Transcending “Labeling” and Prejudice

In February 2023, the Economist Intelligence Unit published its Democracy Index for 2022, asserting that “authoritarianism continues to expand” and that more than one-third of the world’s population lives under authoritarian rule. What deserves even greater attention is that this democracy index report prominently emphasizes the so-called “negative impact of authoritarian states on democracy,” thereby once again revealing the thinking and strategy of mainstream Western political and academic circles in tightly binding non-Western countries to “authoritarianism.” Consequently, whether from the traditional perspective of “promoting authoritarian transition” or from the relatively newer angle of “demonstrating authoritarian resilience—responding to authoritarian challenges,” related research has spawned a series of labeled, formulaic, and prejudice-laden “research findings.” Standing from the position of constructing an indigenous disciplinary and academic discourse system, the negative impact of the authoritarianism research paradigm cannot be ignored: if the limitations of this discourse cannot be successfully transcended, Chinese academia will remain trapped in the judgment that non-Western political systems are “awaiting transition,” and it will be even less possible for the pace of theoretical innovation to keep up with the needs of practice, truly unleashing the consciousness and impetus for Chinese-path modernization to surpass Western-path modernization. Therefore, starting from sorting out and penetrating the “labeling” phenomenon of the authoritarianism research paradigm, this article systematically critiques the abuse of the authoritarianism paradigm in the study of non-Western political systems from multiple dimensions, including theoretical origins, methodology, and discursive hegemony, thereby providing insights for transcending the constraints of labeled interpretations and promoting paradigm innovation in related research.

2023年2月，《经济学人》智库公布了2022年民主指数，提出“威权主义持续扩张”，全球超过1/3的人口都生活在威权主义统治之下。而更值得人们注意的是，这份民主指数报告突出强调所谓“威权主义国家”对“民主的负面影响”，从而也再次展现出西方主流政学两界将非西方国家与“威权主义”紧紧绑定的思维与策略。由此，无论是从传统的“促进威权转型”角度，还是从相对新颖的“论证威权韧性—应对威权挑战”的角度，相关研究都催生出一系列标签化、程式化、充满偏见的“研究成果”。站在建构本土学科及学术话语体系的立场上，威权主义研究范式所带来的负面影响不容忽视：如果不能成功超越这一话语的局限，中国学界就将受困于非西方国家政治制度“有待转型”的判断，也更不可能让理论创新的步伐跟上实践的需要，真正激发出中国式现代化超越西方式现代化的自觉与动力。因此，从梳理透视威权主义研究范式的“标签化”现象开始，本文从理论溯源、方法论和话语霸权等多个维度，展开对非西方国家政治制度研究中威权主义范式滥用问题的系统批判，进而为超越标签化解读的限制、推动相关研究中的范式创新提供启示。

I. The Labeling Phenomenon in Western Political Science Research under the Influence of the Authoritarianism Research Paradigm

一、威权主义研究范式影响下西方政治学研究中的标签化现象

For a long time, labeling non-Western countries that differ from the Western camp in terms of political systems, ideologies, political cultures, etc., as “authoritarian” has nearly become an academic default in Western political science research. For instance, in political system classification databases such as the DD Index, the political systems of countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Cuba have consistently been categorized as authoritarian or autocratic regimes. Adjectives prefixed with “authoritarian” are also frequently used by Western scholars to describe the political systems of these non-Western countries, giving rise to concepts such as Soft Authoritarianism, Fragmented Authoritarianism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Participatory Authoritarianism. In recent years, some Western researchers have also begun to emphasize that non-Western countries are intentionally “exporting authoritarianism” to challenge or even replace the status of Western democracy. In the mainstream discourse of Western academia on the study of non-Western political systems, “authoritarianism” has constituted a premise label that requires no verification. Its significance lies not only in marking the identity of non-Western political systems as “hostile others” but also in thereby seizing the initiative in the struggle over ideology and discursive power. To challenge this “overt rule” from an objective standpoint, it is first necessary to clarify several main ways in which current Western academia engages in “labeling,” with particular attention to their understanding of “authoritarianism” from the perspective of so-called “authoritarian resilience.”

长久以来，西方政治学研究中为政治制度、意识形态、政治文化等不同于西方阵营的非西方国家贴上“威权主义”的标签几近成为一种学术默认。比如在DD Index等政体分类数据库中，俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯、古巴等国的政体一直被归类于威权（Authoritarian）政体或独裁（Autocracy）政体。而带有威权主义前缀的形容词也常被西方学者用来描述这些非西方国家的政治体制，由此也衍生出了诸如柔性威权主义（Soft Authoritarianism）、碎片化威权主义（Fragmented Authoritarianism）、竞争威权主义（Competitive Authoritarianism）、参与式威权主义（Participatory Authoritarianism）之类附加前缀的威权主义概念。近年来，一些西方研究者还开始强调非西方国家正在有意“输出威权主义”，以挑战甚至取代西方民主的地位。在西方学界对非西方国家政治制度研究的主流话语中，“威权主义”已经构成了一个无须检验的前提标签，其意义不仅在于标示非西方国家政体之为“敌对他者”的身份，更在于据此抢占意识形态与话语权之争中的主动权。而要站在客观立场上挑战这一“明规则”，首先就需要厘清当前西方学界“贴标签”的几种主要方式，并且重点关注其从所谓“威权韧性”角度对“威权主义”的认识。

(A) Main Angles from Which Overseas Academia Labels Non-Western Countries as “Authoritarian”

（一）海外学界为非西方国家贴上“威权主义”标签的主要角度

In recent years, with the emergence of the trend of “the East rising and the West declining,” the achievements and influence of political development in non-Western countries have become increasingly difficult to ignore. Yet even so, many overseas scholars still adhere to the presupposition of “authoritarianism” in their study of non-Western political systems, with their main “basis” lying in the following points.

近年来，随着“东升西降”趋势的显现，非西方国家政治发展的成就和影响力已经越来越难以被忽视。但即便如此，许多海外学者在非西方国家政治制度研究中仍然坚持“威权主义”的预设前提，而其主要“依据”则在于以下几点。

First, the ruling party or leader continuously strengthens “centralized authoritarianism.” One of the strongest criticisms of “authoritarian states” in mainstream Western political science research is “centralized authoritarianism,” meaning that political power is concentrated not only in the hands of a few leaders but also in a political party composed of a small group of political elites. According to related research, in some Central American countries, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, leaders who adhere to authoritarianism use centralization to erode the power of other government branches, restrict freedoms, weaken opposition forces, undermine judicial order, and obstruct the media from playing a supervisory role, making them the culprits in destroying these countries’ democratic systems. Other scholars have proposed that “authoritarian regimes” based on political parties are more stable, especially one-party systems, which are more conducive to economic development and avoiding civil war, but these “authoritarian regimes” all desire comprehensive control over society. In related research, whether it is the discussion of topics such as party legitimacy, inter-party relations, and party-government relations, or the analysis of the political measures of the ruling party, it is often built on the argument that the “authoritarian ruling party” uses “power concentration” to “strengthen authoritarianism.” When evaluating the achievements of non-Western countries in the fields of political system reform and democratic construction, scholars holding the above views often also prejudge by denying the intrinsic connection between the subjective motives of the ruling party or leader and objective achievements, instead tending to explain from the perspective of “resistance to the authoritarian system” or “the emergence of signs of internal transformation within the authoritarian system.”

第一，执政党或领导人不断加强“集中威权”。西方主流政治学研究对“威权主义国家”批评最强烈的论点之一就是“集中威权”，即政治权力不仅集中在少数领导人手中，还集中于少部分政治精英组成的政党。在相关研究看来，中美洲的一些国家比如萨尔瓦多、危地马拉和尼加拉瓜奉行威权主义的领导人用集权手段侵蚀政府其他部门的权力，限制自由，削弱反对派力量，破坏司法秩序，阻挠媒体发挥监督作用，是破坏这些国家民主制度的祸首。还有学者提出，以政党为基础的“威权主义政权”更为稳定，尤其是一党制政权更有利于发展经济、避免内战，但是这些“威权主义政权”都渴望对社会进行全方位控制。相关研究中无论是对政党合法性、党际与党政关系等议题的研讨，还是针对执政党政治举措的分析，往往都建立在“威权主义执政党”通过“权力集中”来“强化威权”的论证基础上。在涉及非西方国家政治体制改革与民主建设领域所取得的成绩评价时，持有上述观点的学者也往往会先入为主地否定执政党或领导人主观动机与客观成绩间的内在关联，而是倾向于从对“威权体制的抵抗”或者“威权体制内部转型迹象的出现”的角度来作出解释。

Second, the electoral system does not meet Western “liberal democratic” standards. Among countries labeled as “authoritarian,” many have already established relatively mature electoral systems. However, the mainstream view in Western academia holds that “authoritarian regimes play the multi-party electoral game, regularly holding elections for chief executives and national legislatures, yet they so deeply and systematically violate the liberal democratic principles of freedom and fairness that elections become tools of authoritarian rule, rather than tools of democracy.” For example, Western academia repeatedly highlights the characteristics of “electoral authoritarianism” in Singapore’s politics, emphasizing that the People’s Action Party’s repeated electoral victories are due to the party’s strong control undermining the unity of opposition parties. Similarly, they also believe that Putin’s regime in Russia wins elections because the organizational strength of the opposition is too weak, and authoritarianism faces almost no resistance. Thus, Western academia regards the electoral systems of these countries as tools of authoritarian rule, to some extent acknowledging the freedom of elections in so-called “authoritarian states,” yet using Western liberal democracy as a yardstick to strongly deny the fairness of their electoral systems. Today, “the government obtains legitimacy from democratic elections” has almost become a research axiom in Western academia. Therefore, attacking the electoral systems of “authoritarian states” implies non-recognition of the legitimacy of their governments.

第二，选举制度不符合西方“自由民主”标准。在被贴上“威权主义”标签的国家中，不少国家已经建立起较为成熟的选举制度，但是西方学界的主流观点却认为：“威权主义政权玩弄多党选举游戏，定期举行行政长官和国家立法议会选举，然而，它们却如此深刻而系统地违反了自由民主的自由和公平原则，使选举成为威权主义统治的工具，而不是民主的工具。”比如，西方学界一再突出新加坡政治“选举威权主义”的特征，强调新加坡人民行动党的多次选举胜利是由于该党强大的控制力破坏了反对党的团结；类似地，他们也认为，俄罗斯普京政权的胜选，是因为反对派的组织力量过于薄弱，威权主义几乎没有遭受抵抗。由此可见，西方学界将这些国家的选举制度视为威权统治的工具，在一定程度上承认所谓“威权主义国家”选举的自由性，却以西方自由民主为标尺，强烈否定其选举制度的公平性。如今，“政府从民主选举中获取合法性”几乎已经成为一条西方学界的研究公理，因此，攻讦“威权主义国家”选举制度也就意味着不承认其政府的合法性。

Third, state will is placed above citizens’ rights. Under the influence of the binary opposition mindset of individual freedom versus state will, Western academia often uses “state will first” to characterize the political system of “authoritarian states.” Some argue that authoritarianism not only leads to an imbalance of administrative power but also further compresses the political space of civil society, resulting in the unlimited expansion of state power. Some scholars contend that in the political practice of certain “authoritarian states,” citizens’ willingness to participate is increasing, and societal constraints on public power are becoming stricter; yet the state’s control over society has not weakened, and rapid economic transformation has spawned stringent political control. The root of this contradictory phenomenon lies in the fact that the “state will first” feature of the country’s political system and political culture has not changed but has instead been reinforced with the support of modern policies and media tools. Correspondingly, the significant economic success achieved by non-Western countries through the exercise of state regulatory capacity is regarded as a byproduct of the political aim of “consolidating authoritarianism.” As the term suggests, “state will first” means that in relevant research, the state always appears as a “Leviathan,” and the government, as the primary carrier of state will and the manifestation of state authority, even if it achieves some governance performance, is still considered to have severely impacted individual freedom and personal interests.

第三，国家意志凌驾于公民权利之上。在公民自由与国家意志二元对立的思维定式影响下，西方学界往往用“国家意志优先”来定性评价“威权主义国家”政治制度的特点。有观点认为，威权主义不仅会导致行政权力失衡，还会进一步压缩公民社会的政治空间，导致国家权力无限扩张。一些学者认为，在一些“威权主义国家”的政治实践中，公民参与意愿不断增加，社会对公权力的约束也愈发严格，然而国家对社会控制力没有减弱，快速的经济转型催生了严格的政治控制，这种矛盾现象的根源就在于该国政治制度与政治文化中的“国家意志优先”特征并未改变，而是在现代政策与传媒手段的支持下得到了强化。相应的，非西方国家因为发挥国家的调控能力而取得巨大的经济成功，则被认为是出于“巩固威权”的政治目的而产生的附带效应。顾名思义，“国家意志优先”意味着在相关研究中，国家始终以“利维坦”的形象出现，而政府作为国家意志的主要载体和国家权威的表现形式，纵使取得了一些治理绩效，也会被认为严重冲击了公民自由和个体利益。

In summary, based on the above “arguments,” Western academia has “logically” affixed the label of so-called “authoritarianism” to non-Western countries in the study of political systems.

总之，基于以上几点“论据”，西方学界在政治制度研究中也就“顺理成章”地为非西方国家贴上了所谓“威权主义”的标签。

(II) How Overseas Academia Explains the “Resilience of Authoritarianism” Within the Labeling Framework

（二）海外学界如何在标签化的框架内解释“威权主义的韧性”

If the qualitative label of “authoritarianism” holds, another question arises: why have “authoritarian regimes,” which are inherently “lacking in legitimacy,” not immediately collapsed and “transitioned,” but instead shown vigorous vitality? In response, many Western scholars attempt to provide a seemingly reasonable explanation without shaking the authoritarian research paradigm. Some Western scholars point out that authoritarian political systems are inherently flawed, but the unusual stability of the systems in some East Asian “authoritarian states” stems from the strong resilience of their political authority. In state governance, this manifests as the so-called “Benevolent Authoritarianism” measures implemented by East Asian countries. Because these measures outperform liberal democracies in professionally managing society and responding to crises, they have also gained a relative advantage in governance performance. Andrew J. Nathan, who proposed the concept of “resilient authoritarianism,” argues that “authoritarian resilience” is also reflected in the ability of “authoritarian regimes” to absorb a certain degree of political reform, thereby maintaining rapid economic development and social harmony while avoiding political structural disorder caused by reform. Therefore, the resilience of these countries’ political systems can overcome the drawbacks of traditional authoritarianism and form a “special authoritarian political model.” Similarly, the explanation of so-called “fragmented authoritarianism” can be understood as a supplementary opinion within the “labeling” framework. For instance, Kenneth Lieberthal, Michel Oksenberg, and Andrew Mertha, in studying decentralization in the policy process, attempt to demonstrate that “fragmented authoritarianism” to some extent dissolves the centralizing drawbacks of authoritarianism, making “authoritarianism” more adaptable.

如果“威权主义”的定性标签成立的话，另一个问题也就随之出现了，那就是：天然存在“合法性不足”的“威权主义政体”为什么非但没有马上崩溃“转型”，反而展现出旺盛的生命力呢？对此，许多西方学者都试图在不动摇威权主义研究范式的前提下，提供一种看似合理的解释。有西方学者指出，威权主义政治制度本质上是有缺陷的，但一些东亚“威权主义国家”的制度之所以呈现出非同寻常的稳固性，是因为其政治权威具有很强的韧性(resilient)，表现在国家治理行为中，这就意味着东亚国家推行的所谓“仁政威权主义”（Benevolent Authoritarianism）举措。由于这些举措在专业化地管理社会和应对危机方面比自由民主国家表现更佳，所以也赢得了治理绩效方面的相对优势。“韧性威权主义”概念的提出者黎安友（Andrew JNathan）认为, “威权主义韧性”还表现在“威权主义政体”能够吸纳一定程度的政治改革，从而在保持经济高速发展和社会和谐的同时，避免了改革引发的政治结构紊乱。因此，这些国家政治制度的韧性也就能够克服传统威权主义的弊端，形成“特殊的威权主义政治模式”。类似的，所谓“碎片化威权主义”的解释也可以被理解为“标签化”框架内的一种补充意见。比如，李侃如(Kenneth Lieberthal) 、奥克森伯格 (Michel Oksenberg)和毛雪峰（Andrew Mertha）等就在研究政策过程中的分权问题时，力图证明“碎片化威权主义”一定程度上消解了威权主义的集权弊端，使“威权主义”更具有适应性。

In conclusion, while having to acknowledge at the factual level that the political systems of non-Western countries have produced positive effects after active adjustment, the mainstream Western political science research, with authoritarian narratives as its undertone, has not fundamentally reversed course. On the contrary, this improved authoritarian research paradigm remains fixated on questioning the legitimacy of “authoritarian regimes.” Scholars who propose the concept of “authoritarian resilience” tend to emphasize the limited nature of this “resilience” or, by highlighting the “continuous growth” of factors resisting this “resilience,” argue along the presupposed “transition track” for the prospects of political system change in “authoritarian states.” For such research, the transition of these non-Western countries “from authoritarianism to democracy” is a matter of what ought to be, and the fantasy of “democratic transition” stems precisely from the academic dominance of “political development theory” promoted by Western academia under Western political intervention since the third wave of democratization. As a component of Western political development discourse, the authoritarian research paradigm, from its inception, has erected a hermeneutic barrier between theory and reality. Only by unveiling the veil of “politics hijacking academia” can the true face of “authoritarianism” be restored.

归而言之，在不得不于事实层面承认非西方国家的政治制度经过主动调适后产生积极影响的同时，西方政治学主流研究中以威权叙事为底色的情况并没有发生根本性的逆转。相反，这种改良的威权主义研究范式仍然执着于对“威权主义政体”合法性的质疑，提出“威权主义韧性”概念的学者倾向于强调这种“韧性”的有限性，或是通过对这种“韧性”反抗因素“不断成长”的凸显，来沿着预设的“转型轨道”论证“威权主义国家”政治制度的变迁前景。之于此类研究，这些非西方国家实现“从威权到民主”的转型是一种应然，而对“民主转型”的空想，正是源自第三波民主化浪潮以来在西方国家政治干预之下学界推行“政治发展理论”的学术统治力。威权主义研究范式作为西方政治发展话语的组成部分，在学界形成滥觞之时，就已经筑起了理论与现实之间的解释学壁垒，只有揭开“政治绑架学术”这层面纱，才能还原“威权主义”的本来面目。

II. The Abuse of the Authoritarian Research Paradigm and Its Tracing and Reflection

二、威权主义研究范式的滥用及其溯源反思

Based on the misreading and distortion of non-Western countries’ political systems, the influence of the authoritarian research paradigm is no longer limited to the study of specific issues but has expanded into a “trend” of abuse: scholars first label non-Western countries’ systems as “authoritarian,” then seek evidence to support the existence of certain insurmountable “curses” in “authoritarian states,” thereby creating a deviation in research objectivity. To curb the abusive trend of inappropriate methods, advocate for objectivity in the study of non-Western countries’ political systems, and enhance the consciousness of adopting local perspectives in political research, it is necessary to reveal the ambiguity of the concept of “authoritarianism” through theoretical tracing, as well as the limitations of the underlying “democracy–non-democracy” binary methodology, and further dissect the hegemonic discourse hidden in Western political science research, restoring the “true face” of the authoritarian research paradigm.

基于对非西方国家政治制度的误读和曲解，如今威权主义研究范式的影响力已经不再限于某一具体议题的研究，而是扩张成为一股滥用的“潮流”：学者们会首先定性非西方国家的“威权主义”制度，再去寻找论据支持“威权主义国家”存在某些无法克服的“魔咒”，研究客观性的偏差就此产生。为了阻断不当方法的滥用趋势，倡导非西方国家政治制度研究的客观性，增强政治研究沿用本土视角的自觉性，有必要通过理论溯源揭示“威权主义”概念的模糊性，以及其背后基于“民主—非民主”二分方法论的局限性，并进一步剖开潜藏在西方政治学研究中的话语霸权，还原威权主义研究范式的“本来面目”。

(I) The Abuse of the Authoritarian Research Paradigm

（一）威权主义研究范式的滥用

Early overseas research simply affixed the “authoritarian” label to the political systems of certain countries. As subsequent research progressed, the authoritarian research paradigm has been abused. For example, in the field of state governance, some Chinese researchers attempt to argue that there is an irreconcilable internal contradiction between authoritarian rule and effective governance in non-Western countries, attributing all problems in state governance to the “authoritarian” political system. Moreover, for a time, some domestic scholars directly adopted this authoritarian research paradigm, studying the adverse effects of “authoritarianism” on state governance in multiple fields, leading to an abusive situation where “anything improper can be traced back to authoritarianism.”

早期的海外研究只是将某些国家的政治制度简单地贴上“威权主义”标签，随着相关研究的后续推进，威权主义研究范式已然被滥用。比如在国家治理领域，有华人研究者试图论证非西方国家存在威权统治和实现有效治理之间不可调和的内在矛盾，将国家治理中的问题根源都指向“威权主义”政治制度。不止于此，一时之间一些国内学者也直接套用了这种威权主义研究范式，在多个领域研究“威权主义”对国家治理施加的不良影响，以至于形成“凡不妥之处皆可求证于威权主义”的滥用局面。

Coincidentally, the abusive trend of the authoritarian research paradigm has also spread to political science research in Western developed countries, meaning that Western academia equates any political phenomenon that deviates from Western “liberal democracy” with “authoritarianism.” At this point, the label of “authoritarianism” is no longer confined to the study of regime types but is closely related to race and ethnicity. The most typical example is the evaluation of the Trump administration as “authoritarian populism” in American political science since 2016. This view holds that citizens favor a tyrant-like ruler and a state apparatus that strictly enforces decrees, thus promoting the Trump administration as their representative. The Trump group was able to use the law to criminalize political dissent and disregard the separation of powers and competitive elections, all of which mark the full-scale revival of white racial authoritarianism within the United States. Clearly, this critique of the Trump administration’s authoritarian populism is yet another expansion of the concept of authoritarianism: any political phenomenon that undermines the Western context of checks and balances, competitive elections, and the rule of law can be labeled “authoritarianism” and appear as the antithesis of “democracy” in various political science studies.

无独有偶，威权主义研究范式的滥用趋势也蔓延到了西方发达国家的政治学研究中，这就意味着西方学界将凡是违背西方“自由民主”的政治现象都等同于“威权主义”。此时，“威权主义”的标签不再限于政体范畴的研究，而是与种族、民族息息相关。最为典型的是2016年以来美国政治学界将特朗普政府评价为威权民粹主义（Authoritarian Populism），该观点认为，公民偏爱暴君类型的执政者和严格执行政令的国家机器，于是推出特朗普政府作为代言人，特朗普集团得以利用法律将政治异见入罪，藐视三权分立和竞争性选举，这些现象都标志着白人种族威权主义在美国国内全面复兴。显然，此类对于特朗普政府威权民粹主义的批判正是威权主义概念的又一次扩张：凡是破坏西方语境中的权力制衡、竞争性选举和法治的政治现象都可以被贴上“威权主义”的标签，并以“民主”对立面的形象出现在各类政治学研究中。

The reason the authoritarianism research paradigm is so frequently abused is largely that the concept of “authoritarianism” itself cannot shed the value presuppositions that have been inherited from the academic world since the rise of political development theory, namely that “democracy” is superior to “authoritarianism.” Western academic research on democratic regimes typically presupposes certain preconditions, such as that the executive power of the government is constrained by the rule of law, and that citizens can freely express political opinions. Conversely, research on authoritarian regimes cannot take these conditions for granted; indeed, authoritarian regimes must bear the cross of being “unpredictable” and “despotic.” Therefore, the authoritarianism research paradigm cannot uphold genuine objectivity; all its analyses are first and foremost built upon a value choice that takes Western democracy as the standard. By tracing the origins of the concept and theory of authoritarianism, the limitations of the authoritarianism research paradigm will become further apparent in the following text.

威权主义研究范式之所以被滥用，很大程度上是因为“威权主义”概念本身无法剥离学界自政治发展理论兴起就沿袭下来的价值预设，即“民主”优于“威权主义”。西方学界对于民主政体的研究通常会预设一些前置条件，比如政府的行政权力会受到法治的约束，公民可以自由表达政治意见等。相反，研究威权政体则不能将这些条件视为理所当然，甚至威权政体要背负“不可预测”“专制”的十字架，所以威权主义研究范式无法秉持真正的客观性，它的一切分析都首先建立在以西方民主为圭臬的价值选择之上。后文通过追溯威权主义的概念和理论之源，威权主义研究范式的局限性将会进一步显现。

(II) The Concept of Authoritarianism and Its Theoretical Origins

（二）威权主义概念及其理论之源

1. Origins of the Concept

1.概念之源

Authoritarianism is a concept distilled from political realities that occurred in specific historical periods and specific regions. In academic research, it is mainly manifested as a form of political regime, closely related to forms of state power, ideology, and so on. The concept of “authoritarianism” originated within the Western academic discourse system. As a residual category between “totalitarianism” and “democracy,” it was used by political development theory to define the political systems of non-Western democratic countries. Within the conceptual framework of authoritarianism, political power is highly concentrated in the hands of the rulers, lacking strong constraints. Although in some authoritarian regimes the rulers possess a certain degree of pluralism, their competitiveness and freedom are limited. The reason such a cognitive framework emerged is that Western scholars, using their own countries’ democratic processes as a blueprint, replicated a set of political system evaluation criteria with a Western standpoint. Relying on this evaluation system, Western academia has also produced various types of authoritarianism concepts with added adjectives. After a semantic structural analysis of these sub-concepts of authoritarianism, it is not difficult to find that the subject is “authoritarianism,” which carries a pejorative connotation in the Western context, while the modifiers, such as “responsive,” “resilient,” “participatory,” and “deliberative,” are neutral or even somewhat positive. Such bizarre word combinations were created from the outset to correct the limitations of the parent concept of “authoritarianism”; otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the achievements of various “authoritarian regimes” in political reality. Although these sub-concepts possess a certain explanatory power in specific contexts, whenever a new type of “authoritarian” regime is explored and a new sub-concept must be added, the relevant research still falls into the explanatory dilemma of multiple concepts, failing to form a universal and powerful political science analysis.

威权主义是从历史上特定时期、特定地区发生的政治现实事件中提炼出的概念，在学术研究中主要表现为政体形态，与政权形式、意识形态等紧密相关。“威权主义”概念发端于西方学术话语体系，作为介于“极权主义”和“民主”之间的剩余类型，被政治发展理论用来定义非西方民主国家的政治体制。在威权主义概念框架中，政治权力高度集中在执政者手中，缺乏强而有力的约束，尽管一些威权主义政权中执政者具备一定的多元性，但是其竞争性和自由度有限。之所以形成这样一种认知框架，是由于西方学者以本国的民主进程为蓝本，复刻了一套具有西方立场的政治形态评价体系。依靠这套评价体系，西方学界还产生了各类添加形容词的威权主义概念。对这些威权主义子概念进行语义结构分析后，不难发现，主语是西方语境下暗含贬义的“威权主义”，而定语比如“回应性”“韧性”“参与性”“协商性”等则是中性甚至偏褒义的。这样怪诞的词汇组合，自诞生起就是为了修正“威权主义”母概念的局限性，否则难以解释政治现实中各类“威权政体”的成就。虽然这些子概念在特定情境下具备一定的解释力，然而每当探究一类新的“威权主义”政体就要增加一个子概念的情况发生后，相关研究还是陷入多重概念的解释力困境，无法形成具有普遍性、有力的政治学分析。

Not only do “adjectival authoritarianisms” have explanatory limitations, but the concept of “authoritarianism” itself, as a transitional concept, also has problems. It can summarize the prominent characteristics of countries undergoing political change in a certain historical period, but it cannot support a logically self-consistent political science discourse system. The reasons for this are, on the one hand, that the concept of authoritarianism cannot effectively handle the relationship between political authority and democracy; on the other hand, constrained by the “democracy–non-democracy” binary and the transition paradigm, the concept of authoritarianism has always been a refraction of Western political discourse hegemony, falling into an ideological trap in academic theory.

不仅“带形容词的威权主义”存在解释力局限，“威权主义”这个具有过渡意义的概念本身就存在问题，它能够概括一段历史时期中进行政治变革国家的突出特点，但是无法支撑起一套逻辑自洽的政治学话语体系。究其原因，一方面是因为威权主义概念无法有效处置政治权威和民主之间的关系，另一方面囿于“民主—非民主”二元论和转型范式的限制，威权主义概念始终是西方政治话语霸权的一种折射，在学理上陷入意识形态的陷阱。

2. Origins of the Theory

2.理论之源

The authoritarianism research paradigm is a derivative of “political development theory” and the “transition paradigm.” In mainstream Western political development theory, political development refers to “a process of institutional change involving a starting point and an outcome, that is, the transformation of the form of political system from authoritarian rule to democratic politics.” [5]5 The “third wave of democratization” refers to the global trend of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy that began in the mid-1970s, notably in Southern Europe, Latin America, and later Asia and Africa, as theorized by Samuel P. Huntington. During the third wave of democratization, when countries in sub-Saharan Africa also began the process of “democratization,” political development theorists became more optimistic about the prospects of “democratic transition” in “authoritarian states.” On this basis, they derived the theoretical framework of the “transition paradigm,” systematically and theoretically constructing the causes, processes, and goals of the “democratic transition” in these countries. The academic community has basically reached a consensus on the transition paradigm: although developing countries have different national conditions and democratic transitions also have regional characteristics, the authoritarian regimes in these countries will inevitably face collapse and enter a period of democratic transition, with the ultimate goal being to achieve “democratization” benchmarked against Western developed countries.

威权主义研究范式是“政治发展理论”和“转型范式”的衍生品。西方主流的政治发展理论中，政治发展是指“一个涉及起点和结局的有关制度变迁的过程，即政治体制的形态由威权统治向民主政治转型”。第三波民主化浪潮中，当撒哈拉以南的非洲国家也开始“民主化”进程，政治发展理论家对“威权主义国家”的“民主转型”前景更为乐观，并在此基础上衍生出“转型范式”（transition paradigm）理论框架，对这些国家“民主转型”的原因、进程和目标进行系统化理论化建构。学界关于转型范式基本达成了共识：虽然发展中国家的国情不同，民主转型也具有区域化特征，但是这些国家的威权主义政权迟早会面临崩溃并进入民主转型期，最终目的是实现以西方发达国家为标杆的“民主化”。

However, after the peak of the vigorous third wave of democratization passed, a large number of emerging “democratic” countries experienced varying degrees of decline in democratic quality and collapse of democratic institutions. By the end of the 20th century, about one-fifth of the transitioning countries showed a reversal trend toward non-democracy. [6]6 This refers to the phenomenon of “democratic backsliding” or “autocratization” observed in many post-Soviet and African states during the 1990s. The development models and transition paradigms provided by political development theory did not bring stability and modernization to these countries, but rather turmoil and decline. The frequent occurrence of political turmoil and economic recession indicates that a dislocation has already occurred between political development theory and practice. The failure of the “democratization” process in “authoritarian states” is one of the manifestations of the crisis facing political development theory. Although mainstream theories have some awareness of the complexity of the process of institutional change, political development theorists have always firmly believed that “authoritarian regimes” will inevitably undergo democratic transition. One of the limitations of the authoritarianism research paradigm also stems from the single linear interpretation of “development–democracy” by political development theory and the “transition paradigm.”

然而，声势浩大的第三波民主化浪潮顶峰过去以后，大量新兴的“民主”国家在不同程度上出现了民主质量下降、民主制度坍塌的现象，截止20世纪末约有1/5的转型国家出现滑向非民主的逆转趋势。政治发展理论提供的发展模式和转型范式给这些国家带去的并不是稳定和现代化，而是动荡和衰退，政治动荡、经济衰退的频发说明政治发展理论与实践之间已经产生了错位，“威权主义国家”“民主化”进程的失败是政治发展理论遭遇危机的表现之一。尽管主流理论对制度变迁过程的复杂度有所认知，但是政治发展理论家们始终坚信“威权主义政权”一定会进行民主转型。威权主义研究范式的局限性之一也正是源于政治发展理论和“转型范式”对于“发展—民主”的单一线性解读。

The positive relationship between “development and democracy” is the core value of political development theory. Specifically, political development theorists generally believe that “Third World countries mainly focus on the preconditions for democracy and the development of democratic systems,” [7]7 The “Third World” is a Cold War-era term for countries not aligned with either NATO or the Communist bloc, often used in modernization theory to denote developing nations. and what they advocate is precisely democracy modeled on Western developed countries. They believe that the process of political development is the process of evolution from traditional society to modern society. However, as Howard J. Wiarda stated, “development” does not necessarily mean Westernization. The “traditional–modern” and “Western–non-Western” dichotomies applied by political development theory contain the implication that “Western political systems are more superior.” [8]8 Howard J. Wiarda (1939–2015) was an American political scientist known for his critiques of modernization theory and Western-centric approaches to comparative politics. The prevalence of political development theory cannot be separated from the support of its underlying theoretical logic and empirical experience. Due to the “Western-centric” logic embedded within it and the value presupposition that “the end point of development is Western democracy,” this theory inevitably tends toward decline. The authoritarianism research paradigm, which originates from political development theory, has not only failed to shed the value presupposition of “Western priority” but has also “packaged” Western discourse hegemony in a more covert way, making it more transmissible. This is because authoritarianism has gradually been shaped into the antithesis of “democracy.”

“发展—民主”的正向关系是政治发展理论的核心价值。具体来说，政治发展理论家普遍认为，“第三世界国家主要专注于民主的先决条件和民主制的发展”，而他们所倡导的正是以西方发达国家为模板的民主，并认为政治发展的过程就是从传统社会向现代社会进化的过程。然而，正如威亚尔达（Howard J.Wiarda）所言，“发展”并不一定意味着西方化，政治发展理论应用的“传统—现代”“西方—非西方”二分法存在“西方政治制度更具有优越性”的暗示。政治发展理论的盛行离不开背后理论逻辑和现实经验的支撑，由于其背后蕴藏的“西方中心主义”逻辑、“发展的终点是西方民主”的价值预设，该理论难免走向衰落。而源于政治发展理论的威权主义研究范式，非但没有剥离“西方优先”的价值预设，并且还对西方话语霸权进行了更为隐蔽的“包装”，使其更具有传播性，这是因为威权主义已经逐渐被塑造成“民主”的对立面。

(III) Reflection Based on the “Democracy–Non-Democracy” Dichotomy

（三）基于“民主—非民主”二分法的反思

In recent years, the tropes of “democratic recession” and “democratic stagnation” have been common in Western political science research. Related studies argue that “authoritarian great powers” led by Russia are challenging the “liberal democratic order” established by Western countries led by the United States. These assertions are precisely built on the “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy. The “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy can also be called the “political regime dualism,” a product of Western regime thinking that later became a widely popular yardstick in Western academia for measuring the degree of political development in various countries. Regarding how to define the boundary between “democracy” and “non-democracy,” the democratic measurement standards adopted by Western academia encompass two dimensions: one is the performance of a country in the political dimension, including the degree of freedom of its political system and other characteristics; the other is the performance of that country in the non-political dimension. The former takes competitive elections and the degree of rule of law as the primary measurement standards, with regularly held competitive elections and a sound rule of law becoming the standard configuration of “democratic” countries; the latter focuses on individual freedom, property protection, and the safeguarding of minority rights as measurement priorities, serving as a supplement to the evaluation of the political dimension. Within such an evaluation system, only countries that prioritize individual civil rights, implement a competitive electoral system, and practice the rule of law under checks and balances can be called “free” and “democratic” countries. On one side is the stagnation of “democracy,” on the other is the rise of “authoritarianism.” The stark contrast between the two is a “rehash of old tunes” of ideological conflict that has persisted since the Cold War, only this time the “rising authoritarian states” are placed on the opposite side of “democracy.”

近年来，西方政治学研究中“民主衰退”“民主停滞”论调屡见不鲜。相关研究认为，以俄罗斯为首的“威权主义大国”正在挑战以美国为首的西方国家所奠定的“自由主义民主秩序”，这些论断正是建立在“民主—非民主”二分法之上。“民主—非民主”二分法又可以被称作“政体二元论”，是西方政体思维的产物，后发展成为西方学界广泛流行的衡量各国政治发展程度的标尺。关于如何界定“民主”和“非民主”的界限，西方学界采用的民主测量标准囊括两个维度，其一是一国政治维度的表现，包括政治制度的自由程度及其他特征，其二是该国非政治维度的表现。前者以竞争性选举和法治程度作为最主要的测量标准，定期举行的竞争性选举以及良好的法治成为“民主”国家的标准配置；后者则以个人自由、财产保护和少数群体的权利保障作为测量重点，作为对于政治维度评价的补充。而在这样的评价体系之中，只有以公民个人权利为先、实行竞争性选举制度、权力制衡之下的法治国家才可以被称为“自由”“民主”国家。一面是“民主”的停滞，一面是“威权主义”的崛起，二者的鲜明对比是冷战以后延续至今的意识形态冲突的“老调重弹”，只是这一次被置于“民主”对立面的是崛起中的“威权主义”国家。

Within the theoretical model of the transition paradigm, which takes authoritarianism as its starting point and liberal democracy as its endpoint, there also exist a large number of hybrid regimes in an intermediate state—that is, regime forms that possess some “democratic” features and are in the process of evolving toward “liberal democracy.” For instance, the political systems of some countries and regions contain electoral elements and have systems of checks and balances and supervision. However, simply because their “liberal democratic” features are not sufficiently pronounced, they are judged to be flawed democratic regimes, also called “democracy with adjectives.” Yet this raises another problem: within the same category of hybrid regimes, the distinction between democracy with adjectives and authoritarianism with adjectives seems to exist only at the semantic level, and the criteria for distinguishing the two remain a mystery. Furthermore, within the “transition paradigm,” since neither is a fully non-democratic or fully democratic regime, it is clear that the “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy has a theoretical vacuum, which academia calls the “grey zone.” This also indicates that the “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy always has blind spots in its hermeneutics.

在以威权主义为起点、自由民主为终点的转型范式理论模型中，还存在着大量处于中间状态的混合政体，即具备部分“民主”特征、向“自由民主”进化过程中的政体形态。譬如一些国家和地区的政治制度具备选举元素，拥有权力制衡和监察制度体系，只是因为“自由民主”特征不够明显，就被判定为有瑕疵的民主政体，又称作“带形容词的民主”。然而这又引发另一个问题，同属混合政体（hybrid regime），带形容词的民主和带形容词的威权主义之间的区别似乎只存在于语义层面，如何区分二者标准成迷。再者，在“转型范式”中，由于二者都不是完全的非民主政体或民主政体，显然“民主—非民主”二分法出现了理论真空地带，学界将其称为“灰色地带”（grey zone），这也昭示着“民主—非民主”二分法在解释学上始终存在盲区。

At the same time, Western academia has established “authoritarianism” as a transitional form to explain those real-world political systems that are difficult to incorporate into the “democracy–non-democracy” binary regime framework. But its drawback lies precisely here: on the one hand, it is forced to acknowledge that the governance of some non-Western democratic countries is remarkably effective; on the other hand, it is unwilling to abandon certain basic liberal theoretical presuppositions, especially the mindset that all regimes tend to transition toward a standard regime type. This leads to the situation where authoritarianism can explain the reality of some late-developing countries better than previous theories of political development, yet it cannot provide an analytical framework that truly bridges the gap between theory and reality, nor can it escape Western-centrism and the “democracy–non-democracy” binary discourse.

与此同时，西方学界设立“威权主义”这样一个过渡形态来解释那些难以被纳入到“民主—非民主”二分政体中的现实政治体系。但其弊端也正在于此，即一方面被迫承认一些非西方民主国家的治理卓有成效，另一方面又不肯放弃一些自由主义的基本理论预设，特别是所有政体趋向一种标准政体转型的思维定式。这就导致威权主义可以比以往的政治发展理论更好地解释一些后发国家的现实，但却不能提供一种真正意义上弥合理论和现实裂缝的分析框架，不可能跳出西方中心主义和“民主—非民主”的二元论调。

III. De-“Labeling”: Transcending Authoritarianism

三、去“标签化”：超越威权主义

At a time when the authoritarianism research paradigm is prevalent in Western academia, Adam Przeworski has recently proposed in his new research that the authoritarianism research paradigm is full of ideological bias. He reflects on the authoritarianism research paradigm from the perspective of relevant quantitative research methodology, but in fact this reflection does not touch upon the essential reasons for the failure of the authoritarianism research paradigm. Domestic researchers have long noticed this kind of “authoritarian” label imposed on non-Western countries: Wang Shaoguang has criticized various “authoritarian” hats concocted by Western academia in multiple articles; Xu Yao believes that the limitations of the “authoritarian” regime theory are highlighted in its predicament of explaining real-world politics. In recent related studies, domestic scholars have focused on Western academia’s misinterpretation of the “authoritarian” image of ruling parties in non-Western countries and the stigmatization problem caused by “digital authoritarianism” to the digital governance of relevant countries, writing articles to refute them. At the level of causal analysis, Liu Chenguang believes that the “authoritarian theory” reflects the discursive hegemony of Western “liberal democracy.” Some Chinese and Russian scholars also point out the bias of the authoritarian narrative and the political purposes hidden behind it. Wang Hongming and Yang Guangbin propose that this is a manifestation of Western academia’s current inability to break free from the limitations of ideological politicization. Related studies have already recognized the value presuppositions within the authoritarianism research paradigm, such as Western-centrism, the “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy, and the “end of history” thesis. On this basis, this article will continue to clarify the political context and academic lineage, and explore the possibility of transcending the authoritarianism research paradigm from a critical perspective.

威权主义研究范式在西方学界大行其道之时，普沃斯基（Adam Przeworski）却在新近的研究中提出威权主义研究范式充满了意识形态偏见。他从相关定量研究方法论角度对威权主义研究范式进行了反思，实际上这种反思没有触及威权主义研究范式失效的本质原因。而国内研究者们很早就关注到这类强加给非西方国家的“威权主义”标签：王绍光曾在在多篇文章中批驳西方学界炮制的各种威权主义“帽子”，许瑶认为“威权主义”政体理论的局限性凸显在解释现实政治的困境中。新近的相关研究中，国内学者关注到西方学界对非西方国家执政党“威权主义”形象的误读以及“数字威权主义”给相关国家数字化治理造成的污名化问题，撰文予以辩驳。在原因分析层面，刘晨光认为“威权主义论”反映的是西方“自由民主”的话语霸权，还有一些中俄学者指出威权主义叙事的偏颇及其背后隐藏的政治目的，王鸿铭和杨光斌提出这是目前西方学界没有摆脱意识形态政治化局限的表现。相关研究已经意识到威权主义研究范式中存在的价值预设，如西方中心主义、“民主—非民主”二分法、“历史的终结”论等。本文将在此基础上，继续厘清政治语境与学脉线索，并在批判性视角中探讨超越威权主义研究范式的可能性。

(I) Political Context: The Conflict between “Democracy” and “Authoritarianism”

（一）政治语境：“民主”和“威权主义”的冲突

Some overseas studies do not mince words in stating that the conflict between “democracy” and “authoritarianism” is a competition among major political powers. American establishment scholar Hal Brands believes that the opposition between authoritarianism and democracy is equivalent to the opposition between liberalism and illiberalism. Precisely because the West has long regarded liberalism as its guiding principle, academia has consistently focused the criteria for evaluating liberal democracy on two aspects: first, in the relationship between the state and the individual, individual rights are paramount; second, to achieve social justice, power must necessarily be dispersed rather than concentrated. However, the characteristics exhibited by the political systems of some non-Western countries—such as centralization of power, non-competitive elections, and multi-party cooperation rather than alternating governance—clearly do not conform to the value orientation of liberalism. Therefore, they inevitably become targets of authoritarianism opposed to “democracy.” In real-world politics, Western countries rely on the dominance of the “democratic” academic discourse established by liberalism, repeatedly using political actions to continuously “hijack” academic viewpoints. For example, at the end of 2021, Biden convened social activists, business groups, and representatives from over 100 countries to discuss methods of confronting “authoritarianism” and defending “democracy.” Since the prevalence of political development theory in academia, Western political circles, academia, and public opinion circles have become “well-versed” in exporting “democracy” to developing countries. It is just that the development of real-world politics does not follow such hegemonic political will.

一些海外研究毫不讳言“民主”和“威权主义”之间的冲突是政治大国之间的竞争。美国建制派学者哈尔·布兰茨（Hal Brands）认为，威权主义和民主之间的对立，等同于自由主义和非自由主义之间的对立。正是因为西方长期将自由主义奉为圭臬，所以学界一直把自由民主的评判标准聚焦于两方面，一是国家和个人关系中，个人权力至上；二是实现社会公正，权力必然要分散而非集中。而一些非西方国家政治制度表现出来的集权、非竞争性选举、多党合作而非交替执政等特点，明显不符合自由主义的价值取向，因此不可避免地成为与“民主”相对立的威权主义靶子。现实政治中，西方国家依靠自由主义奠定的“民主”学术话语统治力，一再利用政治行为持续“绑架”学术观点。如2021年年末，拜登召集来自100多个国家的社会活动者、商业团体和代表讨论对抗“威权主义”，捍卫“民主”的方法。自政治发展理论在学界的盛行开始，西方政界、学界、舆论界对向发展中国家输出“民主”已经“驾轻就熟”，只是现实政治的发展并不遵从此类霸权主义政治意愿。

Taking Russia and some Eastern European and Central Asian countries as examples, non-communist parties in Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere frequently alternate in power, exhibiting a certain tendency toward political competition, yet they struggle to meet the standards of “democracy” as defined by Western countries and are still regarded as “authoritarian” states that have failed in “democratic transition.” Lucan Way argues that the reason “authoritarian” states in the post-Cold War era experience regime instability without undergoing “democratic transition” is that, during periods of regime change, authoritarian rulers gradually adapt to the post-Cold War environment, avoid triggering domestic crises of legitimacy, secure support from foreign political allies, defeat competitors through manipulated competitive elections, and use media and public opinion to seize and consolidate power. [15]15 Lucan Way, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, known for his work on authoritarianism and democratization in post-Soviet states. Such research to some extent points out the error in Western scholars’ approach, which is mistaking the unstable phase of “authoritarian regimes” for a prelude to “democratic transition,” but essentially it still sets “democracy” benchmarked against European and American countries as the endpoint of all countries’ political development. However, if the analysis of causes is rephrased—namely, that the ruling party adapts to the development of the times, gains governing status through competitive elections, consolidates its own legitimacy through governance performance, and wins recognition from voters and public opinion—then these “authoritarian” rulers not only have no need for political change or “democratic transition” but will also maintain their grip on power for a long time. At this point, the political context hidden behind the authoritarianism research paradigm is fully exposed: Western academia views other countries’ political systems through “colored glasses,” and any political system that differs from Western democratic values is regarded as authoritarianism and a threat to “democracy.” When the concept of authoritarianism is placed in opposition to “democracy,” this binary opposition of either/or, due to the interference of ideological factors, effectively has more political significance than scholarly significance.

以俄罗斯和一些东欧中亚国家为例，格鲁吉亚、乌克兰等国的非共产主义政党频繁更替执政，表现出一定的政治竞争倾向，却难以达到西方国家认定的“民主”标准，至今依然被认为是“民主转型”失败的“威权主义”国家。卢肯·韦（Lucan Way）认为后冷战时代“威权主义”国家出现政权动荡、没有进行“民主转型”的原因在于：在政权更替期，威权主义执政者逐渐适应冷战后的环境，避免触发国内的合法性危机，获取国外政治盟友的支持，通过操控竞争性选举战胜竞争对手，利用媒体和舆论攫取并稳固权力。类似研究一定程度上指出了西方学者的研究误区，在于将“威权主义政权”的不稳定阶段错认成“民主转型”的前奏，但是本质上还是把以欧美国家为标杆的“民主”设置为所有国家政治发展的终点。然而，如果将原因分析换一种表述，即执政党顺应时代的发展，通过竞争性选举获得执政地位，以治理绩效巩固自身执政的合法性，获得了选民和舆论认可，那么，这些“威权主义”统治者不仅没有必要进行政治变革、推行“民主转型”，并且还将长期保持执政状态。至此，威权主义研究范式背后隐藏的政治语境显露无遗，西方学界是带着“有色眼镜”看待他国政治制度的，凡是不同于西方民主价值取向的政体都被视为威权主义和对“民主”的威胁。当威权主义概念被置于“民主”对立面之时，这种非此即彼的二元对立由于意识形态因素的干扰，政治意义实质上超过了学理意义。

(II) Academic Lineage: Exporting Ideology

（二）学脉线索：输出意识形态

Many researchers believe that “authoritarian regimes” continuously overturn various assumptions in the process of “democratic” expansion—for example, that economic development does not necessarily lead to “democratic transition,” that the success of “democratic consolidation” after “democratic transition” depends on the type of former authoritarian regime, the mode of democratic operation after transition, and the domestic economic level, and that the timing of authoritarianism reverting to “democracy” is also unpredictable. On this basis, academia has further derived a view that setbacks in “democratization” mean authoritarianism still has the capacity to make a comeback, and the reasons for failure are attributed to the growing international influence of countries like Russia. Larry Diamond proposes that to reverse this trend, the United States must once again raise the banner of democracy, restart and vigorously expand public diplomacy policies, and eliminate the adverse effects of countries like Russia on promoting democracy. [16]16 Larry Diamond, a prominent American political sociologist and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, known for his advocacy of democracy promotion. Diamond’s view reflects a subtle shift in the focus of Western academia’s research on authoritarianism: from initially placing high hopes on the “democratic transition” of “authoritarian regimes,” firmly believing that “democratic consolidation” would become the endpoint of transition, to gradually revising “democratization” theory, and now to exaggerating the serious threat of “authoritarianism” to “democracy.” Throughout, the starting point is the comprehensive promotion of Western democracy, and at this level, the trend of democracy being ideological becomes increasingly evident. “When the power of political elites is concentrated in the hands of a few rulers, authoritarianism itself becomes an ideology. Americans generally believe they are pragmatic and non-ideological, so their advocacy of liberal democracy is based on the proposition of building a good international competitive order.” In other words, Western academia has now regarded authoritarianism as an ideology opposed to “democracy,” and promoting “democracy” theory to the world is a need for Western developed countries, led by the United States, to consolidate their advantageous international position.

在许多研究者看来，“威权主义政权”在不断颠覆“民主”扩张进程中的种种假设，比如经济发展不一定会导致“民主转型”，“民主转型”之后的“民主巩固”成功与否取决于曾经的威权政体类型、转型后的民主运行模式以及国内经济水平，而且威权主义逆转为“民主”的时机也是不可预测的。在此基础上，学界进一步衍生出一种观点，认为“民主化”的挫折意味着威权主义还有能力卷土重来，并将失败的原因归咎于俄罗斯等国日益彰显的国际影响力。戴蒙德（Larry Diamond）提出，要想逆转这种趋势，只能由美国再次扛起民主大旗，重启并大力扩张公共外交政策，消除俄罗斯等国对推行民主的不良影响。戴蒙德的观点能够反映出西方学界对于威权主义研究重点的微妙转变：从一开始对“威权主义政体”的“民主转型”寄予厚望，坚信“民主巩固”会成为转型的终点，到逐渐修正“民主化”理论，以至目前渲染“威权主义”对于“民主”的严重威胁，贯穿始终的是全方位推崇西方民主的出发点，在此层面上民主被意识形态化的趋势愈加明显。“当政治精英的权力都集中于少数执政者手中，威权主义本身就成为一种意识形态，美国人普遍认为自身具有务实、非意识形态化的特征，所以他们对自由民主的推崇基于对构建良好国际竞争秩序的主张。”换言之，目前西方学界已将威权主义视为与“民主”对立的意识形态，向世界推广“民主”理论是以美国为首的西方发达国家巩固其优势国际地位的需要。

The reason Western countries can export the ideology of “democracy” externally is that they have historically monopolized the discourse of “democracy” in academia. “The structure of the international system determines the number of democratic and authoritarian countries in the world.” After the Cold War, the United States dominated the international order, so “democratic” countries meeting American standards became mainstream. Looking further back, after the Industrial Revolution, Western countries gradually dominated the process of economic globalization. The hard power of developed countries not only promoted the expansion of Western influence but also enabled the export of Western ideology, leading to the formation of discursive hegemony. When Western academia studies non-Western democratic countries, it generally follows the research path of political development theorists, automatically applying discursive hegemony to evaluate the development reality of other countries, “using the value orientation expressed by Western political culture to define the goals and orientation of political development in developing countries.” The question is, does a universally applicable truth of democracy exist?

之所以西方国家可以对外输出“民主”意识形态，是因为其曾经实现了对学界“民主”话语的垄断，“国际体系的结构决定了全球民主国家和威权国家的数量”。冷战结束后，美国主导国际秩序，所以符合美国标准的“民主”国家成为主流。再向前追溯，工业革命以后，西方国家逐渐主导经济全球化进程，发达国家的强硬实力不仅促使西方势力扩张，还使西方的意识形态得以输出，以致形成话语霸权。西方学界在对非西方民主国家进行研究时，一般都会沿着政治发展理论家的研究进路，自动地应用话语霸权评价他国的发展现实，“以西方政治文化所表达的价值取向来匡定发展中国家政治发展的目标和取向”。问题在于，是否存在置之四海而皆准的民主真理呢？

(III) Transcending the Authoritarianism Paradigm: Diverse Interpretations of Democracy

（三）超越威权主义范式：民主的多样化阐释

The origins of democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece, and through long historical practice, it has given rise to multiple forms: direct democracy inspired by the Athenian city-state, republican democracy based on the legacy of the European bourgeois revolutions, welfare democracy prevalent in Scandinavia, and so on. But this should also include democratic models that emphasize broader popular participation compared to liberalism, deliberative democratic models that focus on communication between different subjects, and democratic models that transcend the nation-state to seek the liberation of all humanity. Since democracy has multiple manifestations, there should not be a single standard for judging democracy. As one British scholar puts it: “The future of democracy depends on our making broader imaginations of both the possibilities and vulnerabilities of democracy.” Acknowledging the diversity of democracy and expanding its corresponding concepts will break through the narrow confines of liberal democracy, no longer limited to the cognition of a single theory, a single research paradigm, or a single political phenomenon.

民主的起源可以追溯到古希腊时期，并在漫长的历史实践中衍生出多种形态：灵感源于雅典城邦的直接民主、基于欧洲资产阶级革命遗产的共和制民主、盛行于斯堪的纳维亚半岛的福利制民主等等。但是这其中还应当包括相对于自由主义，更加强调人民广泛参与的民主模式，注重不同主体间交流的协商民主模式，以及超越民族国家寻求全人类解放的民主模式。既然民主具有多种表现形态，那么就不应该存在判定民主的唯一标准。正如一位英国学者所言：“民主的未来取决于我们对民主的可能性和脆弱性都作出更为广阔的设想。”承认民主的多元化，并拓展相应概念，将会突破自由民主的狭隘界限，不再限于对一种理论、一种研究范式、一种政治现象的认知。

Western countries have gradually monopolized the right to interpret democratic discourse and constructed a democratic value system based on “defending individual freedom and property rights, appealing to reason rather than custom, and requiring that government rule be limited by law and based on the consent of the governed.” However, principles such as competitive elections, protection of private property, and the rule of law—which Western democracy regards as golden rules—are no longer the exclusive preserve of some countries. In the process of exploring their own political development paths, late-developing countries have more or less transformed these into part of their political systems, presenting multiple forms of political systems that are more in line with national conditions and more vibrant. On the contrary, the increasingly capitalized competitive democratic systems in Western countries, the apathetic political participation of citizens, and the so-called populism caused by overemphasizing religious and ethnic political correctness have all gradually eroded the landscape of democratic politics. Of course, the reasons for the stagnation of democracy in Western countries are diverse, and the monopolistic interpretation and rigidification of democratic discourse by the West are undoubtedly one of the catalysts.

西方国家逐步垄断了对民主的解释话语权，并构建了基于“捍卫个人自由和财产权，呼吁理性而非习俗，以及要求政府的统治受法律限制并基于被统治者的同意”的民主价值体系。但是，竞争性选举、保护私人财产、法治这些西方民主奉为圭臬的原则早已不再是一些国家的专利，后发国家在探索自身政治发展道路的过程中已经或多或少地将其转化为政治制度的一部分，并且呈现出更符合国情、更具有生命力的多种政治制度形式。相反，西方各国日益资本化的竞争性民主制度、冷漠化的公民政治参与、过于强调宗教种族政治正确而导致的所谓民粹主义都已经在逐步蚕食民主政治的版图。当然，西方国家民主停滞的原因是多种多样的，西方对民主话语的垄断性解释和固化无疑是催化剂之一。

(IV) Constructing a Local Discourse System for the Study of China’s Political System

（四）构建中国政治制度研究本土话语体系

In essence, the authoritarianism discourse paradigm is an inevitable product of the West’s need to maintain its discursive hegemony over democracy, and this directly affects its validity as a research paradigm. On the one hand, faced with a large “gray zone” between democracy and authoritarianism, the label of authoritarianism based on the “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy clearly cannot encompass all complex regime types—this is its theoretical failure in terms of explanatory power. On the other hand, regarding how to explain the reality of political development in non-Western countries, the “labeling” and “abuse” of the authoritarianism research paradigm also prevent it from producing truly objective research results. In other words, within the framework of the authoritarianism research paradigm, it is inevitably difficult to give an objective understanding and evaluation of the reality of political development in non-Western countries. Correspondingly, if non-Western academic research takes a stance of being responsible for its own country’s political development, it must, by reflecting on the political context and academic lineage of this narrative, return to a local standpoint and local thinking. This naturally includes China.

就其本质而言，威权主义话语范式是西方为了维护民主话语霸权的必然产物，而这也直接影响了其作为研究范式的有效性：一方面，面对民主和威权之间大量的“灰色地带”，基于“民主—非民主”二分法的威权主义标签显然无法囊括所有复杂的政体类型，此为其解释学意义上的理论失效。另一方面，对于如何解释非西方国家的政治发展现实，威权主义研究范式的“标签化”和“滥用”也使其无法产出真正客观的研究成果。申言之，在威权主义研究范式的框架内，必然难以给予非西方国家的政治发展现实以客观的认识与评价。相应的，非西方国家学术研究如果本着对本国政治发展负责的立场，则必须经由反思这一叙事的政治语境和学脉线索，回归到本土立场与本土思维上。这其中，自然也包括了中国。

In fact, current overseas studies of Chinese politics are also considerably influenced by authoritarian narratives, and these political development theories based on the positive relationship between “development and democracy” and the so-called academic research premised on the “democracy–non-democracy” dichotomy can neither objectively describe nor correctly explain the governance achievements China has made. Therefore, both the reflection on the abuse of the authoritarian research paradigm in Western political science and the reflection on the discourse system of overseas Chinese political studies are of great significance. At the same time, this dual reflection also lays the theoretical groundwork for returning to a native standpoint and native thinking in the study of Chinese issues.

事实上，当下海外中国政治研究也在相当程度上受到了威权主义叙事的影响，而这些基于“发展—民主”的正向关系的政治发展理论、“民主—非民主”二分法的所谓学术研究都既无法客观地描述，也不能正确解释中国所取得的治理成就。因此，无论是对西方政治学研究中滥用威权主义研究范式的反思，还是对海外中国政治研究话语体系的反思，都具有重要意义，同时，这双重反思也为回归中国问题研究的本土立场、本土思维做好了理论铺垫。

Of course, from the dimension of development and construction, reflecting on the inadequacies of the Western academic discourse system and criticizing the hegemony of that system are merely necessary preparatory work for constructing a native academic discourse system. In interpreting the practice of China’s political development, native Chinese research should have the greatest say. Based on a native standpoint and native thinking, expounding the achievements and experience of China’s political development and Chinese-path modernization, and constructing a native political science discourse system can be carried out from the following aspects: First, from the dimension of the Second Integration [17]17 The Second Integration (第二个结合) refers to the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism with the best of traditional Chinese culture, as distinct from the first integration with China’s specific realities. It was formally proposed by Xi Jinping in his 2021 centenary speech., focus on the correspondence between history and reality. In his speech at the ceremony marking the centenary of the CPC, General Secretary Xi Jinping clearly stated: “We must uphold the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with the best of traditional Chinese culture.” The Second Integration emphasizes drawing ideological essence from the best of traditional Chinese culture and inheriting excellent political civilization. In the process of constructing political theory, the political wisdom of ancient Chinese statecraft still has certain reference significance. Second, be adept at summarizing the practical experience of political development since the founding of New China. To avoid the distortion of China’s political development reality by the “Western-centric view,” it is advisable to base oneself on “Chinese experience,” deeply clarify questions such as “which features of China’s political system demonstrate the irreplaceable advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics” and “how the CPC plays a leading role in the interaction between the state and society,” and form a systematic scholarly interpretation. Third, the construction of a native discourse system should proceed simultaneously with the response to, critique of, and creative borrowing from the Western discourse system. Although the Western discourse system contains traps such as hegemonism and “labeling,” the understanding of the laws of political development and modernization extracted from it can still provide useful reference for the localized interpretation of China’s political system. Fourth, always adhere to the nature and purpose of socialism in both theory and institutional practice, especially guiding the correct direction of reform and development with a people-centered stance. China’s political development and the realization of Chinese-path modernization are inseparable from the CPC’s consistent adherence to a people-centered development thought. The most important aspect of constructing a native discourse system is also to highlight “people-centeredness,” to better respond to the question “for whom is development, democracy, and modernization realized”—a question that mainstream Western theories cannot answer—and to consolidate the achievements of reform and opening up on the path of advancing democracy and good governance together.

当然，从发展与建构的维度看，反思西方学术话语体系的不足，批判西方学术话语体系的霸权只是构建本土学术话语体系的必要准备工作。对中国政治发展实践的解读，中国本土研究应当最具有话语权。基于本土立场和本土思维，阐述中国政治发展、中国式现代化的成就与经验，构筑本土政治学话语体系可以从以下几个方面展开：一是从“第二个结合”的维度上，注重历史和现实的呼应。习近平总书记在庆祝中国共产党成立100周年大会上的讲话中明确指出：“坚持把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合、同中华优秀传统文化相结合。”“第二个结合”强调从中华优秀传统文化中汲取思想精华，传承优秀的政治文明。在构建政治理论的过程中，中国古代治国理念的政治智慧仍具有一定的借鉴意义。二是善于总结新中国政治发展的实践经验。要想避免“西方中心论”对中国政治发展现实的曲解，不妨立足“中国经验”，深入阐明“中国政治制度的哪几种特征展示出中国特色社会主义制度不可替代的优势”“中国共产党如何在国家和社会的互动中发挥领导作用”等问题，形成体系化的学理性解读。三是建构本土话语体系与对西方话语体系的回应、批判及创造性借鉴同步进行。西方话语体系中纵然存在霸权主义、“标签化”等陷阱，然而从中剥离出来的对政治发展与现代化规律经验的认识，仍将可以为中国政治制度本土化阐释提供有益借鉴。四是要始终在理论与制度实践中坚守社会主义的性质和宗旨，尤其是以人民立场引导正确的改革和发展方向。中国的政治发展与中国式现代化的实现，离不开中国共产党始终坚持以人民为中心的发展思想。建构本土话语体系最重要的也是突出“人民性”，更好地回应“发展民主、实现现代化是为了谁”这一西方主流理论所无法回应的问题，在民主和善治共进的道路上巩固改革开放成果。

Furthermore, from the constructive dimension, one should also be adept at transforming native discourse into discourse capable of competing and contending with Western discourse. It is undeniable that there is currently a phenomenon worth pondering in the field of domestic political system research: “Political concepts based on Western political experience occupy a dominant position, while political concepts rooted in China’s native experience are increasingly scarce and deficient.” Therefore, not blindly seeking verification from Western theories, and reinterpreting academic concepts in the Western discourse system, is not only conducive to constructing a native discourse system for the study of China’s political system but also helps inspire the formation of theoretical achievements in the study of political systems in many non-Western countries that reveal universal laws and highlight diverse interpretations, thereby transforming into important academic momentum for better interpreting and promoting the political development of non-Western countries.

此外，从建构性的维度出发，还应当善于将本土话语转化为具备与西方话语竞争对抗的话语。不可否认的是，目前国内政治制度研究领域存在着这样一种值得思索的现象：“基于西方政治经验的政治概念占据了主导地位,而立足于中国本土经验的政治概念则越发稀少和匮乏。”因此，不盲目求证于西方理论，重新阐释西方话语体系中的学术概念，不仅有利于构建中国政治制度研究的本土话语体系，而且还有助于启发广大非西方国家的政治制度研究中形成揭示普遍规律、突出多样化阐释的理论成果，从而转化为更好阐释与促进非西方国家政治发展的重要学术动力。

(Author bios: Lin Yi, Associate Professor and Doctoral Supervisor, School of Marxism, Tsinghua University; Wang Qiaochu, 2021-level Doctoral Student, School of Marxism, Tsinghua University)

（作者简介：林毅，清华大学马克思主义学院副教授、博士研究生导师；王翘楚，清华大学马克思主义学院2021级博士研究生）

(Project: Staged results of the National Social Science Fund general project “Research on the Construction of a Discourse System for Chinese-Path Modernization Surpassing Western-Path Modernization from a Comparative Perspective” (23BKS064))

（项目：国家社会科学基金一般项目“比较视野下中国式现代化超越西方式现代化的话语体系建构研究”（23BKS064）的阶段性成果）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心