Hegel’s Reconciliation and the Young Marx’s Revolution

Hegel and the young Marx, based on their different understandings of essence, produced two different attitudes toward social reality, namely reconciliation and revolution. Hegel adopts a de-essentialist attitude toward the essence of things, one that dissolves and weakens it, so that he views social contradictions and historical evolution from the perspective of becoming and reconciliation. In contrast, the young Marx tends to view problems from an essentialist standpoint, and this essentialism constitutes the premise of his theory of alienation. In order to sublate alienation, Marx chose the revolutionary program.

黑格尔和青年马克思基于对本质的不同理解，产生了对待社会现实的两种不同态度，即和解与革命。黑格尔对事物的本质持一种消解和弱化的去本质主义态度，这就使得他用变易和和解的观点来看待社会矛盾与历史演进。相反，青年马克思倾向于从本质主义的角度看待问题，这种本质主义构成他的异化理论的前提。为了扬弃异化，马克思选择了革命方案。

On the Understanding of Essence

关于本质的理解

In the “Consciousness” stage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel discusses the process by which the faculties of sense-certainty, perception, and the understanding attempt to grasp the essence of things but all end in failure, thereby profoundly revealing the nullity of essence in the world of phenomena. In the “Reason” stage, Hegel continues to examine the process by which rational self-consciousness explores the essence of things and various laws. He divides reason into theoretical reason, practical reason, and examining reason, scrutinizing and criticizing each in turn. Overall, Hegel dismantles the laws and essences of the objective world, pointing out that the certainty attained by reason—that is, human reason’s cognition and grasp of nature, the mind, and the “thing itself”—is, in the final analysis, merely a dream that human reason weaves for itself, always remaining within the scope of human subjectivity. Through the dialectical movement from sense-certainty, perception, and the understanding to reason, thinking passes through various illusions and negative experiences, ultimately reaching cognition of essence: essence is the reflection and self-reflection of thinking within itself, thinking’s own self-knowledge. In the “Doctrine of Essence” in the *Science of Logic*, essence is first of all a “relation” (Verhältnis), namely the mutual reflection (Scheinen) of two factors, which Hegel critically calls the mode of thinking of the understanding. Essence is reflection (Reflexion); its inherent structure is the reciprocal relation of two factors. Second, essence is “positedness” (Gesetztsein), but because of the reflective relation inherent to essence, positing (Setzen) itself cannot be established. Finally, essence is moving and becoming, not a fixed and unchanging entity. Essence lies between being and the concept, constituting the middle term of the two, and moves from being toward the concept on the basis of being.

黑格尔在《精神现象学》的“意识”阶段论述了感性、知觉和知性的能力试图把握事物本质却都归于失败的过程，从而深刻揭示了现象界本质的虚无性。黑格尔在“理性”阶段继续考察了理性的自我意识探索事物本质和各种规律的过程。他将理性划分为理论理性、实践理性和审核理性三个阶段，并分别加以审视和批判。总体而言，黑格尔瓦解了客观世界的规律和本质，指出理性所达到的确定性，即人类理性对自然界、心灵和“事情本身”的认识与把握，归根到底不过是人类理性自己为自己编织的一套梦幻，始终仍停留在人的主体性范围之内。思维在从感性确定性、知觉、知性到理性的辩证运动中历经各种假象和否定性的经验，最终达到关于本质的认知：本质就是思维在自身中的映现和反思，是思维自己对自己的认识。在《逻辑学》的“本质论”中，本质首先是一种“关系”（Verh ltnis），即两个因素的彼此映现（Scheinen），黑格尔批判地称其为知性思维的模式。本质就是映现或反思（Reflexion），它的固有结构就是两个因素的相互关系。其次，本质是“设定起来的存在”（Gesetztsein），但由于本质所固有的映现关系，导致设定（Setzen）本身是建立不起来的。最后，本质是运动的和生成的，而不是恒定不变的固定之物。本质处于存在和概念之间，构成两者的中项，并以存在为基础向概念运动。

Hegel’s “essence,” taken as a whole, is a necessary link in the developmental history of consciousness and a necessary stage in the self-realization of absolute spirit. Without essence, the formation of absolute knowledge and absolute spirit would be impossible. But essence is, after all, only a transitional link toward truth, toward the true essence, namely absolute spirit. At the same time, the determinacy of essence itself is constantly in flux and becoming, thus exhibiting dialectical characteristics. These factors determine that Hegel’s view of essence is a de-essentialist attitude.

黑格尔的“本质”从总体上看乃是意识发展史的必经环节，也是绝对理念自我实现的必要阶段，没有本质，绝对知识和绝对理念的形成就是不可能的。但本质终究只是向真理，向真正的本质即绝对理念过渡的一个环节。同时，本质本身的规定性是不断流变和生成的，因而表现出辩证的特质，这些因素决定了黑格尔的本质观是一种去本质主义的态度。

If we define essentialism as a mode of thinking and methodology that grasps the laws and essences of things from empirical phenomena, then this essentialist stance can be seen in Marx’s early writings. The young Marx’s essentialism is concretely manifested in his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right, and in his determinations, based on Feuerbach’s concept of “species-essence,” of the essence of religion, the essence of money, the essence of labor, and the essence of man. In this regard, Althusser, when discussing the young Marx’s humanism, points out that the young Marx’s “problematic” (the mode, principle, and method of posing questions) is “the essence of man.” Heidegger also holds that Marx’s humanism is based on a prior understanding of the nature and essence of humanity and humaneness, and is therefore a kind of essentialism.

如果我们将本质主义界定为从经验现象中把握事物规律和本质的一种思维模式与方法论，那么，从马克思青年时期的诸著作中就可以看到这种本质主义立场。青年马克思的本质主义具体表现在他对黑格尔法哲学的批判，表现在他基于费尔巴哈的“类本质”概念而对宗教的本质、货币的本质、劳动的本质和人的本质等所作的规定方面。对此，阿尔都塞在探讨青年马克思的人道主义时指出，青年马克思的“总问题”（提出问题的方式、原则和方法）就是“人的本质”。海德格尔也认为，马克思的人道主义建立在对人性、人道的本性和本质的先行理解基础之上，因而是一种本质主义。

The fundamental difference between Hegel’s and Marx’s views of essence lies in the difference in their theoretical aims. Hegel’s de-essentialism is closely linked to his metaphysical ambition, because the Absolute can realize itself only by sublating the traditional thinking of the understanding, sublating the essence-phenomenon structure, attaining the “concept,” and proceeding from there. The young Marx, on the other hand, discards the metaphysical elements in Hegel’s philosophy, aiming to achieve the goal of criticizing society and transforming the world by cognizing the essence of things.

黑格尔和马克思的本质观的根本差别在于他们的理论旨趣的差异。黑格尔的去本质主义是跟他的形而上学抱负密切关联的，因为绝对者只有扬弃传统的知性思维，扬弃本质—现象的结构，达到“概念”并由此再出发，才能实现自身。而青年马克思抛弃了黑格尔哲学中的形而上学因素，旨在通过认识事物的本质达到批判社会、改造世界的目的。

Alienation and Becoming

异化与变易

We define Marx’s alienation as the separation of a thing from its essence, and its opposition to that essence. Marx’s “alienation” is not a mere concept but constitutes an important methodology. We attempt to interpret Marx’s concept of alienation from an essentialist perspective and to internally link this concept of alienation with his social critique theory.

我们将马克思的异化规定为，事物脱离其本质，并与之相对立。马克思的“异化”不是单纯的概念，而是构成重要的方法论。我们尝试从本质主义的视角来解读马克思的异化概念，并将这种异化概念与他的社会批判理论内在地关联起来。

It is precisely from this essentialist perspective that the young Marx sees the existence of alienated phenomena in capitalist society. For example, the modern state, which in Hegel’s philosophy of right serves as the representative of the universal interest, is in essence regarded by Marx as a false, “formal universal affair,” and stands opposed to the universal interest of the people as a substantive private interest. Marx’s fourfold determination of alienated labor in the *Paris Manuscripts* and his discussion of the alienation of intercourse express his insight into the problem of alienation even more vividly. Without this essentialism as a theoretical premise, the modern state, wage labor, and commodity exchange could be understood entirely from their existing state of being as they are. Bourgeois thinkers before Marx indeed did just this, thereby providing a theoretical justification for the existing capitalist system. The basic line of thought of the young Marx is manifested in the following: he first theoretically presupposes the essence of things, then understands the actual state of things as an alienated state separated from their essence, and finally sublates this alienated state through revolution, returning things to their essential, ideal state.

青年马克思正是从这种本质主义的视角出发才看到资本主义社会异化现象的存在。例如，在黑格尔法哲学中作为普遍利益代表的现代国家，在本质上被马克思看作是虚假的、“形式的普遍事务”，并作为实质的私人利益与人民的普遍利益相对立。马克思在《巴黎手稿》中关于异化劳动的四重规定，关于交往异化的论述更加鲜明地表达了他对异化问题的洞察。如果没有这种本质主义作为理论前提，现代国家、雇佣劳动和商品交换就完全可以从是其所是的现存状态加以理解。马克思之前的资产阶级思想家的确就是这样做的，由此为现存的资本主义制度作了理论辩护。青年马克思的基本思路表现在，他首先在理论上预设事物的本质，然后将事物的实然状态理解为脱离事物本质的异化状态， 最后通过革命的方式扬弃这种异化状态，使事物回归到它的本质的、理想的状态。

In contrast, Hegel’s de-essentialism means that the idea of alienation is necessarily absent from his doctrine. As mentioned above, Hegel could not possibly arrive at Marx’s concept of alienation, because the premise of alienation—the essence of things—has already been dissolved by him. He replaces Marx’s concept of “alienation” with another conceptual tool, namely “becoming” (Werden), to understand actual things; or, rather, he adopts a dialectic of becoming. The concept of becoming is first expounded in the “Doctrine of Being” in Hegel’s logic. Becoming is the transition from pure “being” (Sein) to pure nothing, and the result of becoming is “determinate being” (Dasein). But becoming in a broad sense refers to the movement and change of concepts or things, which constitutes the most important core element of dialectics. Hegel holds that becoming is the basic determination from sense-certainty to absolute knowledge, from pure being to absolute spirit: “Life is becoming… spirit is also becoming.” More precisely, becoming is spirit itself, that is, spirit which, due to the difference between being and nothing, opposes itself to itself and produces self-movement, the “restlessness” (Unruhe) within itself.

相反，黑格尔的去本质主义导致异化思想在他的学说中注定缺席。如前所述，黑格尔是不可能得出马克思意义上的异化概念的，因为异化的前提，即事物的本质已经被他消解了。他用另一个概念工具即“变易”（Werden）代替马克思的“异化”概念来理解现实事物，或者说，他采用的是一种变易的辩证法。变易概念在黑格尔逻辑学里首先是在“存在论”中得到阐述的。变易是从纯粹的“存在”（Sein）向纯粹的无的过渡，变易的结果就是“定在”（Dasein）。但变易在广义上是指概念或事物的运动变化，这是构成辩证法最重要的核心要素。黑格尔认为，变易是从感性确定性直到绝对知识，从纯粹的存在直到绝对理念的基本规定，“生命就是变易……精神也是变易”。更确切地说，变易就是精神本身，即因存在与无的差别而自己与自己相对立并产生自我运动的精神，是在自身中的“不安分”（Unruhe）。

The ingenuity of the concept of becoming lies in the fact that it is movement and change itself. It insists that things themselves are in constant flux, that things in the empirical world have no enduring, fixed essence. Or, rather, becoming is the essence of things. This dialectical thinking of Hegel’s adapts well to his de-essentialist position, dissolving the essence of things through becoming. At the same time, becoming is a broader concept than alienation, and it contains alienation within itself. That is to say, becoming is the movement and change of things, but this movement and change is not necessarily like alienation, which separates from and opposes the essence of things. In Hegel’s view, even if one speaks of so-called essences or laws, these essences or laws are mental things we subjectively posit, confined to a dualistic relational structure of the understanding. From this perspective, when the young Marx discusses alienation on the basis of an essentialist position, it seems to lack a certain dialectical element.

变易概念的巧妙之处表现在，它是运动变化本身。它坚持认为，事物本身是流变不居的，经验世界的事物没有持存恒定的本质。或者说，变易就是事物的本质。黑格尔的这种辩证思维很好地适应了他的去本质主义主张，用变易化解了事物的本质。同时，变易是一个比异化更广的概念，它内在地包含异化。也就是说，变易乃是事物的运动变化，但这种运动变化未必就像异化那样脱离事物的本质并与之对立。在黑格尔看来，即便谈论所谓的本质或规律，这种本质或规律也是我们主观设定的思维之物，局限于知性思维的一种二元关系结构。从这个角度看，在青年马克思基于本质主义立场论述异化的时候，似乎缺少了些许辩证法的因素。

Reconciliation or Revolution

和解还是革命

Reconciliation (Versöhnung) is the basic attitude of Hegel’s practical philosophy toward the problems of social reality. He says: “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.” He cites the maxim from Aesop’s Fables: “Here is the rose, dance here.” In addition, he also says: “To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the present — this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality.” This reconciliation is built upon the grasp of reason; it does not excuse existing evils, but rather consoles consciousness through human reason. The reconciliation of social contradictions does not mean the cessation of the movement of contradictions, but rather that it is itself a component part of the movement of contradictions.

和解（Vers hnung）是黑格尔实践哲学对待社会现实问题的基本态度。他说：“凡是合乎理性的东西都是现实的；凡是现实的东西都是合乎理性的。”他引用《伊索寓言》中的箴言说：“这里就是罗陀斯，就在这里跳吧。”此外，他还说：“在当下的十字架中去认识作为蔷薇的理性，并对当下感到乐观，这种理性的洞察就是与现实的和解。”这种和解建立在理性的把握之上，不是为现存的罪恶开脱，而是以人的理性使意识得到慰藉。社会矛盾的和解也不是意味着矛盾运动的停止，而是矛盾运动的组成部分本身。

So how does Hegel concretely implement this idea of reconciliation in his social theory? In a single phrase: “to be at home with oneself in one’s other” (in seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein). Freedom is to return to oneself in the other and to achieve reconciliation with the other. Actuality inherently contains necessity; according to Hegel’s view, this necessity is bound to be realized. But as to how and when this necessity will be realized, this is a providence that no one can speculate upon; it can only be left to history and fate to answer, which he calls the “cunning of reason.” Therefore, one must let the world change on its own; reconciliation will be achieved without our knowledge, “a state’s continuous development appears outwardly as a calm, imperceptible movement.” However, within this fatalistic tone, Hegel still provides a relatively feasible plan of action in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. This is that modern people must actively engage in the improvement of ethical substance, striving to be good family members, members of civil society, and citizens of the state; in this way, they can achieve reconciliation with actuality and realize their individuality and true freedom. In the words of Allen Wood and Hardimon, reconciliation means “being at home in the social world,” and to achieve being at home with oneself in one’s other, or being at home in the world, one must both safeguard the individuality of modern people and ensure their status as members of society. Furthermore, Hegel does not reject the necessity of social reform. He believes that if social contradictions become acute, or even alienation becomes pronounced — for example, a wide gap between rich and poor — then the social system must be changed to make society once again worthy of reconciliation. Hegel does not even completely reject revolution; reform and revolution are human means to bring what is rational into actuality from reality.

那么，黑格尔究竟如何在社会理论中具体贯彻这种和解思想呢？用一句话概括：“在其他者中即在其自身”（in seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein）。自由就是在他者中回到自身，与他者达成和解。现实内在地包含着必然性，按照黑格尔的看法，这种必然性是必定要实现的。但至于这种必然性如何和何时实现，却是任何人都不能揣测的天意，只能交给历史和命运去回答，他称之为“理性的狡计”。因此，要让世界自行变易，和解会在我们不知不觉中达成，“一种状态的不断发展从外表看来是一种平静的觉察不到的运动”。但是，在这种宿命论的基调下，黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中仍给出了比较切实可行的行动方案。这就是，现代人要积极投身于伦理实体的改善中去，努力使自己做好家庭成员、社会成员和国家公民，就能够达成与现实的和解，实现个人的个体性和真正自由。用艾伦·伍德和哈德蒙的话说，和解就是“在社会世界中就是在家中”，而要做到在他者中就是在自身，或者在世界中就是在家里，就要既维护现代人的个体性，又要确保他们的社会成员身份。此外，黑格尔并不排斥社会改良的必要性。他认为，如果社会矛盾突出，甚至异化显著，例如贫富差距悬殊，那么社会制度就必须作出变革，以使得社会重新变得值得和解。黑格尔甚至并不完全排斥革命，改良和革命是促使合乎理性的东西从现实中实现出来的人为手段。

The young Marx opposes Hegel’s reconciliation scheme. “Hegel’s chief error consists in the fact that he conceives the contradiction in the phenomenon as a unity in the Idea, in the essence.” He clearly states, “To establish a new state system, one must always go through a genuine revolution.” He also denounces Hegel’s philosophy of right and his entire philosophy as “the acme of mysticism.” The young Marx derives his revolutionary stance from his theory of alienation. Because, since alienation causes things to deviate from their essence, we must, through revolution, overturn this already alienated social state of affairs and return it to the essential, ideal state in which it ought to exist. We see that, in the field of social critique, Hegel’s reconciliation inherently possesses a realistic perspective grounded in the present, while the young Marx’s revolution possesses an idealist dimension oriented toward the future.

青年马克思对黑格尔的和解方案表示反对，“黑格尔的主要错误在于：他把现象的矛盾理解为观念中、本质中的统一”。他明确提出，“要建立新的国家制度，总要经过一场真正的革命”。他还将黑格尔的法哲学和整个哲学斥责为“神秘主义之大成”。青年马克思从异化理论得出了他的革命立场。因为，既然异化导致事物背离了它的本质，我们就要通过革命的方式将这个业已异化的社会现状颠倒过来，使它回到它本应存在的本质的、理想的状态。我们看到，在社会批判领域，黑格尔的和解内在地具有立足当下的现实主义视角，而青年马克思的革命则具有指向未来的理想主义维度。

Of course, Marx’s view on revolution tends to shift continuously from political revolution to social revolution. He increasingly emphasizes that only the full development of social forces can truly promote social progress and the succession of social formations, while simply changing dynasties through violent revolution cannot directly drive the transformation of productive forces or the improvement of the mode of production. In *The German Ideology*, Marx begins to become aware of the material foundations and social conditions required for political revolution. He says: “Whether revolutionary convulsions which recur periodically in history are strong enough to overthrow the basis of all existing things; if these material elements of a total revolution are not yet present — that is, on the one hand, a certain level of productive forces, and on the other, the formation of a revolutionary mass that revolts not only against particular conditions of the old society but against the ‘production of life’ itself, against the ‘total activity’ on which the old society is based — then, as the history of communism proves, although the idea of this transformation has been expressed a hundred times, it has no significance for actual development.” He increasingly tends to emphasize that only the full development of social forces can truly promote social progress and the succession of social formations, while simply changing dynasties through violent revolution cannot directly drive the transformation of productive forces or the improvement of the mode of production. The development of social productive forces has its own objective laws, which depend on our grasp of the dialectics of the movement and change of things, and thus connects with Hegel’s dialectic of becoming. Therefore, Marx’s theory of social revolution has a certain degree of compatibility with Hegel’s ideas of becoming and reconciliation.

当然，马克思关于革命的看法存在从政治革命不断向社会革命转变的倾向。他日益强调只有社会力量的充分发展才能真正促进社会进步和社会形态的更迭，而通过单纯的暴力革命改朝换代并不能直接推动生产力的变革和生产方式的改善。马克思在《德意志意识形态》中开始意识到政治革命所需要具备的物质基础和社会条件，他说：“历史上周期性地重演的革命动荡是否强大到足以摧毁现存一切的基础；如果还没有具备这些实行全面变革的物质因素，就是说，一方面还没有一定的生产力，另一方面还没有形成不仅反抗旧社会的个别条件，而且反抗旧的‘生活生产’本身、反抗旧社会所依据的‘总和活动’的革命群众，那么，正如共产主义的历史所证明的，尽管这种变革的观念已经表述过千百次，但这对于实际发展没有任何意义。”他日益倾向于强调只有社会力量的充分发展才能真正促进社会进步和社会形态的更迭，而单纯通过暴力革命改朝换代并不能直接推动生产力的变革和生产方式的改善。社会生产力的发展有自身发展的客观规律，这就依赖于我们对事物运动变化的辩证法的把握，因而就与黑格尔的变易的辩证法关联起来。因此，马克思的社会革命学说与黑格尔的变易与和解的思想具有某种程度的兼容性。

In the final analysis, essentialism is a cognitive model dominated by understanding (*Verstand*). This cognitive model constitutes a necessary stage and fundamental path for human beings to rationally understand things and solve problems. It requires abstracting the various determinations of a thing to grasp them, in order to achieve knowledge of its essence. It is undeniable that Hegel himself, while employing dialectical thinking, cannot do without thinking based on understanding. His own de-essentialism is itself still an inquiry into the problem of essence, and thus is always entangled with essentialism. At the same time, Hegel’s idea of reconciliation clearly also contains revolutionary elements. Similarly, the young Marx’s theory of revolution is, to a certain extent, also a destruction of essentialism itself, possessing characteristics of de-essentialism. His advocacy of social revolution inherently has a tendency toward reconciliation. And, taking a comprehensive view, Marx’s emphasis on becoming and dialectics is certainly no less than Hegel’s. We merely attempt, from the unique perspective of essentialism, to examine Hegel’s reconciliation and the young Marx’s revolutionary program.

归根到底，本质主义乃是由知性思维主导的认知模式，这种认知模式构成人类理性地认识事物和解决问题的必经阶段和根本途径，它要求将事物的诸规定性抽象出来予以把握以达到对其本质的认识。不可否认，黑格尔本人在运用辩证思维的同时也离不开知性思维，他所阐述的去本质主义本身也仍是对本质问题的探讨，因而始终是与本质主义纠缠在一起的。同时，黑格尔的和解思想显然还包含着革命的因素。同样，青年马克思的革命理论一定程度上也是对本质主义本身的摧毁，具有去本质主义的特征。他的社会革命主张内在地具有和解的倾向。而且综合地考察，马克思对变易和辩证法的强调无疑并不亚于黑格尔。我们只是尝试从本质主义这个独特的视角出发来看待黑格尔的和解与青年马克思的革命方案。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗