How Does Labor Ownership Alienate into Capital Ownership?

In recent years, there has been considerable controversy within academic circles surrounding the relationship between Marx’s political philosophy and modern political philosophy represented by Locke, with the focus on whether Locke’s theory of labor ownership defends capitalist exploitation and whether Marx engaged in a thorough critique of Locke. This article does not intend to participate in this debate, but rather seeks to elucidate the internal evolutionary logic of labor ownership from Locke, through Hegel, and finally to Marx—Locke first established the identity of labor and property; Hegel then demonstrated this identity from the heights of metaphysics and discovered its negative effects; Marx subsequently revealed the separation of labor and ownership, the alienation of labor ownership into capital ownership, and arrived at the following conclusion: rather than debating whether Locke’s and Hegel’s theories of property rights defend capitalist exploitation, it is more pertinent to critique those views that conflate capital ownership with labor ownership.

晚近以来，学界围绕马克思的政治哲学与以洛克为代表的近代政治哲学之间的关系问题产生了很大争议，焦点在于洛克的劳动所有权理论是否为资本主义剥削辩护，以及马克思是否对洛克进行了深入的批判。本文无意参与这一争论，而是试图阐明劳动所有权从洛克开始，经由黑格尔，最后到马克思的内在演进逻辑——洛克最先确立了劳动与财产的同一，黑格尔则从形而上学的高度论证了劳动与财产的同一，并发现了劳动与所有权同一的消极效应，马克思进而揭示了劳动与所有权的分离，劳动所有权异化为资本所有权，并得出如下论断：与其争论洛克、黑格尔的财产权理论是否为资本主义剥削辩护，不如批判那些将资本所有权混同为劳动所有权的观点。

I. The Identity of Labor and Ownership

一、劳动与所有权的同一

As is well known, Locke’s theory of property can be briefly summarized as the “principle of labor ownership,” in which labor and ownership achieve identity. How did Locke provide a thorough demonstration of this?

众所周知，洛克的财产权（property）理论可以简单概括为“劳动所有权原则”，劳动与所有权实现了同一。那洛克是如何进行充分论证的呢？

First, Locke developed his theory of property rights in the process of criticizing Filmer’s patriarchal theory. Filmer argued that when God created all things, He also created the first man, Adam. As the father of humanity, God granted all things to Adam, making them Adam’s property. Adam then, through the principle of primogeniture, transferred ownership of all things to subsequent monarchs. Locke resolutely refuted this, making four successive “negations”: Adam did not enjoy ownership of all things based on his fatherhood; even if Adam did, his heirs had no right to such ownership; even if his heirs did, there was no basis to prove who the legitimate heir was; and even if there were a legitimate heir, who Adam’s firstborn son was could no longer be ascertained. Therefore, Locke argued that God did not give the world’s things to Adam alone as private property, but to all of humanity in common. Furthermore, Locke argued from the perspective of human survival why God gave the world’s things to humanity in common. Locke pointed out: “Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence.” [1]1 “The right to the fruits of one’s labor” (劳动所有权) is a translation of Hegel’s concept of *Eigentum* as the embodiment of free will through labor, distinct from the later Marxist concept of property rights. All things in the world, all fruits naturally growing on the earth and beasts, are common to all humanity; they enable humanity to survive more comfortably, so no one has an exclusive private ownership over these common things.

第一，洛克是在批判菲尔麦父权制理论过程中提出自己的财产权理论。菲尔麦认为，上帝在创造万物的同时，也创造了第一个人，即亚当。作为人类的父亲，上帝将万物赐予亚当，归亚当所有。之后亚当再通过嫡长子继承制，将万物所有权转让给后世君主。洛克对此坚决予以驳斥，接连进行了四个“否定”：亚当并不基于父亲身份就享有对万物的所有权；即便亚当享有，但亚当的继承人并无权利享有这种所有权；即便他的继承人享有，但没有依据证明谁是合法继承人；即便有合法继承人，但谁是亚当的嫡长子早已无从考证。所以洛克认为，上帝并非将世界万物归亚当一人所私有，而是给予整个人类所共有。此外，洛克还基于人类生存的角度论证了上帝为什么要将世界万物归人类共有。洛克指出：“不论我们就自然理性来说，人类一出生即享有生存权利，因而可以享用肉食和饮料以及自然所供应的以维持他们的生存的其他用品”。世上万物，土地上所有自然生长的果实、兽类都是归人类所共有，它们让人类能够更加舒适地生存下去，所以没有人对这些共有物具有排他性的私人所有权。

Second, after explaining that God gave the world’s things to humanity in common, the next question is: what makes common things become private property belonging to different individuals? Locke’s answer is: labor constitutes private ownership. “Labor puts a distinction between them and common: that labor added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right.” [2]2 “The rabble” (Pöbel) is Hegel’s term for the impoverished mass that emerges in civil society, characterized by a loss of honor and a sense of right, and a potential threat to social order. Through the labor of his own body, man removes things from the general state nature has placed them in. For example, picking an apple from a tree: this apple has been infused with his labor, so it rightfully belongs to him, becoming his private property for his enjoyment. More importantly, in the process of altering the natural state of things, labor can greatly increase the value of things (mainly land). By comparing the difference between an acre of land planted with wheat and an acre of common, uncultivated land—that is, the difference between the food and clothing provided by labor and those provided solely by nature—Locke emphasized that the value of the former far exceeds that of the latter. Thus, labor excludes the common rights of others and becomes the basis of ownership. It is on this basis that Locke emphasized that humans acquire property rights without needing anyone’s transfer or consent, because their basis lies in labor.

第二，在说明上帝将世界万物归人类共有之后，接下来的问题就在于：是什么使共有的东西成为属于不同个人的私人财产？洛克的回答是：劳动构成了私人所有权。“劳动使他们同公共的东西有所区别，劳动在万物之母的自然所已完成的作业上面加上一些东西，这样它们就成为他的私有的权利了”。人通过自己的身体所从事的劳动，使物脱离自然所安排给它的一般状态。比如说从树上摘苹果，这个苹果已经渗透进他的劳动，所以这个苹果就正当地属于他了，成为他的私有财产，由他享用。更重要的是，劳动在改变物的自然状态过程中，能够使物（主要是土地）的价值大大增加。洛克通过对比一英亩种植小麦的土地与一英亩共有的、未被开垦的土地之间的差别，即依靠劳动提供的衣食和单靠自然提供的衣食之间的差别，强调前者的价值远超后者。这样，劳动就排斥了其他人的共同权利，成为所有权的依据。正是在此基础上，洛克才强调人类获得财产权不需要任何人的让与或同意，因为它的依据在于劳动。

Third, labor is merely the surface cause for establishing ownership; self-ownership is its deeper cause. Locke pointed out: “Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.” [3]3 “The Rhenish Provincial Assembly” was a representative body in the Prussian Rhine Province; Marx wrote articles for the *Rheinische Zeitung* in 1842–1843 criticizing its debates on the law against wood theft. This means that man’s ownership of his own person, i.e., ownership of his own body, is man’s first exclusive right. The implicit premise for man’s ownership of things he has labored on is precisely that his body belongs to himself. Under the condition that man possesses and controls his own body, he then infuses (mixes) the labor performed by his body into things; these things then rationally become his private property, and this attribution conforms to the logical law of identity. As Locke himself pointed out: “Though the things of nature are given in common, yet man (by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labor of it) has still in himself the great foundation of property.” [4]4 “Natural fruits” (天然孳息) is a legal term for products of property that arise naturally, such as fallen wood, crops, or animal offspring, whose ownership typically follows that of the principal property. Therefore, besides labor, the foundation of property rights is man’s ownership of his own person; both are indispensable. A prominent example is the slave. Although the slave labors, he does not own property, because he does not possess his own person (body); his person does not belong to himself, but to his master.

第三，劳动仅仅是确立所有权的表面原因，自我所有权才是其深层原因。洛克指出：“虽然土地和一切低等动物对一切人都是共有的，但每个人对他自己的人格（Person）拥有所有权，除他以外任何人都没有这种权利。他的身体（Body）所从事的劳动和他的双手所进行的工作，我们可以说，是正当地属于他的”。这意味着人对自己人格拥有所有权，即对自身身体的所有权是人的第一个排他性权利。人对经过他劳动的物具有所有权的隐含前提，正是他的身体是属于他自己的。人在拥有和支配自己身体的条件下，进而把自己身体所从事的劳动渗透（mix）于物内，这些物就合乎理性地成为他的私有财产，这种归属符合逻辑学上的同一律。正如洛克自己指出的那样：“虽然自然的东西是给人共有的，但人（通过成为他自己的主人、他自己人格的所有者以及他的行为或劳动）仍具有财产的基本基础”。因此，财产权的基础除了劳动之外，就是人对自己人格的所有权，二者缺一不可。突出的例子就是奴隶。奴隶虽然劳动，但他并不拥有财产，因为他并不占有自己的人格（身体），他的人格并不属于他自己，而是属于主人。

At this point, the argumentative structure of Locke’s theory of property rights becomes apparent. We can grasp Locke’s demonstration of the identity between labor and ownership as a progressively descending logic: “God → person (body) → labor → thing.”

至此，洛克财产权理论的论证结构便呈现出来了。我们可以把洛克对劳动与所有权之间同一性的论证把握为“上帝→人格（身体）→劳动→物”这一逐次递减的逻辑。

At the same time, Locke also placed limits on the quantity of property humans could acquire. Because man is God’s creation, a finite being unlike the omnipotent God, this determines that the quantity of property man acquires is not unlimited. Locke set two boundaries for the principle of labor ownership: first, no waste. The quantity of property one acquires is limited to what one can use; one must not waste it or let it spoil, otherwise one violates the common law of nature and will be punished; one no longer has ownership over property exceeding the limits of one’s life needs. Second, no harm to others’ interests. For example, if a person cultivates land, this does not harm others’ interests because enough land remains, so others cannot object to this person’s ownership of that land. Through these two boundaries, Locke attempted to ensure that the quantity of private property acquired through labor could not be arbitrarily expanded.

与此同时，洛克也对人类获得财产的数量进行了限制。因为人是上帝的创造物，属于一种有限的存在者，不像上帝那样全能，这就决定了人获得财产的数量并不是无限的。洛克对劳动所有权原则设置了两条界限：一是不浪费。人对自己获得的财产数量以享用为限度，不能浪费或使其腐烂，否则就违反了自然的共同法则，就会受到惩罚，对于超过其生活需要限度的财产便不再拥有所有权。二是不损害他人利益。比如说，一个人开垦土地，并不因此就损害他人利益，因为还留有足够多的土地，这样其他人就不会对这些土地的所有权提出异议。洛克试图通过这两条界限确保通过劳动所取得的私有财产数量不能随意扩张。

However, when Locke introduced money into his theory of property rights, the quantity of property was no longer limited. Locke understood money as “a lasting thing that men may keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.” [5]5 John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Second Treatise, §47. In Locke’s view, it was precisely due to these two characteristics of money—durability and consent-based nature—that money became property. The durability of money gave people the opportunity to expand the quantity of their property; they could accumulate as much as they liked, which did not conflict with the first boundary of private property. Additionally, the consent-based nature of money did not harm anyone’s interests. People consented to give gold, silver, and other money a higher value than their actual use; this value of money “has its value only from the consent of men, and yet in great part from the measure of labor.” [6]6 John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Second Treatise, §50. Precisely because of the voluntary consent of all, people could “exchange their surplus products for gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one.” [7]7 John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Second Treatise, §50. This self-evidently reveals that people can have unequal possession of property without harming the interests of others, which does not conflict with the second boundary of private property. When the quantity of property owned by some people becomes so great that the common law of nature can no longer protect it, people must leave the state of nature, enter into contracts to establish a government, and enter a political society, thereby protecting private property.

但是，当洛克将货币引入其财产权理论中时，财产的数量便不再受限制。洛克将货币理解为“一种人们可以保存而不至于损坏的能耐久的东西，他们基于相互同意，用它来交换真正有用但易于败坏的生活必需品”。在洛克看来，正是由于货币这两种特性——耐久与基于同意的特性，使得货币成为了财产。货币耐久的特性给了人们扩大财产数量的机会，他喜欢积攒多少都可以，这与私有财产的第一条界限并行不悖。另外，货币基于同意的特性不会损害任何人的利益。人们同意赋予金银等货币比其实际用处更高的价值，货币的这种价值“只是从人们的同意中来，而且大部分还取决于劳动的尺度”。正是基于所有人自愿的同意，人们才能“把剩余产品去交换可以窖藏而不至损害任何人的金银”。这也就不证自明地揭示出人们对财产可以有不平均的占有，并且不会损害任何他人的利益，这就与私有财产第二条界限并行不悖。当一部分人拥有的财产数量之多以至于自然的共同法则无法加以保护时，人们就不得不走出自然状态订立契约成立政府，进入到政治社会状态中，从而保护好私有财产。

Only up to this point can we fully grasp the complete picture of Locke’s theory of property rights. Then, is Locke’s theory of property rights exactly as he claims? That is, “there will be no reason for quarreling about property rights, nor any doubt about how much property can be allowed to be possessed.” In fact, Locke’s theory of property rights contains an obvious paradox. Before the introduction of money, labor was the sole basis for acquiring property; each person produced through labor as much property as they could consume. This was an extremely equal state, where the fact that property would rot limited the amount of property one could obtain, and it also kept humanity in a state of universal poverty. But after the emergence of money, labor was no longer the sole basis for property. As property, the value of money “depends for the most part on the measure of labor” on the one hand, and on the other hand “comes only from the consent of men.” That is to say, labor and consent together constitute the basis of property, and the basis of property rights shifted from monism to dualism. Therefore, some scholars argue accordingly: “Locke formed two concepts of property, two theories of ownership.”

直到这里，我们才能完整地把握洛克财产权理论的全貌。那么，洛克的财产权理论是否就如他宣称的那样呢？即“对于财产权就不会有发生争执的理由，对于财产权容许占有多少也不能有任何怀疑”。事实上，洛克的财产权理论存在明显的悖论。在引入货币之前，劳动是人获得财产的唯一根据，每个人能消费多少财产，他就通过劳动生产多少。这是一种极为平等的状态，财产会腐烂的事实限制了人对财产数量的获得，这也使得人类处于一种普遍贫困的状态。但在货币出现之后，劳动不再是财产的唯一根据。作为财产的货币，它的价值一方面是“大部分还取决于劳动的尺度”，另一方面是“只是从人们的同意中来”，也就是说，劳动和同意共同构成了财产的根据，财产权的根据从一元走向了二元。所以有学者据此认为：“洛克形成了两种财产观、两种所有权理论”。

In fact, the basis of Locke’s property rights is monistic. The key here is that money is not, as Locke understood it, characterized by durability and based on consent. As Marx pointed out, Locke was one of the representatives of the 18th-century imaginary theory of money value; the essence of money is “the universal equivalent form of all commodities, the direct social incarnation of all human labor.” Money ultimately still comes down to human labor. Therefore, Locke’s theory of property rights is monistic: only labor can establish property rights. More importantly, Locke believed that money is used by people, based on mutual consent, “to exchange truly useful but perishable necessities of life.” Here, money exists as a means of exchange between things, or is used for hoarding. This means that in Locke’s theory of property rights, money does not exist as a means for property to augment itself, that is, not as capital. So we can say that Locke’s theory of property rights has an internal tension, but it cannot be interpreted as two heterogeneous theories of ownership. Only when money exists as capital does labor property right become alienated into capital property right, thus forming two theories of ownership. Marx dissected this deeply through his critique of political economy. But the undeniable fact is that the emergence of money was indeed a turning point: “the dominant equality of destitution was replaced by economic inequality,” and the phenomenon of universal poverty for all was transformed into the coexistence of rich and poor. Hegel was the first to recognize the severity of this issue.

事实上，洛克的财产权的根据就是一元的。这里的关键是货币并非是如洛克理解的那样具有耐久与基于同意的特性，正如马克思所指出的，洛克是18世纪货币价值想象说的代表之一，货币的本质是“一切商品的一般等价形式，是一切人类劳动的直接的社会化身”，货币归根到底还是人类劳动。因此，洛克的财产权理论就是一元的，即只有劳动才能确立财产权。更重要的是，洛克认为，货币是人们基于相互同意“来交换真正有用但易于损坏的生活必需品”，这里的货币是作为物与物交换的手段存在，或被用来窖藏。这意味着洛克财产权理论中的货币不是作为财产增殖自身的手段存在，即不是作为资本存在。所以，我们可以说洛克的财产权理论存在内在的张力，但不能将其解读为两种异质的所有权理论，只有当货币作为资本而存在时，劳动所有权才会走向异化，成为资本所有权，因而形成了两种所有权理论，马克思通过政治经济学批判对此进行了深入解剖。但不得不承认的事实是，货币的出现的确是一个转折点，“占主导地位的赤贫的平等为经济上的不平等所取代”，所有人都贫困的现象转变为贫富共存现象，黑格尔最先意识到了这一问题的严峻性。

II. The Negative Effects of the Identity of Labor and Ownership

二、劳动与所有权同一的消极效应

Hegel’s argument for labor property right is far more complex and refined than Locke’s, rising to the level of metaphysics. As we all know, Hegel’s starting point for arguing property rights is the will, but this starting point is a logical one, not a temporal one. The temporal starting point refers to beginning from the living human being with physical needs, that is, the human being in the natural sense (Mensch). At this point, there is no difference between humans and animals—the human is completely determined, bound by all external determinations (age, stature, etc.) and internal determinations (desires, impulses, etc.), devoid of any will, and no different from animals.

黑格尔对劳动所有权的论证要比洛克复杂与精致得多，上升到了形而上学的高度。我们都知道，黑格尔论证财产权的出发点是意志，但这个起点是逻辑起点，而不是时间起点。时间起点就是指从活生生的、有着肉体需求的人，即自然意义上的人（Mensch）开始。此时，人与动物并没有什么区别——人是被完全规定了的，被束缚在一切外部规定（年龄、身材等）与内部规定（情欲、冲动等）中，毫无意志可言，与动物无异。

But humans possess a unique capacity: “I can free myself from everything, abandon all purposes, and abstract from everything.” That is to say, humans can abstract from all external and internal determinations that bind them, eliminate all determinacy, attain pure thinking and pure consciousness of themselves, and exist in a state of pure abstraction. Only at this point does the human have self-consciousness—consciousness of oneself—and have the concept of the self. “When I say ‘I,’ I abandon all particularities such as character, talent, insight, age, etc.” Hegel highly praised this capacity of humans, because it embodies the nobility of being human. An individual “who has not attained this pure thinking and pure knowledge of oneself does not possess personality (Persönlichkeit).” From this, it can be seen that what Hegel calls will, thinking, and personality are consistent in connotation: the human can abstract from all determinations and become pure existence.

但人却有一种独特的能力：“我能摆脱一切东西，放弃一切目的，从一切东西中抽象出来”。即是说，人能够从束缚他的一切外部与内部规定中抽象出来，消除一切规定性，达到对自己的纯思维、纯意识，处于纯粹抽象的状态中。此时，人才有了自我意识——对自身的意识，有了自我的概念，“当我说我的时候，我把其中的一切特殊性，如性格、天赋、见识、年龄等都放弃了”。黑格尔高度赞扬人的这种能力，因为这种能力体现了人之为人的高贵性。个人“如果没有达到这种对自己的纯思维和纯认识，就未具有人格性（Persönlickeit）”。从这里可以看出，黑格尔所说的意志、思维、人格性三者的内涵是一致的：人能够从一切规定中抽象出来，成为纯粹存在。

On the surface, Hegel’s theory of property rights is not grounded in the theological tradition like Locke’s, but upon careful analysis, it is not difficult to find that Hegel’s argument for property rights also has a strong theological gene. Because the will/personality, as the starting point of the system of legal philosophy, is purely abstract; it does not exist in the human world but belongs to the otherworldly kingdom of heaven. It can be said that will/personality is merely another name for God.

表面上看，黑格尔的财产权理论不像洛克那样奠基在神学传统之中，但细细分析不难发现，黑格尔对财产权的论证同样具有浓厚的神学基因，因为作为法哲学体系出发点的意志/人格性是纯粹抽象的，它在人世间并不存在，属于彼岸的天国中。可以说，意志/人格性就是上帝的另一种称谓而已。

But the will is not content to remain in the stage of abstractness and immediacy, that is, the stage of pure thinking. Its first step is to take possession of its own body. Thinking is a theoretical attitude, while the will is a practical attitude, “that thinking which translates itself into determinate being.” Since humans can abstract from all determinations, they can also set determinations again and translate themselves into determinate being. The first real task they set for themselves is to inhabit the living organic body, that is, to take possession of the body, making it the will’s “docile organ and ensouled instrument.” The person (Person) is precisely the unity of personality and body, the unity of infinity and finitude. A major difference between Hegel and Locke is that Hegel no longer understands personality merely as a direct natural attribute based on the body.

但意志并不满足于自己停留在抽象性和直接性的阶段，即纯思维的阶段，它的第一步就是占有自己的身体。思维是理论态度，而意志是实践态度，是“把自己转变为定在的那种思维”。人既然能够从一切规定中抽象出来，那它就能再次设定规定，把自己转变为定在，它给自己设定的第一个现实任务就是寄居在活生生的有机身体中，即占有身体，使身体成为意志的“驯服器官和有灵性的工具”。人格（Person）正是人格性与身体的统一，是无限性和有限性的统一。黑格尔与洛克之间的重大区别，就在于黑格尔不再将人格仅仅理解为一种基于身体的直接的自然属性。

Personality takes possession of its own body, and by extension, what the body possesses ultimately belongs to personality and is governed by it. As Hegel says: “Only personality can give the right to things.” Where Hegel surpasses Locke is in his strong emphasis on the noble personality within the person and its governance over the body.

人格性占有自己的身体，推而广之，身体所占有的东西最终属于人格性，并由人格性所统摄。正如黑格尔所言：“唯有人格性才能给予对物的权利”。黑格尔超越洛克的地方就在于他极为强调人格中那高贵的人格性，以及其对肉体的统摄。

Please note: the human abstracting from all determinacy to obtain personality, and then taking possession of its own body, is not the entirety of Hegel’s theory of property rights. The human must then go on to take possession of things. “The human embodies his will in a thing—that is the concept of property; the next step is the actualization of this concept.” Taking possession is the actualization of the concept of property, placing the thing under the control of my external power.

请注意，人从一切规定性抽象出来，获得人格性，接着占有自己的身体，这并不是黑格尔财产权理论的全部，人还要再接着去占有物。“人把他的意志体现于物内，这就是所有权的概念，下一步骤才是这一概念的现实化”。取得占有才是所有权概念的现实化，将物置于我的外部力量支配之下。

Only after completing these two steps does the will have a positive relationship with the thing, and my will and the thing achieve identity. This identity is not the initial abstract identity without content differences, but a real identity with content differences. The initially abstract, subjective will thus truly becomes concrete, objective will. Therefore, Hegel says: “Only in property is the person present as reason.” Because the characteristic of reason is the identity of subject and object, which is realized in property. Hence, Hegel would not be satisfied with arguing for property rights based on human physiological needs like Locke does. “Property is rational not because it satisfies needs, but because it sublates the pure subjectivity of personality.” That is to say, the core function of property is to prove that personality has attained determinate being, rather than being in a state of empty abstraction.

只有在完成这两个步骤后，意志对物才有了肯定的关系，我的意志和物达到了同一性。这种同一性不是最初的那种抽象的、无内容差别的同一性，而是现实的、有内容差别的同一性，最初抽象的、主观的意志从而真正成为具体的、客观的意志。所以黑格尔说：“只有在所有权中，人格才是作为理性而存在”。因为理性的特征就是主客同一，其在所有权中得到了实现。因此，黑格尔不会满足于像洛克那样基于人的生理需要来论证财产权，“所有权所以合乎理性不在于满足需要，而在于扬弃人格性的纯粹主观性”。也就是说，财产的最核心的作用就是证明了人格性达到了定在，而不是处于空洞抽象的状态。

At this point, the logical thread of Hegel’s argument for property rights is clearly presented. We can simplify it into the argumentative structure of “person (personality/will and body unity) → possession → thing.” Such an exquisite argument represents the pinnacle of Western theories of property rights. However, the section on abstract law discusses the rationality of my possessing property; how much one possesses belongs to the sphere of civil society. Hegel, unlike Locke, does not set limits on the amount of property one can acquire, nor does he demand an equal distribution of property, because “equality can only be the equality of abstract persons.” This also implies that in civil society, the coexistence of rich and poor will inevitably appear.

至此，黑格尔论证财产权逻辑思路才清晰地呈现出来，我们可以将其精简为“人格（人格性/意志与身体的统一）→占有→物”的论证结构，如此精美的论证代表了西方财产权理论的顶峰。但抽象法部分讨论的是我占有财产的合理性，占有多少却是属于市民社会的领域。黑格尔不像洛克那样给人获得财产的数量设置界限，更不会要求对财产进行平均分配，因为“平等只能是抽象的人格们的平等”。这也暗示了在市民社会中必然会出现贫富共存的景象。

Hegel paid close attention to the problem of poverty emerging in civil society and openly lamented: “How poverty is to be solved is an important problem that agitates modern society and causes it distress.” Avineri points out: “Poverty lies at the margins of Smith’s model; in Hegel, by contrast, poverty takes on a different aspect.” Why, then, is poverty especially important for Hegel? This is not only because poverty prevents people from satisfying their various bodily needs, but also because Hegel grounds personality in property; without property, the noble personality within the person cannot achieve determinate existence [Dasein], and at that point the person is no different from an animal. Poverty ought to have been a central concern of Smith and other classical political economists, but they focused their attention on how to enrich the nation and benefit the people, failing to recognize the severity of the problem of poverty. Hegel, with the keen insight of a philosopher, transcended their narrow perspective.

黑格尔非常关注市民社会出现的贫困难题，并公开感叹道：“怎样解决贫困是推动现代社会并使它感到苦恼的一个重要问题”。阿维纳瑞（Avineri）就指出：“贫苦居于斯密模型的边缘；而在黑格尔那里，贫困则呈现出另一面相”。那么，贫困为什么会在黑格尔这里尤为重要？这不仅是因为贫困使得人无法满足自己的各种身体需要，更是因为黑格尔将人格性奠基在财产之中，没有财产意味着人格中那高贵的人格性无法达到定在，此时的人就与动物无异。贫困理应是斯密等古典政治经济家思考的重点，但他们却将关注的重点放在如何富国裕民上，意识不到贫困问题的严峻性，黑格尔以哲学家的敏锐洞察力超越了他们的狭隘视野。

In fact, Hegel analyzed two different types of poverty in civil society—distinguished according to the specific causes that lead to poverty: contingent poverty and necessary poverty. As for contingent poverty, “various circumstances in nature and in external relations can plunge an individual into poverty,” such as skill, talent, physical constitution, and so on, and this kind of poverty suffered by the individual conforms to the objective right of particularity of spirit.

事实上，黑格尔在市民社会中分析了两种不同类型的贫困——根据导致贫困的具体原因区分为两类贫困：偶然性贫困与必然性贫困。就偶然性贫困而言，“自然界的、和外部关系中的各种情况，都可以使个人陷入贫困”，比如技能、禀赋、体质等，并且个人遭受的这种贫困合乎精神特殊性的客观法。

As for necessary poverty, when the system of civil society operates smoothly, wealth is produced in abundance, but “the subdivision and limitation of particular labor, and with it the dependence and poverty of the class bound to this labor, also increase increasingly.” That is to say, the subdivision of production, i.e., the division of labor, on the one hand makes individual labor simpler and increases the volume of production, but at the same time it makes the individual more dependent on this system, because the individual, separated from this system, can neither labor nor survive; moreover, engaging in this simple, mechanized labor makes the individual increasingly ignorant of other fields of labor, and his dependence on others becomes ever stronger.

就必然性贫困而言，当市民社会的体系顺利运转时，财富被大量生产出来，但是，“特殊劳动的细分和局限性，从而使束缚于这种劳动的阶级的依赖性和贫困，也愈益增长”。也就是说，生产的细分，即分工，一方面使得个人劳动变得简单，生产量增加，但同时也使个人更加依赖于这个体系，因为个人离开了这个体系就无法劳动，无法生存；并且从事这种简单的、机械化劳动使得个人对其他领域的劳动越来越无知，对他人的依赖性也就越来越强。

Furthermore, the principle of civil society is to encourage the particularity of the individual, to encourage the individual to possess more property, and to affirm oneself through property, which gives rise to luxury. “In the same process, dependence and poverty also increase without limit.” This undoubtedly reveals a state of poverty of one part of the population relative to another. Hegel then says: “Dependence and poverty confront a material with infinite resistance, namely, external means, whose characteristic is that they are the property of the free will of others [Eigentum des freien Willens], and therefore this resistance is absolutely stubborn.” This exposition by Hegel is extremely important—under the rules of civil society, others have acquired a great amount of wealth, so that their free will is embodied in it; even if one is very poor, one cannot infringe upon the property of others, cannot violate the principle of ownership. In this way we can understand why Hegel opposed the wealthy class subsidizing the poor, because this would mean that “the poor would be guaranteed the means of subsistence without the mediation of labor,” which contradicts the principle of the right to the fruits of one’s labor. The core principle of civil society is precisely the right to the fruits of one’s labor; under the dominance of this principle, poverty is an inevitable result. Thus, Hegel profoundly recognized the negative effects triggered by the principle of the right to the fruits of one’s labor in civil society.

另外，市民社会的原则就是鼓励个人的特殊性，鼓励个人占有更多的财产，用财产才能肯定自己，这就产生了奢侈。“在同一过程中，依赖性和贫困也无限增长”。这无疑揭示的是一部分人相对于另一部分人的贫困状态。黑格尔接着说道：“依赖性与贫困面对的是一种具有无限抵抗性的物质，即外在手段，这种外在手段的特征就在于它们是别人的自由意志所有物（Eigentum des freien Wllens），因此这种抵抗性是绝对顽强的”。黑格尔的这一论述极为重要——在市民社会的规则中，他人获得了大量的财富，使得其自由意志体现在其中，即便自己很贫困，也不能侵犯他人的财产，不能破坏所有权原则。这样我们就能明白，黑格尔何以会反对由富有者阶级来资助穷人，因为这会导致“穷人用不着以劳动为中介就可保证得到生活资料”，这与劳动所有权原则是相违背的。市民社会最核心的原则就是劳动所有权，在这一原则的主导下，贫困是必然的结果。所以，黑格尔深刻地意识到了劳动所有权原则在市民社会中所触发的消极效应。

And when these contingent and necessary factors act together, the gap between rich and poor grows ever wider; on the one hand, luxury reaches its peak, on the other, poverty plummets into the abyss, ultimately reaching a state of polarization, marked by the emergence of the rabble [Pöbel]. “The emergence of the rabble makes it easier for disproportionate wealth to be concentrated in the hands of a few.” Faced with the paradoxical problem of “poverty–rabble,” i.e., that although wealth is abundant, it is never enough to solve this problem, Hegel proposed many solutions, but all were ineffective. This has also become a target for criticism of Hegel by scholars at home and abroad, but this not only sets too high a demand on Hegel as a philosopher, but also underestimates the complexity of this problem. Under the premise of recognizing the core foundation of modern society—the right to property—paradoxical poverty is a nearly unsolvable problem. The young Marx, when defending the poor picking up dead branches, faced the same problem, and it was only after undergoing the critique of political economy that Marx deeply understood why the principle of the right to the fruits of one’s labor leads in practice to the polarization of rich and poor—because it had long since turned into its opposite, alienating itself into the right of capital.

而当这些偶然与必然的因素共同作用时，贫富之间的差距就会越拉越大，一方面是奢侈达到顶峰，另一方面是贫困跌落深渊，最终达到两极分化的状态，标志就是贱民群体的出现，“贱民之产生使不成比例的财富更容易集中到少数人手中”。面对“贫困—贱民”这一悖论性难题，即财富虽过剩但用来解决这一难题就是不够的，黑格尔提出了诸多解决方案，但都无效。这也成为国内外学者批判黑格尔的靶标，但这不仅是对作为哲学家的黑格尔提出了过高要求，还低估了这一难题的复杂性。在承认现代社会核心基石——财产权的前提下，悖论性贫困就是一个近乎无解的问题。青年马克思在为贫民捡拾枯树枝辩护时面临的同样是这一难题，而经历了政治经济学批判的马克思才深刻理解劳动所有权原则何以会在实践中导致贫富两级分化这一难题，因为它早已走向了自己的反面，异化为资本所有权。

III. The Separation of Labor and Ownership

三、劳动与所有权的分离

In 1842, the young Marx, upon entering his first job after graduating with his doctorate, experienced the cruelty of society. The Rhenish Provincial Assembly attempted to legislate that the poor picking up dead branches should be classified as theft, which was clearly defending the interests of forest owners. Marx tried to defend the poor, because this was one of the important means by which many poor people made a living. But whether based on the customary rights of the poor or from the perspective of moral condemnation, Marx could not provide an effective defense for them. What exactly was the difficulty in this matter? We know that dead branches are natural fruits; they are not ownerless things, and their ownership is clearly stipulated in law. Therefore, the Rhenish Provincial Assembly’s determination of the illegality of picking up dead branches “was merely a reaffirmation of the proper meaning of ownership.” For Marx, who had studied law, this was naturally no stranger. Without questioning the premise of ownership, even if Marx had possessed knowledge of political economy, he could not have made a reasonable defense for the poor, let alone that in 1842 Marx had not yet developed to the point of completely negating ownership. This put Marx in a dilemma: on one side was the dogma that private property is inviolable, on the other was the problem of the poor’s miserable plight, and this also made Marx doubt whether ownership was truly as rational as Hegel had argued.

1842年，青年马克思在博士毕业后初次参加工作时就体会到了社会的残酷性。莱茵省议会试图通过立法，将贫民捡拾枯枝的行为定性为盗窃，这显然是在维护林木所有者的利益。马克思试图为贫民做辩护，因为这是许多贫民赖以谋生的重要途径之一。但无论是基于穷人的习惯法，还是从道德谴责的视角，马克思都无法为贫民提供有效辩护。这件事究竟难在哪里？我们知道，枯枝是天然孳息，它并不是无主物，它的权属在法律上是有明文规定的，因此莱茵省议会认定捡拾枯枝行为的违法性“无非是重申了所有权的应有之义”。这对于学法律出身的马克思而言，自然毫不陌生。在不反思所有权的前提下，马克思即便是具备了政治经济学方面的知识，也不可能为贫民做出合理辩护，更何况1842年的马克思还没有发展到要彻底否定所有权的地步。这就使马克思陷入了两难的境遇：一边是私有财产不可侵犯这一信条，一边是贫民的悲惨遭遇这一难题，这也使马克思对所有权是否真的如黑格尔论证的那样合乎理性产生了怀疑。

But the phenomenon of the poor picking up dead branches revealed more the decay and incompetence of the feudal autocratic system in Germany at that time, and had no direct connection with modern industrial society. In 1843, Marx keenly discovered a new type of poor person—the proletariat, which formed in the then-emerging industrial movement in Germany; the poverty of this proletariat was artificially caused poverty. For Marx, who was undergoing a transformation from state rationalism to communism, he directly assigned to the proletariat a great mission: “to negate private property.” This also shows that Marx wanted to completely negate the foundation of Hegel’s system of legal philosophy—property is not a confirmation of freedom (will/personality), but a destruction of freedom. The reason Marx launched a critique of the right to property was precisely because the right to private property led to poverty.

但贫民捡枯枝这一现象更多地是揭示了当时德国封建专制制度的腐朽与无能，与现代工业社会并无直接关联。1843年，马克思敏锐地发现了一种新型贫困者——无产阶级，它形成于德国刚刚兴起的工业运动，无产阶级的这种贫困是人为导致的贫困。对于正在经历从国家理性主义向共产主义转变的马克思而言，他直接赋予无产阶级的一大使命就是“否定私有财产”。这也说明了马克思要彻底否定黑格尔法哲学体系的根基——财产并非是对自由（意志/人格性）的确证，而是对自由的毁灭，马克思之所以会对财产权展开批判，就是因为私有财产权导致了贫困。

In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx made a new discovery about the poverty of the proletariat—it falls into the paradoxical situation of “the more one labors, the poorer one becomes.” Marx agreed with Smith’s description of the actual situation workers face in a declining, stationary, or fully prosperous state of society, but he strongly refuted Smith’s emphasized view—that only when society is in a state of growth are all classes, including the laboring poor, happiest—because this completely did not correspond to the actual situation of workers. Marx pointed out unequivocally: “In the state of growth of society, the ruin and impoverishment of the worker is the product of his labor and of the wealth he produces. That is to say, poverty arises from the very essence of modern labor itself.” This formulation has a twofold connotation: (1) Marx recognized that labor brings the worker not property, but poverty; (2) “impoverishment” indicates that the poverty suffered by the working class is not only a static phenomenon, but also a dynamic process of continuous deterioration. Therefore, when examining the worker’s alienated labor, Marx stated: “The more wealth the worker produces, the greater the extent and scale of his production, the poorer he becomes.”

在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思对无产阶级的贫困有了新的发现——陷入了“越劳动越贫困”的悖论性处境中。马克思同意斯密所描述的工人在社会衰落、静止或达到完满的状态下所遭遇的实际处境，但针对斯密强调的观点——只有社会处于发展状态时，包括劳动贫民在内的各阶级才是最幸福的，马克思却大加驳斥，因为这完全不符合工人的实际情况。马克思旗帜鲜明地指出：“在社会的增长状态中，工人的毁灭和贫困化是他的劳动的产物和他生产的财富的产物。就是说，贫困是从现代劳动本身的本质中产生出来的”。这一表述具有两重内涵：（1）马克思认识到劳动给工人带来的不是财产，而是贫困；（2）“贫困化”表明工人阶级遭遇的贫困不仅是一种静态的现象，更是一个不断恶化的动态过程。所以，马克思在考察工人的异化劳动时指出：“工人生产的财富越多，他的生产的影响和规模就越大，他就越贫穷”。

What Marx depicts here is evidently the state of poverty of the working class relative to the bourgeoisie. The paradox lies in the fact that labor, as the source of wealth, produces poverty for the worker, and the more the worker labors, the poorer he becomes relative to the capitalist. Of course, by 1844 Marx had clearly recognized that labor ownership had turned into its opposite, but he was still unable to explain clearly how labor ownership had moved from identity to separation. This task was not completed until 1857.

马克思在这里描绘的显然是工人阶级相对于资产阶级的贫困状态，悖论性之处在于：作为财富源泉的劳动却为工人生产了贫困，并且是工人越劳动，相对于资本家而言就越贫困。当然，1844年的马克思已经明确地意识到了劳动所有权走向了自己的反面，但他还无法解释清楚劳动所有权究竟是如何从同一走向了分离，这一工作直到1857年才得以完成。

During these more than ten years, Marx’s perspective on understanding ownership underwent two major shifts. The first is a historical understanding of ownership. “In each historical epoch, property has developed differently and under a set of entirely different social relations.” [9]9 Karl Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 197. In Marx’s view, we cannot treat ownership as an abstract, ahistorical concept in the manner of Hegel; this can only be a metaphysical illusion. Since the era in which Marx lived was one dominated by the bourgeoisie, ownership was bourgeois ownership. The second is understanding ownership from the perspective of relations of production. Treating property relations as legal relations, i.e., relations of will, is Hegel’s typical approach, whereas Marx regarded them as existing relations of production. At this point, ownership in the legal sense is transformed into the system of property ownership in the perspective of the critique of political economy, although both are expressed by the same word “Eigentum.” Approaching legal relations from the perspective of relations of production does not mean that Marx no longer studied legal philosophy (political philosophy), but rather that he used the method of political economy to answer questions of legal philosophy: “no longer studying legal relations in themselves, but studying legal relations from the perspective of relations of production.” [10]10 This formulation is a paraphrase by the author of Marx’s methodological shift; cf. Marx’s “Preface” to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859). The reason the young Marx felt it was difficult to defend the poor gathering dead branches was precisely that in 1842 Marx understood ownership as a legal relation, and legal relations belong to the superstructure, which provides legitimacy for the actual material life of society. But when Marx understood ownership as relations of production, i.e., when he dissected the economic base beneath the superstructure through political economy, he could find the path to resolve this difficulty.

在这十余年的时间内，马克思理解所有权的视角发生了两方面的重大转变。一是历史性的理解所有权。“在每个历史时代中所有权是以各种不同的方式、在完全不同的社会关系下面发展起来的”。在马克思看来，我们不能像黑格尔那样把所有权当作一种抽象的、非历史性的观念，这只能是一种形而上学幻想。由于马克思所处的时代是资产阶级占统治地位的时代，所以所有权就是资产阶级所有权。二是从生产关系入手理解所有权。将财产关系作为法律关系即意志关系来把握是黑格尔的典型进路，而马克思将此视为现存的生产关系，此时法律意义上的所有权就转变成了政治经济学批判视域中的所有制，虽然二者都是用同一个词“Eigentum”来表示。从生产关系入手来研究法权关系，并不意味着马克思不再研究法哲学（政治哲学）了，而是用政治经济学的方式来回答法哲学的问题，“不再是就法权关系本身来研究法权关系，而是从生产关系入手来研究法权关系”。青年马克思之所以会感觉到为贫民捡枯枝辩护是一件难事，就是因为1842年的马克思是将所有权理解为法权关系，而法权关系属于上层建筑，它为现实的物质生活提供合法性证明。但当马克思将所有权理解为生产关系时，也就是对上层建筑底下的经济基础进行政治经济学的解剖时，才能找到解决这一难事的路径。

It is precisely based on this shift in the perspective on understanding ownership that Marx truly discovered the mechanism of exploitation inherent in modern bourgeois ownership. The capitalist purchases labor power according to the law of commodity exchange and brings it into the production process. Marx discovered that the value created by a worker in one working day is always greater than the value advanced by the capitalist in the form of money. In this sense, the first production process is divided into two periods: first, the period of necessary labor, where the value created by the worker through labor equals the amount of money advanced by the capitalist, and the two parties complete an exchange of equivalents; second, the period of surplus labor, where the worker creates for the capitalist value for which the latter pays no money, and the capitalist appropriates this portion of surplus value without compensation. In the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), Marx calls this portion of surplus value “surplus capital I.” [11]11 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 310. When the second production process begins, i.e., when surplus capital I is reinvested in the production process, the capitalist and the worker once again achieve so-called equal exchange. Marx calls the new surplus value generated in this process “surplus capital II.” The key point is that “in order to create surplus capital II, the capitalist must exchange a part of the value of surplus capital I in the form of means of subsistence with living labor capacity.” [12]12 Ibid., p. 312. The capitalist exchanges with the worker using surplus capital I, which itself belongs to the worker. Although formally the buying and selling of labor power continues, in essence the capitalist, under the cloak of equal exchange, completely appropriates the surplus capital II created by the worker without paying any equivalent, and the exchange relation has already disappeared. When the third production process begins, surplus capital II, as a new precondition, reproduces new surplus value, and so on endlessly. The nature of ownership here undergoes a fundamental subversion: for the capitalist, ownership is the right to appropriate the products of others’ labor; for the worker, it is the obligation to regard his own labor product as another’s property. That is, labor ownership is alienated into capital ownership. Hegel emphasized the role of ownership in shaping modern independent personality, but he did not, like Marx, see the alienation of labor ownership—the naked exploitative relationship hidden behind it.

正是基于理解所有权视角的转变，马克思才真正发现了现代资产阶级所有权中内蕴的剥削机制。资本家按照商品交换规律购买劳动力使其参与到生产过程中，马克思发现，工人一个工作日所创造的价值要始终大于资本家以货币形式预付的价值。在这个意义上，第一次生产过程分为两个时期：一是必要劳动时期，工人通过劳动创造的价值等于资本家预付的货币数量，双方完成等价交换；二是剩余劳动时期，工人为资本家创造出无需他付出任何货币的价值，资本家无偿占有了这部分剩余价值。马克思在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》中将这部分剩余价值称为“剩余资本Ⅰ”。当第二次生产过程开始时，即将剩余资本Ⅰ再投入生产过程时，资本家与工人再一次实现了所谓的平等交换，马克思将这个过程产生的新的剩余价值称为“剩余资本Ⅱ”。关键在于，“为了创造剩余资本Ⅱ，资本家必须用剩余资本Ⅰ的一部分价值在生活资料的形式上同活劳动能力相交换”。资本家是用本身就属于工人的剩余资本Ⅰ来与工人相交换，形式上虽不断发生劳动力的买与卖，实质却是资本家在等价交换的外衣下不用支付任何等价物就完全占有工人创造出的剩余资本Ⅱ，交换关系已然消失。当第三次生产过程开始时，剩余资本Ⅱ又作为新的前提再生产出新的剩余价值，如此不断地延续下去。所有权的性质在这里发生了根本性颠覆：所有权对资本家来说是占有他人劳动产品的权利，对工人来说则是把自己的劳动产品视为他人财产的义务，即劳动所有权异化为资本所有权。黑格尔强调所有权对塑造现代独立人格的作用，但并没有像马克思那样看到劳动所有权的异化——它背后掩藏着对人赤裸裸的剥削关系。

Thus, Marx exposed the reflexivity inherent in modern bourgeois ownership: on the one hand, labor constitutes ownership; on the other hand, non-labor, i.e., capital, also constitutes ownership. The former is private property based on the producer’s own labor, while the latter is private property based on exploiting the labor of others. The strategy adopted by bourgeois economists is to conflate the two, substituting the latter for the former, thereby providing a legitimacy defense for exploitation. Marx pointed out that the defense of bourgeois economists is bound to be ineffective because they are incapable of proving “how this exchange of more living labor for less objectified labor conforms to the law of commodity exchange, i.e., the law that labor time determines the value of commodities.” [13]13 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 35 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996), p. 583. So, did the theories of labor ownership, including those of Locke and Hegel, provide a justification for capitalist exploitation? From the analysis above, neither Locke nor Hegel themselves discussed exploitation, and Marx did not characterize their theories of property rights in his texts as theories defending exploitation. However, it must be acknowledged that many apologists for capitalism have indeed used their theories to defend exploitation. That is, Locke and Hegel themselves did not subjectively defend exploitation, but objectively their theories had the effect of fueling it. Rather than debating the nature of their theories of property rights, it is more important to focus on criticizing those views that conflate capital ownership with labor ownership and conflate capitalist private property with general private property, because what the apologists of capitalism are most eager to do is to dress up capital ownership, which bears the character of exploitation, as labor ownership, which bears the character of natural justice.

由此，马克思揭露了现代资产阶级所有权中内蕴的自反性：一方面，劳动形成所有权，另一方面，非劳动，即资本也形成所有权。前者是以生产者自己的劳动为基础的私有制，而后者是以剥削他人的劳动为基础的私有制，资产阶级经济学家采取的策略就是把二者混同起来，将后者置换为前者，从而为剥削提供合法性辩护。马克思就此指出，资产阶级经济学家的辩护注定是无效的，因为他们没有能力证明“较多活劳动同较少物化劳动的这种交换怎样符合于商品交换的规律，即劳动时间决定商品价值的规律”。那么，包括洛克、黑格尔在内的劳动所有权理论是否为资本主义剥削提供了正当性论证呢？从前文的分析看，洛克、黑格尔本人都没有论及剥削，并且马克思也没有在自己的文本中将二人的财产权理论定性为一种为剥削辩护的理论。但必须承认的是，的确有不少资本主义辩护士利用他们的理论来为剥削做辩护。也就是说，洛克、黑格尔本人在主观上并没有为剥削辩护，但客观上却起到了推波助澜的效果。与其争论二人财产权理论的性质问题，不如将重心放在批判那些将资本所有权混同为劳动所有权、将资本主义私有制混同为一般私有制的观点上，因为资本主义的卫道士们最热衷做的事就是把带有剥削特征的资本所有权装扮为带有天然正义的劳动所有权。

Of course, Marx’s diagnosis of workers’ poverty and exploitation is based on the premise that workers possess nothing except their own labor power (capacity). Professor Duan Zhongqiao has captured a detail on this point: “For workers in capitalist society… why they have ownership of their own labor power, Marx offers no explanation.” [14]14 Duan Zhongqiao, “A Study of Marx’s Theory of Labor Ownership,” *Social Sciences in China*, no. 6 (2019), p. 45. We can regard this as Marx inheriting the tradition of political philosophy from Locke and Hegel. The workers here are, of course, not abstract individuals in a state of nature or in speculative philosophy, but real individuals in the context of 19th-century large-scale machine industry. Marx calls this state of the worker “absolute poverty,” i.e., existing merely as living labor capacity. To obtain means of subsistence, the worker is forced to sell his labor power, compelled to accept exploitation by the capitalist, and falls into the paradoxical situation of the more he labors, the poorer he becomes. And when Marx asks how this absolute poverty of the worker is generated, he is in fact examining exploitation within the entire historical dimension. This is a history of blood and fire, a history of the separation of the producer from the means of production, the latter being monopolized and appropriated by the capitalist. The money hoarder in Locke’s account is in fact the later money capitalist. At this point, Marx finally reveals that the root cause of the poverty and exploitation suffered by the working class lies in the capitalist private ownership of the means of production, which is the most essential core of modern bourgeois ownership. Marx’s aim is to destroy this exploitative private ownership of the means of production, so that future society is built on the basis of public ownership of the means of production, i.e., scientific socialism must uphold the principle of public ownership. We can present Marx’s analytical thread of the separation of labor ownership as a logic of progressive depth: “ownership → bourgeois ownership (legal relation) → capitalist relations of production → capitalist private ownership of the means of production.”

当然，马克思对工人贫困与剥削的诊断都是建立在工人除了自己的劳动（能）力外一无所有的基础上。段忠桥教授对此就捕捉到了一个细节：“对于资本主义社会的工人……为什么对其劳动力拥有所有权，马克思没有做任何说明”。我们可以将此视为马克思继承了洛克、黑格尔以来的政治哲学传统，这里的工人当然不是自然状态下或思辨哲学中抽象的个人，而是处于19世纪机器大工业背景下的现实的个人。马克思将工人的这种状态称为“绝对贫困”，是仅仅作为活劳动能力存在。为了获得生活资料，工人不得不出卖自己的劳动力，被迫接受资本家的剥削，陷入越劳动越贫困的悖论性境遇中。而当马克思追问工人的这种绝对贫困何以生成时，其实就是将剥削置于整个历史维度中考察。这是一段血与火的历史，是生产者与生产资料相分离的历史，后者被资本家所垄断占有，洛克笔下的货币贮藏者其实就是后来的货币资本家。至此，马克思才揭示出工人阶级遭受贫困与剥削的根源在于资本主义生产资料私有制，而这正是现代资产阶级所有权最核心的本质所在。马克思就是要摧毁这种带有剥削性质的生产资料私有制，使得未来社会建立在生产资料公有制的基础上，即科学社会主义必须坚持公有制的原则。我们可以将马克思对劳动所有权走向分离的分析脉络呈现为一种层层深入的逻辑——“所有权→资产阶级所有权（法权关系）→资本主义生产关系→资本主义生产资料私有制”。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

Through the above analysis, the relationship between Marx’s political philosophy and modern political philosophy represented by Locke and Hegel is not purely one of external rupture, but rather an internal relationship. Since the English bourgeois revolution in the 17th century, capitalism was in its ascending period, and the relationship between property and labor became a core issue in political philosophy. Locke emphasized the positive effects of property rights, demonstrating how labor and ownership could be identical through a descending logical chain of “God → man → personality (body) → labor → thing,” and labor creating wealth became the spirit of the age. However, from the end of the 18th century onward, the negative effects of the identity of labor and ownership began to appear. Hegel’s outstanding contribution lies not only in his demonstration of the identity of labor and ownership from the depth of speculative philosophy, which presents a descending logic of “personality (unity of personality/will and body) → appropriation → thing,” but also in his philosopher’s keen insight into an intractable social problem, namely the polarization between rich and poor caused by the principle of labor ownership. By the mid-19th century, Marx historically analyzed ownership, studying it from the perspective of relations of production, and through the progressively deepening logic of “ownership → bourgeois ownership (relations of right) → capitalist relations of production → capitalist private ownership of the means of production,” he revealed the hidden exploitation concealed in the poverty of the proletariat, explained the separation of labor and ownership, that is, how labor ownership becomes alienated into its opposite — capital ownership, thereby elevating modern political philosophy to the level of a critique of political economy. In summary, taking labor ownership as the central thread, we can find that the intellectual development from Locke and Hegel to Marx presents an evolutionary logic of “labor → property → poverty → exploitation.” If Locke and Hegel focused on demonstrating the question of why labor and ownership are identical, then Marx placed the emphasis on the question of why labor and ownership are separated, that is, how the property created by the proletariat through labor is exploited. Therefore, we must focus on criticizing those views that confuse capital ownership with labor ownership.

通过以上分析，马克思的政治哲学与以洛克、黑格尔为代表的近代政治哲学之间并不纯然是外在割裂关系，而是一种内生关系。自17世纪英国资产阶级革命之后，资本主义处于上升时期，财产和劳动之间的关系成为政治哲学的核心议题。洛克强调财产权的积极效应，以“上帝→人→人格（身体）→劳动→物”这一逐次递减的逻辑论证了劳动与所有权何以会同一，劳动创造财富成为时代精神。但自18世纪末起，劳动与所有权同一的负面效应开始显现。黑格尔的卓越贡献不仅在于他从思辨哲学的深度论证了劳动与所有权的同一，即呈现为“人格（人格性/意志与身体的统一）→占有→物”逐次递减的逻辑，更在于他以哲学家的敏锐洞察力意识到了一个难解的社会问题，即劳动所有权原则导致的贫富两级分化。而到了19世纪中期，马克思历史性地分析所有权，从生产关系入手研究所有权，透过“所有权→资产阶级所有权（法权关系）→资本主义生产关系→资本主义生产资料私有制”这一层层深入的逻辑，揭示了无产阶级的贫困之中所掩藏的隐性剥削，说明了劳动与所有权的分离，即劳动所有权何以会异化为自身的对立面——资本所有权，将近代政治哲学提升到政治经济学批判的层面。盖言之，以劳动所有权为中心线索，我们可以发现，从洛克、黑格尔到马克思的思想发展脉络呈现为“劳动→财产→贫困→剥削”这一演进逻辑。如果说洛克、黑格尔着力论证的是劳动与所有权何以是同一的问题，那么马克思则是将重心放在劳动与所有权何以是分离的问题上，即无产阶级通过劳动创造的财产是如何被剥削的，因此我们必须将焦点放在批判那些将资本所有权混同为劳动所有权的观点上。

(Fund: Major Project of the National Social Science Fund of China (18ZDA017))

（基金： 国家社会科学基金重大项目（18ZDA017））

(Author’s biography: Hu Shun, Lecturer, PhD, School of Marxism, Yangzhou University)

（作者简介：胡顺，扬州大学马克思主义学院讲师，博士）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗