Zhou Enlai and the August 1 Nanchang Uprising

Zhou Enlai, unlike Mao Zedong who had carried a rifle for half a year in the Changsha New Army after the Wuchang Uprising, and unlike Zhu De who was a regular military academy graduate from Yunnan Military Academy, nonetheless became the principal leader who lifted the curtain on our Party’s independent leadership of large-scale armed struggle—the August 1 Nanchang Uprising—and one of the earliest founders of the people’s army led by the Party. This can only be described as a great legend in Party history and military history. How should we understand this legendary experience of Zhou Enlai? How should we evaluate the historical status of his leadership of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising? On the occasion of commemorating the 126th anniversary of Zhou Enlai’s birth, I would like to offer some personal views.

周恩来既没有像毛泽东那样在武昌起义后的长沙新军中扛过半年枪，也不像朱德那样是云南讲武堂的正规军校行伍出身，却成为揭开我们党独立领导大规模武装斗争序幕——八一南昌起义的主要领导人，是党领导的人民军队的最早创立者之一。这不能不说是党史和军史的一大传奇。怎样认识周恩来的这段传奇经历？怎样评价他领导八一南昌起义的历史地位？在纪念周恩来诞辰126周年之际，我想谈点个人看法。

I. Zhou Enlai Received the Mandate at a Critical Moment and Led the August 1 Nanchang Uprising

一、周恩来临危受命，领导八一南昌起义

Among the early revolutionaries of our Party who appeared on China’s political stage, there were many, some of whom were fleeting figures, but most were sacrificed under the butcher’s knife of the enemy. Zhou Enlai, however, shone brilliantly from the very beginning of his ascent onto China’s political stage and was fortunate enough to accompany the revolution all the way through. Before he returned to China on the orders of the Party Central Committee, the Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe gave him this evaluation: in personal conduct, “sincere and gentle, rich in activity capacity, eloquent in speech, quick in writing, with a deep study of the doctrine, thus able to become completely proletarianized… He was one of the founders of this region’s establishment. He served three terms as an executive committee member of this region, enthusiastic and hardworking, with outstanding achievements.” [1]1 The Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe was established in 1922 as a branch of the Chinese Communist Party among Chinese students and workers in Europe, with Zhou Enlai as one of its founders. In September 1924, after arriving in Guangzhou, the political center of the Chinese revolution, he remained active on China’s political stage, effectively becoming one of the important representative figures of the Chinese Communist Party, and his figure could be seen in many major events and important occasions.

亮相中国政治舞台的我党早期革命家人数众多，其中有昙花一现者，但大多牺牲在敌人的屠刀下。而周恩来自登上中国政治舞台之初就光彩照人，并有幸始终伴随革命前行。在他奉党中央之命回国前，旅欧中国共产主义青年团对他作了这样的评语：为人“诚恳温和，活动能力富足，说话动听，作文敏捷，对主义有深刻的研究，故能完全无产阶级化……本区成立的发启（起）人，他是其中的一个。曾任本区三届执行委员，热心耐苦，成绩卓著”。1924年9月，他抵达中国革命的政治中心广州后，就一直活跃于中国政治舞台，实际上成为中国共产党的重要形象代表之一，在许多重大事件和重要场合中都能见到他的身影。

History chose Zhou Enlai to serve as the principal leader of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising, based on at least the following several important factors:

历史选择周恩来充任八一南昌起义的主要领导人，至少有这样几个重要因素：

——Participation in suppressing the Merchant Corps rebellion, demonstrating acute political awareness and decisive work ability. One month after Zhou Enlai returned to China, the reactionary armed forces of the Guangdong comprador bourgeoisie—the Merchant Corps—with the support of British imperialism, conspired to stage a military rebellion to overthrow the Guangdong revolutionary government of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. On October 10, Zhou Enlai, speaking as a representative of the Guangdong National Liberation Association, issued a warning to the reactionary Merchant Corps, calling on workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants to unite, “Down with imperialism! Down with the northern and southern warlords! Down with all counter-revolutionaries!” The Merchant Corps troops opened fire on the parade, killing and wounding over 100 people. Subsequently, Zhou Enlai and others joined the provisional military headquarters of the Revolutionary Committee established by Sun Yat-sen to suppress the Merchant Corps rebellion. The revolutionary army defeated the Merchant Corps troops, achieving a major victory against imperialism and the comprador bourgeoisie. Zhou Enlai wrote an article pointing out that the Kuomintang must unite with the revolutionary left wing to carry out the national revolution, “only then can it win the revolutionary workers and peasants as the basic force of the revolution.”

——参与平定商团叛乱，显示出敏锐政治意识和果敢工作能力。周恩来回国后一个月，广东买办资产阶级的反动武装——商团，在英帝国主义支持下，阴谋策划军事叛乱，推翻国共合作的广东革命政府。10月10日，周恩来以广东民族解放协会代表身份发表演说，警告反动商团，号召工、农、兵、学、商团结起来，“打倒帝国主义！打倒南北军阀！打倒一切反革命派！”商团军向游行队伍开枪，死伤群众100多人。随后，周恩来等参加孙中山成立平定商团叛乱的革命委员会临时军事指挥部，革命军击溃商团军，取得反对帝国主义和买办资产阶级的一次重大胜利。周恩来撰文指出：国民党必须与革命的左派联成一气，实行国民革命，“才能得到革命的工农群众作革命的基本势力”。

——Assuming the posts of Secretary of the Guangdong District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy, his talents in political work began to show their edge. In October 1924, the Party Central Committee appointed Zhou Enlai as Secretary of the reestablished Guangdong District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, with jurisdiction covering Guangdong, Guangxi, Xiamen, Hong Kong, and other areas. One month later, he was also selected as Director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy. Following the Soviet experience in creating the Red Army, he improved the political work system, formulated a political training plan for soldiers, and conducted political education for students. With Sun Yat-sen’s consent, he organized the Grand Marshal’s Headquarters Armored Vehicle Team, directly under the leadership of the Guangdong District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which was the earliest revolutionary armed force under Party leadership. When the Whampoa Military Academy established two training regiments, he selected Communist Party members to serve as Party representatives for each company under the training regiments. He guided the establishment of the Young Military Association, with Communist Party members and Youth League members from Whampoa as the backbone, to conduct revolutionary ideological education for young soldiers, becoming an important channel for Zhou Enlai to connect with young military personnel. After Sun Yat-sen went north in January 1925, the Guangdong warlord Chen Jiongming planned to take the opportunity to invade Guangzhou. The Guangdong revolutionary government decided to launch an Eastern Expedition to suppress him. The Whampoa Military Academy, based on the two training regiments, formed the Whampoa School Army of about 3,000 men to participate in the Eastern Expedition, with Zhou Enlai, as Director of the Political Department, responsible for the political education of the Whampoa School Army. This was the first time our Party led military political work. Zhou Enlai continuously strengthened our Party’s backbone forces at Whampoa, and the academy’s appearance showed vigorous vitality.

——就任中共广东区委委员长和黄埔军校政治部主任，政治工作才干初露锋芒。1924年10月，党中央任命周恩来为重建后的中共广东区委委员长，所辖工作范围包括广东、广西、厦门、香港等地。一个月后，他又被选任黄埔军校政治部主任，按照苏联创建红军经验健全政治工作制度，制定士兵政治训练计划，对学生进行政治教育。他征得孙中山同意，组建大元帅府铁甲车队，直属中共广东区委领导，是党领导下的最早的一支革命武装。黄埔军校成立两个教导团，他选派共产党员担任教导团下各连党代表。他指导成立青年军人联合会，以黄埔军校的共产党员和青年团员为骨干，对青年军人进行革命思想教育，成为周恩来联系青年军人的重要渠道。1925年1月孙中山北上后，广东军阀陈炯明拟乘机进犯广州。广东革命政府决定东征讨伐。黄埔军校以两个教导团为基础组成黄埔校军约3000人参加东征，周恩来以政治部主任身份负责黄埔校军政治教育。这是我党第一次领导军队政治工作。周恩来在黄埔军校不断加强我党骨干力量，军校面貌呈现勃勃生机。

——Outstanding performance in participating in the two Eastern Expedition campaigns and suppressing the Yang (Ximin) and Liu (Zhenhuan) rebellion, winning praise from all progressive sectors of society. In early February 1925, Zhou Enlai, together with Chiang Kai-shek and Soviet military advisor Galen, led the Whampoa School Army on the Eastern Expedition. He presided over the Political Department in formulating strict discipline, stipulating no forced conscription of laborers, etc., which won popular support; he formulated a wartime propaganda plan and sent propaganda teams to explain the significance of the Eastern Expedition to the masses. Wherever the revolutionary army went, the masses voluntarily helped with transportation and acted as guides, and the political work had remarkable effects. This was very rare in modern Chinese military history. Zhou Enlai gave speeches wherever the Eastern Expedition Army went, propagating the purpose of the revolutionary army fighting for the people and mobilizing the people to aid the revolutionary army in rapidly annihilating the enemy. In mid-February, the Eastern Expedition Army launched an attack on Danshui City. Zhou Enlai led personnel from the Political Department to the front line to boost morale and enhance the army’s combat capability, repelling Chen Jiongming’s forces. From late February to early March, the Eastern Expedition Army captured Haifeng and entered Jieyang. He promptly dispatched Communist Party members to restore peasant associations, establish peasant armed self-defense forces, rebuild Party organizations, and set up Kuomintang party headquarters. In mid-March, the Whampoa School Army’s 1st Training Regiment of about 1,000 men engaged in fierce battle with Chen Jiongming’s main force in the Chaoshan area. Zhou Enlai personally went to the front line to inspire morale. Chen’s forces were defeated and fled to Jiangxi, and the Eastern Expedition achieved a decisive victory. In mid-May, Yang Ximin, Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnan Army stationed in Guangzhou, and Liu Zhenhuan, Commander-in-Chief of the Guangxi Army, taking advantage of the main force of the Eastern Expedition Army being far away in Dongjiang, secretly plotted an armed rebellion to overthrow the revolutionary government. The main force of the Eastern Expedition Army quickly returned and launched an attack on the rebel forces. Zhou Enlai instructed the Armored Vehicle Team to cooperate with the main force of the Eastern Expedition Army in combat. In mid-June, Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan’s forces were forced to surrender, and the Guangzhou government was once again saved from danger. In mid-September, remnants of Chen Jiongming’s old forces again attacked Guangzhou. The National Government launched the Second Eastern Expedition. Chiang Kai-shek served as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Expedition Army, and Zhou Enlai served as Director-General of the Political Department of the Eastern Expedition Army, awarded the rank of Major General. After assuming office, he transferred Communist Party members to the Political Department and organized a propaganda team of over 160 people to carry out various propaganda work. In October, the Eastern Expedition Army set out on the Eastern Expedition. He participated in commanding the Huizhou Campaign, organizing a dare-to-die squad with Communist Party members and Youth League members as the backbone to forcibly scale the city walls. After 30 hours of fierce fighting, the Eastern Expedition Army captured Huizhou, Chen Jiongming’s stronghold. In November, the Eastern Expedition Army entered Fujian and completely annihilated the fleeing enemy, and the Second Eastern Expedition ended in victory.

——参加两次东征战役和平定杨（希闵）、刘（震寰）叛乱的出色表现，赢得社会进步各界赞誉。1925年2月初，周恩来与蒋介石和苏联军事顾问加伦等率黄埔军校校军出发东征。他主持政治部制定严明纪律，规定不强拉伕役等，深得群众拥护；制定战事宣传计划，派宣传队向群众宣传东征意义。革命军每到一地，群众自愿帮助运输、做向导，政治工作效果显著。这在中国近代军事史上十分罕见。周恩来在东征军所到之地发表演说，宣传革命军队为人民打仗的宗旨，动员人民援助革命军以迅速歼灭敌人。2月中旬，东征军向淡水城发起进攻，周恩来率政治部人员到前线鼓舞士气，增强部队作战能力，击退陈炯明军。2月下旬至3月上旬，东征军攻克海丰、进驻揭阳，他迅即派遣共产党员恢复农会、建立农民武装自卫军、重建中共党组织和组建国民党党部。3月中旬，黄埔校军教导1团千余人与陈炯明主力部队在潮汕激战，周恩来亲赴前线激励士气，陈军败逃窜赣，东征取得决定性胜利。5月中旬，驻守广州的滇军总司令杨希闵、桂军总司令刘震寰，利用东征军主力远在东江之机，密谋武装叛乱，推翻革命政府。东征军主力迅即回师，向叛军发起进攻，周恩来指示铁甲车队配合东征军主力作战，6月中旬迫使杨希闵、刘震寰两部缴械，广州政府再度转危为安。9月中旬，陈炯明旧部又向广州进攻，国民政府第二次东征，蒋介石任东征军总指挥，周恩来任东征军总政治部主任，被授以少将军衔。他就职后，抽调共产党员到政治部，组织160多人的宣传队开展各方面宣传工作。10月，东征军出发东征，他参与指挥惠州战役，组织以共产党员和青年团员为骨干的敢死队强行登城。东征军经30小时激战，攻克陈炯明老巢惠州。11月，东征军入闽全歼逃敌，第二次东征胜利结束。

— Governing Eastern Guangdong for four months, he pioneered the CPC’s actual partial governance. On November 21, 1925, the National Government appointed Zhou Enlai as Administrative Commissioner for the Eastern Guangdong Region of Guangdong, overseeing the administrative work of 25 counties under Huizhou, Chaozhou, Meixian, and Hailufeng. On March 16, 1926, because he concurrently served as the Party Representative of the 1st Army of the National Revolutionary Army, with “heavy responsibilities and numerous tasks that could not be managed simultaneously,” he voluntarily requested to be relieved of the post of Administrative Commissioner for the Eastern Guangdong Region. During his governance of Eastern Guangdong, he issued over 400 rifles captured in the Eastern Expedition to the Hailufeng Party organization for arming peasants; strengthened trade union organizations, invigorated the workers’ movement, and held various training institutes for the workers’ and peasants’ movements to cultivate cadres for the Eastern Guangdong workers’ and peasants’ movements; proposed the establishment of the CPC Chaomei Special Committee, with Shantou focusing on the workers’ movement and each county focusing on the peasants’ movement, requiring Party and Youth League members in each county and city to strive for leadership positions as much as possible, adopting a strategy of uniting the revolutionary left, contacting the centrists, and striking at the rightists to open up the work situation; guided the establishment of the Kuomintang Chaomei Special Committee, expanding and consolidating the united front dominated by Communist Party members and Kuomintang leftists; proposed a plan for various constructions based on Sun Yat-sen’s *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, emphasizing administrative innovation, implementing democratic politics, punishing corrupt officials, ordering the dismissal of the unlawful mayor of Shantou and the reactionary county magistrates of six counties including Jieyang, and appointing Kuomintang leftists or centrists as county magistrates for the above counties; established revolutionary order in the areas under his jurisdiction, unified finances, developed cultural and educational undertakings, and negotiated the recovery of educational rights from several missionary schools, making Shantou “the pioneer in the nationwide recovery of educational rights.” This nearly four-month work can be said to represent Zhou Enlai, in his capacity as a leader of the CPC Guangdong District Committee, under the special historical conditions of Kuomintang-CPC cooperation, carrying out partial governance on behalf of our Party. This was unprecedented in the Party’s history.

——主政东江四个月，开创我党实际局部执政之先河。1925年11月21日，国民政府任命周恩来为广东东江各属行政委员，管辖惠（州）、潮（州）、梅（县）和海陆丰下属25县行政工作。1926年3月16日，他因兼任国民革命军第1军党代表，“事繁责重，不能兼顾”，主动请求免去东江各属行政委员之职。在主政东江期间，他将东征战役缴获的400多支枪发给海陆丰党组织，充作武装农民之用；健全工会组织，活跃工人运动，举办各种工农运动人员讲习所，为东江工农运动培养骨干；提议成立中共潮梅特委，汕头市以工运为主、各县以农运为主开展工作，要求各县市党团员尽可能取得领导地位，采取团结革命左派、联系中派、打击右派的策略，打开工作局面；指导成立国民党潮梅特别委员会，扩大和巩固以共产党员和国民党左派占主导地位的统一战线；提出以孙中山建国方略为依据开展各项建设的计划，强调革新行政，实行民主政治，惩办贪官污吏，下令撤销汕头不法市长和揭阳等六县反动县长职务，委任国民党左派或中派人士为上述各县县长；在所属地区建立革命秩序，统一财政，发展文化教育事业，商讨收回多所教会学校的教育权，使汕头“树全国收回教育权之先声”。这近四个月的工作，可以说是周恩来以中共广东区委领导人身份，在国共合作这一特殊历史条件下，代表我党实行的局部执政。这在党的历史上是空前的。

— Actively participating in preparations for the Northern Expedition, strengthening the vanguard role of Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment, and being the meticulous cultivator of this “Iron Army.” While still governing Eastern Guangdong, Zhou Enlai guided the formation of the Independent Regiment of the 4th Army of the National Revolutionary Army, based on the former Iron Cavalry Team of the Grand Marshal’s Mansion. The regiment was expanded to about 2,000 men, with Communist Party members Ye Ting and Zhou Shidi serving as regimental commander and chief of staff, respectively. The regiment had a Party branch, and each company had a Party group. The Party branch was directly under the leadership of the Military Department of the Guangdong District Committee. He personally oversaw the appointment and removal of cadres at the platoon level and above and major military and political training issues, repeatedly listening to reports from Ye Ting. In May 1926, Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment served as the vanguard of the Northern Expedition, departing from Zhaoqing and Xinhui. When passing through Guangzhou, Zhou Enlai convened a meeting of Party members and cadres above the company level, explaining the important significance of the Party’s decision for the Independent Regiment to serve as the advance detachment of the Northern Expedition, and calling on cadres to fight bravely, not fear sacrifice, and play a vanguard, exemplary, and backbone role. During the Northern Expedition, the Independent Regiment fought valiantly and achieved numerous outstanding feats, earning the 4th Army the title of “Iron Army.” During his time in Guangzhou, in his capacity as Minister of the Military Department of the Guangdong District Committee, he presided over the preparations for Communist Party members to participate in the Northern Expedition, often convening meetings of responsible persons from Party organizations in various armies of the National Revolutionary Army where Communist Party members served as Party representatives, to study preparations for the Northern Expedition, implement the Party’s policies and guidelines, and strive to enable our Party to play an important role in the Northern Expedition.

——积极参与北伐准备工作，强化叶挺独立团的北伐先锋作用，是这支“铁军”的精心培育者。还在主政东江期间，周恩来就指导以原大元帅府铁甲车队为基础组建国民革命军第4军独立团。全团扩充为约2000人，由共产党员叶挺、周士第分别任团长和参谋长。团设党支部，连有党小组。党支部由广东区委军事部直接领导。他亲自过问排以上干部任免和重大军政训练问题，多次听取叶挺汇报。1926年5月，叶挺独立团担任北伐先锋，由肇庆、新会出发。途经广州时，周恩来召集连以上党员干部讲话，说明党决定独立团担任北伐先遣队的重要意义，号召干部英勇作战，不怕牺牲，起先锋模范和骨干作用。在北伐战争中，独立团英勇善战，屡建卓功，为第4军赢得“铁军”称号。他在广州期间，以广东区委军事部长身份主持共产党员参加北伐的准备工作，经常约集国民革命军中由共产党员作党代表的各军党组织负责人开会，研究北伐准备工作，贯彻党的方针政策，努力使我们党在北伐战争中发挥重要作用。

— Participating in leading and directly commanding the Third Armed Uprising of the Shanghai Workers, elevating the workers’ movement led by the Party to a new stage. After the Northern Expeditionary Army captured Wuchang and the Nationalist government moved its capital to Wuhan, Zhou Enlai left Guangdong secretly for Shanghai, serving as Secretary of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Central Military Commission, and Secretary of the Military Commission of the CPC Shanghai District Committee. In mid-February 1927, the Northern Expeditionary Army led by Chiang Kai-shek occupied Hangzhou. To respond to the Northern Expeditionary Army, in late February, the Shanghai District Committee decided to launch a third armed uprising, establishing a Special Committee composed of Chen Duxiu, Zhou Enlai, and others as the highest command organ of the uprising; and forming a Special Military Commission composed of Zhou Enlai and others to formulate the uprising plan, organize armed worker pickets, and conduct secret military training, etc. The plan for the uprising was to “immediately revolt after the strike, seize police stations, use pickets to maintain order, disarm the defeated soldiers of the Zhili-Shandong Army; occupy various public organs, establish a municipal government, and welcome the Northern Expeditionary Army.” On March 20, the Northern Expeditionary Army arrived at Longhua on the outskirts of Shanghai. On the 21st, the Special Committee launched a general strike of 800,000 Shanghai workers, which then turned into an armed uprising. Zhou Enlai served as the commander-in-chief of the uprising, with Zhao Shiyan as deputy commander-in-chief. The uprising workers used inferior weapons and fought the enemy in seven areas including Nanshi and Zhabei, with the final fierce battle taking place in Zhabei, directly commanded by Zhou Enlai and Zhao Shiyan. They went to the scene in person, using 3,000 armed worker pickets as the backbone force, relying on the support of the broad masses, and after 30 hours of fighting, captured the last stronghold—the North Railway Station—on the afternoon of the 22nd, achieving victory in the armed uprising. The Third Armed Uprising of the Shanghai Workers was a magnificent feat of the Chinese workers’ movement and a heroic attempt to carry out urban armed struggle.

——参与领导并直接指挥上海工人第三次武装起义，将党领导的工人运动提升到新的阶段。北伐军攻克武昌和国民党中央政府迁都武汉后，周恩来离开广东秘密抵沪，任中共中央组织部秘书兼中央军委委员和中共上海区委军委书记。1927年2月中旬，蒋介石率领的北伐军占领杭州。为响应北伐军，是月下旬，上海区委决定发动第三次武装起义，成立由陈独秀、周恩来等参加的特别委员会为起义最高指挥机关；并由周恩来等组成特别军委，制定起义计划，组建武装工人纠察队，进行秘密军事训练，等等。起义的计划是“罢工后立即暴动，夺取警察局，以纠察队维持治安，解除直鲁军败兵的武装；占领各公共机关，成立市政府，欢迎北伐军”。3月20日，北伐军进抵上海近郊龙华，特委于21日发动上海80万工人总同盟罢工，随即转为武装起义。周恩来担任起义总指挥，赵世炎任副总指挥。起义工人使用劣质武器装备，分别在南市、闸北等7个区域与敌作战，最后的激战在闸北，由周恩来、赵世炎直接指挥。他们亲临现场，以3000名武装工人纠察队为骨干力量，依靠广大群众支援，经过30个小时战斗，于22日下午攻克最后一个据点——北火车站，取得武装起义的胜利。上海工人第三次武装起义，是中国工人运动的壮举，为开展城市武装斗争作了英勇尝试。

— Actively responding to the April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup, resolutely advocating for the punishment of Chiang Kai-shek. After the victory of the Third Armed Uprising of the Shanghai Workers, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Shanghai in late March 1927. At this time, his wings had grown full; he not only stole the fruits of victory but also secretly plotted to oppose the Communist Party and purge its members, tearing off his false revolutionary disguise. On April 12, he confiscated the weapons of the worker pickets and killed Communist Party members and progressives. On the 13th, to resist Chiang Kai-shek’s betrayal, 200,000 Shanghai workers went on strike. Zhou Enlai and Zhao Shiyan participated in a mass rally of over 100,000 people and joined the masses in street demonstrations, which were brutally suppressed by the rebel army. Facing the rapidly changing situation, Zhou Enlai, after analyzing the attitudes of the various armies of the Northern Expedition toward Chiang Kai-shek at multiple special meetings, believed that “Chiang’s strength is not great,” and that as long as the Wuhan government sent troops, “50,000 elite troops could level Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in one month.” He also pointed out: The April 12 Incident showed that “Old Chiang only appears conciliatory on the surface, but is actually preparing for an all-out attack, but we were too conciliatory beforehand, so there was no good anti-Chiang propaganda.” The joint statement by Wang Jingwei and Chen Duxiu issued on April 5 “has no positive meaning whatsoever. If this kind of conciliatory atmosphere continues on the Wuhan side, the losses in all aspects will be great.” “Militarily, the Wuhan side has no positive plan to deal with Old Chiang.” “We should first resolve Old Chiang before we can proceed with the Northern Expedition. Now we should send a telegram to Wuhan to protest, demanding a quick decision on the plan to attack the Southeast.”

——积极应对四一二反革命政变，坚决主张讨伐蒋介石。上海工人第三次武装起义胜利后，蒋介石于1927年3月下旬到达上海。这时，他羽翼已丰，不仅窃取胜利果实，而且密谋反共清党，撕下假革命伪装，于4月12日收缴工人纠察队武装，杀害共产党人和进步人士。13日，为反抗蒋介石叛变，上海20万工人罢工。周恩来、赵世炎参与有10多万人参加的群众大会，同群众一起上街游行示威，遭到叛军残酷镇压。面对骤变形势，周恩来在多次特别会议上分析北伐各军对蒋介石的态度后认为，“蒋的力量并不大”，只要武汉政府出兵，有“五万精兵一月即可削平”蒋介石的势力。他还指出：四一二事变说明“老蒋只是对我们表面和缓，实际是准备整个打击，但我们事前太和缓，以致无好好反蒋宣传”。4月5日发表的汪精卫、陈独秀联合声明“毫无积极意味，此种和缓空气，如果武汉方面仍继续下去，各方面损失很大”，“军事上，武汉方面对于老蒋无积极对付的方策”，“应先解决老蒋然后可以北伐。现在我们应打一电报给武汉提出抗议，要求赶快决定打东南的方策”。

In summary, during the three years from the high tide of the Great Revolution in 1924 to its failure in 1927, Zhou Enlai was always at the vortex of revolutionary development, representing the Chinese Communist Party and active on the political front stage. During this period, although many Chinese Communists were engaged in armed activities, few, like Zhou Enlai, were directly dispatched by the Party to carry out military work at the high level of Kuomintang-CPC cooperation. He was not only the Director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy but also the Party’s highest Party representative in the military during the two Eastern Expeditions; he participated in military command and governed Eastern Guangdong, actually representing the Party in partial governance there for four months; he participated in the leadership of the Guangdong District Committee and, with Sun Yat-sen’s consent, created the first revolutionary armed force led by our Party—the Ye Ting Independent Regiment of the 4th Army of the National Revolutionary Army, based on the former Iron Cavalry Team of the Grand Marshal’s Mansion; he participated in various preparations for the Northern Expeditionary Army’s departure, continuously strengthening the political propaganda work of the Northern Expeditionary Army, and then turned around to go to Shanghai to participate in leading the Third Armed Uprising of the Shanghai Workers, serving as its commander-in-chief; he cooperated and worked with Kuomintang military and political figures such as Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei, and He Yingqin, and after they betrayed the revolution, he advocated for resolute counterattack. He was a delegate to the Party’s Fifth National Congress; although he did not attend the congress, he was still elected as a Central Committee member, subsequently elected as a member of the Central Political Bureau, and in late May 1927 served as Minister of the Central Military Department (Military Department) and member of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau. On July 12, the Central Political Bureau meeting, based on instructions from the Communist International, decided to reorganize the central leadership organs, establishing a Provisional Central Standing Committee composed of Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Li Weihan, Zhang Tailei, and Li Lisan to preside over the work of the entire Party.

综上所述，从1924年大革命蓬勃高涨到1927年大革命走向失败的三年间，周恩来一直处于革命发展的旋涡中，代表中国共产党活跃于政治前台。这期间，尽管有不少中国共产党人都在从事武装活动，但像周恩来这样直接受党派遣在国共合作的高层进行军事工作的，却不多见。他既是黄埔军校政治部主任，又是两次东征中我们党在军队中的最高党代表；他既参与军事指挥，又主政东江，实际代表党在这里局部执政四个月；他既参与广东区委领导，又征得孙中山同意创建了我们党领导的第一支革命武装——以原大元帅府铁甲车队为基础组建的国民革命军第4军叶挺独立团；他既参与北伐军出师的各种准备，不断加强北伐军的政治宣传工作，又转身到上海参与领导上海工人第三次武装起义，充当起义总指挥；他既与蒋介石、汪精卫、何应钦等国民党军政要人合作共事，又在他们叛变革命后主张坚决反击。他是党的五大代表，虽没参加大会，但仍当选为中央委员，随后被选为中央政治局委员，并在1927年5月下旬任中央军人部（军事部）长、中央政治局常委。7月12日，中央政治局会议根据共产国际指示决定改组中央领导机构，成立由张国焘、周恩来、李维汉、张太雷、李立三组成的临时中央常委会主持全党工作。

On July 15, the Wang Jingwei government in Wuhan betrayed the revolution, announced its break with the Communist Party, and thereby declared the defeat of the Great Revolution. At this time, the Standing Committee of the provisional Central Committee of the CPC decided to launch an armed uprising in Nanchang, with Zhou Enlai as secretary of the CPC Front Committee. History chose Zhou Enlai to take on this heavy responsibility in a time of crisis, and this was closely related to his aforementioned experience. The armed struggle experience he had accumulated in the course of the revolution, together with his profound thinking on the general trend of the revolution and his clear political stance, made him the only suitable candidate to be the main leader of the Nanchang Uprising.

7月15日，武汉汪精卫政府叛变革命，宣布同共产党决裂，从而宣告大革命的失败。这时，中共临时中央常委会议决定，在南昌举行武装起义，周恩来为中共前敌委员会书记。历史选择周恩来临危受命，担当如此重任，与他的上述经历密切相关。他在革命过程中积累的武装斗争经验与他对革命大势的深邃思考和鲜明的政治态度，使他成为南昌起义主要领导人的不二人选。

2. The August 1 Nanchang Uprising Won Victory in the First Battle, but the Southward March Was Extremely Arduous

二、八一南昌起义首战告捷，南下进军异常艰辛

The Standing Committee of the provisional Central Committee of the CPC decided to launch an armed uprising in Nanchang because the military armed forces that our Party could control had all been transferred from Wuhan to the Jiujiang area under the name of the "Eastern Expedition to Punish Chiang Kai-shek." [8]8 The "Eastern Expedition to Punish Chiang Kai-shek" refers to the military campaign planned by the Wuhan National Government in 1927 against Chiang Kai-shek after his April 12 counter-revolutionary coup in Shanghai. These forces were: He Long's National Revolutionary Army 20th Army, Ye Ting's 11th Army 24th Division, and the two regiments (the 73rd and 75th Regiments) of the 4th Army 25th Division reorganized on the basis of Ye Ting's Independent Regiment; in Nanchang there were also Zhu De's former 3rd Army Officer Training Regiment and the Nanchang Public Security Bureau Security Detachment. These were the basic backbone forces of the uprising.

中共临时中央常委会议决定在南昌举行武装起义，是因为我们党能够控制的军事武装力量，在“东征讨蒋”名义下，均已从武汉调至九江地区。这些部队是：贺龙率领的国民革命军第20军，叶挺率领的第11军第24师，还有第4军第25师在叶挺独立团基础上整编的两个团（第73、第75团）等；在南昌还有朱德原领导的第3军军官教导团和南昌市公安局保安队等。这是起义的基本骨干力量。

In late July 1927, Wang Jingwei and the commander of the Second Front Army, Zhang Fakui, on whom he relied, felt that the troops of He Long and Ye Ting were "unstable" and attempted to summon the two men to Lushan for a meeting in order to strip them of military command. Ye Jianying, chief of staff of the 4th Army, learned of this and rushed to Jiujiang to discuss countermeasures with He Long and Ye Ting, deciding to move the troops to the vicinity of Nanchang to await developments.

1927年7月下旬，汪精卫和他倚仗的第二方面军总指挥张发奎感到贺龙、叶挺的部队“不稳定”，企图以开会之名将两人召至庐山解除兵权。第4军参谋长叶剑英知情后赶赴九江，与贺龙、叶挺商量对策，决定将部队开到南昌附近待机行事。

(1) Zhou Enlai rushed to Nanchang to preside over the Central Front Committee meeting, vetoed Zhang Guotao's erroneous views, and resolutely decided to launch the August 1 Uprising. Because of the merger of the Nanjing and Wuhan regimes, [9]9 The "merger of the Nanjing and Wuhan regimes" (Ning-Han heliu) refers to the reconciliation in July 1927 between Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing National Government and Wang Jingwei's Wuhan National Government, which ended their split and united against the CPC. some of our Party's leading cadres arrived in Jiujiang one after another. On July 20, Li Lisan, Ye Ting, Nie Rongzhen, and others proposed at a discussion meeting: militarily, quickly concentrate in Nanchang, move He Long's 20th Army to join us, "in Nanchang, stage an insurrection to disarm the 3rd, 6th, and 9th Armies in Nanchang. Politically, oppose the Wuhan and Nanjing governments and establish a new government to issue the call." This opinion was conveyed to the Central Committee and received approval. On July 24 (or 25), Zhou Enlai spoke at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the provisional Central Committee, demanding that the Central Committee quickly decide on the name, political program, and strategy of the Nanchang Uprising, practically plan to mobilize the worker-peasant forces in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and the Dongjiang area of Guangdong, and request that the Comintern quickly supply arms and materials via Shantou. The meeting finally decided to launch an armed uprising in Nanchang under the name of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and determined the direction of the troops' action after the uprising: immediately march south, occupy Guangdong, secure a seaport, obtain aid from the Comintern, and then launch a second Northern Expedition.

（一）周恩来赶赴南昌主持中央前委会议，否定张国焘错误主张，毅然决定发动八一起义。由于宁汉合流，我党一些负责人先后抵达九江。7月20日，李立三、叶挺、聂荣臻等在谈话会上提出：在军事上赶快集中南昌，运动贺龙所率第20军与我们一起，“在南昌暴动解决三、六、九军在南昌之武装。在政治上反对武汉、南京两政府，建立新的政府来号召”。这个意见转告中央后，得到同意。7月24日（或25日），周恩来在临时中央常委会议上发言，要求中央从速决定南昌起义的名义、政纲和策略，切实计划发动湘、鄂、赣和广东东江一带工农势力，并要求共产国际经由汕头迅速接济军火物资。会议最后决定以国民党革命委员会名义在南昌举行武装起义，确定起义后部队行动方向：立即南下，占领广东，取得海口，求得共产国际的援助，再举行第二次北伐。

On July 26, Zhou Enlai, accompanied by Chen Geng, rushed to Jiujiang and conveyed to Li Lisan and others, who were discussing issues related to the uprising, the specific decision of the CPC Central Committee to launch the Nanchang Uprising. In response to the debate over whether to include the confiscation of big landlords' land in the political program, he proposed that "the land revolution should be the main slogan," unifying everyone's understanding. Subsequently, he organized the uprising troops to march toward Nanchang, and instructed Nie Rongzhen to bring the 4th Army 25th Division at Mahuiling to Nanchang to participate in the uprising. The next day, Zhou Enlai secretly arrived in Nanchang, which was under Kuomintang control. In accordance with the decision of the CPC Central Committee, he presided over the establishment of the CPC Front Committee, composed of Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan, Yun Daiying, and Peng Pai, at the Jiangxi Grand Hotel, responsible for commanding all front-line affairs. The meeting decided to launch the uprising on the evening of July 30. The next day, he went to He Long's place and informed him of the CPC Central Committee's decision on the Nanchang Uprising and the action plan. He Long expressed: I completely obey the Communist Party; however you want me to act, I will act.

7月26日，周恩来由陈赓陪同赶到九江，向正在讨论有关起义问题的李立三等传达中共中央关于举行南昌起义的具体决定。针对讨论中发生的是否把没收大地主土地列入政纲的争论，他提出“应该以土地革命为主要的口号”，统一了大家认识。随后，组织起义队伍向南昌进发，他交代聂荣臻将在马回岭的第4军第25师拉到南昌参加起义。次日，周恩来秘密到达国民党控制下的南昌。根据中共中央决定，在江西大旅社主持成立由周恩来、李立三、恽代英、彭湃组成的中共前敌委员会，负责指挥前敌一切事宜。会议决定在7月30日晚举行起义。第二天，他前往贺龙处，告以中共中央关于南昌起义的决定和行动计划。贺龙表示：我完全听共产党的话，要我怎样干就怎样干。

Just as the uprising preparations were intensifying, on the morning of July 30, Central Committee representative Zhang Guotao arrived in Nanchang. At an emergency meeting of the Front Committee, he proposed that the uprising should obtain Zhang Fakui's consent, otherwise it should not proceed; and he said this was the opinion of the Comintern representative. The Front Committee members unanimously opposed this view. Zhou Enlai resolutely stated: "The International representative and the Central Committee gave me the task of coming here to preside over this movement. Now the order given to you is like this; I cannot be responsible. I will immediately return to Hankou!" The next morning, another meeting was held, and Zhang Guotao no longer insisted. The Front Committee decided to launch the uprising on August 1. On the night of the 31st, the uprising forces discovered that a deputy battalion commander had run to the enemy headquarters to inform on them, and the Front Committee decided to advance the uprising by two hours.

正当起义准备工作紧张进行时，7月30日晨，中央代表张国焘来到南昌，在前委紧急会议上提出：起义应该征得张发奎同意，否则不可动；并说这是共产国际代表的意见。前委成员一致反对这一主张。周恩来坚决表示：“国际代表及中央给我的任务是叫我来主持这个运动，现在给你的命令又如此，我不能负责了，我即刻回汉口去吧！”次日晨，再开会，张国焘不再坚持。前委决定，8月1日举行起义。31日夜，起义军发现一个副营长跑到敌军指挥部告密，前委决定起义提前两小时。

In the early morning of August 1, under the leadership of the Front Committee headed by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, and others led more than 20,000 troops directly under the Party's control and influence in an armed uprising. After more than four hours of fierce fighting, the uprising forces annihilated more than 3,000 enemy defenders and occupied the entire city of Nanchang. In accordance with the Central Committee's prior decision, the uprising forces still used the banner of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. At 9 a.m., they convened a joint meeting at the former Jiangxi Provincial Government, attended by Chinese Communist Party members and left-wing Kuomintang figures. Ye Ting reported on the course of the uprising, and the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee was established, electing 25 members including Soong Ching-ling, Deng Yanda, He Xiangning (the three were not in Nanchang), He Long, and Zhou Enlai. In the name of Soong Ching-ling and others, they issued the "Manifesto of the Central Committee Members," pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei had betrayed the revolution, abandoned the three major policies of alliance with Russia, alliance with the Communist Party, and support for the peasants and workers, and had become criminals against Sun Yat-sen's cause; it called on all revolutionaries to unite, inherit Sun Yat-sen's behest, and continue to struggle for opposing imperialism and implementing the solution to the land problem.

8月1日凌晨，在以周恩来为首的前委领导下，贺龙、叶挺、朱德、刘伯承等率领我党直接掌握和影响下的军队两万余人，举行武装起义。经过四个多小时激战，起义军全歼守敌3000余人，占领南昌全城。起义军按照中央事先决定，仍用国民党革命委员会旗号，于上午9时在原江西省政府召开有中国共产党人和国民党左派人士参加的联席会议，由叶挺报告起义经过，成立国民党革命委员会，推举宋庆龄、邓演达、何香凝（3人未到南昌）、贺龙、周恩来等25人为委员；并以宋庆龄等人名义发表《中央委员宣言》，指出蒋介石、汪精卫背叛革命，毁弃联俄、联共、扶助农工三大政策，已成为孙中山事业的罪人；号召一切革命者团结一致，继承孙中山的遗志，继续为反对帝国主义与实行解决土地问题奋斗。

On August 2, Nie Rongzhen and Zhou Shidi led the two regiments of the 4th Army 25th Division, which had risen in revolt at Mahuiling, numbering 3,000 men, to Nanchang. This was a highly combat-effective force. When Zhou Enlai saw them, he said happily: "The action was very successful! I didn't originally expect it to go so smoothly, pulling out most of the 25th Division." Cai Tingkai's (a non-Communist) 11th Army 10th Division also temporarily joined the uprising. Thus, the uprising forces at their peak reached 20,500 men. The uprising troops continued to use the designation of the National Revolutionary Army Second Front Army, under which were the 9th, 11th, and 20th Armies, a total of three armies. The Revolutionary Committee appointed He Long as acting commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army Second Front Army and commander of the 20th Army, Ye Ting as acting front-line commander-in-chief and acting commander of the 11th Army, Zhu De as deputy commander of the 9th Army, Guo Moruo as director of the General Political Department, and Wu Yuzhang as secretary-general of the Revolutionary Committee.

8月2日，聂荣臻、周士第率领在马回岭起义的第4军第25师两个团3000人赶到南昌。这是一支战斗力很强的部队。周恩来见到他们后高兴地说：“行动很成功！我原来没想到这样顺利，把二十五师大部分都拉出来了。”蔡廷锴（非共产党人）部第11军第10师也临时参加起义。这样，起义军最多时兵力达到20500人。起义部队沿用国民革命军第二方面军番号，下辖第9、第11、第20军共3个军。革命委员会任命贺龙为国民革命军第二方面军代总指挥兼第20军军长，叶挺为代前敌总指挥兼代第11军军长，朱德为第9军副军长，郭沫若为总政治部主任，吴玉章为革命委员会秘书长。

(2) Zhou Enlai led the uprising forces south along the eastern route, defeated the enemy twice, and the main force entered Chaozhou and Shantou. From August 3 to 7, the uprising forces successively withdrew from Nanchang in accordance with the Central Committee's prior decision. There were two routes at the time: first, the western route, following the Gan River south, passing through Zhangshu, Ji'an, and Ganzhou, taking the Shaoguan road, and directly descending on Guangdong. This was a relatively prosperous main road, but it was heavily garrisoned by enemy troops, and the forces would inevitably be caught between two fronts. Second, the eastern route, which was advocated by Zhou Enlai and others, that is, taking the eastern Jiangxi road, passing through Fuzhou, Yihuang, and Guangchang, marching south to the Dongjiang area of Guangdong, and occupying the Shantou seaport. This route was mostly mountainous, with weak enemy forces, and the Dongjiang area was where Zhou Enlai had once governed, with a developed peasant movement and a good mass base. The Front Committee approved taking the eastern route. On the 5th, after Zhou Enlai reported to the Central Committee on the situation of the Nanchang Uprising and the withdrawal route, contact with the Central Committee was severed. The long southward march was a test for the uprising forces. After only one day of marching, Cai Tingkai's 10th Division broke away from the main force and turned toward Zhejiang, taking away nearly a quarter of the troops. The uprising forces marched on mountain roads, each person carrying a heavy load, with supply difficulties, suffering from hunger and illness, and the troops suffered severe attrition. After three days of marching, combat strength was reduced by nearly one-third. Starting on the 7th, the troops reached Fuzhou, changed the method of military supply, and the troops received a brief rest. On the 12th, the uprising forces arrived in Yihuang. Chen Yi caught up with the troops, and Zhou Enlai assigned him to serve as political instructor of the 73rd Regiment, the main regiment of the 25th Division, saying to him with a smile: "The job I'm assigning you is too small; don't think it's too small." Chen Yi replied cheerfully: "What's small or not! Even if you told me to be a company political instructor, I'd do it, as long as I get to take up arms."

（二）周恩来率起义军南走东线，两胜敌军，主力入潮汕。8月3日至7日，起义军按照中央先前决定陆续撤离南昌，时有两条路线：一是西线，沿赣江南行，经樟树、吉安、赣州，取道韶关，直下广东。这是条比较富庶的大道，但多为敌军重兵驻扎地区，势必会腹背受敌。二是东线，这是周恩来等所主张的，即走赣东，取道抚州、宜黄、广昌，南下广东东江地区，占领汕头海口。这条路多为山地，敌军薄弱，且东江为周恩来曾主政之地，农民运动发达，有较好群众基础。前委赞同走东线。5日，周恩来向中央报告南昌起义情况和撤离路径后，与中央的联系就中断了。南下征程路漫漫，对起义军是个考验。仅仅行军一天，蔡廷锴部第10师脱离大部队折往浙江，拉走近1/4兵力。起义军走山路，每人负重很多，给养困难，饥病交加，部队减员严重，军行三天，实力损耗近1/3。7日起，部队到达抚州，改变军需办法，部队得到短暂休整。12日，起义军进抵宜黄，陈毅赶上队伍，周恩来分配他担任第25师主力团73团指导员，笑着对他说：“派你干的工作太小了，你不要嫌小。”陈毅爽快回答：“什么小不小哩！你叫我当连指导员也干，只要拿武装我就干。”

In late August, the uprising army marched south to Ruijin, encountered enemy forces, and won two consecutive battles. The first battle was fought at Rentian Market north of Ruijin, where the 20th Army engaged the forces of Qian Dajun and the reinforcements of Huang Shaohong. The fighting lasted until dawn the next day; Qian Dajun’s forces were routed, the uprising army occupied Ruijin, and they achieved their first victory. Next, they took the initiative to attack the main enemy force defending Huichang, with the 25th Division and the 24th Division launching the main assault in a fierce battle. Qian Dajun’s forces suffered 6,000 casualties, prisoners, and deserters, leaving only 3,000 men to retreat. The uprising army won this great victory but paid a heavy price, with a thousand casualties, a significant proportion of the army’s total strength. On September 5, the vanguard of the uprising army reached Changting, and Zhou Enlai reported to the Party Central Committee: “In the two battles at Ruijin and Huichang, our army suffered nearly a thousand casualties among officers and men, and ammunition consumption was also high. ‘After these two battles, although we defeated the enemy, the shortage of troops and ammunition will in fact become the greatest difficulty we will inevitably encounter upon entering Chaozhou and Meixian.’ ‘Please cable the Comintern [10]10 The Communist International (Comintern), an international organization of communist parties founded by Lenin in 1919 and dissolved in 1943. to have goods packed abroad, so that once Shantou is captured, they can be shipped to Shantou within ten days.’ ‘Please cable the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee to call on the workers and peasants of the Eastern River, Chaozhou, and Shantou to respond to everything, in order to consolidate the workers’ and peasants’ political power and its armed forces.’” He convened a meeting of the Front Committee to discuss the plan for capturing the Eastern River. The meeting decided to take Chaozhou and Shantou with the main force, leaving a portion of troops at Sanheba to monitor the enemy in Meixian.

8月下旬，起义军南下瑞金，遭遇敌军，接连两仗皆胜。第一仗在瑞金北壬田市，第20军与敌钱大钧部和增援的黄绍竑部交火，战斗持续到次日清晨，钱大钧部被击溃，起义军进占瑞金，取得首仗之胜。接着，主动进攻防守会昌的敌军主力，由第25师、第24师担任主攻，打了一场恶战，钱大钧部伤亡、被俘、逃散达6000人，只余下3000人退走。起义军赢得这场大胜仗也付出不小代价，伤亡千人，占全军人数不小比重。9月5日，起义军先头部队到达长汀，周恩来向党中央报告说：瑞金会昌两役，我军伤亡官兵，约近千数，子弹消耗亦多。“经此两战，我虽胜敌，但兵员与子弹之缺乏，实成为入潮梅后必生之最大困难。”“请电知国际能于外埠装好货物，一俟汕头攻下，在十日内即能运至汕头方好。”“望电知粤省委号召东江潮汕工农响应一切，以巩固工农政权及其武装。”他召开前委会议，讨论攻取东江计划。会议决定以主力取潮汕，留一部分兵力于三河坝监视梅县之敌。

After a brief rest and reorganization in Changting, the uprising army followed the Ting River through Shanghang into Guangdong, and on September 19 occupied Sanheba, located at the confluence of the Ting, Mei, and Meitan Rivers, which merge to form the Han River. In accordance with the decision of the Changting meeting, the army divided its forces here: Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Liu Bocheng, and others led the main force straight down to Chaozhou and Shantou; Zhu De led the 25th Division of the 11th Army and other units to hold Sanheba, to monitor the pursuing forces of Qian Dajun and cover the army’s flank. The division of forces undoubtedly weakened the uprising army’s combat effectiveness, but the enemy in Chaozhou and Shantou withdrew upon hearing the news. Zhou Enlai, together with most of the Front Committee, returned to Shantou, which he had left more than a year earlier.

起义军在长汀稍事休整后，沿汀江经上杭进入广东，9月19日占领位于汀江、梅江、梅潭河汇成韩江合流处的三河坝。按照长汀会议决定，起义军在此分兵：周恩来、贺龙、叶挺、刘伯承等率主力直下潮汕；朱德率第11军第25师等部留守三河坝，以监视尾追的钱大钧部，掩护全军侧背。分兵无疑削弱了起义军的战斗力，但潮汕敌军闻风撤离了。周恩来同前委大多数人一起又回到他离别了一年多的汕头。

On September 25, the uprising army entered Shantou, issued proclamations to reassure the people, established a municipal government and the Eastern River Workers’ and Peasants’ Counter-Insurgent Army General Headquarters, and posted slogans everywhere reading “Implement land revolution, land to the tillers.” On the 26th, a mass rally of ten thousand people was held, and Zhou Enlai delivered a speech, calling on the people to rise up and struggle for their own liberation.

9月25日，起义军进驻汕头，发布安民告示，成立市政府和东江工农讨逆军总指挥部，遍贴“实行土地革命，耕者有其田”标语。26日，召开万人大会，周恩来发表讲演，号召人民起来奋斗，争取自身的解放。

(3) The forces holding Sanheba, under the leadership of Zhu De and Chen Yi, carried out the “Three Rectifications in Southern Jiangxi” [11]11 “Three Rectifications in Southern Jiangxi” (赣南三整): A series of three reorganizations—ideological, organizational, and military—carried out by Zhu De and Chen Yi on the remaining forces of the Nanchang Uprising in southern Jiangxi in late 1927, analogous to Mao’s “Sanwan Reorganization.”, and joined forces with Mao Zedong, becoming an important mainstay in persisting in the Jinggangshan struggle. After the division of forces at Sanheba, Zhu De led approximately 4,000 men, including the 25th Division of the 11th Army, whose backbone was Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment, and the 9th Army Education Regiment, to hold this key transportation hub. At the end of September, Qian Dajun’s forces, numbering over 20,000, arrived at Sanheba. The two armies faced each other across the river, and fighting began on October 1. Because the enemy was numerous and we were few, in order to preserve revolutionary strength, after three days and nights of bloody combat, in which over 1,000 enemy troops were annihilated, Zhu De led his forces to withdraw from their positions. More than 2,500 commanders and fighters broke through the encirclement, intending to proceed to Chaozhou and Shantou to rejoin the main force of the uprising army. On the way, they learned of the defeat at Chaozhou and Shantou, and the thinking of the troops was greatly shaken. Zhu De said to the uprising army at Maozhi on the border of Guangdong and Jiangxi: “I am a Communist Party member, and it is my responsibility to preserve the revolutionary seeds of the uprising. I have the confidence to lead this revolutionary force out of the enemy’s encirclement.” This speech played a huge role in stabilizing military morale and consolidating the troops. He led his forces to fight across the borders of Guangdong, Fujian, and Jiangxi, arriving at Anyuan, Dayu, and Chongyi, where they carried out the famous “Three Rectifications in Southern Jiangxi”: ideological rectification at Tianxinxu in Anyuan, strengthening political education, revitalizing revolutionary spirit, and reversing the chaotic and lax situation of the troops; organizational reorganization in Dayu, reorganizing the remaining seven to eight hundred men into a column, rectifying Party and Youth League organizations, establishing Party branches, developing new Party members, and assigning Party and Youth League members to companies, placing the army under Party leadership; military training and rectification at Shangbao in Chongyi, including tightening discipline, stipulating that all funds raised and captured supplies be turned over to the public, strengthening military training, changing combat forms, and learning to fight guerrilla warfare. After the “Three Rectifications in Southern Jiangxi,” the remaining forces of the August 1 Uprising withstood the test of extremely difficult conditions, and the spirit of the officers and men was completely renewed. It was close in time to the “Sanwan Reorganization” [12]12 “Sanwan Reorganization” (三湾改编): A reorganization of the Autumn Harvest Uprising forces carried out by Mao Zedong at Sanwan, Jiangxi, in September 1927, which established Party branches on company-level units and laid the foundation for Party leadership over the army. of the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao Zedong, similar in methods, and basically consistent in guiding ideology and the purpose of army building. The great power of ideals and beliefs demonstrated by the “Three Rectifications in Southern Jiangxi” was rooted in the fertile soil of deep reliance on the masses of the people, becoming an important basic principle of our Party’s political army building. This also laid the ideological foundation for the subsequent joining of forces between the remaining forces of the August 1 Uprising and Mao Zedong’s Autumn Harvest Uprising troops at Jinggangshan, making them an important mainstay in persisting in the Jinggangshan struggle.

（三）扼守三河坝部，在朱德、陈毅领导下进行“赣南三整”，与毛泽东会师，成为坚持井冈山斗争的重要主力。三河坝分兵后，朱德率以叶挺独立团为骨干的第11军第25师和第9军教育团共约4000人在这个重要交通枢纽进行坚守。9月底，钱大钧部两万多人到达三河坝。两军隔江对峙，于10月1日战斗打响。由于敌众我寡，为保存革命力量，经过三昼夜血战，在歼灭敌军1000多人后，朱德率部撤出阵地，2500多名指战员突围出来，准备前往潮汕与起义军主力会合。在途中获悉潮汕失败消息，部队官兵的思想有很大波动。朱德在粤赣边的茂芝对起义军说：我是共产党员，有责任把起义的革命种子保留下来，有信心把这支革命队伍带出敌人的包围圈。这个讲话对稳定军心、凝聚部队起了巨大作用。他率部转战粤闽赣边界，到达安远、大余、崇义，进行著名的“赣南三整”，即在安远天心圩进行思想整顿，加强政治教育，振奋革命精神，扭转部队混乱涣散局面；在大余开展组织整编，将仅存的七八百人，改编成纵队，整顿党团组织，成立党支部，发展新党员，将党团员分到连队，使军队置于党的领导之下；在崇义上堡开展军事整训，包括整肃纪律，规定募款和缴获物资全部归公，加强军事训练，改变作战形式，学会打游击战。经过“赣南三整”， 八一起义军余部经受住了极端困难条件的考验，官兵精神面貌焕然一新。它与毛泽东领导的秋收起义军的“三湾改编”在时间上相近，在做法上类似，其指导思想和建军宗旨基本一致。“赣南三整”彰显的理想信念伟大力量，根植于深深依靠人民群众的厚土之中，成为我党政治建军的重要基本原则。这也为不久之后八一起义军余部与毛泽东的秋收起义队伍会师井冈山，成为坚持井冈山斗争的重要主力，奠定了思想基础。

(4) The uprising army failed to detect the enemy’s quiet concentration around Chaozhou and Shantou, was outnumbered, and was defeated at Tangkeng. After the main force of the uprising army reached Chaozhou and Shantou, the enemy’s heavy forces were also gathering in the Chaozhou-Shantou area. The uprising army was eager to raise funds and neglected to understand the serious enemy situation around them. When the enemy attacked Chaozhou and Shantou, the uprising army only then hastily met the enemy. The uprising army had only over 6,000 troops, less than one-third of the enemy forces facing them. The main force of the uprising army engaged in close-quarters bayonet fighting with the enemy in the Jieyang area, fighting fiercely for three days and nights before withdrawing from the battle. Chaozhou and Shantou had no natural defenses to rely on, and the garrison troops successively withdrew, concentrating in the Tangkeng area (today’s Fengshun county seat). The entire battle situation took a sharp turn for the worse.

（四）起义军对敌军悄然集结潮汕周围失察，寡不敌众，汤坑失败。在起义军主力到达潮汕后，敌军重兵也在向潮汕地区集结。起义军急于筹饷，对周围严重敌情疏于了解。当敌军进犯潮汕时，起义军才匆忙迎敌。起义军兵力只有6000余人，不及当面敌军的1/3。起义军主力部队在揭阳地区与敌军展开短兵相接的白刃战，鏖战三昼夜，撤出战斗。潮州、汕头无险可守，驻守部队先后撤离，集中于汤坑（今丰顺县城）一带，整个战局急转直下。

Since the end of September, Zhou Enlai had been seriously ill. He withdrew from Shantou with the Front Committee organs and arrived at Liusha in Puning on October 3. He Long and Ye Ting also withdrew here with the troops from the Jieyang front line. Twenty to thirty members of the uprising army leadership held an emergency meeting here. Guo Moruo’s memoirs record: “It was mainly Enlai who gave the report. He was suffering from malaria, and his face looked bluish-green. He first briefly reviewed the reasons for the defeat,” “and then spoke of the generally decided measures for dealing with the aftermath—armed personnel should be collected and reorganized as much as possible, withdraw to Hailufeng, and from now on carry out a long-term revolutionary struggle. This work had already been slightly organized. Non-armed personnel could stay if they wished, or disperse locally if they did not. Several local peasant association members had already been found as guides to withdraw separately to the seaports, and then go separately to Hong Kong or Shanghai.” The Liusha meeting decided to no longer use the name of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and to implement land revolution.

9月底以来，周恩来身染重病，随前委机关撤离汕头，于10月3日到达普宁流沙。贺龙、叶挺也率揭阳前线部队撤至这里。起义军领导成员二三十人在此召开紧急会议。郭沫若回忆写道：“主要是恩来作报告，他是在发着疟疾的，脸色显得碧青。他首先把打了败仗的原因，简单地检讨了一下”，“接着又说到大体上已经决定了的善后的办法——武装人员尽可能收集整顿，向海陆丰撤退，今后要作长期的革命斗争。这工作已经做得略有头绪了。非武装人员愿留的留，不愿留的就地分散。已经物色了好些当地的农会会友做向导，分别向海口撤退，再分头赴香港或上海”。流沙会议决定不再使用国民党革命委员会名义，实行土地革命。

After the meeting, the troops advanced towards Yunluo on the road to Hailufeng. Zhou Enlai’s fever reached 40 degrees Celsius, and he was carried on a stretcher, walking at the rear of the moving column. He said to comrades who urged him to leave the troops: “My illness is not serious, I can hold on. I cannot leave the troops. I am prepared to go to Hailufeng and raise the banner of the Soviets!” After the troops left Liusha, while marching on mountain paths, they were cut in two by the main 11th Division of Chen Jitang. Zhou Enlai, together with He Long and Ye Ting, commanded the uprising army to counterattack, but because the soldiers were too exhausted from continuous fighting, the troops were scattered. One part broke through and entered the Hailufeng area, joining forces with local peasant troops to form the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. Zhou Enlai, burning with fever, became separated from the main force, with only Ye Ting, Nie Rongzhen, and a few others by his side. When he was delirious, he still shouted: “Charge! Charge!” In the first half of October, Yang Shihun, a Standing Committee member of the Shantou Municipal Party Committee of the CPC (who had been responsible for the Party’s labor movement work when Zhou Enlai was in charge of the Eastern River), transferred them to Jiazi Harbor in Jinxiang Town, Lufeng County, where they took a small boat out to sea. Nie Rongzhen recalled: “That boat was really too small, truly a tiny skiff. The four of us—Enlai, Ye Ting, myself, and Yang Shihun—plus the boatman, crowded the small boat to the brim. We arranged for Enlai to lie down in the cabin, and there was no room for a second person in the cabin. The three of us and the boatman had to crowd on deck. The boat was too small, there was not much space on deck, the wind and waves were high, and the small boat rocked violently. It was impossible to stand steadily, or even to sit steadily. I tied myself to the mast with a rope to avoid being shaken into the sea. This journey was quite difficult. We tossed and struggled on the vast sea for two days and one night before finally reaching Hong Kong. After arriving in Hong Kong, Comrade Yang Shihun got in touch with the provincial Party committee, arranged for Comrade Enlai to settle down for treatment, and then left.”

会后，部队向海陆丰道上的云落前进。周恩来高烧到40度，由担架抬着，走在转移队伍后面。他对劝他离开部队的同志说：“我的病不要紧，能支撑得住。我不能脱离部队，准备到海陆丰去，扯起苏维埃的旗帜来！”部队离开流沙后，走山路被陈济棠的主力第11师拦腰切断。周恩来与贺龙、叶挺指挥起义军还击，但因战士们连续作战太疲劳，部队被打散，一部突围进入海陆丰地区，同当地农军会合，组建为工农革命军。发着高烧的周恩来，同主力部队失散后，由叶挺、聂荣臻等几个人守在身边。他神志不清时还在喊：“冲啊！冲啊！”10月上中旬，中共汕头市委常委杨石魂（周恩来主政东江时负责党的工运工作）将他们转移到陆丰金厢镇的甲子港，乘小船出海。聂荣臻回忆道：“那条船，实在太小，真是一叶扁舟。我们四个人——恩来、叶挺、我和杨石魂，再加上船工，把小船挤得满满的。我们把恩来安排在舱里躺下，舱里再也挤不下第二个人。我们三人和那位船工只好挤在舱面上。船太小，舱面没多少地方，风浪又大，小船摇晃得厉害，站不稳，甚至也坐不稳。我就用绳子把身体拴到桅杆上，以免被晃到海里去。这段行程相当艰难，在茫茫大海中颠簸搏斗了两天一夜，好不容易才到了香港。到香港后，杨石魂同志同省委取得了联系，把恩来同志安置下来治病，以后他就走了。”

The Nanchang Uprising, which shocked China and the world, thus ended tragically.

震惊中外的南昌起义就这样悲壮地失败了。

After recuperating from illness in Kowloon, Hong Kong, Zhou Enlai traveled by ship to Shanghai in early November to attend the enlarged provisional Politburo meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC. The meeting was chaired by Qu Qiubai and adopted the “Resolution on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Party of China,” drafted by the Comintern representative Besso Lominadze. The resolution incorrectly analyzed the revolutionary situation in China, demanding urban insurrections everywhere, thereby giving rise to the “

周恩来在香港九龙养病后，于11月上旬乘船到达上海出席中共中央临时政治局扩大会议。会议由瞿秋白主持，通过了由共产国际代表罗米纳兹起草的《中国现状与共产党的任务决议案》。决议对中国革命形势作出不正确分析，要求各地举行城市暴动，形成“左”倾盲动错误。会议还通过决议，在组织上对以周恩来为书记的南昌起义前敌委员会全体成员予以警告处分。同时，增选周恩来为临时中央政治局委员、常务委员。

III. A New Inquiry into the Historical Status of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising

三、八一南昌起义历史地位新探

During the “Cultural Revolution,” the Red Guards demanded that August 1 be abolished as Army Day and that September 9, the start of the Autumn Harvest Uprising on the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi, be substituted as the commemorative day for the founding of the people’s army. Their basis was this: the August 1 Nanchang Uprising was a product of the “city-center” line; it did not carry out land revolution or establish revolutionary base areas, and it had serious errors; only the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao Zedong represented the correct line, and therefore it should be the Army Day of the people’s army. The arguments were plausible and the clamor grew loud; ordinary people found it difficult to take a stand, and in the end it was Mao Zedong himself who stopped it. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC [13]13 The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, held in December 1978, marked the beginning of the reform and opening-up era and a shift away from Maoist class struggle to economic development., comprehensive efforts were made to set things right, ultraleftist trends of thought were criticized, and scientific explanations were given for many historical issues of the Party. The second historical resolution of 1981 and the third historical resolution of 2021 affirmed the achievements of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising [14]14 The “second historical resolution” refers to the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” adopted in 1981; the “third historical resolution” refers to the “Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s 100 Years of Struggle” adopted in 2021.. Works such as the multi-volume *History of the Communist Party of China* published by the Party History Research Center of the Central Committee and *The 100 Years of the Communist Party of China* published by the Central Institute of Party History and Literature also provided ample historical accounts of it. However, many people, including Party history researchers, have long had an unresolved knot in their minds: how to view the “city-center” line of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising, and how to give it a more scientific and comprehensive historical positioning in theoretical terms. Here, I offer some personal thoughts, seeking advice from my comrades in Party history studies.

“文化大革命”时，红卫兵曾要求废除“八一”为建军节，把湘赣边界秋收起义开始的9月9日改为建军节纪念日。其根据是：八一南昌起义是城市中心论的产物，没有实行土地革命和建立革命根据地，有严重错误；只有毛泽东领导的秋收起义才代表了正确路线，因而应为人民军队的建军节。言之凿凿，呼声高涨，一般人难以表态，最后是毛泽东本人予以制止。党的十一届三中全会后，全面拨乱反正，批判极左思潮，对党的许多历史问题给予了科学说法。1981年第二个历史决议和2021年第三个历史决议对八一南昌起义的功绩作了肯定。中央党史研究室出版的《中国共产党历史》多卷本、中央党史和文献研究院出版的《中国共产党的一百年》等著作，也都对此给予了充分的历史叙述。但是，不少人包括党史研究工作者一直有个心结未能解开：怎样看待八一南昌起义的“城市中心论”，怎样从理论上给予八一南昌起义更为科学全面的历史定位。这里，谈谈个人的一点想法，求教于党史同仁。

(1) Historical evaluation and historical lessons should be distinguished; one cannot completely tailor or interpret historical events based on subsequent success or failure. Traveling through the tunnel of time, let us look at that period of history 97 years ago. After the two severe anti-Communist incidents of April 12 and July 15 [15]15 April 12, 1927, refers to the Shanghai Massacre, when Kuomintang forces under Chiang Kai-shek purged Communists; July 15, 1927, refers to the Wuhan government’s split with the Communists, ending the First United Front., the surging Great Revolution failed. At that time, apart from a very few leaders and older followers who had participated in the Xinhai Revolution and then converted to belief in communism, such as Lin Boqu and Wu Yuzhang, most leading cadres at all levels—from members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee down to grassroots Party members—were young people in their twenties or thirties. Zhou Enlai was then only 29, not yet at the age of “standing firm” [16]16 “Standing firm” (而立之年) is a classical allusion to Confucius’s *Analects*, referring to age 30 as the time when a person establishes themselves in life.. Faced with the mass slaughter by the Kuomintang reactionaries, all comrades who stood on the correct side of history and on the side of human justice and wanted to continue the revolution were filled with uncontrollable rage and righteous indignation, their hot blood burning in their chests. Their first reaction was to wage armed resistance, to use armed revolution to oppose armed counter-revolution. As for whether to take the path of urban armed insurrection as in the Russian October Revolution or the path of encircling the cities from the countryside, there was no a priori cognitive model in their minds. After the Party’s founding, having determined to follow the path of the Russian October Revolution, there was no further deepening of understanding about what revolutionary path to take. The idea of urban armed insurrection versus the path of encircling the cities from the countryside was only raised after the failure of urban armed insurrection. At that time, there was no “choose one of two” option. If there had been, one could criticize it for choosing the wrong path; without that premise, it is inappropriate to be harsh with it. The evaluation of historical events should not be based on later understandings (that belongs to summing up historical lessons and experience), but should consider whether they contributed to advancing historical development. Therefore, we cannot simply use the later concept of what revolutionary path was proposed to measure that period of history, nor judge historical events of that time with a binary mindset.

（一）应将历史评价和历史教训加以区别，不能完全以事后成败来裁剪、解读历史事件。穿越时间隧道，看看97年前的那段历史。经历了“四一二”和“七一五”两个反对共产党的严重事变，轰轰烈烈的大革命失败了。当时的中国共产党人除极少数领导者和参加过辛亥革命转而信仰共产主义的追随者如林伯渠、吴玉章等年长些外，各级领导干部，上至中央政治局委员，下至基层党员，多数是二三十岁的青年人。那时周恩来也才29岁，不满“而立”之年。面对国民党反动派大屠杀，凡是站在历史正确和人间正义一边、要继续革命的同志，都怒不可遏、义愤填膺，满腔热血在胸中燃烧，第一反应就是要进行武装反抗，以武装的革命去反对武装的反革命。至于是走俄国十月革命的城市武装暴动道路，还是走农村包围城市道路，思想上根本没有一个先验的认知模式。在党创立时认定俄国十月革命道路后，对于走什么样的革命道路便再没有深化的认识。是城市武装暴动，还是走农村包围城市道路，是在城市武装暴动失败后才始而提出的。当时并不存在“二选一”方案。如果有，可以指责它是选择了错误道路；没有这个前提，对它苛责就不合适了。对历史事件的评价，不能按照后来的认识来要求（那属于总结历史的经验教训），而应当根据它是否对推进历史发展作出贡献来考量。因此，我们不能简单地用后来提出的是什么样的革命道路这个观念去衡量那段历史，以非此即彼的思维定式臧否那时的历史事件。

During the period of the Nanchang Uprising, our Party universally held the concept of urban armed insurrection, and could only hold this concept. This was because it was the successful experience of the October Revolution. On this basis, our Party launched three successive armed workers’ uprisings in Shanghai. Although they failed time and again, at that time it was not yet recognized that urban armed insurrection did not suit China’s national conditions, so it could only continue. After the right wing of the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution, the first consideration for opposing it was also urban armed insurrection, hence the Nanchang Uprising; at that time, the Party Central Committee also prepared to launch peasant armed uprisings in provinces where the peasant movement was relatively well developed, such as Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. As for Mao Zedong, although he had already conceived the idea of “going up to the mountains” before the August 7 Meeting [17]17 The August 7 Meeting (八七会议) was an emergency meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1927 that ended Chen Duxiu’s leadership and called for armed resistance., the attack target set by the forces he led in the Autumn Harvest Uprising was also to strike Changsha; it was only because they lacked the strength to take it that they quickly turned their guns and headed for the Jinggang Mountains, rather than deciding from the outset to go up to the mountains. It was not until the failure of the Guangzhou Uprising at the end of 1927, after experiencing multiple failures of urban armed insurrections, that the Central Committee decided not to launch urban armed insurrections, but it still did not recognize the need to shift the Party’s work focus from the cities to the countryside, nor had it realized that urban armed insurrection was completely “impracticable.” At that time, the guiding ideology of the Central Committee was still the city-center line, which is why there were three successive “Left” errors [18]18 The three successive “Left” errors refer to the putschist line of Qu Qiubai (1927-1928), the Li Lisan line (1930), and the Wang Ming line (1931-1935), all of which emphasized urban insurrection.. What made Mao Zedong exceptionally outstanding was, first, that he did not “throw an egg against a rock” by stubbornly attacking Changsha, but instead acted according to circumstances and took the path of “going up to the mountains”; second, that he was adept at summing up practical experience for theoretical reflection. Through the practice of opening up the revolutionary base area on the Jinggang Mountains, he realized that only by carrying out “armed independent regimes of workers and peasants” in remote rural areas where counter-revolutionary forces were weak could the revolution have a future. After writing the essay “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire” [19]19 “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire” (星星之火，可以燎原) is a 1930 essay by Mao Zedong arguing for the viability of rural base areas., and through the arduous struggle of opening up the Central Soviet Area, he explored the Chinese-characteristic revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside. How to make revolution in China, and what path to take, was only realized after groping in the darkness, by early 1930.

南昌起义时期，我们党普遍地是城市武装起义观念，也只能是这个观念。因为这是十月革命的成功经验。基于此，我们党才在上海接连发动三次工人武装起义。尽管一次又一次失败，但在那时还没有认识到城市武装暴动不符合中国国情，只能继续进行。国民党右派背叛革命后，怎样去反对它，首先考虑的也是城市武装暴动，所以举行南昌起义；那时，党中央也准备在农民运动开展得比较好的湖北、湖南、广东、江西等地举行农民武装暴动。就毛泽东而言，尽管在八七会议前已有“上山”思想，但率领秋收起义队伍确定的攻击目标也是要打长沙的，只是没有力量打下来才迅即掉转枪头向井冈山进发的，而并非一开始就决定上山。直至1927年底广州起义失败，在经历了多次的城市武装起义失败后，中央才决定不发动城市武装起义，但还没有认识到要将党的工作重点由城市转向农村，还没有觉悟到城市武装起义完全“行不通”。那时中央的指导思想还是城市中心论，所以才有接连三次“左”倾错误。毛泽东的超群过人之处，一是他没有去“鸡蛋碰石头”，死打长沙不放，而是见机行事，走上“上山”道路；二是善于总结实践经验进行理论思考，通过在井冈山开辟革命根据地的实践认识到，要到反革命势力薄弱的边远农村实行“工农武装割据”，革命才有发展前途，并且在写出《星星之火，可以燎原》一文后，经过开辟中央苏区艰苦卓绝的斗争，探索出农村包围城市的中国特色革命道路。中国怎样革命，走什么样的道路，是在黑暗中苦苦求索之后，到1930年初才体悟到的。

(2) The August 1 Nanchang Uprising was an important component of the arduous exploration of the Chinese revolutionary path. For a time, many people held a notion that the August 1 Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising on the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi were not moving in the same direction but were opposed to each other, believing that the Autumn Harvest Uprising was an exploration of the Chinese revolutionary path while the August 1 Nanchang Uprising was not. I do not agree with this view. Since it was exploration, that is, “crossing the river by feeling the stones,” there would be both successes and failures. One cannot say that successes are exploration while failures are not. Whether successful or not, they were all exploration and played a useful role. Those that were not successful told people “this road leads nowhere”—wasn’t that a conclusion reached only through exploration?! Knowing that “this road leads nowhere” served as a warning. Without “crossing the river by feeling the stones,” one would not know that “this road leads nowhere.” This is like traffic lights on a highway: a green light means go, a red light means stop. Can one say that the green light’s instruction is effective while the red light’s instruction is useless? Obviously not. Of course, this is only a metaphor; the two cannot be simply equated. But if we use this way of thinking to understand the August 1 Nanchang Uprising and change that linear mindset, then our understanding of its historical status will be more comprehensive. This is not to say that the August 1 Nanchang Uprising had no shortcomings or errors, or to make excuses for it. This humble article merely argues that the historical roles of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising were moving in the same direction, not opposed. Mao Zedong once pointed out: “The revolution failed, and we learned bitter lessons; hence there were the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and the Guangzhou Uprising, and we entered a new period of creating the Red Army.” [20]20 This quotation is from Mao Zedong’s 1936 essay “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War.” Clearly, Mao Zedong believed that the three major uprisings played a historical role moving in the same direction. Such a positioning conforms to historical reality. On this basis, the historical significance of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising can be stated in at least three points:

（二）八一南昌起义是对中国革命道路艰辛探索的重要组成部分。一个时期，不少人头脑中有一种观念，好像八一南昌起义与湘赣边界秋收起义不是相向而行而是相悖而立的，认为秋收起义是对中国革命道路的探索，八一南昌起义则不是。我不赞成这种观点。既然是探索，也就是“摸着石头过河”，就会有成功的，也有不成功的。不能说成功的是探索，不成功的就不是探索。无论成功与否，都是探索，都起了有益的作用。没有成功的，告诉人们“此路不通”，这不就是探索了才得出的结论吗？ ！知道“此路不通”，就起到了警示作用。不去“摸着石头过河”，就不会知道“此路不通”。这正如公路交通有红绿指示灯一样，绿灯是放行通过，红灯是不准通过。能说绿灯指示就有效益，红灯指示就无作用吗？显然不能这么说。当然，这只是一个比喻，不能将两者简单地等同看待。但是，如果参照这种思维方法来认识八一南昌起义，改变那种线性的思维定式，那么对它的历史地位的认识就会更全面一些。这样说，不是讲八一南昌起义没有缺点错误，要为其辩解。拙文只是认为八一南昌起义与秋收起义的历史作用是相向而行而不是相悖而立的。毛泽东曾指出：“革命失败，得了惨痛的教训，于是有了南昌起义、秋收起义和广州起义，进入了创造红军的新时期。”显然，这里毛泽东认为三大起义起了相向的历史作用。这样的定位符合历史实际。基于此，对八一南昌起义的历史意义，至少可讲三点：

First, the August 1 Nanchang Uprising fired the first shot of armed resistance against the reactionary Kuomintang, and in the language of blood and fire, proclaimed the Chinese Communists’ firm determination not to fear violence and to persist in revolution. As Mao Zedong pointed out: In the face of severe White Terror, “the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people were not intimidated, conquered, or annihilated. They picked themselves up from the ground, wiped off the blood stains, buried their fallen comrades, and continued the fight.” [21]21 Mao Zedong, “The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4.

第一，八一南昌起义打响了武装反抗国民党反动派的第一枪，以血与火的语言，宣告中国共产党人不畏强暴、坚持革命的坚强决心。如毛泽东指出的：在严重的白色恐怖面前，“中国共产党和中国人民并没有被吓倒，被征服，被杀绝。他们从地下爬起来，揩干净身上的血迹，掩埋好同伴的尸首，他们又继续战斗了”。

Second, the August 1 Nanchang Uprising was the beginning of the Chinese Communist Party’s independent command of armed forces, marking the formal birth of the people’s army led by the Party. The August 1 Nanchang Uprising was the first to raise the banner of using revolutionary armed force to oppose counter-revolutionary armed force; the troops participating in the uprising were the first large-scale army led by the Party. Precisely because of this, on July 11, 1933, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin adopted a resolution pointing out that, given that the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was first formed from the Nanchang Uprising, it approved the proposal of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and stipulated that each year “August 1” would be the Commemoration Day of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was the predecessor of the People’s Liberation Army, and “August 1” thus became the founding day of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In a few more years, it will be the centenary of the army’s founding; the People’s Liberation Army will achieve new goals of struggle and display a new heroic posture of a strong military.

第二，八一南昌起义是中国共产党独立掌握武装力量的开端，标志着党领导的人民军队正式诞生。八一南昌起义首先亮出以革命的武装去反对反革命武装的旗帜，参加起义的部队是党领导的第一支大规模军队。正因为如此，1933年7月11日，在瑞金的中华苏维埃共和国临时中央政府通过决议指出，鉴于中国工农红军是由南昌起义开始组建的，批准中央革命军事委员会的建议，规定以每年“八一”为中国工农红军纪念日。工农红军是人民解放军的前身，“八一”就成了中国人民解放军的建军节。再过几年，就是建军百年，人民解放军将实现新的奋斗目标，展现强军新的雄姿。

Third, the August 1 Nanchang Uprising lifted the curtain on the Agrarian Revolutionary War. In terms of the development of Party history, the period before the August 1 Nanchang Uprising belongs to the Great Revolution period, and the period after it belongs to the Agrarian Revolutionary War period. The August 1 Nanchang Uprising is the boundary marker for this periodization of Party history. This is not only because it fired the first shot and the Party had its own independent armed forces, but also because, at the time it decided on the Nanchang Uprising, the Central Committee of the CPC had already proposed that the uprising should take the implementation of the agrarian revolution as its political program. After Zhou Enlai arrived in Jiujiang from Wuhan on July 25, 1927, he conveyed the views of the Party Central Committee, emphasizing that the uprising “should take the agrarian revolution as its main slogan.” After the uprising, the “Letter to All Officers and Soldiers from He Long, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Second Front Army” pointed out that “the first mission of China’s national revolution is to carry out the agrarian revolution,” and that “our revolutionary action this time is precisely to fight for the implementation of the agrarian revolution and the solution of the peasant problem.” The Party Central Committee also clearly instructed: The Ye-Ting and He-Long Nanchang insurrection aimed “to establish a workers’ and peasants’ political power and to carry out the agrarian revolution.” Precisely because the August 1 Nanchang Uprising took the implementation of the agrarian revolution as its political program, it is the historical starting point of the Agrarian Revolutionary War.

第三，八一南昌起义揭开了土地革命战争的序幕。按照党的历史发展而言，八一南昌起义前属于大革命时期，此后为土地革命战争时期。八一南昌起义是这一段党史分期的界碑。这不仅因为它打响了第一枪，党有了自己的独立武装，还在于中共中央在决定南昌起义时就提出这次起义应以实行土地革命为政治纲领。周恩来在1927年7月25日由武汉到达九江后，传达党中央意见，强调起义“应该以土地革命为主要的口号”。起义后发表的《兼代第二方面军总指挥贺龙告全体官兵书》指出，“中国的国民革命，第一个使命就是要实行土地革命”，“我们此次革命的行动，即是为实行土地革命，解决农民问题而奋斗”。党中央还明确指示：叶、贺南昌暴动是以“建立民众的工农政权为目的，以实行土地革命为目的”。正因为八一南昌起义是以实行土地革命为政治纲领的，所以它是土地革命战争的历史起点。

(3) The August 1 Nanchang Uprising can be regarded as an important component of the great beginning of the Party’s exploration of the path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. In July 2007, on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising, Hu Jintao pointed out: “The Nanchang Uprising and the establishment of the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base occupy an extremely important position and have extremely far-reaching significance in the history of the development of our Party and the people’s army. The Nanchang Uprising and the establishment of the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base are the great beginning of our Party’s integration of the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and the creation of a sinicized Marxism; they are the glorious starting point for the Chinese Communist Party to develop Marxist military doctrine, create the Party’s military guiding theory, and forge a new type of people’s army.” This is an important historical positioning of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising, which can be interpreted from the following three aspects.

（三）八一南昌起义可视为党探索马克思主义中国化道路伟大开篇的重要内容。2007年7月，在南昌起义80周年前夕，胡锦涛指出：“南昌起义和井冈山革命根据地的建立，在我们党和人民军队发展史上具有极为重要的地位和极其深远的意义。南昌起义和井冈山革命根据地的建立，是我们党把马克思主义基本原理同中国革命具体实践相结合、创立中国化的马克思主义的伟大开篇，是中国共产党发展马克思主义军事学说、创建党的军事指导理论、缔造一支新型人民军队的光辉起点。”这是给八一南昌起义的一个重要历史定位，可以从以下三个方面来解读。

First, the Nanchang Uprising, as the beginning of the Party’s independent leadership of the Chinese revolution’s armed struggle, can be regarded as an important component of the great beginning of the Party’s exploration of the revolutionary path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. From its founding, the Party was committed to integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution, actively engaging in revolutionary practical struggle, and exploring the specific path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. In the Great Revolution movement, which was based on Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, although the Party participated in some important decisions and actively played an important role, it was not the leading protagonist of the Great Revolution. Starting from the Nanchang Uprising, the Party used independently led revolutionary armed force to oppose counter-revolutionary armed force, realizing the historic transition from the failure of the Great Revolution to the rise of the Agrarian Revolutionary War; only then did it truly begin the arduous journey of exploring the path of the Chinese revolution. Because urban armed uprisings failed again and again, the Party had to consider what kind of path would make the revolution succeed. Only then did the question of the path become an important issue that the Chinese Communists needed to resolve in revolutionary practice. The August 1 Nanchang Uprising, which fired the first shot of armed resistance against the reactionary Kuomintang, undoubtedly became an important component of the great beginning of the Party’s exploration of the revolutionary path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. The exploration it conducted for a new path of the Chinese revolution can be regarded as the practical starting point for opening up a new revolutionary path for China.

第一，南昌起义作为党独立领导中国革命武装斗争的开端，可以视为党探索马克思主义中国化革命道路伟大开篇的一个重要内容。党自创立后就致力于将马克思主义的基本原理与中国革命具体实际相结合，积极地投身革命实践斗争，探索实现马克思主义中国化的具体路径。在以国共合作为基础的大革命运动中，党虽然参与一些重要决策，积极发挥党的重要作用，但不是领导大革命的主角。从南昌起义开始，党以独立领导的革命武装反对反革命武装，实现由大革命失败到土地革命战争兴起的历史性转变，才真正展开探索中国革命道路的艰难历程。由于城市武装起义的一次又一次失败，党不得不考量走什么样的道路才能使革命成功。这样，道路问题才成为中国共产党人的革命实践需要解决的重要问题。八一南昌起义打响武装反抗国民党反动派的第一枪，无疑成为党探索马克思主义中国化革命道路伟大开篇的重要内容。它为中国革命新道路进行的探索，可视为开辟中国革命新道路的实践起点。

Second, the Nanchang Uprising provided extremely important historical lessons for the Party’s exploration of the correct revolutionary path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. Where did the reasons for the failure of the Nanchang Uprising lie? Not in the fact that the uprising should not have been held in Nanchang at that time, but in the fact that after the uprising, the troops should not have continued to carry out the pre-uprising Central Committee’s established policy of marching south to Chaozhou and Shantou, hoping to restore the Guangdong revolutionary base area, and then re-launch the Northern Expedition. Because most of the National Revolutionary Army that had carried out the Northern Expedition had already turned to the counter-revolutionary side, and the forces of the Nanchang Uprising led by the Party were weak, it was impossible to re-launch a Northern Expedition war. Mao Zedong’s greatness lay precisely in his ability to proceed from reality, change the Central Committee’s decision to attack Changsha, and lead the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops up to Jinggangshan. The leaders of the Nanchang Uprising were relatively rigid in following Central Committee instructions and lacked Mao Zedong’s political wisdom in sizing up the situation and adapting to changes. Regarding this, Zhou Enlai himself, the main leader of the uprising, explained it very clearly after the Yan’an Rectification Movement when summing up the experiences and lessons of the Great Revolution. He said: The “main mistake of the Nanchang Uprising was that it did not adopt the policy of revolution on the spot. After the uprising, the troops should not have been pulled away; even if they had to leave, they should not have gone so far. If the agrarian revolution had been carried out on the spot at that time, it would have been possible to gather the disbanded military academy students from Wuhan and some of the surviving peasants from the uprisings in Hunan and Hubei, and it would have been possible to develop their own strength more greatly. But after the Nanchang Uprising, instead of carrying out the agrarian revolution on the spot, they went far away to Shantou; instead of developing slowly on the spot, they engaged in purely military offensives and went to the seaport, hoping to receive Soviet military supplies. If they had carried out revolution on the spot, they might not have been able to hold Nanchang, but the situation in the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi would have been different, and they could have joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Comrade Mao Zedong.” Re-examining history, this analysis is correct. Failure is the mother of success. Analyzed from the dialectical theory of transformation, the Nanchang Uprising made an important contribution to the great beginning of the Party’s exploration of the revolutionary path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.

第二，南昌起义为党探索马克思主义中国化的正确革命道路提供了极其重要的历史教训。南昌起义失败的原因在哪里？不在于那时不该在南昌起义，而在于起义后不该继续执行起义前中央决定的南下潮汕、以期恢复广东革命根据地，然后重新北伐的既定方针。因为进行北伐的国民革命军大部分已转到反革命方面，党领导的南昌起义部队力量弱小，不可能再重新进行北伐战争。毛泽东的伟大就在于：能从实际出发，改变中央攻打长沙的决定，率领秋收起义部队上井冈山。南昌起义的领导人比较拘泥于执行中央指示，缺乏毛泽东那样的审时度势、善于应变的政治智慧。对此，作为起义主要领导人的周恩来本人在延安整风后总结大革命的经验教训时讲得很清楚。他说：南昌起义的“主要错误是没有采取就地革命的方针，起义后不应把军队拉走，即使要走，也不应走得太远。当时如果就地进行土地革命，是可以把武汉被解散的军校学生和两湖起义尚存的一部分农民集合起来的，是可以更大地发展自己的力量的。但南昌起义后不是在当地进行土地革命，而是远走汕头；不是就地慢慢发展，而是单纯的军事进攻和到海港去，希望得到苏联的军火接济。假使就地革命，不一定能保住南昌，但湘、鄂、赣三省的形势就会不同，并且能同毛泽东同志领导的秋收起义部队会合” 。重新审视历史，这个分析是正确的。失败是成功之母。从辩证法的转化论来分析，南昌起义为党探索马克思主义中国化革命道路的伟大开篇作出了重要贡献。

Third, after the Nanchang Uprising forces split at Sanheba, the contingent led by Zhu De made its way through arduous marches to Jinggangshan and joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong, making a tremendous contribution to opening up the Jinggangshan path. After Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops up Jinggangshan in October 1927, he carried out armed independent regimes of workers and peasants, opening a new page in the history of the Chinese revolutionary struggle. The major error of the Nanchang Uprising mentioned above by Zhou Enlai was that it did not “take root on the spot” and shift the battle to the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi to join forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong. The defeat of the main force of the Nanchang Uprising as it moved southward meant that this error could not be overcome as a whole, but the Nanchang Uprising troops left at Sanheba, under Zhu De’s command, after a hard-fought march, went up Jinggangshan half a year later and joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong, thereby partially compensating for the historical defect of the main force of the Nanchang Uprising. Also going up Jinggangshan with Zhu De were the remnants of the uprising troops that had reached Chaozhou and Shantou. The Nanchang Uprising troops that went up Jinggangshan were mostly from the Ye Ting Independent Regiment, which had strong combat effectiveness during the Northern Expedition; they were relatively well-equipped, with nearly a thousand rifles, superior to all other units. After the two forces led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De joined forces, they formed the Fourth Red Army, and a relatively large proportion of its leading members had participated in the Nanchang Uprising. At the army level, apart from the Party representative Mao Zedong, the army commander Zhu De, the chief of staff Wang Erzhuo, and the director of the training battalion and chairman of the soldiers’ committee Chen Yi, all belonged to the Nanchang Uprising forces. When discussing the Nanchang Uprising, one must also discuss this part that went up Jinggangshan; only then is it relatively complete, only then is it the full history of the Nanchang Uprising. Therefore, regarding the Nanchang Uprising and the establishment of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base as “the great beginning of creating a Sinicized Marxism” conforms to historical reality, whether in evaluating the Nanchang Uprising or in understanding the opening up of the Jinggangshan path.

第三，南昌起义部队在三河坝分兵后，由朱德率领的起义军辗转上井冈山同毛泽东领导的秋收起义部队会合，为开辟井冈山道路作出了巨大贡献。毛泽东在1927年10月率领秋收起义部队上井冈山后，实行工农武装割据，揭开了中国革命斗争历史新的一页。上述周恩来讲的南昌起义的一个主要错误是没有就地革命，转战湘、鄂、赣三省，同毛泽东领导的秋收起义部队会合。南昌起义军主力南下失败，这个错误在总体上无法克服，但留在三河坝的南昌起义军在朱德率领下，经过艰苦转战，半年之后，上井冈山同毛泽东领导的秋收起义部队会合，则在局部弥补了南昌起义主力部队的历史缺陷。随朱德上井冈山的还有南下潮汕的起义军余部。上井冈山的南昌起义军，大多属于北伐时期具有很强战斗力的叶挺独立团，装备比较整齐，枪近千支，优于其他各部。毛泽东、朱德领导的两支部队会师后组成红四军，其领导成员中参加过南昌起义的占较大比例。在军一级，除党代表毛泽东外，军长朱德、参谋长王尔琢和教导大队长兼士兵委员会主任陈毅，都属于南昌起义军。讲南昌起义，一定要讲上井冈山的这一部分，这样才比较完整，才是南昌起义的全史。因此，将南昌起义和井冈山革命根据地的建立作为“创立中国化的马克思主义的伟大开篇”，这无论是对南昌起义的评价，还是对开辟井冈山道路的认识，都是符合历史实际的。

IV. Zhou Enlai Was One of the Great Explorers Who Led the August 1 Nanchang Uprising and Opened the Path of Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context

四、周恩来是领导八一南昌起义、开启马克思主义中国化道路的伟大探索者之一

The above analysis from three aspects shows that the August 1 Nanchang Uprising can be regarded as an important component of the great beginning of the Party’s exploration of the path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. Since this is the case, Zhou Enlai, as the principal leader of the Nanchang Uprising, was undoubtedly one of the main explorers of this path, or one of the great pioneers who explored this path. Although he led the main force of the uprising to defeat in Chaozhou and Shantou, his leadership role continued to be exerted. Especially after he joined the core leadership of the Central Committee and took charge of military work, he continued to explore this path. This can be seen as his continuation of the unfinished work of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising and his continuation of the exploration of a new path for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.

上面从三个方面分析了八一南昌起义可视为党探索马克思主义中国化道路伟大开篇的重要内容。既然如此，周恩来作为南昌起义主要领导人，无疑是参与这条道路的主要探索者之一，或者说是探索这条道路的伟大先驱之一。虽然他率起义军主力在潮汕失败了，但他的领导作用还在发挥。特别是他到中央参与核心领导、负责军事工作后，还在继续探索这条道路。这可视为他在完成八一南昌起义未竟之业，探索马克思主义中国化新道路的继续。

(1) He instructed the remnants of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising forces to persist in the struggle to explore the path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context. In 1927, after participating in the November meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Zhou Enlai remained in the Central Committee to work, guiding local military struggles. At the end of the year, he learned that the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong were active at the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, and that the remnants of the Nanchang Uprising forces led by Zhu De and Chen Yi had also moved to southern Hunan. In late December, on behalf of the Party Central Committee, he wrote to Zhu De, saying, “According to what we know, in the north of Guidong, at Chaling, Lingxian, and even Lianhua in Jiangxi, there are peasant troops stationed led by Comrade Mao Zedong.” “If they are stationed in these places, you should definitely establish contact and jointly plan—mobilize the masses to use these armed forces to create a situation of insurrection and separate regimes, and establish workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ representative councils—Soviet power.” [22]22 The letter from the Party Central Committee to Zhu De, dated December 1927, instructed the Nanchang Uprising remnants to link up with Mao Zedong’s forces on Jinggangshan. At this time, Zhu De had just sent Mao Zetan to establish contact with Mao Zedong, and Mao Zedong had also successively sent Wu Zhonghao, He Changgong, and others to Zhu De’s unit to report on the terrain, masses, and products of the Jinggangshan area. The letter from the Central Committee promoted the joining of forces between the two at Jinggangshan and had guiding significance for the creation of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base. Zhu De’s unit was formed on the basis of the highly effective Ye Ting Independent Regiment, was well-equipped, and had nearly a thousand rifles, more than any other unit on Jinggangshan. Their arrival on the mountain unprecedentedly strengthened the military power of the Jinggangshan base, making them a powerful fresh force for persisting in the Jinggangshan struggle. In addition, more than 1,200 men from the remnants of the main force of the uprising that had fought their way to Liusha, from the 24th Division of the 11th Army, under the leadership of Dong Lang and Yan Changyi and following Zhou Enlai’s instructions, entered the Hailufeng area, combined with local peasant armed forces, and were reorganized into the 2nd Division of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. They launched the third armed uprising in Hailufeng and established the first county-level Soviet political power in Guangdong—the Hailufeng Soviet Revolutionary Base—initially realizing the conception of armed separate regimes of workers and peasants advocated by Zhou Enlai.

（一）指示八一南昌起义军余部坚持探索马克思主义中国化道路的斗争。1927年，周恩来参加中央政治局11月会议后，就留在中央工作，指导地方军事斗争。年底，他得知毛泽东领导的秋收起义部队活动在湘赣交界处，朱德、陈毅领导的南昌起义军余部也转移至湘南活动。12月下旬，他以党中央名义致信朱德，“据我们所知道的在桂东的北边茶陵、酃县以至江西莲花均有毛泽东同志所带领的农军驻扎”，“他们如果驻在这些地方，你们应确实联络，共同计划——发动群众以这些武力造成割据的暴动局面，建立工农兵代表会议——苏维埃政权” 。这时，朱德正派毛泽覃与毛泽东取得联系，毛泽东也先后派伍中豪、何长工等来到朱德部，报告井冈山区的地形、群众、物产等情况。中央来信促进了二者的井冈山会师，对创建井冈山革命根据地具有指导意义。朱德部是以具有很强战斗力的叶挺独立团为基础形成的，装备整齐，有近千支枪，比井冈山其他各部都多。他们的上山，空前增强了井冈山根据地的军事力量，成为坚持井冈山斗争的强大生力军。此外，打到流沙的起义军主力余部第11军第24师1200多人，在董朗、颜昌颐带领下遵照周恩来嘱咐，进入海陆丰地区，与当地农民武装结合，整编为工农革命军第2师，发动海陆丰第三次武装起义，建立广东第一个县级苏维埃政权——海陆丰苏维埃革命根据地，初步实现周恩来倡导的工农割据构想。

(2) He opposed the “Left” putschist tendency, guided the whole Party in creating the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and carrying out the struggle for armed separate regimes, and provided leadership support for exploring a revolutionary path with Chinese characteristics. After Zhou Enlai came to work in the Central Committee, although the “Left” putschist tendency held a dominant position in the Central Committee, he felt from the lessons of the defeat of the Nanchang Uprising that attention should be paid to reality, and he opposed the military adventurism prevalent in various places. In response to the widespread putschist mood in the Youth League organizations, he pointed out that if attention were not paid, the Youth League would become adventurist; this was very dangerous and would sacrifice many comrades; “no movement without an insurrection” was a serious problem. The then-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Youth League, Ren Bishi, agreed with Zhou Enlai’s view, believing that comrades in the Youth League regarded insurrection too lightly, did not understand what insurrection really was, and that random insurrections were very dangerous. In several resolutions drafted on behalf of the Central Committee and in instructions to provincial Party committees, Zhou Enlai proposed resolutely eliminating “superficially revolutionary putschism,” and that there could be no dangerous tendency to toy with insurrection. He emphasized that insurrection meant seizing political power by armed force and could only be carried out by leading the struggle of the worker and peasant masses to initiate and create a great revolutionary tide among the masses. He criticized insurrection plans in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Yunnan, and other places, resolutely opposed the implementation of a “policy of burning and killing,” and effectively curbed the ever-expanding putschist mood. He agreed with He Long and others going to the Hunan-Hubei border to form the Red Army, “building the army by relying on the mountains, then developing toward the plains,” and carrying out armed separate regimes. He Long soon raised a force, organized the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army, established a worker-peasant democratic political power, opened up the Hunan-Western Hubei base area, and formed the Second Red Army Corps. Zhou Enlai also continuously dispatched military and political cadres to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and other base areas to strengthen the work of creating the Red Army and base areas.

（二）反对“左”倾盲动倾向，指导全党创建工农红军、实行武装割据斗争，为探索中国特色革命道路提供领导支持。周恩来到中央工作后，尽管“左”倾盲动倾向在中央占据主导地位，但他从南昌起义失败的教训中感到应该注重实际，反对各地盛行的军事冒险行动。针对青年团组织普遍存在的盲动情绪，他指出，若不注意，青年团将变成冒险主义；这很危险，会牺牲许多同志；“无动不暴”是一个严重问题。时任团中央书记任弼时赞同周恩来的看法，认为团的同志将暴动看得太容易了，对暴动为何物还不太了解，随便暴动是很危险的。周恩来在代表中央起草的若干决议和给地方省委的指示中，提出要坚决扫除“表面上革命的盲动主义”，不能有玩弄暴动的危险倾向，强调暴动是武装夺取政权，必须在领导工农群众的斗争中去发动和创造群众的革命大潮才能进行。他批评苏、浙、闽、湘、鄂、赣、云等多地的暴动计划，坚决反对实行“烧杀政策”，有力地遏制住不断膨胀的盲动情绪。他赞同贺龙等去湘鄂边组建红军，“依山建军，再向平原发展”，开展武装割据。贺龙不久就拉起队伍，组织起工农革命军，建立工农民主政权，开辟了湘鄂西根据地，组建起红二军团。周恩来还不断派遣军事政治工作干部到鄂豫皖等根据地，以加强红军和根据地的创建工作。

(3) He paid very close attention to the “Zhu-Mao Red Army” and continuously propagated and promoted their experience. After Zhu De led the Sanheba remnants through the border areas of Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong to reach Hunan, Zhou Enlai agreed with his launching of the Southern Hunan Uprising. During the Sixth National Congress of the Party, Zhou Enlai delivered a military report on behalf of the Central Committee, introducing the development of the Red Army, especially the Jinggangshan struggle after the “Zhu-Mao Red Army” joined forces. After the Sixth Congress, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in charge of military work, he was responsible for liaising with the Soviet areas. In a report to the Communist International in late November 1928, he also introduced the situation that “the land revolution in several counties of western Jiangxi, influenced by Zhu and Mao at the Hunan-Jiangxi border, had indeed penetrated deeply among the masses.” [23]23 Zhou Enlai’s report to the Communist International in November 1928 described the deepening of the land revolution in western Jiangxi under the influence of Zhu De and Mao Zedong. He also used the Party Central Committee’s publications to repeatedly propagate the experience of the “Zhu-Mao Red Army” and the Jinggangshan struggle. With the recommendation of the Central Committee and Zhou Enlai, base areas such as the Hunan-Western Hubei and Hubei-Henan-Anhui learned from the Jinggangshan methods, establishing Party branches in companies and flexibly applying various guerrilla tactics. By the early 1930s, the situation of armed separate regimes of workers and peasants represented by the “Zhu-Mao Red Army” had initially taken shape at the borders of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and other provinces, with more than ten revolutionary base areas established one after another.

（三）非常关注“朱毛红军”，不断宣传和推广他们的经验。朱德率三河坝余部经闽赣粤边到达湖南后，周恩来赞同其发动湘南暴动。党的六大期间，周恩来代表中央作军事报告，介绍了红军发展情况，特别是“朱毛红军”会师后的井冈山斗争情况。六大后，他作为中央政治局常委分管军事工作，负责联系苏区。在1928年11月下旬向共产国际的报告中，他还介绍了“朱毛在湘赣边境所影响之赣西数县土地革命，确实深入了群众”的情况。他还通过党中央刊物多次宣传“朱毛红军”和井冈山斗争的经验。在中央和周恩来的推荐下，湘鄂西、鄂豫皖等根据地学习井冈山的办法，连队建立党支部，灵活运用各种游击战术。至20世纪30年代初，以“朱毛红军”为代表的工农武装割据局面在湘、鄂、赣、粤、闽、浙等省边界初步形成，陆续建立起10多块革命根据地。

(4) Striving to win the support of the Communist International and the leaders of the Soviet Party for the new path of rural separatist regimes opened up by the Chinese Communists. The Communist International held Zhou Enlai in high regard. In their view, Zhou Enlai was the most intelligent, most practical, most experienced, most responsible, and the only actual working leader of the Central Committee of the CPC, an irreplaceable figure for improving the Party’s work and transforming the Party into a Bolshevik Party. On the one hand, Zhou Enlai respected the Communist International; on the other hand, he did not blindly obey orders and still argued on the basis of reason when he held differing opinions. In April 1928, the Provisional Politburo of the CPC Central Committee received the “Resolution on the Chinese Question” issued by the Communist International in February. This resolution played a positive role in correcting the Party’s “Left” putschist errors, but it opposed waging guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Zhou Enlai spoke up, disagreeing with this view, pointing out: China is different from Russia; the peasantry constitutes an important factor, and from this arises the imbalance in the development of the Chinese revolution between the cities and the countryside. The revolution in the countryside cannot wait for urban insurrection; it needs to establish a Red Army and strengthen the Party’s leadership over the rural struggle. At the Party’s Sixth National Congress held in Moscow, Bukharin stated in his report that it was absolutely impossible for a regime without cities to exist for a long time. Zhou Enlai spoke up, pointing out: The development trend of the Chinese revolution and the strengthening of reactionary forces, together with China’s inability to achieve unification and the unevenness of the revolution, prove that there is a possibility of separatist regimes in the Chinese revolution. In the provinces of southern China, preparations for a situation of separatist regimes

（四）努力争取共产国际和苏联党的领导人支持中国共产党人开辟的农村割据新道路。共产国际对周恩来十分器重。在他们看来，周恩来是中共中央最聪明、最讲究实际、最有经验、最负责任和唯一的实际工作领导人，是改进党的工作和改造党成为布尔什维克党的不可替代的人物。周恩来一方面尊重共产国际，另一方面又不唯命是从，有不同意见仍据理力争。1928年4月，中共临时中央政治局收到共产国际在2月发布的《关于中国问题的议决案》。该决议对党纠正“左”倾盲动错误起了积极作用，却反对在农村进行游击战争。周恩来发言不同意这个看法，指出：中国与俄国不同，农民占了一个重要因素，由此发生中国革命在城市与农村发展的不平衡。农村的革命不能等待城市暴动，需要建立红军，加强党对农村斗争的领导。在莫斯科召开的党的六大上，布哈林在报告中说，天下绝不可能有无城市的政权长期存在的事实。周恩来发言指出：中国革命发展趋势和反动势力的加强，与中国不能统一，以及革命不平衡性，证明中国革命有割据的可能。在南中国各省，目前就有割据局面的准备。1930年4月至7月，周恩来赴苏联向共产国际汇报工作，途中在德共《红旗报》上撰文指出：农民游击战争和土地革命是今日中国的主要特征，呼吁世界无产阶级和殖民地被压迫民族支援中国的苏维埃斗争。他应邀在联共十六大作报告介绍中国革命的特点时指出：在游击战争与土地革命的发展中，半殖民地的中国革命有它特殊的产物，这便是中国工农革命的红军。在同斯大林会见时，他介绍农村红军的发展和游击战争的情况后，斯大林承认中国红军有重大发展的事实，提出应该把红军问题放在中国革命问题的第一位。随后，共产国际关于中国问题的议决案指出：“建立完全有战斗力的政治坚定的红军，在现时中国的特殊条件之下，是第一等的任务。”

After the August 1 Nanchang Uprising, through his summation of historical experience and lessons and his new understanding of the uneven development of the Chinese revolution, Zhou Enlai not only realized a cognitive shift from the theory of urban centers to the theory of rural centers, but also helped the leaders of the Communist International and the Soviet Communist Party recognize the reality of the uneven development of the Chinese revolution, ultimately leading them to accept the new path of the Chinese revolution. This is Zhou Enlai's irreplaceable major contribution to the great exploration of the path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.

周恩来在八一南昌起义后，通过对历史经验教训的总结和对中国革命发展不平衡形势的新认识，不仅实现了由城市中心论向农村中心论的认知转变，而且帮助共产国际和苏联共产党领导人认识到了中国革命发展不平衡的现实，最终认同中国革命发展的新道路。这是周恩来对马克思主义中国化道路伟大探索所作出的无人能替代的重大功绩。

(About the author: Shi Zhongquan, former deputy director and researcher of the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee)

（作者简介：石仲泉，原中共中央党史研究室副主任、研究员）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心