Mao Zedong’s Strategic Guidance in the Great War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea

Employing superb art of war guidance to defeat a superior enemy with inferior forces and to overcome a powerful foe is a fine tradition and military magic weapon forged by the Chinese Communist Party through long years of war practice. During the revolutionary war years, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee flexibly mastered and applied the “art of swimming” in the ocean of war, guiding the people’s army to defeat exceptionally ferocious enemies at home and abroad, and laying a solid foundation with blood and life for the establishment of a new China where the people are the masters of the country. In the early days of the founding of New China, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, with far-sighted strategic wisdom and the strategic courage to dare to fight and win, led the making of the historic decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and defend the homeland, guiding the Chinese People’s Volunteers to win this war of national foundation under conditions of extreme disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves, achieving brilliant military and political victories. General Secretary Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out that the great victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea “is the declaration of the Chinese people standing upright in the East after they had risen, an important milestone in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and has major and far-reaching significance for both China and the world.” On the occasion of the 130th anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong’s birth, reviewing and summarizing the strategic guidance art of the founding leader of New China in this war has significant practical implications for us today in carrying forward and promoting the great spirit of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, effectively responding to new risks and challenges that are increasingly turbulent and complex, and continuously opening up new prospects for the cause of the Party and the state.

运用高超的战争指导艺术以劣胜优、战胜强敌，是中国共产党在长期战争实践中锻造形成的优良传统和军事法宝。革命战争年代，毛泽东和党中央灵活掌握和运用战争大海中的“游泳术”，指导人民军队打败了国内外异常凶恶的敌人，以鲜血和生命为建立人民当家作主的新中国奠定了牢固根基。新中国成立之初，毛泽东和党中央以高瞻远瞩的战略智慧、敢打必胜的战略气魄，领导作出抗美援朝、保家卫国的历史性决策，指导中国人民志愿军在敌我力量极其悬殊的条件下打赢了这场立国之战，取得了军事上政治上的辉煌胜利。习近平总书记深刻指出，抗美援朝战争伟大胜利，“是中国人民站起来后屹立于世界东方的宣言书，是中华民族走向伟大复兴的重要里程碑，对中国和世界都有着重大而深远的意义”。在毛泽东同志诞辰130 周年之际，回顾总结新中国的开国领袖在这场战争中的战略指导艺术，对于我们今天赓续弘扬伟大抗美援朝精神，有效应对风高浪急、日趋复杂的新风险新挑战，不断开创党和国家事业新局面，具有重大现实启示意义。

I. Coordinating the overall political situation and the overall strategic situation, adhering to using war to stop war and using military force to halt armed conflict, and making the major decision to fight abroad with extraordinary spirit and courage

一、统筹政治大局和战略全局，坚持以战止战、以武止戈，以非凡气魄和胆略作出出国作战重大决策

On June 25, 1950, the Korean civil war broke out. The U.S. government manipulated the UN Security Council to pass a resolution, cobbling together 16 countries led by the United States to form the so-called “UN forces,” armed intervention in the Korean civil war, and dispatched the 7th Fleet to invade the Taiwan Strait. In early October 1950, U.S. troops brazenly crossed the 38th parallel, bringing the flames of war to the China-Korea border. The Korean Party and government requested China to directly dispatch troops to provide assistance. New China, which had just been born, faced a very dangerous war choice and severe test. Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee stood high and looked far, scientifically grasped the general trend of the times, and with a broad vision, took charge of the overall situation of the Party and state’s cause. While resolutely making the decision to send troops to Korea, they carefully planned the scale and method of the war, achieving the goal of using a small war to stop a large war and using external line operations to achieve internal line defense, thereby extinguishing the aggressor’s ambitions for invasion.

1950年6月25日，朝鲜内战爆发，美国政府操纵联合国安理会通过决议，纠集以美国为首的16个国家组成所谓“联合国军”，武装干涉朝鲜内战，并派遣第7舰队侵入台湾海峡。1950年10月初，美军悍然越过三八线，把战火烧到中朝边境，朝鲜党和政府请求中国直接出动军队给予援助。刚诞生不久的新中国，面临着十分艰险的战争抉择和严峻考验。毛泽东和党中央站高望远，科学把握时代发展大势，以宏阔的视野统揽党和国家事业全局，在毅然下定出兵朝鲜决心的同时精心筹划战争规模、战争方式等，实现了以小战止大战、以外线作战达成内线防御目的，消弭了战争发动者的侵略野心。

Adhering to safeguarding long-term interests and properly handling the relationship between “fighting” and “building.” The decision in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was extremely difficult to make. The situation at the time was: on the one hand, after years of war, the country was in ruins and awaiting reconstruction, with the task of restoring production and construction being very heavy. The Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party proposed the central task of achieving a fundamental turnaround in the financial and economic situation within about three years; on the other hand, a powerful enemy was at the gate, U.S. imperialism had put a knife to our necks, and the task of safeguarding the survival of the new regime was very urgent. After comprehensively weighing the pros and cons, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee formally made the strategic decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and defend the homeland, mainly considering that “if we strike with one punch, we will avoid a hundred punches coming at us,” thereby safeguarding our long-term interests. First, they adhered to promoting construction through fighting and promoting fighting through construction, ensuring the country’s long-term peace and stability. On October 13, 1950, in a telegram to Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong pointed out: “If we do not send troops and allow the enemy to press to the Yalu River, the arrogance of domestic and international reactionaries will increase, which will be disadvantageous to all sides, first of all to the Northeast, where the entire Northeast border defense force will be pinned down and the power supply in South Manchuria will be controlled.” “In short, we believe we should participate in the war, we must participate in the war. The benefits of participating in the war are extremely great, and the harms of not participating are extremely great.” Proceeding from the goal of building a modern socialist country, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee coordinated the two major tasks of “grasping construction” and “ensuring survival,” shifting the military strategic focus from the southeast to the northeast, using the anti-aggression war to provide security for national construction, and using national construction to provide material support for winning the war. While safeguarding national territorial sovereignty and consolidating the new regime, they pressed ahead with economic construction and national defense construction. This created favorable domestic and international conditions for comprehensively launching socialist construction. Second, they carried forward the great spirit of internationalism and supported the world’s national liberation movements. Mao Zedong considered the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea within the general trend of the times. An important intention was to strike down the arrogance of domestic and international reactionaries and avoid a potentially unfavorable situation for the East and even the world revolution. He mentioned this many times: “Because if the entire Korea is occupied by the Americans, and the Korean revolutionary forces suffer a fundamental defeat, then the U.S. aggressors will become even more rampant, which is disadvantageous to the entire East,” and “Adopting the above positive policy is extremely beneficial to China, to Korea, to the East, and to the world.” History has proven that this war shattered the myth of the invincibility of the U.S. military, greatly inspired the confidence of oppressed nations and peoples around the world in striving for national independence and people’s liberation, and powerfully promoted the development of world peace and the cause of human progress.

坚持维护长远利益处理好“打”与“建”。抗美援朝战争决策，极其难以下定。当时面临的形势是：一方面，历经多年战乱国家百废待兴、百业待举，恢复生产建设的任务十分繁重，党的七届三中全会提出以三年左右时间实现财政经济状况根本好转中心任务；另一方面，大敌当前，美帝国主义把刀架在我们的脖子上，维护新生政权生存的任务十分紧迫。经过全面衡量利弊，毛泽东和党中央正式作出抗美援朝、保家卫国的战略决策，主要考虑是“打得一拳开，免得百拳来”，维护我们的长远利益。首先，坚持以打促建、以建促打，保障国家长治久安。1950年10月13日，毛泽东在给周恩来的电报中指出：“我们不出兵让敌人压至鸭绿江边，国内国际反动气焰增高，则对各方都不利，首先是对东北更不利，整个东北边防军将被吸住，南满电力将被控制。”“总之，我们认为应当参战，必须参战。参战利益极大，不参战损害极大。”从建设现代化的社会主义国家这一目标出发，毛泽东和党中央统筹“抓建设”与“保生存”两大任务，把军事战略重心从东南转移到东北，以反侵略战争为国家建设提供安全保障，以国家建设为打赢战争提供物质支撑，在维护国家领土主权、巩固新生政权的同时，抓紧推进经济建设和国防建设。这就为全面展开社会主义建设创造了良好的国内外条件。其次，发扬伟大国际主义精神，支持世界民族解放运动。毛泽东把抗美援朝战争纳入时代大势中来考量，一个重要用意是打击国内国际反动气焰，避免东方乃至世界革命可能出现的不利局势。这一点他曾多次提及，“因为如果让整个朝鲜被美国人占去了，朝鲜革命力量受到根本的失败，则美国侵略者将更为猖獗，于整个东方都是不利的”，“我们采取上述积极政策，对中国、对朝鲜、对东方、对世界都极为有利”。历史证明，这场战争打破了美军不可战胜的神话，极大鼓舞了全世界被压迫民族和人民争取民族独立和人民解放的信心，有力推动了世界和平与人类进步事业的发展。

Adhering to using a local war to stop a larger-scale aggressive war. Mao Zedong clearly stated that we are not war lovers; we are peace lovers. However, China is never afraid of war. When someone imposes war on us, we will resolutely respond to war with war and stop war with war. How to achieve stopping war with war, using war to eliminate war? One method is to oppose a full-scale war with a full-scale war, such as the world’s anti-fascist war and the Chinese People’s Liberation War; another method is to stop a large war with a small war, such as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and New China’s successive border self-defense counterattack operations. In some respects, the requirements for stopping a large war with a small war are higher. To maintain the overall peace of the country and avoid or reduce interference and impact on the overall political situation of the state, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee carefully designed the decision to send troops to Korea, keeping the war within limited bounds as much as possible. First, they decided to send troops under the name of “Volunteers” rather than the “People’s Liberation Army,” which avoided giving the United States a pretext to declare war on China; second, they confined the war to the Korean Peninsula region, “not allowing the U.S. aggressive actions to expand into a world event,” which facilitated the localization of the war’s scale; third, they strictly limited the war’s objectives. After the Fifth Campaign, they changed the war objective from completely driving the U.S. military out of Korea to restoring the pre-war state, which reduced the risk of the war escalating and even triggering a world war; finally, they adhered to the principle of not fighting unless necessary, but if fighting, then fighting to inflict pain and fear on the opponent. By severely punishing the “UN forces” led by the U.S. military, they made them deeply realize that provoking the Chinese people was “not easy to handle,” which truly achieved the goal of stopping war with war.

坚持以局部战争制止更大规模侵略战争。毛泽东明确表示，我们不是战争爱好者，我们是和平爱好者。但是，中国决不惧怕战争，当有人把战争强加于头上的时候，将坚决以战争回应战争，以战争制止战争。如何实现以战止战，用战争消灭战争？一个方式是，以全面战争反对全面战争，例如世界人民反法西斯战争、中国人民解放战争等；另一个方式是，以小战制止大战，例如抗美援朝战争、新中国的历次边境自卫反击作战等。从某些方面讲，以小战制止大战的要求更高。为了维护国家的总体和平，避免或减少对国家政治全局的干扰冲击，毛泽东和党中央在决策出兵朝鲜问题上精心设计，尽可能把战争控制在有限范围内。首先，确定以“志愿军”而不是“解放军”的名义出兵，这就避免了给美国对中国宣战以口实；其次，将战争限定在朝鲜半岛区域，“不使美军的侵略行动扩大成为世界性的事件”，这就促成了战争规模的局部化；再次，严格限定战争目的，在第五次战役之后将战争目的由彻底把美国军队驱逐出朝鲜转变为恢复战前状态，这就减少了战争越打越大甚至引发世界大战的风险；最后，坚持不打则已、打则必打痛打怕对方，通过狠狠教训以美军为首的“联合国军”，使其深刻认识到惹翻了中国人民是“不好办的”，这就真正达到了以战止战的目的。

Persisting in achieving the goal of strategic defence through offensive operations on exterior lines. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Active defence, also called offensive defence, also called decisive defence.” In *On Protracted War* he put forward “offence within defence, speed within protractedness, exterior lines within interior lines,” holding that while conducting strategic defence, protracted operations and interior-line operations, one should carry out offensive warfare, quick-decision warfare and exterior-line operations at the campaign and tactical levels. Later he further proposed adopting a strategy of pursuit, “to disarm the invading armed forces at their starting-point base.” In practice, most of the border self-defence counterattack operations after the founding of New China adhered to the principle that if the enemy can come, we can go; after the enemy launched a military invasion against us and we had gained the right of self-defence counterattack, we adopted exterior-line counterattack operations to defeat the enemy. At the same time as Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee made the decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea and defend the homeland, they also clearly adopted the method of fighting outside the national territory, achieving strategic defence through exterior-line counterattack operations. History has proved this decision was entirely necessary and correct. To support the Korean government and army and safeguard the tranquillity of China’s northeastern border, the Chinese People’s Volunteers had to engage the “UN forces” on Korean soil. If we had waited until the United States had completely crushed the Korean government and army before dispatching troops, we would only have been able to prepare to meet the Americans on the border line, and would have had to be constantly on guard against the US forces suddenly crossing the Yalu River and bringing the flames of war into China’s northeast, which would have placed us in a position of great strategic passivity. From a longer-term perspective, if the United States had been emboldened by victory in the Korean War, its war ambitions would have further swelled, greatly reducing China’s security coefficient and increasing the hidden dangers to national security. It was precisely on the basis of these considerations that, in 1970, when Mao Zedong discussed the decision to send troops to Korea with Kim Il-sung, he pointed out that the Volunteers were to defend the homeland, and “they had to go to that place to defend it, that place to guard it.”

坚持以外线反击作战达成战略防御目的。毛泽东指出：“积极防御，又叫攻势防御，又叫决战防御。”他在《论持久战》中提出“防御中的进攻，持久中的速决，内线中的外线”，认为在战略上开展防御、持久、内线作战的同时，在战役和战斗上应进行进攻战、速决战和外线作战。后来他进一步提出，要采取追击战略，“将敌人的出发根据地的侵略武装力量加以解除”。从实践看，新中国成立后的几场边境自卫反击作战，大都是坚持敌可以来、我就可以去，在敌人对我发动军事入侵、我们取得自卫反击权后，采取外线反击作战打败敌人。毛泽东和党中央在作出抗美援朝、保家卫国战争决策的同时，也明确采取境外作战方式，以外线反击作战达成战略防御。历史证明，这一决策是十分必要、正确的。为了支援朝鲜政府和军队、维护我国东北边疆安宁，志愿军必须到朝鲜境内迎战“联合国军”。如果等到美国把朝鲜政府和军队完全打垮后我们再出兵，我们只能做边境线上迎战美国的准备，并且必须随时防止美军突然越过鸭绿江，把战火烧到中国东北，这将使我处于很大的战略被动。从更长远来看，如果美国从朝鲜战争的胜利中受到鼓舞，战争野心会进一步膨胀，这将大大降低我国安全系数，增大国家安全隐患。正是基于以上考虑，1970年毛泽东跟金日成谈起出兵朝鲜决策时指出，志愿军要保家卫国，“要到那个地方去保，那个地方去卫”。

Mao Zedong’s resolute strategic decision to fight abroad profoundly enlightens us: military affairs are a great matter of the state; war decisions bear on the future and destiny of the nation and its people. On the question of “whether to fight or not,” the key is to proceed from the overall strategic situation, insist that military affairs serve politics, and insist that immediate interests serve long-term interests. When long-term interests do not permit it, one must, with sufficient strategic resolve, withstand all kinds of agitation and resolutely hold back from acting; when long-term interests require it, one must, with extraordinary willpower and decisiveness, make the determination to fight, and be prepared to pay a certain price. To achieve the goal of active defence, it is also necessary to further clarify what mode of warfare to adopt — whether to fight a small war or a big war, whether to operate on interior lines or exterior lines. Judging from the historical experience of responding to wars of aggression, local wars and exterior-line counterattack operations are the modes of warfare we commonly use.

毛泽东毅然作出出国作战的战略决策，深刻启示我们：兵者国之大事，战争决策事关国家和民族前途命运。在战争“打不打”这一决策问题上，关键是要从战略大局出发，坚持军事服从政治，坚持眼前利益服从长远利益。当长远利益不允许时，必须以足够的战略定力经得起各种鼓动，坚决忍住不出手；当长远利益需要时，必须以超凡的意志力决断力下定打的决心，并做好付出一定代价的准备。为了达成积极防御的战略目的，还需要进一步明确采取什么样的战争方式，是小打还是大打、是内线作战还是外线作战。从应对反侵略战争的历史经验看，局部战争和外线反击作战是我们常用的战争方式。

2. Striving to seize the initiative to control the course of war development, carrying out scientific pre-positioning and flexible adjustment, and properly managing war preparation, opening, transition and conclusion

二、力争主动以驾驭战争发展进程，进行科学预置与灵活调整，做好战争准备、开局、转换和收局

Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee profoundly understood and grasped the laws of war, skillfully exploited the uncertainties in war, led the Volunteers to base war preparations on the worst possible scenarios, flexibly adjusted operational plans in light of developments on the battlefield, shifted in a timely manner to strategic counteroffensive and strategic defence, meticulously planned the conclusion of the war, promoted the orderly transition of the war’s pivotal points and the organic linkage of its stages, and directed a vivid, spectacular and powerful war drama.

毛泽东和党中央深刻认识和把握战争规律，娴熟利用战争中的不确定性，领导志愿军立足最坏可能做好战争准备，并根据战场发展变化灵活调整作战计划，适时转入战略反攻、战略防御，周密筹划战争收局，推动战争枢纽有序转换、战争阶段有机衔接，导演了一幕有声有色威武雄壮的战争活剧。

Basing war deployment on the worst possible scenarios in advance. Mao Zedong believed that although war possesses “probability” — that is, uncertainty — war directors can overcome this uncertainty by giving full play to subjective initiative; one important method is to “insist on not fighting a battle without the certainty of victory” and to fully prepare all war-related work. In preparing for the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, he stressed basing preparations on the most difficult and complex situations, making provisions before trouble arises by carrying out strategic pre-positioning, especially deploying combat forces, to ensure victory in the first battle. Three days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong pointed out: “The people of the whole country and the whole world should unite, make full preparations, and defeat any provocation by US imperialism.” Subsequently, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee quickly decided to form the Northeast Border Defence Army, mobilising four armies and three artillery divisions, among other units, and stationing them along the China-Korea border (with one additional army later deployed), while simultaneously assembling six armies in the second and third echelons as strategic mobile forces, preparing to cope with a complex situation. Regarding the war situation that our forces might face after entering the war, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee made the following three estimates: first, to annihilate and drive out the US and other invading forces within Korea; second, to be unable to annihilate large numbers of US forces in Korea, leading to a stalemate; third, to be able to persist in fighting in Korea, forcing the United States to resolve the issue through negotiations. Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee’s attitude was to strive for the emergence of the third scenario, to guard against and prepare for the second, and the general principle later established was “to strive for all possible victories on a stable and reliable basis.” In the first few days after the Volunteers crossed the Yalu River and entered Korea, Mao Zedong sent several telegrams a day to guide them, aiming to “win the first battle abroad well.” These thorough war preparations gave our forces deployed along the China-Korea border a relative superiority over the enemy, laying the foundation for the Volunteers’ victory in the first battle. The subsequent development of the war, on the whole, did not exceed Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee’s advance estimates.

立足最坏可能提前进行战争布局。毛泽东认为，战争固然具有“盖然性”亦即不确定性，然而战争指导者是可以发挥主观能动性克服这种不确定性的，一个重要方法就是“坚持不打无把握之仗”，充分做好各项战争准备工作。在抗美援朝战争准备上，他强调立足于最困难最复杂情况，未雨绸缪搞好战略预置，特别是展开作战力量布势，确保初战必胜。朝鲜战争爆发三天后，毛泽东就指出：“全国和全世界的人民团结起来，进行充分的准备，打败美帝国主义的任何挑衅。”随后，毛泽东和党中央迅即决策组建东北边防军，调集4个军及3个炮兵师等部队，摆在中朝边境地区（后又增调1个军），同时又在二线、三线调集6个军作为战略机动部队，做好应付复杂局势的准备。对于我军参战后可能面临的战争局势，毛泽东和党中央作了以下三种估计：一是在朝鲜境内歼灭和驱逐美国及其他侵略军；二是在朝鲜不能大量歼灭美军，战争形成僵局；三是能够在朝鲜坚持作战，迫使美国通过谈判解决问题。毛泽东和党中央的态度是争取第三种情况的出现，防范和准备出现第二种情况，后来确立的总原则是“在稳当可靠的基础上争取一切可能的胜利”。在志愿军渡江入朝后的最初几天内，毛泽东为“争取打好出国第一仗”，一日连发数电进行指导。这些充分的战争准备工作，使摆在中朝边境的我军兵力对敌军形成相对优势，为志愿军初战一举取胜打下了基础。后来的战争发展，从总体上看，也没有超出毛泽东和党中央的预先估计。

Seizing the initiative flexibly to promote the transition of war stages. Mao Zedong was adept at seeing the signs of things, synthesising various sources of information, especially the situation of the enemy and ourselves on the battlefield, scientifically predicting the direction of war development, accurately grasping the pivotal points of the war, and using pre-emptive measures to push the war process in a direction favourable to us. At the beginning of the dispatch of troops to Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee seized the element of complete surprise to the enemy, ordered the Volunteers to adjust their operational doctrine from the originally planned defensive operations to annihilating the enemy in mobile warfare, immediately launched a strategic counteroffensive and carried out several successive campaigns, catching the “UN forces” off guard. As the war reached a stalemate around the 38th parallel, Mao Zedong timely formulated the operational doctrine of “protracted operations and active defence”; the Volunteers took positional warfare as their main form of operations, closely coordinating combat with negotiations, thereby shifting to the stage of strategic defence. During this stage, Mao Zedong instructed our forces to heighten vigilance, prepare for enemy attacks from the air, ground and sea during the negotiations, and demanded that “if the enemy launches a large-scale offensive, our forces must launch a large-scale counteroffensive and defeat them,” continuously consolidating our front line. The final outcome was that “the more we fought, the stronger we became. The Americans could not attack our positions; on the contrary, they were always being eaten up by us.” This created favourable conditions for our subsequent successful achievement of an armistice.

把握先机灵活推动战争阶段转换。毛泽东善于见微知著，综合各类信息特别是战场上敌我态势，科学预判战争发展走向，准确把握战争关节枢纽，以先发制人举措推动战争进程向有利于我的方向发展。出兵朝鲜之初，毛泽东和党中央抓住完全出敌意料的突然性，下令志愿军调整作战方针，由原定的防御作战转为在运动中歼敌，立即发起战略反攻并连续进行几次战役，打了“联合国军”一个措手不及。随着战争在三八线地区出现相持局面，毛泽东适时制定“持久作战、积极防御”作战方针，志愿军以阵地战为主要作战形式，作战与谈判紧密配合，由此转入战略防御阶段。这一阶段，毛泽东指示我军提高警惕，做好谈判期间应对敌人来自空中、地面以及海上进攻的准备，要求“如遇敌军大举进攻时，我军必须大举反攻，将其打败”，不断巩固了我军战线。最终的结局是，“我们越战越强。美国人攻不动我们的阵地，相反，他们总是被我们吃掉”。这就为后来我们胜利实现停战创造了有利条件。

Planning the conclusion of the war based on the waxing and waning of enemy and our forces. In the history of warfare, there are often two situations regarding the ending of a war: one is where one side is completely defeated or even basically wiped out by the other, and the defeated side surrenders unconditionally; the other is where neither side can gain an absolute advantage, making it necessary to end the war through negotiations. As early as June 1951, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, after comprehensively considering the domestic and international situation and the balance of forces on the battlefield, set for the Volunteers the strategic policy of “fully preparing for protracted operations and striving to end the war through peace talks,” deciding to end the war through political negotiations. The goal for ending the war was to restore the pre-war state, making every effort to stabilise the front line near the 38th parallel; this both met the requirements of China’s political overall situation and was basically consistent with the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. Over the following two years and more, we waged an unremitting struggle around this war aim, finally forcing the United States to sign the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953, bringing the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea to a victorious conclusion.

根据敌我力量消长筹划战争收局。从战争史看，在结束战争问题上往往有两种情况：一种是一方被另一方彻底打败甚至基本消灭，战败方无条件投降；另一种是双方谁都无法占据绝对优势，这就需要以谈判方式结束战争。早在1951年6月，毛泽东和党中央综合考虑国内外形势及战场力量态势，为志愿军确定了“充分准备持久作战和争取和谈达到结束战争”的战略方针，决定通过政治谈判结束战争。战争结束目标是恢复战前状态，全力把战线稳定在三八线附近，这既适应我国政治大局的要求，又与敌我双方力量对比状况基本相符。其后两年多，我们围绕这一战争目的进行不懈斗争，终于迫使美国于1953年7月27日签订停战协定，抗美援朝战争至此胜利结束。

Mao Zedong’s experience and methods in steering the course of war profoundly enlighten us: just as military formations have no constant shape and water has no constant form, uncertainty is a prominent feature of modern warfare. We must vigorously enhance our ability to steer war, using scientific subjective guidance to overcome the uncertainty of war’s development, causing it to evolve in a direction favorable to us, and resolutely avoiding the loss of control over the war situation or its deviation from the predetermined track. The key here lies in achieving the following aspects: first, making strategic pre-deployments well, adhering to bottom-line thinking by preparing for the worst possible outcome while also adhering to forward-looking thinking to predict the development of the war situation and seize the initiative in war; second, maintaining a high degree of mobility and flexibility, making new adjustments and deployments at any time according to the rapidly changing battlefield situation, and granting frontline commanders full command authority, ensuring that our subjective guidance always conforms to objective reality; third, grasping the pivotal joints of war, actively promoting the orderly transition of war phases based on the changes in the balance of forces between enemy and ourselves on the battlefield, and seizing the initiative in the evolution and development of war.

毛泽东驾驭战争发展进程的经验做法，深刻启示我们：兵无常势水无常形，不确定性是现代战争的突出特征。我们必须大力增强驾驭战争能力，以科学的主观指导来克服战争发展不确定性，使其向着有利于我的方向发展演变，坚决避免战局发展失控、脱离预先轨道。这里关键是做到以下几个方面：一是搞好战略预置，既要坚持底线思维立足最坏可能做好准备，又要坚持前瞻思维预测战局发展抢占战争先机；二是高度机动灵活，根据快速发展变化的战场情况随时作出新的调整部署，并给予前线指挥员充分的自主指挥权，确保我方主观指导始终与客观实际相符合；三是把握战争关节枢纽，根据战场敌我力量对比消长变化，积极推动战争环节有序转换，掌握战争发展演变的主动权。

III. Adhere to “You fight your way, I fight my way,” closely follow the changes in war and the changes in the opponent, maximize strengths and avoid weaknesses, and create new strategies and tactics to defeat the enemy

三、坚持你打你的、我打我的，紧盯战争之变与对手之变，扬长避短创造新的制敌战略战术

In the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, focusing on the new forms of warfare, the combat opponents, and the actual battlefield conditions, innovatively developed a new materialist method of employing troops based on seeking truth from facts. They successively resolved issues such as “whether we can fight,” “whether we can hold positions,” “whether we can guarantee supplies,” and “whether we can break the germ warfare,” [5]5 The term “germ warfare” refers to the allegations, widely publicized by China and the Soviet Union during the Korean War, that the United States used biological weapons against North Korea and China. The U.S. government has consistently denied these allegations. applying flexible and mobile strategic tactics to the extreme.

在抗美援朝战争中，毛泽东和党中央着眼新的战争样式、作战对手及战场实际，创新发展实事求是的唯物主义用兵新法，先后解决了“能不能打”“能不能守”“能不能保证给养”“能不能打破细菌战”等问题，把灵活机动的战略战术运用到极致。

Learning warfare from warfare, promptly transforming the concept of war. Mao Zedong pointed out: “During wartime, war is learning.” “The battlefield is the school.” After the founding of New China, the nature of the war faced by our military shifted from a domestic war of unification to a foreign war of counter-aggression, and the form of warfare also shifted from a domestic war with a low degree of modernization to a modern war involving powerful enemies. The engagement with the U.S. military in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea made Mao Zedong deeply aware of this. He remarked with deep feeling: “It is not enough to rely on the equipment and tactics we used in the past to fight against relatively backward domestic enemies. We must master the latest equipment and the latest tactics that come with it.” He believed that we had fought for over 20 years in the past and could not cling to old combat experience in modern warfare; using old methods to fight battles of annihilation would no longer suit the new situation. To this end, he proposed that “the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea is a great school,” requiring the entire military to promptly adapt to the new form of warfare, shifting from dealing with domestic wars with a low degree of modernization to dealing with modern wars. This guided all officers and soldiers of the military to break free from the constraints of domestic war thinking and urgently study and master new tactics and methods for winning modern wars.

从战争中学习战争，及时转变战争观念。毛泽东指出：“战争时期，战争就是学习。”“战场就是学校。”新中国成立后，我军面临的战争性质由国内统一战争转变为对外反侵略战争，战争样式也由现代化程度不高的国内战争转变为有强敌介入的现代化战争。抗美援朝战争与美军的交手，让毛泽东深切地认识到这一点。他深有感触地指出：“依靠我们过去和较为落后的国内敌人作战的装备和战术是不够的了，我们必须掌握最新的装备和随之而来的最新的战术。”他认为，我们过去打了20多年仗，在现代化战争中不能抱着老的作战经验不放，用老办法打歼灭战就不适应新情况了。为此，他提出“抗美援朝战争是个大学校”，要求全军抓紧适应新的战争样式，由应对现代化程度不高的国内战争向应对现代化战争转变。这就引导全军官兵打破了国内战争思维观念的束缚，抓紧学习研究掌握打赢现代化战争的新战法打法。

Emphasizing knowing both the enemy and oneself to identify the weaknesses and strengths of a powerful enemy. Mao Zedong pointed out that imperialism appears very powerful, but in essence it is a “paper tiger.” Strategically, we should despise them; tactically, we should take them seriously. The key is to identify their soft spots. In his long-term guidance of war, Mao Zedong focused on identifying the characteristics of different opponents and adopted targeted strategies and tactics accordingly. On the Korean battlefield, our military encountered a powerful and unfamiliar opponent like the U.S. military for the first time, facing significant challenges. Mao Zedong deeply analyzed the contradictions and problems facing the U.S.-led Western camp, pointing out that a prolonged war was unfavorable to the United States because the U.S. would suffer casualties, expend money, face insurmountable contradictions domestically and internationally, and its strategic focus was Europe; capitalism was not a monolith, and the “UN forces,” seemingly numerous and powerful, were in fact a “paper tiger.” Through a period of confrontation, we gradually understood the situation of the U.S. military: its strength lay in the high degree of mechanization of its weaponry and its possession of air and naval supremacy; its weaknesses were low military morale, inflexible tactics, and especially a fear of close-quarters combat and night fighting. Overall, it was “more steel, less spirit.” [6]6 “More steel, less spirit” is a phrase attributed to Mao Zedong, contrasting the U.S. military’s material superiority (steel) with the Chinese military’s superior morale and fighting spirit (spirit). This gave us the confidence and courage to despise the enemy strategically and to boldly engage in struggle against a powerful enemy. Compared with the U.S. military, our military’s weakness was its backward weaponry and very low level of modernization; our military’s strength lay in broad popular support, flexible tactics, high morale, strong will to fight, and the troops’ spirit of “fearing neither hardship nor death,” with the subjective initiative of officers and soldiers fully brought into play. Overall, we were “less steel, more spirit.” Accordingly, Mao Zedong emphasized maximizing strengths and avoiding weaknesses, guiding our military to use our strengths to overcome the enemy’s weaknesses, using “less steel, more spirit” to overcome “more steel, less spirit.”

强调知彼知己摸清强敌的弱点强项。毛泽东指出，帝国主义貌似很强大，但本质上是“纸老虎”，要在战略上藐视它们，在战术上重视它们，关键是要摸清其软肋。毛泽东在长期指导战争的过程中，注重摸清不同对手的特点，据此采取有针对性的战略战术。在朝鲜战场上，我军首次遭遇美军这样陌生的强大对手，一度面临很大挑战。毛泽东深入分析以美国为首的西方阵营面临的矛盾问题，指出战争长期打下去对美国不利，原因在于美国要死人、要用钱、其国际国内有难以克服的矛盾、战略重点是欧洲；资本主义不是铁板一块，“联合国军”貌似人多势众，其实是“纸老虎”。通过一段时间的较量，逐渐摸清了美军情况：其长处是武器装备机械化程度高，拥有制空权和制海权；弱点是军队士气不高，战术不灵活，尤其怕近战、夜战，总体看来是“钢多气少”。这就为我们从战略上藐视敌人，勇于开展对强敌斗争，鼓足了信心和勇气。与美军相比，我军的弱点是武器装备落后，军队现代化水平很低；我军的长处是有人民的广泛支持，战术灵活，士气高涨，战斗意志旺盛，部队发扬“一不怕苦、二不怕死”的战斗精神，官兵主观能动性得到了充分发挥，总体看来是“钢少气多”。据此，毛泽东强调扬长避短，指导我军以己之长克敌之短，以“钢少气多”力克“钢多气少”。

Summarizing practical war experience to create new tactics and methods. Mao Zedong pointed out that Marxism-Leninism is not stagnant but develops forward, and the military principles now proposed “must also be supplemented and developed according to the actual conditions of future wars, and some may need to be revised.” In his long military career, he led our military to promptly summarize battlefield experience after every battle, create and invent new tactics and methods, and further test them in war practice, continuously enriching and developing our military’s strategic and tactical arsenal. On the issue of the operations of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), Mao Zedong believed that the primary concern was “whether we can annihilate the U.S. military on Korean soil.” Focusing on annihilating the enemy’s effective strength, he initially required the CPV to annihilate U.S. troops by divisions and regiments upon just entering Korea. However, after several engagements, he realized that the combat effectiveness of the U.S. military far exceeded that of the Kuomintang army during the civil war. Therefore, he summarized the experience and proposed using the method of “nibbling away at a piece of cowhide candy” [7]7 “Nibbling away at a piece of cowhide candy” (零敲牛皮糖) is a Chinese idiom referring to a tactic of piecemeal attrition, breaking down a larger enemy force through many small-scale attacks, analogous to breaking off small pieces from a large piece of chewy candy. to annihilate the enemy, and later proposed “fighting more small-scale battles of annihilation,” creating our military’s advantage in campaigns and battles by concentrating forces. In response to the trend of the war becoming protracted, Mao Zedong decided to adopt a policy of rotating troops in Korea, which not only solved the problems of battlefield rest and sustained combat for the CPV but also effectively trained the troops. Unlike the revolutionary war era, when he proposed “opposing fixed battle lines and positional warfare,” Mao Zedong, proceeding from actual needs and based on the characteristics of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, guided the CPV to construct a solid defensive system with tunnels as the backbone in positional defense, creating a set of tactics for offensive and defensive operations relying on tunnels, and accumulating rich experience in positional warfare. Mao Zedong also guided our military to use the night to gain freedom of action, creating an effective set of night combat tactics; seizing on the weakness of the U.S. military’s modern equipment’s heavy dependence on rear areas and roads, boldly implementing outflanking and encircling tactics to cut off the enemy’s retreat; adopting all feasible means to organize air defense and ensure material transport, establishing an unbreakable and unbreakable “steel transport line.” This series of new tactics and methods greatly limited the role of the U.S. military’s superior weapons and equipment, gave full play to the advantages and strengths of the CPV, and solved a series of new situations and problems concerning how to defeat a powerful enemy under conditions of extreme disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves.

总结战争实践经验创造新战法打法。毛泽东指出，马克思列宁主义不是停止的，而是向前发展的，现在提出的军事原则“也要根据今后战争的实际情况，加以补充和发展，有的可能要修正”。他在长期军事生涯中，领导我军每打一仗就及时总结战场经验，创造发明新的战法打法，并在战争实践中进一步检验，不断丰富发展了我军战略战术宝库。在志愿军作战问题上，毛泽东认为，首要的是“能否在朝鲜境内歼灭美国军队”。他着眼歼灭敌军有生力量，要求志愿军刚入朝时成师、成团地歼灭美军，但几番交手后认识到美军战斗力远超内战中的国民党军队，因而总结经验提出用“零敲牛皮糖”办法歼灭敌军，以后又提出“多打小规模的歼灭战”，通过集中兵力造成了我军在战役战斗中的优势。毛泽东针对战争呈现长期化趋势，决定在朝鲜采取轮番作战方针，既解决了志愿军战场休整和持续作战问题，又有效地锻炼了部队。与在革命战争年代提出“反对固定的作战线和阵地战”不同，毛泽东从实际需要出发，根据抗美援朝战争特点，指导志愿军在坚守防御中构筑了以坑道为骨干的坚固防御体系，创造了一套依托坑道进行攻防作战的战术，积累了丰富的阵地战经验。毛泽东还指导我军利用夜间争取行动自由，创造了一套有效的夜战战术；抓住美军现代化装备对后方和道路依赖性大的弱点，大胆实施迂回包围战术并切断敌军后路；采取一切可行手段，组织对空防御和保证物资运输，建立打不烂、炸不断的“钢铁运输线”。这一系列新的战法打法，极大限制了美军优势武器装备的作用，较好发挥了志愿军的优势特长，解决了在敌我力量极其悬殊条件下如何制胜强敌的一系列新情况新问题。

Mao Zedong’s experience and methods in creating new tactics and methods profoundly enlighten us: no matter what form war takes, the most fundamental principle on the battlefield is “preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy.” However, under different war conditions, different opponents, and different battlefields, the ways and means to achieve “preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy” vary greatly. War commanders must firmly base themselves on the material and technological conditions of their era, deeply analyze and grasp the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, flexibly utilize the factors of time and space on the battlefield, and explore and invent methods to maximize strengths and avoid weaknesses, defeating a powerful enemy in an asymmetric manner. Practice yields true knowledge; all tactics and methods come from war practice. War commanders must follow the operational theory generation chain of coming from practice and going to practice, fully respect the creativity of frontline officers and soldiers, and be adept at distilling new ways to defeat the enemy from the fresh experience of the battlefield.

毛泽东创造新战法打法的经验做法，深刻启示我们：无论什么形态的战争，战场上最根本的一条就是“保存自己、消灭敌人”。然而，不同的战争条件、不同的对手与战场，实现“保存自己、消灭敌人”的方式途径大相迥异。战争指导者必须牢牢立足于所处时代的物质技术条件，深入分析和把握敌我双方的优劣长短，灵活利用战场时间与空间因素，探索发明扬长避短、以非对称方式制胜强敌的方法。实践出真知，一切战法打法都来自于战争实践。战争指导者必须遵循从实践中来、到实践中去的作战理论生成链路，充分尊重前线官兵的创造，善于从战场鲜活经验中凝练新的克敌制胜之道。

IV. Carry forward the fine tradition of people’s war, comprehensively utilize various means of struggle including military, political, economic, and diplomatic ones, and defeat the opponent through a total war approach

四、发扬人民战争优良传统，综合运用军事、政治、经济、外交等多种斗争手段，以总体战方式战胜对手

The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was in fact a comprehensive contest between two major powers, China and the United States. When guiding this war, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee used the power of the state apparatus to mobilize and integrate the resources of the entire nation, employed various means of struggle to open a second front, effectively coordinated with the operations on the main battlefield, and gathered the great power of the people’s war total war approach to defeat the powerful enemy.

抗美援朝战争实际上是中美两个大国之间的全面较量。毛泽东和党中央在指导这场战争时，使用国家政权力量动员整合举国资源，运用多种斗争手段开辟第二条战线，有力配合了正面战场作战，汇聚形成制胜强敌的人民战争总体战伟力。

Widely mobilising the masses of the people to enhance the war’s sustainability. Mao Zedong adhered to the view that “the soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory,” holding that “the deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses of the people.” After the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea began, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee relied closely on and organised and mobilised the broad masses of the people. Through the Chinese People’s Committee for the Resistance to U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and its various levels of general branches and branches, they launched nationwide propaganda and education campaigns to eliminate erroneous psychological attitudes such as pro-Americanism and fear of America. On this basis, they extensively and deeply carried out the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, mobilising people of all ethnic groups and all walks of life across the country to participate in and support the war in various ways. This fully stimulated the patriotic enthusiasm and work and production initiative of the entire nation, effectively supported and ensured the recovery of national construction, and, through a new type of people’s war, “created conditions to compensate for deficiencies in weaponry and other equipment, and created the prerequisites for overcoming all war difficulties.” For example, people across the country signed up to join the Chinese People’s Volunteers with unprecedented enthusiasm; moving scenes unfolded everywhere of mothers sending off their sons, wives sending off their husbands, and brothers vying to enlist. Mao Zedong’s beloved son Mao Anying volunteered to join the war, was called “the first soldier of the Volunteers” by Peng Dehuai, and later died a heroic death on the Korean battlefield. In the one-year period from 1 June 1951 to 31 May 1952, the total funds contributed by all sectors of the country for purchasing weapons amounted to more than 5,565 billion yuan (old renminbi); calculated at 1.5 billion yuan per aircraft, this could purchase 3,710 aircraft, with a remainder of 62.3 million yuan. When summing up the experience of victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong said with deep feeling, “This is mainly because our war is a people’s war, supported by the entire nation, and fought shoulder to shoulder by the peoples of China and Korea.”

广泛发动人民群众增强战争可持续力。毛泽东坚持“兵民是胜利之本”，认为“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源，存在于民众之中”。抗美援朝战争开始后，毛泽东和党中央紧紧依靠和组织动员广大人民群众，通过中国人民抗美援朝总会和各级总分会、分会，在全国展开了消灭亲美、恐美等错误心理的抗美援朝宣传教育活动。在此基础上，广泛深入开展抗美援朝运动，动员全国各族各界人民以各种方式参与和支持战争，充分激发了全国人民的爱国热情和工作生产积极性，有力支援和保证了国家建设的恢复，以新型人民战争“造成了弥补武器等等缺陷的补救条件，造成了克服一切战争困难的前提”。例如，全国人民空前踊跃地报名参加志愿军，到处出现了母亲送儿子、妻子送丈夫、兄弟争相入伍的感人场景。毛泽东的爱子毛岸英报名参战，被彭德怀称为“志愿军第一兵”，后来壮烈牺牲在朝鲜战场上。自1951年6月1日至1952年5月31日的一年中，全国各界用于购买武器钱款共为55650亿余元人民币，以每架飞机15亿元计算，可购买3710架飞机，尚余人民币6230万元。毛泽东在总结抗美援朝胜利的经验时深情地指出，“主要是因为我们的战争是人民战争，全国人民支援，中朝两国人民并肩战斗”。

Actively carrying out political, economic, and diplomatic struggles to coordinate battlefield operations. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea involved multiple parties, and diplomatic warfare and public opinion warfare ran through it throughout. Mao Zedong, manoeuvring adeptly amid the complex contradictions among the great powers, personally led the conduct of struggles in these areas, effectively winning sympathy and support from the international community and striking at the warmongers headed by the U.S. government. On the one hand, he secured international support for New China. After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Mao Zedong pointed out: “If the imperialists prepare to attack us, we have already found a helper.” On a series of issues concerning the dispatch of troops, combat operations, and armistice negotiations in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, China, the Soviet Union, and Korea supported one another, providing important conditions for winning the war. For example, on the basis of air force equipment assistance provided by the Soviet government, the Volunteer Air Force rapidly developed and grew stronger during the war, fighting side by side with the Soviet Air Force, dealing heavy blows to the U.S. air force invading Korea and achieving brilliant results. On the other hand, he proactively carried out political, economic, and diplomatic struggles against the United States. Mao Zedong once pointed out: “Standing on a commanding height, sweeping all before us with irresistible force—this is the necessary form of our diplomatic struggle.” When discussing the principles and tactics of the struggle against the United States, he believed it should be “proactive, offensive, and justified.” During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, with the goal of isolating and striking the main enemy—U.S. imperialism—conducted extensive public opinion propaganda at home and abroad, denounced U.S. crimes in invading Korea and China’s Taiwan at various diplomatic occasions, sought by every possible means to break the U.S.-led economic blockade and embargo imposed on China through the United Nations, and countered U.S. attempts to isolate and restrict China inside and outside the UN, winning over international friends to form a united front. All these efforts effectively coordinated with battlefield operations.

积极开展政治、经济、外交等斗争配合战场行动。抗美援朝战争涉及多方，外交战、舆论战等贯穿其中。毛泽东立足大国间复杂矛盾纵横捭阖，亲自领导开展这些领域的斗争，有力争取了国际社会的同情和支持，打击了以美国政府为首的战争贩子。一方面，为新中国争取国际支持。《中苏友好同盟互助条约》签订后，毛泽东曾指出：“帝国主义者如果准备打我们的时候，我们就请好了一个帮手。”在抗美援朝战争出兵、作战、停战谈判等一系列问题上，中、苏、朝相互支持，为赢得战争胜利提供了重要条件。例如，在苏联政府提供空军装备援助的基础上，志愿军空军在战争中迅速发展壮大，同苏联空军并肩作战，给予美国侵朝空军以沉重打击，取得了辉煌的战果。另一方面，积极主动开展对美政治、经济、外交等斗争。毛泽东曾指出：“高屋建瓴，势如破竹，是我们外交斗争的必须形态。”在谈及对美斗争的方针策略时，他认为应是“主动的、攻势的和有理的”。抗美援朝战争期间，毛泽东和党中央以孤立和打击美帝国主义这个主要敌人为目标，在国内外开展广泛的舆论宣传，在各种外交场合控诉美国侵略朝鲜和我国台湾的罪行，想方设法打破美国通过联合国操纵西方国家对我实行的经济封锁、禁运，针对美国在联合国内外对我的孤立和限制进行反孤立、反限制，争取国际朋友建立统一战线。这些都有力地配合了战场上的作战行动。

Adhering to the unity of principle and flexibility to promote negotiations through fighting. In long-term revolutionary wars, our Party accumulated rich experience in fighting and negotiating, and once created the Beiping method of promoting negotiations and peace through fighting. Mao Zedong believed that the most important thing in implementing the strategy and tactics of fighting and negotiating was to achieve military superiority—that is, to fight while negotiating, to promote negotiations through fighting, and to promote peace through fighting. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea lasted 2 years and 9 months, with negotiations lasting nearly 2 years and 1 month. The two sides engaged in fierce struggles around two issues: the military demarcation line and the repatriation of prisoners. On the eve of the armistice, in order to strike at the Syngman Rhee clique, which had openly violated the agreement on prisoner repatriation, the Volunteers launched the Battle of Kumsong, crippling four of its divisions and effectively coordinating with the armistice negotiations. Because we held the initiative on the battlefield, the United States was unable to break the military stalemate and faced enormous pressure at home and abroad; in the end, it had no choice but to sign the armistice agreement and accept the fact that it had lost the war. In guiding the implementation of the strategy of fighting and negotiating, Mao Zedong adhered to a high degree of unity between principle and flexibility: on major issues of principle involving fundamental interests, he would not yield an inch, even at the risk of a breakdown in negotiations; but on the premise of not harming fundamental interests, he would make certain concessions as circumstances required, to demonstrate our sincerity in seeking peace. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that served our strategic objectives, creating a post-war arrangement favourable to our interests.

坚持原则性与灵活性相统一以打促谈。在长期革命战争中，我们党在打打谈谈方面积累了丰富经验，曾经创造了以打促谈促和的北平方式。毛泽东认为，实施打打谈谈的策略原则，最重要的就是必须取得军事优势，即边打边谈，以打促谈，以打促和。抗美援朝战争历时2年9个月、谈了近2年1个月，双方先后围绕军事分界线和遣返俘虏两个问题展开激烈斗争。在停战前夕，为了打击公然破坏战俘遣返协议的李承晚集团，志愿军发起金城战役，将其4个师打残，有力配合了停战谈判。由于我们掌握了战场主动权，美国没有能力在军事上打破僵局，并且面临国内外的巨大压力，最后不得不在停战协议上签字，接受输掉了这场战争的事实。毛泽东在指导实施打打谈谈策略上，坚持原则性与灵活性的高度统一，在涉及根本利益的重大原则问题上不让半步，甚至不怕谈判破裂，但在不损害根本利益的前提下又视情况做出某些让步，以体现我们争取和平的诚意，最终达成符合我战略目的的协议，形成了有利于我方利益的战后安排。

The experience and practices of Mao Zedong’s leadership in people’s war profoundly enlighten us: although there are various channels for achieving victory in modern warfare, the most fundamental one is still to rely closely on the masses of the people and to maximise the advantages of a total national war. At present, the contradictions and conflicts in great-power games are extremely intense. We must clearly recognise the risks of war, hold high the banner of just war, persist in combining military struggle with political, economic, and diplomatic struggles, and deeply explore the path of full participation by the masses of the people, comprehensive support from factors of production, and all-dimensional input of power resources. We must promote the coupling and correlation of national strategic competitiveness, social productive forces, and military combat effectiveness, and strive to consolidate and improve the integrated national strategic system and capability. At the same time, we must also be adept at exploiting the complex contradictions within the international community, isolating and striking the main enemy, winning over and uniting other countries, and focusing on unleashing the power of the international united front to defeat the enemy. We must deeply understand and apply the laws of cognitive offense and defence in modern warfare, sum up the lessons and experiences of cognitive warfare on both sides in cases such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, concentrate efforts on winning public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare under the new form of cognitive warfare, and effectively fulfil the missions and tasks of the people’s military in the New Era.

毛泽东领导进行人民战争的经验做法，深刻启示我们：现代战争虽然制胜渠道多种多样，但最根本的还是要紧紧依靠人民群众，最大限度发挥国家总体战的优势。当前，大国博弈矛盾冲突十分激烈，我们必须认清战争风险，高举正义战争的旗帜，坚持军事斗争与政治、经济、外交斗争相结合，深入探索人民群众全员参与、生产力要素全面支撑、力量资源全维度投入的路径，促进国家战略竞争力、社会生产力、军队战斗力的耦合关联，努力巩固提高一体化国家战略体系和能力。同时，还要善于利用国际社会错综复杂的矛盾，孤立和打击主要敌人、争取和团结其他国家，着力发挥国际统一战线的制敌威力；深入认识和运用现代战争中的认知攻防规律，总结俄乌冲突等案例中双方认知作战的经验教训，聚力打赢认知作战新形态下的舆论战、心理战、法律战，有效履行新时代人民军队使命任务。

(Author: Mao Xinyu, Researcher at the War Research Institute, Academy of Military Sciences)

（作者：毛新宇，军事科学院战争研究院研究员）

Online Editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心