“The Lockean Factor” in Marx’s Intellectual Construction

Marx called the philosophical system he constructed through arduous exploration “new materialism,” “modern materialism,” and “new philosophy.” It is both a product of the political and economic changes and social development of the modern world and a result of the transformation of the long-standing Western intellectual tradition. Regarding the latter, clarifying the complex relationship between Marx and his intellectual predecessors is undoubtedly of great significance for grasping and understanding the purport, content, and characteristics of Marx’s philosophy. However, the Western intellectual tradition is itself a rather complex referent; macroscopic discourse and general discussion often fall into abstraction and obscurity. Therefore, choosing an appropriate method and a narrower perspective for in-depth excavation, and then gradually broadening the horizon to generate and extend conclusions, is a more feasible research path.

马克思将其经过艰苦探索所建构的哲学体系称为“新唯物主义”“现代唯物主义”和“新哲学”。它既是近代以来世界政治经济变迁和社会发展的产物，也是源远流长的西方思想传统变革的结果。就后者来说，清理马克思与其思想先驱之间的复杂关系，对于把握和理解马克思哲学的意旨、内涵和特征无疑具有重要意义。然而，西方思想传统又是一个相当复杂的所指，宏观的言说和笼统的讨论往往会陷入抽象和玄虚，所以选择恰当的方式和较小的视角予以深度挖掘，再由此渐次拓宽视域，生发和延伸结论，是比较可行的研究路径。

In the Western intellectual tradition and its connection with modern society, John Locke (1632–1704) is not an insignificant figure. On the contrary, he made outstanding contributions in the fields of empiricist philosophy, the theory of labor ownership, and liberal political theory, exerting a significant influence on later generations. Precisely because of this, Marx, who had a deep research and precise grasp of the history of thought, attached great importance to Locke. From the extant literature, as early as the humorous novel *Scorpion and Felix*, written during his student days at the University of Berlin, Marx mentioned Locke’s name and the issue of “primogeniture” discussed in detail in the first treatise of *Two Treatises of Government* (see *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 820). From then on, in the voluminous writings Marx produced throughout his life, Locke and his works appear frequently, even including lengthy analyses and quite pertinent evaluations. As late as his old age, when drafting the second section of the tenth chapter, “A Contribution to the History of *Anti-Dühring*,” for Engels’s *Anti-Dühring*, he summarized and “explained” the “position Locke should occupy in the genesis of classical political economy” (*Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 17). It can be said that Locke “participated” in Marx’s intellectual process to a considerable extent; in other words, Marx’s intellectual construction contains many “Lockean factors.” Unfortunately, although a few scholars in domestic and international academia have touched upon this topic in their research, their discussions are mostly macroscopic and abstract, lacking systematic and meticulous examination based on specific texts.

在西方思想传统及其与近代社会的关联中，约翰·洛克（John Locke,1632-1704）不是一个无足轻重的人物。相反，他在经验论哲学、劳动所有权学说和自由主义政治理论诸领域都有卓越的建树，并对后世产生了重要影响。正因为如此，对思想史有深入研究和精准把握的马克思十分重视洛克。从留存下来的文献看，早在柏林大学求学期间写作的幽默小说《斯考尔皮昂和费利克斯》中，马克思就提及洛克的名字及其《政府论》上篇所详加论述的“长子继承权”问题。（参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第820页）从此之后，在马克思一生撰写的卷帙浩繁的著述中，洛克及其著作更是频繁出现，甚至不乏大段的剖析和相当中肯的评价。直至晚年在为恩格斯的《反杜林论》一书执笔起草第二编第十章《〈批判史〉论述》时，他更总结、“说明”了洛克“在古典经济学产生过程中所应占的地位”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，第17页）——可以说，洛克很大程度上“参与”了马克思的思想进程；换言之，在马克思思想建构中包含着诸多“洛克因素”。可惜的是，国内外学界虽然有个别论者在研究中对这一专题有所涉猎，但多是宏观而抽象的言说，缺乏基于具体文本的系统而细致的清理。

To remedy the deficiencies in the aforementioned research, the author has recently sorted out the complex relationships between Locke and Marx’s doctrines in three areas: the relationship between “empiricist” philosophy and “modern materialism,” between the theory of “labor ownership” and the “labor theory of value,” and between liberal political theory and the idea of “the free association of individuals.” Clearly, this is a rather broad and cumbersome comparative study. To make the discussion concrete and in-depth, only the first aspect is explored here. Following the “textological” research method, I intend to examine, based on the ideological content and argumentative logic of Locke’s representative work of the “empiricist” system, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the “traces” and influence of these ideas in Marx’s “doctoral dissertation” and its preparatory notes, his writings from the “*Rheinische Zeitung*–*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* period,” *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and many other works. Given that this study aims to achieve a breakthrough in the discrimination of details, this article takes only the critique of the “theory of innate ideas” in Book I of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* as an example to distinguish the inheritance and transcendence between the two thinkers in terms of relevant lines of thought and viewpoints. As for the comparisons and discussions arising from the content of the other three books of that work, I will elaborate on them in another article.

为了弥补上述研究中存在的缺憾，笔者最近梳理了洛克与马克思所创立的学说中有关“经验论”哲学与“现代唯物主义”、“劳动所有权”学说与“劳动价值论”、自由主义政治理论与“自由人联合体”思想三方面之间的复杂关系。显然这是一项较为宽泛而繁琐的比较研究。为了使得讨论具体、深入，这里只就第一方面的问题进行探讨。遵循“文本学”研究方法，笔者拟依据作为洛克“经验论”体系的代表作《人类理解论》中的思想内容及其论证逻辑，一一考辨它们在马克思“博士论文”及其笔记、“《莱茵报》—《德法年鉴》时期”的著述、《黑格尔法哲学批判》、《1844年经济学哲学手稿》、《神圣家族》、《德意志意识形态》等众多著述中的“踪迹”和影响；又鉴于本项研究力图在细节甄别方面有所突破，本文只以《人类理解论》第一卷中对“天赋观念论”的批判为例，辨析在相关思路和观点上二人之间的传承和超越关系；至于由该书其他三卷内容引发的比较和讨论，笔者将在另文中详加论述。

I. “Innate Principles” Are a “Fictitious” “Hypothesis”

一、“天赋原则”是一种“虚妄”的“假设”

The “theory of innate ideas,” as a way of understanding and grasping the world, has a long tradition. Related doctrines had already appeared in ancient Greek philosophy, the most typical being Plato’s “theory of recollection.” He believed that there are certain innate ideas in the human mind; they are inborn, but temporarily buried and “forgotten” by people in worldly life. When external things stimulate people’s senses, they evoke their memory, enabling them to retrieve these forgotten things and thereby acquire knowledge. Plato called this process of thinking and acting “recollection” (see Plato, pp. 86–92). By the Middle Ages, Scholastic philosophers believed that the various dogmas, ideas, knowledge, and truths that believers observe, learn, and comprehend all come from God, are mastered and provided by God, and are interpreted and disseminated by priests. For example, Augustine, the great synthesizer of “Patristic philosophy,” held that empirical reality is not real and therefore insignificant; the certainty of knowledge originates from God’s will and is transformed into the human heart. God governs and demands of people according to “truthful” knowledge and morality; what people need to do is only to believe in God and act according to His will.

“天赋观念论”作为人类理解和把握世界的一种思路和方式有悠久的传统。相关学说在古希腊哲学中业已出现，最典型的要数柏拉图的“回忆说”。他认为，人心中存在某些与生俱来的观念，它们是天赋的，但在尘世生活中被暂时埋没，被人们“遗忘”了。当外部事物刺激人们的感官时，唤起了他们的记忆，使其得以重新找回这些被忘记的东西，进而获取知识。柏拉图将这种思维和行动过程叫作“回忆”（参见柏拉图，第86-92页）。到中世纪，经院哲学家们认为，信徒遵守、学习和领悟的各种信条、观念、知识和真理等均来自上帝，是由上帝掌握、提供并交由神父来解释和传布的。比如，“教父哲学”的集大成者奥古斯丁就认为，现实经验不是实在的，因而不足道；知识的确定性起源于上帝的意旨，并转化到人心内部。上帝是依据“真理”性的知识和道德来管制、要求人的，人所要做的只是信仰上帝，并按其旨意行事。

As the times advanced to the early modern period of the transition between old and new modes of thought, with the “epistemological turn” in philosophical research, the “theory of innate ideas” became a conscious and rational proposition for some philosophers, who provided more systematic explanations. Descartes explicitly put forward the “theory of innate truths.” He classified the ideas people acquire into three categories: “some appear to be innate, some adventitious, and others to have been invented by me” (Descartes, p. 54). The latter two categories, being obtained from the outside world or arbitrarily pieced together by the human mind, cannot be trusted and are open to doubt. The first category consists of axioms and principles that are universal and necessary. They are placed in the human heart by God before birth, are self-evident and eternal truths, and on this basis people can understand other complex things in the world through reasoning and deduction. Therefore, they are the most true, reliable, and trustworthy. Descartes regarded these innate ideas as the principles of certainty in the world and the “first principles” of philosophy. After him, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and even later Kant held similar views.

时序推进到新旧思维方式交替的近代早期，随着哲学研究的“认识论转向”，“天赋观念论”成为一些哲学家自觉而理智的主张，并作出更为系统的阐释。笛卡尔明确提出“天赋真理”说，他将人们所获得的观念归纳为三类：“有些我认为是与我俱生的，有些是外来的，来自外界的，有些是由我自己做成的和捏造的。”（笛卡尔，第54页）后两类观念由于是由外界获得或者由人的心灵随意拼凑的产物，所以是不能信任、让人怀疑的。第一类观念则是具有普遍性、必然性的公理和原则，它们在人出生前就由上帝将其置放于人的心里，是不证自明、永恒不变的真理，人们在此基础上可以通过推理、演绎来认识世界上其他复杂的事物，所以是最真实、可靠和可以信任的。笛卡尔将这些天赋的观念视为世界确定性的原则和哲学的“第一原理”。在他之后，斯宾诺莎、马勒伯朗士、莱布尼茨、贝克莱、休谟甚至后来的康德都持有类似的看法。

In the history of modern Western philosophy, Locke was the first to question the “theory of innate ideas.” Proceeding from the purpose of constructing an “empiricist” system, he strongly realized that to elaborate in detail “our notions of our own knowledge must be established on a true foundation”; and to “lay the foundation,” it was first necessary to “clear the way.” The “theory of innate ideas” was the first obstacle on this path. Precisely because of this, Book I of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* launches a comprehensive critique of the “theory of innate ideas”; in Locke’s words, “I must explain the reasons for my doubt concerning innate principles” (Locke, pp. 71–72).

在西方近代哲学史上，洛克率先质疑“天赋观念论”。从“经验论”体系建构的意旨出发，他强烈地意识到，要详尽地阐述“我们对于自己知识所有的意念，必须建立在真正的基础上”；而为了“打定基础”，又必须首先“扫除道路”。“天赋观念论”就是这条道路上的第一个障碍。正因为如此，《人类理解论》第一卷展开了对“天赋观念论”全方位的批评；用洛克的话说，“我必须把我所以怀疑天赋原则的道理，解释一番”。（洛克，第71-72页）

Locke re-examined the meaning of “innate principles.” As mentioned above, those who adhere to the “theory of innate ideas” firmly believe that before people begin their actual cognitive activities and acquire knowledge, there are some original notions imprinted on their minds like marks, which are bestowed by heaven outside the human mind and brought into the mortal world. But Locke believed that, from the perspective of how humans acquire knowledge, these presuppositional and foundational notions do not exist; even if they did “exist,” they would have no significance. Because “if people only use their natural faculties, they can obtain all the knowledge they have without the help of innate impressions.” That is to say, since heaven has endowed humans with the capacity to acquire knowledge, there is no need to endow them with a priori ideas; otherwise, it would be a redundancy. And from the human side, as long as they use this capacity, they can naturally obtain corresponding knowledge, so there is no need to resort to any innate ideas (see ibid., pp. 6–7). Therefore, in Locke’s view, so-called “innate principles” are merely a “fictitious” “hypothesis.”

洛克重新审视了“天赋原则”（innate principle）的意涵。如前所述，坚持“天赋观念论”的人深信，人们在展开现实的认识活动、获取知识之前，就有一些原始的意念如同记号一样印在其心上，它们是在人的心灵之外由上天禀赋并带到尘世间来的。但洛克认为，从人类获取知识的方式看，这些前提性、基础性的意念是不存在的；即便“存在”，也没有什么意义。因为“人们只要运用自己的天赋能力，则不用天赋印象的帮助,就可以得到他们所有的一切知识”。也就是说，上天既然赋予人类获取知识的能力，就没有必要再赋予其先验的观念，否则就是一种重复了；而从人这方面来说，只要运用这种能力，就可以自然地获得相应的知识，也就不必借助什么天赋观念。（参见同上，第6-7页）所以，在洛克看来，所谓“天赋原则”不过是一种“虚妄”的“假设”。

In the era in which Locke lived and pursued theoretical exploration, although the rise of natural science, the outbreak of the Glorious Revolution [1]1 The Glorious Revolution (1688-1689) was the overthrow of King James II of England by a union of Parliamentarians and the Dutch stadtholder William III of Orange, which established constitutional monarchy and parliamentary supremacy. and the development of capitalism weakened the influence of religion in real life and greatly enhanced the secularization of society, the concept of God and the tradition of “worship” remained deeply entrenched. Consequently, the religious sphere also became a “hotbed” and “enclave” for many advocates of the “theory of innate ideas” to argue for and construct their doctrines. It is precisely on this basis that Locke’s negation of “innate principles” mostly took religion as its object of analysis, thereby seeking a breakthrough.

在洛克生活和进行理论探索的时代，尽管自然科学的兴起、“光荣革命”的爆发和资本主义的发展减弱了现实生活中宗教的影响，社会的世俗化程度大大增强，但上帝观念和“礼拜”传统依然根深蒂固，于是宗教领域也成为诸多“天赋观念论”者论证、建构自己学说的“渊薮”和“飞地”。正是基于此，洛克对“天赋原则”的否定也多以宗教为剖析对象，由此来寻求突破。

In Locke’s view, religious ideas are not innate, nor have they existed since time immemorial. Leaving aside the fact that ancient books record distant ages in which atheists holding no faith existed, even the many countries discovered by modern European navigators in the Middle East, the Americas, and the Pacific had no concept of God whatsoever. Moreover, in those countries that had made great progress on the path of modern civilization, some religious ideas gradually faded, and religious beliefs were even abandoned outright. As for the ancient great Eastern power—China—the ritual teachings [2]2 “Ritual teachings” (礼教) refers to the Confucian system of rites and moral norms that governed social hierarchy and conduct in imperial China, often criticized by modern thinkers as a form of ideological control. adhered to by the ruling class and scholar-officials were, in essence, pure atheism. And among the vast multitudes of believers and those who possessed the concept of God, even within the same country, each person’s faith and understanding of God differed, being full of divergences and even mutual opposition. The complex situation described above shows that the so-called “God” is nothing more than a “vague notion.” Since people believe in and worship thousands of deities, who can truly say what “God” is? Where is the “divine being”? Furthermore, the advocates of the “theory of innate ideas” placed great value on principles and rituals such as “God ought to be worshipped,” even elevating them “to an equal status with any great truth in the human mind” (Locke, p. 53), and asserted that these required no demonstration and admitted no doubt. Locke sharply pointed out that such ideas and principles are entirely absent in children, and are rarely effective even in adults, because the connotation of the term “worship” is not clear or distinct. If this is so, those who advocate and emphasize “worship” fall into a contradiction: on the one hand they say “God ought to be worshipped” is an innate principle; on the other hand, people do not know why this must be so or what their duty is. In Locke’s view, this “is the most ridiculous thing imaginable” (ibid., p. 54).

在洛克看来，宗教观念不是天赋的，也不是亘古就有的。姑且不论古书上记载的久远的时代就有不持任何信仰的无神论者，就是近代欧洲航海家在中东、美洲、太平洋等地发现的不少国家，也根本没有关于上帝的观念。而那些已经在现代文明之路上有巨大进步的国家，有的宗教观念逐渐淡漠，乃至宗教信仰惨遭废弃。至于古老的东方大国——中国，统治阶级和士大夫们所固守的礼教，就其实质而言属于纯粹的无神论。而在那些庞大的信教和拥有上帝观念的人群中，即便在同一国土上，各自信仰和理解的上帝也不相同，反而充满差异甚至彼此对立。上述复杂的情形表明，所谓“上帝”不过是一些“含糊的意念”。既然人们信奉、崇拜着的是千百个神明，那么，谁能真正说得清什么是“上帝”？“神明”何在？此外，“天赋观念论”者还很看重诸如“上帝是应当礼拜的”这样的原则和礼仪，甚至将其“同人心中任何伟大的真理立于相等的地位”（洛克，第53页），并认定这些是不需论证和不容质疑的。洛克对此尖刻地指出，这样的观念和原则在儿童那里根本就是缺失的，即便在成人那里亦很少有效，因为“礼拜”这个名词的内涵不是清楚、明白的。既然如此，主张和重视“礼拜”的人就陷入了矛盾：一方面他们说“上帝是应该礼拜的”，是天赋的原则；另一方面人们又不知道为什么必须如此和自己的责任何在。在洛克看来，这“乃是最可笑不过的一件事”。（同上，第54页）

This judgment of Locke’s regarding innate principles was inherited by Marx. Nearly two hundred years later, in the gradual transformation of his early thought through the mode of thinking constituted by “idealism—materialism—new materialism,” Marx not only consciously stripped away any possibility of the “innate” formation of ideas, but also grounded the above judgment in the real soil of modern capitalist society and its ongoing process of generation and change, thereby greatly advancing Locke’s understanding in this regard.

洛克对于天赋原则的上述判定为马克思所继承。将近200年之后，马克思在其早期思想由“唯心主义—唯物主义—新唯物主义”构成的思维方式的渐次嬗变中，不仅自觉地剥夺了观念形成的任何“天赋”的可能性，更将上述判定奠基于现代资本社会的现实土壤之上及其不断生成、变化过程之中予以观照和透视，从而大大推进了洛克这方面的认识。

Even at the incipient stage of Marx’s thought, when he was deeply influenced by the ideas of the Young Hegelians, and in the “Dedication to the Doctoral Dissertation” he uttered the stirring declaration—“Idealism is no fantasy, but truth” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 9)—by praising his father-in-law, he still generated his ideas on the basis of a profound analysis of “atomism,” a philosophical form that had taken shape and developed in ancient Greece and had a materialist tendency. His argument shows that freedom and self-consciousness, as the “highest divinity,” are rooted not in God, but in the revelation of the philosophical connotation and significance of “the atom’s swerve from the straight line”: the “swerve from the straight line” breaks the “fetters of fate” represented by the necessity of the “rectilinear fall,” and constitutes a confrontation and struggle against the external environment of freedom, i.e., “determinate being.” Thus, any spirit or idea can be adequately grasped and objectively understood only when placed in its relationship with the real world. For this reason, in this work deeply influenced by idealism, Marx achieved a transcendence of idealism, “arriving at the conclusion that the philosophization of the world is at the same time the worldization of philosophy” (ibid., p. 76); and in the process of philosophy’s realization, human self-consciousness and ideas “always have a double-edged demand: one edge is directed against the world, the other against philosophy itself” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 76). This close connection with the real world makes the “theory of innate ideas” a pure “delusion”; moreover, it can be seen that, while both employ abstract theoretical argumentation, Marx’s logic is more refined and rigorous than Locke’s.

即便在马克思思想发轫期受到青年黑格尔派思想的深刻影响，在“‘博士论文’献词”中借助对岳父的赞美而喊出那句振聋发聩的心声——“唯心主义不是幻想，而是真理”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第9页），他也是以对“原子论”这样一种古希腊时期形成并发展起来、具有唯物主义倾向的哲学形态深刻剖析的基础上生发出思想的。他的论证表明，自由和自我意识作为“最高的神性”，并不是根植于上帝，而是基于“原子脱离直线而偏斜”的哲学内涵和意义的揭示：“偏离直线”打破了“直线式的下落”运动的必然性所表征的“命运的束缚”，是对构成自由的外部环境即“定在”进行的对抗和斗争。这样说来，任何精神、观念只有放在同现实世界的关系中才能获得到位的把握和客观的理解。正因为如此，马克思在这部受到唯心主义深刻影响的著述中实现了对唯心主义的超越，“得出这样的结论：世界的哲学化同时也就是哲学的世界化”（同上，第76页）；而在哲学现实化过程中，人的自我意识和观念“始终具有一个双刃的要求：其中一面针对着世界，另一面针对着哲学本身”。（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第76页）与现实世界的这种紧密关联，更使“天赋观念论”成为一种纯粹的“虚妄”；而且从中也可以看出，同样是抽象的理论论证方式，马克思的逻辑要比洛克更加精致而严密。

The real events that had a greater impact on the transformation of Marx’s thought occurred during the “Rheinische Zeitung period.” [3]3 The “Rheinische Zeitung period” refers to Marx’s tenure as editor of the liberal Cologne newspaper *Rheinische Zeitung* from 1842 to 1843, during which his encounters with practical social and economic issues prompted his turn from idealism to materialism. The debates on issues such as the press censorship decree and freedom of the press, the wood theft law and the divorce bill, and the complex problems of poverty along the Moselle River all made Marx see the pivotal role of “material interests” in people’s lives, prompting him to “the first impulse to study economic questions” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2, pp. 1-2). This also led him to grasp the source of ideas more consciously from a real perspective, gradually eliminating the speculative elements that remained in his earlier negation of the “theory of innate ideas.” On this, he gave an extremely brilliant exposition in his “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung”: “Philosophers do not spring up like mushrooms out of the ground; they are the products of their time and of their people, whose most refined, most precious and most hidden essences are concentrated in philosophical ideas. It is the same spirit that builds railways with the hands of workers that builds philosophical systems in the minds of philosophers.” “Philosophy is not outside the world,” but rather “takes root in the earth with its feet and plucks the fruits of the world with its hands”; “any genuine philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of its time, and therefore there must necessarily come a time when philosophy not only internally, through its content, but also externally, through its manifestation, comes into contact and interaction with the real world of its time” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, pp. 219-220). It should be noted that during this period, in his discussion of the division of landed property, Marx also absorbed beneficial elements from Locke’s thought on property rights. As this goes beyond the scope of the present article, I will treat it separately in another essay.

对马克思思想变革产生更大触动的现实事件发生在“《莱茵报》时期”。举凡关于书报检查令和新闻出版自由、林木盗窃和离婚法案、摩泽尔河沿岸贫困诸多复杂问题的争论，都让马克思看到“物质利益”在人们生活中举足轻重的作用，促使他去“研究经济问题的最初动因”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第2卷，第1-2页）这也导致他更加自觉地从现实的角度来把握观念的来源，逐步清除此前否定“天赋观念论”时残留的思辨成分。对此，他在《〈科隆日报〉第179号的社论》中作了极为精彩的阐述：“哲学家并不像蘑菇那样是从地里冒出来的，他们是自己的时代、自己的人民的产物，人民的最美好、最珍贵、最隐蔽的精髓都汇集在哲学思想里。正是那种用工人的双手建筑铁路的精神，在哲学家的头脑中建立哲学体系。”“哲学不是在世界之外”，而是“用双脚扎根大地，并用双手采摘世界的果实”，“任何真正的哲学都是自己时代的精神上的精华，因此，必然会出现这样的时代：那时哲学不仅在内部通过自己的内容，而且在外部通过自己的表现，同自己时代的现实世界接触并相互作用。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第219-220页）需要指出的是，马克思在这一时期有关地产析分问题的讨论中，还吸收了洛克所有权思想中的有益因素，因超出本文讨论的范围，我将另外撰文专门梳理。

In order to resolve the “vexing question” arising from the opposition between material interests and free reason, Marx sought to find an explanation and explore a way out from “the philosophy of the state and of law” which “received its most systematic, richest and final expression in Hegel’s works” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 9). At the same time, Marx also participated in the “discussion concerning the Jewish question” then underway in German intellectual circles. As regards the entanglement with the “theory of innate ideas,” one of the most important advances in Marx’s thought during the “Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher period” was to “reduce” religious questions to real problems, thereby thoroughly blocking the possibility that God creates the world, manipulates ideas, and dominates faith. Marx clearly states: “Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has already lost himself again” (ibid., p. 1). Religion is “a reversed world-consciousness”; the “general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification” all originate from the “reversed world” and can be explained in the real state and society. “Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (ibid., pp. 1-2). In this way, the “oratio pro aris et focis” [4]4 “Oratio pro aris et focis” is a Latin phrase meaning “a speech for altars and hearths,” i.e., a defense of one’s most sacred and fundamental possessions. that the proponents of the “theory of innate ideas” made for the deities in heaven was thoroughly “refuted,” its “fallacy” was exposed for all to see, and “its existence in the human world was discredited” (cf. ibid.).

为了解决因物质利益与自由理性对立而产生的“苦恼的疑问”，马克思试图从“在黑格尔的著作中得到了最系统、最丰富和最终的表述”的“国家哲学和法哲学”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第9页）中寻求解释和探究出路。与此同时，马克思也参与了当时德国思想界正在进行的“有关犹太人的问题的讨论”。就与“天赋观念论”的纠葛来说，“《德法年鉴》时期”马克思思想最重要的进展之一，是将宗教问题“还原”为现实问题，从而彻底堵死了上帝创造世界、操控观念和主宰信仰的可能性。马克思明确指出：“人创造了宗教，而不是宗教创造人。就是说，宗教是还没有获得自身或已经再度丧失自身的人的自我意识和自我感觉。”（同上，第1页）宗教是“一种颠倒的世界意识”，宗教理论中“包罗万象的纲要”、“具有通俗形式的逻辑”、“唯灵论的荣誉问题［Point-d’honneur］，它的狂热，它的道德约束，它的庄严补充，它借以求得慰藉和辩护的总根据”都来源于“颠倒的世界”，都可以在现实的国家、社会中得到说明。“宗教里的苦难既是现实的苦难的表现，又是对这种现实的苦难的抗议。宗教是被压迫生灵的叹息，是无情世界的情感，正像它是无精神活力的制度的精神一样。宗教是人民的鸦片。”（同上，第1-2页）这样，“天赋观念论”者“在天国为神祇所作的雄辩［oratio pro aris et focis］”就被彻底“驳倒”，其“谬误”昭然若揭，“它在人间的存在就声誉扫地了。”（参见同上）

If, in Locke’s critique of the “theory of innate ideas,” the initial demonstration of the falsity of “innate principles” was based merely on preliminary logical inference, then, by comparison, in Marx’s case, owing to the intervention of real and complex problems, the exposure of its crux was far more penetrating.

如果说，在洛克对“天赋观念论”的批判中，首先针对“天赋原则”虚妄性的指证还仅仅基于初步的逻辑推断，那么，相形之下，在马克思这里由于有现实复杂问题的介入，对其症结的揭示就更为入木三分了。

II. There Is No “Universal Consent” That Transcends Epoch, Region, or Class

二、不存在超越时代、地域、阶层的“普遍同意”

The “theory of innate ideas” is not merely a matter of simple belief and assertion; it also contains rational reflection and argumentative reasoning, especially among modern philosophers, who exerted greater effort in the latter respect. But Locke, through systematic analysis, held that these reflections and arguments are untenable.

“天赋观念论”不只是单纯的信念和主张，其中也包含了理性思考和思维论证，特别是在近代哲学家那里，在后一方面用力更甚。但洛克通过系统的辨析认为，这些思考和论证都是不成立的。

The first argument and reason advanced by the “theory of innate ideas” is the “doctrine of universal consent,” namely, that certain “speculative and practical principles” are acknowledged by all of humanity, are constant impressions in the human world, just as people are born with the ability and capacity to know the world and acquire knowledge. To this, Locke points out that this argument “has this misfortune, that if it were true, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate” (Locke, p. 7). Take the “speculative principles” that proponents of the “theory of innate ideas” treat as universally consented to by humanity, such as philosophical propositions like “what is, is” and “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” These are admittedly the most abstract and speculative, but precisely for this reason they are not naturally imprinted on every person’s mind. Children and idiots “plainly have not the least apprehension or thought of them,” because such people simply do not know what these “odd” propositions mean. “No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it has never yet known, which it has never yet come to the consciousness of” (ibid., p. 9).

“天赋观念论”所持的第一个论据和理由是“普遍同意说”，即认为某些“思辨和实践的原则”是全人类一致承认的，是人世间的恒常印象，就如同人们天生具有认识世界、获取知识的能力和才具一样。对此，洛克指出，这种论据“有一层不幸，因为事实上纵然真有一切人类所公认的真理，那亦不足以证明它们是天赋的”（洛克，第7页）。就拿被“天赋观念论”者当作人类普遍同意的“思辨原则”来说，诸如“凡存在者存在”“一种东西不能同时存在又不存在”等哲学命题，应该说是最抽象、思辨的了，但也正因为如此，它们才不是自然印于每个人心中的，像儿童和白痴“分明一点也想不到它们”，因为对于这些人来说，根本就不知道这些“古怪”的命题说的是什么。“人心所不曾知道的命题，所不曾意识到的命题，根本就不能说是在人心中的。”（同上，第9页）

The crux of the falsity of religious ideas mentioned above is also manifested here. Every religion believes in and worships its own sublime, great, and unattainable deities, but there is no concept of “God” in the world that transcends all religions and is universally recognized by all of humanity. Not only do atheists not acknowledge its existence in their minds, but even among believers of different religions, the concept of “God” varies, even to the point of mutual opposition and hostility, making it difficult to reconcile or understand; there is simply no “universal consent.” Theists of various stripes cannot form an “alliance” or “consensus”; the degree of difference among them even exceeds that between atheism and theism. Hence Locke’s conclusion: there are no principles and ideas that are universally consented to by all of humanity and innate.

前述宗教观念虚妄性的症结也体现在这里。每一种宗教都信仰和崇拜着各自崇高而伟大、高不可攀的神灵，但世界上却没有超越所有宗教、全人类普遍认同的“上帝”观念，不仅无神论者心目中不认可它的存在，就是在不同的宗教信徒心目中，“神”的观念也各不相同，甚至相互对立、敌视，难以融通、理解，根本不存在“普遍同意”的情形。各种有神论者之间形不成“同盟”和“共识”，彼此之间的差异程度甚至超过无神论与有神论之间的关系。所以，洛克的结论是，没有什么全人类普遍同意的、与生俱来的原则和观念。

For the development of Marx’s thought, stripping religious ideas of their “innate” and eternal character led to a shift in the field of his early inquiry. As he pointed out in the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction,” after “the truth of the beyond has vanished, it is the task of history to establish the truth of the here and now. The immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, once the holy form of human self-alienation has been unmasked, is to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 2). In this way, Marx’s focus shifted from religion to reality, specifically to two important domains constituting reality: politics and civil society. The critique of religion turned into a critique of politics and society; the former was a critique of the state, law, and moral philosophy that embodied the dominant ideas and the will of the rulers of the time; the latter was a critique of civil society, controlled by wealth and capital, and its property system. Further, the question of freeing people from the fetters and constraints they suffered in these two domains was raised, making “human emancipation” the lifelong theoretical and practical pursuit of Marx thereafter.

对于马克思思想的发展来说，剥夺了宗教观念的“天赋”性、永恒性，更导致其早期探究领域的转向。正如他在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中所指出的，宗教所代表的“真理的彼岸世界消逝以后，历史的任务就是确立此岸世界的真理。人的自我异化的神圣形象被揭穿以后，揭露具有非神圣形象的自我异化，就成了为历史服务的哲学的迫切任务。于是，对天国的批判变成对尘世的批判，对宗教的批判变成对法的批判，对神学的批判变成对政治的批判”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第2页）这样，马克思关注的重点就由宗教转向现实，具体说来，转向构成现实的两个重要领域：政治和市民社会。由宗教批判转向政治批判和社会批判，前者是对体现当时主流观念和统治者意志的国家、法和道德哲学的批判；后者是对受财富和资本操控的市民社会及其财产制度的批判。进一步，将人从这两个领域所遭受的桎梏和束缚中摆脱出来的问题提了出来，使“人的解放”成为其后马克思毕生理论和实践探索的旨趣。

But, in essence, so-called “emancipation” is also a kind of idea or ideal. How exactly should it be grasped? Is it “universally” recognized by people? If not, how did it arise? What specific content did it undergo in its evolution? Why did the pursuit of “emancipation” only become an inspiring, broad social movement in modern times? And how can such a movement avoid remaining merely a simple wish and an empty slogan and instead yield tangible fruits of victory? Reflecting on these questions not only led Marx to inherit Locke’s approach of questioning the “doctrine of universal consent” in his critique of the “theory of innate ideas,” but also to transcend religious issues, expanding and deepening into real society, holding that there is likewise no “universal consent” that transcends epoch, region, or class.

但是，究其实，所谓“解放”也是一种观念或理想，究竟该如何把握？它是为人们所“普遍”认同的吗？如果不是，它又是怎么产生的？其具体内涵经历过怎样的演变？对“解放”的追求缘何到近代才成为一种鼓舞人心的、广泛的社会运动？而这种运动又如何避免仅限于一种朴素的愿望和空洞的口号而能结出实实在在的胜利之果？对这些问题的思考，不仅使马克思继承了洛克反对“天赋观念论”时质疑“普遍同意说”的思路，而且越超宗教议题，拓展和深化到现实社会之中，认为同样不存在超越时代、地域、阶层的“普遍同意”。

Marx was a thinker with a global vision; he indeed observed the conditions and development of Europe and even various countries of the world from the general trend of “the transformation of history into ‘world history.’” However, he was particularly aware that differences in epoch, region, and country made this trend manifest a complexity and tortuosity far from linear progress and upward development. Taking his own fatherland, Germany, as an example, he believed that if one “starts from the German status quo itself,” the “only appropriate way” to adopt toward it “is a negative way” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 3), because “the modern German regime is an anachronism” (ibid., p. 5), and “what is coming to an end in France and England is only now beginning in Germany” (ibid., p. 6). Even if the German despotic system of 1843 were negated, it would not elevate it to the level of the ideas established by the French Revolution of 1789, “still less to the focal point of the present age” (ibid., p. 3).

马克思是具有世界眼光的思想家，他诚然是从“历史向‘世界历史’转换”的大趋势来观察欧洲乃至世界各国的状况及其发展的。然而，他特别意识到，时代、区域、国度的差异使这种趋势呈现出远非线性推进、向上发展的复杂性和曲折性。以他的祖国德意志为例，他认为，如果“从德国的现状［status quo］本身出发”，对此“采取的唯一适当的方式”，只能是“否定的方式”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第3页），因为“现代德国制度是时代错乱”（同上，第5页），“在法国和英国行将完结的事物，在德国现在才刚刚开始。”（同上，第6页）即使否定了1843年的德国专制主义制度，也不会将其提升到1789年法国大革命所确立的理念的水准，“更不会是处在当代的焦点。”（同上，第3页）

Since the actual situation is such, and “society endlessly … divides into all sorts of people,” the understandings, evaluations, and practical choices made by different people regarding the condition of Germany at that time, based on their respective perspectives and positions, differed enormously. Marx enumerated these controversies one by one: “One school legitimizes today’s baseness with yesterday’s baseness; another school declares every cry of the serf against the whip … to be rebellion”; while the “Historical School of Law,” [5]5 The Historical School of Law (Historische Rechtsschule) was a 19th-century German legal movement, associated with figures like Friedrich Carl von Savigny, that emphasized the organic, customary, and national-historical development of law, rejecting natural law theories. Marx criticized it in his early writings for its conservative and anti-revolutionary implications. which originally emphasized “the national spirit and historical tradition,” “fabricated German history” and “went to our prehistoric Teutonic virgin forests to look for our history of freedom.” As for the “narrow-minded, ill-natured, coarse and mediocre people” in real life who “adopt an ambiguous and suspicious attitude toward … mutually opposed states,” “they even have to acknowledge and affirm that their being dominated, ruled, and possessed is all heaven’s approval!” (ibid., p. 4) In Germany, only philosophy “remains on the same level [al pari] with the official contemporary reality” (ibid., p. 7), so the “practical political party” is justified in demanding the critique and negation of philosophy, but this party believes that “the negation of philosophy is accomplished simply by turning one’s back on it and muttering a few stale, angry phrases at it” (ibid., p. 8). Its “narrowness of vision consists in its failure to include philosophy in the German reality, or even in its belief that philosophy is inferior to German practice and the theories that serve it.” The “theoretical political party, which proceeds from a different line of thought, commits the same error, only with the factors reversed. This party believes that the present struggle is merely a critical struggle of philosophy against the German world; it … adopts a critical attitude toward its adversary and an uncritical attitude toward itself” (ibid.). From this it can be seen that the German intellectual world at that time was dazzlingly motley and complex, with no consensus whatsoever.

现实情形如此，而“社会无止境地……分成各色人等”，所以导致对于当时德国的状况，不同的人基于各自的视角、立场作出的理解、评价和实际选择又差异极大。马克思一一清点了这些争议：“有个学派以昨天的卑鄙行为来说明今天的卑鄙行为是合法的，有个学派把农奴反抗鞭子……的每一声呐喊都宣布为叛乱”；而本来强调“民族精神和历史传统”的“历史法学派”却“杜撰了德国历史”，“到我们史前的条顿原始森林去寻找我们的自由历史。”至于现实生活中“心胸狭窄、心地不良、粗鲁平庸之辈”对“处于互相对立的状态……采取暧昧的猜疑的态度”，“甚至他们还必须承认和首肯自己之被支配、被统治、被占有全是上天的恩准！”（同上，第4页）在德国唯有哲学“与正式的当代现实保持在同等水平上［al pari］”（同上，第7页），所以“实践政治派”要求对哲学进行批判和否定具有正当性，但该派以为，“只要背对着哲学，并且扭过头去对哲学嘟囔几句陈腐的气话，对哲学的否定就实现了”（同上，第8页），其“眼界的狭隘性就表现在没有把哲学归入德国的现实范围，或者甚至以为哲学低于德国的实践和为实践服务的理论。”与此思路不同的“理论政治派犯了同样的错误，只不过错误的因素是相反的。该派认为目前的斗争只是哲学同德国世界的批判性斗争，它……对敌手采取批判的态度，对自己本身却采取非批判的态度”。（同上）由此可以看出，当时德国思想界的光怪陆离、斑驳繁杂，根本无共识可言。

Lacking the concept of “universal consent” and acting without consensus, one can only return to a meticulous analysis of the actual situation to gain an accurate and thorough grasp, and thereby find a path to resolution. Take, for example, the “emancipation” that Jews in Germany at that time yearned for: it must be clarified, “what kind of emancipation do they desire?” Bruno Bauer conflated the “emancipation” of Jews, Christians, and different groups and classes in civil society, arguing that the “specific oppression and humiliation they suffer in reality should not be regarded as exceptions to the general rule, but rather as confirmations of the general rule” (Marx and Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 21). The so-called “general rule” here is the norm and requirement based on “universal consent” and used to constrain different people. In Marx’s view, Bauer’s understanding was “one-sided,” and his viewpoint was too “abstract.” To break down this theory of “universal consent,” Marx traced the evolution from the emergence of Judaism to the differentiation of Christianity from it and then to their opposition, noted the transformation of Judaism itself from its origins through the “rabbinic period” to the Middle Ages and up to its modern form, and saw the waning influence of the Talmud as its doctrinal basis. Thus, he delved deeper into the actual living conditions of real Jews, arguing that one should not, like Bauer, focus only on the “Sabbath Jew,” but must “examine the everyday Jew.” When this is done, the picture that emerges is completely different: “What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Haggling. What is his worldly god? Money” (ibid., p. 49). On this basis, Marx concluded that Jewish emancipation consists in: “the emancipation of mankind from Judaism” (ibid., p. 50). The meaning of Jewish self-emancipation is emancipation from their haggling and money, and thus from actual, secular Judaism; while the political emancipation of the Jews is to eliminate the precondition of their haggling through a social organization, thereby eliminating the possibility of their haggling. And with this social transformation, the religious consciousness of the Jews will dissipate like a faint mist in the real, life-sustaining air of society.

缺少“普遍同意”的观念，又无共识可言的行动，只有再回到现实状况的细致分析中才能获得准确而到位的把握，进而寻找到解决之径。就以当时德国境内犹太人渴望的“解放”诉求来说，必须弄清楚，“他们渴望什么样的解放？”布鲁诺·鲍威尔曾将犹太人、基督徒和市民社会中不同群体、阶层的“解放”混为一谈，认为他们在现实中“所受的特种压迫和耻辱，不应该看成是通则的例外，相反，应该看成是通则的证实”。（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第21页）这里的所谓“通则”就是基于“普遍同意”并用来约束不同人的规范和要求。在马克思看来，鲍威尔的这种理解是“片面”的，其观点则过于“抽象”了。为了破除这种“普遍同意”之论，马克思追溯了从犹太教产生到从中分化出基督教再到二者对立的变迁，关注到犹太教本身从起源到“拉比时期”再到中世纪直至现代形态的转换中，看到了作为其教义依据的《塔木德》影响力式微的过程，从而更深入探究了现实的犹太人的生存境况，认为不能像鲍威尔那样只关注“安息日的犹太人”，而是必须“考察日常的犹太人”。这样一来，呈现出来的情形就完全不同了——“犹太教的世俗基础是什么呢？实际需要，自私自利。犹太人的世俗礼拜是什么呢？经商牟利。他们的世俗的神是什么呢？金钱。”（同上，第49页）据此，马克思将犹太人的解放归结为：“人类从犹太精神中解放出来”（同上，第50页）。其中犹太人的自我解放的意涵是从其经商牟利和金钱中解放出来，从而是从实际的、世俗的犹太教中解放出来；而犹太人的政治解放就是通过一种社会组织，消除其经商牟利的前提，从而消除其经商牟利的可能性。而随着这种社会变革，犹太人的宗教意识也会像淡淡的烟雾一样在社会这一现实的、生命所需的空气中自行消失。

Going further, Marx not only replaced Bauer’s religious convictions with secular relations as the perspective and approach for observing the Jewish question, and used political emancipation and social emancipation to dissolve the “abstractness” of the way out that Bauer proposed for solving the Jewish question through religious emancipation; he also noted more profoundly that so-called political emancipation and social emancipation are only a “mediation,” and compared with genuine “human emancipation,” they too are abstract and inadequate. Thus, through his exploration of the Jewish question, Marx mapped out a ladder of “emancipation” that unfolds step by step and gradually rises: “political emancipation”—“social emancipation”—“human emancipation.” These understandings and concepts can only be properly grasped and understood when placed within the developmental stages of modern capitalist society, its real predicaments, and the sustained efforts to change these predicaments.

更进一步，马克思不仅用世俗关系替代鲍威尔的宗教信念作为观察犹太人问题的视角和思路，用政治解放、社会解放化解鲍威尔所提出的借助宗教解放以解决犹太人问题的出路的“抽象性”，而且更深刻地注意到：所谓政治解放、社会解放也只是一个“中介”，较之真正的“人的解放”，它们也是抽象的、不合格的。这样借助对犹太人问题的探讨，马克思规划了一条次第展开、逐步提升的“解放”阶梯：“政治解放”—“社会解放”—“人的解放”。而这些认识和观念只有放在近代资本社会的发展阶段、现实困境及其改变这种困境的持续努力中才能获得到位的把握和理解。

Clearly, compared with Locke’s abstract refutation of the “theory of universal consent,” Marx’s analysis, situated in era, region, and class, is far more powerful and profound.

显然，较之于洛克对“普遍同意说”的抽象驳斥，马克思置于时代、地域、阶层中的分析要有力得多、深刻得多。

III. The “Reason” Principle and Its Effects Are Only Manifested When Linked to Reality

三、“理性”原则及其效应只有与现实关联起来才得到彰显

The second basis and reason held by the “theory of innate ideas” is “rational discovery,” i.e., the belief that when people begin to use reason to grasp the world, they can discover and intuit those a priori principles, and that “knowing these propositions and assenting to them is sufficient proof that they are innate.” Locke argued that this inference “takes meaningless and vague expressions for clear reasons” (Locke, p. 10), and that it actually contains a huge paradox and contradiction: on the one hand, it holds that for reason to function, it needs the things naturally imprinted on the mind (i.e., innate ideas) as its basis and guide; on the other hand, it says that whether these things exist and, if so, what they are, is initially unknown, and to discover and grasp them, one must again use and exert the power of reason. This is essentially saying that regarding these innate ideas, “people know and do not know them at the same time.” Reason needs to rely on them, and they must also rely on reason. In this way, what “ideas” and “reason” actually are both become “vague expressions.” If so, where is the talk of “understanding” them? And what meaning does such “understanding” have?

“天赋观念论”所持的第二个依据和理由是“理性发现”，即认为当人们开始运用理性把握世界的时候，可以发现、感悟到那些先验的原则，“知道这些命题、同意这些命题，这就足以证明它们是天赋的。”洛克认为，这种推论是“把毫无意义的含糊的说法当做清晰的理由”（洛克，第10页）了，而实际上它蕴含着巨大的悖论和矛盾性：一方面，认为理性要发挥作用，需要以自然印入人心的东西（即天赋观念）为基础和指导；但另一方面，又说这些东西是否存在、如果存在究竟是什么，起初并不知道，要发现和把握它们,又必须运用和发挥理性的力量。这实际上等于说，对于这些天赋观念，“人们同时知道而又不知道它们”。理性需要借助它们，同时它们也必须借助理性。这样，“观念”和“理性”究竟是什么，都成为“含糊的说法”了。既然如此，哪里还谈得上对它们的“理解”？这种“理解”又有什么意义？

Beyond the speculative principles involved in the “theory of universal consent,” the “theory of innate ideas” also finds no support in practice; that is, “practical principles are equally incapable of gaining universal assent” (ibid., p. 28). For example, in moral practice, “faith” and “justice,” although in a certain sense they can be said to be the public bonds that maintain normal social functioning and people’s life order, are not regarded as principles of conduct by such people as desperadoes and arch-criminals. There is also the saying that “there is a code of honor even among thieves,” but even if fellow gang members in a den of thieves can deal with each other peacefully according to this, when they encounter others, they will rob and kill. In the minds of those who live by deception and robbery, what innate moral principles exist!

在“普遍同意说”所涉及的思辨原则之外，“天赋观念论”在实践上也得不到支持，就是说，“实践的原则(Practical Principles)亦一样是不能得到普遍的认可的”（同上，第28页）。比如，道德实践中的“信义”（faith)和“公道”（justice)，虽然它们某种意义上可以说是维系正常的社会运转和人们的生活秩序的公共纽带，但像那些亡命之徒、元恶大憝等就不会将其视为其行为的准则。也有所谓“盗亦有道”之说，但是，就算像在贼窝之中同党之间可以据此和平处事，可遇到别人，他们就会抢劫杀戮。在那些以欺骗和抢劫度日的人心目中，哪有什么天赋的道德原则！

Furthermore, Locke also held that “moral rules” belonging to the sphere of reason “need a proof,” and that “when they are proposed, one may reasonably ask for a reason why they should be followed” (ibid., pp. 30-31). Only when the proof is forceful and the answer pertinent can one achieve “convincing people by virtue.” Moreover, such evidence and reasons should be universal, that is, consistent across different eras and among different people. However, anyone “slightly acquainted with the history of mankind” knows that the actual situation is not so. For example, regarding the moral principle of “keeping contracts,” Christians give the reason that “God requires us to do so,” followers of Hobbes hold that “it is required by the public,” while humanist philosophers say it is “in accordance with human dignity” and a demand of “virtue” as “the highest excellence of human nature.” This shows that people assent to such “great and undeniable moral rules” “not because they are innate, but because they are advantageous”! (ibid., p. 32) The consequence is that in actual practice, even concerning the same moral principle, various opinions diverge and intermingle, and the effects of practice are multifarious, even diametrically opposed. Since “the practical principles of different men are so widely different, I think it is impossible to prove innate moral principles by the mark of universal consent” (ibid., p. 40); even the presence of powerful rational force is equally futile.

此外，洛克还认为，属于理性范畴的“道德的规则需要一个证明”，“在一提出来以后，人们都可以合理地请问一个所以然的理由”（同上，第30-31页）。只有证明有力、回答中肯，才能达致“以德服人”。而且这样的证据和理由应该具有普适性，即在不同的时代、不同的人那里都是一致的。但是，“稍微明白人类的历史”的人都知道，实际情况并不是如此。比如，对于“遵守契约”这条道德原则，基督徒所持的理由是“上帝需要我们那样做”，霍布斯的信徒则认为“那是公众需要”，而人文主义哲学家会说这“合于人的尊严”，是作为“人性中的最高优点”的“德性”的要求。这表明，人们之所以赞同此类“伟大而不能否认的道德规则”，“不是因为它是天赋的，乃是因为它是有利的”！（同上，第32页）这样的后果是，在现实实践中，即便有关同一个道德原则，也会各种意见分歧错杂，践行效果更是五花八门，甚至截然相反。鉴于“各人的实践原则是有很大差异的，因此，我想，要以普遍同意的标记，来证实天赋的道德原则，那是不可能的”（同上，第40页）；即便有强大的理性力量同样无济于事。

Through the above analysis, Locke concludes: whether speculative principles or practical principles, “various ideas, especially those belonging to principles, are not innate” (ibid., p. 51).

通过以上辨析，洛克得出结论：无论是思辨原则还是实践原则，“各种观念，尤其是属于原则的那些观念，都不是与生俱来。”（同上，第51页）

According to traditional understanding, Locke belongs to the empiricists, and empiricism is opposed to rationalism. However, this is merely a simple demarcation made by philosophy textbooks for the convenience of exposition; the actual situation is not so, but more complex. As for Locke, his philosophical thought is precisely expounded through rationalist reflection and relatively rigorous logical deduction. The argumentation in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is extremely detailed and exhaustive, to the point of giving an impression of being excessively trivial and complicated. But Locke’s intention is to consider and explain all aspects of a given problem thoroughly. In this sense, his empiricist stance and rationalist method are not so much opposed as complementary and interpenetrating.

按照传统的理解，洛克属于经验论者，而经验论与唯理论又是对立的。然而，这只是哲学史教科书为了叙述的方便而作出的简单划界，实际情形并非如此，而是更为复杂。就洛克来说，他的哲学思想恰恰是通过理性主义（Rationalism）的思考和较为严密的逻辑推论来阐发的，《人类理解论》的论证非常细致和详尽，以至于给人极其琐屑和繁杂之感。但洛克的意图在于，将关于某一个问题的各个方面都考虑全、解说透。这样说来，他的经验论主张与唯理论方法与其说是对立的，还不如说是可以互补和融通的。

Marx’s “modern materialism” also inherits this characteristic and pushes it forward in depth. In the evolution of modern Western philosophy after Locke, “reason” increasingly became a very complex concept and category; in reality, it also signifies an indispensable idea, attitude, capacity, and quality for understanding society and history. Hegel provided a relatively systematic and profound exposition of it within his philosophical system. Marx grasped this quite precisely and, within the framework of “modern materialism,” emphasized, reflected upon, and reconstructed it. Thus, we see that after twice “taking leave” of Hegel—in his doctoral dissertation and during the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* period—Marx, having “turned” to the study of political economy, unexpectedly engaged in an analysis of “Hegel’s entire dialectic, especially the exposition of dialectics in the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, and finally the relationship of modern critical movements to Hegel” (Marx/Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 197). In the “Paris Manuscripts,” in the third notebook’s “seven points” on communism, he inserts a lengthy discussion of Hegel’s philosophy—this is the most concentrated exposition and argumentation directly related to “reason” in the process of Marx’s intellectual construction.

马克思的“现代唯物主义”也继承了这一特色，并向纵深做了推进。在洛克之后西方近代哲学的演进中，“理性”愈益成为一个非常复杂的概念、范畴；而在现实中，它又意味着一种理解社会历史不可或缺的理念、态度、能力和素养。黑格尔在其哲学体系内对其做过较为系统而深入的阐释，马克思对此有相当精准的把握，并且在“现代唯物主义”的框架下予以强调、反思和重构。所以，我们看到，在“博士论文”和“《德法年鉴》时期”两度“告别”黑格尔之后，“转向”政治经济学研究的马克思又出人意料地“对黑格尔的整个辩证法，特别是《现象学》和《逻辑学》中有关辩证法的叙述，以及最后对现代批判运动同黑格尔的关系”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第197页）进行了辨析。在“巴黎手稿”第三笔记本关于共产主义的“七条说明”中他大段插入的有关黑格尔哲学的讨论，这是马克思思想建构过程中最为集中的与“理性”直接相关的阐发和论证。

Marx outlines the structure of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as “the true birthplace and secret of Hegel’s philosophy,” with particularly detailed excerpts on the chapter concerning “reason.” Besides the chapter title “Reason’s Certainty and Truth,” he highlights the content of sections such as “Observing Reason,” “Reason as Lawgiver,” and “Reason as Testing Laws” (ibid., p. 202). This principle of “reason” is later summarized by him as “Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and its final achievement—the dialectic, as the negative principle of movement and creation,” and its “greatness” lies in “grasping the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as de-objectification, as externalization and the supersession of this externalization” (ibid., p. 205), while “thorough naturalism or humanism is distinct from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time is the truth that unites them” (ibid., p. 209). This reflection on “reason” not only exposes the absurdity and impossibility of explaining ideas, spirit, self-consciousness, and even human existence through “innateness,” “priority,” “logic,” and “speculative” characteristics, but also grasps and explains social structure, historical change, and human development—including the origin and renewal of ideas—through the contradictions and struggles between “man and nature, man and man,” “existence and essence, objectification and self-confirmation, freedom and necessity, individual and species” (ibid., p. 185).

马克思概略地勾勒了作为“黑格尔哲学的真正诞生地和秘密”的《精神现象学》的体系结构，其中有关“理性”章节的摘录尤显详尽，在“理性的确定性和真理性”这一章的标题外，还突出了“观察的理性”“立法的理性”“审核法律的理性”（同上，第202页）等节的内容。这种“理性”原则随后更被他概括为“黑格尔的《现象学》及其最后成果——辩证法，作为推动原则和创造原则的否定性”，认为其“伟大之处”在于“把人的自我产生看做一个过程，把对象化看做非对象化，看做外化和这种外化的扬弃”（同上，第205页），而“彻底的自然主义或人道主义，既不同于唯心主义，也不同于唯物主义，同时又是把这二者结合起来的真理。”（同上，第209页）这种“理性”思考不仅揭露了观念、精神、自我意识包括人的存在的“天赋”“先在”“逻辑”“思辨”特征解释思路上的荒谬性和不可能性，更在“人和自然界之间、人和人之间”“存在和本质、对象化和自我确证、自由和必然、个体和类之间”（同上，第185页）矛盾和斗争中把握和解释了社会的结构、历史的变迁和人的发展，当然也包括观念的起源和更新。

Compared with Locke’s use of the principle of “reason” to refute the “theory of innate ideas,” Marx’s application of it to the investigation of the different existential conditions of people in capitalist society achieves even more striking effects. This is prominently manifested in the first notebook of the “Paris Manuscripts,” where the principle of “reason” is displayed as a grasp of social structure and class composition from the perspective of “totality.”

较之于洛克用“理性”原则来驳斥“天赋观念论”，马克思将其运用于对资本社会人们不同的生存状态的探究中，所达致的效果更为明显。这突出表现在“巴黎手稿”第一笔记本将“理性”原则展示为从“总体性”上对社会结构和阶级构成的把握。

As we know, the most authoritative “historical-critical edition” (MEGA²) of Marx’s writings provides two versions of this part of the “Paris Manuscripts”: the “logical arrangement version” and the “original sequence version” (MEGA², I/2, pp. 187-322, 323-444). The “logical arrangement version” begins with the sequential arrangement of “Wages,” “Profit of Capital,” and “Rent of Land.” Reading it gives the impression that these are merely different forms of income for three classes at the time; their actual conditions and manifestations differ greatly, and their historical origins and future destinies appear to have little connection with one another. It is difficult to grasp the overall situation of the whole society from this. However, if one returns to Marx’s original manuscript and carefully reads the “original sequence version,” which presents Marx’s writing process, one learns that Marx divided a page of manuscript into three or two columns, respectively labeled “Wages,” “Profit of Capital,” and “Rent of Land,” and wrote the content of each in a corresponding manner. Why was this done? What special intention lay behind it? In my understanding, this method of writing precisely indicates that Marx had already realized that these three are controlled by an overall social structure, namely, the unique function of “capital.” Whether in the sections on “Wages” and “Rent of Land” or in “Profit of Capital” itself, we can see “capital” playing an irreplaceable role like a shadow, participating in, shaping, permeating, and generating social phenomena, influencing the living conditions and future destinies of people in different classes, and thereby closely connecting these different classes with one another. In other words, without capital, many social phenomena cannot be accurately described or adequately explained.

我们知道，马克思著述最权威的“历史考证版”（MEGA²）提供了有关“巴黎手稿”这一部分的两个版本：“逻辑编排版”和“原始顺序版”（MEGA2,I/2,S.187-322，323-444）。“逻辑编排版”的开头是按照“工资”“资本的利润”和“地租”依次编排的，读起来让人觉得这只是当时三个阶层的不同的收入形式，它们之间现实境况和表现差异很大，历史渊源和未来命运也看不出彼此之间有多么大的关联，据此很难把握得到整个社会的总体状况。但如果回到马克思的原始手稿，认真阅读能够呈现马克思写作过程的“原始顺序版”，就会知道，马克思是将一页稿纸分成三栏或者两栏、分别标上“工资”“资本的利润”“地租”来写作的，而在阐述其各自的内容时则是一一对应着写的。为什么会这样呢？有什么样特别的用意吗？按照我的理解，这种写法恰恰表明，这时的马克思已经意识到这三者之间是受到一个社会总结构的控制的，这就是“资本”的独特功能。无论在“工资”“地租”部分抑或“资本的利润”本身中，我们都可以看到“资本”如影随形地发挥着不可替代的作用，参与、塑造、渗透和创生着社会现象，影响着不同阶层的人的生活境遇和未来命运，而这些不同阶层的人之间又因此而密切联系在一起了；换句话说，离开资本，诸多社会现象就得不到准确的描述和到位的说明。

Although the above mode of thinking and writing does not come directly from Locke, it incorporates the influence of the research and interpretive methods of modern philosophy, especially German classical philosophy. Yet it not only has a great connection in argumentative approach with the analysis of the critique of the “theory of innate ideas” in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* from various dimensions, but also greatly advances it under the new framework of “modern materialism.” This is a new philosophical way of understanding the world, but Marx gradually constructed it through his investigation of political economy. The “Paris Notebooks” and the “Paris Manuscripts” are the results of Marx’s forty years of political economy research and the initial stage of writing *Capital*. He “starts almost from the original words of the national economists,” but the profundity of the thought thus formed “surpasses the level of national economy” (Marx/Engels *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 124). The reason is that the essence of the economic phenomena of the era of capital provided by the economists was revealed by Marx through rationalist thinking and structural, holistic exposition.

上述思考和写作方式虽然并不是直接来自洛克，而是熔铸了近代哲学特别是德国古典哲学研究和阐释方式的影响。但它不仅与《人类理解论》中对“天赋观念论”批判各个维度的分析在论证思路上有极大的关联性，而且在“现代唯物主义”这种新的思维框架下将其大大推进了。这是一种新的理解世界的哲学方式，但马克思却是通过政治经济学的探究来逐步建构起来的。“巴黎笔记”和“巴黎手稿”是马克思40年政治经济学研究和《资本论》写作起步阶段的成果，他“几乎是用国民经济学家的原话所作的论述出发”的，但借此形成的思想的深刻性却“超出国民经济学的水平”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第124页）。原因在于，经济学家提供的资本时代经济现象的实质被马克思通过理性主义思考和结构性、总体性的阐发揭示出来了。

IV. Examining the Truth of the Content of Ideas by Placing Them within the Changes of Social History

四、置于社会历史的变迁之中检视观念内容的真实性

After exposing the loopholes and absurdities in the “principles of speculation and practice” of the proponents of the “theory of innate ideas,” Locke also carefully examined other types of ideas and the various complex situations they involve. After careful analysis, he demonstrated that they also do not possess the characteristics of “innateness” and cannot provide any evidence for the “theory of innate ideas,” thereby completing the “encirclement” of the “theory of innate ideas.” Coincidentally, Marx also investigated these ideas one by one in different writings, thereby embodying the level that “modern materialism” can achieve.

在揭穿“天赋观念论”者在“思辨和实践的原则”上存在的漏洞和荒谬之后，洛克还悉心考察了其他类型的观念及其所关涉到的多种复杂状况，并且在进行认真辨析之后，说明它们也不具有“天赋”性特征和不能为“天赋观念论”提供任何佐证，进而完成了对“天赋观念论”的“合围”。无独有偶，马克思在不同著述中对这些观念也一一进行过探究，借此体现了“现代唯物主义”所能达到的水准。

1. “Identity” in Logical Thought

1.逻辑思维中的“同一性”

Locke believed that if there were so-called “innate ideas,” they should be very clear and distinct, widely known by people, and naturally agreed upon, that is, possessing universally and distinctly true components and characteristics; otherwise, they would inevitably cause constant doubt and confusion. The so-called “identity” is precisely problematic in this respect. It has always been “not very certain, not very clear.” For example, the concept of “identity” understood by non-Pythagoreans is certainly different from that of Pythagoras and his followers. Then, how can it be determined which school’s concept is true, is “innate,” and which is not? Are all the different concepts of “identity” “innate”? If so, does this not violate the intent and principle of “identity” itself? The existence of these problems fully demonstrates that “identity” is not an “innate idea.”

洛克认为，假如有所谓“天赋观念”，那它应该是十分清楚明白的，能够广泛地被人知道、自然地被人认同，即具有普遍而分明的真理成分和特性，否则必然会引起人们不断地怀疑和困惑。而所谓“同一性”恰恰在这方面是成问题的。它始终是“不很确定、不很清晰”的，比如，非毕达哥拉斯学派的人所理解的“同一性”观念同毕达哥拉斯及其信徒之间肯定是不一样的。那么，如何确定哪一派别的观念是真的、是“天赋”的，而别的派别不是呢？难道具有差异性的“同一性”观念都是“天赋”的吗？如果是这样，不是违背了“同一性”本身的意旨和原则吗？这些问题的存在充分表明，“同一性”不是“天赋观念”。

Having rationally denied the “innate” nature of identity, Locke later, in Chapter 27 of Book II of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, explored “what identity consists in.” In his view, this needs to be determined by “comparing the existence of things themselves.” He particularly limited “things” to “one kind,” pointing out: “If we compare a thing’s existence at a certain time and place with its existence at another time and place, we form the ideas of identity and diversity. If we see any thing existing at a certain time and place, we are sure (whatever it is) that it is that very thing, and not another” (Locke, p. 325). That is to say, in Locke’s view, so-called “identity” is merely “a thing’s identity with itself.” To this end, he cautioned: “But to say that two or more things can be one is a contradiction” (ibid., p. 327).

从理性上否定了同一性的“天赋”性质，洛克之后在《人类理解论》第二卷第27章探究了“同一性是由何成立的？”在他看来，这需要“比较事物的存在本身”来确定。他特别将“事物”局限于“一种”，指出：“我们如果把一种事物在某个时间和地点存在的情形，同其在另一种时间和地点时的情形加以比较，则我们便形成同一性（identity）和差异性（diversity）的观念。我们如果看到任何事物在某地某时存在，则我们一定会相信（不论它是什么），它就是它，不是别的”。（洛克，第325页）就是说，在洛克看来，所谓“同一性”只是“一个事物与其自身同一”，为此他告诫说：“不过要说两个以上的东西可以成为一个,那只是一种矛盾。”（同上，第327页）

Marx agreed with determining “identity” through “comparing the existence of things themselves,” but his grasp of this issue differed from Locke’s: First, he regarded “one kind of thing” as a system composed of different elements of contradiction or opposing sides. In this sense, “identity” refers less to the consistency of this total thing across different times and spaces than to the inseparable internal connection and fusion of the contradictory sides within the unity, that is, the tendency of these elements to interconnect, attract, permeate, and renew each other. Second, by comparing two things or multiple things, clarifying the state and composition in which they can coexist, and treating the common properties they possess as “identity.” This is Marx’s breakthrough and transcendence of Locke’s thought within the framework of “modern materialism”; paradigmatic analyses of this are Marx and Engels’ expositions on “the identity of thinking and being” and “the general relation of production, distribution, exchange and consumption.”

马克思认同通过“比较事物的存在本身”来确定“同一性”，但对这一问题的把握与洛克不同：一是将“一种事物”看作是由矛盾或对立双方不同因素构成的系统，这个意义上的“同一性”与其说指的是这个总体性事物在不同时空中的一致性，不如说指统一体内部矛盾双方不可分割的内在关联和融合，即这些因素之间相互联结、吸引、渗透、更新的倾向；二是对两种事物或多种事物进行比较，厘清它们能够共同存在的状态和构成，将它们所具有的共同的性质视为“同一性”。这是马克思在“现代唯物主义”框架内对洛克思想的突破性和超越性；对此具有典范意义的分析是马克思、恩格斯有关“思维与存在的同一性”和“生产与分配、交换、消费的一般关系”的阐释。

In his later years, Engels, while summing up the relationship between Marxist philosophy and German classical philosophy, once asked: “Is the world created by God, or has it always existed?” Obviously, the “theory of innate ideas” gives a double affirmative answer to this question. Fundamentally different from this, Engels regarded the “world” here as a combination of “spirit” and “nature,” “thinking and being.” The state of the world and its movement is the concrete manifestation of the relationship between the two. He considered this to be “the great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy,” “the highest question of all philosophy,” and also “only after the long winter of the Christian Middle Ages in Europe, when people awakened, was it clearly posed and acquired its full meaning” (Marx/Engels *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 230). He particularly pointed out that according to the answer to the relationship between the two, philosophies in history can be divided into the “two great camps” of materialism and idealism; but at the same time, it is necessary to understand that “apart from this, the two terms idealism and materialism originally have no other meaning, and they are not used here in any other sense.” On the contrary, “if other meanings are added to them, what confusion will arise” (ibid., p. 231). That is to say, Marx and Engels grasped the world and understood philosophy in the sense of the interconnection between “spirit” and “nature,” “thinking and being,” and further “idealism and materialism”; these paired “elements” and “units” differ from each other, even being heterogeneous, but they are “relational terms” within the same system, mutually related, indispensable, and cannot be neglected. The latter is the “identity” between them. As Engels said: “What is the relationship of our thoughts about the world around us to this world itself? Can our thinking know the real world? Can we correctly reflect reality in our representations and concepts of the real world? In philosophical language, this question is called the question of the identity of thinking and being” (Marx/Engels *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 231). In short, “identity” is established on the basis of “difference”; and “difference” is not the negation of “identity,” but its derivation, development, and deepening. This is the “modern” level and “new” realm that Marxist materialism has reached in the question of “identity,” surpassing old philosophy (including idealism and general materialism).

恩格斯在晚年中总结性地清理马克思主义哲学与德国古典哲学的关系时曾经追问：“世界是神创造的呢，还是从来就有的？”显然，“天赋观念论”对这个问题持双重肯定性回答。与此根本不同，恩格斯将这里的“世界”视为“精神”与“自然界”、“思维和存在”的组合，所谓世界的状况及其运动就是二者之间关系的具体呈现。认为这既是“全部哲学，特别是近代哲学的重大的基本问题”、“全部哲学的最高问题”，也是“在欧洲人从基督教中世纪的长期冬眠中觉醒以后，才被十分清楚地提了出来，才获得了它的完全的意义”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷，第230页）他特别指出，可以依照对二者关系的回答将历史上的哲学分成唯物主义和唯心主义“两大阵营”；但同时也需要明白，“除此之外，唯心主义和唯物主义这两个用语本来没有任何别的意思，它们在这里也不是在别的意义上使用的”，相反，“如果给它们加上别的意义，就会造成怎样的混乱。”（同上，第231页）这就是说，马克思、恩格斯是在“精神”与“自然界”、“思维和存在”进而“唯心主义和唯物主义”相互关联的意义上来把握世界、理解哲学的；这些成对出现的“元素”“单元”彼此是存在差异，甚至是异质的，但它们又是同一体系中的“关系项”，彼此相互关联、不可或缺和偏废，后者就是它们之间的“同一性”。诚如恩格斯所说：“我们关于我们周围世界的思想对这个世界本身的关系是怎样的？我们的思维能不能认识现实世界？我们能不能在我们关于现实世界的表象和概念中正确地反映现实？用哲学的语言来说，这个问题叫作思维和存在的同一性问题”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷，第231页）质言之，“同一性”是建立在“差异性”基础上的；而“差异性”不是“同一性”的否定，而是其衍生、发展和深化。这就是马克思主义的唯物主义在“同一性”问题上超越旧哲学（包括唯心主义和一般唯物主义）所达到的“现代”水准和“新”境界。

Marx further extended this transformation in philosophical perspective to a profound analysis of capitalist society. His discussion of the “general relation of production to distribution, exchange, consumption” within the economic structure of capitalist society is a vivid manifestation of his thought on “identity.” Regarding “these items that are juxtaposed with production,” the understanding obtained from “superficial appearance” is: “Production appears as the starting point, consumption as the end, distribution and exchange as the middle link,” or among them “a formal syllogism is formed: production is the universal, distribution and exchange are the particular, consumption is the individual, and the whole is united thereby.” In Marx’s view, “this is of course a connection, but a superficial one,” and therefore not genuine “identity.” Genuine “identity” means that “they constitute the moments of a single totality, the differences within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well. The process always returns to production. Exchange and consumption cannot be predominant… Distribution, as the distribution of products, is likewise so. And as the distribution of the elements of production, it is itself a moment of production. Hence, definite production determines definite consumption, distribution, exchange and definite relations of these different moments to one another. Of course, production in its one-sided form is also determined by the other moments… With changes in distribution, for example, with the concentration of capital, with a different distribution of the population between town and country, etc., production changes. Finally, the needs of consumption determine production.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, pp. 30-42)

马克思更进一步把哲学观上的这种变革延展至对资本社会的深刻剖析中。他有关资本主义社会经济结构中“生产与分配、交换、消费的一般关系”的讨论就是其“同一性”思想的鲜明体现。对于“与生产并列的这几个项目”，根据“肤浅的表象”所获得的理解是：“生产表现为起点，消费表现为终点，分配和交换表现为中间环节”，或者它们之间“形成一个正规的三段论法：生产是一般，分配和交换是特殊，消费是个别，全体由此结合在一起”。在马克思看来，“这当然是一种联系，然而是一种肤浅的联系”，因此并不是真正的“同一性”。真正的“同一性”是说，“它们构成一个总体的各个环节，一个统一体内部的差别。生产既支配着与其他要素相对而言的生产自身，也支配着其他要素。过程总是从生产重新开始。交换和消费不能是起支配作用的东西，……分配，作为产品的分配，也是这样。而作为生产要素的分配，它本身就是生产的一个要素。因此，一定的生产决定一定的消费、分配、交换和这些不同要素相互间的一定关系。当然，生产就其单方面形式来说也决定于其他要素。……随着分配的变动，例如，随着资本的积聚，随着城乡人口的不同的分配等等,生产也就发生变动。最后，消费的需要决定着生产。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第30卷，第30-42页）

This grasp of the complexity of the problem of “identity” within the structure of capitalist society means that, for Marx, so-called social revolution is not a separate change in one or some “moments,” but a total transformation of society, because “there is an interaction between different moments. This is the case with every organic whole.” (Ibid., p. 41)

对资本社会结构中“同一性”问题的复杂性的这种把握，意味着在马克思那里所谓社会革命不是某个或者某些“要素”的单独变化，而是社会的整体转型，因为“不同要素之间存在着相互作用。每一个有机整体都是这样”。（同上，第41页）

2. The Mathematical Principle of “The Whole Is Greater than the Part”

2.“全体大于部分”式的数学原则

In Locke’s view, the “whole” and “part” contained in this proposition are entirely relative concepts; what can appropriately and directly embody and support these two concepts is “nothing but extension and number,” that is, area and quantity. This means that the nature of the relationship between “whole” and “part” should be determined by the relationship between the things in which they are embedded and on which they depend. If “whole” and “part” are “innate” ideas, then extension and number must also be; but everyone knows that “extension and number,” i.e., area and quantity, are real, “positive existences” in actual life, and are by no means “innate.”

在洛克看来，这个命题所包含的“全体”和“部分”完全是相对的概念，能恰当而直接地体现和支持这两个概念的“不外广袤和数目”，亦即面积和数量。这就意味着，“全体”和“部分”之间关系的性质应该由它们所寄寓的、所依赖的东西之间的关系来确定。如果说“全体”和“部分”是“天赋”观念，那么广袤和数目一定亦是；但谁都知道，“广袤和数目”即面积和数量是现实生活中实实在在的、“积极的存在”，根本不是“天赋”的。

How did abstract mathematical ideas, principles, and axioms originate and become established? In a letter to a relative, Marx addressed this issue by returning to everyday life and its socio-historical changes, pointing out: “Not very large calculations, for example in household expenses and commerce, were never performed with [numerals] but only with stones and other similar markers on the abacus… As for even larger mathematical calculations, before such a need arose the ancient Romans already had the multiplication table or the Pythagorean table… In making very large calculations, the old method created insurmountable obstacles, as can be seen from the tricks performed by the outstanding mathematician Archimedes.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 650)

抽象的数学观念、原则和公理是怎么起源和确立起来的？马克思在一封写给亲属的信中谈及这一问题，他回归到日常生活及其社会历史变迁中来观照，指出：“不太大的计算，例［如］在家庭开支和商业中，从来不用［数字］而只用石子和其他类似的标记在算盘上进行。……至于更大一些的数学计算，则在有这种需要之前古罗马人就已经有了乘法表或毕达哥拉斯表，……在作很大的计算时，旧方法造成不可克服的障碍，这一点从杰出的数学家阿基米得所变的戏法中就可以看出来。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第30卷，第650页）

Academia usually regards Marx’s study of mathematics as merely an “amateur pastime” outside his research on political economy. However, if we carefully study Marx’s economic and mathematical manuscripts and letters published in the “historical-critical edition” of the *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, we will find that, since the 1860s, Marx had been committed to an intrinsic integration of economics and mathematics. On the one hand, he saw that economic phenomena and movements contain extremely important and complex quantitative relationships, which are a fertile soil and field for the generation, advancement, and breakthrough of mathematical methods, principles, axioms, and ideas; on the other hand, he felt that a complete economic system and universally applicable economic laws (including value, surplus value, profit, average profit, etc.) could only be abstracted, outlined, deduced, revealed, and elucidated through mathematical methods. Therefore, Marx studied mathematics for economic purposes and from an economic perspective. As he pointed out in a letter to Engels: “(I) am, in formulating the principles of political economy… rapidly reviewing algebra.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 247) The economic manuscripts he produced between 1857 and 1881 convey the following information: he “intended to apply mathematics to economics, not simply algebraic operations (Marx would not engage in simple operations), but to find universally applicable laws among these economic numerical values, and if possible, to use them to precisely calculate dynamic economic numerical values, as well as to logically deduce (transform) economic concepts (value—surplus value—profit—average profit)—this was also quite important for Marx.” (Vollgraf, pp. 81-82)

学界通常认为，马克思对数学的研究只是他在政治经济学研究之外的“业余消遣”。然而，如果我们对《马克思恩格斯全集》“历史考证版”所刊布的马克思经济学、数学手稿和书信进行认真研究，就会发现，马克思自19世纪60年代以来就致力于经济学与数学的内在结合。一方面他看出经济现象和运动中蕴含着极为重要而复杂的数量关系，是数学方法、原则、公理和观念由以产生、推进和突破的丰沛土壤和园地；另一方面他感到，完整的经济学体系及普遍适用的经济学规律（包括价值、剩余价值、利润和平均利润等等），只有通过数学方法才能被抽象、勾勒、推导、揭示和阐发出来。所以，马克思是出于经济学目的、又从经济学视角出发研究数学的。诚如他给恩格斯的信中所指出的：“（我）在制定政治经济学原理时……把代数迅速地温习一遍。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第29卷，第247页）1857-1881年间他创作的经济学手稿传达出这样的信息：他“打算将数学运用于经济学，不过不是简单的代数运算（马克思不会从事简单的运算），而是要在这些经济学数值之间找出普遍适用的规律，如果可能的话还打算用来精确计算动态的经济学数值，以及对经济学概念（价值—剩余价值—利润—平均利润）进行逻辑推导（转化）——这对于马克思来说也相当重要”。（福尔格拉夫，第81-82页）

It should be said that a clearer and more complete theoretical exposition of the above issues was provided by Engels. In the “Philosophy” section of *Anti-Dühring*, he devoted a chapter to criticizing “apriorism,” asking: “From where does thought obtain these principles? From itself?” To this, Dühring’s view was that “without any empirical additive, all pure mathematics can be deduced from those mathematical axioms which ‘according to pure logic can neither be demonstrated nor are in need of demonstration,’ and then applied to the world” (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 414). Moreover, as if responding to Locke’s critical line of thought, Engels pointed out that, in Dühring’s case, “the mathematical axioms are the expression of the extremely meager thought content that mathematics is obliged to borrow from logic. They can be reduced to the following two: 1. The whole is greater than the part… 2. If two quantities are equal to a third quantity, then they are equal to each other.” (Ibid., pp. 414-415) This is typical “apriorism” and “the theory of innate ideas.” The crux of this idealist view is that “it stands everything on its head” (Ibid., p. 410), “whether in mathematics or in any other field, such meager propositions are of no use. To proceed further, we must introduce real relations, relations and spatial forms derived from real objects. The ideas of line, surface, angle, polygon, cube, sphere, etc., are all derived from reality… from definite reality” (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 415). That is to say, mathematical principles and axioms appear abstract, but from the long-term perspective of social history, these principles too come from reality, experience, and practice—that is, they possess substantive content.

应该说，对上述问题作出更明确而完满的理论阐述的是恩格斯。在《反杜林论》的“哲学编”中，他专设一章批判“先验主义”，追问：“思维从什么地方获得这些原则呢？从自身中吗？”对此，杜林的看法是，“不需要任何经验的填加料，就可以从那些‘按照纯粹逻辑的观点既不可能也不需要论证’的数学公理中推导出全部纯数学，然后把它应用于世界”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第3卷，第414页）。不仅如此，恩格斯还仿佛回应洛克的批判思路似地指出，在杜林那里，“数学公理是数学不得不从逻辑学那里借用的极其贫乏的思想内容的表现。它们可以归结为以下两条：１.整体大于部分。……２.如果两个数量等于第三个数量，那么它们彼此相等。”（同上，第414-415页）这是典型的“先验主义”和“天赋观念论”。这种唯心主义观点的症结在于，“它把事物完全头足倒置了”（同上，第410页），“不论在数学中或者在别的领域中，这样贫乏的命题都是无济于事的。为了继续前进，我们必须引入真实的关系，来自现实物体的关系和空间形式。线、面、角、多角形、立方体、球体等等观念都是从现实中得来的……是从确凿的现实中得来的”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第3卷，第415页）。这就是说，数学原则和公理貌似抽象，但从社会历史的长时间段来看，这些原理等也是来自现实、经验和实践，即具有实在的内容。

3. “Substance” as an Idea

3.作为观念的“实体”

The idea of “substance” is an important issue that Locke devoted two chapters to in Book II of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. In Book I, he only pointed out that the “substance” discussed by proponents of the “theory of innate ideas” is not a concept with a clear referent; that is, it is not a special, clear, “positive” idea. They merely vaguely assume something they do not know, and regard it as the foundation and support of those ideas we do know. Furthermore, “substance” has no other meaning; it is merely something we obtain through sensation or reflection. Given that “substance” has such complex entanglements with reality, and can only confirm its own existence and value through these, how can it be said to be “innate” or “a priori”?

“实体”观念是洛克在《人类理解论》第二卷要专设两章论述的重要问题。在第一卷中他只指出，“天赋观念论”者谈及的“实体”也不是一个含义明确的所指，即并不是一个特殊的、清楚的、“积极的”观念，他们只是含糊地假定了一个自己所不知道的东西，并将其视为我们所知道的那些观念的基础和支柱。此外，“实体”并没有别的意义，它只是我们借感觉或反省得来的。“实体”与现实方面有如此复杂的纠葛，且由此才能确证自己的存在及其价值，缘何谈得上是“天赋”的、“先在”的呢？

Marx, for his part, did not regard the meaning of “substance” as obscure; rather, he examined it in the context of the transformation of modes of thinking brought about by social development. In modern times, with the development of capitalism, the progress of science and technology, and the “struggle against abstract subjectivity” in modes of thinking, “the philosophy of the 18th century moved toward mutually opposed one-sidednesses.” Engels summarized this as “the opposition of objectivity to subjectivity, of nature to spirit, of materialism to spiritualism, of abstract universality and substance to abstract singularity.” (Marx/Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 88) In essence, in terms of the connotation of “substance,” it is the opposition between material substance and ideal substance. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, by clarifying the differences between Feuerbach’s and Hegel’s thought, Marx elucidated the essentials of these two views of substance: the former “proceeds from the positive, from the sensuously certain,” “sublates the infinite, and posits the real, sensuous, actual, finite, particular”; the latter “proceeds from alienation (logically, from the infinite, the abstract universal), from substance, from absolute and fixed abstraction—that is, to put it more plainly, he proceeds from religion and theology.” (ibid., p. 200) More importantly, the development of the epoch “caused the two opposing sides to develop fully in their antagonism, thereby making it inevitable that this opposition be abolished.” (ibid., p. 89) This is precisely the work undertaken by Marx’s “new materialism.”

马克思倒是不认为“实体”的含义不明所以，而是将其放在社会发展导致的思维方式的变迁中予以观照。近代以来，随着资本主义的发展、科学技术的进步以及思维方式上“反对抽象主体性的斗争”，促使“18世纪的哲学走向相互对立的片面性”。恩格斯将其概括为“客体性同主体性相对立，自然同精神相对立，唯物主义同唯灵论相对立，抽象普遍、实体同抽象单一相对立”。（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第88页）质言之，以“实体”内涵而论，就是物质实体与观念实体的对立。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思借助对费尔巴哈与黑格尔思想差异的厘清，对这两种实体观的要义作出了阐释，即前者“从肯定的东西即从感觉确定的东西出发”，“扬弃了无限的东西，设定了现实的、感性的、实在的、有限的、特殊的东西”；而后者“从异化出发（在逻辑上就是从无限的东西、抽象的普遍的东西出发），从实体出发，从绝对的和不变的抽象出发，就是说，说得更通俗些，他从宗教和神学出发”。（同上，第200页）更重要的是，时代的发展“使对立的双方在针锋相对中得到充分发展，从而使消灭这种对立成为必不可免的事”。（同上，第89页）这就是马克思“新唯物主义”所作的工作。

In *The Holy Family*, Marx analyzed and elucidated this issue through two methods and approaches.

在《神圣家族》中，马克思通过两种方式和途径来分析和阐释了这一问题。

The first is the differentiation of two types of “views of substance.” According to simple life experience and everyday thinking, we derive the general concept of “fruit” from actual apples, pears, strawberries, and almonds. However, the Young Hegelians [10]10 The Young Hegelians were a group of German intellectuals in the 1830s and 1840s who interpreted Hegel’s philosophy in a radical, critical direction, emphasizing the role of consciousness and critique in transforming society. subjected this to “further imagination” and a “transcendental” interpretation, holding that the abstract concept of “fruit” (*die Frucht*) is a essence existing outside of human beings, the true essence of actual pears, apples, and so on. Thus they “declare (to use speculative language) that ‘fruit’ is the ‘substance’ of pears, apples, almonds, etc.” (ibid., p. 276) That is to say, for actual pears, apples, etc., their existence as themselves is inessential and irrelevant; they are merely the simple forms or modes of existence of the concept “fruit.” “The essential thing about these things is not their actual sensuous existence that can be perceived by the senses, but the essence I have abstracted from them and imposed upon them—the essence of my concept—‘fruit.’” Speculative reason, like the proponents of “innate ideas,” “sees in apples and pears something in common, in pears and almonds something in common, namely ‘fruit.’ The various particular actual fruits henceforth are merely illusory fruits, and their true essence is the ‘substance’ of ‘fruit.’” (Marx/Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 277) Marx held that “this method yields no particularly rich determinations.” Unlike “speculation, which derives an abstract ‘fruit’—‘fruit’—from various actual fruits,” he argued that one must “abandon abstraction” or “move from abstraction to its opposite.” That is, “in order to achieve the appearance of some real content, it must somehow return from ‘fruit,’ from substance, to the actual, manifold, ordinary fruits—to pears, apples, almonds, etc.” (ibid.)

一是两类“实体观”的辨析。按照朴素的生活经验和日常思维，我们是从现实的苹果、梨、草莓、扁桃中得出“果品”这个一般的观念，然而青年黑格尔派却对此作了“进一步想象”和“先验”的解释，认为“果品”（die Frucht）这个抽象观念是存在于人之外的一种本质，是现实的梨、苹果等等的真正的本质，于是就“宣布（用思辨的语言来表达）‘果品’是梨、苹果、扁桃等等的‘实体’”。（同上，第276页）就是说，对于现实的梨、苹果等来说，它们作为其自身，是非本质的、无关紧要的，只是“果品”这个观念的单纯的存在形式或样态。“这些物的本质的东西并不是它们的可以用感官感触到的现实的定在，而是我从它们中抽象出来并强加于它们的本质，即我的观念的本质——‘果品’”。思辨的理性如同“天赋观念论”者一样，“在苹果和梨中看出了共同的东西，在梨和扁桃中看出了共同的东西，这就是‘果品’。各种特殊的现实的果实从此就只是虚幻的果实，而它们的真正的本质则是‘果品’这个‘实体’”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第277页）。马克思认为，“用这种方法是得不到内容特别丰富的规定的。”与“思辨从各种不同的现实的果实中得出一个抽象的‘果实’——‘果品’”不同，他认为必须“抛弃抽象”或者“从抽象转到抽象的对立面。”也就是说，“为了要达到某种现实内容的外观，它就不得不用某种方法从‘果品’、从实体返回到现实的千差万别的平常的果实，返回到梨、苹果、扁桃等等。”（同上）

The second is the constructive path of material substance theory. The transition between the two views of substance is not easy: “It is easy to derive the abstract concept ‘fruit’ from actual fruits, but it is difficult to derive actual fruits from the abstract concept ‘fruit.’” (ibid.) Therefore, while “empiricism” finds it relatively easy to reject the “theory of innate ideas,” constructing a truly and thoroughly transcendent “modern materialist” mode of thought requires traversing a difficult path of construction. The materialist view of substance did not begin from scratch, nor did it start with the explorations of Marx and Engels. To this end, Marx surveyed the entire evolution of materialism, focusing on “the 18th-century French Enlightenment, and particularly French materialism.” (ibid., p. 327) In this process, Locke became an extremely important figure due to his sustained and widespread influence on the development of French materialism. “Materialism is the native son of Great Britain.” When philosophers on the European continent “needed to engage in a negative critique of theology and 17th-century metaphysics,” they “required a positive, anti-metaphysical system… a book that systematized the life-practice of the time and provided it with theoretical justification.” (ibid., p. 330) At this juncture, Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* appeared. “This work was welcomed like a long-awaited guest.” (ibid.) Condillac [11]11 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780) was a French philosopher and epistemologist who developed a sensationalist theory of knowledge, heavily influenced by Locke. directly translated it into French and elaborated Locke’s thought in his *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*, using Locke’s sensationalism to oppose 17th-century metaphysics. Helvétius [12]12 Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771) was a French philosopher and materialist who applied Lockean sensationalism to ethics and social theory. likewise took Locke’s doctrine as his starting point. In his *De l’esprit* and *De l’homme*, he applied materialism to the analysis of all aspects of social life, making “sensuous characteristics and self-esteem, enjoyment and correctly understood personal interest” the “foundation of all morality,” while “the natural equality of human intelligence, the unity of the progress of reason and the progress of industry, the natural goodness of man, and the omnipotence of education” constituted the main factors of his system. This led to “materialism acquiring a truly French character in his work.” (ibid., p. 333)

二是物质实体论的建构之路。两种实体观的转换是不容易的，“从现实的果实得出‘果品’这个抽象的观念很容易，而从‘果品’这个抽象的观念得出各种现实的果实就困难了。”（同上）所以，“经验论”摒弃“天赋观念论”比较容易，但要建构起真正、彻底超越这种思想的“现代唯物主义”思维方式还必须走过一个艰苦的建构之路。“唯物主义”实体观不是从头开始，不是自马克思、恩格斯的探索起步的，为此，马克思清理了整个唯物主义的嬗变历程，重点是“18世纪的法国启蒙运动，特别是法国唯物主义”。（同上，第327页）在这一过程中，洛克因其对法国唯物主义的发展所产生的持续而广泛的影响成为一个极其重要的角色。“唯物主义是大不列颠本土的产儿”，当欧洲大陆的哲学家们“要对神学和17世纪形而上学进行否定性的批驳”的时候，“需要有一个肯定性的、反形而上学的体系……需要一部把当时的生活实践归纳为一个体系并从理论上加以论证的书”。（同上，第330页）这时，洛克《人类理解论》出现了，“这部著作就像人们翘首以待的客人一样受到了热烈的欢迎”（同上）。孔狄亚克直接将其翻译成法文，并在《人类知识起源论》中详细阐述了洛克的思想，借助洛克的感觉论去反对17世纪的形而上学。爱尔维修同样也是以洛克的学说为出发点的，在《论人的理智能力和教育》一书中将唯物主义运用到社会生活各个方面的分析，将“感性的特性和自尊、享乐和正确理解的个人利益”视为“全部道德的基础”，而“人的智力的天然平等、理性的进步和工业的进步的一致、人的天然的善良和教育的万能”构成其体系中的主要因素。这导致“在他那里唯物主义获得了真正法国的性质”。（同上，第333页）

Besides this school, which was deeply influenced by Locke and “originated from Locke’s thought,” another school of French materialism “originated from Descartes.” Descartes was a dualist: “he completely separated his physics from his metaphysics,” and “within the scope of his physics, matter is the sole substance, the sole basis of existence and knowledge.” (ibid., p. 328) However, this matter is not a passive existence; rather, it “possesses the power of autonomous creation and regards mechanical motion as the life-activity of matter.” Body, existence, and substance are the same real idea. Hence, Marx emphasized: “One cannot separate thought from thinking matter. Matter is the subject of all changes. If the word ‘infinite’ does not signify our spirit’s capacity for infinite addition and supplementation, it is meaningless. For only material things can be perceived and known, so one knows nothing of the existence of God. Only my own existence is certain and credible. All human passions are mechanical motions with a beginning and an end. The object of desire is the good. Man and nature are subject to the same laws. Force and freedom are identical.” (Marx/Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 332) This analysis reveals very clearly the crux of idealist philosophy, including that of Bruno Bauer [13]13 Bruno Bauer (1809–1882) was a German philosopher and Young Hegelian critic of religion and theology, later a target of Marx’s critique in *The Holy Family*.: namely, “it does not recognize any existence distinct from thought, any natural force distinct from spiritual spontaneity, any human essential power distinct from intellect, any passivity distinct from activity, any influence of others distinct from self-action, any feeling and desire distinct from knowledge, any heart distinct from head, any object distinct from subject, any practice distinct from theory, any human being distinct from the critic, any actual commonality distinct from abstract universality, any you distinct from me.” (ibid., p. 345)

除了深受洛克影响、“起源于洛克”思想的这一派别，法国唯物主义的另一派“起源于笛卡儿”。笛卡尔是一个二元论者，“他把他的物理学和他的形而上学完全分开”，而“在他的物理学的范围内，物质是唯一的实体，是存在和认识的唯一根据”。（同上，第328页）但这个物质不是被动性的存在，而是“具有自主创造的力量，并把机械运动看做是物质的生命活动。”形体、存在、实体是同一种实在的观念。所以，马克思强调，“不能把思想同思维着的物质分开。物质是一切变化的主体。如果‘无限的’这个词不表示我们的精神具有无限增添补充的能力，这个词就毫无意义。因为只有物质的东西才是可以被感知、被认识的，所以人们对神的存在就一无所知了。只有我自己的存在才是确实可信的。人的一切激情都是有始有终的机械运动。欲求的对象是善。人和自然都服从于同样的规律。强力和自由是同一的。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第332页）这种分析把包括布鲁诺·鲍威尔在内的唯心主义哲学的症结展示得非常明显了，即“不承认任何有别于思维的存在、任何有别于精神自发性的自然力、任何有别于理智的人的本质力量、任何有别于能动的受动、任何有别于自身作用的别人的影响、任何有别于知识的感觉和愿望、任何有别于头脑的心灵、任何有别于主体的客体、任何有别于理论的实践、任何有别于批判家的人、任何有别于抽象的普遍性的现实的共同性、任何有别于我的你”。（同上，第345页）

This thus brings to the fore the essential point of “modern materialism.” That is, the process of the construction of Marx’s thought is not merely the successive replacement of philosophical forms—“idealism—materialism—new materialism”—as outlined in traditional interpretations; rather, it is a gradual inquiry unfolded within the framework of the interrelation of “subject—object,” “spirit—matter,” and “idea—reality.”

这也就使“现代唯物主义”的要旨凸显出来了。即在马克思思想的建构过程并不仅仅是传统解释所勾勒的“唯心主义—唯物主义—新唯物主义”的哲学形态的次第更替不同，更是在“主体—客体”“精神—物质”“观念—现实”相关的框架内展开的渐进探寻。

Furthermore, in the first volume of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke immediately goes on to analyze the nature and function of “language” as well as the content of “recollection” and “memory,” again emphasizing that they are by no means innate ideas. From Marx’s writings, we can likewise find discussions of related issues, in which the views expressed are not only connected to Locke’s line of thought in denying their “innate” character but also offer penetrating revelations and analyses within the framework of “modern materialism.” Due to space limitations, a detailed examination will not be undertaken here.

此外，在《人类理解论》第一卷中，洛克还紧接着辨析了“语言”的本质和功能以及“回想”和“记忆”中的内容，再次强调了它们绝非天赋观念。而我们从马克思的著述中同样可以找到对相关问题的论述，其中所表达的看法既与洛克否定其“天赋”性的思路相关联，更在“现代唯物主义”的框架内有鞭辟入里的揭示和剖析。限于篇幅，这里就不再进行细致的清理了。

Thus, through a circuitous and even meticulous argument, Locke, in the first volume of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, completed the mission of “clearing the way” by criticizing the “theory of innate ideas.” This made him all the more convinced that ideas, principles, and propositions are not “innate,” “because they have neither utility nor certainty” (Locke, p. 67). The so-called “theory of innate ideas” is nothing but a trick of the “lazy” and the “skeptic”; grasping ideas in this way, “the lazy man saves the trouble of inquiry, and the skeptic ceases the pain of searching” (ibid., p. 71). The inevitable conclusion, then, is that people’s different “discoveries” of ideas result only from their use of their own talents and abilities, either perceived through sensation and introspection, or understood by composing ideas into propositions in the mind and making appropriate comparisons and careful deductions of the relations between different ideas. Only in this way can ideas be known and recognized by people. In short, “a man must think for himself and understand for himself” (ibid., p. 69). After criticizing and rejecting the “theory of innate ideas,” Locke resolved to build a complete system of knowledge based on experience and observation—this is his “empiricist” philosophy. It “stands on a solid foundation, without relying on any props or supports, without borrowing any borrowed or begged basis”; logically, “empiricism” is rationalist; in Locke’s words, even if it is “a castle in the air, I will make it complete and consistent in its entirety” (ibid., p. 72).

这样，经过曲折甚至琐屑的论证，洛克在《人类理解论》第一卷中通过对“天赋观念论”的批判完成了“扫清道路”的使命，这使他更加确信，观念、原则、命题都不是“天赋”的，“因为它们既没有功用，亦没有确定性。”（洛克，第67页）所谓“天赋观念论”，不过是“懒惰者”“怀疑者”的把戏，以这样的方式把握观念，“懒惰者便省了探求之劳，怀疑者便停了搜索之苦。”（同上，第71页）那么，必然的结论是，人们所以对观念有不同的“发现”，只由于他们运用了自己的才具和能力的结果，或者靠人们的感觉和内省来感知，或者通过在人心中将观念组成命题、对不同观念间的关系进行适当的比较和细致的演绎来理解。这样，观念才能被人知道、被人认同。质言之，“人必须自己来思想，自己来理解。”（同上，第69页）在批判和否定了“天赋观念论”之后，洛克立志要借助经验和观察建立一个体系完整的关于知识的大厦，这就是他的“经验论”哲学。它“立在稳固的基础上，而不依靠任何支柱和倚墙，而不凭借任何借得的、丐得的基础”；而在逻辑上，“经验论”则是理性主义的，用洛克的话说，即便“是空中楼阁，我亦要使它首尾完整、体系一贯”。（同上，第72页）

We see that, with nearly 200 years of social development, the world has presented more complex conditions, and the kingdom of ideas constructed by humanity has become more variegated and intricate, all of which has added greater difficulty to people’s grasp and understanding. At the origin of his thought, Marx was also nurtured and deeply influenced by German classical philosophy, especially Hegel and his successor, the Young Hegelians’ “idealism,” believing that freedom and “self-consciousness are the highest divinity” (*Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, p. 12). [14]14 This quotation is from Marx’s doctoral dissertation, *Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* (1841), where he paraphrases a line from Aeschylus’s *Prometheus Bound*. However, through the contemplation of the “perplexing questions” [15]15 This refers to Marx’s “perplexing questions” (*verlegene Fragen*) from his time as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* (1842–1843), when he encountered practical issues like the debate on wood theft laws, leading him to question Hegelian idealism. raised by real social problems encountered during the “Rheinische Zeitung period,” and through the writing of works such as *On the Jewish Question*, *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, the “Paris Manuscripts,” *The Holy Family*, *Theses on Feuerbach*, and *The German Ideology*, he broke his intellectual ties with these predecessors and embarked on the path of independently creating a “new philosophy.” He shifted from criticizing the “copy” of society to criticizing the “original,” from exploring a national philosophy and legal philosophy that highlighted freedom and reason to studying the political economy of the living conditions of civil society, reducing religious issues to worldly issues, and gradually exploring the path of modern social development along the trajectory of “political emancipation”—“social emancipation”—“human emancipation.” He not only replaced the “innate principle” of ideas with the “principle of reality,” eliminating the idealist explanation of the origin of ideas, but also found the practical path for the generation, elevation, and development of ideas.

我们看到，伴随着将近200年的社会发展，世界呈现出更为复杂的状况，人类建构的观念王国也更加斑斓、庞杂，这些都为人们的把握和理解增添了更大的难度。马克思在其思想起源时也受到德国古典哲学特别是黑格尔及其后继者青年黑格尔派“观念论”的哺育和深刻影响，认为自由和“自我意识是最高神性”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第12页）。但通过“《莱茵报》时期”遭逢现实社会问题所引发的“苦恼的疑问”的沉思，借助《论犹太人问题》、《黑格尔法哲学批判》“巴黎手稿”、《神圣家族》、《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》和《德意志意识形态》等著述的写作，他了断了与这些先驱的思想因缘，走上了独立创立“新哲学”的道路。他由对社会的“副本”批判转向“原本”批判，由彰显自由理性的国家哲学、法哲学的探讨转向了对市民社会生存境况的政治经济学研究，把宗教问题还原为世界问题，沿着“政治解放”—“社会解放”—“人的解放”的路径渐次探究现代社会发展之路，不仅将观念的“天赋原则”置换为“现实原则”，消除了观念来源问题上的唯心主义解释，而且找到观念产生、提升和发展的实践途径。

Analyzing the “Lockean factor” in the construction of Marx’s thought and the transcendence he achieved not only reflects, from the perspective of an “individual case” in the history of thought, the inseparable internal connection between Marxism and the Western intellectual tradition, but also reveals the trajectory, content, and significance of the intellectual transformation he accomplished through changes in social history and the transformation of the issues of the times.

辨析马克思思想建构中的“洛克因素”及其所实现的超越，既从一个思想史“个案”的视角反映了马克思主义与西方思想传统之间不可分割的内在关联，也昭示出他借助社会历史的变迁和时代问题的转换所完成的思想变革的轨迹、内涵及其意义。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗