Marx’s Historical Thought and Its Contemporary Perspective

When philosophy is understood as a system of pure rational speculation, whereby reason unfolds according to its own logic and constitutes the foundation of social existence, history is in any case neglected. Even in Hegel, who displayed a tremendous sense of history, although the starting point of his philosophical construction was history, because its ultimate destination was logic, history was in fact “history as it is conceptually comprehended.” If we say that in 1845 Marx founded historical materialism, proposing that “men’s social existence determines their consciousness,” then from that point onward history and logic were no longer internally unified in the self-activity of spirit or idea; philosophy truly realized a return from the world of rational autonomy to the process of actual life. The extraordinary significance of this “return” lies in revealing that thought, idea, or consciousness is not the master of history; on the contrary, they all arise without exception from the process of social life and are all without exception conditioned by the mode of production of material life. Thus, what is crucial is to elucidate the internal isomorphic relationship between philosophy and social reality, and to assign a social-historical orientation to reason. From this perspective, when we look back at *The German Ideology*, Marx’s assertion that “we know only a single science, the science of history” takes on a special meaning. There is no doubt that historical materialism manifests itself as a science after the “end” of philosophy of history. For once speculation ceases and one turns toward actual life, discourse about consciousness will inevitably be replaced by a positive science that describes people’s practical activities and actual developmental processes, and the description of reality will deprive any independent philosophy of its living space. It is also in this sense that Marx accomplished a profound philosophical revolution: only by first penetrating into the inner logic of social reality can philosophical reflection and critique become possible.

当哲学被理解为一种纯粹理性思辨的体系，从而理性按照自身的逻辑展开并构成社会存在的基础，历史无论如何都是被忽视的。即使是在彰显出巨大的历史感的黑格尔那里，尽管其哲学建构的出发点是历史，但由于最终的归宿是逻辑，历史实际上是“被概念式地理解了的历史”。如果说1845年，马克思创立唯物史观，提出“人们的社会存在决定人们的意识”。自此，历史与逻辑不再内在地统一于精神或观念的自我活动，哲学真正实现了从理性自律的世界向现实生活过程的回归。这一“回归”的非凡意义在于揭示了思想、观念或意识并非历史的主宰者，相反，它们无不是从社会生活过程中产生的，无不是由物质生活的生产方式所制约的。那么，至关重要的就是阐明哲学与社会现实之间的内在同构关系，给予理性以社会历史定位。由此再度反观《德意志意识形态》，马克思指认“我们仅仅知道一门唯一的科学，即历史科学”也就具有特别的意味。毫无疑问，唯物史观表现为历史哲学“终结”之后的科学。因为一旦思辨终止，面向现实生活，关于意识的言说必然会被描述人们实践活动和实际发展过程的实证科学所取代，而对现实的描述将使任何独立的哲学失去生存空间。也正是从这个意义上说，马克思完成了一场深刻的哲学变革：只有先行深入到社会现实的内在逻辑之中，哲学的反思与批判才有可能实现。

Heidegger once keenly pointed out that Marx, in experiencing alienation, penetrated into the “essential dimension” of history, and thus his view of history is far superior to that of other historiographies. What is called the “essential dimension” of history here refers precisely to social reality. However, merely emphasizing a departure from social reality is insufficient to highlight the scientific horizon of Marx’s historical narrative. After all, long before Marx, classical political economy had already explored the general laws of social development from objective economic reality, and Hegel’s speculative philosophy likewise opened a path for understanding human social reality. Therefore, the question more fundamentally concerns how social reality should be understood and grasped. It is evident that when Marx penetrated the fog of rational speculation and entered actual life, he clearly recognized that the life-world surrounding humanity is by no means something that has existed directly and unchanged since the beginning of the world, but is a product of industry and social conditions, a product of history. Here, “history” acquires a methodological significance for social cognition; that is, what is particularly crucial is to carry out a historical analysis of social reality. This historical analysis, on the one hand, affirms that social-historical development has its objective laws. Marx believed that within the complex and ever-changing social life there exists a “timeless” economic structure, namely the production and reproduction of material life, which is deeply connected to the interaction among productive forces, relations of production (economic base), and superstructure. The process of change is precisely “history,” often manifested as the unfolding of this economic structure. On the other hand, Marx did not speak abstractly about the possibilities of history, but emphasized the need to pay full attention to the specific historical circumstances that make historical events possible. “Historical circumstances” are not a simple sum of various elements, but an encounter in which various elements, situated in relations of force, appear in the form of a “combination.” Here, the view that “the forms of production in a given epoch have a historically and transitory character” emerges.

海德格尔曾十分敏锐地指出，马克思在体会到异化之际深入到历史的“本质性一度”中，因而其关于历史的观点要远比其他的历史学优越。这里所谓历史的“本质性一度”指的就是社会现实。不过，仅仅强调从社会现实出发并不足以彰显马克思历史叙事的科学视域。毕竟，早在马克思之前，古典政治经济学已然从客观的经济现实出发探求社会发展的一般规律，黑格尔的思辨哲学同样打开了一条理解人类社会现实的道路。所以，问题更根本地关涉于究竟应该如何理解和把握社会现实。显见的是，当马克思穿透理性思辨的迷雾走进现实生活之际，他十分清楚地认识到人类周遭的生活世界绝不是某种开天辟地以来就直接存在的、始终如一的东西，而是工业和社会状况的产物，是历史的产物。在此，“历史”获得了一种社会认识的方法论意涵，也就是说，尤为关键的是对社会现实展开一种历史性分析。这种历史性分析，一方面，肯定社会历史发展有其客观规律。马克思认为，在复杂多变的社会生活之中存在着一种“无时间”的经济结构，即物质生活的生产与再生产，它与生产力、生产关系（经济基础）以及上层建筑之间的相互作用深切关联。变化的过程也就是“历史”，往往表现为这一经济结构的展开。另一方面，马克思并没有泛泛地谈论历史的可能性，而是强调要充分关注到使得历史事件由以发生的具体历史情势。“历史情势”并非诸种要素的简单相加，而是处于力量对比关系之中的各种要素以“结合”的形式出现的相遇。这里，“一定时代中生产所具有的各种形式的历史地和暂时的性质”的观点跃然而现。

Having reached this point, the essential difference between Marx and classical political economy as well as Hegel becomes obvious. In fact, when Marx returned to social reality, he did not return to life-world in a general sense; what he confronted and investigated was social reality with historical determination, namely modern capitalist society. It is very clear that, although classical political economy also focused on capitalist society, its entire interpretive framework was “supra-historical.” For them, the capitalist mode of production was regarded as the most natural mode, and economic categories were seen as eternal laws, rather than “historical laws—laws that are only appropriate to a certain stage of historical development, a certain stage of development of productive forces.” Take the understanding of capital as an example: Marx surpassed Smith and others not simply by starting from the perspective of “social relations” rather than “things”; he actually more deeply perceived that “capital is by no means a simple relation, but a process, in which capital remains capital in its various elements throughout this process. Hence this process requires explanation.” Hegel’s theoretical construction, of course, was not lacking in a perspective on capitalist social reality; otherwise he would not have so tirelessly analyzed the inner contradiction between the “particularity” and “universality” of civil society in his *Philosophy of Right*. Not to mention that his philosophy of history proved, as never before, that there exists a development, an inner connection, in history. But unlike Hegel, what Marx focused on was not the self-knowledge of the “absolute spirit,” but the “real individuals” engaged in definite material production in the creation of history; “history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his own ends.” All his philosophical discourse on history points to a clear theme: how to break the domination of the logic of capital and realize the emancipation of the proletariat and humanity.

论及至此，马克思与古典政治经济学以及黑格尔的本质性区别也就显而易见了。事实上，当马克思回到社会现实之中，他并非回到一般意义上的生活世界，其所直面并予以探究的是具有历史规定的社会现实，即现代资本主义社会。十分明朗的是，虽然同样聚焦于资本主义社会，古典政治经济学的整个解释构架却是“超历史”的。在他们那里，资本主义生产方式被视为最合乎自然的方式，经济范畴则被看作是永恒的规律，而非“历史性的规律——只是适于一定的历史发展阶段、一定的生产力发展阶段的规律”。以对资本的理解为例，马克思之所以超越斯密等人并不简单地在于从“社会关系”而非“物”的视角出发，他实际上更深刻地洞察到了“资本绝不是简单的关系，而是一种过程，资本在这个过程的各种不同的要素上始终是资本。因而这个过程需要加以说明”。黑格尔的理论建构当然也并不缺少对资本主义社会现实的透视，否则他不会在《法哲学原理》中如此不厌其烦地剖析市民社会“私己性”与“普遍性”的内在矛盾。更不用说，其历史哲学史无前例地证明了历史中存在着一种发展、一种内在联系。但不同于黑格尔，马克思关注的并非“绝对精神”的自我认识，而是历史创造中从事一定的物质生产的“现实的个人”，“历史不过是追求着自己目的的人的活动而已”。他关于历史的全部哲学言说指向一个明确的主题，这就是如何打破资本逻辑的支配，实现无产阶级和人类的解放。

However, replacing speculative reason with the mode of production, and then grounding the examination of the dynamic mechanism of social-historical change in the contradictory movement of productive forces and relations of production—especially endowing productive forces with a “ultimately” determining role—this theoretical operation later subjected Marx to many distortions and criticisms. It can be seen that, originating from the Second International, the understanding of Marx as an economic determinist and the treatment of his historical narrative as a grand linear view of history once became quite popular. At the same time, as a rebellion, from Lukács to the Frankfurt School, all emphasized the role of subjectivity, hoping to extricate Marx’s historical narrative from entanglement with mechanical determinism. Among them, Althusser is undoubtedly unavoidable. In order to transcend the “orthodox” interpretation of the Second International and the humanist interpretive framework, he not only purged the category of “totality” derived from Hegel, viewing history as a subjectless process “overdetermined” by the interaction of various factors. By constructing a “materialism of the encounter,” Althusser can be said to have redefined the Marxist epistemology of history. Although he still adhered to the basic materialist stance when examining history, he did not advocate viewing historical change as a necessary process whose endpoint is predictable; instead, he recognized that it is full of indeterminate changes and contingencies. Here, by replacing the definite mode of production in Marx’s perspective with “aleatory encounter,” Althusser sought to shake off the fetters of the idealist teleological tradition and provide a new materialist logic of historical narrative based on the “event.” According to Badiou’s definition, an event represents an “exception” that can never be completely dissolved by the situation; it is a truly disruptive force within all situations. As Žižek put it: “Without any preparation, a terrifying and unexpected thing suddenly happens, breaking the usual rhythm of life; these sudden situations have neither signs nor perceptible causes, and their appearance seems to be based on no stable foundation.” The materialist historical narrative attributed to Althusser is precisely to “face the event, including events that are still unimaginable and that encompass all living practices and politics, and to think about the openness of the world.”

不过，用生产方式取代思辨理性，进而在考察社会历史变迁的动力机制时落脚于生产力与生产关系的矛盾运动，特别是赋予生产力以“归根到底”的决定作用，这一理论操作使得马克思在后来遭遇到了诸多曲解和批评。可以看到，滥觞于第二国际，把马克思理解为一名经济决定论者，将其历史叙事看作是一种大写的线性历史观曾一度颇为流行。与此同时，作为一种反叛，从卢卡奇到法兰克福学派无不强调主体性方面的发挥，以期把马克思的历史叙事从与机械决定论的纠缠之中解脱出来。其中，阿尔都塞无疑又是无法被绕开的。为了超越第二国际的“正统”阐释以及人本主义的解释构架，他不仅通过涤除来自黑格尔的“总体”范畴，把历史看作是诸种因素相互作用从而“过度决定”的无主体过程。通过建构“偶然相遇的唯物主义”，阿尔都塞更可以说重新定义了马克思主义的历史认识论。尽管在考察历史之际仍然坚持唯物主义的基本立场，但他并不主张将历史的变迁看作是其终点可预判的必然进程，而是指认其中充满了未确定的变化与偶然性。在此，用“偶然相遇”置换马克思视域中一定的生产方式，阿尔都塞希冀摆脱唯心主义目的论传统的羁绊，提供一条奠基于“事件”的新唯物主义历史叙事逻辑。根据巴迪欧的界定，一个事件代表了一种始终无法被情势所彻底消融的“例外”，它是一切情势内部的真正断裂性力量。正如齐泽克所言：“在毫无准备的情况下，一件骇人而出乎意料的事情突然发生，从而打破了惯常的生活节奏；这些突发的状况既无征兆，也不见得有可以察觉的起因，它们的出现似乎不以任何稳固的事物为基础。”被标记在阿尔都塞名下的唯物主义历史叙事就是要“面向事件，包括至今仍难以想象的且所有活生生的实践和政治在内的事件，去思考世界的开放性”。

We cannot say that Althusser’s theoretical construction is entirely groundless. In fact, even in widely prevalent interpretations, historical materialism is understood to have revealed the general process and general laws of socio-historical development. Marx particularly emphasized the determining role of the economic structure, yet he was not completely oblivious to historical contingency. The crux of the matter is that if the exploration of strategies for emancipatory politics is an inherent requirement of historical materialism, then the unfolding of political practice cannot be separated from the identification and grasp of contingent factors and elements within the historical process. As Marx pointed out in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann in April 1871: “If ‘accident’ plays any part, then world history would be of a very mystical nature. … The acceleration and retardation of development depend to a great extent on these ‘accidents,’ including the ‘accidental’ character of the people who are at the head of the movement from the start.” [6]6 Marx’s letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, 17 April 1871. The translation follows the standard English edition; the Chinese text cited by the author is a slightly different rendering. Here, we might borrow Badiou’s viewpoint: history concerns two kinds of temporality: one is relatively static time, in which nothing truly novel occurs; the other is “evental” time, which breaks the stable state of the established order and triggers rapid and intense change. While understanding the determining factors of historical necessity is certainly important, the contingent occurrence of events is equally indispensable. The irruption of an evental moment often creates a situation and conditions; the possibility of emancipatory politics lies in whether individuals can seize these fleeting situations and conditions, and have the capacity to be subjectivized by the event into revolutionaries.

我们不能说阿尔都塞的这一理论建构毫无根据。事实上，即便是在广泛流行的理解中，唯物史观被认为揭示了社会历史发展的一般过程和一般规律，马克思尤为强调经济结构的决定性作用，他也并非对历史偶然性完全视而不见。问题的关键在于，如果说对解放政治策略的探寻是唯物史观的题中应有之义，那么政治实践的展开离不开对历史进程中偶然性因素与成分的辨识和把握。正如马克思在1871年4月致路德维希·库格曼的信中所指出的：“如果斗争只是在机会绝对有利的条件下才着手进行，那么创造世界历史未免就太容易了。另一方面，如果‘偶然性’不起任何作用的话，那么世界历史就会带有非常神秘的性质。……发展的加速和延缓在很大程度上是取决于这些‘偶然性’的，其中也包括一开始就站在运动最前面的那些人物的性格这样一种‘偶然情况’。”这里，我们不妨借用巴迪欧的观点，历史关涉于两种时间性：一种是相对静止的时间，其中没有任何新奇性事情真正发生；另一种是“事件性”时间，它将打破既定秩序的平稳状态，引起快速而激烈的变化。对历史必然性的决定因素的认识固然重要，事件的偶然发生也同样不可或缺。一个事件性时刻的绽出往往造成了一种形势和条件，解放政治的可能性就在于个体能否抓住这些转瞬即逝的形势和条件，有能力被事件主体化为革命者。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗