”[29]29 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (October 1938). This exposition scientifically clarifies the dialectical relationship between seeking truth from facts and far-sightedness. Seeking truth from facts is the essence of Marxism and the cornerstone of the worldview and methodology of Chinese Communists. The essence of strategic foresight is the grasp and application of the laws of development of the overall strategic situation, and grasping and applying laws must be premised on seeking truth from facts. In his youth, Mao Zedong twice lived in the Banxue Studio of the Yuelu Academy, and the plaque inscribed with “seeking truth from facts” hanging high in the academy’s lecture hall gave him direct inspiration. In the course of the revolution, Mao pointed out: “To recognize China’s national conditions is the fundamental basis for recognizing all revolutionary issues.”[30]30 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” (December 1939). In his essay “On Practice,” he emphasized that “the viewpoint of practice is the first and basic viewpoint of the epistemology of dialectical materialism.”[31]31 Mao Zedong, “On Practice” (July 1937). To stand high and see far, one must keep one’s feet on the ground; to take a high position, one must first have a solid footing. Mao stressed: “Deciding on our work policy according to actual circumstances is the most basic working method that all Communists must firmly remember.”[32]32 Mao Zedong, “Methods of Work of Party Committees” (March 1949). Looking back at the Party’s history, Mao’s creative and far-sighted brilliant theses and strategic thoughts, such as “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,”[33]33 A famous thesis from Mao’s speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC (August 1927), arguing that armed force is essential for seizing political power. “encircling the cities from the countryside,”[34]34 The strategic path of the Chinese revolution, focusing on establishing rural base areas and encircling cities from the countryside, as opposed to the urban insurrection model. “the Anti-Japanese National United Front,”[35]35 The united front formed in 1937 between the CPC and the Kuomintang to resist Japanese invasion. and “carry the revolution through to the end,”[36]36 The slogan of the CPC in 1948–1949, calling for the complete defeat of the Kuomintang and the establishment of a new China. are all great crystallizations of seeking truth from facts.

1938年，毛泽东首次提出实事求是的概念，强调了实事求是对远见卓识的支撑作用。他在党的六届六中全会上指出：“共产党员应是实事求是的模范，又是具有远见卓识的模范。因为只有实事求是，才能完成确定的任务；只有远见卓识，才能不失前进的方向。”[27] 这一论述科学阐明了实事求是与远见卓识的辩证关系。实事求是，是马克思主义的精髓，是中国共产党人世界观和方法论的基石。战略远见的本质，是对战略全局发展规律的把握与运用，而把握和运用规律，必须以实事求是为前提。毛泽东青年时期两次寓居岳麓书院半学斋，高悬于岳麓书院讲堂的“实事求是”匾额给予他直接启发。在革命过程中，毛泽东指出：“认清中国的国情，乃是认清一切革命问题的基本的根据。”[28] 他在《实践论》中强调，“实践的观点是辩证唯物论的认识论之第一的和基本的观点”[29] 。登高望远，必须脚踏实地；站位高远，首先站位要实。毛泽东强调：“按照实际情况决定工作方针，这是一切共产党员所必须牢牢记住的最基本的工作方法。”[30] 回顾党的历史，毛泽东创造性提出“枪杆子里出政权”“农村包围城市”“抗日民族统一战线”“将革命进行到底”等富有远见的光辉论断和战略思想，都是实事求是的伟大结晶。

(II) Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is a profound understanding of the dialectical unity of a bright future and a tortuous path

（二）毛泽东的战略远见，是对前途光明与道路曲折辩证统一的深刻领悟

“The future is bright, the path is tortuous” is a famous saying of Mao Zedong. A bright future and a tortuous path incisively expound the unity of progress and twists and turns in the historical process, brimming with the historical consciousness, historical confidence, and historical initiative of the Chinese Communists. A bright future reflects the inevitability of history, while a tortuous path reflects the complexity of history. Advancing amidst twists and turns, and moving forward in the midst of twists and turns—this is the historical logic of the development of all just causes. Mao’s profound understanding of the dialectical unity of a bright future and a tortuous path shows that his strategic foresight is built on the foundation of the Marxist materialist conception of history, is a profound insight into the trend of historical development, is a firm belief in the inevitable victory of just causes, and is a scientific understanding of achieving a bright future through struggle. In May 1945, at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC, facing the imminent victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao analyzed the bright prospects for the world and China after the victory, but especially pointed out the need to “prepare for setbacks.” He listed 17 difficulties in one breath, emphasizing that while seeing the bright side, one must be even more prepared to overcome difficulties, “to establish our policy on the basis of the worst possibility,” and that senior responsible cadres of the Party, in particular, must have the “mental preparation” to “deal with extraordinary difficulties and extraordinary adverse situations.”[37]37 Mao Zedong, “Conclusions on the Report of the Central Committee” at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC (May 31, 1945). His purpose was to guide the entire Party to recognize the direction, strengthen faith, overcome difficulties, and strive for victory. Later, when Chiang Kai-shek launched an all-out civil war, precisely because our Party had made early judgments and adopted correct strategic policies, the War of Liberation achieved a decisive victory in just over three years.

“前途是光明的，道路是曲折的”，是毛泽东的一句名言。前途光明与道路曲折，精辟阐明了历史进程中前进性与曲折性的统一，洋溢着中国共产党的历史自觉、历史自信和历史主动。前途光明反映了历史的必然性，道路曲折反映了历史的复杂性。在前进中有曲折，在曲折中向前进，这是一切正义事业发展的历史逻辑。毛泽东对前途光明与道路曲折辩证统一的深刻领悟，表明毛泽东的战略远见建立于马克思主义唯物史观基础之上，是对历史发展趋势的深刻洞察，是对正义事业必胜的坚定信念，是对通过斗争实现光明前景的科学认识。1945年5月，党的七大召开，面对抗战即将胜利的局面，毛泽东分析了抗战胜利世界和中国的光明前景走向后，特别指出要“准备吃亏”，一口气讲了17条困难，强调在看到光明的同时，更要准备战胜困难，“要在最坏的可能性上建立我们的政策”，尤其是党的高级负责干部，更要有“对付非常的困难，对付非常的不利情况”的“精神准备”[31] 。其目的就是引导全党认清方向、坚定信念，战胜困难、争取胜利。后来蒋介石发动全面内战，正因为我党早有预判并采取正确战略策略，解放战争只用3年多时间，就取得了决定性胜利。

(III) Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is a profound understanding of the dialectical unity of strategic resolve and tactical flexibility

（三）毛泽东的战略远见，是对战略定力与策略活力辩证统一的深刻领悟

Strategic foresight is, first and foremost, political foresight, manifested in strategic steadfastness. On matters of principle concerning political direction, political conviction, and political path, one must take a clear stand, maintain a firm position, preserve resolve, and never waver. Mao Zedong said: “Once the correct political direction is established, it must be held firmly; that is, there must be a ‘firm and correct political direction.’ This direction is unshakable, and one must have the moral backbone to uphold it, as expressed in the saying: ‘Neither riches nor honors can corrupt him; neither poverty nor lowliness can make him swerve; neither power nor force can bend him.’” [38]38 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University,” 1937. The classical quotation is from Mencius, *Teng Wen Gong II*. When the political direction is firm and correct, strategy and tactics have their backbone and compass. During the Jinggangshan struggle period, Mao Zedong firmly grasped the political direction from the very beginning of exploring the path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force: before the Autumn Harvest Uprising, he advocated raising high the flag of the Communist Party, marking the first time in the history of our Party and our army that the bright red banner of the worker-peasant revolutionary army led by the Party was unfurled; when the uprising suffered setbacks and morale was low, through the Sanwan Reorganization [39]39 The Sanwan Reorganization (September–October 1927) was a restructuring of the forces that had just conducted the Autumn Harvest Uprising, establishing Party branches at the company level and introducing democratic reforms in the army. he established Party branches on company-level units, ensuring the Party’s absolute leadership over the army politically and organizationally; at the Gutian Congress [40]40 The Gutian Congress (December 1929) was the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army, which adopted resolutions on ideological and political army building. he creatively put forward a series of principles and policies for building the Party ideologically and building the army politically, providing a firm guarantee for the Chinese revolution ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Tactical flexibility is the means and method for realizing strategy. *The Art of War* by Sunzi states: “In battle, there is no constant situation, just as water has no constant shape. Those who can win by adapting to the enemy’s changes are called divine.” *The Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government* [41]41 *Zizhi Tongjian* (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government) is a monumental Chinese historical chronicle compiled by Sima Guang (1019–1086) of the Northern Song dynasty. says: “Tactics cannot be predetermined; changes cannot be planned in advance. They shift with the times and respond to circumstances—this is the key to devising strategy.” Both emphasize flexible and creative tactics. Mao Zedong stressed a firm and correct political direction and flexible and mobile strategy and tactics, and emphasized that policy and tactics are the lifeblood of the Party, achieving an organic unity of strategic steadfastness and tactical flexibility, demonstrating high strategic wisdom. Mao Zedong was a strategic master of flexibility, mobility, and surprise victories. The Four Crossings of the Chishui River [42]42 The Four Crossings of the Chishui River (January–March 1935) was a series of brilliant maneuvers by the Red Army during the Long March, repeatedly crossing the Chishui River to outmaneuver pursuing Nationalist forces. with its surprise maneuvers was Mao’s “masterstroke.” At a time when the Red Army was in a desperate, life-or-death situation, Mao, with immense creative boldness and rare pioneering spirit, broke conventions and skillfully played his cards, commanding the Red Army to move on foot, now east, now west, weaving in zigzag patterns through the enemy’s heavy forces, achieving a decisive victory in the strategic shift and setting a model for mobile warfare.

战略远见，首先是政治远见，表现在战略上的坚定性，就是在事关政治方向、政治信仰、政治道路等原则问题上，必须旗帜鲜明、立场坚定，保持定力、决不动摇。毛泽东说：“有了正确的政治方向后，还要坚定，就是说，要有‘坚定正确的政治方向’。这个方向是不可动摇的，要有‘富贵不能淫，贫贱不能移，威武不能屈’的骨气来坚持这个方向。”[32] 政治方向坚定正确，战略策略就有了主心骨、定盘星。井冈山斗争时期，毛泽东在探索农村包围城市、武装夺取政权这条道路之始就牢牢把握政治方向：秋收起义前，主张高高打出共产党的旗子，使我党我军在历史上首次打出了党领导的工农革命军的鲜红旗帜；在起义失利、士气低落时，经三湾改编将党支部建在连上，从政治上、组织上保证了党对军队的绝对领导；在古田会议上创造性提出了思想建党、政治建军的一系列方针原则，在思想上政治上组织上为中国革命提供了坚强保证。策略的灵活性是实现战略的举措手段、方式方法。《孙子兵法》讲：“兵无常势，水无常形。能因敌变化而取胜者，谓之神。”《资治通鉴》云:“权不可预设，变不可先图；与时迁移，应物变化，设策之机也。”强调的都是策略灵活创造。毛泽东强调坚定正确的政治方向、灵活机动的战略战术，强调政策策略是党的生命，使战略坚定性与策略灵活性有机统一，展现出高度的战略智慧。毛泽东是灵活机动、出奇制胜的战略大师。四渡赤水出奇兵是毛泽东的“得意之笔”。在红军处于绝境、生死攸关之时，毛泽东以巨大的创造魄力、罕见的开拓锐气，不拘一格、巧出妙棋，指挥红军迈开铁脚板，忽东忽西，迂回曲折地穿插于敌人重兵之间，取得了战略转移中有决定意义的胜利，成为运动战的典范。

(4) Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is a profound comprehension of the dialectical unity between summing up history and opening up the future.

（四）毛泽东的战略远见，是对总结历史与开辟未来辩证统一的深刻领悟

Taking history as a mirror, one can know the rise and fall of states. Mao Zedong, with a thousand years of history in his palm and a million troops in his chest, benefited from using the summing up of history as a mirror for guiding the present and opening up the future. Mao Zedong pointed out: “If you want to see the future, you must look at history.” [43]43 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Conference of Cadres of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Liberated Area,” April 1948. In 1938, he said: “Today’s China is a development of historical China; we are Marxist historicists, and we should not cut off history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, we should sum it up and inherit this precious legacy. This is of great help in guiding the great movement of the present.” [44]44 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” October 1938. Mao Zedong was adept at grasping laws and elevating rational understanding through summing up experiences and lessons. He profoundly elucidated the dialectical relationship between success and failure, correctness and error, treating both successful experiences and lessons from setbacks as valuable assets for guiding the future. He said: “Without those victories and those defeats, without the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign [45]45 The Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign (1933–1934) was the failed defense of the Jiangxi Soviet against the Nationalist forces, which led to the start of the Long March., without the Long March, that little pamphlet of mine, *Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War*, could not have been written.” [46]46 Mao Zedong, “Speech at a Meeting of the Supreme State Conference,” September 1958. In *On the Ten Major Relationships*, Mao Zedong pointed out: “Recently, the Soviet side has exposed some of its shortcomings and mistakes in the process of building socialism. Do you still want to follow the detour they took? In the past, we took fewer detours precisely because we learned from their experiences and lessons; now, of course, we must take even more warning from them.” [47]47 Mao Zedong, *On the Ten Major Relationships*, April 1956. Mao Zedong paid attention to summing up both positive and negative experiences from the economic construction of the Soviet Union and our own country, and put forward the basic policy of mobilizing all positive factors to serve the cause of socialism, giving the Party’s exploration of socialist construction a good start.

以史为镜，可以知兴替。毛泽东掌上千秋史，胸中百万兵，得益于把总结历史作为指导今天、开辟未来的镜鉴。毛泽东指出：“如果要看前途，一定要看历史。”[33] 1938年，他讲道：“今天的中国是历史的中国的一个发展；我们是马克思主义的历史主义者，我们不应当割断历史。从孔夫子到孙中山，我们应当给以总结，承继这一份珍贵的遗产。这对于指导当前的伟大的运动，是有重要的帮助的。”[34] 毛泽东善于在总结经验教训中把握规律，提升理性认识。他深刻阐发了成功与失败、正确与错误的辩证关系，把成功经验和失利教训都作为指导未来的宝贵财富。他说：“没有那些胜利和那些失败，不经过第五次反‘围剿’的失败，不经过万里长征，我那个《中国革命战争的战略问题》小册子也不可能写出来。”[35] 毛泽东在《论十大关系》中指出：“最近苏联方面暴露了他们在建设社会主义过程中的一些缺点和错误，他们走过的弯路，你还想走？过去我们就是鉴于他们的经验教训，少走了一些弯路，现在当然更要引以为戒。”[36] 毛泽东注意总结苏联和我国经济建设中的正反两方面经验，提出调动一切积极因素为社会主义事业服务的基本方针，使党对社会主义建设的探索有了良好开端。

(5) Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight is a profound comprehension of the dialectical unity between individual wisdom and collective wisdom.

（五）毛泽东的战略远见，是对个人智慧与集体智慧辩证统一的深刻领悟

Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight was both the great talent and bold vision of a leader and the crystallization of collective wisdom; it came from the Party’s leadership collective and from the masses. Mao Zedong clearly stated that concentrating ideas from the masses and then persisting among them to form correct leadership opinions is the basic leadership method. In early 1948, to expand the strategic offensive and draw the war into the outer lines, the Central Committee decided that Su Yu would lead three main columns of the East China Field Army to cross the Yangtze River southward. Su Yu “dared to speak frankly” to the Central Committee, arguing that it would be more conducive to accelerating the annihilation of the enemy’s main forces for the People’s Liberation Army to fight larger-scale annihilation battles north of the Yangtze River. Mao Zedong attached great importance to Su Yu’s suggestion and decisively adjusted the strategic deployment, which had a profound impact on the entire subsequent course of operations. In directing operations, Mao Zedong not only observed and grasped the overall situation of the war but also proceeded from the actual conditions on the battlefield, giving frontline commanders the necessary flexibility and autonomy, requiring them to make timely decisions and act on their own judgment, ensuring that strategic initiative was transformed into operational initiative on the battlefield. Mao Zedong pointed out: “The masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often childish and ignorant; without understanding this, it is impossible to acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge.” [48]48 Mao Zedong, “Preface and Postscript to ‘Rural Surveys’,” March 1941. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Party Central Committee put forward the policy of “better troops and simpler administration.” Mao Zedong said that this opinion of “better troops and simpler administration” was proposed by Mr. Li Dingming, a non-Party personage. He made a good suggestion that was beneficial to the people, and we adopted it. It was precisely because of the emphasis on collective wisdom and the wisdom of the masses that Mao Zedong’s far-sighted strategic decisions truly reflected objective laws and relied closely on the whole Party and the people to create historic achievements.

毛泽东的战略远见既是领袖的雄才伟略，也是集体智慧的结晶，它来自党的领导集体，来自人民群众。毛泽东明确指出，从群众中集中起来又到群众中坚持下去，以形成正确的领导意见，这是基本的领导方法。1948年初，为扩大战略进攻，把战争引向外线，中央决定粟裕率华野3个主力纵队渡长江南下。粟裕向中央“斗胆直呈”，认为解放军在长江以北打更大规模的歼灭战，更有利于加速消灭敌人主力。毛泽东极为重视粟裕建议，果断调整战略部署，对后续作战整个进程产生了深远影响。毛泽东在指挥作战中，既通观和掌握战争全局，又处处从战场实际出发，给予战场指挥员应有的机动权和自主权，要求前方指挥员当机决策、机断行事，确保了战略主动权在战场上转化为战役主动权。毛泽东指出：“群众是真正的英雄，而我们自己则往往是幼稚可笑的，不了解这一点，就不能得到起码的知识。”[37] 在抗日战争中，党中央提出精兵简政的政策。毛泽东说，精兵简政这一条意见，就是党外人士李鼎铭先生提出来的。他提得好，对人民有好处，我们就采用了。正是因为重视集体智慧、群众智慧，毛泽东富有远见的战略决策，才真正反映了客观规律，又紧紧依靠全党和人民创造了历史伟业。

The leader’s bearing shines across the universe; the power of thought is inexhaustible. At present, facing an external environment marked by rising instability and uncertainty, earnestly comprehending and appreciating the profound implications of Mao Zedong’s strategic foresight will surely inspire us to broaden our strategic vision, strengthen our strategic thinking, fulfill our original aspiration and founding mission, and create new brilliance.

领袖风范，光耀寰宇；思想伟力，其力无穷。当前，面对不稳定性不确定性明显上升的外部环境，认真领会体悟毛泽东战略远见的厚重意蕴，必将启迪我们拓宽战略视野，强化战略思维，践行初心使命，创造新的辉煌。

(About the author: Bi Jingjing, former Vice President of the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, Lieutenant General, Professor)

（作者简介：毕京京，中国人民解放军国防大学原副校长、中将、教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心