“What Is Chinese Communism?”: American Observers’ Reflections on the Chinese Revolution during the Total War of Resistance

After the outbreak of the total war of resistance, several groups of American observers came to North China. They were think-tank scholars, well-known journalists, presidential confidants, or military elites, all holding high social status and considerable influence. When they came into contact with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the observers were most concerned with the following questions: How close were the ties between the CCP and the Soviet Union? What kind of revolution was the CCP actually leading? How should the United States handle its relationship with the CCP, and accordingly adjust its Far Eastern strategy? On-the-spot investigation dispelled the observers’ doubts. They realized that the CCP possessed an independent and autonomous organization, and that what the CCP advocated was a communist program grounded in China’s actual conditions. Based on this understanding, they used various means to make their voices heard, publicizing the true CCP to the U.S. government and public, and actively promoting a shift in America’s Far Eastern strategy.

全面抗战爆发后，数批美国观察家来到华北。他们或是智库学者、知名记者，或是总统亲信、军事精英，具有较高社会地位与较大影响力。当同中共接触时，观察家们最关心以下几个问题：中共和苏联的联系有多密切？中共领导的究竟是什么样的革命？美国应如何处理同中共的关系，并据此调整远东战略？实地调查打消了观察家们的疑虑。他们意识到：中共拥有独立自主的组织，中共主张的也是立足中国实际的共产主义纲领。基于此认知，他们借助各种方式发声，向美国政府及公众宣传真实的中共，积极推动美国远东战略转向。

At present, domestic scholars’ research on wartime American observers’ interactions with the CCP and their perceptions of the CCP is already very mature. Beyond these angles, some questions are still worth pondering: Why did American observers have the question “What is Chinese communism”? How were the deep-seated prejudices against the CCP initially dispelled? How did the observers’ re-cognition influence wartime America’s Far Eastern strategic arrangements? The American observers’ entirely new understanding of the CCP and the Chinese revolution broke down ideological barriers, providing an opportunity for both sides to unite in shared hatred against the Japanese army.

目前，国内学者关于战时美国观察家与中共交往及中共认知的研究已经非常成熟。在这些角度之外，仍有一些问题值得思考：美国观察家为什么会有“何为中国共产主义”的疑问？最初对中共的深重偏见是怎样消弭的？观察家们的再认知如何影响了战时美国远东战略安排？美国观察家对中共以及中国革命的全新认识破除了意识形态壁垒，为双方同仇敌忾共抗日军提供了契机。

I. A Communism “Independent of the Soviet Union”

一、“独立于苏联”的共产主义

Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto*: “A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism.” The reason they used the word “spectre” was precisely because capitalist countries were filled with fear of communism. As early as after the outbreak of the October Revolution, the U.S. high-level was extremely vigilant about the influence Soviet Russia was having in China. In April 1927, the Fengtian warlord Zhang Zuolin raided and seized a large number of documents exchanged between the CCP and the Communist International in Beijing; after these documents were made public, they caused a huge shock in the United States. For a time, the fear of communism within the United States grew sharply, and some propaganda pamphlets were even directly titled *Red Hands on China*: the cover showed a pair of giant red hands stretching from the northwest, tightly gripping half of China’s territory. This suspicion continued to grow with the development of the domestic revolutionary war, reaching its peak before the War of Resistance against Japan. American journalist Harrison Forman analyzed this irrational notion. He believed that the geographical connection between China and the Soviet Union gave rise to American fantasies: the Soviet Union schemed to dominate China, and the CCP “was the

马克思、恩格斯在《共产党宣言》中写道：“一个幽灵，共产主义的幽灵，在欧洲游荡。”之所以会使用“幽灵”措辞，正是由于资本主义国家对共产主义充满恐惧。早在十月革命爆发后，美国高层就对苏俄在中国造成的影响极为警惕。1927年4月，奉系军阀张作霖在北京抄检出大量中共与共产国际的往来文件，这些文件公布后在美国引起巨大震动。一时间，美国国内关于共产主义的恐惧心理急剧增长，一些宣传小册子甚至直接以《赤手抓中国》（Red Hands on China）为标题：封面上画着一双从西北伸来的红色巨手，正紧紧攫住中国半壁版图。这种猜疑随着国内革命战争的发展而持续增长，至抗日战争前达到顶峰。美国记者哈里森·福尔曼（Harrison Forman）对这种非理性观念进行了分析。他认为，中国与苏联的地缘联系令美国人心生遐想：苏联图谋主宰中国，而中共“就是苏联在华代理，随时都准备将莫斯科垂涎的中国疆土拱手让予其‘俄国同志’”。因此，许多美国人近乎偏执地相信，“全世界民主国家应结为联盟，反对苏联、反对中共。这是挽救亚洲乃至世界遭遇赤化的唯一办法”。

Contrary to long-established conventional perceptions, Snow depicted a completely different image of the CPC. While his account stirred enormous controversy, it also drew greater attention and reflection. What connections existed between CPC policies and the Comintern’s positions, and what essential differences were there? This was a question American observers urgently needed to answer. The first to analyze this issue was the *Amerasia* Group, which arrived in Yan’an in June 1937. The group’s core members were all renowned scholars of Far Eastern affairs, holding dual identities as intellectual elites and members of government think tanks. To a certain extent, their views served as a reference for the U.S. government’s Far Eastern strategic decision-making. The group’s central figure, Owen Lattimore, had pondered the relationship between the CPC and the Soviet Union several years earlier. He pointed out unequivocally that, although the Red Army had developed closer geographical ties with the Soviet Union after arriving in northern Shaanxi, the CPC could never serve as a tool or puppet of the Soviets. To make his argument more persuasive, Lattimore emphasized: “I am not constrained or pressured by any person or any party.” Thomas Bisson, when interviewing Zhu De, asked bluntly: “What connections does your party have with the Soviet Union?” Zhu De candidly replied that the CPC’s exchanges with the Soviet Union were currently limited to correspondence and that it had received no material or weapons assistance from the Soviets. The on-the-ground investigation in Yan’an convinced the *Amerasia* Group even more that the CPC possessed a high degree of independence.

与长期形成的固有认知相反，斯诺描绘了一个完全不同的中共形象，他的叙述在掀起巨大争议的同时，也引发了更多关注和思考。中共政策与共产国际主张有何联系，又有何本质不同？这是美国观察家亟待回答的。最早对这一问题进行分析的是1937年6月来到延安的《美亚》小组(Amerasia Group）。小组骨干均是享誉学界的远东问题专家，兼具知识精英与政府智库成员的双重身份。一定程度上，他们的观点是美国政府远东战略决策的参照。小组核心人物欧文·拉铁摩尔（Owen Lattimore）在数年前便思考过中共同苏联的关系，他旗帜鲜明地指出，尽管红军抵达陕北后与苏联的地缘联系愈加密切，但中共绝不可能充当苏联的工具或傀儡。为使自己的观点更具说服力，拉铁摩尔特意强调：“我不受任何人、任何党派的制约或施压。”托马斯·毕森（Thomas Bisson）在采访朱德时单刀直入地提问：“贵党同苏联有何联系？”朱德坦诚相告，目前中共同苏联的交流仅限于书信层面，并未接受苏联的物质或武器援助。延安的实地考察使《美亚》小组更加确信，中共具有高度的独立性。

From the winter of 1937 to the summer of the following year, U.S. Marine Corps Captain Evans F. Carlson twice visited the enemy’s rear areas and Yan’an, becoming the first American officer to inspect the base areas. Although Carlson came in a private capacity, he also carried out a secret mission. As a confidant of Roosevelt, Carlson was ordered to record his observations along the way and report them directly to the White House. Thus, his investigation can in fact be regarded as an act of the U.S. government collecting political and military intelligence on the CPC.

1937年冬至次年夏，美国海军陆战队上尉埃文斯·卡尔逊（Evans F. Carlson）两次来到敌后并访问延安，他是首位考察根据地的美国军官。尽管卡尔逊是以私人身份前来，但同时他也承担着一项秘密使命。作为罗斯福的亲信，卡尔逊奉命记录自己的沿途见闻，直接呈报白宫。因此，他的考察事实上可视为美国政府收集中共政治、军事情报的行为。

Carlson not only observed and analyzed the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Route Army but also reflected on the nature and characteristics of the Chinese revolution. He referred to the CPC as the “so-called Communist Party,” a formulation that was not actually original. As early as July 1930, the U.S. State Department had suggested that official American representatives in China, when dealing with the Nationalist government, prefix “So-called” before the CPC to avoid unnecessary diplomatic complications. However, this suggestion was not adopted; the then U.S. Minister to China, Nelson T. Johnson, disagreed with it. In subsequent reports, he even preferred to use “Bandit and Communist Disturbances” rather than adopt the “so-called” phrasing. After arriving in the base areas, Carlson, based on his own on-the-ground experiences and exchanges with CPC figures, reinterpreted this qualifier. He wrote unequivocally: “China’s ‘so-called Communist Party’ does not conform to our definition of the term.” “Unlike the October Revolution, which transformed the world overnight, the CPC’s revolutionary program has distinct Chinese characteristics.” Carlson’s view came from his conversations with Zhu De. Zhu De told him that the CPC “does not plan to achieve everything in one stroke and communize China all at once”; “we intend to establish a reliable government that allows the people to speak freely and raises the living standards of the poor.”

卡尔逊不仅观察分析了八路军的战斗力，也对中国革命的本质与特点进行了思考。他将中共称为“所谓的共产党”，这一提法其实并非首创。早在1930年7月，美国国务院就曾建议美国驻华官方人士在同国民政府交涉时，在中共前冠以“So-called”，以免引发不必要的外交麻烦。但该建议并未得到认可，时任美国驻华公使纳尔逊·詹森（Nelson T. Johnson）对此不以为然。在后续报告中，他甚至宁愿使用“共党叛匪”（Bandit and Communist Disturbances），都不肯采纳“所谓的”措辞。来到根据地后，卡尔逊基于自己的实地考察感悟，结合同中共人士的交流，重新诠释了这一定语。他旗帜鲜明地写道：“中国‘所谓的共产党’和我们对该词汇的定义并不一致。”“与十月革命朝夕之间改天换地不同，中共的革命纲领有鲜明中国特色。”卡尔逊的观点来自他同朱德的谈话。朱德告诉他，中共“并不计划毕其功于一役，将中国共产主义化”，“我们意图建立可靠的政府，使民众可以自由发声，提高贫苦人民的生活水平”。

On November 15, 1938, Carlson boarded the USS *Chaumont* in Shanghai and returned to the United States via the Philippines. On the eve of his departure, Carlson held a small tea party with several American elites in Shanghai. He was astonished to find that these bankers, merchants, doctors, and educators all expressed support for the CPC. Some even said bluntly: “China’s only hope lies in the

1938年11月15日，卡尔逊在上海搭乘“肖蒙”号军舰，取道菲律宾返回美国。启程前夕，卡尔逊同几位在沪美国精英举办了一场小型茶话会。他惊讶地发现，这些银商巨贾、医生及教育家均表示支持中共。有人甚至直言：“中国唯一的希望就在于中共取得政权，蒋委员长应让贤于朱德。”这令卡尔逊兴奋不已，翌日，他刚踏上归途，就迫不及待地写道：“听闻这些，我深受鼓舞。”

Carlson’s descriptions of the CPC produced a great resonance. Under his pen, “so-called” was no longer pejorative but rather affirmative and even laudatory, and it was truly accepted by the U.S. military and political establishment, becoming a customary expression when high-level officials discussed the CPC. Even Roosevelt himself, in his reply to Carlson, adopted this phrasing. Yet Carlson and the U.S. government figures did not explain — or perhaps it never occurred to them — why the CPC was the “so-called Communist Party.” This qualifier, so full of interrogative nuance, in fact highlighted the CPC’s independence; it also indicated that as early as the beginning of the Total War of Resistance, the CPC had already carried out an innovative adaptation of Marxist theory to the Chinese context.

卡尔逊关于中共的描述产生了很大反响。“所谓的”在他笔下不再具有贬损性，而是一种肯定甚至褒扬，也真正被美国军政界接受，成为高层论及中共时的惯用措辞。就连罗斯福本人在给卡尔逊的回信中，也采纳了这样的表述。但卡尔逊与美国政府人士没有解释，或者他们也未曾想到，中共为何是“所谓的共产党”。这一充满疑问色彩的定语，其实正彰显了中共的独立性；这也表明早在全面抗战爆发之初，中共就对马克思主义理论进行了中国化的创新。

By the time Carlson left China, Wuhan had already fallen, and the War of Resistance had entered its most arduous phase. Practical needs impelled the CPC to further advance its exploration of a Sinicized Marxism. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Mao Zedong first raised the historical proposition of “adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.” [1]1 The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC was held in Yan’an from September to November 1938. It was at this session that Mao Zedong formally raised the task of “Sinicizing Marxism,” i.e., adapting Marxism to China’s specific conditions. After the Rectification Movement, [2]2 The Rectification Movement (1942–1944) was a Party-wide campaign of ideological education and organizational consolidation aimed at correcting subjectivist, sectarian, and stereotypical writing styles within the CPC, and at establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology. integrating Marxist principles with China’s reality to guide the Chinese revolution had become a consensus across the entire Party. Thus, when another group of American observers arrived in Yan’an in the summer of 1944, they felt even more keenly the special appeal of this communism “independent from the Soviet Union.”

卡尔逊离开中国之际，武汉已经沦陷，抗战进入最艰苦的阶段。现实需求使中共进一步开启了中国化马克思主义的探索。在中共六届六中全会上，毛泽东首次提出“马克思主义中国化”的历史命题。整风运动后，将马克思主义原理与中国现实相结合以指导中国革命，已经成为全党共识。因此，在1944年夏，当又一批美国观察家来到延安时，他们更鲜明地感受到了这种“独立于苏联”的共产主义的特殊魅力。

In June 1944, five foreign journalists came to Yan’an: Harrison Forman of United Press and the *New York Herald Tribune*; Gunther Stein of the Associated Press and the *Christian Science Monitor*; Israel Epstein of *Time* magazine and the *New York Times*; Maurice Votaw of the *Baltimore Sun*; and Cormac Shananhan of the *Catholic Signal* magazine. Before setting out, they too were filled with doubts. Forman opened his *Northward Journey* with a string of questions: “What is really happening behind the blockade? Are these Communists really as vicious as the government authorities depict? … What connection do they actually have with the Comintern? What instructions has Moscow given them, and what influence has it exerted?”

1944年6月，5名外国记者来到延安，他们分别是合众社及《纽约前驱论坛报》记者福尔曼、美联社及《基督教科学导报》记者冈瑟·斯坦因（Gunther Stein）、《时代》杂志及《纽约时报》记者伊斯雷尔·爱泼斯坦（Israel Epstein）、《巴尔的摩太阳报》记者毛里斯·武道（Maurice Votaw）和《天主教信号杂志》记者夏南汉（Cormac Shananhan)。在成行前，他们内心同样充满疑问。福尔曼在《北行漫记》开篇便连发数问：“封锁线内究竟发生了什么？这些共产党人真的像政府当局描绘的那样穷凶极恶吗？……他们和共产国际到底有什么联系？莫斯科给了他们什么指示，又施加了什么影响？”

Shortly after the journalists’ visit, the U.S. Army Observer Group in Yan’an also arrived. Compared with other wartime observers, the military observer group had a tighter and higher-level composition — it was dispatched by and directly answerable to the China-Burma-India Theater Command. Their primary tasks were to comprehensively collect intelligence on the Japanese army in North China, rescue U.S. airmen, and investigate and assess the CPC’s political and military potential to provide a reference for U.S. Far Eastern strategic planning. At the same time, they also intended to expand American influence over the CPC and prevent Soviet infiltration into North and Northeast China.

继记者团到访不久，美军延安观察组也抵达延安。较之战时其他观察家，军事观察组有更紧密、更高规格的人员构成——由中缅印战区司令部派出并直接对其负责。他们的首要任务是全面收集华北日军情报，救援美军飞行员；调查并衡量中共的政治军事潜能，为美国远东战略安排提供参照。与此同时，他们还意图扩大美国对中共的影响，防止苏联势力渗透到华北和东北。

Like Carlson, the journalists and the observer group found that the relationship between the CPC and the Soviet Union was not as close as Americans had imagined. Yan’an’s independence was evident in many details. The library contained not only Marxist-Leninist works but also a large number of writings reflecting Western democratic thought; Stalin was not the symbol of communism here but an “anti-fascist ally”; Soviet authors’ works were no longer fervently sought after, replaced by works reflecting the situation of the anti-fascist war. In Forman’s photographs, two shots of the then-popular play *The Second Front* are extremely interesting. This play was staged in Yan’an on the third day after the Normandy landings, and the journalists were invited to watch it. Moreover, Yan’an’s music was not limited to communist songs; it also included the Western classic *The Blue Danube* and even the then most popular American patriotic song *Yankee Doodle*.

同卡尔逊一样，记者团与观察组也发现，中共与苏联的关系并没有美国人想象的那样密切。延安的独立性表现在诸多细节。图书馆里除了马列书籍，还有大量反映西方民主思想的著述；斯大林在这里并不是共产主义的象征，而是“反法西斯的盟友”；苏联作家的著述已不再受到狂热追捧，取而代之的是反映反法西斯战争形势的作品。在福尔曼的摄影中，有两张表现当时经典剧目《第二战线》的摄影，极为有趣。这出剧于诺曼底登陆后第三天便在延安上映，记者团应邀观看。此外，延安的音乐也不尽是共产主义歌曲，还包括西方经典《蓝色多瑙河》，甚至当时美国最流行的爱国歌曲《扬基歌》。

This independence was also reflected in the construction of the Central Party School. [3]3 The Central Party School (中共中央党校) is the highest training institution for leading cadres of the CPC. During the Yan’an period, it played a key role in cadre education and the Rectification Movement. Teaching at the school did not consist of mechanically lecturing on Marxist dogma but of mutual learning through the exchange of practical experience. The students were mostly high-ranking commanders and cadres transferred from various anti-Japanese battlefronts, as well as people from all walks of life in the border regions and base areas. Each person had their own expertise; they learned from one another and shared their unique experiences. A military leader who could not answer specific questions about social economy and education would be considered unqualified. Every Party member had to understand the essentials of the New Democracy and also possess comprehensive abilities to handle all kinds of affairs, because only in this way could they meet the needs of the masses and better unite and lead them. Stein exclaimed: “No other institution could be more innovative, more practical, freer and more vibrant, and less bound by dogma than this unique cadre school of the CPC.”

这种独立性也映射在中央党校的建设方面。党校教学不是照本宣科讲授马克思主义教条，而是通过交流实践经验互相学习。学员大都是各抗日战场调来的身居要职的将领干部，还有边区、根据地各行各业的人。每个人都术业有专攻，他们彼此切磋，分享各自的独特经验。军事领导人如果不会解答社会经济及教育等具体问题，就会被视为不合格。每位党员都必须了解新民主主义要旨，也要兼备处理各种事务的全面能力，因为只有这样才能满足群众所需，更好地团结领导群众。斯坦因感叹道：“再没有哪所机构能比中共这座独特的干部院校更具创新性、实用性，更自由勃发，不受教条约束了。”

The observers further realized that the fear of the CPC “colluding secretly” with the Soviet Union was entirely irrational. When interviewing Mao Zedong, John S. Service cut straight to the point: “What relationship does the CPC now have with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union?” Mao frankly stated: “In the past, the CPC indeed had close ties with the Soviet Union. But now, the CPC has no official relations with the Communist Parties of any other country in the world.” Through further investigation, the observers also found that the weapons or supplies the CPC received from the Soviet Union were extremely limited. In a speech to the journalists and the observer group, Ye Jianying stated that since 1941, the weapons the CPC had received from the Soviet Union amounted to only “121 machine guns and six flat-trajectory guns,” and beyond that, “not a single bullet, gun, coin, or grain of rice.”

观察家们更意识到，关于中共与苏联“暗通款曲”的担心完全是非理性的。在采访毛泽东时，谢伟思（John S. Service)开门见山地抛出问题：“中共现在与苏联共产党有什么关系？”毛泽东坦陈：“过去中共的确与苏联有密切联系。但现在，中共与世界上其他国家的共产党都不存在官方联系。” 通过进一步考察，观察家们也发现，中共从苏联获得的武器或物资极为有限。叶剑英在对记者团与观察组的演讲中表示，自1941年后，中共从苏联获得的武器仅有“一百二十一架机枪及六门平射炮”，此外更无“一弹一枪一钱一粟”。

Service wrote a special report on the relationship between the CPC and the Soviet Union. As one of the most famous “China hands” of the war, he had a thorough understanding of China’s political structure. Service analyzed that although there were indeed connections between Yan’an and Moscow, there was not a shred of evidence to prove that “the Soviet Union remotely controlled the CPC.” He found various arguments: “The last flight between Yan’an and Moscow was in 1942; before that, the frequency of flights between the two sides was at most twice a year. Soviet aircraft going to Yan’an had to obtain permission from Chongqing and land in Lanzhou for inspection. The aircraft could only carry supply materials and personal belongings of Soviet personnel stationed in Yan’an, and absolutely could not carry anyone of non-Soviet nationality. Therefore, the Soviet aircraft that flew to northern Shaanxi, apart from carrying enough fuel for the return trip, could not possibly carry any useful supplies.” Service also emphasized that the three Soviets then residing in Yan’an were “by no means persons of high position or great power”; their Chinese language ability was poor, they had little understanding of Chinese issues, and their relations with the CPC’s top leadership were distant — they could absolutely not be so-called remote controllers.

谢伟思特意就中共与苏联的关系撰写了专题报告。身为战时最著名的“中国通”之一，他对中国政治结构有透彻的认知。谢伟思分析，尽管延安同莫斯科的确存在联系，但没有蛛丝马迹能证明“苏联对中共存在遥控”。他找到了种种论据：“延安同莫斯科最后一次通航是1942年，在那之前，双方通航频率一年最多不过两次。苏联飞机赴延安都须取得重庆方面许可，在兰州降落接受检查。飞机上只能装载驻延安苏联人员的补给物资和个人财产，绝对不能搭乘非苏联国籍人员。因此，飞抵陕北的苏联飞机除携带返程所需燃料外，根本不可能装载任何有用物资。”谢伟思还特别强调，现在延安居留的三位苏联人都“绝非位高权重之士”，他们中文能力不佳，对中国问题也不甚了解，同中共高层关系疏离，绝不可能是所谓的遥控者。

II. “China’s Own” Communism

二、“中国自己的”共产主义

The great historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee believed that the loss of the capacity for self-determination is “the last sign of decline” for a social community. The same applies to political parties. The CPC not only possessed complete independence but also a high degree of self-determination — this was the consensus of wartime American observers. When the *Amerasia* group [4]4 The *Amerasia* group refers to a circle of American journalists, scholars, and officials associated with the journal *Amerasia*, which published sympathetic reports on the Chinese Communist movement in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Several of its members, including T.A. Bisson and Philip J. Jaffe, visited Yan’an in 1937. and Carlson first visited the enemy rear, the proposition of “adapting Marxism to the Chinese context” had not yet been born. Nevertheless, they still felt the CPC’s development of Marxist principles based on a consciousness of self-determination.

历史学巨擘阿诺德·约瑟夫·汤因比（Arnold Joseph Toynbee）认为，失去自决能力是社会共同体“衰落的最后标志”。对政党而言亦是如此。中共不仅具有彻底的独立性，更具有高度的自决性，这是战时美国观察家们的共识。《美亚》小组和卡尔逊初访敌后时，“马克思主义中国化”的命题尚未诞生。尽管如此，他们还是感受到了中共基于自决意识对马克思主义原理的发展。

This was most clearly reflected in the CPC’s positioning and grasp of China’s historical stage and revolutionary tasks. Bisson [5]5 T.A. Bisson (1900–1979) was an American journalist and scholar who visited Yan’an in 1937 as part of the *Amerasia* group. He later wrote extensively on Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations. was the first to record this issue; his greatest concern was: faced with a powerful enemy at the gates, how would the CPC define its revolutionary tasks? When meeting with Zhou Enlai, Bisson asked: “Is it possible for China to establish a democratic republic at present?” Zhou Enlai replied frankly that the Chinese revolution would proceed in two stages, like two sets of wheels: “Resisting foreign aggression is the first imperative, equivalent to the front wheel; the second is realizing the democratic movement, equivalent to the rear wheel. The front and rear wheels are interrelated and move in tandem. But the anti-Japanese activities should undoubtedly come first.”

这最鲜明地体现于中共对中国历史阶段以及革命任务的定位与把握。毕森最早对该问题进行了记录，他最关心的问题是：当此强敌压境之际，中共会如何确定革命任务。在拜会周恩来时，毕森问道：“中国当前有无可能建立民主共和国？”周恩来开诚布公地回答，中国革命将分为两个阶段，就如同两组车轮：“抗击外侮是第一要义，相当于前轮；其次是实现民主运动，相当于后轮。前后轮彼此相关、联动运转。但抗日活动毫无疑问，应当先行。”

Some highly insightful observers also discovered that the CPC’s self-determination was even more evident in its rational foreign policy. The CPC was not trapped in the shackles of unilateral diplomacy but was willing to share a common hatred of the enemy with Britain and the United States. When meeting with Carlson, Mao Zedong clearly stated that in the future, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States should fight side by side. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, China and the United States formally became allies. In an interview with Stein, Mao again emphasized that it was wrong for China either to lean toward the Soviet Union and alienate Britain and the United States, or to rely on Britain and the United States and be hostile to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the CPC did not rely on the Soviet Union to defeat Japan. Service summarized in his report that although the CPC hoped the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan, they deeply understood that “the War of Resistance is a war of national liberation” and that the key to victory lay in “fully mobilizing the masses.” Soviet participation in the war could hasten Japan’s defeat, “but it would also hinder the Chinese nation’s struggle for freedom.”

一些极具洞见的观察家还发现，中共的自决性更体现在理性的外交政策中。中共并未陷入单边外交桎梏，而是愿意与英美同仇敌忾。在会见卡尔逊时，毛泽东便明确表示，未来中国、苏联、美国应并肩作战。太平洋战争爆发后，中美正式成为盟友。在接受斯坦因采访时，毛泽东再次强调，中国无论是倒向苏联疏离英美，抑或是依靠英美敌视苏联，都是不对的。同时，中共并未仰仗苏联打败日本。谢伟思在报告中总结，尽管中共希望苏联对日出兵，但他们深知“抗日战争是民族解放战争”，制胜之道在于“全面动员群众”。苏联参战虽然可以加速日本覆灭，“但也会阻碍中华民族为自由而战”。

As their observations deepened, American observers also discovered the self-determination of the Chinese Communist Party from the economic policies of the base areas. Based on the actual conditions of the base areas and the needs of the War of Resistance, the CCP promptly adjusted its land policy: it no longer confiscated landlords’ property but gradually implemented rent reduction; although already confiscated land was not returned, landlords who had fled and returned could obtain land equal to that of the peasants. Owen Lattimore had long focused on the villages and peasants of northern China. He believed that the CCP’s policy adjustment was by no means a compromise or a “deviation from the communist revolution,” but rather because the CCP understood that it was dealing with “Marxist peasants” and knew “how to mobilize and utilize this resource,” and “could organize complex problems with flexible thinking.” Evans Carlson went a step further, reminding Roosevelt that the United States need not worry about China being “reddened” into a Soviet model, because the communism advocated by the CCP was entirely based on China’s cultural psychology.

随着观察的不断深入，美国观察家们也从根据地经济政策中发现了中共的自决性。中共基于根据地的实际情况以及抗战需求，及时调整土地政策：不再褫夺地主田产，而是逐步施行减租；业已没收的田产虽不归还，但返乡的外逃地主可以获得和农民等同的土地。拉铁摩尔长期关注中国华北的农村与农民，他认为中共的政策调整绝非妥协或“对共产主义革命的背离”，而是因为中共明白，他们面对的是“马克思主义者的农民”，知道该“如何调动、利用这一资源”，“能以灵活思维将复杂问题条理化”。卡尔逊则更进一步，他提醒罗斯福，美国根本不必担心中国“赤化”成苏联模式，因为中共倡导的共产主义完全是基于中国的文化心理。

In this regard, the journalist corps and the observer group had even more vivid impressions. Like Carlson, they were astonished to find that the CCP’s strategy “seemed to deviate from ‘communism,’ or at least from the communism Americans understood.” As the revolutionary practice unfolded, the CCP continuously adjusted its policies, “making compromises when necessary.” The Chinese revolution was not the terrifying “red storm” they had imagined, but a vigorous practice that combined theoretical core with Chinese elements. This particularity left the observers greatly perplexed; Harrison Forman even stated bluntly: “According to the Soviet definition, the Chinese Communist Party is not a communist party.”

对此，记者团和观察组有更鲜明的感受。同卡尔逊一样，他们惊讶地发现，中共的方略“似乎偏离了‘共产主义’，至少不是美国人理解的共产主义”。随着革命实践的开展，中共不断调整政策，“在必要情况下作出折中”。中国革命不是他们臆想中可怖的“红色风暴”，而是兼备理论内核与中国元素的踊跃实践。这种特殊性令观察家们大惑不解，福尔曼甚至直言：“根据苏联词义界定，中国共产党不算共产党。”

A question then arose: if what the CCP advocated was not “communism in the general sense,” then what kind of communism was it? All the observers reflected on this. Guenther Stein had grown up in China and had a thorough understanding of China’s cultural background and political environment. Compared with other journalists, Stein’s insights were sharper, and he alone had the unique discernment to discover: there was an intrinsic connection between the CCP’s revolutionary program and Soviet communist theory, but there was also a fundamental difference. The Chinese Communists did not cling to dogma; their enthusiasm for Marxism did not stem from theoretical superstition; to a greater extent, they regarded it merely as a correct mode of thinking, believing that adhering to Marxism had extraordinary significance for the success of their policies. It was already quite remarkable for a foreigner to realize this. But Stein was not satisfied with this; he further discovered that in the CCP’s revolutionary program, “the nationalist hue seemed stronger than the Marxist hue”; although Yan’an had many elements that appeared to be copied from the Soviet Union, “they did not surpass the importance and mainstream status of nationalism.” In Stein’s view, these similarities were by no means mechanical replication, but “expedient adaptations and further development.” He concluded that the CCP had accumulated rich experience through years of war, and just as Lenin “greatly developed Marxism based on Russia’s actual environment,” the CCP’s nationalist-based innovative exploration was precisely “the practical application of Marxism.”

一个问题随之而来，如果中共主张的并非“一般意义”的共产主义，那它究竟又是怎样的共产主义？观察家们都对此进行了思考。斯坦因从小在中国长大，对中国文化背景及政治环境都有较透彻的理解。较之其他记者，斯坦因见地更为犀利，也唯有他慧眼独具地发现：中共革命纲领同苏联共产主义理论存在内在联系，但更有本质不同。中国共产党人并未固守教条，他们对马克思主义的热忱并不是出于理论迷信；更大程度上，他们只视之为正确的思维方式，认为坚持马克思主义对其政策成功具有非凡意义。外国人能意识到这一点已相当不易。但斯坦因并未满足于此，他进一步发现，在中共的革命纲领中“民族主义色彩似乎比马克思主义更浓烈”；虽然延安有许多看似照搬自苏联的元素，但“它们并未超越民族主义的重要性及主流地位”。在斯坦因看来，这些相似性绝不是机械复刻，而是“权益之变通，以及再发展”。他得出结论，中共在连年战火中已积累起丰富经验，就像列宁“基于俄国现实环境将马克思主义大大发展”，中共基于民族主义的创新探索也正是“马克思主义的现实应用”。

The nationalist hue was precisely a manifestation of the CCP’s exploration of Sinicized Marxism. Having recognized this, the observers faced a new puzzle: “Is Chinese Marxism ‘communism first’ or ‘China first’?” When interviewing Mao Zedong, Gunther Stein and Ralph Ward [6]6 “Seeking truth from facts” (实事求是) is a key principle of Mao Zedong Thought, derived from a classical Chinese phrase and later elevated as the core ideological method of the CPC. both raised this question. According to Stein’s recollection, Mao lit two candles and brought out village-brewed wine to entertain him. The two talked freely over candles and wine, thoroughly enjoying themselves, for a full twelve hours. Mao stated at the outset: “The only thing communists worldwide have in common is that they all believe in Marxism, and that is all.” Communist theory and communist social organization were entirely different concepts; the latter was the ultimate political goal of the former. He told Stein, “Communists worldwide must consciously distinguish between the two.” Mao pointed out that it was self-evident that the CCP believed in Marxism; this did not mean denying the value of Western thought or discarding China’s cultural heritage. He particularly emphasized: “Chinese people must use their own brains to think about problems and weigh what can grow on our soil.” In dealing with Marxist theory and ideas from foreign or Chinese history, one should neither blindly absorb nor completely reject, but rather accept critically, discriminating and utilizing those beneficial elements that can serve the national war of resistance and the liberation of the people.

民族性色彩正是对中共中国化马克思主义探索的彰显。认识到这一点后，观察家们有了新的困惑：“中国的马克思主义究竟是‘共产主义至上’还是‘中国至上’？”采访毛泽东时，武道和斯坦因不约而同提出了这一问题。据斯坦因回忆，毛泽东点燃两支蜡烛，端出村酿的葡萄酒招待他。两人秉烛把酒言谈甚欢，足足聊了12个小时。毛泽东开宗明义地指出：“全世界共产主义者唯一相同之处就是都信奉马克思主义，仅此而已。”共产主义理论同共产主义社会组织是完全不同的概念，后者是前者的终极政治目标。他告诉斯坦因，“全世界共产主义者都必须有意识地区分二者”。毛泽东指出，中共信奉马克思主义为自明之理，这并不意味着要否定西方思想价值，或抛弃中国文化遗产。他特别强调：“中国人必须用自己的头脑思考问题，权衡什么才能在我们的土地生长。”在对待马克思主义理论以及外国或中国历史上的思想时，不能盲目吸纳或彻底否定，而应批判接受，甄别并利用能服务民族抗战、民众解放的有益元素。

This led the observers to further recognize the characteristics of “Chinese communism.” They conceived an idea: the CCP might as well change its name, using a milder term in Western conceptions, to dispel American fears and doubts and to better communicate the CCP’s political ideas. In an interview with Harrison Forman, Mao stated, “Soviet-model communism is not our goal,” and “the political vision the CCP seeks is similar to the goal of the American Civil War, which was to liberate the slaves.” Forman immediately pressed: “Why doesn’t the CCP change its name to the ‘New Democracy’ Party?” Mao replied that if it suddenly changed its name, “there would certainly be critics at home and abroad who would seize on it to slander us as trying to pull the wool over people’s eyes… Therefore, we will absolutely not change our name, and there is no need to do so.” He emphasized that a name was just a label; what outsiders called them was not important; the essence and practice of the party were what mattered most.

这使观察家们进一步认识到“中国共产主义”的特质。他们萌生了一个念头：中共不妨更改名称，使用西方观念中较温和的措辞，以打消美国人的恐惧和疑虑，更好地理解中共政治理念。在接受福尔曼采访时，毛泽东表示，“苏联模式的共产主义并非我们的奋斗目标”，“中共求索的政治愿景与美国南北战争的目标相似，那就是解放奴隶”。福尔曼立刻追问：“中共何不改名‘新民主主义’党？”毛泽东回答，如果突然改名，“国内国际一定会有批评者借题发挥，污蔑我们掩人耳目……因此，我们绝不会改名，也没有必要这样做”。他强调，名称只是标签，外界称呼无可厚非，党派本质及实践才是最重要的。

Stein also raised a similar question: since the CCP was leading a new-democratic revolution, “is it possible to change this frightening name ‘Communist Party’?” Mao analyzed that discarding the appellation was one-sided. “Without communist ideological theory, we could not lead the current social revolution in China; without the new-democratic political system, communist philosophy could not be applied to China’s reality.” These remarks made Stein suddenly see the light. When he took his leave in the early morning, although “his whole body ached and his eyes burned,” he was immensely exhilarated. Stein realized that “what the CCP truly cares about is

斯坦因也提出了类似问题，既然中共领导的是新民主主义革命，那么“有无可能改变‘共产党’这一可怕的名字？”毛泽东分析，摒弃称呼是片面的。“没有共产主义思想理论，我们无法领导中国现阶段社会革命；没有新民主主义政治体系，共产主义哲学就无法适用于中国现实。”这番言论令斯坦因豁然开朗，凌晨时分他起身告辞，虽然“浑身酸疼双眼灼痛”，却振奋不已。斯坦因意识到，“中共切实关心的是中国这片土地，而不是把耳朵贴紧在电台上，惟莫斯科之命是从”。他甚至发出这样的感慨，中共“仿佛已长大成人”，他们是“中国自己的共产主义者”，“马克思主义已然中国化了”。

Service took the interviews with the two journalists very seriously. He deliberately appended them to his own report, submitted it to the China-Burma-India Theater Command, and on this basis summarized the political propositions of the CPC. On August 23, Service was invited to hold a six-hour conversation with Mao Zedong. He frankly stated that, in his daily contact with CPC personnel, he had “discovered a special quality, namely the style of realism and seeking truth from facts” [n6]; this feeling grew day by day and left him “deeply surprised.” Service wrote in a rather poetic vein: “The fierce debates revolving around impractical foreign theories are now a distant past. The utopian theorists of those days have either long since left their posts or been buried by history; only the doers remain. Everyone firmly believes that whether a theory can be implemented and proven effective in China — that is the sole touchstone for testing it.” To present to the U.S. high command a more intuitive picture of the CPC’s Sinification of Marxism, Service also translated and submitted works such as *Reform Our Study* [n7].

谢伟思对两位记者的访谈非常重视，他特意将其附在自己的报告后，上呈给中缅印战区司令部，并基于此对中共的政治主张作了总结。8月23日，谢伟思应邀与毛泽东进行了6小时会谈。他坦言，自己在同中共人士的朝夕相处中“发现了一种特殊气质，即现实主义与实事求是的作风”，这种感觉与日俱增，令他“深感意外”。谢伟思用颇具诗意的笔触写道：“围绕不切实际的外国理论爆发激烈争论，这已是久远的过去时。当年的空想理论家或早不在其位，或已被历史淹没，只有实干家（doers）留了下来。人人笃信，能否在中国落实、奏效，这才是检验理论的唯一试金石。”为了更直观地向美国高层展现中共对马克思主义的中国化建设，谢伟思还翻译递交了《改造我们的学习》等著述。

The CPC’s adherence to a “Chinese own” communism aroused great interest among high-level U.S. officials. At the same time, however, they were deeply puzzled: why had the CPC made such adjustments to Marxism, and was there some unspeakable secret or conspiracy behind this? On November 7, 1944, John P. Davies Jr., the original proponent of the Yan’an Observer Group and political adviser to Stilwell, submitted to the U.S. State Department a famous report entitled “How ‘Red’ Are the Chinese Communists?” Like Service, Davies was born in China and spent his youth there, and also had rich experience working in consulates; this background gave him a profound understanding of Chinese culture and Chinese politics. Also a “China hand,” Davies’s fame even surpassed Service’s. With astonishing insight, he refuted the U.S. government’s suspicions about the CPC’s wartime policy adjustments. Davies stated unequivocally that the changes in the CPC’s revolutionary program were “by no means a cunning opportunism” but rather “a return to primitive revolutionary fervor,” whose value “far exceeds orthodox communism itself.” He reached the same conclusion as Lattimore: the CPC’s adjustment of its own policies “must not be misinterpreted as weakness or decay”; on the contrary, it proved that they were “sober realists.” It can be said that “their own communism” was precisely the result of the CPC exercising its self-determination and exploring the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context.

中共奉行的是“中国自己的”共产主义，这一论述引起美国高层极大兴趣。但同时，他们也深感疑惑：中共为何会对马克思主义作出此种调整，这背后是否有不可告人的秘密或阴谋？1944年11月7日，延安军事观察组首倡者、史迪威政治顾问约翰·戴维斯（John P. Davies Jr.）向美国国务院递交了一份题为《中国共产党有多“红”》的著名报告。与谢伟思一样，戴维斯也在中国出生并度过少年时光，亦有丰富的领馆工作经验，这种经历使他对中国文化及中国政治都有深刻认知。同为“中国通”，戴维斯的盛名甚至超过了谢伟思，他以惊人的灼见批驳了美国政府对中共战时政策调整的怀疑。戴维斯旗帜鲜明地指出：中共革命纲领的变化“绝非诡计多端的机会主义”，而是“向原始革命热情的回归”，其价值“远远超过正统共产主义本身”。他得出了和拉铁摩尔一致的结论，中共调整自身政策“决不能被误解为是软弱或腐朽”，这恰恰证明他们是“清醒的现实主义者”。可以说，“自己的共产主义”其实正是中共发挥自决性，对马克思主义进行中国化探索的成果。

III. “A Test Plot for the New China”

三、“新中国的试验田”

Marx pointed out: “Social life is essentially practical.” After gaining an initial understanding of the uniqueness of “Chinese communism,” American observers went on to analyze the CPC’s revolutionary program from the perspective of socio-economic practice. They found that the CPC’s policy adjustments and mobilization of all forces to serve the War of Resistance were most clearly embodied in two major wartime economic guidelines: the agricultural policy of “reducing rent and interest and delivering rent and interest” [8]8 “Reducing rent and interest and delivering rent and interest” (双减双交) refers to the wartime policy of reducing land rent and interest rates for peasants while ensuring that rent and interest were still paid to landlords, as a compromise to unite all classes against Japan. and the industrial and commercial policy of “taking care of both public and private interests.” [9]9 “Taking care of both public and private interests” (公私兼顾) was a policy balancing the state sector and private enterprise to support the war economy. The integration of Marxist principles and communist ideals with the reality of the War of Resistance ushered in a spring of economic development in the border regions.

马克思指出：“社会生活在本质上是实践的。”在对“中国共产主义”的独特性有了初步认知后，美国观察家们又从社会经济实践角度对中共革命纲领进行了分析。他们发现，中共调整政策、动员一切力量服务抗战，最鲜明地体现在两大战时经济方针中，即“双减双交”的农业政策和“公私兼顾”的工商业政策。马克思主义原理、共产主义理想与同抗战现实的结合，开启了边区经济发展的春天。

In May 1938, when Carlson visited Yan’an, he discovered that the CPC’s economic policy was very steady; it did not implement drastic land nationalization or property redistribution. Mao Zedong also introduced to him the CPC’s new economic policy: “The CPC advocates the nationalization of mines, railways, and banks; the establishment of cooperatives; the encouragement of private enterprise; and a welcome to countries willing to establish equal diplomatic relations with China to invest here.”

1938年5月，卡尔逊到访延安时便发现，中共经济政策非常稳健，并没有实施大刀阔斧的土地公有化及财产重新分配。毛泽东也向他介绍了中共崭新的经济政策：“中共主张矿山、铁路及银行收归国家；成立合作社，鼓励私人企业；欢迎愿意与中国建立平等邦交的国家在华投资。”

After leaving Yan’an, Carlson inspected Suiyuan and Chahar, then passed through Hequ to Shanxi. He found that although “reducing rent and interest and delivering rent and interest” had not yet been formally established as law, it had already been implemented and promoted in many places; the policy had achieved great success. In just half a year, sincere cooperation had been established among groups such as landlords and tenant farmers. In Carlson’s view, “this was the most encouraging great change in the base areas.” Surprised and delighted, he was also deeply puzzled: how exactly had the CPC won the support of the landlords? Carlson arrived at the temporary government seat of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region in Mount Wutai, where he met Nie Rongzhen, Song Shaowen, and Peng Zhen. During the talks, Carlson raised his question. Nie Rongzhen smiled and said: “Landlords are also Chinese; they possess national pride and a sense of national dignity. We explain to the landlords the basis and value of cooperation, telling them that if they reduce rent and interest, they will also get more active cooperation from the peasants.” Carlson had met Nie Rongzhen six months earlier in Fuping, Hebei, so they were old acquaintances. Carlson affectionately called Nie Rongzhen “comrade” and asked him about the economic situation in the base areas. Nie Rongzhen explained that local cooperatives integrating production and consumption had been established, private enterprises were allowed to operate, and small traders and peddlers could also engage in their own activities. The government took the lead in establishing clothing factories and munitions factories, which produced according to cooperative plans. The CPC also coordinated agricultural production, guiding peasants in crop cultivation, with the surplus harvest used for exchange. In this way, all the people could benefit.

离开延安后，卡尔逊考察了绥远和察哈尔，取道河曲来到山西。他发现，“双减双交”虽尚未作为法律正式确立，但已在多地落实推广；该政策取得了极大成功，短短半年时间，地主、佃农等群体之间已建立起诚挚合作。在卡尔逊看来，“这是根据地最鼓舞人心的巨变”。他在惊喜之余也深感不解：中共究竟是如何争取到地主支持的呢？卡尔逊到达五台山晋察冀临时政府驻地，他在这里见到了聂荣臻、宋劭文和彭真。会谈中，卡尔逊提出了自己的疑问。聂荣臻笑道：“地主也是中国人，拥有民族自豪感与国家尊严感。我们向地主解释合作的基础与价值，告诉他们如果减少租金和利息，他们也会得到农民更积极的配合。”卡尔逊和聂荣臻半年前在河北阜平就曾会面，算是旧相识。卡尔逊亲密地称聂荣臻为“同志”，又向他询问根据地的经济状况。聂荣臻介绍，当地已建立起集生产和消费于一体的合作社，允许私有企业运营，小商小贩也可自主活动。政府主导建立被服厂、军火厂，按合作社计划生产。中共还协调农业生产，引导农民种植作物，收成所余用作交易。通过这种方式，所有民众都可受益。

This conversation caused a great shock in Carlson’s mind. Combining what he had seen along the way, he truly felt the enterprising spirit of practice in the base areas. “Any valuable opinion could be tried out. If it was effective, it would be adopted; if not, it would be stopped and other plans tried.” Carlson was a fine writer and often used brilliant metaphors in his investigations. For the base areas, he also made a metaphor: “This blockaded area, surrounded by an iron wall, is a test tube for cultivating and testing new ideas… Ten to fifteen million people are conducting a great experiment in cooperative joint operation and joint survival.” Carlson acknowledged that the external driving force for advancing this movement was the resistance against the Japanese invaders, which on the surface did seem somewhat “reluctant.” Nevertheless, he looked forward with confidence: “The longer people invest time and the more energy they pour into this production relation full of empathy, fairness, and justice, the greater the value and benefits of the cooperative economy will be.” He even anticipated that perhaps by the time the national war was won, this new way of life would have already taken deep root in people’s hearts.

这场会谈在卡尔逊心中引发巨大震动。结合沿途所见，他真切感受到根据地充满进取的实践精神。“凡有价值的意见都可被试行。如若有效，就会被采用；反之则会被叫停，再试行其他方案。”卡尔逊文采斐然，他在考察中常有精妙之譬喻。对于根据地，他同样作出一个设喻：“这被铁壁合围的封锁地是培育、检验新思想的试管（test tube）……1000万至1500万民众正在此进行一场合作联营、共谋生存的伟大试验。”卡尔逊承认，推进此运动的外部动力就是抗击日寇，表面上看确乎有些“情非得已”。尽管如此，他又满怀信心地憧憬道：“人们在这项充满同理心、公平公正的生产关系中投入时间越久、注入精力越多，合作经济的价值及收益就越大。”他甚至预想，也许到民族战争胜利时，这种新式生活早已深入人心。

When Carlson was in the base areas, the exploration of Sinicized Marxism had just begun, and a series of policies were only preliminary ideas and partial trials. After several years of effort, the CPC gradually perfected land and industrial-commercial policies based on Chinese realities. Observers who later visited the base areas recorded this in detail. From October to December 1940, Stanton Lautenschlager, an American Presbyterian missionary and teacher at Qilu University, traveled through northwest China. He crossed the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, passed through Fuxian County in Shaanxi, and was escorted by Eighth Route Army soldiers to Yan’an. Lautenschlager found that, compared with the devastated occupied areas, the border region was thriving. “In the villages along the way, the peasants were all wearing warm cotton-padded jackets, and the children were well-fed, well-clothed, and healthy.” After traveling for two days and nights, the group finally reached their destination. The scene before him filled Lautenschlager with excitement: “The night was thick, the bright moon shone on the great rivers and deep valleys, and we suddenly saw a pagoda standing on a mountaintop a mile away, glittering in the bright moonlight. It announced to us that this was Yan’an.”

卡尔逊在根据地时，中国化马克思主义的探索刚刚起步，一系列政策仅是初步设想和局部试行。经过数年努力，中共逐渐完善了基于中国实际的土地及工商业政策，之后到访根据地的观察家对此进行了详细记录。1940年10—12月，美国长老会传教士、齐鲁大学教会教习罗天乐（Stanton Lautenschlager）游历中国西北。他穿越陕甘宁边区，取道陕西富县，在八路军战士护送下去往延安。罗天乐发现，较之满目疮痍的沦陷区，边区一派欣欣向荣。“沿途村庄，农民都穿着暖和的棉袄，孩子们也丰衣足食、身体健康。”兼程两天后，一行人终于到达目的地。眼前情景令罗天乐振奋不已：“夜色浓重，朗朗明月照射着大川深谷，我们猛然看到一英里外的山顶矗立着一座宝塔，在皎洁的月光下闪闪发亮。它向我们宣告，这里就是延安。”

In Yan’an, Lautenschlager visited the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, the Lu Xun Academy of Arts, and the Central Hospital, and met Mao Zedong and others. The flexible and moderate policies of the border region left a deep impression on him. Shortly thereafter, Lautenschlager submitted a lengthy report to Johnson entitled “What Is the Chinese Communist Party?” In the report, Lautenschlager specifically used the special topic “Socialism in Yenan” to introduce the border region’s agricultural and industrial-commercial policies. His many years of living and working in China gave Lautenschlager a keen understanding and insight into Chinese politics. “Socialism in Yenan” was actually similar in spirit to “the so-called Chinese Communist Party” and “China’s own communism.” Johnson greatly praised this report and forwarded it to the Secretary of State. In his covering note, he also changed his previous bias, no longer referring to the CPC as “Red Bandits,” but wrote fairly: “Professor Lautenschlager went to Yan’an with an open mind, and his observations are objective, fair, and impartial.”

在延安，罗天乐参观了抗日军政大学、鲁迅艺术学院及中央医院等处，并见到了毛泽东等人，边区灵活温和的政策给他留下了深刻印象。此后不久，罗天乐便向詹森递交了题为《何为中国共产党？》的长篇报告。在报告中，罗天乐特意用专题“延安的社会主义”（“Socialism in Yenan”）来介绍边区的农业政策和工商业政策。多年的在华工作生活经历令罗天乐对中国政治有敏锐的理解力与洞察力，“延安的社会主义”其实正与“所谓的中国共产党”“中国自己的共产主义”有异曲同工之妙。詹森对这份报告大加赞赏，将之转呈给国务卿。在附言中，他也一改既往的偏见，不再用“赤匪”（Red Bandits）来指代中共，而是中肯地写道：“罗天乐教授怀抱开放的心态前往延安，他的观察记录客观公正、不偏不倚。”

In the following years, the CPC continued its exploration of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. In April 1941, Lin Boqu proposed in the Border Region government work report that, under the conditions of a national war, the development of capitalism was “inevitable and necessary.” The following month, the *Outline of the Administrative Program of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region* was promulgated, explicitly stipulating the protection of private property and encouraging investment and free trade. In January 1942, the Politburo of the Party Central Committee adopted the “Decision on Land Policy in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas,” enforcing the “double reduction and double delivery”[n] as a strict legal decree. In October of the following year, the Party Central Committee issued the directive “On the Movement to Reduce Rent, Increase Production, and Support the Government and Cherish the People in the Base Areas,” again urging implementation of this policy. At the same time, the CPC formally proposed rewarding investment and operating both public and private enterprises. Mao Zedong pointed out in *Rural Surveys* that the clear purpose of implementing this economic policy was “to give free capitalism an opportunity to develop, in order to oppose Japanese imperialism and the semi-feudal system.” In July 1943, the Party Central Committee issued the “Declaration on the Sixth Anniversary of the War of Resistance,” advocating “the implementation of a democratic and centralized economic policy that regulates the economic interests of all classes.” The declaration stressed that in implementing the new economic policy, “it is necessary first of all to abolish all current fiscal and economic policies that hinder the production initiative of both public and private sectors.” The new policy indeed stimulated people’s labor enthusiasm, and both the military industry and civilian enterprises achieved great development. By the time the observers arrived in 1944, they found that the Border Region “had factories everywhere,” with more than 80 factories including textile mills, paper mills, arsenals, machine plants, iron foundries, and tanneries.

此后数年，中共持续进行着中国化马克思主义的探索。1941年4月，林伯渠在边区政府工作报告中提出，在民族战争背景下，“必然且需要”资本主义的发展。次月，《陕甘宁边区施政纲领》颁行，明文规定保护私有财产，鼓励投资及自由贸易。1942年1月，中央政治局通过《关于抗日根据地土地政策的决定》，将“双减双交”作为法令严格推行。次年10月，中共中央发布《开展根据地的减租、生产和拥政爱民运动》指示，再次敦促落实该政策。与此同时，中共正式提出奖励投资、公私兼营。毛泽东在《农村调查》中指出，实行这种经济政策有明确目的，就是“让自由资本主义得着发展的机会，用以反对日本帝国主义和半封建制度”。1943年7月，中共中央发表《为抗战六周年纪念宣言》，主张“实行一个调节各阶级经济利益的民主集中的经济政策”。宣言强调，在实行新的经济政策时，“必须首先废除一切妨碍公私生产积极性的现行财政经济政策”。新政策确实激发了人们的劳动热情，军工产业及民生实业都获得了极大发展。待1944年的观察家到来时，他们发现边区“到处设有工厂”，纺织厂、造纸厂、兵工厂、机器厂、铸铁厂，皮革厂等多达80余家。

The exploration of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context was also reflected in the CPC’s innovations regarding cooperatives and mutual-aid teams. Marx once proposed that the only way for agricultural workers to escape poverty was to engage in large-scale cooperative production and realize the union of labor—that is, after the victory of the socialist revolution, to liberate the land through collective ownership and to liberate the labor force through joint production. The basic premise of this theory was that the socialist revolution had already been won and that the land had been “transformed into social property and jointly cultivated by cooperatives of agricultural workers.” Building on Marx’s theory of cooperatives and combining it with the historical conditions of the implementation of the New Economic Policy in Russia, Lenin further proposed that “extensive and deep cooperation” was “everything necessary for building a complete socialist society” in Russia. Lenin’s innovation lay in treating the establishment of cooperatives as a path to achieving socialism.

中国化马克思主义的探索还体现在中共对合作社及互助组的创新方面。马克思曾提出：农业工人摆脱贫困的唯一出路是进行大规模合作生产，实现劳动联合，即在社会主义革命胜利后，依靠集体占有来解放土地，借助联合生产来解放劳动力。这一理论的基本前提是，社会主义革命已取得胜利，土地已“转变为社会财产，并由农业工人的合作社共同耕种”。列宁基于马克思的合作社理论，结合俄国新经济政策施行的历史条件，进一步提出“广泛而深入的合作化”就是俄国“建成完全的社会主义所必需的一切”。列宁的创新在于，他将建立合作社当作实现社会主义的一种路径。

Unfortunately, these classical theories and existing experiences were not applicable to the actual conditions of China at the time. First, unlike the context of the cooperative movement envisioned by Marx, China’s socialist revolution had not yet been completed. Second, the core force of Marx’s cooperative theory was agricultural workers, and the targets of revolution were large landowners or feudal lords. However, China’s anti-Japanese base areas were located in the vast countryside, and the revolutionary masses and the foundation of the revolution were precisely the peasants and the individual economy on which they depended for survival. Moreover, the historical background of a national war required the CPC to unite with landlords and peasants of all strata. Third, China’s special national conditions and dual revolutionary tasks also determined that it was not yet possible to achieve the socialization of the base areas through the establishment of cooperatives.

遗憾的是，这些经典理论和既有经验并不适用于中国当时的现实环境。首先，与马克思设想的合作社运动背景不同，中国的社会主义革命此时尚未完成。其次，马克思合作社理论的核心力量是农业工人，革命对象为大农或封建主。而中国的抗日根据地位于广大农村，革命群众及革命的基础正是农民以及农民赖以生存的个体经济，而民族战争的历史背景要求中共必须团结地主和各阶层农民。再次，中国特殊的国情及双重革命任务也决定着，当前尚不能以建立合作社实现根据地的社会主义化。

Based on China’s reality, Mao Zedong formally proposed: “Build labor mutual-aid organizations based on the individual economy (without destroying the foundation of individual private property), that is, agricultural producers’ cooperatives for the peasants.” The creativity of this theory lay in the following: unlike Marx’s view that small-peasant land ownership should also be included in the targets of socialist transformation, the CPC, when implementing the cooperative policy, did not take back the land and means of production that had already been distributed. More importantly, unlike Lenin’s view that equated the development of cooperatives with the development of socialism, the CPC’s purpose in establishing cooperatives was direct and practical: to integrate scattered means of labor, fully mobilize the strength of all individuals—young and old, men and women alike—and achieve a leap in productive forces and production efficiency, thereby serving the construction of the base areas and the national war.

毛泽东立足中国现实，正式提出：“建设以个体经济为基础（不破坏个体的私有财产基础）的劳动互助组织，即农民的农业生产合作社。”该理论的创造性在于：与马克思将小农土地所有制也划入社会主义改造对象的主张不同，中共在实行合作社政策时，并不收回业已分配的土地和生产资料。更重要的是，与列宁将合作社发展等同于社会主义发展的观点不同，中共建立合作社的目的直接而现实：整合分散的劳动资料，充分发挥青壮年及老弱妇孺等所有个体力量；实现生产力及生产效率的飞跃，服务于根据地建设及民族战争。

The CPC’s exploration of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context achieved remarkable results. After bidding farewell to Nie Rongzhen and others, Carlson continued eastward. Two years later, recalling his grand journey from across the Pacific, he was still filled with nostalgia: “It was sad to leave this place of friendly atmosphere and people of unwavering commitment. The people here are the vanguard of the ‘experimental field for a new China.’” Carlson’s keen vision is admirable; through the raging flames of war, he saw the hope of a new China. And the subsequent observers went a step further: from the base areas, they glimpsed China’s future.

中共对马克思主义中国化的探索取得了卓越成效。挥别聂荣臻等人后，卡尔逊继续东行。两年后，他在大洋彼岸回忆自己的壮游，仍充满眷恋：“离开这个气氛友好、人人都矢志不渝的地方真令人感伤。这里的人们是‘新中国试验田’的急先锋。” 卡尔逊的巨眼令人叹服，他穿过缭乱战火看到了新中国的希望；而后续的观察家们则更进一步，他们从根据地透视到了中国的未来。

IV. “A Microcosm of China’s Future”

四、“中国未来的缩影”

By the time the journalist delegation and the observation group arrived, the policies of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context had already matured, and the observers mentioned this in their writings or reports. The agricultural producers’ cooperatives and mutual-aid teams, based on the principle of democracy and voluntariness, greatly shocked Forman. He could not help but raise two major questions again: “Are they really Communists?” and “Is this still communism?” This seemed to be a kind of doubt, but in fact it confirmed the CPC’s exploration of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.

记者团与观察组到来时，中国化的马克思主义政策已较为成熟，观察家们在著述或报告中对此都有提及。基于民主自愿原则的农业生产合作社及互助组令福尔曼大为震撼，他不禁再次提出两大疑问：“他们真的是共产党吗？”“这还算共产主义吗？”这看似是一种质疑，事实上正印证了中共中国化马克思主义的探索。

To answer Forman’s confusion, Mao Zedong explained to him the thinking behind the CPC’s land policy: “There are millions of slaves in

为解答福尔曼的困惑，毛泽东向他解释了中共土地政策的思路：“中国有数百万奴隶被封建主义枷锁牢牢束缚……在解放奴隶、通过土地改革提高其生活水平的进程中，我们并不计划像苏联那样激进。”关于私营经济，毛泽东表示，中共鼓励竞争和私人企业，也欢迎外国人基于平等互惠原则，在根据地投资并进行商贸活动。因为中国确实需要引入国外资本，来“协助建设仅凭自身力量难以完成的实业”。为获得更多信息，福尔曼还采访了周恩来。周恩来告诉福尔曼，中共的目标是建成“共产主义的社会集体主义”。

At the end of August 1944, the journalist group set out from Yan’an and entered various parts of the border region and other base areas for investigation. They discovered that the cooperative movement was already developing vigorously in North China. This system was not compulsory, but after witnessing the efficiency of the cooperatives, everyone was willing to join. “200,000 peasants joined the cooperatives, and 137,000 women joined textile cooperatives.” In Forman’s view, although the cooperatives and the labor-exchange system in the base areas bore some resemblance to the Soviet collective farm system, there were also notable differences. This was because the peasants in the base areas “still retained ownership of small plots of land”; by comparison, the labor-exchange system was instead “more like the joint harvesting of American farms.” At this point, Forman’s doubts were completely dispelled: it was precisely the Sinicized governing concepts and practices that had brought about the economic prosperity of the border region.

1944年8月底，记者团从延安出发，进入边区各地和其他根据地考察。他们发现，合作社运动已在华北如火如荼地开展起来。这种制度不是强制的，但大家在目睹合作社的高效性后都愿意加入。“20万农民加入合作社，13.7万女性加入纺织合作社。”在福尔曼看来，根据地合作社与换工制同苏联集体农场制虽有相似之处，但更有显著不同。因为根据地农民“仍保留着小块土地的所有权”，相较之下，换工制反而“更像美国农场的联合收获”。至此，福尔曼的疑问彻底消除了，正是中国化的施政理念及实践促成了边区经济的繁荣。

Among the several journalists, Epstein produced the most writings on observations of the base areas and reflections on China’s destiny. Epstein was born in Warsaw; his father had been imprisoned for participating in the Jewish Labor Bund’s resistance against the tsar, and his mother had even been exiled to Siberia. These turbulent and bitter experiences made him empathize deeply with the suffering of the Chinese people. According to his recollections, in the base areas, “everything that was practically feasible was put into practice… The CPC formulated reasonable plans based on existing resources to meet current and future needs.” Although material goods were relatively scarce, this did not dampen people’s enthusiasm for production. When visiting cooperatives, workers asked the journalist group “how foreigners make better-quality soap”; at another place, workers asked them for the tin foil inside cigarette packs to use for making capacitors.

在几位记者中，爱泼斯坦关于根据地观察及中国命运思考的作品最多。爱泼斯坦生于华沙，父亲曾因参加犹太人劳动联盟反抗沙皇而系狱，母亲还被流放至西伯利亚，颠沛多舛的经历使他对中国人民的苦难感同身受。据他回忆，在根据地，“所有切实可行的事情都得到实践……中共基于现有资源制定合理方案，满足当前及未来需求”。尽管物资比较匮乏，但这并未消磨人们的生产热情。参观合作社时，工人向记者团请教“外国人如何制作质量更好的肥皂”；在另一处，工人则向他们要香烟盒内的锡箔纸，用来制作电容器。

What also left an indelible impression on Epstein was the labor-exchange teams in the base areas. He wrote: “Peasants formed labor-exchange teams to cooperatively cultivate their respective fields, and they also reclaimed wasteland together, distributing the harvest equally. Therefore, although the border region practiced private land ownership, labor was collectivized. As wasteland was reclaimed, collective ownership also began to emerge. The labor-exchange system greatly improved the efficiency of sowing and harvesting.” Labor exchange was also applied in the production of daily necessities; large numbers of women were mobilized to collectively spin yarn and weave cloth. In 1943–1944, in Yan’an alone, the total cotton cloth woven in factories and households amounted to “over 80,000 pounds” and “over 4 million yards.” Epstein stated that although he had not verified the authenticity of these figures, among the observers in the base areas “not a single person in tattered clothing was ever seen,” and thus “this one fact alone suffices to prove their accuracy.”

令爱泼斯坦难忘的还有根据地的换工队。他写道：“农民组成换工队合作耕种各自田地，还一起拓荒，平均分配收成。所以，尽管边区实行土地私有制，但劳动是集体化的。随着荒地开垦，集体所有制也开始出现。换工制大大提升了播种和收割效率。”换工在日用品生产中也有应用，广大女性被动员起来，集体纺纱织布。1943—1944年，仅延安一地，工厂和家庭所织成的棉布合计就在“八万磅以上，”“四百万码以上”。爱泼斯坦表示，虽然自己没有考证此数据的真实性，但在边区观察家们“从未见有衣衫褴褛之人”，因而“即此一事，足以证明其确切性矣”。

Epstein was skilled at observation, able to discover clues and see through to the essence of things from details that ordinary people overlooked. He discerned the implementation and effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party’s policies from Yan’an woodcuts. One of these depicted a scene of women spinning thread collectively. Originally, women had to spend several hours each day cooking and delivering meals to their husbands. After joining the cooperative, they took turns at this task, delivering meals to 10–20 people each time, and the women could use the time and energy saved to spin yarn and weave cloth. Spinning wheels and looms were sold at low prices or lent directly by the cooperative, and cotton could be purchased on credit; the finished cloth could be sold to the cooperative or “taken to the market and sold at a good price.” These fabrics or garments sold well because “the army needed uniforms, and some people who had become prosperous also wanted to wear new clothes.” In this way, women’s participation in labor exchange increased family income while also gaining them economic independence, and their social status rose accordingly.

爱泼斯坦善于观察，能通过常人忽略的事物发现线索，透视本质。他从延安木刻画中洞察到中共政策的实行与成效。其中一幅描绘女性集体纺线的情景。原本女性每天都要花数小时，给丈夫做饭、送饭。加入合作社后，她们轮流负责这项工作，每次给10—20人送饭，女性可以利用节省出的时间和精力纺纱织布。纺车和织机由合作社以低廉价格出售或直接出借，棉花也可以赊购；制成的衣物能卖给合作社，也能“拿到市场卖个好价钱”。这些布料或成衣销路很好，因为“军队需要制服，一些富裕起来的人也希望穿上新衣”。这样，女性参与换工，在增加家庭收入的同时也获得了经济独立，社会地位相应提升。

The woodcut “Family Production Meeting” depicted the impact of the cooperative system on the family. Epstein discovered that the new economic policies had changed the structure of family production. “Fathers and sons joined labor-exchange teams, mothers participated in spinning to supplement the family income, and small children went to school and helped keep the family accounts.” Many families, for the first time, “had surplus grain and money left over at the end of the year.” Just like the scene in the print, they were looking forward to the future with hope, “discussing how to spend this year’s savings and how much money they planned to earn next year.” Epstein keenly realized that this kind of family planning was of great significance: “Every household, every mutual-aid group could make plans,” and by extension, “the entire village, the entire border region, and even all the liberated areas of the country could be planned in advance.”

木刻画“家庭生产会议”则表现了合作社制对家庭的影响。爱泼斯坦发现，崭新的经济政策改变了家庭生产结构。“父亲和儿子加入换工队，母亲参与纺纱补贴家用，小孩子上学堂，帮家里记账”，很多人家在年底“破天荒积攒了余粮余钱”。就像版画里的情景，他们正满怀希望憧憬未来，“讨论今年的积蓄该怎么花，明年又计划赚多少钱”。爱泼斯坦敏锐地想到，这种家庭计划意义非凡：“每户人家、每个互助组都可以做计划”，由此大而化之，“整个村落、整个边区，乃至全国解放区都可进行预先规划”。

The members of the Observer Group had a special mission, and their observations were mostly focused on the military level. In their view, the CPC’s adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context had improved the border region’s economy, which was directly reflected in the soldiers’ food supply and physical condition. When David D. Barrett, the head of the Observer Group, reviewed the troops at Nanniwan, he also noticed that the Eighth Route Army was neatly dressed, completely different from the image they had imagined. Wilbur J. Peterkin, who later succeeded him as group leader, had visited the Guilin Army Training Camp and found that compared with the soldiers there, the Eighth Route Army “appeared well-nourished and healthy.”

观察组成员使命特殊，他们的观察多集中于军事层面。在他们看来，中共对马克思主义的中国化探索改善了边区经济，这直接反映在士兵的温饱和身体素质上。观察组组长大卫·包瑞德（David D. Barret）在南泥湾检阅士兵时也注意到，八路军军容整洁，与他们想象中的形象完全不同。后续接任组长的威尔伯·彼得金（Wilbur J. Peterkin）曾参观过桂林陆军训练营，他发现与那里的士兵相比，八路军“看起来营养充足、身体健康”。

While the new policies improved the border region’s economy, they also optimized the local social ecology, and social mobilization achieved a breakthrough. Former loafers, or “idlers,” were even transformed into model workers; some extremely poor men were able to accumulate property and had hope of getting married. Furthermore, the new policies reshaped social identities, thereby changing group psychology. A woodcut Epstein collected, titled “Exiled Landlord Returns to His Homeland,” reflected this. Why were exiled landlords willing to return? Epstein believed that a major reason was that “cooperative labor raised production efficiency and peasants’ enthusiasm, and the government built water conservancy projects, provided high-quality farm tools, and popularized efficient farming methods.” A series of measures increased the peasants’ harvest. Therefore, although rents were reduced, the landlords suffered no serious losses. In addition, policies encouraging investment provided landlords with opportunities to change their status, fully mobilizing their enthusiasm. “If a prosperous peasant wanted to buy a landlord’s land, the landlord could invest the proceeds from the land sale in industry without having to pay taxes.” Driven by these policies, many landlords began to set up industrial enterprises. The change in role brought about a change in mentality, and the sensitive Epstein captured this. In his view, the landlords no longer felt like “marginalized people” but were transformed into “participants,” and they therefore threw themselves more enthusiastically into production in the base areas.

新政策在改善边区经济的同时，还优化了当地社会生态，社会动员取得了突破性进展。原本游手好闲的“二流子”甚至被改造成劳模；一些赤贫男性也能积攒家私，有望结婚。此外，新政策重塑了社会身份，进而改变了群体心理，爱泼斯坦收录的一幅“流亡地主重返家园”木刻便反映了这一点。流亡地主为何愿意回来？爱泼斯坦认为，一大原因在于“合作社劳动提高了生产效率和农民积极性，加之政府兴修水利、提供优质农具，普及高效耕作方法”，一系列措施增加了农民收成。所以尽管租金降低，但地主并无严重损失。此外，鼓励投资政策为地主提供了改变身份的机会，充分调动了他们的积极性。“如果富裕起来的农民想购买地主田地，地主可将卖田所得投资工业，且无需缴纳税款。”在政策推动下，许多地主开始设立实业。角色改变带来心态转化，心思细腻的爱泼斯坦捕捉到了这一点。在他看来，地主感到自己不再是“边缘者”，而是焕然一新的“参与者”，他们因而更加热情地投身根据地生产。

The exploration and practice of adapted Marxism also promoted the CPC’s organizational building. “By the end of 1944, the number of CPC members had reached about 1.29 million, of whom 93 percent had joined after 1937. Of the new members, 90 percent were peasants, and a considerable portion came from the middle peasant stratum.” Unlike Epstein, who saw the big picture through small details, Stein tended to conduct abstract analysis from a macro perspective. He believed that new members joined the Chinese Communist Party not because they had thoroughly read and agreed with Marxist principles, but for the most practical reasons—the CPC had liberated them from the iron heel of the Japanese invaders and led them in social reform. “It was precisely in the process of fighting bloody battles for national freedom and struggling hard for social progress that the masses accepted and were convinced by the CPC’s leadership. They realized that the CPC made it possible to realize a dual revolution.”

中国化马克思主义的探索与实践还促进了中共的组织建设。“截至1944年底，中共党员数量达到129万左右，其中93%是在1937年后加入的。新增加的成员有90%是农民，相当一部分来自中农阶层。”与爱泼斯坦透过细节见微知著不同，斯坦因多从宏观角度进行抽象分析。他认为，新成员加入中国共产党，并不是由于熟读并赞同马克思主义原理，而是出于最切实的原因——中共从日寇铁蹄下解放了他们，又带领他们进行社会改革。“正是在为争取民族自由浴血奋战、为推动社会进步艰苦斗争的过程中，民众接纳、信服了中共的领导。他们意识到，中共使实现双重革命成为可能。”

Most importantly, the new policies protected the interests of different groups and indeed united all forces that could be united. Mao Zedong once told Stein: “We adjust our policies according to the demands of the masses. Party organizations at all levels must abide by this basic principle and always keep in line with the actual needs and wishes of the masses.” It can be said that this adjustment was a vivid reflection of the CPC’s beneficial exploration in continuously adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. The new policies, which fit the actual situation, increased the masses’ goodwill toward the CPC and strengthened and consolidated the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Epstein wrote sincerely: “The CPC and its current supporters represent the broadest strata of China.”

最重要的是，崭新的政策保护了不同群体的利益，确实团结了一切可以团结的力量。毛泽东曾这样告诉斯坦因：“我们根据民众诉求调整政策。各级党组织都务必遵守此基本原则，时刻同群众现实需要和愿望保持一致。”可以说，这一调整正是中共持续推进马克思主义中国化有益探索的生动反映。契合实际的新政策增加了民众对中共的好感，强化巩固了抗日民族统一战线。爱泼斯坦由衷地写道：“中共及其当前拥护者，代表着中国最广泛的阶层。”

Carlson had already written about the CPC’s mass base. When the journalist group and the Observer Group arrived, they felt this even more strongly. In early September 1944, Forman,武道, Epstein, and Observer Group member Melvin A. Casberg passed through Fenyang, Shanxi, and climbed a mountaintop to observe a night battle by the Eighth Route Army. At daybreak, they witnessed local people coming spontaneously to reward the troops. Forman vividly recreated what he saw with a camera-like pen: “Some people climbed up the mountain path… They were wearing their best clothes and carrying baskets of fruits and vegetables… Elderly women with bound feet hobbled along. Everyone was chatting and laughing, as if they were on a picnic.” This scene deeply moved him: “This was the best reflection of how the people living under the guns of the Japanese army viewed the Eighth Route Army.”

关于中共的群众基础，卡尔逊其实早有述及。记者团和观察组到来时，他们对此感受更为强烈。1944年9月初，福尔曼、武道、爱泼斯坦，还有观察组成员梅尔文·卡斯伯格（Melvin A. Casberg），途经山西汾阳，在一座山顶观摩八路军夜战。天明时分，他们目睹当地民众自发前来酬军。福尔曼用照相机般的笔触生动还原了自己的所见：“一些民众沿着山路爬上来……他们穿着自己最好的衣服，带着一篮篮蔬果……缠足的老妇人步履蹒跚地走来。大家谈笑风生，像是来野餐。”此番情景令他大为感动，“生活在日军枪口下的民众如何看待八路军，这是最好的体现”。

Another group of observers had the same experience. In October, Raymond P. Ludden led six members of the Observer Group from Yan’an to the Jin-Sui and Jin-Cha-Ji base areas. During the inspection, what impressed Ludden most was that the CPC had already won widespread support from the masses. Before this, some critics had argued that this mass base was a facade created by the CPC. But after a journey of four months covering 1,000 kilometers, Ludden completely overturned this false accusation. In a report to George Atcheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, Ludden wrote bluntly: “The support of the people of North China for the CPC is so widespread… it is difficult to cling to the idea that this is a stage set up for foreign visitors.” He analyzed that the reason the CPC was able to “unite sincerely and intimately with the masses” was that the CPC “guaranteed the basic rights and interests of ordinary people, provided them with decent treatment, and ensured they had ample food and clothing.” Ludden even exclaimed with emotion: “I am finally convinced that what the Communists proclaim about being deeply supported by the masses is actually true.” Atcheson was very convinced by Ludden’s account and forwarded the report to Secretary of State Cordell Hull for reference.

另一路观察家也有相同体验。10月，雷蒙德·卢登（Raymond P. Ludden）率6名观察组成员从延安出发，开赴晋绥及晋察冀根据地。在考察中，卢登感触最深的便是中共已获得民众的广泛支持。在此之前，曾有批判者认为，这种群众基础是中共营造出的假象。但卢登经过历时4个月、跨越1000公里的行路，彻底推翻了这一不实指控。在给时任国务卿助理乔治·艾奇逊（George Atcheson）的报告中，卢登直言不讳地写道：“华北民众对中共的支持如此普遍……很难抱守残念，认定这是为应付外国来访者搭设的表演台。”他分析，中共之所以能“与民众真诚亲密地团结在一起”，就是因为中共“保障平民基本权益，为他们提供体面的待遇，确保他们丰衣足食”。卢登甚至大发感慨：“我终于确信，共产党宣扬他们深受群众拥护，原来是真的。”艾奇逊对卢登的论述极为信服，将报告转发给国务卿科德尔·赫尔 (Cordell Hull)参考。

Although the eclectic economic policy was only one part of the programme of the New Democratic Revolution, it was a model of the flexible application of Marxist principles to solve China’s practical problems, and also the fruit of the CPC’s constant exploration and experimentation based on reality during the revolutionary years. In a letter to his wife, Epstein wrote excitedly: “The people and things here are more vital than anywhere else in China; everything is so full of vigour. … Yan’an is the epitome of China’s future; the next decade will prove it!” [18]18 Israel Epstein (1915–2005), a Polish-born Jewish journalist who later became a naturalized Chinese citizen and a member of the CPC; he reported from Yan’an and other base areas during the war. John S. Service (1909–1999), a U.S. Foreign Service officer and member of the Dixie Mission, who reported favorably on the CPC. Service directly quoted this statement, writing in his report: “I deeply concur with a correspondent’s view — we penetrated deep into the mountains of northern Shaanxi, yet discovered the most modern place in China.” [19]19 Evans Carlson (1896–1947), a U.S. Marine Corps officer who visited the CPC base areas in 1937–1938 and became an advocate for cooperation with the CPC. It can be said that just as Carlson saw in the base areas the source of strength for a new China, the observers who followed him also saw there the hope of China’s development.

兼容并蓄的经济政策虽然只是新民主主义革命纲领的一部分，却是中共灵活运用马克思主义原理解决中国实际问题的典范，也是中共在革命年代基于现实不断探索、试验的成果。在给妻子的信中，爱泼斯坦激动地写道：“这里的人和事都比中国其他地方更富有生气，一切都是那么朝气蓬勃。……延安就是中国未来的缩影，下一个十年将证明这一点！” 谢伟思直接引用了这番论述，他在报告中写道：“我深切赞同一位通讯员的观点——我们进入陕北深山，却探寻到中国最现代的地方。”可以说，正如卡尔逊在根据地看到了新中国的力量源泉，继他而来的观察家们也在这里看到了中国发展的希望。

V. Concluding Remarks

五、余论

“What is Chinese communism?” Since the 1920s, this question had deeply troubled the U.S. government and public. After the outbreak of the Total War of Resistance, wave after wave of American observers went deep into north China to conduct investigations, and their personal experiences changed their previous prejudices. They discovered that the CPC, basing itself on China’s social reality, “was carrying out a comprehensive Sinicization of communism in both exploration and practice.” [20]20 John Colling, a U.S. Army officer and member of the Dixie Mission; his memoir *The Spirit of Yan’an* (1973) offered a sympathetic view of the CPC. Worthy of special mention is that John Colling, a member of the observer group, redefined the “Chinese Communist Party” in his memoir *The Yan’an Spirit*. Reading his words, one finds that Colling had a clear and original mind and often expressed unique opinions. Unlike Carlson, Forman, Stein, and others, Colling believed that the name “Chinese Communist Party” was entirely appropriate. Because “they shared labour and hardships, worked together with one heart and one mind, and in no way violated the literal meaning of the Chinese characters for ‘communist’ (共产).” [21]21 The Chinese term 共产 (gòngchǎn) literally means “sharing property” or “common property.” Thus, from “so-called” to “Yan’an’s,” then to “their own,” and finally to “entirely appropriate,” American observers gained a completely new understanding of “what is Chinese communism.” Nevertheless, they were all ultimately unable to truly grasp the significance behind these qualifiers. Whatever the qualification, its connotation was the CPC’s continuous exploration of Sinicized Marxism — this is the correct answer to “what is Chinese communism.”

“何为中国共产主义？”自20世纪20年代起，这一问题便深深困扰着美国政府和公众。全面抗战爆发后，一批又一批美国观察家深入华北开展考察，切身体验改变了既往偏见。他们发现，中共立足中国社会现实，“对共产主义进行着全面的中国化探索与实践”。值得特别一书的是，观察组成员约翰·科林（John Colling）在回忆录《延安精神》中，重新界定了“中国共产党”。读其文字可发现，科林思维清奇，常发独到议论。与卡尔逊、福尔曼和斯坦因等人都不同，科林认为，“中国共产党”之名恰如其分。因为“他们同劳作共甘苦，和衷共济、同心同德，完全没有违背‘共产’之中文字面意思”。可见，从“所谓的”到“延安的”，再到“自己的”，最终到“恰如其分的”，美国观察家对“何为中国共产主义”有了全新认知。然而尽管如此，他们其实都未能真正理解这些定语背后的意趣。不论是何种限定，其内涵都是中共中国化马克思主义的持续探索，这便是“何为中国共产主义”之正解。

Accompanying this change in perception was an update in American observers’ image of the CPC. The base areas under CPC leadership were “the experimental field for a new China,” “the most modern place in China,” and “the epitome of China’s future,” and this elevation of image brought about a change in the U.S. assessment of the CPC’s strategic role. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Carlson wrote repeatedly to Roosevelt, suggesting that the United States strengthen ties and cooperation with the CPC, and calling the CPC a “reliable and steadfast ally.” [22]22 Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945), U.S. president during most of World War II. Colonel Barrett also recommended in a report submitted to the China-Burma-India Theater headquarters that the United States provide weapons aid to the CPC. [23]23 David D. Barrett (1892–1977), U.S. Army colonel who led the Dixie Mission (the U.S. Army Observer Group in Yan’an) in 1944–1945. The observers’ recommendations influenced U.S. high-level strategic decision-making to a certain extent, and the CPC and the U.S. military entered into a period of multifaceted military cooperation.

与此认知变化相伴而生的，是美国观察家关于中共形象认知的更新。中共领导下的根据地是“新中国的试验田”“中国最现代的地方”以及“中国未来的缩影”，而形象升华带来的则是美国对中共战略角色定位的变化。太平洋战争爆发后，卡尔逊多次致信罗斯福，建议美国加强同中共的联系与合作，并称中共是“可信赖的坚定盟友”。包瑞德也在呈送中缅印战区司令部的报告中建议美国向中共提供武器援助。观察家们的建议一定程度上影响了美国高层的战略决策，中共与美军展开了一段涉及多方面的军事合作。

However, this cooperation was as fleeting as a flower in the morning, quickly dying out after a brief brilliance. In the winter of 1944, a fierce debate erupted within the U.S. government over China policy. With the failure of Hurley’s mediation and the recall of Stilwell, U.S. strategy toward China lurched sharply to the right. Most U.S. government decision-makers, dwelling in the halls of power, though they continuously obtained a steady stream of political and military intelligence from China, were deeply mired in ideological obsessions and dismissed the observers’ reports as biased and erroneous perceptions. Although the Yan’an side did its utmost to expand propaganda, although the American observers tried to clear the mud and stir the clear waters, and although some people of insight raised their voices and set forth arguments, regrettably, their efforts ultimately came to nothing. Whether it was the policy of “restraining Chiang” in the later period of the War of Resistance, or the slide back toward “anti-communism” on the eve of victory, both essentially reflected the dual nature of U.S. policy toward China.

然而，这段合作如昙花一现，在短暂绚烂后很快寂灭。1944年冬，美国政府内部关于对华政策爆发激烈争论。随着赫尔利调停失败以及史迪威被召回，美国对华战略急剧右转。美国政府大多数决策者居于庙堂之上，虽然源源不断从中国获取了大量政治军事情报，却深陷意识形态执念，将观察家的报告视为偏听偏信的错误认知。尽管延安方面尽力扩大宣传，尽管美国观察家们试图激浊扬清，尽管一些有识之士发声立论，但遗憾的是，他们的努力最终付诸徒劳。无论是抗战后期实行“抑蒋”，还是胜利前夕再次滑向“反共”，本质上都反映出美国对华政策的两面性。

(Author’s biography: Lu Xiaona, female, Ph.D. in History, postdoctoral fellow and assistant researcher at the Institute of Historical Theory, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（作者简介：卢晓娜，女，历史学博士，中国社会科学院历史理论研究所博士后、助理研究员）

(Fund projects: This article is a phased result of the National Social Science Fund major project “Collection, Collation, and Research of Archival Materials on the History of the World Anti-Fascist War (Including China’s War of Resistance)” (project no. 16KZD020), the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation general project “American Observers’ Behind-the-Lines Observations during the War of Resistance and the Adjustment of U.S. Strategy toward China” (project no. 2023M733861), and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Postdoctoral Innovation Project “U.S. Strategic Investigation and Perception of the CPC during the War of Resistance.”)

（基金项目：本文系国家社会科学基金重大项目“世界反法西斯战争史(含中国抗战)档案资料收集整理与研究”(项目编号:16KZD020)、中国博士后科学基金面上项目“抗战时期美国观察家的敌后观察及美国对华战略调整”（项目编号：2023M733861）、中国社会科学院博士后创新项目“抗战时期美国对中共的战略考察及认知”的阶段性成果）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心