The State and the Rise and Fall of Late Development — An Analysis Based on State Autonomy and State Embeddedness

After the end of the Second World War, a large number of colonial and semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America became independent nation-states and began their own processes of modernization. Late-developing countries generally suffer from many late-development disadvantages and must simultaneously realize multifaceted transformations and resolve multi-layered contradictions within a relatively short period of time. Therefore, compared with the modernization of early-developing countries, late modernization requires more “artificial” intervention to control the direction of modernization and accelerate the modernization process. This objectively demands that the state assume important responsibilities and play an active role. On the basis of existing research and combined with observations of the empirical realities of late-developing countries, this article finds that state autonomy and state embeddedness are key factors in whether the state can play a positive role in modernization, and both can be high or low. This article first provides a conceptual analysis of state autonomy and state embeddedness, then constructs a model using the degree of state autonomy and the degree of state embeddedness as coordinate axes, and, employing case-study methods, explains from the perspective of resource allocation the mechanisms linking different combinations with modernization performance, in order to explore more comprehensively, clearly and intuitively what type of state and what type of state-society relations are conducive to the modernization of late-developing countries.

第二次世界大战结束后，亚非拉一大批殖民地半殖民地国家独立为新的民族国家，并开始了自身的现代化过程。后发国家一般存在诸多后发劣势，还要在相对较短的时间内同时实现多方面变革、解决多层次矛盾。因此，与先发国家的现代化相比，后发现代化需要更多“人为”的干预，以控制现代化方向、加快现代化进程，这在客观上要求国家承担重要职责、发挥积极作用。本文在既有研究基础上，结合对后发国家经验现实的观察，发现国家自主性和国家嵌入性是国家在现代化中能否发挥正向作用的关键要素，两者均有高低之分。本文首先对国家自主性和国家嵌入性作概念辨析，然后以国家自主性程度和国家嵌入性程度为坐标轴来建构模型，并运用案例分析方法，从资源配置视角阐释不同的组合与现代化绩效之间的关联机制，以期更全面、清晰和直观地探讨何种类型的国家、何种国家与社会关系有利于后发国家的现代化。

I. Theoretical Models and Research Approaches to State Autonomy

一、国家自主性的理论模型和研究路径

When modern nation-states were established in Europe, the question of the relationship between the state and the economic sphere and the sphere of classes — that is, the question of state autonomy — already emerged. The analytical approaches put forward by thinkers represented by Marx and Weber have had an important impact on the development of state theory and development theory.

现代民族国家在欧洲建立时，就显露出国家相对于经济领域和阶级领域的关系问题即国家自主性问题。以马克思、韦伯等为代表的思想家提出的分析路径，对国家理论和发展理论的发展产生了重要影响。

Marx and Engels’ ideas on the independence of the state relative to the ruling class were derived from analyzing the relationship between the state power and bourgeois society, and are concentrated in their description of “Bonapartism.” In *The Holy Family*, when analyzing Napoleon’s First Empire, Marx and Engels pointed out that Napoleon already had an understanding of the essence of the modern state, recognizing and protecting “the smooth development of bourgeois society, the free movement of private interests, etc.” as the foundation of the modern state; but at the same time, Napoleon still regarded the state as an end in itself, and “whenever the most important material interests of bourgeois society (i.e., commerce and industry) came into conflict with his political interests, he no longer spared these material interests,” and “treated bourgeois society as an enemy of the state and clamped down on it.” In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx pointed out that after Bonaparte came to power, he continuously strengthened executive power in his struggle with the parliament, and after he was elected president, the state “seemed to have become completely independent. Compared with civil society, the state machine had already greatly consolidated its position.” The Second French Empire seemed to have broken free from the control of its class base, with state interests independent of and opposed to society. In his later years, Engels also noted in a general sense that once the state emerged, it had “special interests opposed to those who authorized it,” and thus possessed “relative independence.” It can be seen that the independence of the state is not absolute; it merely allows the state to carry out “class tasks” in a more appropriate and flexible manner, and does not change the basic characteristic that the state is an instrument of class rule.

马克思、恩格斯关于国家相对于统治阶级的独立性的思想，是从分析国家政权和资产阶级社会阶级的关系中得出的，集中体现在他们对“波拿巴主义”的描述。在《神圣家族》中，马克思、恩格斯分析拿破仑第一帝国时指出，拿破仑已经有了对现代国家的本质的认识，承认并保护“以资产阶级社会的顺利发展、私人利益的自由运动等等”这一现代国家的基础;但与此同时，拿破仑还是把国家看作目的本身，“只要资产阶级社会的最重要的物质利益(即商业和工业)同他的政治利益发生冲突，他就不再顾惜这些物质利益了”，就“把资产阶级社会当作国家的对头来加以钳制”。在《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》中，马克思指出波拿巴执政后，在与议会的斗争中不断强化行政权力，到他当选总统后，国家“似乎成了完全独立的东西。和市民社会相比，国家机器已经大大巩固了自己的地位”。法兰西第二帝国似乎摆脱了阶级基础的控制，国家利益独立于社会并与社会相对立。恩格斯晚年还从一般意义上指出，国家一经出现就有了“同授权给他们的人相对立的特殊利益”，而具有了“相对独立性”。可见，国家的独立性不是绝对的，只是相对能以更为适当灵活的方式行使“阶级的任务”，并没有改变国家是阶级统治的工具这一基本特征。

Weber, on the other hand, tended toward an isolationist analysis of the state, viewing the state as a “ruling group that monopolizes legitimate violence and coercive institutions.” Behind the monopoly of legitimate violence, institutional organization, and bureaucracy lies the possibility of the state being independent of the market and society and achieving autonomous action. In Weber’s view, rational bureaucracy is the ideal form of political rule for the modern state, because positions in the bureaucracy have an impersonal character — that is, those in positions must execute regulations rather than make decisions based on personal feelings, relationships, etc. — coupled with detailed division of labor, clear rights and responsibilities, and strictly subordinated hierarchical relationships, enabling the state as a whole to achieve a certain degree of “isolation” from society and thus operate efficiently.

韦伯对国家则倾向一种隔离式的分析，国家被看作“垄断合法暴力和强制机构的统治团体”。而合法暴力的垄断、制度性组织和官僚制的背后，都隐含着国家独立于市场与社会、实现自主行动的可能性。在韦伯看来，理性官僚制是现代国家实现政治统治的理想形式，因为官僚制中的各职位具有非人格化的特征，即处在职位上的人需要执行规定，而不是自己凭感情、关系等做决定，加之专业分工细致、权责清晰、严格服从的等级从属关系，使得国家能够作为一个整体实现与社会一定程度上的“隔离”而得以高效运转。

However, whether it was Marx and Engels or Weber, their ideas on state autonomy were limited to political-level description and analysis, and did not link state autonomy with economic development. Moreover, the objects of their observation and research were mainly the early-modernizing countries of Europe. After the Second World War, the newly independent nation-states in Asia, Africa and Latin America exhibited historical processes, internal and external environments, and state characteristics different from those of early-modernizing countries, requiring new theories for explanation and guidance. In the 1960s, the issue of state autonomy regained attention, and Western Marxist scholars represented by Poulantzas and Miliband explicitly proposed the concept of “relative autonomy of the state.” They respectively adopted structuralist and instrumentalist methods to debate the sources of state autonomy, sparking academic interest and attention to this issue. However, Poulantzas and Miliband mainly expanded or modified relevant views in classical Marxist texts, and did not address the practical problems of late-developing countries.

不过，无论是马克思、恩格斯还是韦伯，其国家自主性思想都限于政治层面的描述剖析，并未将国家自主性与经济发展联系起来，且他们观察研究的对象主要是欧洲先期现代化国家。第二次世界大战后，亚非拉新独立的民族国家呈现出与先期现代化国家不同的历史进程、内外环境和状态特征，需要新的理论加以解释和指引。20世纪60年代，国家自主性问题再次受到关注，以波朗查斯和密利本德为代表的西方马克思主义学者明确提出了“国家相对自主性”的概念。他们分别采用结构主义和工具主义的方法，就国家自主性的来源问题展开争论，引发了学术界对这一问题的关注和重视。但波朗查斯和密利本德主要是对经典马克思主义文本中的相关观点进行拓展或改造，并未关注到后发现代化国家的现实问题。

Merely using different methods to prove the existence of state autonomy was far from sufficient. The modernization processes of many developing countries after the war were faltering, and classical modernization theory could not adequately explain this phenomenon. Faced with the predicament of mainstream modernization theory, Huntington, based on the situation of Third World countries, proposed his theory of political order, advocating for building a strong state: “The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.” Huntington shifted the focus of modernization theory, elevating the role of the state and politics in late-developing countries to the forefront, with far-reaching influence.

仅仅是采用不同的方法来证明国家存在自主性还远远不够。战后众多发展中国家的现代化进程步履蹒跚，经典现代化理论无法对这一现象作出恰当的解释。面对主流现代化理论的困境，亨廷顿立足于第三世界国家的现状，提出了他的政治秩序论，支持建设强有力的国家，“各国之间最重要的政治分野，不在于它们政府的形式，而在于它们政府的有效程度”。亨廷顿改变了现代化理论的侧重方向，将国家和政治在后发现代化国家中的作用提到首位，影响深远。

In the 1960s and 1970s, the economic miracle of East Asia became the most striking phenomenon in late modernization, and the “developmental state” theory emerged accordingly. In his book *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, American scholar Johnson proposed the concept of the “developmental state” based on Japan’s modernization experience. Subsequently, scholars such as White, Wade, and Amsden, also based on studies of Japan, South Korea, and other regions, argued that the state plays an important role in modernization, should actively intervene in industrial policy, education, and technological investment, and support domestic enterprises in enhancing their competitiveness in the international market, with state autonomy being one of the core conditions of the “developmental state.” It was precisely the state constituted by “autonomy” and “excellent bureaucracy” that led to the successful economic development of East Asia. This view was widely accepted and became a representative theory explaining the East Asian model. At the same time, a wave of “bringing the state back in” emerged in European and American political science. The “state-centric” school, represented by Skocpol, Nordlinger, and Tilly, adopted a state-centric research paradigm, emphasizing that the state is an important subject of political and social development, and further analyzed state autonomy.

20世纪六七十年代，东亚地区的经济奇迹成为后发现代化中最瞩目的现象，“发展型国家”理论应运而生。美国学者约翰逊在《通产省与日本奇迹》一书中，根据日本现代化的经验提出了“发展型国家”这一概念。其后，怀特、韦德、阿姆斯登等学者也基于对日本、韩国等地区的研究，认为国家在现代化中扮演着重要的角色，应该在产业政策、教育和科技投入等方面积极干预，支持本国企业在国际市场上提升竞争力，而国家自主性是“发展型国家”的核心条件之一。正是“自主性”和“优秀官僚”所构成的国家导致了东亚经济成功发展。这种观点被普遍接受，成为解释东亚模式的代表性理论。与此同时，在欧美政治学界也出现了讨论“找回国家”的热潮，以斯考克波、诺德林格、梯利等为代表的“回归国家”学派采用国家中心主义的研究范式，强调国家是政治和社会发展的重要主体，并进一步分析了国家的自主性。

However, from the mid-1980s onward, the “state-centric” perspective of the developmental state school gradually came under criticism. Scholars pointed out that explaining East Asia’s modernization achievements solely in terms of state autonomy and state capacity, while logically clear and concise, did not fully correspond to actual conditions, because it neglected the connection between state and society, running the risk of being external to society and seeing only the state. In addition, as time progressed, the trend toward democratization in East Asia also strengthened, which likewise challenged the original theory. Particularly after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, “the economies previously hailed as the East Asian miracle almost overnight became objects requiring vigilance and reflection.”

但从20世纪80年代中期开始，发展型国家学派的“国家中心”视角逐渐遭到了批评。学者们指出，以国家自主性、国家能力解释东亚的现代化成就，虽然逻辑关系简洁明确，但并不十分贴合实际情况，因为这忽视了国家与社会之间的联结，存在自外于社会、只见国家的危险。另外，随着时间推进，东亚地区的民主化趋势也日益加强，这同样对原有理论产生了冲击。特别是亚洲金融危机爆发后，“之前被誉为东亚奇迹的经济体几乎在一夜之间就沦落为需要警醒和反思的对象”。

Facing the dual challenges of theory and reality, scholars represented by Migdal, Evans, and Weiss, on the basis of reflecting on previous theories, have incorporated the dimension of interconnection between state and society into their field of vision, proposing and developing research paradigms such as “state in society,” “embedded autonomy,” and “governed interdependence.” They acknowledge that the state possesses autonomy free from interference by any social organization, but they do not believe that state autonomy “opposes” society, emphasizing that while bringing the state back in, society should not be kicked out. Among them, Migdal recognizes the autonomous characteristics of the state, but simultaneously emphasizes that the state is an actor constrained by society, developing a proposition representing “limited state”: “We must abandon that practice of isolating the state from other spheres and treating the state as an independent unit of analysis.” [1]1 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 22. Weiss’s “governed interdependence” attempts to resolve the problem of how to preserve the efficiency of governance without having to sacrifice state autonomy when social organizations, especially the power of capital, rise. She argues that the relationship between the state and industry is inherently interdependent; it is only necessary to further establish institutionalized cooperation, formally acknowledge this interdependence, and enable this interdependent relationship to be “governed.”

面对理论与现实的双重挑战，以米格代尔、埃文斯、韦斯等为代表的学者，在反思前人理论的基础上将国家与社会的相互关联层面纳入视野，提出并发展了“社会中的国家”“嵌入式自主”“被治理的互赖”等研究范式。他们承认国家具有不受任何社会组织干预的自主性，但是并不认为国家自主性会“反对”社会，强调在把国家找回来的同时，不把社会踢出去。其中，米格代尔认可国家的自主性特征，但同时强调国家是受社会制约的行动者，发展了一种代表“有限国家”的主张，“我们必须抛弃那种将国家与其他领域隔离，把国家当做独立分析单位的做法”。韦斯的“被治理的互赖”则试图解决当社会组织特别是资本的力量兴起之后，如何保留施政的效率，但又不必牺牲国家自主性的问题。他认为国家与产业间的关系本就是相互依赖的，只是需要进一步建立制度化的合作，正式承认此种互赖，使此种相互依赖的关系得以“被治理”。

Evans’s “embedded autonomy” is a milestone in the study of the developmental state theory. He distinguishes two ideal types of states: at one end is the “predatory” type, and at the other is the “developmental” type. The developmental state possesses the characteristic of “embedded autonomy,” while states in between are “intermediate states,” which can only play a helpful role in development in certain industries or for a certain period of time. The type of state is related to the internal structure of the state and the relationship between state and society. State structure mainly refers to whether there is a complete bureaucracy within the state, and the state-society relationship is primarily the government-business relationship. However, whether state intervention takes effect is also determined by the “role” the state plays: “The emergence and survival of any industry depends to a certain extent on the state’s ability to assume a mix of roles consistent with the demands of that industry.” [2]2 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 80. Evans summarizes four roles the state may play: “custodian”—the state prioritizes policy regulation over promoting development; “demiurge”—the state is deeply suspicious of private capital and replaces market competition with state-owned enterprises; “midwifery”—the state helps nurture emerging entrepreneurial groups; “husbandry”—guiding and helping private entrepreneurs overcome challenges. He argues that a mixed strategy of midwifery and husbandry will be more effective than a mixed strategy of custodian and demiurge.

埃文斯提出的“嵌入式自主”是发展型国家理论研究的一个里程碑。他区分了国家的两种理想类型，其中一端是“掠夺型”的，另一端则是“发展型”的，发展型国家具有“嵌入式自主”的特征，处于两者之间的则是“中间国家”，它们只能在某些行业中或在某段时间内对发展起帮助作用。国家类型与国家内部结构以及国家和社会的关系有关，国家结构主要指国家内部是否有完备的官僚制，国家与社会的关系主要是政商关系。但国家的干预是否得以生效还要由国家所扮演的“角色”决定，“任何产业的出现和生存在一定程度上取决于国家承担与该产业需求相一致的混合角色的能力”。埃文斯归纳了国家可能扮演的四种角色:“监护人”(custodian)——国家将政策规制置于促进发展之先;“造物主”(demiurge)——国家对私人资本充满怀疑，用国有企业代替市场竞争;“助产士”(midwifery)——国家帮助孕育新生企业家群体;“丈夫”(husbandry)——引导并帮助私人企业家克服挑战。他认为，助产士和丈夫型的混合策略将比监护人和造物主的混合策略更有效。

However, Evans’s research still has some unresolved issues. First, the meaning of state autonomy is unclear; in most cases, he conflates a complete bureaucracy with state autonomy. For example, when analyzing India as an “intermediate state,” Evans judges solely based on India’s “long bureaucratic tradition” that India’s internal state structure is not the main reason affecting India’s economic development. [3]3 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, p. 67. Moreover, the classification of the “intermediate state” type itself contains a considerable degree of ambiguity, and the measurement criteria are not precise. Second, the intermediate process, logical relationship, and mechanism of action from “embedded autonomy” to “performance” remain lacking in clear exposition. Evans focuses on elaborating the various roles the state plays, but there is no strict mutually exclusive or complementary relationship between these roles. The roles a state needs to play at different times and in different industries are ever-changing, and Evans’s selection of cases involving state participation in the information technology industry in a few countries also reduces the explanatory power.

但是埃文斯的研究仍然存在一些尚待解决的问题。首先是国家自主性含义的不清晰，在大多时候他将完备的官僚制与国家自主性进行混用。如分析印度这一“中间国家”时，埃文斯仅凭印度具有“悠久的官僚传统”，就判定印度国家内部结构不是影响印度经济发展的主要原因。而“中间国家”这一类型的划分，本身就存在相当程度的模糊性，衡量标准并不确切。其次，从“嵌入式自主”到“绩效”的中间过程、逻辑关系与作用机制到底为何，尚欠缺清楚的阐述。埃文斯重在阐述国家扮演的各种角色，而各种角色之间并不存在严格的互斥互补关系。国家在什么时段、什么行业中需要扮演什么角色是千变万化的，埃文斯选用几个国家在信息技术行业的参与作案例支撑，也降低了解释的效力。

II. Extraction and Model Construction of the Dual Dimensions of Autonomy and Embeddedness

二、自主性与嵌入性双重维度的提取和模型建构

Through a review of existing literature, we find that academic research on the question “what kind of state can play a positive role in late development” has made considerable progress, but related research still has limitations. “The interactive connection between state and society” and “state autonomy” should be equally important. In reality, there are many cases where late-developing countries have a high degree of autonomy but extract excessive resources, make erroneous decisions, or even hinder modernization. If state autonomy is a key “quality” required by the state in late development, then the dimension of “state-society connection” pointed out by scholars should also have corresponding conceptual analytical tools. However, current research has not yet clearly extracted it. The “embeddedness” in Evans’s “embedded autonomy” mainly serves as a modifier for “autonomy” and has not been explicitly used as a clear element throughout the analysis, leading to biases in explaining reality.

通过对既有文献的梳理，我们发现，学界对“何种国家才能在后发现代化中发挥积极作用”这一问题的研究已有不少进展，但是相关研究仍然存在局限。“国家和社会的关联互动”与“国家自主性”应是同等重要的，现实中存在不少后发国家的自主性程度高，但却夺取过量资源、作出错误决策甚至阻滞现代化的情况。如果说国家自主性是国家在后发现代化中所需的一个关键“品质”，那么学者们所指出的“国家与社会的联系”这一层面理应也有相应的概念分析工具，然而目前的研究却尚未清晰地提取出来。埃文斯“嵌入式自主”中的“嵌入”也主要为“自主”的修饰词，没有作为明确的要素贯穿于分析之中，导致在解释现实时出现偏误。

Nevertheless, existing research, especially Evans’s “embedded autonomy,” still provides important ideas and inspiration. This article argues that “state embeddedness” can relatively effectively express the “quality” of the state at the level of “state-society relations,” and that “state autonomy” and “state embeddedness” are two key dimensions determining what role the state plays in late development. Therefore, it is first necessary to clearly distinguish the concepts of “state autonomy” and “state embeddedness” and establish a coordinate system for different combinations.

不过现有研究尤其是埃文斯的“嵌入式自主”仍旧提供了重要的思路与启发。本文认为“国家嵌入性”可以较为有效地表达国家在“国家与社会关系”层面的“品质”，“国家自主性”和“国家嵌入性”是决定国家在后发现代化中发挥何种作用的两个关键维度。因此首先需要对“国家自主性”和“国家嵌入性”作明确的概念辨析，并建立不同组合的坐标系。

The “state” in “state autonomy” as referred to in this article is understood in the sense of “state,” while “autonomy” mainly refers to the state’s autonomy at the domestic level. As an organization, the state extracts social resources to maintain its own operation, uses violent or non-violent means to promote the formation, development, and consolidation of the economic base it supports, and simultaneously struggles against other economic relations and social forces that obstruct or threaten it. Thus, in reality, the state possesses autonomy relative to the economically ruling class and society as a whole. But this autonomy is not absolute; there are degrees of high and low. In late-developing countries, high state autonomy means that the state can, to a considerable extent, make decisions according to its own judgment, will, and preferences, and has the capacity to penetrate, change, and regulate society through hard and soft actions, forcing individual citizens, social forces, groups, or organizations to implement state policies whether they are willing or not. This penetration, change, and regulation is understood in a neutral sense, including actions such as anti-monopoly, taxation, resource redistribution, and provision of public goods. Low autonomy means that the state, as an actor, lacks to a certain extent the power of final decision-making and the means and capacity to ensure effective implementation by society.

本文所指“国家自主性”中的“国家”是在“state”意义上来说的，“自主性”则主要指国家对内层面的自主。国家作为一种组织，它抽取社会资源来维持自身运行，运用暴力或非暴力的手段促进自身所支持的经济基础的形成、发展和巩固，同时与阻碍自己、对自己有威胁的其他经济关系、社会势力进行斗争。因而实际上，国家拥有相对于经济统治阶级和整个社会的自主性。但这种自主性不是绝对的，存在高低之分。在后发国家中，高国家自主性意味着国家相当程度上能够按照自身的判断、意志和偏好作出决策，并有能力通过硬性和软性的行动渗透、改变、规制社会，让各公民个体、社会势力、集团或组织不管愿意与否都要执行国家的政策。这种渗透、改变和规制是在中性意义上讲的，包括反垄断、税收、再分配资源、提供公共物品等行为。低自主性则意味着国家作为行动主体一定程度上缺乏最终决策的权力和使社会有效执行的手段与能力。

The “embeddedness” of the state refers to whether there are institutionalized or non-institutionalized channels, explicit or implicit forces, to ensure that the state contacts, communicates, dialogues, consults, and interacts with society, so as to collect information and ideas from individual citizens, various classes and strata, various groups or organizations within society, and to help society transform and develop. If these channels are numerous and the forces are strong, it means the state’s embeddedness is high; a lack of channels and weak forces mean the state’s embeddedness is low. High embeddedness is not equivalent to more direct intervention by the state, because whether to intervene, and the degree of intervention, are not absolutely positively correlated with industrial development. Behind high state embeddedness lies extensive contact with society, rather than only understanding the information, wishes, and interests of individuals, specific groups, and specific regions. If it only connects with some social forces, or even only cares about the interests of the state bureaucratic group itself, then embeddedness is low.

国家的“嵌入性”是指有无制度化或非制度化的渠道、显性或隐性的力量来保证国家同社会接触沟通、对话协商、互动联系，以从社会中收集公民个体、各阶级阶层、各类集团或各种组织的信息、想法，并帮助社会改造和发展。如果这种渠道多、力量大，则意味着国家的嵌入性高;渠道缺乏、力量弱小则意味着国家的嵌入性低。高嵌入性不等同于国家更多的直接干预行为，因为干预与否、干预程度高低与产业的发展并不是绝对的正相关关系。国家的高嵌入性背后其实隐藏着与社会接触的广泛性，而不是只了解个体和特定集团及特定区域的信息、意愿和利益。如若只与部分社会力量联系、甚至只顾国家官僚集团自己的利益，则嵌入性低。

The difference between autonomy and embeddedness can be analogized by the relationship between a king and his ministers. Embeddedness refers to whether the king understands the ministers’ information and listens to their thoughts and opinions; autonomy refers to whether the king has the capacity to make his own final choices and decisions and have the ministers execute them. It should be noted that when the preferences of society or some social forces are consistent with the state’s final decision, it does not necessarily mean that the state is obeying these social forces and lacks autonomy; there is also the possibility that the state, under high autonomy, has chosen preferences that happen to coincide with theirs.

自主性和嵌入性的区别，可以用国王与其大臣的关系来类比。嵌入性指国王是否了解大臣的信息并听取他们的想法和意见;自主性则是指国王是否有能力作出自己最后的选择和决断，并且让大臣们去执行。需要注意的是，社会或部分社会力量的偏好与国家的最终决策一致时，并不一定代表着国家听命于这部分社会力量而没有自主性，还存在国家在高自主性下选择的偏好恰好与其偏好一致的情况。

On the basis of distinguishing these two dimensions, we can create a coordinate system (Figure 1), where the X-axis represents the degree of state autonomy and the Y-axis represents the degree of state embeddedness. Clearly, neither the degree of state autonomy nor the degree of state embeddedness has a universally recognized, precisely quantifiable metric, and universal weighting is impossible. However, by defining the high and low degrees of the two dimensions, different late-developing countries can roughly locate their own positions along the axes based on actual performance, thereby achieving positioning. The coordinate system combining the X-axis and Y-axis is divided into four quadrants — low autonomy–high embeddedness (Quadrant I); low autonomy–low embeddedness (Quadrant II); high autonomy–low embeddedness (Quadrant III); high autonomy–high embeddedness (Quadrant IV).

我们可以在对这两个维度的区分的基础上创建一个坐标系(图1)，坐标的X轴代表国家的自主性程度，坐标的Y轴代表国家的嵌入性程度。显然，无论是国家的自主性程度还是嵌入性程度，都没有一个普遍认可的、能够精确量化的衡量指标，进行普遍加权是不可能的。但是依靠对两个维度程度高低的定义，不同后发国家根据实际表现沿轴可以大体上找到自己的位置，实现定位。X轴、Y轴结合起来的坐标系，被划分为四个象限——低自主性—高嵌入性(象限Ⅰ);低自主性—低嵌入性(象限Ⅱ);高自主性—低嵌入性(象限Ⅲ);高自主性—高嵌入性(象限Ⅳ)。

Countries located in different quadrants will produce different modernization outcomes; that is, different combinations of state autonomy and state embeddedness have different effects on modernization. This article selects industrial upgrading and industrial policy as analytical intermediaries, and from the two aspects of the state removing obstacles to the free flow of resources and concentrating resources to support strategic industries, it specifically explains how “state autonomy” and “state embeddedness” actually affect late development. This article argues that the optimal zone is Quadrant IV, which combines relatively high state autonomy with relatively deep state embeddedness, and can play the most positive role in the modernization process. In the remaining quadrants, the state not only finds it difficult to assume corresponding responsibilities and complete the task of resource allocation, but may even have a counterproductive effect on modernization. However, if a country moves too far from the origin, it is also detrimental to modernization. We hypothesize that if the state moves further to the right along the X-axis or upward along the Y-axis, modernization will fall into stagnation.

处在不同象限的国家会导致不同的现代化绩效，也就是说，国家自主性和国家嵌入性的不同组合对现代化影响不同。本文选取产业升级和产业政策作为分析中介，从国家为资源自由流动消除障碍和集中资源帮扶战略产业两个面向，具体阐释“国家自主性”和“国家嵌入性”究竟是如何作用于后发现代化的。本文认为最佳区域是象限Ⅳ，它结合了较高的国家自主与较深的国家嵌入，最能在现代化进程中发挥积极作用;在其余象限，国家不仅很难承担起相应职责、完成资源配置的任务，甚至会对现代化起反作用。不过，如果一个国家离原点移动太远，也不利于现代化。我们假设，国家进一步沿着X轴向右移动或Y轴向上移动，现代化将陷入停滞。

III. Resource Flows and Modernization Outcomes in Different Combinations of State Autonomy and State Embeddedness

三、国家自主性和国家嵌入性不同组合中的资源流向与现代化绩效

Continuously cultivating new comparative advantages and completing industrial upgrading layer by layer plays a key role in a country’s modernization. Compared with developed countries, late-developing countries generally have only labor-intensive industries as their comparative advantage in the international market. But resource endowments such as labor quality, capital, and technology are variable over time. Every country can actively construct its own advantages, such as striving to increase capital stock, improve labor quality, and promote the application of scientific and technological knowledge in production, so as to transcend the constraints of current endowments and develop higher value-added industries. Only then is it possible for late-developing countries to rise and catch up.

不断培育新的比较优势、逐层完成产业升级在一国现代化中发挥着关键作用。与发达国家相比，后发国家在国际市场中具有比较优势的一般只有劳动密集型产业。但劳动力素质、资本、技术等资源禀赋是随时间可变的。每个国家都可以主动去建构自己的优势，如努力增加资本存量、提高劳工素质以及促进科技知识在生产中的应用等，以超越当前禀赋的限制、发展更高附加值的产业，这才有后发国家崛起和迎头赶上的可能。

From the perspective of resource allocation, the state needs to do at least two things to cultivate comparative advantages and promote industrial upgrading. First, improve public infrastructure. Beyond hardware facilities, what is more important is “soft infrastructure,” especially providing a fair competitive market environment, thereby removing obstacles to the free flow of resources between different industries, so that resources are attracted to industries with high productivity and high returns, thereby promoting spontaneous industrial transformation and upgrading. Second, the state must be able to identify and judge the current strategic industries and industries that need priority development, and take measures to channel more resources to these specific industries, accelerating their development speed. When these supported industries grow strong, the state must also withdraw from intervention in a timely manner, so as to transfer limited resources to new, more important industries.

从资源配置的角度来看，国家至少需要做两方面的事情来培育比较优势、推动产业升级。一是改善公共基础设施，除硬件设施外，更重要的是“软性基础设施”，特别是提供公平竞争的市场环境，从而排除资源在不同产业之间自由流动的障碍，使资源被吸引到生产力高、回报率高的产业中，以推动产业自发地转型升级;另一方面国家要能够识别判断出当前的战略产业和需要优先发展的产业，并采取措施让资源更多地流向这些特定产业，加快其发展速度。当这些受扶持的产业壮大起来后，国家还需及时退出干预，以把有限的资源转移到新的、更重要的产业上。

Among late-developing countries with different degrees of autonomy and embeddedness, the degree of resource concentration and the main direction of resource flows differ considerably, and modernization outcomes also differ.

在拥有不同程度自主性和嵌入性的后发国家中，资源的集中程度和主要流向存在较大差异，现代化的绩效也不同。

(I) Low Autonomy/High Embeddedness Countries — Unable to Concentrate Resources or Resources Tilt toward Backward Industries

(一)低自主性/高嵌入性国家——无法集中资源或资源倾向落后产业

Low autonomy and high embeddedness generally appear in late-developing countries that began political democratization earlier. Although democratization has increased the state’s embeddedness, it has weakened its autonomy, making it difficult for the state to make and implement decisions that take the long view. The economic development of late-developing countries is of a catch-up type, and they generally lack funds. Development cannot achieve breakthroughs across the board, and resources need to be concentrated for key project construction. Thus, high embeddedness and low autonomy either cause the state to be constrained by fragmented and turbulent politics or the populace’s high welfare demands, making it unable to concentrate limited resources on industries that need priority development, as in Argentina in the second half of the 20th century; or they cause the old traditional interest structure to remain unchanged and a market environment where resources flow freely according to industry returns to fail to form, so that large amounts of resources are continuously invested in those outdated, backward, and inefficient industries, as in India.

低自主、高嵌入一般出现在政治民主化较早开始的后发国家里，尽管民主化提升了国家的嵌入性，但却削弱了其自主性，使得国家难以作出并实施顾全长期的决策。后发国家的经济发展属于赶超型，且一般资金较为缺乏，发展无法全面突破，需要集中资源用于关键项目建设。由此，高嵌入性、低自主性要么导致国家受制于分裂动荡的政治或民众的高福利要求，无法集中有限的资源投向需要优先发展的产业，如20世纪下半叶的阿根廷;要么导致旧有的传统利益格局无法改变、资源根据产业报酬高低自由流动的市场环境无法形成，使大量资源持续投入到那些陈旧落后、效率低下的产业中，如印度。

Late-developing countries usually face heavy historical burdens and complex real contradictions. The democratic political systems directly introduced from outside often cannot find support points within the country and thus operate poorly. Consequently, late-developing countries that adopt electoral democracy prematurely mostly encounter problems such as participation disorder, a proliferation of political parties, extreme political conflict, and frequent government turnover. Coupled with the pressure from political parties and the populace aimed at short-term votes, this leads to high state embeddedness and declining autonomy. In an era of global information circulation, countries with high embeddedness and lacking autonomy easily succumb excessively to the populace’s economic propositions and welfare demands made by reference to developed countries, and the surplus originally used for expanded reproduction is diverted to satisfy popular welfare. Yet late-developing countries need to concentrate resources for construction, and it is almost inevitable that they must temporarily sacrifice some of the populace’s current consumption. “People build and replace factories, encourage scientific research, manufacture new machines, or adopt new agricultural technologies to increase economic productivity through investment. The national revenue spent on these purposes cannot be used for health care, housing, social insurance, and many other welfare purposes.” [4]4 Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), p. 42. At the same time, a substantial increase in various tax burdens will also cause domestic enterprises to lose the motivation to invest and innovate, and they will be even less able to compete with enterprises from other countries. Therefore, countries with high embeddedness and low autonomy will drag down the speed of modernization.

后发国家通常面临沉重的历史包袱和复杂的现实矛盾，从外部直接引进的民主政治制度往往由于无法在本国内部找到支撑点而运作不畅，因而过早实行选举民主的后发国家大都会出现参与失序、党派林立、政治冲突极端化和政府更迭频繁等问题。加之以短期选票为目的的政党和民众的压力，导致国家嵌入性高、自主性下降。在全球信息流通的时代，嵌入性高、自主缺乏的国家易过分屈服于民众参照发达国家提出的经济主张和福利要求，那些原本用于扩大再生产的剩余被转而用于满足民众福利。而后发国家需要集中资源进行建设，几乎不可避免地要暂时牺牲民众的一些当期消费。“人们通过投资来建立和更换工厂，鼓励科研，制造新的机器或采用新的农业技术来提高经济生产力。花费在这些用途上的国家收入，就不可能用于保健、住房、社会保险和其他许多福利目的。”与此同时，各种税负的大幅增加，也会导致本国企业丧失投资和创新的动力，更无法与他国企业竞争。因此，高嵌入、低自主的国家会拖累现代化的速度。

Argentina was once regarded as one of the world’s most promising emerging countries, with its per capita national income even ranking among the top ten in the world in the early 20th century. However, as the first country in Latin America to grant all adult males the right to vote, Argentina fell into a stop-and-go predicament in economic development. Along with democratization, Argentine society gradually became divided and polarized. The agricultural and livestock export group, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, labor, and the powerful military repeatedly engaged in political struggles. Different social groups used their political influence to steer the direction of economic development, hoping the state would adopt policies favorable to themselves. Trade unions, political parties, and even the state apparatus became tools for various groups to contend politically. Social negotiations, electoral competition, and even military coups were all manifestations of political struggle. “True democracy requires a change in the balance of power among different groups in society and a system accountable to the majority of the people.” [5]5 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Democracy in Argentina: Macro and Micro,” in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 163. But in Argentina, zero-sum games among various groups and forces caused distrust and cooperation failure. State policies swung back and forth many times, presenting a “pendulum-style” political form. The result was not only a failure to form a unified force with clear goals to participate in international competition, but also an internal consumption of Argentina’s economic resources. Up to the present, Argentina has not escaped the low-quality development model of relying on agricultural and livestock product exports.

阿根廷曾一度被视作世界上最具增长潜力的新兴国家，在20世纪初其人均国民收入甚至排名世界前十。然而，作为拉美地区最早规定所有成年男性享有投票权的国家，阿根廷在经济发展上却陷入了走走停停的困境。伴随着民主化，阿根廷社会逐渐分裂对立，农牧业出口集团、工业资产阶级、中产阶级、劳工和强大的军方反复进行政治争夺，不同的社会集团运用自己的政治影响力去引导经济发展的方向，以期国家采取有利于自己的政策。工会、政党甚至国家机器都成为各个集团在政治上进行争夺的工具，社会谈判、选举竞争甚至军事政变都是政治角力的体现。“真正的民主需要社会中不同群体之间权力平衡的改变，以及对大多数人负责人的体制”。但是在阿根廷，各种集团和势力间的零和博弈造成不信任和合作失败，国家政策多次摇摆，呈现出“钟摆式”政治形态。其结果是不仅没有形成一个目标明确的合力参与国际竞争，反而从内部消耗着阿根廷的经济资源，直至现在阿根廷都没有摆脱依靠农牧产品出口的低质量发展模式。

During the Perón administration, Argentina fully implemented an import-substitution industrialization strategy, nationalizing a large number of enterprises, including foreign-invested ones, while adopting a policy of concessions toward the large landed estate system. The import-substitution strategy led to a lack of national innovation capacity and also delayed the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure. Moreover, the rise of Peronism pushed Argentina’s already prominent labor political forces to a peak, with a large amount of resources being overextended to support its vast populist goals. “It is often more difficult to add an accumulation project to a redistribution agenda than to add a redistribution agenda to an accumulation project.” [6]6 The authors are quoting a proposition from the political economy literature on late development, likely referring to the difficulty of shifting from redistributive to accumulative policies once welfare entitlements are entrenched. The improvement of welfare in late-developing countries must be based on accelerated accumulation, but this low-autonomy, high-embeddedness model made it persistently difficult for Argentina to shed the burden of high welfare, bringing about a series of problems such as hedonism, consumerism, and cultural disorientation among the populace. Before the oil crisis, the overall prosperity of the world economy fueled Argentina’s economic growth; however, when the international economic environment deteriorated, its economic policies remained influenced by social conflicts and could not be adjusted in time, leaving the economy in a state of stagnation throughout the 1980s. Entering the 21st century, Argentina repeatedly fell into crises due to its inability to repay massive maturing debts. “Argentina’s economic situation has continuously deteriorated over the past few decades, especially in 2023, with inflation reaching 160%, low foreign exchange reserves, a 77.89% depreciation of the peso against the US dollar, the lowest economic growth rate among Latin American countries (estimated at -3%), and a debt of US$44 billion to the International Monetary Fund.” [7]7 The source of this quotation is not given in the original text; it appears to be a summary of Argentine economic data from 2023. With national policies swinging left and right and persistent economic decline, the gap between Argentina and developed countries as well as the industrialized countries and regions of East Asia has grown ever wider.

庇隆当政时期，阿根廷曾全面实行进口替代工业化战略，将包括外资企业在内的大量企业国有化，对大地产制则采取让步政策。进口替代战略导致国家创新能力不足，也延误了产业结构转型升级。而庇隆主义的兴起更是将阿根廷本就非常突出的劳工政治力量推向了一个巅峰，大量的资源被透支，用以支撑其庞大的民众主义目标。“在再分配议程中增加一个积累项目往往比在积累项目中增加一个再分配议程更加困难。”后发国家福利的改善必须建立在加速积累的基础上，但这种低自主、高嵌入模式却使阿根廷一直难以卸下高福利负担，并带来了民众的享乐主义、消费主义、文化迷失等一系列问题。石油危机之前，世界经济的总体繁荣促成了阿根廷经济的增长，然而当国际经济环境恶化时，其经济政策仍受社会冲突的影响而不能及时调整，整个20世纪80年代经济都处于停滞状态。进入21世纪后，阿根廷又多次因无法偿付巨额到期债务陷入危机。“阿根廷在过去几十年来经济状况持续恶化，尤其是2023年高达160%的通货膨胀、低外汇储备、按美元计算阿根廷货币大幅贬值77．89%的比索，经济增长率在拉美国家之中垫底(预计为－3%)，还背负国际货币基金组织440亿美元的债务。”国家政策的左右摇摆和经济持续衰退，阿根廷与发达国家和东亚工业化国家和地区的差距越拉越大。

India, on the other hand, presents another manifestation of the low-autonomy, high-embeddedness model. Its early political democratization became a tool for established interest groups to protect themselves, with power relations based on caste, religion, ethnicity, and class divisions largely preserved intact. These were further solidified through electoral democracy and an “overly advanced” legal system, making key reforms impossible to implement and creating a huge obstacle to industrialization.

印度则呈现出低自主、高嵌入模式的另一种表现类型，较早的政治民主化成为旧有利益集团保护自身的工具，种姓、宗教、民族、阶层划分等权力关系基本都原封不动地保留下来，并借助票选民主和“过于先进”的法律体系进一步固化，使得关键的改革无法推行，成为工业化的巨大障碍。

After independence, India politically chose a Western-style parliamentary democracy and economically imitated the Soviet Union by adopting planned economy and nationalization. However, India’s land nationalization reform was marked by obvious class compromise and political appeasement. Under the resistance and obstruction of landowners, the pace of reform gradually slowed, land remained concentrated in the hands of a few private individuals, and the vast agricultural sector suffered from low productivity, unable to provide sufficient support for heavy industry and infrastructure construction. After progressing through the first three “Five-Year Plans,” India’s industrialization hit a bottleneck of slow development due to insufficient resources. In 1991, India began market economy reforms, but it took a path of “deindustrialization” by bypassing the secondary sector and directly developing the service sector. Services, rather than manufacturing, gradually became the pillar of the national economy, presenting a “post-industrial” industrial structure typically seen only in developed countries. From 1990 to 2003, the share of services in India’s GNP rose from 40.9% to 51.2%, while the share of industry during the same period fell from 27.6% to 26.6%. [8]8 The source of these figures is not given in the original text. Although India’s high-tech products and high-end services are competitive globally, for a populous country like India, the service sector cannot provide sustained momentum for economic development. External dependence on industrial goods, insufficient employment opportunities, low overall efficiency, lack of industrial linkages, and weak social integration are all systemic problems arising from the arrears in industrialization. After 2014, the Modi government launched the “Make in India” initiative aimed at advancing industrialization, but it achieved only partial success, and India’s modernization process remains fraught with difficulties to this day.

独立后印度在政治上选择了西方式的议会民主，经济上仿照苏联实行计划经济和国有化。但印度推行的土地国有化改革带有明显的阶级调和和政治妥协色彩，在有地者的抵抗和阻挠下，改革速度渐渐慢了下来，土地依旧集中在少数私人手中，庞大的农业部门生产效率低下，无法为重工业和基础设施建设提供充分支持。印度工业化在经历了前三个“五年计划”的推进后，就因资源不足陷入发展缓慢的瓶颈期。1991年印度开始进行市场经济体制改革，但却走向了一条绕过第二产业直接发展服务业的“去工业化”道路，服务业而非制造业逐渐成为国民经济的支柱，呈现出一般只有在发达国家才能看到的“后工业化”产业结构。1990年至2003年期间，服务业占印度国民生产总值的比例从40.9%上升为51.2%，而同一时期内的工业占比则从27.6%倒退为26.6%。尽管印度的高端技术产品和高端服务业在世界范围内都具有竞争力，但对于印度这样的人口大国而言，服务业难以为经济发展提供持续动力，工业品的外部依赖、就业机会不足、整体效率低下、产业缺乏联动、社会整合乏力等都是工业欠账带来的系统性问题。2014年后莫迪政府推出旨在推动工业化进程的“印度制造”计划，也只取得了局部成功，印度的现代化进程至今仍然举步维艰。

The difficulty in advancing India’s industrialization stems precisely from the institutionalization of vested interests brought about by excessive embeddedness and insufficient autonomy. Due to the failure of past land reforms and the protection of “the sanctity of property rights,” Indian landowners colluded freely to drive up prices, making the cost of land acquisition for industry far exceed the country’s level of economic development and preventing a large amount of labor from transferring to the industrial sector. Meanwhile, the combination of tightly organized trade unions and electoral democracy granted Indian workers comprehensive labor rights and protections, while the behavior of capital was strictly restricted by labor legislation. The petty bourgeoisie, represented by small shopkeepers and small factory owners, is also a political force that cannot be ignored. They are numerous and use elections to push the state to adopt policies favorable to small-scale production. Successive Indian governments have designated many products exclusively for small-scale industrial production. Among more than 800 products reserved for small-scale industry, about 200 are products that small-scale industry is simply not equipped to produce, yet large and medium-sized enterprises are not allowed to enter these production fields, so the result is reliance on imports.

印度工业化难以推进正是嵌入性过高、自主性不足带来的既得利益制度化所致。由于曾经土地改革的失败加之“产权神圣”的庇护，印度的地主们肆意结成联盟共同抬价，造成印度工业征地成本远超其经济发展水平，也导致大量劳动力无法向工业部门转移。而严密的工会组织与票选民主的结合，使印度的劳工享受全方位的劳动权利和保护，而资方的行为则被劳动立法严格限制。以小店主、小厂主为代表的小资产阶级也是不容忽视的政治力量，他们人数众多并利用选举促使国家出台有利于小生产的政策。印度历届政府都指定很多种产品专门保留给小型工业生产，在800多种保留给小型工业生产的产品中，有大约200多种是小型工业根本没有条件生产的，而大型中型企业又不许进人这些生产领域，结果只好依靠进口。

Because the democratic system provides institutionalized protection for these interest groups, India’s modernization has always been constrained by insufficient state autonomy, weak state capacity, and the excessive strength of social interest groups, making it impossible to translate the state’s goals and policies into reality. This low-autonomy, high-embeddedness model hinders both the state’s integration of society and the spontaneous integration of society through the market, preventing resources from being allocated efficiently according to market principles.

由于民主制度对上述利益团体的制度化保护，印度的现代化始终受制于国家自主性不足、国家能力孱弱、社会利益集团势力过强的问题，无法将国家的目标和方针转化为现实。这种低自主、高嵌入模式既阻碍了国家对社会进行整合，也阻碍了社会内部通过市场进行自发的整合，资源无法按照市场规律进行有效的配置。

(II) Low-Autonomy/Low-Embeddedness States — Resources Tilt Toward Powerful Groups or Distributive Coalitions

(二)低自主性/低嵌入性国家——资源倾向强势集团或分利集团

Low-autonomy, low-embeddedness states generally manifest as the state being constrained by certain powerful groups in society, lacking the ability to make decisions based on the overall and long-term goals of society, and having a relationship with society that is an exclusive connection targeting only some forces. In low-autonomy, low-embeddedness states, most domestic resources flow into the hands of economically powerful groups or entrenched distributive coalitions, such as large chaebols, prominent families, tribal or ethnic forces, and religious or clan groups. These groups either control large amounts of resources and even command key industries, thereby influencing state policy, or possess extensive social power and political influence, dispersing state authority, refusing to heed the state’s directives, and obstructing the formation of a unified national market. Aiming to maximize their own interests, their business activities are mainly concentrated in the circulation sphere, where value can be rapidly appreciated, rather than in advanced and critical industries.

低自主性、低嵌入性国家一般表现为国家受社会部分强势集团牵制，缺乏根据社会全体和长期目标做出决策的能力，国家与社会的联系是一种只针对部分力量的排他性联系。在低自主、低嵌入的国家，国内资源大部分都流向经济强势集团或固有的分利集团手中，如大型财阀、显赫家族、部族族群势力、宗教宗族势力。他们要么占有大量资源甚至掌握着命脉产业，进而影响国家政策，要么拥有广泛的社会权力和政治影响力，分散国家的权威、不听国家的调遣，妨碍全国统一市场的形成。他们以自身利益最大化为目标，经营活动主要集中于能迅速增值的流通领域，而不是先进和关键的产业。

A common pattern in low-autonomy, low-embeddedness states is that political elites succumb to economically dominant families or groups, and the state is largely constrained and bound by “chaebols” to the point of being unable to attend to society as a whole. These powerful economic forces may be prominent families, large landowners, or big bourgeoisie that formed before the establishment of the regime, whom the state chose to co-opt rather than strike down after coming to power, or they may be ultra-large enterprises that grew with economic development after the regime’s establishment. Powerful interest groups form dense networks of personal connections with the regime, thereby influencing the formulation of state policy and even the promotion or demotion of certain government officials. They devour large amounts of economic resources, monopolize and control the national economy, and profit-maximizing enterprises channel capital into industries that yield quick high returns or areas that can rapidly appreciate in value, leading to unbalanced industrial development. The long-term monopoly of powerful wealth groups also suppresses technological innovation, undermines fair competition in the market, squeezes the living environment of small and medium-sized enterprises, and widens the gap between rich and poor in society.

政治精英屈服于经济上有支配势力的家族或集团、国家很大程度上受“财阀”牵制和捆绑以至于无力关注社会全体，是低自主性、低嵌入性国家的常见模式。这些强大的经济势力有可能是政权建立前就形成的显赫家族、大地主或大资产阶级，政权成立后国家未选择对其打击而是拉拢，也有可能是政权建立后随经济发展壮大起来的超大规模企业。强势的利益集团与政权结成密集的人脉关系网，进而能够影响到国家政策的制定甚至是某些政府官员的升降去留。它们吞噬大量经济资源，垄断和掌控国家经济，而以利润最大化为导向的企业则把资本投入那些快速获得高回报的产业或能迅速增值的领域，导致产业发展的不协调。强势财富集团的长期垄断还会抑制技术创新、破坏公平的竞争市场，造成中小企业的生存环境被挤压，拉大社会的贫富差距。

States with low autonomy and low embeddedness due to dispersed political power are mainly concentrated in regions where modern state-building has not been completed, such as African countries. In the absence of completed national integration and nation-state construction, many African countries introduced Western political systems and party systems, further exacerbating competition and conflict among ethnic groups, leading to low state autonomy and low state governance capacity. Take Nigeria as an example. Historically, Nigeria was long colonized by Britain. To maximize gains with minimal costs, Britain implemented indirect rule based on existing territories and tribes, without touching traditional authority structures, resulting in a situation where tribal forces were strong and state power was weak. After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the major regions continued to practice autonomy under federalism, thus perpetuating the original local tribal politics. The three major tribes — the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba and Igbo in the south — exerted enormous influence over the government’s economic and political activities, inhibiting Nigeria’s political unification and national integration. As a typical African country practicing multiparty democracy, although Nigeria’s central government structure has a modern form, political power is exercised by various tribal institutions, with each political party representing the interests of different ethnic groups, and the state becomes a decentralized authority above ethnic groups.

因政治权力分散导致的低自主性、低嵌入性国家则主要集中在现代国家构建未能完成的地区，如非洲国家。在未完成民族融合与民族国家建构的状态下，许多非洲国家就引进西方的政治制度和政党制度，进一步加剧了族群之间的竞争和冲突，导致国家自主性和国家治理能力低下。以尼日利亚为例。历史上尼日利亚长期受英国殖民，为尽可能用最小的成本获取最大的收益，英国以原有地域和部落为基础实行间接统治，并未触及传统的权威机构，形成了部族势力强大、国家力量弱小的局面。1960年尼日利亚独立后，各大区继续实行联邦下的自治，从而延续了原有的地方部族政治，北方的豪萨族、南方的约鲁巴族和伊博族三大部族，对政府的经济和政治活动拥有巨大影响，抑制了尼日利亚的政治统一与民族一体化。作为非洲实行多党民主政治的典型国家，虽然尼日利亚的中央政府结构具有现代形式，但政治权力却由各部族机构来行使，各个政党都分别代表着不同族群的利益，国家成为族群之上的非中心化权威。

Highly decentralized states find it difficult to penetrate society to extract sufficient resources, nor do they have the capacity to autonomously formulate and implement policies nationwide. Nigeria, at certain periods, even had to rely on deficits and debt to maintain the operation of its bureaucratic system, which increased economic inefficiency and further reduced the state’s penetration capacity. “No one truly understands and upholds Nigeria’s national interest as the common interest of all the people; people only have tribal concepts, regional concepts, and party concepts, seeking benefits for their own tribe, region, and using this as the standard to determine political attitudes and policy measures.” [9]9 Jin Tao, *A Study of Nigerian Ethnic Issues* (Ph.D. dissertation, Central China Normal University, 2013), p. 93. Tribal concepts and local forces hindered the formation of a unified national market, preventing the free flow and exchange of labor, land, capital, technology, and products. Tribal conflicts also politicized economic decisions. Fearing that tribal opposition might threaten regime stability, the state had to allocate substantial resources to tribal elites in exchange for their support, severely limiting the implementation of national development goals. For example, from 1962 to 1979, the priority issues considered by the Nigerian government were mainly aimed at strengthening the Hausa tribe in the north. The new constitution formulated by the Nigerian National Constitutional Conference in 1994–1995, centered on “zoning” and “presidential rotation,” divided the country into six major electoral districts: Northeast, Northwest, Southwest, Southeast, Central, and Southern, stipulating that important positions such as the presidency would rotate among candidates from these six districts. The new constitution clearly ethnicized the presidency, fragmenting the authority of the head of state, leading to a serious regression in Nigeria’s constitutional transition.

权力极为分散化的国家难以深入社会汲取足够的资源，也不具有自主制定和在全国推行决策的能力。尼日利亚在部分时段甚至需要通过赤字和债务来维持官僚系统运转，这增加了经济的无效率且进一步降低了国家的渗透能力。“没有谁真正把尼日利亚的国家利益作为全体人民的共同利益来理解和维护，人们只是有部族的观念、地区的观念、政党的观念，为本部族利益、地区利益谋利并以此为标准来决定政治态度和政策措施。”部族观念和地方势力妨碍了全国统一市场的形成，劳动力、土地、资本、技术、产品等都不能自由地流动和交换。部族冲突又使得经济决策政治化，由于担心部族的反对会威胁政权稳定，国家不得不赋予部族精英大量资源来换取其支持，严重限制了国家发展目标的落实。例如1962—1979年，尼日利亚政府优先考虑的议题，主要目标都在于增强北方豪萨族的力量。1994—1995年尼日利亚全国宪法大会制定的新宪法以“分区制”和“总统轮换制”为核心，全国被划分为东北、西北、西南、东南、中部、南部六大选区，规定总统等重要职位轮流从这六大选区的候选人中产生。新宪法明显将总统职位族体化，导致国家首脑的权威四分五裂，尼日利亚宪政转型出现严重倒退。

In recent years, Nigeria’s economy has maintained overall growth relying on the oil industry, but a single economic structure, lagging agricultural development, and weak infrastructure will continue to constrain the healthy development of Nigeria’s economy for a long time. The problems of other African countries are even more severe than Nigeria’s. In 2019, Africa’s per capita GDP was only $2,000, far below the world average of $11,300 (developing economies’ per capita GDP was $5,500). The driving force of Africa’s economic growth is singular and fragile; to date, its exports remain dominated by primary raw materials such as fuel, ores, and agricultural products. Low state autonomy and low embeddedness are the main reasons why Africa’s economy cannot truly take off.

近年来，尼日利亚经济依靠石油工业总体保持了增长，但经济结构单一、农业发展落后、基础设施薄弱仍将长期制约尼日利亚经济的健康发展。其他非洲国家的问题比尼日利亚有过之而无不及。2019年非洲的人均GDP只有2000美元，远远低于世界平均水平的11300美元(发展中经济体人均GDP为5500美元)。非洲经济增长的驱动力单一、脆弱，截至目前其出口仍然以燃料、矿石、农产品等初级原料为主。国家低自主、低嵌入性是非洲经济无法真正腾飞的主因。

(3) High Autonomy/Low Embeddedness States — Resources Inclined toward Bureaucratic Groups and Coercive Organizations

(三)高自主性/低嵌入性国家——资源倾向官僚集团和强制组织

In terms of the organizational classification of production or consumption, the state is primarily a non-productive organization. It extracts resources from social production sectors through various means, and these resources must first be used to maintain the normal operation of the bureaucratic system and coercive organizations. The interests of bureaucratic groups are not entirely consistent with the overall interests of society; the former are more concerned with maintaining or enhancing their authority, political life, and control over society. And if an actor possesses much more power than the other side, it “may be more likely to achieve its own interests through the threat or use of force rather than voluntary exchange,” thus being able to “obtain a lot without much effort rather than at great cost.” [10]10 [U.S.] Mancur Olson, *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships*, translated by Su Changhe and Ji Fei (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2005), p. 2. Therefore, high state autonomy and power concentration may lead to stronger extraction of social resources, with large amounts of resources used for consumption rather than being invested in material production and social construction.

就生产或消费的组织分类来说，国家主要是一种非生产性组织。它通过各种方式从社会生产部门中抽取资源，而这些资源首先要用来维持官僚系统和强制组织的正常运行。官僚集团的利益和社会的整体利益也不完全一致，前者更关注的是维持或增强其权威、政治生命以及对社会的控制。而如果一个行为者拥有比对方多得多的权力，它“也许更可能通过武力威胁或使用武力而不是自愿交换来实现自己的利益”，这样便可以“毫不费力而不是花很大代价就能得到很多”。因此，国家的高自主性和权力集中可能导致对社会资源更强的攫取行为，大量资源被用于消费，而不是投入到物质生产和社会建设中去。

High autonomy, low embeddedness states can be roughly divided into two categories. One category does not formulate policies aimed at economic development and social progress, but rather considers how to extract more resources to satisfy its own interests. In such states, only enterprises that attach themselves to the regime and deliver benefits to it can obtain privileges to survive. Unhealthy interest-binding relationships, unpredictable political rules, and decision-making environments become stumbling blocks for industrial development. However, whether it is resource extraction or policy implementation, both must be carried out through society. The gradually increasing overt or covert resistance from society increases the costs of governance and management, leading the state to need to extract more resources to establish additional coercive forces or maintain the loyalty of existing coercive forces, forming a vicious cycle.

高自主、低嵌入国家大致可以分为两类，其中一类并不以经济发展和社会进步为目的出台政策，而是考虑怎样汲取更多资源来满足自身的利益。在这类国家中，只有依附于政权并向其输送利益的企业才能取得特权得以生存。不健康的利益绑定关系、不可预测的政治规则和决策环境，成为产业发展的绊脚石。然而，不论是资源的抽取还是政策的执行都需要通过社会。社会逐渐增加的或显性或隐性的抵抗会增加统治管理的成本，导致国家需要汲取更多资源来增设强制力量或维持强制力量的忠诚，形成恶性循环。

Another category operates the economy through the sale of abundant resources, with the state being the controller of resource sales and the distributor of income, while society basically lacks the ability to “bargain” with the state. Take Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region as an example. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emerged from a tribal society, where tribal chiefs had significant influence. However, after oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s and 1940s and commercial production began, tribal chiefs and wealthy merchants gradually lost their power and importance as components of political alliances, because the increase in oil revenues enhanced the autonomy of the royal family, enabling it to expand central administrative institutions and hold key positions within them. At the same time, the wealth brought by oil extraction and the oil nationalization movement greatly reduced the state’s overall dependence on society. By the 1970s, the state had basically shed the burden of extracting resources from society, shaping powerful control forces and extremely high autonomy. The state took over oil extraction rights, using the acquired wealth to support a large number of public employees and distribute benefits to the people to maintain regime stability. According to statistics, the wage expenditure of Saudi public employees accounts for roughly one-third of GDP. [11]11 See Ma Xiuqin, “The Political Stability of Saudi Arabia and Its Weaknesses,” *Arab World Studies*, no. 6 (2010). According to statistics from the National Bank of Kuwait, in 2009, the number of people employed in the public sector in Gulf monarchies accounted for 58% of the total employed population in the region, with Qatar exceeding 90%, Kuwait at 84%, Saudi Arabia over 50%, and this proportion continues to increase. [12]12 See “Gulf Monarchies: The Largest Employer in the Region,” *Reference News*, June 15, 2009. On the other hand, the state provides the people with free education and free medical care, housing loans, and price subsidies for basic food and commodities. Although economic benefits are not distributed equally, society’s dependence on the state has greatly increased.

还有一类是通过对丰富资源的售卖来运转经济，国家是资源售卖的控制者和收入的分配者，社会基本不具备与国家“讨价还价”的能力。以海湾地区的沙特阿拉伯为例。沙特阿拉伯王国产生于一个部落社会，各部落酋长影响力很大。但在20世纪三四十年代沙特发现石油并开始商业生产后，部落酋长和有实力的商贾们逐渐失去了他们的权力以及作为政治联盟组成部分的重要性，因为石油收益的增加使王室家族的自主性增加，王室有条件拓展中央行政机构并在其中把持关键职位。同时，石油开采带来的财富以及石油国有化运动也极大地削弱了国家对社会整体的依赖。至20世纪70年代，国家已经基本卸下了从社会汲取资源的重担，塑造起强大的管控力量和超高的自主性。国家拿走石油开采权，用获得的财富供养数量庞大的公职人员并分予民众以维护政权稳定。据统计，沙特公职人员的工资开支差不多占到国内生产总值的三分之一。另据科威特国家银行统计，2009年海湾君主制国家公共部门中就职的民众数量占整个地区就业人口的58%，其中卡塔尔超过90%，科威特占84%，沙特超50%，而这一比例还在持续增加。另一方面，国家向民众提供免费教育和免费医疗、住房贷款、基本食品和商品的价格补贴等福利。虽然经济利益没有实现平均分配，但社会对国家的依赖大幅提高。

In sum, the state has secured an absolutely dominant position through the exploitation of oil extraction rights, yet it does not require a vibrant socio-economy to provide tax revenue. As a result, Saudi Arabia has gradually formed a state model of high autonomy and low embeddedness. Although the oil economy has propelled Saudi Arabia from its former impoverished and backward economic state into the ranks of the world’s high-income countries, this model has also created many deep-seated development problems that have affected the long-term modernization process. The first is an imbalance in human resource allocation: the average monthly salary of Saudi civil servants is about three times that of the private sector, and they enjoy various hidden incomes. Most of the population is directly or indirectly employed in the public sector, lacking the incentive to operate private enterprises. The few private enterprises that exist are often inextricably linked to the royal family or are themselves operated by royal family members. This has led to an imbalanced economic structure in Saudi Arabia, with a single industry that is difficult to upgrade, making the national economy vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices and market conditions, exhibiting a considerable degree of fragility. The Saudi economy still relies on oil exports, which account for 40% of the country’s GDP and over 80% of government revenue. Second, most of the income from oil is used for consumption rather than investment in industrial production, causing industries other than oil and the broader economy to further shrink, thereby increasing dependence on external markets, with numerous goods and equipment needing to be imported. Finally, the comprehensive welfare benefits provided by the state have fostered hedonistic attitudes among many people. “This ethos has also been brought into university campuses, where college students lack the spirit of diligent study and exploration in the tedious fields of science and engineering, exacerbating the already severe shortage of professional and technical personnel in the six Gulf states.” [13]13 Quotation from an unspecified source on Gulf state education and technical personnel shortages.

总之，国家利用石油开采权占据了绝对主导地位，却并不需要活跃的社会经济来提供税收，由此沙特逐渐形成了高自主性、低嵌入性的国家模式。尽管在石油经济的推动下，沙特阿拉伯从以往贫穷落后的经济面貌一跃步入世界高收入国家之列，但这种模式也造成了许多深层次的发展问题，影响了长远的现代化进程。首先是人力资源分配的不平衡，沙特公务员每月平均工资是私营部门的三倍左右，且拥有各种隐形收入，大部分民众直接或间接地在公共部门就业，缺乏经营私营企业的积极性。而为数不多的私营企业，往往和王室有着千丝万缕的关系或本身就由王室家族成员来经营。由此造成沙特经济结构失衡，产业单一化且升级困难，国家的经济容易受到油价和市场波动的影响，呈现出相当程度的脆弱性。沙特经济目前仍依赖石油出口，石油出口额占沙特国内生产总值的40%、政府收入的80%以上。其次，石油的所得收入大部分被用来消费，而不是投入工业生产，除石油外的产业和经济进一步萎缩，从而加剧了对外部市场的依赖，众多商品和设备都需进口。最后，国家提供的名目齐全的福利保障使许多人逐渐滋生了享乐主义情绪，“这种风气也被带进了大学校园，大学生对枯燥乏味的理工科专业缺乏钻研和探素精神，使海湾六国本来就缺乏专业技术人员的状况日益严峻”。

Directly selling resources can yield substantial short-term gains, and Saudi Arabia’s annual fiscal revenue may be much higher than that of some developed countries. However, in the long run, this model is ultimately unstable and unsustainable. In recent years, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia have begun to implement economic transformation and governance reforms. Saudi Arabia proposed the “Vision 2030” in 2016 to promote industrial diversification, reduce fiscal burdens, and strive to transform into a market-based, resource-assisted economic model. Reform requires sufficient impetus, and whether the state can enhance its embeddedness is the key to the success of the economic reform plan.

直接售卖资源可以获得大量的短期收益，沙特政府的年财政收入可能比部分发达国家都高上许多，但长远来看这种模式终究不够稳定持久。近年来，沙特等海湾国家开始推行经济转型和治理变革，沙特在2016年提出“2030愿景”，以推动产业多元化、降低财政负担，致力于转变为以市场为基础、以资源为辅助的经济模式。改革需要有足够的推力，能否提高国家的嵌入性，是经济改革计划成功与否的关键。

(4) High Autonomy/High Embeddedness State — Resources Tilted Toward Strategic and Advanced Industries

(四)高自主性/高嵌入性国家——资源倾向战略产业和先进产业

The realization of modernization is a process synchronized with continuous industrial upgrading and an increasingly optimized industrial structure. “Different industrial structures imply not only different capital intensities of industries but also different optimal enterprise sizes, production scales, market scopes, transaction complexities, and types of risks.” [14]14 Quotation from an unspecified source on industrial structure and enterprise characteristics. Therefore, the stepwise ascent of industries is usually accompanied by changes in the requirements for soft and hard infrastructure; otherwise, it will increase operational and transaction costs, hindering the spontaneous transformation and upgrading of industries. Late-developing countries often face problems of capital scarcity and capital dispersion. High autonomy enables the state to extract dispersed resources to invest in infrastructure such as transportation. For improvements in intangible infrastructure such as institutions, laws, and market rules, state intervention and reform are even more indispensable. Institutional and rule reforms often touch upon vested interests both inside and outside the political regime. Without autonomy and embeddedness, the state’s motivation to improve soft infrastructure will be insufficient, and it may even be unaware of what improvements are needed.

现代化的实现是一个和产业不断升级、产业结构愈发优化同步的过程。而“不同的产业结构不仅意味着不同的产业资本密集度，还意味着不同的最优企业规模、生产规模、市场范围、交易复杂程度以及不同的风险种类”。因此，产业的拾级而上通常伴随着对软硬基础设施的要求的变化，否则便会增加运行和交易的成本，影响产业自发转型升级。后发国家往往存在资本短缺和资本分散的问题，高自主性让国家能够汲取分散资源投资交通等基础设施建设。对于制度、法律、市场规则等无形基础设施的改进来说，国家的干预与改革更是必不可少。制度、规则的改革很多时候是触动政权内外既得利益的，若缺乏自主性与嵌入性，国家改进软性基础设施的动力便会不足，甚至不知道需做哪些改进。

In addition to infrastructure construction, the state also needs to guide the direction of industrial upgrading and provide timely assistance. Dispersed enterprises and individuals find it difficult to make overall judgments about the types of industries that urgently need development. Even if they have sufficient acumen and judgment, they may lack the strength to produce. Moreover, the production costs of mid-to-high-end products are high, and enterprises generally shy away. Furthermore, the closer one gets to the frontier of science and technology, the harder it becomes to introduce mature technologies from developed countries. When the success rate and return rate of independent research and development cannot be guaranteed, enterprises are often unwilling to invest in the R&D of new products and technologies; instead, they may form interest groups to lobby the government. At this point, the state needs to use tariffs, subsidies, and other means to mobilize resources to protect strategic or emerging industries. And once products have gained competitiveness, the state must be able to withdraw in a timely manner from the “well-intentioned” distortion of resource allocation.

除基础设施建设外，国家还需要引导产业升级的方向并适时提供帮助。分散的企业和个体很难从整体上对当前亟需发展的产业类型作出判断，就算有足够的敏锐性和判断力，也难有实力去生产。而中高端产品的生产成本高，企业一般都望而却步。此外，离前沿科技越近，就越难从发达国家引进成熟的技术。在自主研发的成功率和收益率都无法保证的情况下，企业往往不愿对新产品和新技术研发进行投资，反而会组成利益集团游说政府。这时便需要国家运用关税、补贴等手段调动资源保护战略产业或新兴产业的发展。而当产品已取得竞争力之后，国家还要能及时从对资源配置的“好意”扭曲中退出。

Therefore, only a state that possesses both a relatively high degree of autonomy and embeddedness can play a positive role in removing obstacles to the free flow of resources and promoting the flow of resources toward strategic industries. High embeddedness enables the state to obtain extensive sources of information, judgment that condenses the wisdom of multiple parties, and the willingness to help society overcome problems; high autonomy ensures that the state is free from capture by fragmented social forces, granting it a neutral stance not swayed by interest groups, a long-term vision concerned with the overall situation, and the capacity to implement policies. South Korea in the considerable period after the war is an example of leveraging high state embeddedness and autonomy to drive economic takeoff.

因此，唯有兼具较高程度自主性和嵌入性的国家，才能在排除资源自由流动障碍和促进资源流向战略产业这两方面发挥积极作用。高嵌入性可以使国家获得广泛的信息来源、凝结多方智慧的判断力和帮助社会克服问题的意愿;高自主性则保证国家免于社会碎片化的捕获，使国家具备不被利益集团左右的中性立场、关心大局的长远视野和推行方针政策的贯彻能力。战后相当一段时间内的韩国就是凭借较高的国家嵌入性和自主性，带动经济腾飞的。

After Park Chung-hee came to power, South Korea established a centralized and powerful bureaucratic apparatus, enhancing national cohesion and autonomy. The state’s capacity to extract resources subsequently improved, providing conditions for investment in infrastructure. The government, guided by industrial policy, implemented precise investment in infrastructure. During the period of developing light industry, the focus of infrastructure construction was on highway transportation, land transport, and communication equipment. When the development focus shifted to heavy industry, South Korea concentrated on building large industrial parks, expanding the railway freight network, and vigorously improving water and electricity supply facilities. At the end of the 20th century, as science and technology became a new breakthrough point for the economy, the government’s infrastructure construction revolved around science and technology research parks to gather various technical research institutions. At the same time, the South Korean government continuously improved “soft” infrastructure, such as promptly revising relevant laws according to the needs of economic development, steadily increasing the proportion of public education expenditure in GNP, and perfecting institutional mechanisms. To support and nurture specific industries, the South Korean government formulated a series of laws between 1967 and 1971. To promote fair market competition, South Korea issued the “Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act” in 1980, clearly defining the scope of monopoly products, monopolists, and unfair trade practices. By the end of the 20th century, South Korea had also enacted the “Special Act on Science and Technology Innovation” to promote the development of new technologies.

朴正熙执政后，韩国建立起权力集中的强势官僚机构，提升了国家凝聚力和自主性，国家的资源汲取能力随之提高，为投资基础设施提供了条件。政府以产业政策为导向，实行对基础设施的精准投资。在发展轻工业时期，基础设施建设的重心放在高速公路交通陆路运输和通信设备方面。而当发展的重心转向重工业时，韩国便重点建设大型工业园区、拓展铁路货运网络，并大力改善用水和电力供应设施。20世纪末，随着科学技术成为经济新的突破口时，政府的基础设施建设又围绕科学技术研究园展开，以集合各类技术研究机构。与此同时，韩国政府还持续完善“软性”的基础设施，如根据经济发展的需要及时修订有关法律、稳步提升公共教育经费占国民生产总值的比例、完善体制机制等。为支援和培育特定产业，韩国政府在1967—1971年制定了一系列法律。为促进市场公平竞争，1980年韩国发布《限制垄断及公正交易法》，明确界定了垄断产品、垄断者和非公正交易行为的范围。至20世纪末，韩国又制定了《科学技术创新特别法》，以促进新技术发展。

South Korea’s industrial upgrading was not a purely spontaneous process. The government established the Economic Planning Board, formulating economic plans on a five-year cycle starting in 1962, and selecting industrial directions and setting clear industrial policy targets for each five-year plan. Initially, South Korea had a weak industrial base, a shortage of resources, and a small market, with only cheap labor available for use. Therefore, the state encouraged the development of labor-intensive industries such as light textiles, established the Korea Trade Association and the Export Promotion Joint Committee, and formulated a series of measures to stimulate exports, providing preferential support to relevant enterprises. When the focus of economic development shifted to heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s, the South Korean government set up a “Heavy Industry Promotion Committee,” offering various preferential terms to leading enterprises in steel, petrochemicals, machinery, metals, and electronics. To concentrate resources, South Korea promulgated the Basic Law on National Investment, and private savings were forcibly mobilized to participate in investment in heavy and chemical industries. From 1974 to 1981, the National Investment Fund raised a total of 673.4 billion won, of which 50%–60% was invested in heavy and chemical industrial sectors. In addition to various explicit supports, the state also implemented repressive labor policies, such as restricting unions and strikes, to lower production costs. Entering the 1980s, South Korea shifted its industrial focus to technology-intensive industries, seizing the opportunity of the technological revolution to develop high-tech industries such as information, microelectronics, biotechnology, precision machinery, and new materials, increasing investment in research and technology, and pushing the industrial structure toward a higher level. To achieve South Korea’s “leadership” in the new global round of industrial revolution, after 2013 the South Korean government proposed an innovation strategy for implementing a “creative economy,” issued the Manufacturing Innovation 3.0 Strategy and its implementation plans, and through measures such as launching multiple government support programs, formulating a roadmap for smart manufacturing technology development, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in smart transformation, aimed to establish South Korea’s global leading position in advanced manufacturing. According to International Monetary Fund statistics, South Korea’s average GDP growth rate reached 8.52% from 1980 to 1997, and its average GDP growth rate over the 20 years from 1998 to 2017 was also 4%, making it a model of rapid development among late-developing countries.

韩国的产业升级并不是一个纯自发的过程。政府成立经济企划院，从1962年起以每五年为期制定经济计划，并为各个五年计划选择产业方向、制定目标明确的产业政策。起初韩国工业基础薄弱、资源短缺、市场狭小，只有低价的劳动力资源可资利用，因此国家鼓励发展轻纺工业等劳动密集型产业，成立韩国贸易协会和出口促进联合委员会，并制定一系列刺激出口的措施，对相关企业进行倾斜性扶持。当20世纪70年代经济发展的重心转移至重化工业后，韩国政府设立了“重工业推进委员会”，对钢铁、石化、机械、金属及电子工业中的主体企业提供了种种优惠。为集中资源，韩国颁布了《国家投资基本法》，民间的储蓄资金被强制性地动员起来参与到对重化工业的投资中。1974—1981年，国民投资基金共计筹集6734亿韩元，其中50%—60%投资到重化工业部门。除各种显性支持外，国家还实行了压制性的劳工政策，如限制工会和罢工等来降低生产成本。进入20世纪80年代后，韩国又将产业重点转向技术密集型产业，抓住科技革命的机遇发展信息、微电子、生物、精密机械和新材料等高新技术产业，加大对科研和技术的投资力度，推动产业结构向更高级发展。为实现韩国在全球新一轮工业革命中的“领跑”，2013年后，韩国政府提出了实施“创造经济”的创新战略发展思路，出台《制造业创新3.0战略》及其实施方案，通过推出多项政府扶持计划、制定智能制造技术发展路线、扶持中小企业进行智能化改造等举措，旨在确立韩国先进制造业的全球领先地位。据国际货币基金组织统计数据，1980—1997年韩国的GDP平均增速达到8.52%，1998—2017年的20年间，其GDP的平均增速也有4%，是后发国家快速发展的典范。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

There is a wide variety of theoretical paradigms exploring the relationship between the state and society, and between the state and economic development, in the process of modernization, such as the strong/weak state and strong/weak society models, the model of state development willingness and development capacity, the model of state functional scope and institutional capacity, and the model of state despotic power and infrastructural power. [15]15 The “despotic power” and “infrastructural power” of the state are concepts introduced by sociologist Michael Mann to distinguish between the state’s capacity for arbitrary action (despotic power) and its capacity to penetrate and coordinate civil society (infrastructural power). However, historical experience tells us that at different stages of modernization, the required size and strength of the government, the scope and degree of state intervention, and the levels of state despotic and infrastructural power are not fixed values; they need to align with one’s own historical and actual national conditions and adapt to changes in the internal and external environment.

探讨现代化进程中的国家与社会、国家与经济发展关系的理论范式林林总总，例如强/弱国家、强/弱社会模型，国家发展意愿与发展能力模型，国家功能范围和制度能力模型，国家专制权力和基础权力模型等。但历史经验告诉我们，现代化的不同时段，所需的政府大小、强弱和国家的干预范围、干预程度，以及国家专制和基础权力的高低并非固定值，需要契合自身的历史和现实国情，并适应内外环境的变化而调整。

The model of state autonomy and state embeddedness constructed in this article overcomes, to a certain extent, the problem of changes in effectiveness over time. For any period of a state, especially a late-developing state, high levels of both autonomy and embeddedness are required from beginning to end. The combination of the two ensures that the state can make the best possible judgments at different times, thereby formulating and implementing correct decisions. Only then can the state and society each perform their own functions, cooperate with each other, and gradually advance modernization. It should be pointed out that state autonomy cannot be equated with rational state behavior. High state autonomy and high state embeddedness are conducive to the modernization of late-developing countries, but if autonomy or embeddedness is pushed to the extreme—that is, choosing a strategy of withdrawing from the market or having the state take over society entirely—it will be counterproductive. This has been confirmed by the modernization processes of some late-developing countries.

本文建构的国家自主性和国家嵌入性模型，在一定程度上克服了时间上的效力变动问题。对于任何时段的国家尤其是后发国家而言，从始至终都需要较高的自主性和嵌入性。两者的结合保证国家在不同的时间段中能尽量作出最佳判断，从而制定并贯彻实施正确的决策。如此国家和社会才能各司其职、互相配合，推进现代化逐步实现。需要指出的是，国家自主性不能与理性的国家行为划等号。较高的国家自主性和国家嵌入性有利于后发国家的现代化，但如果将自主性或嵌入性推到极致，即选择退出市场战略、国家全盘接管社会，则会适得其反。这已被一些后发国家的现代化历程所证实。

Of course, using industrial upgrading and industrial structure as mediating mechanisms and resource allocation as a perspective to demonstrate the impact of different types of combinations of state autonomy and state embeddedness on modernization also has certain limitations. Modernization is a process encompassing changes in many aspects, including politics, economy, society, culture, and values, such as industrialization and modern economic growth, political democratization and legalization, urbanization, religious secularization, universal education, and the modernization of people. The research perspective of industry and resource allocation cannot yet reflect the full picture. Therefore, related research still needs to be further deepened.

当然，以产业升级和产业结构作中介机制、以资源配置为视角来论证国家自主性和国家嵌入性组合的不同类型对现代化的影响，也有一定局限。现代化是一个包括政治、经济、社会、文化和价值观念等多方面变革的过程，如工业化和现代经济增长、政治民主化和法制化、城市化、宗教世俗化、教育普及化、人的现代化等。产业与资源配置的研究视阈，尚不能反映全貌。因此，相关研究仍需进一步深化。

Furthermore, the factors influencing the varying levels of autonomy and embeddedness in late-developing countries, the variability of autonomy and embeddedness, and the methods for improving autonomy and embeddedness also await further discussion. There are many factors affecting the degree of autonomy and embeddedness in late-developing countries. In addition to internal factors such as social structure, policy systems, nationalism, and historical culture, external environments such as geopolitics also exert significant influence. The state and society are mutually constitutive; society changes over time, and the degree of state autonomy and embeddedness is naturally not a fixed constant. A state with high autonomy and high embeddedness may gradually become a state with low autonomy or low embeddedness. For late-developing countries, a certain bias toward some industrial capital is necessary and aligns with the overall and long-term interests of society. However, after the stage of capital accumulation is completed, if the state is swayed by developed interest groups and fails to timely raise the income and consumption capacity of the people or expand the middle-income group, it will also hinder the deepening of modernization. At the same time, a state lacking autonomy or embeddedness can also improve its autonomy or embeddedness through reforms and other means. Late-developing countries should maintain moderate state autonomy and state embeddedness and continuously promote the growth of modernization.

此外，关于后发国家自主性、嵌入性高低不同的影响因素，自主性、嵌入性的变动性，及提高自主性和嵌入性的方法等，也有待进一步讨论。影响后发国家自主性和嵌入性程度的因素很多，除社会结构、政策体制、民族主义和历史文化等内部因素外，地缘政治等外部环境也会产生重要影响。国家与社会是互构的，社会会随时间发生变化，国家的自主性和嵌入性程度自然也不是固定不变的常量。一个高自主、高嵌入的国家有可能逐渐变为低自主性或低嵌入性国家。对后发国家来说，对部分产业资本的偏重是必要的，符合社会的整体和长远利益。然而，完成资本积累阶段后，如果国家被发展起来的利益集团左右，不能适时提高民众的收入和消费能力、扩大中等收入群体，也会阻滞现代化的深化。同时，一个自主缺乏或嵌入缺乏的国家也可以通过改革等方式提高自身的自主性或嵌入性。后发国家应保持适度的国家自主性和嵌入性，持续推动现代化成长。

(Author biographies: Sun Daiyao, Professor, School of Marxism, Peking University)

（作者简介：孙代尧，北京大学马克思主义学院教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心