A Political Economy Analysis of "Techno-Feudalism"

In recent years, the platform economy has developed rapidly worldwide. The rise of the internet and digital platforms has profoundly changed modes of production and daily life, promoting the development of the sharing economy. At the same time, however, it is worth noting that a series of problems that have emerged alongside this development—including data monopolies and algorithmic hegemony—have also created certain obstacles to the orderly development of the economy and society. With the further deepening of the information technology revolution, a new theoretical trend has arisen among left-wing scholars represented by Cédric Durand, Yanis Varoufakis, Jodi Dean, and others: "techno-feudalism." Among them, Varoufakis has even asserted that profit, the pillar of capitalism, has been defeated by rent, that it is the "cloudists" rather than the proletariat who will end the rule of the bourgeoisie, and that what will replace capitalism is "techno-feudalism" rather than socialism. So, does "techno-feudalism" based on digital platforms truly transcend capitalism? To study this question, it is necessary to return to the standpoint and method of Marxism and to delve into the sources and forms of "cloud rent" in the platform economy.

近年来，世界范围内平台经济发展迅速。互联网和数字平台的兴起深刻改变了生产和生活方式，推动共享经济的发展。但同时值得关注的是，随之滋生的数据垄断、算法霸权等在内的一系列问题，对经济社会的有序发展也形成了一定阻碍。随着信息技术革命的进一步深化发展，以塞德里克·杜朗（Cédric Durand）、雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）、约迪·迪恩（Jodi Dean）等为代表的左翼学者在学界掀起了一股新理论思潮，即“技术封建主义”。其中，瓦鲁法基斯甚至断言，作为资本主义支柱的利润已经被租金击败，终结资产阶级统治的是“云主义者”而非无产阶级，代替资本主义的是“技术封建主义”而非社会主义。那么，基于数字平台的“技术封建主义”真的超越了资本主义吗？要研究这一问题，需要回归马克思主义的立场和方法，深入探究平台经济中“云租金”的来源与形式。

I. The Operational Mechanism and Core Characteristics of "Techno-Feudalism"

一、“技术封建主义”的运行机制与核心特征

The theory of "techno-feudalism" generally holds that the internet has accelerated the demise of capitalism, but what replaces it is not socialism but "techno-feudalism." Here, "techno-feudalism" constructs its theoretical system on a series of core concepts such as "cloud capital," "cloudists," "cloud fiefs," "cloud rent," and "cloud serfs."

“技术封建主义”理论一般认为，互联网加速了资本主义的灭亡，但取代它的并不是社会主义，而是“技术封建主义”。在这里，“技术封建主义”将其理论体系建构在“云资本”“云主义者”“云封地”“云租金”“云农奴”等一系列核心概念基础之上。

(A) The Valorization Mechanism of "Cloud Capital" Based on "Cloud Fiefs"

（一）以“云封地”为基础的“云资本”增殖机制

"Cloud capital," as a core concept of "techno-feudalism," encompasses two key domains: digital infrastructure and content production. Specifically, it involves not only the infrastructure built through digital platforms and cloud computing technologies—such as intelligent algorithms, server clusters, and other hardware and software facilities—but also the control and management of global information flows, data, and content, such as the comments, videos, and photos uploaded and published by users on various platforms. Among the bourgeoisie, those capitalists who manage to accumulate large amounts of "cloud capital" can be called "cloudists." In the digital information age, "cloudists" concentrate resources and power through technological means, thereby forming an economic and social structure similar to feudalism. However, unlike feudal landlords, "cloudists" do not naturally possess the power to extract rent; rather, they must create rent from the source, and this process of creation is essentially the replacement of the market by digital platforms. Because digital platforms are fundamentally different from markets and more closely resemble fiefs under feudalism, they can be called "cloud fiefs." By virtue of their monopoly over "cloud fiefs," "cloudists" charge rent to users who access digital platforms and use cloud computing services, thereby generating "cloud rent." Based on the above mechanism, "cloud capital" incorporates nearly all internet users into its valorization process, turning wage workers into workers under cloud computing—making their lives increasingly precarious and stressful under algorithmic control—while simultaneously turning all internet users into "cloud serfs" who voluntarily produce "cloud capital" for the "cloudists."

“云资本”作为“技术封建主义”的核心概念，涵盖了数字基础设施和内容生产两个关键领域。具体而言，它不仅涉及通过数字平台和云计算技术构建的基础设施，例如智能算法、服务器群等软硬件设施；还控制和管理着全球的信息流、数据与内容，例如各类平台中用户上传发布的评论、视频、照片等数据信息。在资产阶级中，设法积累大量“云资本”的资本家可称为“云主义者”。在数字信息时代，“云主义者”通过技术手段集中资源与权力，从而形成一种类似于封建主义的经济和社会结构。但与封建地主不同的是，“云主义者”并不是天然就拥有获取租金的权力，而是需要从源头开始创造租金，而这一创造过程实质上就是数字平台取代市场的过程。由于数字平台与市场有着本质不同，更类似于封建制度下的封地，因而可以称之为“云封地”。“云主义者”凭借其对“云封地”的垄断，向访问数字平台和使用云计算服务的用户收取租金，从而产生“云租金”。基于上述机制，“云资本”将几乎所有网络用户纳入其增殖过程之中，并把雇佣工人变成云计算下的工人，导致他们在算法的控制下生活越来越不稳定、压力越来越大，同时使所有网络用户变成“云农奴”，自愿为“云主义者”生产“云资本”。

(B) The Core Characteristic of "Techno-Feudalism" Is That Profit Gives Way to "Cloud Rent"

（二）“技术封建主义”的核心特征体现为利润让位于“云租金”

The theory of "techno-feudalism" holds that "techno-feudalism" is a new form of production that transcends and will bury capitalism, and that the difference in the mode of capital valorization is the core distinction between "techno-feudalism" and capitalism, manifested mainly in two aspects: the market is replaced by "cloud fiefs," and profit gives way to "cloud rent." From the perspective of the dynamic developmental process of "feudalism—capitalism—techno-feudalism," the core characteristic of "techno-feudalism"—that profit gives way to "cloud rent"—can be better understood.

“技术封建主义”理论认为，“技术封建主义”是超越并将会埋葬资本主义的新的生产形式，资本增殖方式的不同是“技术封建主义”与资本主义的核心区别，并主要表现在两个方面：市场被“云封地”取代和利润让位于“云租金”。从“封建主义—资本主义—技术封建主义”的动态发展过程视角，可以更好地理解利润让位于“云租金”这一“技术封建主义”的核心特征。

The transition from feudalism to capitalism was a process of the transfer of power from landowners to capital owners. The "enclosure movement" forcibly separated laborers from the land, and the primitive accumulation of capital laid the foundation for the establishment of the capitalist mode of production. In the historical process of opposing the feudal system, the bourgeoisie played a crucial role. At the economic level, the fundamental transformation from feudalism to capitalism was built on the usurpation of rent by profit as the driving force of the socioeconomic system. The pursuit of surplus value is the engine of capitalist development, prompting capitalists to continuously improve production techniques in order to obtain extra surplus value. The development of productive forces greatly promoted commodity exchange; commodity economy thus continuously improved and entered the stage of a market economy; value transformed into price of production; and surplus value manifested as profit, which in turn transformed into average profit. As a result, serfs and landlords transformed into wage workers and industrial capitalists, and land rent, which had once occupied a dominant position, gave way to profit.

从封建主义到资本主义的过渡是权力从土地所有者向资本所有者的转移过程。“圈地运动”强制将劳动者与土地分离，资本的原始积累为资本主义生产方式的确立奠定了基础。在反对封建制度的历史进程中，资产阶级发挥了至关重要的作用。在经济层面，从封建主义到资本主义的根本转变是建立在以利润篡夺租金作为社会经济体系的驱动力之上的。对剩余价值的追逐是资本主义的发展引擎，它促使资本家不断改进生产技术，以获得超额剩余价值。生产力的发展极大地促进了商品交换，商品经济因而不断完善并进入市场经济阶段，价值转变为生产价格，剩余价值表现为利润进而转化为平均利润。由此，农奴和地主转变为雇佣工人和产业资本家，曾经占据主体地位的地租让位于利润。

Under the conditions of the digital economy, capital evolves into "cloud capital," and "techno-feudalism" gradually destroys the two pillars of capitalism—the market and profit. The theory of "techno-feudalism" holds that the market is a decentralized price-formation mechanism in which exchange value is realized in the form of monetary prices, wages, and so on. However, the algorithms of the "cloudists" not only have the ability to centrally match buyers and sellers but can also isolate each buyer from other buyers and each seller from other sellers—which is completely contrary to the meaning of the market. Therefore, the market has already been replaced by digital platforms, and "cloud fiefs" have assumed a dominant position. Correspondingly, rent has once again triumphed over profit. In the internet world shaped by the "new enclosure," everyone is forced to surrender themselves to digital platforms that isolate buyers from each other and sellers from each other. "Cloud capital" exhibits unprecedented control; it internalizes the roles of managers and marketing personnel into algorithms, and when users are active on "cloud fiefs," the "algorithmic police" begin to collect "cloud rent." As more and more activities are completed on digital platforms, rent ultimately defeats profit once again and becomes the dominant force in the socioeconomy.

在数字经济条件下，资本演变成“云资本”，“技术封建主义”逐渐摧毁了资本主义的两大支柱——市场和利润。“技术封建主义”理论认为，市场是一种分散的价格形成机制，其中的交换价值以货币价格、工资等形式实现。而“云主义者”的算法不仅具有集中匹配买家和卖家的能力，并且能将每一个买家与其他买家、每一个卖方与其他卖家隔离开来，而这与市场的含义完全相反。因此，市场已经被数字平台所取代，“云封地”占据了主导地位。相应地，租金也重新战胜了利润。在由“新圈地”塑造的互联网世界中，所有人被迫将自己交给那些将买家之间和卖家之间隔离开来的数字平台。“云资本”展现出前所未有的掌控力，它将管理者和市场营销人员的角色内化到算法之中，当用户在“云封地”活动时，“算法警察”就开始收集“云租金”。随着越来越多的活动在数字平台完成，最终使租金再次击败利润，成为社会经济的主导。

Does "techno-feudalism" transcend capitalism? On this point, the theory of "techno-feudalism" gives an affirmative answer. The valorization of "cloud capital" in "techno-feudalism" relies on the unpaid labor of all humanity, whereas the valorization of capital in capitalism relies on the paid labor of the working class. Therefore, the rule of the "cloudists" is fundamentally different from the rule of capitalism. The development of capitalism causes the organic composition of capital to continuously rise in the process of accumulation, leading to a tendency for the rate of profit to fall, which in turn compresses the living space of capitalism. As "cloud fiefs" replace the capitalist market, "cloud rent" gradually replaces profit. Consequently, the theory of "techno-feudalism" holds that, due to the rapid development of capitalist activities, capitalism is dying out—only it is not the proletariat that buries capitalism but the "cloudists," and it is not socialism that emerges victorious but "techno-feudalism."

“技术封建主义”超越了资本主义吗？对此，“技术封建主义”理论给出了肯定的答案。“技术封建主义”中“云资本”的增殖依靠的是全人类的无偿劳动，而资本主义中的资本增殖是依靠工人阶级的有偿劳动，因此，“云主义者”的统治与资本主义的统治存在根本不同。资本主义的发展使资本有机构成在积累过程中不断提升，导致利润率呈现下降趋势，而这反过来压缩了资本主义的生存空间。随着“云封地”取代资本主义市场，“云租金”也逐渐取代利润。因此，“技术封建主义”理论认为，由于资本主义活动的迅速发展，资本主义正在消亡，只是埋葬资本主义的不是无产阶级而是“云主义者”，取得胜利的不是社会主义而是“技术封建主义”。

However, is this really the case? The theory of "techno-feudalism" holds that the core of "techno-feudalism" transcending capitalism lies in the former's reliance on rent, while the latter focuses on profit. Therefore, to correctly understand the relationship between "techno-feudalism" and capitalism, it is necessary to conduct a further analysis of "cloud fiefs" and "cloud rent."

然而，事实真的如此吗？“技术封建主义”理论认为，“技术封建主义”超越资本主义的核心在于前者依赖于租金，而后者关注的是利润。因此，要正确认识“技术封建主义”与资本主义的关系，就需要对“云封地”“云租金”作进一步分析。

II. "Cloud Fiefs" Take Digital Platforms as Their Form of Expression

二、“云封地”以数字平台为表现形式

The core pillar of “techno-feudalism” is “cloud rent,” and the realization of “cloud rent” is inseparable from the “cloud fief.” “Techno-feudalism or cloud capitalism, it subjugates the real capitalists and the workers they exploit to the monopolistic digital commons controlled by our new feudal lords.” [1]1 The quotation is from the work of the authors cited in the original text; the specific source is not provided in the paragraph. The “monopolistic digital commons” here is the “cloud fief,” which in essence belongs to digital space. However, digital space cannot directly serve as a venue for human activity; therefore, the realization of the “cloud fief” requires the use of digital platforms. A digital platform is a venue for human activity within digital space, based on information equipment and software algorithms, and is also the primary form of the “cloud fief.”

“技术封建主义”的核心支柱是“云租金”，而“云租金”的实现离不开“云封地”。“技术封建主义或云资本主义，它使真正的资本家及其剥削的工人从属于由我们的新封建主控制的垄断数字公地。”这里的“垄断数字公地”即“云封地”，本质上属于数字空间。但数字空间不能直接作为人的活动场所，因此，“云封地”的实现需要借助数字平台。数字平台是以信息设备和软件算法为基础的数字空间中人的活动场所，也是“云封地”的最主要形式。

(I) Digital Space Is the Form of Existence of Digital Information Movement

（一）数字空间是数字信息运动的存在形式

Digital space is essentially a digitized information space based on information equipment and software algorithms, and is the form of existence of digital information movement. Information spaces come in various forms, and the particularity of digital space lies in its digitized form, i.e., information within digital space moves in the form of digitized encoding. Ma Yan et al. hold that internet space can be divided into the internet infrastructure layer, the network connection layer, and the online space layer. [2]2 Ma Yan et al. are Chinese scholars; the specific work is not identified in the paragraph. This classification places greater emphasis on revealing the structure and hardware foundation of internet space. Digital space is the form of existence of information movement, and digital space can be understood from the perspective of information movement. The forms of information movement are mainly divided into information processing, information storage, and information transmission; correspondingly, digital space can also be divided into digital information processing space, digital information storage space, and digital information transmission space. According to the specific forms of information movement, further refinement is possible, where information processing can be subdivided into information creation, information presentation, and information processing; information storage can be divided into local storage and cloud storage; and information transmission can also be divided into wired transmission and wireless transmission.

数字空间实质上是一种以信息设备和软件算法为基础的数字化信息空间，是数字信息运动的存在形式。信息空间形式多样，而数字空间的特殊性在于其数字化形式，即数字空间内的信息以数字化编码的形式运动。马艳等认为，互联网空间可以分为互联网基础层、网络连接层、在线空间层。这种分法更侧重于展现互联网空间的结构和硬件基础。数字空间是信息运动的存在形式，可以从信息的运动角度认识数字空间。信息的运动形式主要分为信息处理、信息存储和信息传输，相应地，数字空间也可划分为数字信息处理空间、数字信息存储空间和数字信息传输空间。根据信息运动的具体形式，还可以继续细化，其中信息处理又可细分为信息创造、信息呈现和信息加工，信息存储可分为本地存储和云存储，信息传输也可划分为有线传输和无线传输。

Digital space and real physical space are both connected and distinct. Mi Jianing et al. propose that digital space is a third space embedded in physical space and social space in the form of data, which is not only a mapping of real space but also a reshaping of real space. [3]3 Mi Jianing et al. are Chinese scholars; the specific work is not identified in the paragraph. First, digital space is closely connected to real space. The existence of digital space is inseparable from hardware equipment such as servers, network cables, hard drives, and CPUs, as well as software facilities such as data algorithms; the movement of information must be based on information equipment and software algorithms. Therefore, it can be said that virtual space is a logical mapping of geographic space, built upon the high-fidelity simulation of the real world by information technology. Second, digital space does not merely map and simulate real space but transcends real space to a certain extent. For example, in games, physical rules are redefined, creating scenes that violate the rules of real space, such as anti-gravity; or constructing objects that do not exist in reality based on human imagination. Therefore, digital space also serves to a certain extent as a medium between real space and spiritual space: on the one hand, by simulating the real world, it presents real space in a digitized form; on the other hand, it concretizes the spiritual world within digital space, creating a virtual space that transcends real space.

数字空间与现实物理空间既有联系又存在区别。米加宁等提出，数字空间是以数据的形态内嵌于物理空间和社会空间的第三空间，不仅是对现实空间的映射，更是对现实空间的重塑。首先，数字空间与现实空间联系密切。数字空间的存在离不开服务器、网线、硬盘、CPU等硬件设备，以及数据算法等软件设施，信息的运动必须以信息设备和软件算法等为基础。因此可以说，虚拟空间是对地理空间的逻辑映射，建立在信息技术对现实世界高度仿真的基础之上。其次，数字空间并不是单纯地映射和仿真现实空间，而是在一定程度上超越了现实空间。例如，在游戏中重新定义物理规则，从而创造反重力等违背现实空间规则的场景；根据人的想象构造出现实中并不存在的事物。因此，数字空间在一定程度上也充当了现实空间与精神空间的媒介，一方面通过对现实世界的仿真，将现实空间以数字化的形式加以呈现；另一方面，将精神世界具现在数字空间中，创造超越现实空间的虚拟空间。

(II) Digital Platforms Are Venues for Human Activity in Digital Space

（二）数字平台是数字空间中人的活动场所

The digitized characteristics of digital space mean that it cannot directly serve as a venue for human activity; human activity in digital space must also rely on digital platforms. In the term “digital platform,” “digital” serves as an adjective characterizing its form, while “platform” is its core content. Human activity is inseparable from a certain space; for example, agricultural labor mainly occurs in the “fields,” while handicraft workshop and machine-based large-scale industry mainly occur in the “workshop.” At the same time, the diversity of human needs determines the diversity of human activities, which inevitably requires various types of activity spaces. In the process of social development, these activity spaces have gradually acquired conventional names, such as stages for artistic performance, sports fields for exercise, and studios for small teams. With the development of information technology, more and more activities occur in digital space, forming a rich variety of activity venues with different names, such as social platforms, e-commerce platforms, and search platforms. Although they have different names due to different functions, there is no doubt that these platforms are all venues for human activity and all possess digitized characteristics, thus all belong to digital platforms. From this, digital platforms can be defined as venues for human activity in digital space based on information equipment and software algorithms.

数字空间的数字化特征意味着其不能直接作为人的活动场所，人在数字空间中的活动也必须借助数字平台。在“数字平台”一词中，数字作为定语表征其形式，平台才是其核心内容。人的活动离不开一定的空间，例如农业劳作主要发生在“田间”、工场手工业和机器大工业则主要发生在“工作间”。同时，人的需要的多样性决定了人的活动的多样性，也必然要求各种各样的活动空间。在社会发展过程中，这些活动空间逐渐有了约定俗成的名称，例如进行艺术表演的舞台、用于运动的操场、小团队的工作室等。而随着信息技术的发展，越来越多的活动发生在数字空间中，形成了丰富多彩的活动场所，并有了不同的名称，例如社交平台、电商平台、搜索平台等。尽管因功能不同而名称各异，但毫无疑问，这些平台都是人的活动场所，并且都具有数字化的特征，因而都属于数字平台。由此，可以把数字平台定义为以信息设备和软件算法为基础的数字空间中人的活动场所。

Figuratively speaking, digital platforms are “plots of land” carved out one after another in digital space, providing venues for human production and life. Digital spaces are diverse, and human activities are rich and varied, thus requiring different types of digital platforms. Different classification criteria correspond to different types of digital platforms, and therefore domestic scholars’ classifications of digital platforms are not entirely the same. For example, Xie Fusheng et al., based on charging models and types of traded goods, divide digital platforms into three major categories: advertising platforms, online commodity trading platforms, and offline service trading platforms. [4]4 Xie Fusheng et al. are Chinese scholars; the specific work is not identified in the paragraph. Wang Lu et al. classify digital platforms into five types: advertising platforms, product platforms, lean platforms, cloud platforms, and industrial internet. [5]5 Wang Lu et al. are Chinese scholars; the specific work is not identified in the paragraph. Li Yunyao et al. argue that platforms are the core of two-sided markets, and two-sided markets have four forms: transaction intermediaries, media, payment tools, and software platforms. [6]6 Li Yunyao et al. are Chinese scholars; the specific work is not identified in the paragraph. It is not difficult to see that existing classifications mainly target digital information processing space.

形象地说，数字平台是在数字空间中开辟的一块又一块的“土地”，为人的生产生活提供场所。数字空间多种多样，人的活动也丰富多彩，因而需要不同类型的数字平台。不同的划分标准会对应不同的数字平台类型，因而国内学者对数字平台的分类也不尽相同。如，谢富胜等根据收费模式和交易商品类别，把数字平台分为广告平台、线上商品交易平台和线下服务交易平台三大类。王璐等将数字平台划分为广告平台、产品平台、精益平台、云平台和工业互联网五种类型。李允尧等认为，平台是双边市场的核心，而双边市场有交易中介、媒体、支付工具和软件平台四种形式。不难看出，现有分类主要针对的是数字信息处理空间。

Digital platforms are both venues for human activity in digital space and, in essence, a type of information space; therefore, they can be classified according to different forms of information movement. Based on the classification of digital space, digital platforms can first be divided into digital information processing platforms, digital information storage platforms, and digital information transmission platforms. Further, digital information storage platforms can be divided into local storage platforms and cloud storage platforms, and digital information transmission platforms can also be divided into wired transmission platforms and wireless transmission platforms. The forms of information movement in digital information processing space are the most abundant, including information presentation, retrieval, and processing, which also leads to a wide variety of digital information processing platforms. At the same time, this type of platform is most closely related to human needs and activities; therefore, its classification can be based on the forms of information movement, such as information presentation platforms, information retrieval platforms, and information processing platforms, or it can be based on the types of human activities, dividing them into production-type platforms, exchange-type platforms, consumption-type platforms, etc. Among these, production-type platforms mainly serve production, for example, the industrial internet and industrial design software are digital platforms that provide digital space for production activities. Exchange-type platforms mainly focus on exchange, such as currency circulation platforms. With the continuous rise in e-commerce platform sales, consumption platforms have developed very rapidly, and non-material product consumption platforms have gradually become popular. For different types of platforms, their revenue forms also differ significantly, such as software purchase fees, annual subscription fees, advertising revenue, and commissions from live-streaming sales. Although the revenue forms of these platforms are diverse, apart from the interest on capital invested in the digital platform, they are essentially the economic forms of realization of digital platform ownership, that is, the “cloud rent” collected by relying on the “cloud fief” based on the monopoly of digital platform space. To further deeply study the source and manifestation of “cloud rent,” this paper mainly takes large-scale e-commerce platforms closely related to people’s lives as examples for analysis.

数字平台既是数字空间中人的活动场所，本质上又是一种信息空间，因此，可以从信息运动的不同形式对其进行分类。根据数字空间的分类，数字平台首先可以分为数字信息处理平台、数字信息存储平台和数字信息传输平台。进一步来看，数字信息存储平台又可分为本地存储平台和云存储平台，数字信息传输平台也可分为有线传输平台和无线传输平台。数字信息处理空间中信息的运动形式最为丰富，包括信息的呈现、检索、加工等，这也导致数字信息处理平台的种类繁多。同时，这类平台与人的需求和活动的关联又最为紧密，因此，对其分类既可依据信息的运动形式分为信息呈现平台、信息检索平台以及信息加工平台等，又可根据人的活动类型将之划分为生产型平台、交换型平台、消费型平台等。其中，生产型平台以服务生产为主，例如工业互联网、工业设计软件便是能够为生产活动提供数字空间的数字平台。交换型平台则以交换为主要内容，例如货币流通平台。随着电商平台销售额的不断攀升，消费平台发展十分迅速，非物质产品消费平台也逐渐风靡。对于不同类型的平台，其收入形式也有明显差异，例如软件购买付费、年金缴纳、广告收入、直播带货抽成等。虽然这些平台的收入形式多样，但是除了投入数字平台的资本的利息外，本质都是数字平台所有权的经济实现形式，是依靠基于数字平台空间垄断的“云封地”所收取的“云租金”。为进一步深入研究“云租金”的来源与表现，本文主要以规模较大的、与人们生活较密切的电商平台为例展开分析。

III. Digital Platform Monopoly and the Generation of “Cloud Rent”

三、数字平台垄断与“云租金”的产生

The rent paid for the use of digital platforms, or “cloud rent,” is in essence the economic form of realization of digital platform ownership. However, it must be pointed out that this economic realization does not occur unconditionally; it has corresponding constraints. Marx pointed out: “It is not what is made but how, and by what instruments of labour, that distinguishes different economic epochs.” [7]7 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, ch. 7, sec. 1. Since the agricultural revolution, instruments of labour have gradually developed from simple tools to the system of machinery, and the latter has continuously advanced toward informatization and intellectualization. The attribute of land as an object of labour has gradually given way to its attribute as a spatial site of labour, and the continuous intensification of the spatial attribute of the labour site has ultimately evolved into the digitalization and virtualization of the labour site. In this process, the digitalization of the labour site and the monopoly of digital platforms have become the real basis for the emergence of “cloud rent.”

为使用数字平台而缴纳的租金或者说“云租金”，本质上是数字平台所有权的经济实现形式。然而，需要指出的是，这种经济实现绝非在无条件的情况下发生的，它有着与之对应的约束条件。马克思指出：“各种经济时代的区别，不在于生产什么，而在于怎样生产，用什么劳动资料生产。”自农业革命以来，劳动工具逐渐由简单工具发展到机器体系，且后者不断向信息化、智能化发展，土地作为劳动对象的属性逐渐让位于作为劳动场所的空间属性，而劳动场所空间属性的不断强化最终演变为劳动场所的数字化和虚拟化。在这一过程中，劳动场所的数字化和数字平台的垄断成为“云租金”产生的现实基础。

(I) The information revolution has driven the shift of the labour site to digital platforms

（一）信息革命推动了劳动场所向数字平台转移

“On the one hand, land is utilized for the purposes of reproduction or extraction; on the other hand, space is an element of all production and all human activity. In both respects, landed property demands its tribute.” [8]8 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, ch. 46. After the agricultural revolution, humans began to settle down, and the labour site and instruments of labour were transformed into artificially modified cultivated land and simple tools in agricultural society. Cultivated land served both as the object of labour and as the labour site. After the industrial revolution, machinery became the main instrument of labour, and the factory became the main labour site. “As far as the factory is concerned, land acts only as a foundation, as a site, as an operational spatial base.” [9]9 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, ch. 46. Therefore, in industrial society, as agriculture’s share of the overall economy declined, the attribute of land as an object of labour had already begun to weaken, while its attribute as a spatial site of labour continuously developed, and this also made possible the “shift from the real to the virtual” of the labour site.

“一方面，土地为了再生产或采掘的目的而被利用；另一方面，空间是一切生产和一切人类活动的要素。从这两个方面，土地所有权都要求得到它的贡赋。”农业革命后，人类开始定居生活，劳动场所和劳动工具转变为农业社会中经过人工改造的耕地和简单工具。耕地既承担着劳动对象的角色，又作为劳动场所而存在。工业革命后，机器成为主要劳动工具，工厂成为主要劳动场所。“就工厂来说，土地只是作为地基，作为场地，作为操作的空间基地发生作用。”因此，在工业社会，随着农业占整个经济比重的下降，土地作为劳动对象的属性已经开始弱化，作为劳动场所的空间属性则不断发展，而这也导致劳动场所的“脱实向虚”成为可能。

From the second half of the 20th century onward, computer technology gradually developed, and today mobile clients such as smartphones have become necessities of life. Especially with the development of communication technologies such as 5G, a series of new phenomena such as the information superhighway and smart cities have continuously emerged, and the whole society is gradually moving toward an era of the Internet of Everything. Information technology has profoundly changed the mode of human production and life, and the scale of e-commerce has also continuously expanded. In 2023, e-commerce sales accounted for over 19% of global retail sales, and it is projected that by 2027 the online market will account for nearly one-quarter of total global retail sales. [10]10 Source data as cited by the authors; original source not specified in the text. At the same time, traditional manufacturing is gradually integrating with the Internet; intelligent manufacturing liberates workers from the main labour site of industrial society, namely the factory; the system of machinery is gradually developing toward informatization and intellectualization; and more and more labourers have left the physical labour site and instead labour in virtual digital space, which can only be realized by relying on digital platforms.

从20世纪后半叶开始，计算机技术逐步发展，至今手机等移动客户端已成为生活必需品。尤其随着5G等通信技术的发展，信息高速公路、智慧城市等一系列新事物不断涌现，整个社会正逐步迈向万物互联时代。信息技术深刻地改变了人类的生产和生活方式，电子商务规模也随之不断扩大。2023年，电子商务销售额占全球零售额的19%以上，预计到2027年在线市场将占全球零售总额的近四分之一。同时，传统制造业与互联网逐步融合，智能制造将工人从工业社会的主要劳动场所即工厂中解放出来，机器体系逐渐向信息化、智能化发展，越来越多的劳动者脱离了实体劳动场所，转而在虚拟的数字空间中劳动，而这必须借助于数字平台才能实现。

(II) Digital platform monopoly is the prerequisite for the emergence of “cloud rent”

（二）数字平台垄断是“云租金”产生的前提

“The premise of landed property is that certain persons monopolize a certain quantity of land, treating it as a sphere exclusive to all others and subject only to their own private will.” [11]11 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, ch. 37. The premise of digital platform ownership is the monopoly of digital platforms. The rapid development of the platform economy has led to a sharp expansion in the scale of platform enterprises, which inevitably brings about the problem of digital platform monopoly. Moreover, as the scale of the platform economy continues to grow, the problem of digital platform monopoly becomes increasingly severe. Regarding the monopoly of platform enterprises and its formation mechanisms, domestic research has yielded considerable results. For example, Xie Fusheng et al. argue that platform enterprise monopoly exists at three levels: horizontal monopoly platforms in specific relevant markets, large-scale monopolistic platform complexes with vertical integration and cross-industry expansion, and hierarchical nested platform ecosystems centered on specific foundational platforms. [12]12 Xie Fusheng et al., as cited by the authors; original source not specified in the text. Li Yongjian et al. analyze the initial monopoly of hub-type markets and the second-round monopoly of radiation-type markets, arguing that at the level of initial monopoly, monopoly relies mainly on means such as digital platform control and channel and data regulation; at the level of second-round monopoly, advantages in traffic, data, and capital drive the spread of monopoly to other markets. [13]13 Li Yongjian et al., as cited by the authors; original source not specified in the text. Huang Yinxu et al. propose that the basis of platform monopoly lies in the linkage among platforms, data, and algorithms, i.e., digital platforms strengthen their market monopoly capacity by collecting data and constructing algorithms. [14]14 Huang Yinxu et al., as cited by the authors; original source not specified in the text. Li Hao et al. argue that digital enterprises achieve monopoly through capital manipulation of science, infiltration of political power, and the shaping of specific social cultures. [15]15 Li Hao et al., as cited by the authors; original source not specified in the text.

“土地所有权的前提是，一些人垄断一定量的土地，把它当做排斥其他一切人的、只服从自己私人意志的领域。”数字平台所有权的前提则是数字平台的垄断。平台经济的快速发展导致平台企业规模急剧扩大，从而不可避免地带来数字平台垄断问题。而且随着平台经济规模的不断扩大，数字平台垄断问题也愈发严峻。关于平台企业的垄断及其形成机制，国内研究成果颇丰。如，谢富胜等认为，平台企业垄断存在三个层次：特定相关市场上的横向垄断平台，纵向一体化和跨行业扩张的大型垄断性平台复合体，以特定基础平台为核心的层级嵌套式平台生态系统。李勇坚等分析了轴心型市场的初始垄断与辐射型市场的二轮垄断，认为在初始垄断层面，垄断主要依靠数字平台控制和渠道、数据管制等手段；在二轮垄断层面，流量、数据、资金优势等推动垄断向其他市场扩散。黄尹旭等提出，平台垄断的基础在于平台、数据、算法三者的联动，即数字平台通过收集数据、建构算法，从而强化其市场垄断能力。李灏等认为，数字企业会通过以资本操纵科学、渗透政治权力，以及塑造特定的社会文化，从而达到垄断的目的。

Thus it can be seen that the monopoly of digital platforms depends not only on technological factors but also on socio-cultural factors. First, digital platforms themselves have a tendency toward technological barriers and capital barriers. The monopoly of digital capital over key production factors lies in the fact that building a platform requires not only a large quantity of digital information equipment but also a large number of specialized technical personnel. At the same time, to ensure the normal operation of the platform, corresponding network protection technologies are also needed. These equipment, personnel, and technology inputs set up multiple obstacles for later entrants. Second, once a platform is constructed, data is generated continuously, and the continuously accumulated data, together with algorithms, sets up entry barriers for potential competitors of the platform. Finally, the number of platform users cannot be ignored. A large-scale user base can provide the platform with massive amounts of data, and also means a larger market share, which can continuously strengthen the platform’s monopoly position. To ensure the number of users, on the one hand, digital platforms enhance their hard power through means such as updating information equipment and optimizing data algorithms; on the other hand, they enhance their soft power through socio-cultural means such as improving management systems, shaping social culture, and cultivating user habits.

由此可见，数字平台的垄断既依赖于技术要素，又离不开社会文化要素。首先，数字平台本身就有技术壁垒和资本壁垒倾向。数字资本对关键生产要素的垄断在于，构建平台不仅需要大量的数字信息设备，还需要大量的专业技术人才。同时，为保证平台的正常运行，还需要相应的网络防护技术。这些设备、人才和技术投入为后进入者设置了重重障碍。其次，平台一旦构建完成，数据就源源不断地产生，而不断积累起来的数据连同算法一起，为平台的潜在竞争者设置了进入壁垒。最后，是不能忽视的平台用户数量。大规模的用户能够为平台提供海量数据，同时也意味着更大的市场份额，能够不断强化平台的垄断地位。为了保证用户数量，一方面，数字平台通过信息设备更新、数据算法优化等手段，提升平台的硬实力；另一方面，通过管理制度改进、社会文化塑造、用户习惯养成等社会文化手段，增强平台的软实力。

One view holds that the monopoly over data is the basis of platform profitability, and that platform revenue is data rent. Data has become a new factor of production, and its important role is beyond doubt. The revenue of some digital platforms is indeed closely related to data, but digital platforms collecting data rent is only a surface phenomenon. First, the ownership of data does not belong to the platform. The premise for the platform to possess data is its monopoly over digital space; the so-called data rent obtained by the platform is in essence obtained by relying on the monopoly over the virtual labour space. Second, digital platforms that do not rely on data can also be profitable. Digital platforms can be divided into various types, such as production-type, exchange-type, and consumption-type; many production-type platforms do not depend on data, such as industrial simulation design software. On these platforms, the data produced by labourers does not belong to the platform enterprise; the platform’s rental income is in essence obtained by relying on the monopoly over the virtual labour space. In short, data is an important driving factor for digital platform monopoly and may also bring revenue to the platform. But in essence, digital platform ownership is not only the ownership of tangible assets such as electronic equipment and intangible assets such as knowledge, technology, brand, reputation, and data, but also the ownership of the virtual labour space. Precisely because of this, the revenue of digital platforms consists of two different types of income: both the interest on the capital invested in the digital platform and the true economic form of realization of digital platform ownership, i.e., “cloud rent.”

一种观点认为，对数据的垄断是平台盈利的基础，平台收入是数据租金。数据成为新的生产要素，其重要作用毋庸置疑。一些数字平台的收入确实与数据密切相关，但数字平台收取数据租金只是表面现象。首先，数据的所有权并不属于平台。平台占有数据的前提是其对数字空间的垄断，平台获得所谓的数据租金实质上是依靠对虚拟劳动空间的垄断。其次，不依靠数据的数字平台也可以盈利。数字平台可以分为生产型、交换型、消费型等多种类型，很多生产型平台并不依赖于数据，如工业仿真设计软件等。在这些平台中，劳动者生产出的数据并不属于平台企业，平台的租金收入实质上是依靠对虚拟劳动空间的垄断。总之，数据是数字平台垄断的重要推动因素，也可能给平台带来收入。但从本质上看，数字平台所有权不仅是电子设备等有形资产的所有权及知识、技术、品牌、信誉、数据等无形资产的所有权，更是虚拟劳动空间的所有权。正因如此，数字平台的收入也由两种不同性质的收益组成，既包括投入数字平台的资本的利息，也包括数字平台所有权的真正经济实现形式，即“云租金”。

IV. The Forms of Realization and the Source of Value of “Cloud Rent”

四、“云租金”的实现形式与价值源泉

Digital platforms can, from an economic attribute perspective, be regarded as virtual land, i.e., “cloud fiefs.” Therefore, the analysis of “cloud rent” can be analogized to land rent. Duran [16]16 Cédric Durand, a French economist known for his work on digital capitalism and the concept of “techno-feudalism.” also considers contemporary capitalism from the perspective of rent, pointing out that “once we take the issue of rent seriously, the political economy of digital technology becomes a logic of techno-feudalism.” Platform revenue consists of two parts: the interest on platform capital and the platform rent based on the monopoly of digital platform ownership, i.e., “cloud rent.” Capital invested in platforms includes platform construction costs such as information equipment procurement and software algorithm development; the returns demanded by this portion of capital are included in platform revenue. But just as the returns on land capital do not constitute true land rent, this portion of platform revenue is not true “cloud rent.” “Rent is the form in which landed property is economically realized, i.e., valorized.” [17]17 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume III, Chapter 37. Similarly, “cloud rent” is the form in which digital platform ownership is economically realized; it is revenue of a rent-like nature obtained through digital platforms. E-commerce platforms are an important component of the platform economy, and the forms and sources of “cloud rent” can be better understood from their operational logic. Therefore, this section takes e-commerce platforms as an example to analyze the forms of realization and the sources of value of their “cloud rent” (hereinafter referred to as “platform rent”).

数字平台从经济属性上可被看作虚拟的土地，即“云封地”，因此，对“云租金”的分析可以类比土地租金。迪朗也正是从地租角度思考当代资本主义问题，并指出“一旦我们认真对待地租问题，数字技术的政治经济学就变成了一种技术封建主义逻辑”。平台收入由两部分组成，即平台资本的利息和以数字平台所有权垄断为基础的平台租金即“云租金”。投入平台的资本包括信息设备采购、软件算法构建等平台建设费用，这部分资本要求的收益包含在平台收入之中。但正如土地资本的收益不构成真正的地租一样，这部分平台收入也不是真正的“云租金”。“地租是土地所有权在经济上借以实现即增殖价值的形式。”同样的，“云租金”是数字平台所有权在经济上的实现形式，是通过数字平台获取的类似于地租性质的收入。电子商务平台是平台经济的重要组成部分，从其运行逻辑中可以更好地理解“云租金”的形式和来源。因此，这里以电商平台为例，分析其“云租金”（以下简称“台租”）的实现形式与价值源泉。

(I) The heterogeneity of information flow in digital space generates differential platform rent

（一）数字空间信息流量的异质性产生了级差台租

When Marx explained the general concept of differential rent, he took the example of a natural waterfall. “This natural force is a monopolizable natural force, like a waterfall, which only those who control a particular stretch of land and its appurtenances can control. … Such a natural force is neither a general condition of the relevant branch of production nor a condition that can generally be created by that branch of production.” [18]18 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume III, Chapter 38. Digital space is the form of existence of information movement; therefore, the natural force monopolized by digital platforms manifests in e-commerce platforms as higher information flow. The virtual space provided by e-commerce platforms is essentially information-processing space, and this space is not homogeneous; the information contained or displayable on different platforms varies. Consequently, platforms with large information content and strong display capabilities are like land with waterfalls, and the excess profit thus generated is also the basis for differential platform rent.

马克思在阐释级差地租的一般概念时，是以自然瀑布为例的。“这种自然力是一种可以垄断的自然力，就像瀑布那样，只有那些支配着特殊地段及其附属物的人才能够支配它。……这样的自然力，既不是相关生产部门的一般条件，也不是该生产部门一般都能创造的条件。”数字空间是信息运动的存在形式，因而数字平台垄断的自然力在电商平台中就表现为更高的信息流量。电商平台所提供的虚拟空间本质上是信息处理空间，而该空间并不是同质的，不同平台所蕴含的或能展示的信息存在差异。因此，信息含量大、展示能力强的平台就如同拥有瀑布的土地一样，而由此带来的超额利润也是级差台租的基础。

Differential rent I is based on land fertility and land location; differential platform rent I is also based on these two factors, except that in platform space, “fertility” and “location” are closely related—a good “location” often implies high “fertility,” and the excess profit brought by this high “fertility” is precisely the basis of differential platform rent I. In e-commerce platforms, differential platform rent I depends on external traffic and internal rankings. So-called external traffic refers to the volume of information flowing into the e-commerce platform and is one manifestation of the platform’s “fertility.” The higher the external traffic, the higher the platform’s “fertility,” the higher the probability of commodity transactions, and the larger the transaction volume. External traffic is mainly related to the platform’s technological level, degree of management perfection, and brand recognition. At the same time, external traffic does not uniformly increase the “fertility” of platform space; it varies according to different internal rankings on the platform. Internet bidding rankings are common, and internal bidding rankings on platforms are also frequent; higher-ranked display positions tend to obtain more traffic, thereby achieving higher profits.

级差地租Ⅰ以土地肥力和土地位置为基础，级差台租Ⅰ也以二者为基础，只是在平台空间中，“肥力”与“位置”密切相关，好的“位置”往往意味着高的“肥力”，而这种高的“肥力”所带来的超额利润正是级差台租Ⅰ的基础。在电商平台中，级差台租Ⅰ依赖于外部流量和内部排名。所谓外部流量是指流入该电商平台的信息量，是电商平台“肥力”的表现之一。外部流量越高，电商平台的“肥力”越高，其商品成交概率就越高，成交额也越大。外部流量主要与平台的技术水平、管理完善程度、知名度等相关。同时，外部流量并不会均等地提高平台空间的“肥力”，而会因平台内部排名不同而有所区别。互联网竞价排名屡见不鲜，平台内部竞价排名也很常见，靠前的展示位置往往能够获得较多的流量，进而实现更高的利润。

Differential rent II is related to additional capital investment; differential platform rent II is likewise. The excess profit generated by e-commerce merchants’ investment in their own reputation and credibility, as well as platforms’ improvement of their own technology and enhancement of brand recognition, constitutes the basis of differential platform rent II. First, e-commerce merchants establish pre-sale, in-sale, and after-sale customer service systems, strictly control product quality, and improve product logistics and distribution processes, thereby enhancing brand reputation and recognition, ultimately achieving increased product sales. Second, based on the monopolistic competition among large e-commerce platforms, each platform continuously improves its own technology, refines management models, and boosts platform recognition in order to attract more external traffic and expand transaction scale, thereby providing possibilities for commercial capital to absorb more surplus value.

级差地租Ⅱ与追加资本有关，级差台租Ⅱ同样如此。电商对自身的口碑、信誉的投资，以及平台完善自身技术、提高知名度所带来的超额利润是级差台租Ⅱ的基础。首先，电商通过建立售前、售中、售后客户服务体系，严格把控商品质量，完善商品物流配送流程，进而提高品牌信誉、认知度，最终达到提升商品销售额的目的。其次，基于大型电商平台之间的垄断竞争状态，各电商平台不断完善自身技术、改进管理模式、提升平台知名度，以便吸引更多外部流量、扩大交易规模，进而为商业资本吮吸更多的剩余价值提供了可能。

Differential platform rent I and differential platform rent II are both connected and distinct. First, differential platform rent II is based on differential platform rent I. Although differential platform rent II arises from additional capital investment, its essence remains excess profit obtained by relying on differences in the “fertility” of digital space. The platform’s own additional investment will increase the platform’s overall traffic, i.e., raise the platform’s “fertility.” E-commerce merchants’ investment in their own reputation and credibility both increases the platform’s “fertility” and boosts traffic to their own stores. Second, differential platform rent II differs from differential platform rent I in terms of the mode of appropriation. The basis of differential platform rent I mainly comes from the e-commerce platform itself; although external traffic is related to the number of merchants入驻, it is primarily based on the platform’s hardware facilities, software services, management systems, and reputation. At the same time, the internal ranking of the e-commerce platform is mainly controlled by the platform owner. Therefore, differential platform rent I is directly appropriated by the e-commerce platform owner. The basis of differential platform rent II is the improvement of both the platform owner and the入驻 merchants through additional investment. The platform owner’s additional investment benefits the entire platform, and the resulting differential platform rent II is jointly appropriated by the platform owner and the入驻 merchants. As the platform continues to invest additional capital and the effects of that investment are released, new merchants continuously入驻, and the increase in platform traffic leads to intensified competition. To maintain their internal ranking on the platform, merchants must increase their investment; coupled with the platform’s common practice of charging fees based on transaction volume, this ultimately leads to the gradual transfer of the differential platform rent II generated by platform investment—previously appropriated by merchants—into the hands of the platform owner. As for the入驻 merchants’ additional investment in their own stores, while improving their stores, it also increases the overall traffic of the platform; thus, the differential platform rent II arising from this is also jointly appropriated by the platform owner and the入驻 merchants, with the former taking a larger share. Moreover, when a merchant exits the platform, the portion of differential platform rent II appropriated by the merchant is not entirely transferred to the platform owner, because the merchant’s additional investment is mainly directed at the quality and reputation of its own store, rather than at improving the platform.

级差台租Ⅰ和级差台租Ⅱ既有联系又有区别。首先，级差台租Ⅱ以级差台租Ⅰ为基础。级差台租Ⅱ尽管是由追加资本产生的，但其本质依然是依靠数字空间的“肥力”差别而获得的超额利润。平台自身的追加投资会提高平台的整体流量，即提高平台的“肥力”。电商对自身口碑、信誉等的投资既会提高平台的“肥力”，又会提高自身商铺的流量。其次，级差台租Ⅱ与级差台租Ⅰ存在区别，即二者的占有方式不同。级差台租Ⅰ的基础主要来自电商平台本身，平台的外部流量虽然与入驻商家的数量有关，但主要以平台的硬件设施、软件服务、管理制度及信誉口碑等为基础。同时，电商平台的内部排名也主要由平台所有者控制。因此，级差台租Ⅰ被电商平台所有者直接占有。级差台租Ⅱ的基础是平台所有者和入驻商家通过追加投资对自身的改良。平台所有者的追加投资有益于整个平台，由此产生的级差台租Ⅱ由平台所有者和入驻商家共同占有。随着平台继续追加投资及投资效应的释放，不断有新的商家入驻，而平台流量增加会导致竞争趋于激烈，商家要保持自身在平台的内部排名，就要加大投资，加之平台往往存在按成交额收费的条款，从而最终导致由商家占有的由平台投资带来的级差台租Ⅱ逐渐转移到平台所有者手中。而入驻商家对自家店铺的追加投资，在改良店铺的同时也促进了整个平台的流量增加，因而由此带来的级差台租Ⅱ同样由平台所有者和入驻商家共同占有，只是前者占据了更大份额。并且，当商家退出平台时，由商家占有的这部分级差台租Ⅱ并不会完全转移到平台所有者手中，因为商家的追加投资主要是针对自家店铺的质量、口碑等，而非是对平台的改良。

(II) The division of surplus value from industrial capital forms absolute platform rent

（二）对产业资本剩余价值的分割形成绝对台租

Just as with land resources, rent must be paid whenever a digital platform is used; this form of platform rent, distinct from differential platform rent I and differential platform rent II, is absolute platform rent. The platform rent of e-commerce platforms originates from surplus value divided from industrial capital. In the traditional business model, there exist agents at various levels, numerous intermediaries, and many retailers. The e-commerce model significantly shortens circulation links, even enabling direct transactions between producers and consumers. The shortening of circulation links also greatly reduces the total amount of commercial capital and increases the turnover speed of commercial capital. On the one hand, the emergence of e-commerce platforms reduces the warehousing and storage costs of goods for distributors and retailers at various levels. On the other hand, e-commerce does not need to pay rent, utilities, or sales staff wages like physical stores. Here, we take the case of e-commerce platforms reducing the total amount of commercial capital as an example:

与土地资源一样，只要使用数字平台，就要缴纳租金，这种区别于级差台租Ⅰ和级差台租Ⅱ的台租形式即绝对台租。电商平台的台租来源于由产业资本分割的剩余价值。在传统商业模式中，存在着各级代理商、大量中间商和众多零售商。电商模式则大幅缩短了流通环节，甚至可以实现生产商与消费者的直接交易。流通环节的缩短也大大减少了商业资本的总量，提高了商业资本的周转速度。一方面，电商平台的出现减少了各级经销商、零售商的商品仓储、保管等费用。另一方面，电商不需要像实体商店那样支付房租、水电及销售人员工资等费用。这里以电商平台减少商业资本总量的情况为例：

Assume that the e-commerce price and the physical store price of a certain commodity A are the same (1), and without considering the impact of capital turnover, the ex-factory price of industrial capital is:

假设某一商品A的电商价格和实体店价格是相同的(1)，且不考虑资本周转的影响，产业资本的出厂价格为：

Where C0 represents the total capital consumed in the production process of commodity A, and r represents the average rate of profit (after averaging with commercial capital).

其中，C0表示商品A生产过程所耗费的总资本，r表示平均利润率（已和商业资本平均之后的利润率）。

There are two pathways for commodity A to enter the consumption sphere from the production sphere: one is through traditional intermediaries at various levels and physical retailers; the other is through e-commerce platforms. Then, in the former case, the price at which the commodity reaches the consumer is:

商品A由生产领域进入消费领域有两种途径，一是经过传统的各级中间商及实体零售商，二是经过电商平台。那么，在前一种情况下，商品到达消费者手中的价格是：

Where C1i represents the commercial capital of agents and intermediaries at various levels, and C2 represents the commercial capital of retailers. ∑C1i·r + C2·r represents the total capital and the profit obtained by agents, intermediaries, and retailers at various levels.

其中，C1i表示各级代理商和中间商的商业资本，C2表示零售商的商业资本。∑C1i·r+C2·r则表示各级代理商、中间商及零售商的总资本量及所获利润量。

In the latter case, the price at which the commodity reaches the consumer is:

在后一种情况下，商品到达消费者手中的价格是：

(3)

（3）

Here, C3 and r1 respectively denote the capital volume and profit rate of e-commerce platform merchants. Under the condition that e-commerce prices equal physical-store prices, the profit rate of e-commerce platform merchants is:

其中，C3、r1分别表示电商平台商家的资本量及其利润率。在电商价格等于实体店价格的条件下，电商平台商家的利润率为：

(4)

（4）

It can thus be seen that, without considering capital turnover factors, when completing the sale of an equal quantity of commodities, if the commercial capital volume of e-commerce is less than that of the traditional sales model, e-commerce can obtain a higher profit rate. If we consider the case where e-commerce accelerates capital turnover, because e-commerce’s costs of inventory accumulation, commodity warehousing, etc., are lower than those of physical agents and retailers, its capital turnover speed is faster, and thus its annual profit will also be higher. This portion of surplus profit exceeding the average profit is precisely the source of absolute platform rent. In sum, the monopoly of platform ownership is the cause of absolute platform rent, while the surplus value transferred by industrial capitalists is the source of absolute platform rent.

由此可见，在不考虑资本周转因素时，完成等量的商品销售，若电商的商业资本量小于传统销售模式的商业资本量，那么电商可以获得更高的利润率。如果考虑电商加速资本周转的情况，因电商的存货积压、商品仓储等成本要小于实体代理商、零售商，所以其资本周转速度要更快，从而年利润也将更高，而这部分超出平均利润的超额利润正是绝对台租的来源。总而言之，平台所有权的垄断是绝对台租产生的原因，产业资本家转移的剩余价值则是绝对台租的来源。

(3) Monopoly Profit Based on Monopoly Price Constitutes Monopoly Platform Rent

（三）基于垄断价格的垄断利润构成垄断台租

Absolute rent and differential rent are the two basic forms of ground rent. “Apart from this, ground rent can only be based on a genuine monopoly price, which is determined neither by the production price of the commodity nor by its value, but by the buyer’s need and ability to pay.” [19]19 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chapter 46. Academic circles generally refer to this form of rent as monopoly rent. In digital platforms, there also exists monopoly platform rent based on monopoly profit. The basis of agricultural monopoly rent is the rare and scarce products yielded by certain special lands and the monopoly price they form; the basis of monopoly platform rent is likewise the monopoly price.

绝对地租和级差地租是地租的两种基本形式，“除此以外，地租只能以真正的垄断价格为基础，这种垄断价格既不是由商品的生产价格决定，也不是由商品的价值决定，而是由购买者的需要和支付能力决定”，学界一般把这种地租形式称为垄断地租。在数字平台中，也存在着以垄断利润为基础的垄断台租。农业垄断地租的基础是某些特殊土地所产出的名贵而稀少的产品及其形成的垄断价格，垄断台租的基础同样是垄断价格。

Digital space is limited and heterogeneous; this is the basis for some merchants to form monopoly prices. First, digital platforms themselves are limited, and the infinity of the virtual space they can provide is also relative; for example, technological barriers, capital barriers, and brand effects restrict the number of platforms. The virtual space provided by digital platforms far exceeds the absolute space of land in reality, and through means such as optimizing software and hardware facilities, a relatively larger amount of virtual space can be obtained at a relatively small cost; thus, the virtual space of digital platforms is theoretically approximately infinite. However, although digital space can theoretically expand without limit, it is constrained by factors such as the quantity of labor power, the performance of smart terminals, and the scale of the market, and therefore has de facto finitude. For instance, the information that a smartphone screen can display is limited; when shopping online, consumers usually only browse a few pages of search results, so the space of e-commerce platforms does not expand indefinitely. Second, the digital space provided by digital platforms is also not homogeneous. This causes the information content and information flow speed of certain positions in digital space to be superior to other positions, thereby laying the foundation for the generation of monopoly profit. The monopoly profit here refers to the profit obtained by platform users due to their monopoly over certain spatial positions, not the income brought by the platform owner’s monopoly over the platform. Certain special positions in digital space are occupied by some merchants; these positions can provide better information presentation and attract more traffic, thereby enabling faster and larger-scale commodity transactions. However, this profit is still transformed into differential platform rent. Only when merchants, by virtue of these advantageous positions, sell commodities at a monopoly price exceeding the commodity’s value, thereby obtaining monopoly profit, can this constitute the basis of monopoly platform rent. The oligopolistic monopoly of e-commerce platforms and the heterogeneity of online and offline commodities mentioned earlier also provide conditions for the formation of monopoly prices for some e-commerce merchants.

数字空间是有限且不同质的，这是部分商家形成垄断价格的基础。首先，数字平台本身是有限的，其所能提供的虚拟空间的无限性也是相对的，如技术壁垒、资本壁垒及品牌效应等会限制平台的数量。数字平台所提供的虚拟空间远远多于现实中土地的绝对空间，并且能通过优化软硬件设施等方式，以相对较小的成本获得相对较多的虚拟空间，因而数字平台的虚拟空间在理论上具有近似的无限性。然而，数字空间虽然理论上可以无限扩展，但受到劳动力数量、智能终端的性能、市场规模等因素的限制，因而具有事实上的有限性。如，智能手机屏幕所能显示的信息是有限的，消费者网上购物时通常只会浏览少数几页的搜索结果，所以电商平台的空间不会无限扩大。其次，数字平台提供的数字空间也不是同质的。这就造成数字空间中某些位置的信息含量和信息流动速度优于其他位置，从而为垄断利润的产生奠定了基础。这里的垄断利润是指平台的使用者由于对某些空间位置的垄断而获得的利润，而非平台的所有者对平台的垄断所带来的收入。数字空间中某些特殊位置被部分商家占有，这些位置能够提供更好的信息呈现、吸引更多的流量，从而可以实现更快和更大规模的商品交易，但是这种利润依然会转化成级差台租。只有商家凭借这种有利位置以超过商品价值的垄断价格出售商品，进而获得垄断利润，才能构成垄断台租的基础。前文提到的电商平台的寡头垄断、线上线下商品异质化等，同样也为部分电商垄断价格的形成提供了条件。

V. The Essence of “Techno-Feudalism” and the Inevitable Historical Trend of Capitalism’s Decline

五、“技术封建主义”的本质与资本主义衰亡的必然历史趋势

Platform rent or “cloud rent” ultimately comes from the surplus value created by the paid labor of wage workers. The essence of “techno-feudalism” is the technological extension of capitalist relations of production, further highlighting the parasitic nature of capitalism, which achieves the upgrading of exploitation through technological restructuring. However, Marxists must be wary of its metaphorical trap, adhere to starting from the theory of surplus value, and squarely face the contemporary characteristics of capitalist development and its accelerating historical trend of decline.

台租或“云租金”归根结底来自雇佣工人的有偿劳动创造的剩余价值。“技术封建主义”的本质是资本主义生产关系的技术化延伸，进一步彰显了资本主义通过技术重构实现剥削升级的寄生性本质。但马克思主义者需警惕其隐喻陷阱，坚持从剩余价值理论出发，正视资本主义发展的当代特征及其加速衰落的历史趋势。

(1) “Techno-Feudalism” Is a New Form of Capitalist Development in the Digital Information Age

（一）“技术封建主义”是数字信息时代资本主义发展的新形式

“Cloud fiefs” are the result of the “enclosure movement” in the digital information age. Compared with the early stage of capitalist development, the “enclosure movement” in the digital information age exhibits different characteristics in both content and form. In terms of content, digital space is the object of “enclosure” in the digital information age. Historically, the bourgeoisie forcibly expropriated peasants’ farmland, destroying the connection between laborers and the conditions of labor, thereby laying the foundation for the establishment and development of the capitalist mode of production. As capitalist relations of production came to dominate, the vast majority of laborers lost their means of production and became wage workers, and the expropriation of land or means of production gave way to exploitation mainly manifested in the extraction of absolute or relative surplus value. However, with the continuous development of digital information technology and the popularization of digital infrastructure, it has become possible for laborers to again have direct contact with the means of production. Digital space serves as the “land,” and users can complete production and life activities on digital platforms. Capitalist production does not allow laborers to own and freely use the means of production; hence the “enclosure movement” for digital space arises. With the formation and continuous consolidation of the monopoly position of digital platforms, “cloud fiefs” appear. Moreover, due to the characteristics of digital space, digital platforms can penetrate into various fields of production and life, making the scope of the “enclosure movement” even broader. In terms of form, the “enclosure movement” in the digital information age adopts more concealed technological violence. Before using a digital platform, users must agree to a series of terms and hand over various information such as personal accounts to the platform enterprise; otherwise, they cannot use the platform’s related functions. The expropriation of users’ digital assets by platforms based on technological monopoly is more convenient and concealed, while the expropriation of “cloud serfs’” digital achievements by “cloud capital” is a form of primitive accumulation of capital in the digital information age.

“云封地”是数字信息时代“圈地运动”的结果。相较于资本主义发展初期，数字信息时代的“圈地运动”在内容和形式上都呈现了不同特征。在内容方面，数字空间是数字信息时代“圈地”的对象。历史上，资产阶级强制剥夺农民的耕地，破坏了劳动者与劳动条件之间的联系，为资本主义生产方式的建立与发展奠定了基础。随着资本主义生产关系占据了主导地位，绝大部分劳动者失去了生产资料并沦为雇佣工人，对土地或生产资料的剥夺让位于以绝对或相对剩余价值的获取为主要表现形式的剥削。然而，随着数字信息技术的不断发展和数字基础设施的普及，劳动者再次与生产资料产生直接联系成为可能。数字空间充当了“土地”的角色，用户可在数字平台上完成生产和生活活动。资本主义生产不允许劳动者拥有并自由使用生产资料，对数字空间的“圈地运动”因此而产生。随着数字平台垄断地位的形成及不断巩固，“云封地”便出现了。并且由于数字空间的特性，数字平台可以渗透到生产和生活的各个领域，使得“圈地运动”的范围更加广泛。在形式方面，数字信息时代的“圈地运动”采用的是更加隐蔽的技术暴力。用户在使用数字平台前必须同意一系列条款，并将个人账户等各类信息交付给平台企业，否则将不能使用平台的相关功能。基于技术垄断的平台对用户数字资产的剥夺更便捷和隐蔽，而“云资本”对“云农奴”数字成果的剥夺则是数字信息时代的资本原始积累形式。

The “techno-feudalism” theory holds that digital platforms have dissolved the market because the former have lost the fundamental characteristic of the market: decentralization. However, first, whether it is decentralized or not is not a sufficient condition for judging whether a market exists, because the essence of the market is exchange. Although exchange-type digital platforms isolate sellers from sellers and buyers from buyers, they do not eliminate commodity exchange itself. Second, so-called decentralization is closer to the market characteristics of the stage of free-competition capitalism, but as capitalism entered the monopoly stage, capital concentration and monopoly have long become the main characteristics of the market. At the same time, due to the limited scale of private capital, no single capital can completely monopolize the market; oligopolistic competition may exist within the same market segment, and different markets are often controlled by different capital groups. Therefore, even against the backdrop of the increasing development of digital platforms, the characteristics of market decentralization and competition still exist.

“技术封建主义”理论认为，数字平台瓦解了市场，因为前者失去了市场的根本特征：分散。然而，首先，分散与否并不是判断市场是否存在的充分条件，因为市场的本质是交换。尽管交换类的数字平台将卖家与卖家之间、买家与买家之间隔离开来，但并没有消除商品交换本身。其次，所谓的分散更接近于自由资本主义阶段的市场特征，但随着资本主义进入垄断阶段，资本集中和垄断早已成为市场的主要特征。同时，由于私人资本规模的有限性，任何资本都无法完全垄断市场，同一细分市场中可能存在寡头竞争，不同市场也常由不同的资本集团所控制。因此，即使是在数字平台日益发展的背景下，市场的分散和竞争特征依然存在。

Platform rent or “cloud rent” is the economic form of realization of digital platform ownership, and in the final analysis it comes from the value created by the living labor of the working class. The forms of “cloud rent” are diverse, and the criteria for classification are also complex and varied. Examining “cloud rent” from the value level, the category of users who pay the rent can be used as the classification standard. Users of digital platforms can be divided into production-type, exchange-type, and consumption-type, and “cloud rent” can also be divided into three categories accordingly. Specifically, with the increasing prevalence of production-side digital platforms such as the Industrial Internet, the production sphere is increasingly inseparable from various types of industrial software. The production-type “cloud rent” paid by their relevant users is a partial deduction from the final value realized through social exchange of the commodities produced by their own labor. The representative of exchange-type “cloud rent” is the rent paid by the numerous merchants who settle on e-commerce platforms. Since the sales sphere does not create value, its profits come from the surplus value obtained by industrial capital; therefore, the rent it pays comes directly from its own profits, and in the final analysis is still value created by industrial workers. The representative of consumption-type “cloud rent” is the user groups who use digital platforms; the “cloud rent” paid by such subjects comes from their income, and for the vast majority of users comes from their wages, that is, a portion of the value they create through labor.

台租或“云租金”是数字平台所有权的经济实现形式，归根结底来自工人阶级活劳动创造的价值。“云租金”的形式多样，分类标准也纷繁复杂。从价值层面来看“云租金”，可以缴纳租金的用户类别作为划分标准。使用数字平台的用户可以划分为生产类、交换类和消费类，“云租金”也可据此分为三类。具体来看，随着工业互联网等生产端数字平台的日益普及，生产领域越来越离不开各类工业软件，其相关用户所交纳的生产类“云租金”，就是自身劳动生产的商品经过社会交换而实现的最终价值的部分扣除。交换类“云租金”的代表是入驻电商平台的众多商家所缴纳的租金。由于销售领域并不创造价值，其利润来自产业资本所获得的剩余价值，因此，其缴纳的租金直接来自本身的利润，归根结底仍是产业工人创造的价值。消费类“云租金”的代表是使用数字平台的用户群体，此类主体交纳的“云租金”来自其收入，对于绝大部分用户而言是来自其工资，即其通过劳动创造的价值的一部分。

In summary, markets and profits have not disappeared; “cloud capital” has strengthened the control and exploitation of the proletariat in a completely new form, invisibly pushing the degree of capitalist monopoly to a new peak, and also accelerating the decline of capitalism.

总而言之，市场和利润没有消亡，“云资本”以一种全新的形式强化了对无产阶级的控制和剥削，无形中将资本主义的垄断程度推向新的高峰，也加速了资本主义的衰落。

(II) The development of digital technology has not changed the historical trend of the inevitable demise of capitalism

（二）数字技术的发展没有改变资本主义必然灭亡的历史趋势

As a core critical paradigm of contemporary Western left-wing scholars toward digital capitalism, the theoretical value of “techno-feudalism” theory lies in its keen capture of the new changes in the means of capital accumulation in the digital age and the strengthening of capitalist monopoly and oppression. However, its reduction of the historical dialectical movement to a narrative of “regression” and its analogy of digital monopoly to feudal land annexation—this metaphor obscures the essence of capitalist exploitation. The “cloud rent” proposed by “techno-feudalism” is essentially capital’s redistribution of surplus value through monopolizing digital means of production, rather than a completely new mechanism of exploitation. At the same time, “techno-feudalism” overemphasizes the autonomy of technology, regards platform monopoly as a historical inevitability, neglects the historical role of the proletariat, and mistakenly regards the “cloudists” [20]20 “Cloudists” (云主义者) refers to the class of digital platform users or workers whose labor and data are exploited by “cloud capital,” a term used in the techno-feudalism discourse to denote those supposedly positioned to overthrow digital capitalism. as the gravediggers of the bourgeoisie. Marxists need to be alert to its metaphorical trap, adhere to starting from the theory of surplus value, and correctly understand the latest development of capitalism in the digital age.

“技术封建主义”理论作为当代西方左翼学者对数字资本主义的核心批判范式，其理论价值在于敏锐地捕捉到了数字时代资本积累手段的新变化和资本主义垄断性与压迫性的强化。但其将历史辩证运动简化为“倒退”叙事，将数字垄断类比为封建土地兼并，这种隐喻遮蔽了资本主义剥削的本质。“技术封建主义”提出的“云租金”本质上是资本通过垄断数字生产资料对剩余价值的再分配，而非全新的剥削机制。同时，“技术封建主义”过度强调技术的自主性，将平台垄断视为历史必然，忽视了无产阶级的历史作用，错误地将“云主义者”视作资产阶级的掘墓人。马克思主义者需要警惕其隐喻陷阱，坚持从剩余价值理论出发，正确认识数字时代资本主义的最新发展。

The essence of “techno-feudalism” is the technological extension of capitalist relations of production, further confirming the parasitic nature of capitalism in achieving upgraded exploitation through technological restructuring. By monopolizing data assets and algorithmic power, tech giants have transformed the traditional mechanism of surplus value exploitation into a new extraction mechanism centered on rent. The fusion of financial capital and tech giants has further reduced digital technology to a tool for capital expansion. The center of gravity of capital accumulation has shifted from material production to the enclosure of digital commons such as user behavior and social relations, and the traditional bourgeoisie has gradually become a vassal of the technological oligarchy. This exposes the intensification of the inherent contradictions of capitalism—the conflict between the privatization of the means of production and the socialized nature of digital technology has become irreconcilable, and the capitalist system is accelerating its historical process of self-negation through technological monopoly.

“技术封建主义”的本质是资本主义生产关系的技术化延伸，进一步印证了资本主义通过技术重构实现剥削升级的寄生性本质。科技巨头通过垄断数据资产与算法权力，将传统的剩余价值剥削机制转化为以租金为核心的新型榨取机制。金融资本与科技巨头的融合则使数字技术进一步沦为资本扩张的工具。资本积累的重心已从物质生产转向对用户行为、社交关系等数字公地的圈占，传统资产阶级逐渐成为技术寡头的附庸。这揭露了资本主义内在矛盾的激化——生产资料的私有化与数字技术的社会化属性之间的冲突已不可调和，资本主义制度正通过技术垄断加速其自我否定的历史进程。

In conclusion, the analysis of “techno-feudalism” must take Marxist dialectical materialism as the methodological guide. It is necessary both to face squarely the reality that digital technology has been alienated by capital into a tool of domination, and not to ignore the essence that capital accumulation in the digital information age remains the exploitation of surplus value; it is necessary both to affirm its critical value in exposing the decline of the capitalist system, and to be alert to the dissolution of revolutionary subjectivity by historical metaphor. Only by taking the theory of surplus value as the theoretical foundation of technological critique can we correctly understand the contemporary development of capitalism and its historical trend of accelerated decline and inevitable demise.

总之，对“技术封建主义”的分析要以马克思主义唯物辩证法为方法论指南，既要正视数字技术被资本异化为统治工具的现实，也不能忽视数字信息时代资本积累仍是剥削剩余价值的本质；既要肯定其揭露资本主义制度衰亡的批判价值，也要警惕历史隐喻对革命主体性的消解。唯有将剩余价值理论作为技术批判的理论基石，才能正确认识资本主义的当代发展及其加速衰落和必然灭亡的历史趋势。

(Author affiliations: Northwestern Polytechnical University, Nankai University · University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 21st Century Marxism Research Institute)

（作者单位分别为：西北工业大学、南开大学·中国社会科学院大学21世纪马克思主义研究院）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗