An Analysis of Research on the Political Roots of Contemporary European and American Populism

I. Introduction

一、引言

In recent years, with the emergence and development of populism in European and American countries, research related to populism has become an important topic. In fact, populism is not a novel phenomenon. From the Russian Narodnik movement [1]1 The Russian Narodnik movement (народничество) was a populist political current in the Russian Empire in the 1860s–1870s, whose adherents (narodniki) sought to mobilize the peasantry against the Tsarist autocracy, often through "going to the people" campaigns. of the 1870s and the farmers' movement in the southwestern United States, to the national revival movements of Latin American populism in the mid-20th century, and then to the frequent outbreaks of neo-populist movements in the late 20th century and recent years, populism has never left the historical stage. Instead, it has appeared intermittently alongside the process of modernization, generally presenting a trend of periodic wave-like development. Among these, the third wave of populism has drawn significant attention from scholars. The reason lies in the fact that this third wave has mostly occurred in established capitalist countries such as those in Europe and America, causing a strong impact on their national institutions and mechanisms. This has made the decline and crisis of Western democratic politics a focal topic in academic circles in recent years, thereby yielding a number of research outcomes.

近年来，随着民粹主义在欧美国家的发生和发展，民粹主义的相关研究成为重要话题。事实上，民粹主义并不是新颖事物。从19世纪70年代的俄国民粹派运动和美国西南部的农民运动，到20世纪中期拉美民粹主义的民族复兴运动，再到20世纪后期以及近年来新民粹主义运动的频发，民粹主义从未离开过历史舞台，而是伴随着现代化的进程间歇性登场，总体呈现阶段性浪潮式发展趋势。其中，第三次民粹主义浪潮引发了学者的高度关注。究其原因在于，第三次浪潮多发生于欧美等老牌资本主义国家，对其国家体制机制造成强烈冲击，使得西方民主政治的衰退与危机成为近年来学术界的焦点话题，由此形成了若干成果。

Traditional views hold that populist radical right-wing politics is a kind of "pathology" of (post-war) Western society, a line of thought also referred to as the "normal pathology thesis." This is mainly reflected in two aspects: ideologically, although populism has a certain influence, its extremist and radical ideas are fundamentally incompatible with mainstream Western values; in practice, as an antithesis to democracy, populism is considered to succeed only under extreme conditions such as crises. The consequence of this is that populism is regarded as an abnormal phenomenon in contemporary Western countries, excluded from mainstream concepts and theoretical research. It is seen as a pathological symptom requiring explanation by the social sciences, rather than a phenomenon that challenges people's understanding of democracy. Therefore, for a long time, it did not attract widespread attention in political science research.

传统观点认为，民粹主义激进右翼是（战后）西方社会的一种“病态”，这个思潮也被称为“正常的病态”（normal pathology thesis），主要体现在两个方面：在思想上，民粹主义虽然具有一定的影响力，但其理念中的极端主义和激进主义却与西方主流价值观格格不入；在实践中，作为民主的对立面，民粹主义被认为只有在诸如危机的极端条件下才有可能获得成功。这样做的结果是，民粹主义被视为当代西方国家的反常现象，被主流概念和理论研究排斥在外；它被看作是需要社会科学解释的病理症状，而不是挑战人们对民主理解的一种现象，因此在很长一段时间内并未引起政治学研究的广泛关注。

However, with the continuous emergence of populist waves, existing Western theoretical paradigms have been unable to explain why an increasing number of people accept this socio-political ideology, which is not recognized by mainstream consciousness and possesses certain narrow characteristics. Cas Mudde, upon re-examining the basis of traditional theory, reached the opposite conclusion and named it "pathological normalcy." He pointed out that few have tested the validity of the "normal pathology" theory. In reality, the ideological core of populist radical right-wing politics has an inherent consistency with the basic values of Western society. He defines populism as: "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will." Populism's reverence for the general will indicates that its ideas do not contradict Western mainstream ideology; indeed, they can even share a value system. The relationship between the two is not one of fundamental opposition, but merely a difference in degree—radical or moderate—and populism and democracy should be compatible. Cas Mudde's understanding opened the door to research on the political roots of the rise of populism.

但是，随着民粹主义浪潮的不断涌现，既有西方理论范式无法解释为何越来越多的民众接受这种不被主流意识认可、带有一定狭隘特征的社会政治思潮。卡斯·穆德在重新考察传统理论依据的基础上得出相反的结论，并将其命名为“病态的常态”（pathological normalcy）。他指出，很少有人检验过“正常的病态”理论的有效性。实际上，民粹主义激进右翼的意识形态核心与西方社会的基本价值观具有内在一致性。他将民粹主义定义为：“一种‘弱中心’的意识形态（thin-centred ideology），认为社会最终被划分成两个同质且对立的群体，‘纯粹的人民’（the pure people）与‘腐败的精英’（the corrupt elite），政治应当是一种公共意志（general will）的表达。”民粹主义对公共意志的推崇表明，它的观念与西方主流意识形态并不违背，甚至可以共用一个价值体系；两者之间的关系并非根本对立，只是程度的差别—激进，抑或温和，民粹主义和民主应该是相容的。卡斯·穆德的认识，开启了对民粹主义兴起的政治根源研究之先河。

Nevertheless, in research concerning the roots of the rise of populism, two explanatory paradigms—one from an economic perspective and the other from a cultural perspective—have received greater attention from Western scholars in recent years. One is the "economic insecurity" theory, explained from the angle of globalization's "losers"; the other is the "cultural backlash" theory, which takes socio-cultural change as its entry point. In fact, European and American populism is strongly influenced by political life and political systems. First, summarizing the characteristics of populist movements from the most superficial phenomena, we find that it seems to have always accompanied Western representative democracy; "populism is a phenomenon that appears in almost all democratic countries." Taggart summarized four major factors for the rise of populism in Europe: the rise of neo-populism, the collapse of regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis of legitimacy of Western liberal democratic systems, and the process of European integration embodied by the European Union. He found that the common theme of these factors is "representative politics and non-representative politics," reflecting two distinct transitional processes in the experience of representative politics. The theme of "opposing representative politics" runs through the main instances of populist practice. Second, although populism is often triggered by economic or socio-cultural issues, its commonality lies in appealing to so-called legitimate claims based on the principles of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Third, the roots of dissatisfaction with democracy are not limited to the economic sphere but involve the level of political institutions. During periods of economic downturn, political rules perceived as bad can amplify the impact of a weak economy on the political system. Finally, and most crucially, "factors such as ideology and social background can be defined as conditions that promote the emergence of populism. However, the most important condition for populism's success remains politics." Whether the populace has economic grievances or cultural conflicts, these grievances and conflicts can only become a political force on the historical stage under the conditions of representative politics. This is not to say that populism does not exist where there is no representative politics or its ideas, but rather that only through the legitimate channels of representative politics, when scattered populist sentiments are constructed into a political or party movement, can populism truly exert a political effect. It is precisely through Western representative politics or party politics that populism transforms from a cultural theme into a relatively systematic ideology or political movement.

尽管如此，在民粹主义兴起根源的相关研究中，以经济和文化为视角的两种解释范式近年来更受西方学者的重视，一种是从全球化“输家”角度阐释的“经济不安全感”理论，另一种是以社会文化变迁为切入点形成的“文化反冲”理论。实际上，欧美民粹主义受着政治生活和政治制度的强烈影响。首先，从最表层的现象来概括民粹主义运动的特征，我们会发现它似乎一直伴随着西方代议制民主的左右，“民粹主义是一种几乎在所有民主国家都会出现的现象”。塔格特总结了民粹主义在欧洲抬头的四大因素，即新民粹主义的兴起、中东欧政权的崩溃、西方自由民主政体的合法性危机以及欧盟所包含的欧洲一体化进程。他发现，这些因素共有的主题是“代议制政治与非代议制政治”，这体现了代议制政治经验中两个截然不同的过渡进程，“反对代议制政治”的主旨贯穿于民粹主义实践的主要实例。其次，尽管民粹主义经常由经济或社会文化问题引起，但其共同点是求诸基于人民主权和多数统治原则的所谓合法诉求。再次，对民主不满的根源并不限于经济层面，而是涉及政治制度层面。在经济下行时期，那些被人们视作是糟糕的政治规则，会放大疲软的经济对政治体制的影响。最后，也是最关键的一点，“意识形态和社会背景等因素都可以被定义为是促进民粹主义出现的条件。然而，致使民粹主义获得成功的最重要条件还得是政治”。无论是民众在经济上有所不满还是在文化上出现冲突，这些不满和冲突都只有在代议制政治条件下才能成为一种政治力量登上历史的舞台。这并不是说在没有代议制政治或理念的地方就不存在民粹主义，而是只有通过代议制政治的合法途径，将分散的民粹主义情绪构建为政治或政党运动时，民粹主义才能真正发生政治作用。民粹主义正是通过西方代议制政治或政党政治，才从一种文化主题转变为相对系统的意识形态或政治运动。

Therefore, excavating and evaluating Western academic research on the political roots of the rise of populism is not only conducive to deepening the study of Western political philosophy but also helps people to profoundly grasp the various political disorders in contemporary Europe and America, thereby enhancing their understanding of the essence of Western democracy.

因此，发掘和评析西方学术界有关民粹主义兴起的政治根源研究，不仅有利于深化西方政治哲学的研究，而且有助于人们深刻把握当下欧美的种种政治乱象，提升对西方民主本质的认识。

II. The Basic Political Root of Populism: The Opposition of Two Types of Western Political Democracy

二、民粹主义的基本政治根源：西方两种政治民主的对立

Western scholars believe that the contradiction and tension between populism and Western democratic politics are the main reasons for the rise of European and American populism. Therefore, they focus on the challenge populism poses to democratic ideas and political practice, and their analysis of the complexity of Western democracy forms a basic understanding of the political roots of populism. Margaret Canovan is a representative figure of this analytical paradigm. Drawing on Oakeshott's view of two styles of modern politics, she argues that modern democratic politics (ideas and phenomena) can be understood as the intersection of the "redemptive" and the "pragmatic," that is, the two faces of Western democracy. The former represents a romantic hue, emphasizing ideas such as "sovereignty resides in the people" and "rule by the people"; the latter focuses on realism, treating democracy as a functional system for peacefully resolving disputes. There are two pairs of tensions between them: On the one hand, democracy promises to realize an "ideal good governance" world through the action of the sovereign people; yet, in reality, democracy is at best a political form for handling conflicts of interest in modern society—this is the contradiction between democracy's ideality and instrumentality. On the other hand, while democratic institutions constrain power, they also play a role in constructing the foundation of power's legitimacy; but democratic ideas inherently possess a strong anti-establishment impulse, characterized by directness, spontaneity, and a yearning to overcome alienation—that is, the opposition between democracy's rationality and irrationality. From this, Canovan points out that these two aspects of democracy are like "a pair of quarreling Siamese twins, inevitably linked together." When the gap between them gradually widens, populism breeds in the state of mutual opposition and tension. Clearly, Canovan's discussion of the dual nature of democracy is pioneering. By introducing Oakeshott's theoretical framework into the study of the rise of populism, she enables populism to engage in dialogue with traditional democratic theory.

西方学者认为，民粹主义与西方民主政治之间的矛盾和紧张关系是欧美民粹主义兴起的主要缘由，因此，他们关注民粹主义对民主理念和政治实践的挑战，而对西方民主复杂性的分析形成了关于民粹主义政治根源的基本理解。玛格丽特·卡诺万（Magaret Canovan）是这一分析范式的代表人物。她借鉴了奥克肖特（Oakeshott）关于现代政治两个风格的观点，认为可以将现代民主政治（理念和现象）理解为“救赎性”（redemptive）和“务实性”（pragmatic）的交叉点，即西方民主的两幅面孔。前者代表着浪漫主义色彩，强调“主权在民”“人民统治”等理念；而后者则侧重于现实主义，将其作为一种和平解决纷争的功能体制。二者之间存在着两对紧张关系：一方面，民主许诺通过主权人民的行动实现所谓“理想的善治”世界，然而现实中的民主充其量只是处理现代社会利益冲突的一种政治形式，这是民主的理想性与工具性的矛盾。另一方面，民主制度在约束权力的同时也发挥着构建权力合法性基础的作用，但民主理念又先天存在着强烈的反建制冲动，具有直接性、自发性和克服异化的向往，也就是民主的理性与非理性的对立。由此卡诺万指出，民主的这两个方面仿佛是“一对争吵不休的暹罗双胞胎，不可避免地联系在一起”。当彼此之间的鸿沟逐渐被拉大时，民粹主义就在相互对立的紧张状态中滋生。显然，卡诺万对民主两面性的论述具有开拓意义，她将奥克肖特的理论框架引入民粹主义兴起的研究，使得民粹主义得以与传统的民主理论进行对话。

Yves Mény and Yves Surel, building on Canovan’s analytical framework, re-examined the constituent elements of democracy. They argue that Western “mass democracy” and “constitutional democracy” constitute the two pillars of the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic regimes, and that an ideal democracy should be a balance between the two. Unfortunately, Western democratic systems have always had to choose between “the supremacy of the people as the source of the legitimacy of power” and “limiting the people’s arbitrary exercise of sovereign power.” Specifically, “mass democracy” is a hybrid product of the accidental combination of “popular sovereignty” and “the principle of representation,” and inherently possesses a defect: the structural tension between its ideology (the power of the people) and its function (the power of the people to choose elites). Under this ambiguous combination, democracy is no longer a pure concept of the people’s power in the populist sense, but degenerates into an electoral tool of elitism, and the people’s role in democracy is merely to choose their rulers. In this regard, the contradiction between populism and democracy can also be seen as a structural contradiction between populism and representative democracy.

伊夫·姆萨梅尼（Yves Mény）和伊夫·苏雷尔（Yves Surel）在延续卡诺万分析思路的基础上，重新审视了民主的构成要素。他们认为，西方的“大众民主”和“宪政民主”构成了民主政权合法性和有效性的两大支柱，理想的民主应当是二者之间的平衡。遗憾的是，西方民主制度始终不得不在“人民作为权力合法性来源的至上性”与“限制人民任意行使主权权力”之间作出取舍。具体而言，“大众民主”是“人民主权”与“代议制原则”意外结合的混合产物，始终存在着固有缺陷，即它的意识形态（人民的权力）和它的功能（人民选择精英的权力）之间的结构性紧张关系。在这种模糊的结合下，民主不再是民粹主义意义下单纯的人民力量的概念，而沦为精英主义的选举工具，人民对民主的作用也不过是选择其统治者。就此而言，民粹主义与民主之间的矛盾也可以被视为是民粹主义与代议制民主之间的结构性矛盾。

Unlike “mass democracy,” which emphasizes the political participation of the people, so-called “constitutional democracy” combines “rule by the people” with the “rule of law” through representation and majority rule, aiming to limit the discretionary or arbitrary power of the people’s representatives. The two world wars made most European democratic countries realize that even non-democratic groups could gain power through democratic elections. For this reason, they shifted their attention from “mass democracy” to “constitutional democracy”: “constitutionalism—that is, the development of checks and balances against the supreme power of the unbalanced people—developed rapidly: enforceable human rights, constitutional courts, territorial and functional division of powers, and the autonomy of central banks all became key features of the new regime.” [2]2 Yves Mény and Yves Surel, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism,” in Yves Mény and Yves Surel, eds., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 13. What worries the two scholars is that, on the one hand, not all democratic countries can incorporate “constitutional” factors into their institutions and democratic concepts. On the other hand, the balance between the two pillars of democracy has been broken by the rise of “constitutionalism”; the rapid development of so-called “constitutionalism” has, to a certain extent, limited the space for the growth of mass democracy. People urgently hope to find an alternative to restore the status of mass democracy, and the rebound of public opinion has given strong support to the emergence of populism. Clearly, the analytical framework of the two pillars of democracy seeks to avoid the empty theory of the dual nature of democracy and instead grounds the redemptive and pragmatic aspects of democracy in the specific internal structural contradictions of democracy, thereby broadening the analytical approach to the rise of populism.

与“大众民主”强调人民的政治参与不同，所谓“宪政民主”是通过代表制和多数原则将“人民统治”与“法治”原则相结合，其目的在于制约人民代表的自由裁量权或专断权。两次世界大战让欧洲多数民主国家意识到，即使是非民主集团也可以通过民主选举的方式获得政权。为此，他们将注意力从“大众民主”转向“宪政民主”，“立宪主义—即发展制衡人民不平衡的至高无上的力量—迅速发展起来：可执行的人权、宪法法院、领土和职能上的权力分工以及中央银行的自治都成为新政权的关键特征”。令两位学者担忧的是，一方面，不是所有民主国家都能在制度和民主观念中加入“宪政”因素。另一方面，民主两大支柱的平衡因为“宪政”的崛起被打破，所谓“宪政”的迅速发展，在一定程度上限制了大众民主的生长空间；人们迫切希望找到一个替代方案来重拾大众民主的地位，民意呼声的反弹给予民粹主义出场以强有力支持。显然，民主两大支柱分析框架力图避免空洞的民主两面性理论，而将民主的救赎性和务实性落实到具体的民主内部结构性矛盾中，从而拓宽了民粹主义兴起的分析思路。

Rudy B. Andeweg and Tom Louwerse further deepen the analysis of the contradiction between the two pillars of democracy into the tension between the “populist-majoritarian” tradition and the “liberal-consensus” tradition. They point out that the different natures of the two European revolutions led to distinctly different understandings of representative democracy: the French Revolution was a struggle over social status and economic and political privileges, giving rise to the “populist-majoritarian” tradition, which demands that democracy guarantee popular sovereignty and equality of political rights and obligations, emphasizes a close connection between representatives and the people, and follows majority rule (unconstrained) in decision-making; while the British Glorious Revolution was actually a struggle for religious tolerance, and its contribution to democracy lies in ensuring the freedom and rights of minorities from infringement and threat by the majority, and in decision-making, it grants minorities a veto over the majority through the “unanimous decision” principle, forming the “liberal-consensus” tradition. [3]3 The French Revolution (1789-1799) overthrew the absolute monarchy and established a republic based on popular sovereignty; the British Glorious Revolution (1688-1689) established a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary supremacy and protections for minority rights. The two scholars reveal a problem long overlooked by the public: most democratic countries guarantee the rationality of parliamentary representation through proportional representation, but neglect that governments are formed based on the principle of parliamentary majority confidence, and the democratic traditions followed by the institutional designs of the two are inconsistent. This means that, on the one hand, the representative relationship between citizens and parliament is constrained by the constitution and can hardly be presented in a purely direct majority form; on the other hand, the government, as a decision-making body, does not constitute a majoritarian tradition relationship with citizens, and the principle of majority rule is actually reflected in the internal operation of political power. In fact, it is difficult for citizens to participate in political decision-making through majoritarian channels, and populism thus becomes the only alternative for citizens to realize the majoritarian principle in modern democracy.

鲁迪·安德鲁格（Rudy B· Andeweg）和汤姆·卢维尔斯（Tom Louwerse）则是将民主两大支柱的矛盾分析深入到“民粹主义—多数主义”传统与“自由—共识”传统之间的紧张关系中。他们指出，两次欧洲革命的不同性质导致对有关代议制民主截然不同的理解：法国大革命是一场有关社会地位和经济政治特权的斗争，催生出“民粹主义—多数主义”传统，要求民主保证人民主权和政治权利与义务的平等，强调代表与民众之间的紧密关联，在决策上遵循多数人决定（不受制约）；而英国光荣革命实际上是一场关于宗教宽容的斗争，它对于民主的贡献在于保证少数人的自由和权益免受多数人的侵犯和威胁，在决策上通过“一致决定”原则给予少数人对多数人的否定权，形成“自由—共识”传统。两位学者揭示出一个被大众长期忽视的问题，即大多数民主国家通过比例代表制的形式保障议会代表权的合理性，却忽略了政府是基于议会多数信任原则组建的，二者的制度设计所遵循的民主传统并不一致。这意味着，一方面，公民与议会的代表性关系受到宪法的制约，很难以纯粹的直接多数形式呈现；另一方面，政府作为决策机构与公民并不构成多数主义传统的关系，多数决原则实际体现在政治权力内部的运行上。事实上公民难以通过多数主义渠道参与政治决策，民粹主义由此成为现代民主中公民得以实现多数主义原则的唯一替代方案。

Peter Mair, building on the theory of the two pillars of democracy, points out an unfavorable trend: the importance of political parties as key institutions linking the two pillars of democracy is declining, which greatly weakens the mediating role of parties in democratic politics, thereby providing space for the revival of populism. This change is first reflected in the identity perception of political parties. Among mainstream parties, there has been a phenomenon of voter sharing, and the differences in ideology and political platforms between different parties have become increasingly blurred. People gradually realize that they can no longer view current political parties with traditional roles. At the same time, governments and political parties face increasing constraints on their policy-making capacity at the national level. The operation of political parties depends on party constitutions, and professionalized election campaigns and public opinion propaganda have also blurred the strategic differences between different parties. Secondly, the functions of traditional political parties have also changed. The function of parties to integrate and mobilize citizens has become less necessary in fully mobilized Western countries; the function of parties to express and aggregate interests has been shared with non-party organizations, movements, and public opinion media; the function of public policy formulation has been increasingly delegated to non-party committees and institutions. The representative function of parties is gradually shrinking and serving procedural content. These indicate that the representative role of political parties is depreciating, which gives populism space to compete for political representation.

皮特·迈尔（Peter Mair）则在民主两大支柱理论的基础上指出了一种不利趋势，即政党作为联结民主两大支柱的关键机构的重要性正在下降，这大大削弱了政党在民主政治中的调节作用，从而为民粹主义的复兴提供了空间。这一变化首先体现在政党的身份认知上，在主流政党中出现了选民共享的现象，不同政党意识形态和政治纲领之间的差异也变得愈发模糊，人们逐渐意识到，无法再用传统的角色来看待现在的政党；与此同时，政府和政党在国家的政策能力上面临越来越多的限制，政党的运作依赖于党的章程，专业化的竞选与舆论宣传也模糊了不同政党间的策略差异。其次，传统政党的功能也发生了转变，政党整合和动员公民功能，在被充分动员的西方国家显得没有那么必要；政党的利益表达和聚集功能已被分享给非党派组织、运动以及舆论媒体；公共政策制定功能被更多委托给非党派的委员会和机构，政党的代表性逐渐萎缩并服务于程序性内容。这些表明，政党的代表性作用正在贬值，这就给予民粹主义争夺政治代表性的空间。

III. The Deep Political Roots of Populism: The Inherent Paradox of Populism and Western Democracy

三、民粹主义的深层政治根源：民粹主义与西方民主的内在悖论

In in-depth research and exploration, Western scholars have further recognized that it is far from sufficient to analyze the problem solely from the perspectives of socio-economic difficulties, defects in the party system, and the relationship between liberalism and democracy, because they cannot explain the enduring power of populist ideology and the way it supports political movements. Therefore, populism should be supported by a deeper democratic paradox.

在深入研究和探讨中，西方学者进一步认识到，仅仅从社会经济困难、政党制度缺陷、自由主义与民主主义的关系出发分析问题是远远不够的，因为它们无法解释民粹主义意识形态的持久力量及其支撑政治运动的方式，因此民粹主义应当有更深层的民主悖论作为支撑。

Margaret Canovan, building on the theory of the dual nature of Western democracy, further refines the paradox of Western democracy into the contradiction between “letting the people participate in politics” and “letting the people understand politics” (or “letting politics reach the people”). Canovan argues that, on the one hand, to let the people participate in politics, it is necessary to expand the political arena of democracy and grant people more political rights and channels of influence. However, perhaps precisely because of this, democracy is also the most complex political form to date, designing a variety of checks and balances to prevent the people from arbitrarily using power, to the extent that the vast majority of participants cannot fully understand the operational mechanisms of democracy. In other words, “the fundamental contradiction of democracy lies in the fact that authorization undermines transparency.” [4]4 Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1999, p. 11. Accompanying authorized democracy are more complex checks and balances. Mass democracy has long been infiltrated by non-democratic elements (such as so-called “elite democracy” and “constitutional democracy”), becoming a hybrid institutional existence. Voters are seduced by populism because they can entrust their interests to leaders or representatives directly elected by the people, thereby achieving a combination of authorization and transparency and restoring the original appearance of mass democracy as portrayed by its ideology.

玛格丽特·卡诺万在西方民主两面性理论的基础上，将西方民主悖论进一步提炼为“让人民参与政治”与“让人民了解政治”（或者说“让政治走向人民”）之间的矛盾。卡诺万认为，一方面，想让人民参与政治，就必须扩大民主的政治舞台，赋予人们更多的政治权利和影响渠道。然而，也许正因为如此，民主又是迄今为止最复杂的政治形式，它设计了多种多样的制衡机制来防止人民任意使用权力，以至于绝大多数参与者都无法完整地了解民主运行机制。换言之，“民主的根本矛盾就在于授权会破坏透明度”，伴随授权民主而来的是更为复杂的制衡，大众民主早已被非民主的因素所渗透（例如所谓“精英民主”和“宪政民主”），成为一种混合式的制度存在。而选民之所以被民粹主义诱惑，因为他们可以将利益托付给由人民直接选出的领袖或代表，从而实现授权与透明度的结合，恢复大众民主在意识形态渲染下的本来样貌。

On the other hand, to increase political transparency and enable people to understand politics more, one must rely on the role of ideology. Canovan points out that ideology has two basic functions: first, to simplify complex political issues, bridging the gap between politics and the people by transforming opaque complexity into content that voters can understand; second, it endows politics with a meaning akin to religious salvation, thereby stimulating participants' enthusiasm and forming a source of political legitimacy. Thus, ideology is an indispensable part of mass democracy. In theory, traditional Western democratic ideology is replete with populist themes, which Canovan summarizes as "four oppositions": emphasizing the people against elites, emphasizing the majority against the minority, emphasizing direct transparency against complex procedures, and emphasizing the people and territorial sovereignty against accommodation. Canovan concludes that the paradox of democracy lies in the fact that, although the most inclusive democracy is proclaimed to require people's understanding, the ideology that bridges the gap between the people and politics distorts the actual operation of democratic politics. Unfortunately, the aforementioned paradox of Western democracy is almost impossible to resolve; this paradox is a long-term invitation to populism, making the populace feel "betrayed," and their discontent is fully mobilized under the banner of restoring "politics for the people."

另一方面，想要增加政治透明度，让人们更多地了解政治，就必须依赖意识形态的作用。卡诺万指出，意识形态具有两种基本功能：一是将复杂的政治问题简单化，通过将不透明的复杂性转化为选民可以理解的内容，弥合政治与人民之间的鸿沟；二是它赋予政治一种近乎宗教救赎的意义，由此激发参与者的热情，形成政治合法性的来源。可见，意识形态是大众民主不可或缺的部分。在理论上，传统的西方民主意识形态充满了民粹主义的主题，卡诺万将其概括为“四个反对”：强调人民反对精英，强调多数反对少数，强调直接透明反对复杂程序，强调人民与领土主权反对迁就。卡诺万得出结论认为，民主的矛盾之处就在于，尽管宣称最具包容性的民主需要得到人们的理解，但是弥合人民与政治鸿沟的意识形态却歪曲了民主政治的实际运作方式。遗憾的是，西方民主的上述悖论几乎无法得到解决，这一悖论是对民粹主义的长期邀请，它让民众感觉受到了“背叛”，其不满情绪在恢复“政治为民”的旗帜下得到了充分动员。

Apart from Canovan, Yannis Papadopoulos also questions the analytical framework of the two pillars of democracy. He endorses Canovan's theoretical analytical framework of "ideology and the actual operation of democracy" and further locates the contradictions of democratic practice in "the structural ambiguity of electoral democracy." Yannis points out that representative democracy has inherent oligarchic characteristics, that is, the "aristocratic principle" of electoral democracy. Under this electoral conception, politics is not only a profession but also a specialty; representatives are legitimate not because they are close to the electorate, but precisely because of their difference, even their remoteness. In Western democratic countries, this principle is challenged by the "mirror decision principle," which contains populist elements: in an ideal state, people expect political representatives to be "replicas" of the people, that is, requiring representatives to possess wisdom while also hoping they merely represent the people's will; needing representatives to have abilities different from the people while also demanding they align with the people. It is precisely the tension between the "aristocratic principle" and the "mirror principle" in Western electoral democracy that provides a fulcrum for populist critique.

除卡诺万之外，扬尼斯·帕帕佐普洛斯（Yannis Papadopoulos）也对民主两大支柱的分析框架表示质疑。他认可卡诺万“意识形态与民主实际运作”的理论分析框架，并将民主实践的矛盾进一步落实在“选举民主的结构性模糊上”。扬尼斯指出，代议制民主存在固有的寡头政治特征，也就是选举民主的“贵族原则”。在这种选举观念下，政治不仅是职业，更是一种专业；代表之所以具有合法性，不是因为他们贴近选民，恰恰是因为他们的不同，甚至有些遥远。在西方民主国家，这一原则受到蕴含民粹主义因素的“镜面决策原则”的挑战，即在理想状态下人们期望政治代表是人民的“复制品”，也就是说，既要求代表具有智慧，又希望他们仅代表人民的意志；既需要代表掌握不同于人民的才能，又要求其与人民保持一致。正是西方选举民主中“贵族原则”与“镜面原则”之间的紧张关系，给予民粹主义批判的支点。

On this basis, Yannis further emphasizes that populism also arises from the decision-making, accountability, and institutional techniques of representative politics. In terms of government responsiveness and accountability, the dominant contemporary policy styles can potentially hinder accountability, thereby fostering the growth of populist protest. This stems, on one hand, from the fact that responsiveness and accountability do not necessarily change simultaneously; public officials may not only become more distant from the people, but the people also find it increasingly difficult to identify actors and supervise public officials. The complexity of institutions often reduces the visibility of decision-makers, thereby weakening the function of accountability. On the other hand, it is reflected in the transformation of decision-making behavior from "government" to "governance," which tends toward state-society cooperation, requiring coordination among different institutions to form systemic networks, with multiple governance actors jointly formulating and implementing public policies. Yannis argues that, in this situation, explaining the rise of populism through the contradiction between liberal constitutionalism and populism is no longer applicable, because Western constitutional democracy has triggered a wave of "deformalization," which in turn fuels populism. Thus, Yannis concludes: "The current contradiction is less a contradiction between populism and the emergence of informal governance models than a contradiction between populism and the (diminishing) formalism in the 'Rechtsstaat' (rule-of-law state)."

在此基础上，扬尼斯进一步强调认为，民粹主义也产生于代议制政治的决策、问责环节和制度技术。在政府的问责与回应方面，占主导地位的当代政策风格都有可能阻碍问责制，从而导致民粹主义抗议的滋生。这一方面源于回应和问责不一定同时变化，公职人员不仅可能更加远离民众，而且民众也愈发难以识别行为主体并监督公职人员。制度的复杂性往往会降低决策者的可见度，从而削弱问责制的功能。另一方面则体现在决策行为由“统治”向“治理”的转型，它倾向于国家与社会的合作，需要不同机构之间配合形成系统网络，多元治理主体共同携手制定和实施公共政策。扬尼斯认为，在这种情况下，继续用自由宪政主义与民粹主义之间的矛盾来解释后者的兴起已不再适用，因为西方宪政民主引发了“去形式化”的浪潮，这反过来又助长了民粹主义。由此扬尼斯总结到：“当前的这种矛盾与其说是民粹主义与非正式治理模式的出现之间的矛盾，不如说是民粹主义与‘法治国家’（Rechtsstaat）中（正在减少）的形式主义之间的矛盾。”

Furthermore, Yannis suspects that traditional accountability mechanisms are outdated, mainly reflected in: first, officials produced by formal elections are an important but not the sole part of the decision-making chain; when the power held by such officials is gradually diluted by other informal institutions, identifying the responsible subject becomes a challenge; second, pluralist democracy cannot handle the increasingly complex connections between the political system and other social subsystems; yet, to date, no better, alternative accountability mechanism has been found, allowing populists to seize the initiative; third, the characteristics of governance arrangements are: lack of social visibility, instability, and reliance on ad hoc choices. In other words, a prerequisite of representative democracy is the ability to identify actors and respond accordingly. Among these, decision-making is seen as the top-down transmission of the will of the ruling elite, while the role of governance dissolves this political role and its performance, largely rendering this command model illusory. Due to changes in governance forms, the top-down authoritative position of state actors is weakened, opening up space for the rise of populism.

此外，扬尼斯怀疑传统的问责机制已经过时，其主要体现在：其一，由正式选举产生的官员是决策链条的重要组成部分但并非是唯一，当这类官员掌握的权力逐渐被其他非正式机构稀释时，如何辨别责任主体成为难题；其二，多元民主无法处理政治系统与其他社会子系统之间日益复杂的联系，然而迄今为止，尚未找到更好的、可替代的问责机制，这就让民粹主义者抢占了先机；其三，治理安排的特质表现为：缺乏社会能见度、不稳定性，并且依赖临时选择。换言之，代议制民主的先决条件是能够识别行为者并做出相应回应。其中，决策被视为统治精英自上而下的意志传达，而治理的作用却消解了这一政治角色及其表现，在很大程度上使得这一命令模式变得虚幻。由于治理形式发生变化，国家行为者自上而下的权威地位被削弱，这为民粹主义的兴起开辟了空间。

Similarly, Cesare Pinelli also starts from the gap between power and accountability. His analysis of non-majoritarian institutions powerfully supplements Yannis's discussion on the transformation from government to governance. The operational logic of these institutions lies in the fact that when society faces long-term problems, politicians have little incentive to support a decision whose success will only materialize after the next election. Therefore, such problems need to be transferred to independent authorities not subject to electoral structures (such as central banks, supervisory agencies, the European Union, etc.). These institutions pursue efficiency-oriented policies rather than relying on democratic legitimacy as in traditional political institutions; they serve stakeholders rather than being accountable to citizens. Moreover, the rapid development of such institutions is entirely driven by state rulers, whose purpose is less to promote the long-term effective implementation of policies than to fear that policy outcomes might threaten voter consent, thus hoping to avoid being held accountable by voters while losing as little power as possible. In Pinelli's view, the alienated character of non-majoritarian institutions from the people is easily attacked by populism, because such institutions clearly lack democratic legitimacy. From another perspective, the challenge of populism can also be seen as a symptom of the malaise of Western constitutional democracy. Here, Pinelli must return to the analytical framework of Msamani and Surel, arguing that, in the absence of significant structural changes in mass democracy, the marked increase in non-majoritarian institutions means that the space reserved for mass politics and the people has been greatly reduced, widening the gap between power and accountability, creating a "structural imbalance between the democratic pillar and the liberal pillar—the popular aspect and the aristocratic aspect of government."

无独有偶，切萨雷·皮内利（Cesare Pinelli）同样从权力与问责的差距入手，他对非多数主义机构的分析有力地补充了扬尼斯有关政府向治理转型的论述。这一机构的运行逻辑在于，当社会面临长期问题时，政客几乎没有动力去支持一个持续到下次竞选后才会成功的决策。因此，需要将这类问题转交给不受选举结构影响的独立当局（如中央银行、监督机构、欧盟等），该类机构追求以效率为导向的政策，而不是传统政治机构中对民主合法性的依赖；它们服务的对象是利益相关者，而不是对公民负责。此外，这类机构的迅速发展完全是由国家统治者推动的，其目的与其说是推动政策的长期有效落实，不如说是害怕政策结果会威胁到选民的同意，因此希望在尽可能不失去权力的情况下避免被选民问责。在皮内利看来，非多数主义机构这种与人民相疏离的特质很容易被民粹主义攻击，因为这类机构显然缺乏民主合法性。从另一个角度看，民粹主义的挑战也可以被视为是西方宪政民主萎靡不振的征兆。在此，皮内利又不得不回到姆萨梅尼和苏雷尔的分析框架中，认为在大众民主无明显结构性变化的前提下，非多数主义机构的显著增加，意味着为大众政治和人民保留的空间已被大大缩小，权力与问责之间的差距被拉大，造成了“民主支柱与自由支柱—政府的人民方面与贵族方面—之间的结构性失衡”。

IV. Representative Government Interpretation of the Political Roots of Populism: Populism and the Western Crisis of Representation

四、民粹主义政治根源的代议制解读：民粹主义与西方代表性危机

Unlike the above discussions, some other scholars, by introducing the economic “principal-agent approach,” focus their analysis on the structural contradictions of representative government between voters and representatives. Yannis states: “Populism is not lacking in reliable academic foundations; its belief that representation damages popular sovereignty is similar to the conclusions drawn from the ‘principal-agent’ approach in economics or the ‘goal displacement’ theory in organizational sociology.” [5]5 Yannis Stavrakakis, “Populism in Power: Syriza’s Challenge to the EU,” in *Populism in the Civil Sphere*, eds. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Peter Kivisto, and Giuseppe Sciortino (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021), p. 88. In fact, the populist distrust of representative government stems, to a certain extent, from the feudal origins of this system. The earliest representatives served the consultative needs of feudal monarchs or the church, having nothing to do with the people. The populist appeal for direct democracy or charismatic leadership aims precisely to avoid the principal-agent problem between citizens and representatives. This attitude is also reflected in citizens’ views of representatives. In Herbert Kitschelt’s view, populism refers to the widespread distrust of agents by principals; citizens, as “principals,” refuse to authorize politicians or democratic representative institutions, opposing them acting as the people’s “agents.” Therefore, populism supports abolishing the traditional principal-agent relationship, advocating that citizens actively participate in political decision-making themselves, or entrust it to “true agents” directly elected by voters to realize the people’s will on their behalf.

与上述探讨不同，另有一些学者通过引入经济学的“委托—代理方法”，将分析的重点聚焦于选民与代表之间的代议制结构性矛盾。扬尼斯坦言：“民粹主义并不缺乏可靠的学术依据，其关于代表对人民主权造成损害的信念类似于经济学中的‘委托—代理’方法或组织社会学中的‘目标置换’理论得出的结论。”实际上，民粹主义不信任代议制政府的原因，在一定程度上来自于这一制度的封建起源。最初的代表服务于封建君主或教会的议事需求，与人民毫不相关。民粹主义对直接民主或魅力型领袖的诉求，其目的就在于避免公民和代表之间的委托—代理问题。这种态度也体现在公民对于代表的看法上，在赫伯特·基瑟尔特（Herbert Kitschelt）看来，民粹主义就是指委托人对代理人的普遍不信任，公民作为“委托人”拒绝向政治家或民主代表机构授权，反对他们充当人民的“代理人”。因此，民粹主义支持废除传统的委托—代理关系，主张公民自己积极参与政治决策，或者交付给由选民直接选出的“真正代理人”来代为实现人民的意志。

Kenneth M. Roberts further refines the principal-agent problem into a crisis of representation within representative democracy, with populism being a specific response to this crisis. Unlike the “political exclusion” response triggered by the large-scale political integration at the founding of representative government, voters in Western democracies are leaving political parties not because the parties are weak, but precisely because the parties are too strong and overbearing. Voters find that the electoral arena and governing institutions are monopolized by established parties, effectively restricting their exercise of the franchise. Therefore, this type of representation crisis manifests as “the mobilization of the alienated and disaffected,” encompassing both elite populist “outsiders” and grassroots social protest movements. This indicates that research on populism should be extended to the broader field of political representation. Especially when Western party systems fail to respond effectively to key public policies or provide meaningful programmatic competition, populist backlash often easily occurs. In this sense, populism is not a voluntary political practice but a reaction to different types of crises of representation.

肯尼斯·罗伯茨（Kenneth M· Roberts）则将委托—代理问题进一步提炼为代议制民主的代表性危机，民粹主义正是对这一危机的特殊回应。不同于代议制初立时大规模的政治整合带来的“政治排斥”回应，西方民主国家的选民脱离政党的原因不是因为政党的软弱，而恰恰是因为政党太过强势和霸道。选民发现，选举领域和管理机构被成熟的政党所垄断，实际上限制了他们行使选举权，因此这类代表性危机就体现为“被异化和不满的动员”，囊括了上层的民粹主义“局外人”和下层的社会抗议活动。以上表明，对民粹主义的研究应该拓展至更大的政治代表领域，特别是在西方政党制度无法对关键的公共政策做出有效回应、提供有价值的纲领竞争时，往往容易使得民粹主义反弹。在这种意义上，民粹主义并非是出于自愿的政治实践，而是一种对不同类型代议制危机的反应。

On the principal-agent issue, Paul Taggart seems to think more deeply. His view is similar to Kitschelt’s, regarding populism as a response to representative politics. Differently, Taggart believes that representative politics causes populism to manifest a deeper, broader, perhaps “primitive” political instinct— “the reaction of the governed to the governors” (i.e., the reaction of the principal to the agent). He points out that the driving force behind populism is not necessarily continuous; it is a forced reaction to accepting the mode of representative politics. This driving force is often negative; it is a rejection of something, “because populists are always clearer about what they oppose than what they support.” They rely on the exclusion and negation of others to confirm their own identity and existential value. When the potential distance between the rulers and the ruled widens, the negative emotions of populism intensify, and participating in representative politics and electoral competition becomes a breakthrough for them to express their will and vent their emotions.

在委托—代理问题上，保罗·塔格特思考得似乎更为深远。他的观点与基瑟尔特类似，将民粹主义视为对代议制政治的一种回应。与此不同的是，塔格特认为，代议制政治使民粹主义体现出一种更深刻、更广泛，也许是“原始”的政治本能—“被统治者对统治者的反应”（即委托人对代理人的反应）。他指出，民粹主义背后的驱动力不一定是持续性的，它是被迫接受代议制政治方式的反应。这种驱动力往往是负面的，它是对某种事物的拒绝，“因为民粹主义者总是更清楚他们反对什么，而不是他们支持什么”，他们依赖于对他者的排斥和否定来确认自己的身份认同和存在价值。当统治者和被统治者之间的潜在距离被拉大时，民粹主义的负面情绪就会愈加浓烈，参与代议制政治、选举竞争就成为了他们表达意愿、宣泄情绪的突破口。

Going further, from a macro perspective of power, the above discussion on the relationship between rulers and the ruled can also be expressed as the tension between “sovereignty and representation.” In Oliver Schmidtke’s view, the promise of “collective re-sovereignization” by populist parties becomes a core competitive advantage for mobilizing voters. Somewhat ironically, the way populism maintains its momentum precisely benefits from the preconditions that sustain the constitutional order. Schmidtke, citing Carl Schmitt’s view, argues that the legal framework of socio-political life depends on “sovereign decisions” that legal norms and practices themselves cannot actively produce. [6]6 Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 5. Furthermore, the establishment of a constitutional order relies on a political “state of exception,” meaning that sovereign decisions are made to address internal and external existential crises threatening the integrity of the community. In other words, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” [7]7 Ibid., p. 5. It requires an extra-legal force to maintain a specific legal order, or to establish a new order within the “state of exception.” Only then can sovereign power be unprecedentedly strengthened, enabling it to override other social groups, prioritize the establishment of a community amidst chaos and disorder, and ensure that democratic institutions and legal systems become possible. This is clearly separate from the content of Western liberal democratic politics and conventional law.

更进一步，从权力的宏观视角看，上述有关统治者与被统治者之间关系的论述，实际上也可以表述为“主权与代表权”之间的紧张关系。在奥利弗·施密特克（Oliver Schmidtke）看来，民粹主义政党对“集体重新主权化”的许诺成为动员选民的核心竞争力。略带讽刺意味的是，民粹主义维持其动力的方式恰恰得益于维系宪政秩序的先决条件。施密特克引用卡尔·施密特的观点，认为社会政治生活的法律框架取决于法律规范和实践自身不能主动产生的“主权决定”。而宪法秩序的成立又依赖于政治的“例外状态”（State of exception），即主权决定是为了应对足以威胁共同体完整性的内外部生存危机而建立。换言之，“决定例外状态的人是主权者”，它需要借助一种法外的力量来维系特定的法律秩序，或者在“例外状态”中建立起新的秩序。唯有如此，主权权力才会得到空前加强，使之凌驾于其他社会群体之上，以便在混乱和无序中优先建立起共同体，确保民主的制度和法律体系成为可能，这显然与西方自由民主政治和常规法律的内容是相分离的。

The constitution’s method of defending its own legitimacy through extra-legal sovereign power has been borrowed by populism. For the constitution, the most extreme “state of exception” it faces is Hobbes’ “war of all against all” and modern representative democracy’s fear of the “tyranny of the majority.” These two situations are, after all, extremely rare in democratic practice, so the constitution’s reliance on the “state of exception” stems more from its founding moment. However, populism is different. To challenge and resist the traditional Western liberal constitutional order and fulfill the promise to “reclaim sovereignty,” it must invoke a superior legitimacy that can override the logic of the existing order, that is, to evoke a sufficiently sustained and powerful “state of exception.” It is in this sense that populism uses the slogan “sovereignty returns to the people” as a political weapon, portraying external factors such as the EU and immigration as the culprits dividing national sovereignty, transferring internal contradictions into external ones, providing a highly attractive and instrumental sense of community, and creating conditions for the generation of sovereign power. At the same time, by endowing “the people” with a moral characteristic of purity, populism constructs a “friend-enemy binary opposition” relationship with the corrupt elite, thereby distinguishing friendly insiders from threatening outsiders. In Schmidtke’s view, this effectively provides a “permanent state of exception.” In this state, the voice of the people is permanently suppressed, and their social interests and identities are chronically harmed by corrupt and unresponsive elites. Populists believe that traditional liberal democratic procedures cannot handle the current crisis of sovereignty, and this crisis in turn fuels the populist demand for decisive “sovereign action.” Thus, populism thrives in the perception and exploitation of urgent crises.

宪法通过法外的主权权力捍卫自身合法性的做法得到了民粹主义的借鉴。对于宪法而言，它所要面临的最极端“例外状态”即霍布斯所说的“一切人对一切人的战争”，以及现代代议制民主对“多数人的暴政”的恐惧，这两种情况在民主实践中毕竟是极少数的，因此宪法对“例外状态”的依赖更多源于创立之初。但是民粹主义却不同，它对西方传统自由宪政秩序发起挑战和反抗，兑现“夺回主权”的承诺，就必须借助一个能凌驾于现行秩序逻辑之上的优越合法性，也就是唤起一种足够持续而强大的“例外状态”。正是在这个意义上，民粹主义利用“主权回归人民”的口号作为政治武器，将欧盟、移民等外来因素描述为分割本国主权的罪魁祸首，将内部矛盾转移为外部矛盾，提供一种极具吸引力和工具性特征的共同体意识，为主权权力的生成创造条件；同时，民粹主义通过赋予“人民”纯洁性的道德特征，构建与腐败的精英群体之间的“敌友二元对立”关系，从而将友好的内部人员与威胁性的外部人员区分开来。在施密特克看来，这实际上提供了一种“永久性的例外状态”。在这种状态下，人民的声音被长久压制，他们的社会利益和身份受到腐败迟钝的精英的长期损害。民粹主义者认为，传统的自由民主程序无法处理当前的主权危机问题，而这一危机又反过来助长了民粹主义对果断采取“主权行为”的诉求，民粹主义由此在对紧迫性危机的感知和利用中得到蓬勃发展。

V. Further Discussion

五、进一步讨论

Populism has been an important proposition in Western political science research in recent years. On the one hand, it is very closely linked to traditional Western democratic theory, often combined with hotspot research such as “democratic backsliding.” On the other hand, it is also closely related to political practice. For example, the dramatic rightward shift in the 2024 European Parliament elections and Trump’s overwhelming victory in the US presidential election, sweeping seven key swing states, [8]8 The 2024 US presidential election saw Donald Trump win a second, non-consecutive term, defeating incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris. The “seven key swing states” refers to Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, which were closely contested and ultimately decisive in the Electoral College outcome. once again sounded the alarm for Western democratic politics, attracting high attention from scholars. Objectively speaking, while contemporary European and American populist political science research has made some cognitive progress, it has also exposed obvious deficiencies.

民粹主义是近年来西方政治学研究的重要命题，一方面它与西方传统民主理论有着非常紧密的联系，常与“民主倒退”等热点研究结合；另一方面，它又与政治实践密切相关。例如2024年6月欧洲议会选举集体右转的戏剧性结果以及特朗普以狂揽七大摇摆州的压倒性优势二度赢得总统大选，再次为西方民主政治敲响了警钟，引发学者的高度关注。客观地看，当代欧美民粹主义政治学研究在取得一定认识进展的同时，也暴露出明显的缺陷。

(I) Cognitive Progress in Contemporary European and American Populist Political Research

（一）当代欧美民粹主义政治研究的认识进展

1. Preliminary Determination of the Connotation of Populism and Delineation of the Research Domain of Populism

1.初步确定民粹主义内涵，划出民粹主义研究论域

Clarifying the connotation of a concept is the foundation of political science research. Yet, intriguingly, Western academia finds it difficult to reach a complete consensus on the connotation of populism. Many scholars are particularly cautious about treating populism as an ideology. To avoid the ambiguity and stance of the concept of “ideology,” they propose using relatively neutral concepts such as “political discourse,” “political style,” “rhetorical style,” and “argumentative framework” to replace the position of “ideology.” Nevertheless, Mudde and others argue that whether populism is regarded as a complete ideology or as a set of loose ideas is ultimately secondary to the study of core issues, and often cannot be determined empirically; regardless of the definition of populism, it essentially presupposes that populism is first and foremost a set of ideas, the core of which lies in the antagonistic relationship between elites and the people, as well as the exaltation of popular sovereignty. After all, ideology needs to be conveyed through discourse, and discourse itself is a core element of political style. Therefore, the above definitions can be subsumed under the “ideational approach.”

明确概念内涵是政治学研究的基础，然而，耐人寻味的是，西方学术界难以就民粹主义的内涵达成完整的共识。有不少学者对将民粹主义视为一种意识形态的做法表现得格外谨慎。为避免“意识形态”概念的含混性以及立场，他们提出使用“政治话语”“政治风格”“修辞风格”“辩论框架”等相对中性的概念来代替“意识形态”的位置。尽管如此，穆德等认为，将民粹主义看作是完整的意识形态还是看作一些松散的思想，对于核心问题研究而言终究是次要的，而且也往往无法通过经验来确定；无论是哪种民粹主义定义，本质上都默认民粹主义首先是一种思想观念，其核心在于精英与人民的敌对关系，以及对人民主权的推崇。毕竟，意识形态需要通过话语传达，而话语本身就是政治风格的一个核心要素，因此可以把上述定义归结为“观念性方法”。

The definitional approach of Mudde and others has been widely recognized and applied. Other definitions of populism generally revolve around four angles: ideology (or a set of loose ideas), the (pure) people, the (corrupt) elite, and the general will (or popular sovereignty). Therefore, although Western academia has not yet settled on a unified definition, because various definitions all involve these four angles, Western scholars have formed a domain of discourse on the connotation of populism that allows for communication and exchange.

穆德等人的定义方式得到广泛认可和应用，其他民粹主义的定义大体围绕着意识形态（或一套松散的思想观念）、（纯粹的）人民、（腐败的）精英以及公共意志（或人民主权）四个角度展开。因此，虽然西方学术界尚未确定统一的定义，但是由于各种定义中都涉及到这四个角度，西方学者关于民粹主义的内涵已经形成了可以沟通和交流的论域。

2. Preliminary Exploration of the Political Roots of European and American Populism

2.初步涉及欧美民粹主义产生的政治根源

The analysis of the roots of the rise of populism has always been an important topic in political science research. However, within this, the analysis of political roots has not received equal attention from Western scholars. On the one hand, this is because early political science research did not regard populism as an internal phenomenon of Western democracy, but rather as a remnant of an extreme ideology excluded from mainstream politics. On the other hand, it is because the democratic political system is seen as an objective existence that, once established, escapes people’s arbitrary control and becomes “relatively static” and difficult to change; when explaining the conditions for the rise of a phenomenon, people tend to focus on which factors have undergone profound changes, while explanatory factors that do not show obvious changes at the intuitive level are easily overlooked.

民粹主义的兴起根源分析一直是政治学研究的重要话题，然而在其中，政治根源分析却并未得到西方学者同等的重视。这一方面是因为早期的政治学研究并未将民粹主义视作西方民主的内部现象来看待，而是作为一种极端意识形态的残余被排除在主流政治之外，另一方面则是因为民主政治体制被视为一种一旦确立就会脱离人们的任意控制，成为很难发生改变的、“相对静止”的客观存在；在解释一种现象的兴起条件时，人们往往更加关注是什么因素发生了深刻的变化，而在直观层面变化并不明显的解释因素就很容易受到忽视。

It is precisely for this reason that Canovan’s analysis of the “two faces of democracy” [9]9 Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” Political Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1999, pp. 2-16. is of groundbreaking significance. This is the first theory to combine the rise of populism with the internal contradictory relationship of democracy. It not only emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between populism and Western democracy but also reveals the dynamic tension and huge gap between the two faces of democracy. It is on the basis of this theory that Mssameni and Surel [10]10 Yves Mény and Yves Surel, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism,” in Yves Mény and Yves Surel, eds., Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 1-21. concretized the two faces of democratic ideals and reality into the opposition and contradictory relationship between popular democracy and constitutional democracy, establishing the basic logical framework for analyzing the political roots of populism. Most subsequent theories revolve around the dynamic equilibrium between the two pillars of democracy. Some scholars argue that it is the excessive expansion of constitutional democracy that has restricted the normal development of popular democracy, leading to an imbalance between the two, and populism has thus entered the historical stage as an alternative to popular democracy; other scholars see the development of non-majoritarian institutions and the changes in power and accountability mechanisms and principal-agent structures brought about by the transformation of democratic governance, arguing that it is precisely the atrophy of constitutional democracy that provides space for the rise of populism. Various signs indicate that the development of modern Western democracy is not static; it is gradually showing new trends of change, which Patrick Buisson calls the arrival of the “post-democracy” era, a phenomenon that deviates from democratic procedures and strengthens the power of oligarchy. These discussions preliminarily touch upon and reveal the political roots of European and American populism.

正因为如此，卡诺万对“民主两面性”的分析具有开创性的意义，这是首个将民粹主义的兴起与民主内部矛盾关系相结合起来的理论，它不仅强调了民粹主义与西方民主的共生关系，也揭示了民主两面性之间存在着的动态张力与巨大鸿沟。正是在这一理论的基础上，姆萨梅尼和苏雷尔将民主理想与现实的两面落实到大众民主和宪政民主的对立和矛盾关系中，奠定了民粹主义政治根源分析的基本逻辑框架。此后的理论大多围绕着民主两大支柱之间的动态平衡关系展开。部分学者认为，正是宪政民主的过度膨胀限制了大众民主的正常发育，导致二者之间的不平衡，民粹主义作为大众民主的替代方案由此登上历史舞台；另外一些学者则看到了非多数主义机构的发展以及民主治理转型所带来的权力与问责机制以及委托—代理结构上的变化，认为恰恰是宪政民主的萎靡为民粹主义的兴起提供了发展空间。种种迹象表明，现代西方民主的发展并非是一成不变的，它逐渐呈现新的变化趋势，帕特里克·比松（Patrick Buisson）称之为“后民主时代”（Post-Democracy）的到来，这是一种偏离民主程序的现象，强化了寡头政治的力量。这些论述，初步涉及和显示了欧美民粹主义的政治根源。

3. Touching on the Inherent Paradoxes and Contradictions of Western Democratic Principles and Institutions

3.触及西方民主原则和制度的内在悖论和矛盾

In fact, contemporary research on European and American populism not only preliminarily explores the political roots of European and American populism but also touches on the inherent paradoxes and contradictions between Western democratic principles and institutions. The appeal of populism and mainstream Western ideology to “popular sovereignty” and “sovereignty resides in the people” partly stems from a crude understanding of Rousseau’s theory of “popular sovereignty” and partly from an excessive idealization of the direct democratic practices of ancient Greece. However, theoretically, ancient Greek democracy was never the ideal polity in the minds of political thinkers and democratic theorists. Criticism of direct democracy can be traced back to the times of Plato and Aristotle. Whether it is “rule by the virtuous” or a republican polity, elites have played an important role in them, but this does not hinder people’s admiration for “democracy.” Before the 18th century, many political thinkers still regarded democracy as “the power of the people.” This misconception did not change until the 19th and 20th centuries. Thinkers of the realist school, such as Ostrogorski, Michels, Schumpeter, Mosca, and Pareto, revealed the elitist nature of Western democracy, pointing out that modern Western democracy is merely a form in which the people participate in choosing their rulers. If elite democracy is the hallmark of a well-functioning democracy, then the populist demand for additional popular participation undoubtedly becomes an unsettling and pathological presence for “democracy.”

事实上，当代欧美民粹主义研究不仅初步涉及了欧美民粹主义的政治根源，而且触及西方民主原则和制度之间的内在悖论和矛盾。民粹主义和西方主流意识形态对“人民主权”“主权在民”的呼吁，一部分来源于对卢梭“人民主权”理论的粗放理解，还有一部分来源于对古希腊直接民主实践的过度美化。然而从理论上来看，古希腊民主从来都不是政治思想家和民主理论家心目中的理想政体。对直接民主的批判最早可以追溯到柏拉图和亚里士多德时期，无论是“贤人政治”还是共和政体，精英在其中都发挥了重要的作用，但是这并不妨碍人们对“民主”的推崇。在18世纪之前，许多政治思想家仍会将民主视作是“人民的力量”，这样的错觉直到19—20世纪才有所转变。奥斯特罗戈尔斯基、米歇尔斯、熊彼特、莫斯卡、帕累托等现实主义学派思想家揭示了西方民主的精英主义本质，指出现代西方民主不过是人民参与选择其统治者的一种形式。如果说精英民主才是民主运行良好的标志，那么民粹主义对民众额外参与的要求无疑就成为令“民主”感到不安和病态的存在。

Apart from theory, the political practice of Western democracy has also been a long historical evolution. It has long departed from the original, crude form of ancient Greek democracy and, after integrating many “non-democratic” factors, has become a composite existence different from traditional ideological narratives. For example, the “principle of representation” incorporates the factor of elite politics into democracy; the “principle of constitutionalism” imposes restrictions on the arbitrary exercise of power by the people; and the “transformation of governance models” introduces a third-party bureaucratic mechanism distinct from the ruling elite and the people. This is the irreconcilable fundamental contradiction between the ideology of democracy and the actual operation of democracy emphasized by scholars such as Canovan and Yannis [11]11 Yannis Stavrakakis, “Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy: A Critical Reassessment,” in Giorgos Katsambekis and Alexandros Kioupkiolis, eds., The Populist Radical Left in Europe, London: Routledge, 2019, pp. 27-47.. As popular democracy becomes more inclusive, open, and pluralistic, more non-democratic factors are accommodated within it, the complexity of the democratic system increases accordingly, and the constraining force of Western constitutional democracy is continuously strengthened. This creates a contradiction between delegated authority and political transparency, widening the distance between rulers and the ruled. This internal contradiction of Western democracy is continuously amplified under the threat of external crises, and the traditional “principal-agent” relationship between elites and the masses, which is the foundation of Western representative democracy, is strongly questioned, thus manifesting as a crisis of representation in democratic politics. Populism, as a radical response to the above crisis, is in fact a product of the internal and external contradictory movements of Western democratic politics.

除理论之外，西方民主的政治实践也是一个漫长的历史演进。它早已脱离了原初粗放的古希腊民主形式，在融合众多“非民主”因素之后，成为一种有别于传统意识形态述说的复合性存在。例如，“代议制原则”为民主融入了精英政治的因素，“宪政原则”实现了对人民任意行使权力的限制，而“治理模式转变”则引入了有别于统治精英与民众的第三方官僚机制。这也就是卡诺万和扬尼斯等学者所强调的民主的意识形态与民主的实际运作之间不可调和的根本矛盾所在。随着大众民主愈发包容、开放和多元，非民主因素被更多地容纳其中，民主制度的复杂性便随之增加，西方宪政民主的约束力度也不断加强，由此造成授权民主与政治透明度之间的矛盾，拉大了统治者与被统治者之间的距离。西方民主的这种内在矛盾在外部危机的威胁下被不断放大，作为西方代议制民主基础的精英与大众之间传统的“委托—代理”关系受到强烈质疑，从而表现为民主政治的代表性危机。民粹主义作为对上述危机的一种激进反应，实际上是西方民主政治内外部矛盾运动的产物。

(II) Defects in the Political Study of Contemporary European and American Populism

（二）当代欧美民粹主义政治研究的缺陷

1. Possessing an Underlying Color of Historical Idealism

1.具有历史唯心主义底色

Western scholars’ determination of the connotation of populism emphasizes the subjective initiative of consciousness. Their analysis of the roots of the rise of populism takes ideas and concepts as the main driving force for the rise and development of populism, treating the socio-economic and political background as the nourishment for the rise of populist thought. Their revelation of the internal contradictions of Western democratic politics is limited to the different forms, aspects, and functions of democratic politics. They fail to see that the essence of Western democratic politics is the political embodiment of Western capitalist economic relations, which is the rule and oppression of the working class and the masses. This actually exaggerates the active role of subjective consciousness on the objective world, reverses the primary relationship between matter and consciousness, and displays an obvious idealist stance.

西方学者对于民粹主义内涵的确定侧重于意识的主观能动性。他们对于民粹主义产生根源的分析，将思想观念作为推动民粹主义兴起和发展的主要动力，把社会经济与政治背景作为民粹主义思潮兴起的养料。对于西方民主政治的内在矛盾的揭示，仅仅限于民主政治不同形态、不同面向和不同功能，看不到西方民主政治本质是西方资本主义经济关系的政治体现，是对劳动阶级和人民群众的统治和压迫，实际上夸大了主观意识对客观世界的能动作用，颠倒了物质与意识第一性的关系，显示出明显的唯心主义立场。

In reality, populism is also a social and political movement. Although it is influenced by subjective emotions, this sentiment of resistance and discontent fundamentally arises from a specific socio-historical foundation. Essentially, it is the subjective reflection of populist political practice. Populist thought, while summarizing and refining practical experience, continuously accumulates and enriches its own connotations. The stance held by Western scholars on this issue actually inverts the relationship between social structure and political ideology.

实际上，民粹主义同时也是一种社会和政治运动，它虽然会受到主观情感的影响，但是这种反抗和不满情绪从根本上说产生于特定的社会历史基础，本质上是民粹主义政治实践活动的主观反映，民粹主义思想在总结和归纳实践经验的同时不断沉淀和丰富自身内涵，西方学者在此问题上所持的立场实际上倒置了社会结构与政治思潮之间的关系。

2. Possessing metaphysical epistemological characteristics

2.具有形而上学认识论特质

Populist political research severs the relationship between elites and the masses in historical and political life, thereby exhibiting a metaphysical mode of thought. In fact, this metaphysical mode of thought is not unique to populist political research; rather, there is a long-standing tradition of elitism within Western democratic political thought. The common feature of "elitism" and "populism" lies in their shared cognitive structure of a binary opposition between elites and the masses, though their conclusions are entirely opposite. Elitism holds that the people are dishonest and mediocre, while elites have advantages in culture, knowledge, morality, and other aspects over the masses. The people can only elect representatives they believe can express their will, without needing to participate personally in the political agenda. In this sense, contemporary European and American populist research guided by elitism has also failed to break free from the metaphysical mindset regarding the relationship between elites and the masses.

民粹主义政治研究割裂了历史和政治生活中精英与民众关系，从而具有形而上学的思想方法特质。事实上，这种形而上学的思想方法并非是民粹主义政治研究所独有的，实际上西方民主政治思想中就存在着悠久的精英主义传统。“精英主义”与“民粹主义”的共同特征就在于二者共享精英和民众二元对立的认知结构，不过得出的结论却是完全相反的。精英主义认为，人民是不诚实和平庸的，而精英在文化、知识、道德等方面都比民众更具优势，人民能做的只是选出认为可以代表自己意志的代理人，无须亲自参与政治议程。在这种意义上，以精英主义作为指导思想的当代欧美民粹主义研究也未能突破对于精英与民众关系的形而上学的思维定式。

In real life, social disparities between elites and the masses objectively exist, but populist political research one-sidedly exaggerates the moral differences and opposition between them, failing to see (or deliberately ignoring) the common connections between elites and the masses. Compared with direct democratic forms, Western scholars and research on the rise of populism generally pay more attention to indirect democracy, especially the role of constitutional democracy in the transformation of Western democracy, thereby simplistically opposing popular sovereignty and the limitation of power.

在现实生活中，精英与民众之间的社会性差距是客观存在的，但是民粹主义的政治研究片面夸大二者之间的道德差异和对立，没有看到（或刻意忽视）精英与民众的共同联系。相比于直接民主形式，西方学者及民粹主义兴起的相关研究普遍更加关注间接民主，特别是宪政民主在西方民主转型中的作用，由此把民主主权与限权简单对立起来。

From the perspective of dialectical materialism, the masses are the creators of history. Their practical activities constitute the entire content of social history, and historical development is precisely the result of the combined forces of countless individuals. At the same time, dialectical materialism also acknowledges the special role of outstanding figures in the process of historical development. They stand out through keen vision and precise insight, playing a specific role in political development and operation. However, this does not mean that outstanding figures exist detached from the masses. On the one hand, they are themselves part of the "masses"; on the other hand, the so-called "combined forces of countless individuals" does not refer to individuals within a particular group, but rather the product of cooperation under the leadership of outstanding figures and the participation of the masses. Populist research has not formed a dialectical understanding of the relationship between elites and the people, thereby rendering its analysis and understanding of the relationship between direct democracy and indirect democracy one-sided.

在唯物辩证法看来，人民群众是历史的创造者，他们的实践活动构成了社会历史的全部内容，历史的发展正是由无数个体合力推动的结果。与此同时，唯物辩证法也承认杰出人物在历史发展过程中的特殊作用，他们凭借敏锐的眼光与精准的洞察力脱颖而出，在政治发展和运行中具有特定的作用。但是，这并不意味着杰出人物脱离人民群众而存在，一方面他们实际上本身也是“人民群众”的一员，另一方面所谓的“无数个体合力推动”也并非是指某一特殊群体中的个人，而是在杰出人物引领、人民群众参与下的共同合作的产物。民粹主义研究没有就精英与人民的关系形成辩证认识，进而使其对于直接民主与间接民主之间的关系的分析和认识带有着片面性。

3. Failing to point out the fundamental way out of the predicament of capitalist democracy

3.没有指出摆脱资本主义民主困境的根本出路

Although Western scholars recognize that populism arises from irreconcilable structural contradictions within Western democracy, they rarely doubt the self-correcting ability of Western democratic systems when dealing with problems and crises. Consequently, they have not deeply understood or revealed the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, nor have they exposed the antagonism between capitalist democratic politics and economic and social relations, nor have they profoundly revealed the inherent paradox between the form and substance of the capitalist democratic system. This not only leads them to misjudge the "staying power" of populism but also prevents them from proposing effective solutions to the contradiction between populism and Western democracy.

虽然西方学者认识到民粹主义兴起于西方民主内部不可调和的结构性矛盾，却较少怀疑西方民主制度在处理问题和危机时的自我纠正能力，致使他们没有深刻认识和揭示资本主义根本矛盾，没有揭示资本主义民主政治与经济关系和社会关系的悖逆性，没有深刻揭示资本主义民主制度形式与实质的固有悖论。这不仅使其错估了民粹主义的“续航能力”，更致使其无法提出针对民粹主义与西方民主矛盾的有效解决方案。

Western scholars generally harbor illusions about the existing democratic system, believing that democratic systems possess a certain capacity for self-regulation. Even when challenged and impacted by populism, they think that through repeated checks and balances and adjustments over a period of time, democratic politics can gradually return to normal. However, the reality is precisely the opposite: Western democratic systems (especially the party system, which is the core of modern politics) not only fail to self-correct but are prone to falling into a self-reinforcing "doom loop." "Once a system enters a state of polarization, well-intentioned attempts to improve intergroup interactions may increase rather than decrease polarization by encouraging behaviors that separate people... Under certain conditions, some systems can exhibit irreversibility. Even if we could raise tolerance to 11, we could not escape the polarized equilibrium state." [12]12 This is a reference to a concept in systems theory or social dynamics, likely drawn from a specific academic work on polarization, though the exact source is not identified in the original text. Thus, the concerns of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt about the current state of American democracy are well-founded. They point out: "Part of the problem we face today is something many of us revere: our Constitution. The United States has the oldest written constitution in the world. It is a remarkable piece of political craftsmanship that has provided the foundation for stability and prosperity. For more than two centuries, it has successfully constrained the power of ambitious and overreaching presidents. But the flaws in our Constitution are now endangering our democracy... One thing is clear: our institutions cannot save our democracy; we must save it ourselves." [13]13 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (2018), a widely cited work on the erosion of democratic norms in the United States. In fact, Western populism has seized this opportunity to re-emerge on the political stage. Of course, traditional mainstream Western thought will not abandon its position either. This approach often emphasizes adding more "democratic" elements to the existing compound democratic system, balancing various forces through increased pluralism to achieve a dynamic equilibrium among political subjects. For example, Lee Drutman argues that long-term democratic stability requires not fewer intermediary institutions or direct democracy, but more and better political parties. The rise of populism signals the failure of the Western party system, and only institutional change can address this threat and challenge. He therefore proposes a fusion voting system in the short term and a proportional representation system as an alternative in the long term. [14]14 Lee Drutman, a political scientist, has proposed electoral reforms such as fusion voting and proportional representation to address political polarization in the U.S. However, Drutman's proposal still fails to break free from traditional thinking patterns. Increasingly complex institutional designs seem once again to confirm Margaret Canovan's paradox of democracy's irreconcilability, where delegation undermines political transparency. [15]15 Margaret Canovan, a scholar of populism, has discussed the tension between democratic delegation and transparency, often referred to as the "paradox of democracy."

西方学者普遍对现行的民主体制抱有幻想，认为民主制度存在着一定的自我调节能力，即便受到民粹主义的挑战与冲击，也能通过一段时间内反复的制衡与调和逐渐使民主政治恢复常态。然而，事实恰恰相反，西方民主制度（尤其是作为现代政治核心的政党制度）不仅不会自我纠正，反而容易陷入自我强化的“厄运循环”，“一旦进入两极分化状态，改善群体间互动的善意尝试可能会通过鼓励将人们分开的行为来增加而不是减少两极分化……在某些条件下，一些系统可以表现出不可逆性。即使我们可以将容忍度提高到11，也无法摆脱两极分化的平衡状态”。由此，史蒂芬·莱维茨基（Steven Levitsky）和丹尼尔·齐布拉特（Daniel Ziblatt）对美国民主现状的担忧也就有迹可循。他们指出：“我们今天面临的部分问题在于我们许多人尊敬的东西：我们的宪法。美国拥有世界上最古老的成文宪法。这是一项杰出的政治技巧，为稳定和繁荣奠定了基础。两个多世纪以来，它成功地制约了雄心勃勃、不自量力的总统的权力。但我们宪法的缺陷，现在正危及我们的民主……有一点是明确的：我们的制度无法拯救我们的民主，我们必须自己拯救它。”实际上，西方民粹主义正是借助这一机遇而得以重新活跃在政治舞台。当然，传统的西方主流思想也不会放弃他们的阵地，这种解决方式往往强调要在现行的复合民主政体中加入更多“民主”的元素，通过增加多元性来制衡各方势力，达到政治主体之间的动态平衡。例如，李·德鲁特曼（Lee Drutman）认为，长期的民主稳定需要的不是更少的中介机构或者直接民主，而是更多更好的政党。民粹主义的兴起显示着西方政党制度失败的后果，只有制度变革才能解决这一威胁和挑战，由此他提出在短期内实行融合投票制，在长期实行比例代表制的替代方案。但是德鲁特曼的提议仍旧没有摆脱传统的思维定式，愈加复杂的制度设计似乎又再次验证了玛格丽特·卡诺万所提出的授权会破坏政治透明度的民主不可调和悖论。

The laws of historical development revealed by historical materialism show that all patchwork repairs to the capitalist political and economic system cannot resolve the impact of populism on traditional capitalist democracy, nor can they save capitalist democracy from its historical fate of decline. Only through socialist revolution, replacing capitalism with socialism, can the fundamental contradictions of capitalism be resolved. This is the fundamental method for resolving the internal crisis of capitalist democracy and overcoming the tendency toward populism.

历史唯物主义揭示的历史发展规律表明，所有对于资本主义政治经济制度的修修补补，并不能解决民粹主义对传统的资本主义民主的冲击，也不能挽救资本主义民主衰败的历史命运，而只有通过社会主义革命，以社会主义代替资本主义，才能解决资本主义的根本矛盾，才是解决资本主义民主内在危机，克服民粹主义倾向的根本方法。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗