The Historical Presence of Philosophy

The contemporary notion that “philosophy is the history of philosophy” is largely attributable to Hegel’s systematic elaboration. His *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* inaugurated the tradition of grasping philosophy through its history: within the framework of speculative philosophy he constructed the history of Western philosophy, while simultaneously situating the question of truth in philosophical inquiry within the temporally fluid process of philosophical history. Under the principle of “the unity of history and logic,” Hegel’s doctrine of the history of philosophy combined the systematicity of knowledge with its empirical dimension, thereby uniting the singularity and multiplicity of thought, and the eternity and historicity of truth. Heidegger called it “the first philosophical history of philosophy, the first appropriate historical investigation, but at the same time the final and final possible form of such investigation.”

今人“哲学即哲学史”的观念，很大程度归功于黑格尔的系统性阐发。其《哲学史讲演录》开启了以哲学史把握哲学的传统：他既在思辨哲学框架之中构架西方哲学的历史，又把哲学研究的真理问题落在具有时间流变性的哲学史进程之中。在“历史与逻辑之一致”的原则之下，黑格尔的哲学史学说结合了知识的系统性与经验维度，进而结合了思想的单一性与复多性、真理的永恒性与历史性。海德格尔称之为“第一部哲学上的哲学史，是第一次适当的历史探究，但同时也是这种探究最后的和最后可能的形态”。

For Hegel, however, the position that “philosophy is the history of philosophy” was not a self-evident presupposition, but a theoretical solution to the core problem his intellectual development confronted. In fact, the fact that “philosophy has a history” constituted a major intellectual challenge for post-Kantian philosophers who sought to make philosophy a science with systematicity. Tracing Hegel’s intellectual development, in his early Jena period he denied the historicity of philosophy; subsequently, through his conception of dialectics, he developed a doctrine of the historical process of spirit; and finally, in his doctrine of the history of philosophy, he comprehensively established the connection between philosophy and its history. This article will trace Hegel’s different conceptual approaches to the relation between philosophy and its history from the Jena period to his mature stage, in order to clarify the conceptual background and core insights with which Hegel constructed his theory of the history of philosophy, and thereby to discern the intellectual orientation of this doctrine.

不过对黑格尔来说，“哲学即哲学史”这一立场并非不言自明的设定，而是对他思想发展所面对的核心问题的理论解决。事实上，“哲学具有历史”这一事实，对于追求哲学之科学与体系性的后康德哲学家来说，构成了巨大的思想挑战。从黑格尔的思想发展来看，他在耶拿早期否定了哲学的历史性，随后通过对辩证法的构思而发展了关于精神之历史化进程的学说，进而在其哲学史学说中整体性地建立了哲学与其历史的关联。本文将回溯黑格尔自耶拿时期到成熟阶段关于哲学与哲学历史之关联的不同思想方案，以说明黑格尔架构其哲学史理论的概念背景和核心洞见，进而辨析这一学说的思想定位。

I. The Supra-Historical Character of Philosophy

一、哲学的超历史性

From the perspective of Hegel’s philosophical development, the philosopher’s first thematic treatment of the problem of the history of philosophy appears in the 1801 *Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy*. In this period, Hegel’s problematic radiated outward from the context of post-Kantian philosophy, focusing on how to make philosophy a science. This theoretical goal originated from the systematic conception prepared in Kant’s critical philosophy, was developed through K. L. Reinhold’s philosophy of representation, and received explicit expression in Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre* and Schelling’s philosophy. The core aim of this theoretical direction was to establish a single, universally necessary system.

从黑格尔哲学的发展来看，哲学家第一次主题性地考察哲学史问题，见于1801年《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》。这一时期黑格尔的问题意识辐射在后康德哲学之背景下，关注于如何让哲学成为一门科学。这一理论目标源自于康德批判哲学中预备的体系构想，通过莱茵霍尔德（K.L.Reinhold）的表象哲学得到了发展，并在费希特知识学和谢林哲学中得到了明确表达。此理论方向的核心目标在于去建立一门唯一的、具有普遍必然性的体系。

In this context, Hegel emphasized: “The entire work of reason, and its activity, is also in philosophy itself. And as far as the inner essence of philosophy is concerned, it has neither predecessors nor successors”; “Speculation is the activity of the single and universal reason itself, so it must not see in the various systems of philosophy of different times and persons merely different viewpoints and purely idiosyncratic perspectives.” According to Hegel’s claim, reason is singular, and the scientific system established by reason can only be one; the manifold variety of cognitions, since they necessarily conflict and contradict one another, represent opinion rather than truth: “The multiplicity of concepts of the understanding and of opinions—such multiplicity is not philosophy.” Since reason is universal and indubitable, the knowledge derived from it is necessary and absolute; this unconditioned system of knowledge transcends history.

在此背景中，黑格尔强调：“理性的整个工作以及它的活动，也在哲学本身之中。并且就哲学的内在本质来说，既没有先行者，也没有后来者”；“思辨是单一而普遍的理性自己本身的活动，所以它必须在不同时代和人物的诸哲学体系之中不要只看到不同的方式和纯粹独特的观点”。根据黑格尔的主张，理性是唯一的，由理性所建立的科学体系也只能是一个；而纷繁多样的认识，由于必然存在相互龃龉和冲突，代表着意见而非真理：“知性概念的多样性及意见，这样的多样性不是哲学”。既然理性是普遍的、确定无疑的，那么从中推出知识是必然的、绝对的；这一无条件的知识体系超越了历史。

Hegel’s definition of the history of philosophy was consistent with the mainstream view of his time: the history of philosophy, as a presentation of different philosophical thoughts in history, does not belong to philosophy. In comparison, Hegel’s contemporary Reinhold held that the history of philosophy could still be taught as an introduction to philosophy, because philosophy is a universally valid art that needs to be perfected through historical refinement; the history of philosophy thus constituted the forecourt of philosophical training, providing the knowledge base on which philosophical analysis depends. Hegel’s position was more resolute: he emphasized that the work of reason does not lie in the art of analysis and argumentation, but in the intuition and presentation of the Absolute. To enter into genuine thought, one can only take a risk of reason, “plunging in without reserve” in a groundless place, “establishing the Absolute in consciousness.” The thoughts that appear in the history of philosophy are invalid for the presentation of the Absolute in consciousness. Hegel emphasized: “Every reason that contemplates and knows itself produces a genuine philosophy, to solve the task, which, like its solution, is the same at all times.”

黑格尔对哲学史的界定与当时的主流看法一致：哲学史作为对历史上不同哲学思想的呈现并不属于哲学。相较而言，黑格尔的同代人莱茵霍尔德认为，哲学史仍然可以作为哲学导论而被传授，因为哲学是一种普遍有效的技艺，需要在历史打磨中日臻完善；而哲学史则构成了哲学训练的前院，提供了哲学分析所依赖的知识基础。而黑格尔的立场更坚决，他强调理性的工作并不在于分析与论证的技艺，而是对绝对者的直观与呈现。为了进入到真正的思想，人们唯有通过一个理性的冒险，在无根基之处“忘身地冲进去”“在意识中建立起绝对物”。在哲学历史之中出现的思想，对于绝对在意识之中的呈现来说，是无效的。黑格尔强调：“任何注视着、认识着自己的理性就产生出一种真正的哲学，去解决任务，这任务跟它的解决一样，在一切时间都是同一个”。

In the 1801/02 course “Logic and Metaphysics,” Hegel likewise advocated the singularity and supra-historicity of philosophy in the sense of philosophy as science. Hegel pointed out: “We must first completely construct the principles of all philosophy… From the genuine cognition of it will arise the conviction that at any time, there is only one philosophy.” What Hegel taught was not the history of metaphysics, but what was considered truth in this intellectual enterprise. Even when Hegel discussed the different theoretical approaches of Schelling, Fichte, and Kant, the purpose was not to present the philosophical history they constructed, but to point out that different philosophical systems originate from the same highest principle, only that “one system will only make one factor of the totality more prominent, while another system will make another factor more prominent.” Hegel focused on the totality of reason, and this totality, as the manifestation of absolute truth, transcends time. Because Hegel advocated the supra-historicity of philosophy in his early Jena period, he did not put forward a theory of the history of philosophy in the philosophical sense.

在1801/02年“逻辑与形而上学”课程中，黑格尔同样在哲学作为科学的意义上，主张哲学的单一性和超历史性。黑格尔指出，“我们首先要完整地构建所有哲学的原理……从对它的真正认识中会产生样的信念：在任何时候，都只有一种哲学”。黑格尔所讲授的不是形而上学的历史，而是这个思想事业中被认为是真理的东西。即使黑格尔谈到了谢林、费希特、康德各自不同的理论方案，目的也不在于呈现它们构筑的哲学历史，而在于指出，不同的哲学体系来自同一个最高原则，只不过“一个体系只会使整体性的一个因素更加突出，而另一个体系则会使另一个因素更加突出”。黑格尔关注于理性的整体，而这一整体作为绝对真理的显示超越时间。由于黑格尔在耶拿早期主张哲学的超历史性，他没有提出哲学意义上的哲学史理论。

Furthermore, a detail is worth noting. In this period, while emphasizing the scientific dimension of philosophy, Hegel also understood philosophy in the sense of art, which is entirely distinct from science. In the “Difference Essay,” Hegel stated: “The truly peculiar thing of philosophy is the interesting individuality, in which reason forms a shape from the building materials of a particular age… like a true work of art.” Some interpreters have therefore described Hegel’s model of the history of philosophy as “aesthetic,” because Hegel emphasized philosophy’s self-sufficiency and unconditionality. This interpretation reveals Hegel’s affinity with the Romantics in his early Jena period. Science, as the product of universal reason, and the work of art, as the crystallization of unique individuality, relate to their respective histories differently. In science, the doctrines of scientists of successive generations belong to the same enterprise of pursuing truth; once a new doctrine better solves previous problems, the old theory loses its validity as science and is preserved only as history. In the field of art, the personal genius of the creator is unique and expands the boundaries of meaning in a particular way; this means that new progress does not render classic works in history meaningless. Hegel understood philosophical work in an aesthetic manner, which suggests that in this period he perceived that each philosopher contributes to the revelation of truth in a unique way. If genuine philosophy is unique and self-sufficient, and if there is more than one genuine philosophy, then the history of philosophy is not a philosophically insignificant subject. However, the early Jena Hegel did not explore a conceptual discourse capable of adequately expressing the historicity of philosophy.

此外，值得关注一个细节。这一时期的黑格尔在强调哲学的科学维度同时，也在与科学截然不同的艺术的意义上理解哲学。在“差异论文”中黑格尔表示，“哲学的真正的独特物是有兴趣的个性，在个性中，理性从一个特殊时代的建筑器材中构成一个形态……像真正的艺术品一样”。一些解读者因而把黑格尔这一哲学史模式描述为“审美”的，因为黑格尔强调哲学的自身完满和无条件性。这一解读揭示了黑格尔在耶拿早期与浪漫派的亲缘关系。作为普遍理性之产物的科学，与作为独特个性之结晶的艺术作品，两者与其历史的关系并不相同。就科学来说，历代科学家之学说从属于同一个追求真理的事业，一旦新的学说更好地解决了先前的问题，那么旧理论就失去了作为科学的效力，而仅仅作为历史保存下来。而在艺术领域，创作者的个人天才独具一格而以特定的方式拓展了意义的边界；这意味着新的进展并不让历史中的经典作品失去意义。黑格尔以审美的方式理解哲学工作，这暗示着黑格尔这一时期洞察到了每一个哲学家以独一无二的方式贡献了对真理的揭示。如果真正的哲学是独特且自身完满的，并且不止一种真正的哲学，那么哲学的历史就不是一个哲学上无足轻重的主题。只不过，耶拿早期的黑格尔没有探索出能够恰切表达哲学历史性的概念话语。

II. The Historicity of Spirit

二、精神的历史性

According to K. Rosenkranz’s account, in his middle Jena period (around 1805–1806), Hegel rethought the philosophical significance of the history of philosophy: “He now realized that the unity of all philosophy exists in the most determinate way in the continuum of a great whole. For the first time he expounded universal history from the standpoint of absolute knowledge; for the first time he saw himself in his historical relation to his predecessors.” The lecture manuscripts from this period have been lost, but according to materials unearthed by the contemporary scholar H. Kimmerle, Hegel in this period was especially concerned with “the progression from one system to another,” and his audience was particularly inspired by Hegel’s “unheard-of dialectic,” because it differed from Schelling’s static system. Through the conception of the dialectical movement of spirit, Hegel brought history back into the purview of philosophy: the differences of thought that exist in the history of philosophy are not elements to be transcended and overcome by philosophy itself, but are themselves topics with philosophical significance; the historicity of philosophy itself belongs to truth, not to opinion.

从罗森克朗茨（K.Rosenkranz）的记述来看，黑格尔在耶拿中期（1805—1806年左右）重新反思了哲学史的哲学意义：“他现在意识到，所有哲学的统一性都以最确定的方式存在于一个伟大整体的连续体中。他第一次从绝对知识的角度阐述普遍历史；他第一次从自己与前人的历史关系中看到了自己。”这一时期讲座的讲稿已经丢失，不过根据当代学者基默勒（H. Kimmerle）发掘的材料，黑格尔这一时期尤其关注“从一个体系到另一个体系的进展”，其听众尤其被黑格尔“闻所未闻的辩证法”所启发，因为这与谢林静态的体系有所不同。通过对精神的辩证运动的构想，黑格尔让历史重新纳入哲学的视野：哲学历史中存在的思想差异不是哲学本身要超越和克服的要素，而是自身具有哲学意义的论题；哲学的历史性本身属于真理，而非意见。

From the claim of philosophy’s supra-historicity to the excavation of the philosophical significance of the history of philosophy, Hegel gradually shifted from his youth toward his mature stage. This intellectual development was accompanied by three core insights. The first concerns the constitutive significance of the history of knowledge for knowledge itself. As early as his Jena period, Hegel already saw that “every philosophy is in itself completed … and possesses totality within itself”; this means that every piece of knowledge within history possesses a certain rationality within the totality of knowledge. The various philosophies within history signify not merely an accumulation of contingent opinions; they rather constitute the manifestation of truth at different levels. Hegel’s insight here benefited greatly from Herder, namely that the historicity of thought is not negative; it rather reveals the uniqueness of the human spiritual domain. The second point lies in Hegel’s conception of dialectical movement. Conflicts indeed exist among the various philosophies, but contradiction is not mere negation; it is rather the driving force of the forward movement of thought. Hegel called this process of the affirmation of negation, which is at once related to the other and returns to itself, “dialectics,” in order to explain how the differences among different forms of knowledge in history are integrated into the system of knowledge. The third point is Hegel’s excavation of the concept of “spirit.” This concept expresses both individual knowledge and the totality of thought. Through this vocabulary, Hegel is able to articulate both the diversity and difference of knowledge (spirit as “moment”) and the meaningful totality that accommodates different forms of knowledge (spirit as “totality”). The concept of spirit outlines the historical process of knowledge: every piece of knowledge constitutes a moment of the systematic totality, and they belong, as the movement of spirit and its externalization, to the space of truth as totality. Through the historicity of knowledge, dialectics, and the concept of spirit, Hegel reconnected philosophy and history, which he had separated in his early years: history, “that is, spirit externalized in time” (der an die Zeit entäuẞerte Geist); and the authentic object of philosophy lies precisely in the movement that spirit unfolds in a dialectical manner.

从哲学的超历史性的主张到对哲学史的哲学意义的发掘，黑格尔从青年时期逐渐向成熟阶段转变。这一思想发展伴随着三个核心洞见。第一点涉及知识历史本身对知识的构成意义。黑格尔在耶拿早期就已经看到了，“任何哲学在本身中都是完成了的……自身具有总体性”；这意味着，每一个历史之中的知识在知识总体中都具有一定合理性。历史之中的诸哲学不仅仅意味着偶然意见的堆积，它们毋宁构成了真理不同层面的显现。黑格尔的这一洞察很大程度上受益于赫尔德，即思想的历史性不是负面的，它毋宁彰显了人类精神领域的独特性。第二点在于黑格尔对辩证运动的构思。各个哲学之间的确存在相互冲突，但矛盾并非单纯的否定，反而是思想前进的动力。黑格尔将这一否定之肯定、既关联于他者又回到自身的过程称之为“辩证法”，以之说明历史中不同知识的差异如何被整合到知识体系之中。第三点则是黑格尔对“精神”概念的发掘。这一概念既表述个别的知识，也指向思想的整体。通过这一语汇黑格尔能够既说出知识的多样性与差异（作为“环节”的精神），又表达容纳不同知识的意义总体（作为“总体”的精神）。精神的概念勾勒出知识的历史性进程：每一个知识都构成了体系总体的环节，它们作为精神的运动及其外显而归属于总体性的真理空间。通过知识的历史性、辩证法以及精神概念，黑格尔将他早年区分开来的哲学与历史重新关联在一起：历史，“即在时间里外化了的精神”（der an die Zeit entäuẞerte Geist）；而哲学的本真对象，就在于精神以辩证的方式所展开的运动。

Hegel’s first positive and systematic expression of the philosophical significance of the history of philosophy is found in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Based on the dialectical movement of spirit and its externalization, Hegel concretely presents the diverse forms of consciousness, that is, the process that proceeds from natural consciousness, through its path of doubt, despair, and cultivation, to the standpoint of absolute knowledge. Hegel abandoned the supra-historical view of philosophy from his early Jena period and instead turned to studying the forms of spirit as they appear in history. Hegel’s point here points directly to the core insight of his philosophy: spirit means the historical process of coming to know itself, and this process as a whole constitutes truth. Thus, Hegel systematically expressed the post-Kantian philosophical exploration of the “history of self-consciousness.”

黑格尔对哲学历史之哲学意义的首次正面的、系统性的表述，见于他的《精神现象学》。基于精神的辩证运动及其外化的思路，黑格尔具体呈现了意识多样的形态，也就是从自然的意识出发，经历其怀疑、绝望和教化之路，上升到绝对知识的进程。黑格尔放弃了耶拿早期的超历史哲学观，而转而研究历史之中呈现的精神样态。黑格尔这里的观点直指其哲学的核心洞见：精神意味着走向自身认识的历史性进程，这个进程整体构成了真理。由此，黑格尔将后康德哲学“自我意识之历史”的思想探索系统性地表达了出来。

Then, can it be said that Hegel’s “phenomenology of spirit” is the first expression of his doctrine of the history of philosophy? Although the different forms of consciousness that Hegel presents can be more or less correlated with specific doctrines in the history of philosophy, what Hegel calls the “experience of consciousness” does not directly correspond to the “history of philosophy.” The historicity of the former means the dynamics of spirit itself, while the latter lies in specific doctrines within an empirical-temporal context. More importantly, from the perspective of the overall plan of Hegel’s philosophical system, the positioning of the phenomenology of spirit is the “introduction” to the system of science, and its core lies in revealing the process of the cultivation of consciousness so as to arrive at the standpoint of absolute knowledge. Only at the end of the phenomenology of spirit does consciousness transcend the division between certainty and its object and point to the logical starting point of the system of science—the identity of thought and being. This shows that Hegel’s discussion of the relationship between philosophy and its history during this period is particularly complex: on the one hand, by developing the doctrine of the dialectical movement of spirit, Hegel presents in philosophical terms the continuity of the different forms of spirit that appear in history. In this sense, the different forms of consciousness are not contingent events but belong to the necessary process of spirit’s coming to self-knowledge. Hegel thus provides the theoretical preparation for thinking about the history of philosophy in a philosophical sense. On the other hand, the domain of the phenomenology of spirit lies in “appearing knowledge” and “the path of natural consciousness toward true knowledge”; the historicity of spirit as phenomenon does not overlap with the historicity of truth as it unfolds as a system of science.

那么，是否可以说，黑格尔的“精神现象学”就是他哲学史学说的首次表达？虽然黑格尔呈现的意识的不同形态能够或多或少地与哲学史中的具体学说相关联，但是黑格尔所说的“意识的经验”并不直接对应于“哲学的历史”。前者的历史性意味着精神自身的动态，而后者则在于经验—时空语境中的具体学说。更重要的是，从黑格尔哲学体系的整体规划来看，精神现象学的定位是科学体系的“导论”，其核心在于揭示意识教化的进程而抵达绝对知识的立场。只有在精神现象学的结尾处，意识才超越确定性及其与对象之分裂，而指向科学体系的逻辑起点——思与存在的同一性。由此可见黑格尔这一时期对哲学与其历史之关系的讨论尤为复杂：一方面，通过发展关于精神的辩证运动的学说，黑格尔在哲学上呈现了历史中出现的不同精神形态之连续性。在此意义上，不同意识形态不是一个个偶然的事件，而是从属于精神走向自身认识的必然性进程。黑格尔因而提供了在哲学意义上思考哲学史的理论准备。但另一方面，精神现象学的论域在于“显现着的知识”“自然意识走向真正的知识的一条道路”，精神作为现象的历史性并不与真理作为科学体系而展现的历史性重叠。

The internal relationship between the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Hegel’s philosophical system has always been a focus of scholarly controversy, but due to space limitations this article will not delve into it. At least it is clear that because Hegel classified the phenomenology of spirit as the introduction to the system, he weakened the philosophical significance of the various forms presented by the externalization of spirit in history: the movement of spirit toward self-knowledge presented in the book is less the final answer to Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy than a stage-specific plan in the evolution of his thought.

关于1807年《精神现象学》与黑格尔哲学体系的内在关联，历来是学界争议的焦点，限于篇幅本文暂不深究。至少清楚的是，由于黑格尔把精神现象学归于体系的导论，他弱化了精神在历史之中的外化所呈现的诸形态的哲学意义：书中展现的精神走向自身认识的运动，与其说是黑格尔哲学史理论的最终答案，不如说是其思想演进的阶段性方案。

III. The Unity of History and Logic

三、历史与逻辑的一致

On the basis of the movement of spirit’s self-knowledge, Hegel developed his insight into the historicity of spirit at different levels: first, the phenomenology of spirit, which unfolds as the experience of consciousness; second, logic, which is based on the self-movement of the concept; and finally, the history of philosophy, which is the historical presentation of the development of truth. Phenomenology, logic, and the history of philosophy constitute the three modes Hegel uses to present the dialectical progress of spirit and its historical externalization. We cannot discuss all of them here and will focus only on his doctrine of the history of philosophy.

以精神认识自身的运动为基础，黑格尔在不同层面上发展了他关于精神的历史性的洞见：首先是作为意识经验而展开的精神现象学，其次是基于概念的自身运动的逻辑学，最后是作为真理发展之历史呈现的哲学史。现象学、逻辑学与哲学史，它们构成了黑格尔用以展现精神之辩证进展及其历史外化的三种模式。我们在这里无法全部作讨论，而仅仅聚焦于他的哲学史学说。

Beginning in 1819, Hegel delivered six lecture courses on the history of philosophy, covering the history of philosophy from Eastern philosophy, ancient Greek philosophy, medieval philosophy, up to the philosophy of his own time. Different from the supra-historical positioning of philosophy in his early Jena period, Hegel in his mature system period pointed out that the two pairs of contradictions—the unity of truth and the diversity of philosophical doctrines, and the eternity of truth and the historical dimension of philosophy—could be resolved. Hegel argued: “In the history of philosophy, we are not confronted with the past, not with other thoughts. We are confronted with the present, with the most living present.” The history of philosophy itself constitutes a philosophical system, “the system of the totality of [thought] forms.” Hegel differed from his contemporaries, who regarded the history of philosophy merely as a collection of doctrines that appeared in history, and also transcended the intellectual effort since Kant to establish a single rational system. Hegel demanded not only that philosophy but also that the history of philosophy itself become a science.

自1819年起，黑格尔一共讲授了6次哲学史课程，涉及东方哲学、古希腊哲学、中世纪哲学直至他的时代的哲学之历史。与耶拿早期关于哲学的超历史性定位有所不同，黑格尔在成熟体系时期指出，真理的单一性与哲学学说的多样性，真理的永恒性与哲学的历史维度，这两对矛盾能够获得解决。黑格尔主张：“在哲学史中，我们所面对的不是过去，不是其他思想。我们面对的是当下，是最鲜活的现在”。哲学史本身构成一种哲学体系，“诸［思想］形式总体性的体系”。黑格尔既不同于他的同代人，认为哲学史仅仅是历史中出现的学说之汇集，也超越了自康德以来建立单一理性体系的思想努力。黑格尔不仅要求哲学，也要求哲学史本身成为一门科学。

1. The Unity of History and Logic: Text So, can Hegel make the history of philosophy—as a narrative of plural truth—also the expression of a single truth? In his mature-period *Science of Logic* and *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel, starting from the conceptual categories of thought and the historical forms of thought respectively, subsumes the diversity of philosophies in history under the necessary evolution of the categories of thought in logic. Let us consult the conclusion of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, where Hegel sorts out the different stages of the history of philosophy and the different ideas they represent as follows:

1.历史与逻辑的一致：文本那么，黑格尔能让哲学史——作为复数性真理的叙述——也成为唯一真理的表现？在其成熟时期的《逻辑学》与《哲学史讲演录》中，黑格尔分别从概念的思维范畴与历史的思想形态出发，将历史中哲学的多样性归于逻辑中思维范畴的必然演进。让我们参考《哲学史讲演录》结论部分，在此黑格尔如是梳理哲学史上的不同阶段及其代表的不同理念：

(1) Starting from the objective, from what is given, and transforming the objective into the idea… the Being of Parmenides. (2) Abstract thought, nous, is taken as the universal essence… the universals of Plato. (3) In Aristotle the concept appears; free, naive, conceptual thought permeates and spiritualizes all forms within the cosmos. (4) The concept is taken as subject, emphasizing the independence of the subject, being-in-itself, abstract separation; the representatives are the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics… abstract, purely formal universality. (5) Totality of thought, the intellectual world, the world as a world of thought — this is the concrete idea we see in the Neoplatonists. … (6) Progressing from the knowing idea to the self-knowing idea… the idea reaches the absolute division in which it is conscious of itself… in Descartes pure thinking had already made this division or bifurcation… thinking and being are both opposed and identical in Spinoza… the principle of reconciliation starting from thinking itself, sublating the subjectivity of thinking — this is Leibniz’s monad endowed with the power of representation. (7) Self-consciousness becomes conscious of itself as self-consciousness… subjectivity initially [in Kant] as the critique of thinking, then [in Fichte] as the tendency or impulse toward the concrete. … (8) Absolute content and absolute form are identical — substance itself is identical with cognition.

（1）从客观的、作为给予的东西出发、并把客观的东西转变成理念……巴门尼德的存在。（2）抽象的思想，nous，被认作普遍的本质……柏拉图的共相。（3）在亚里士多德那里概念出现了，自由的、朴素的、概念式的思想浸透着、精神化着宇宙内的一切形态。（4）概念被认作主体，强调主体的独立性、自在存在、抽象的分离，代表者为斯多葛派、伊壁鸠鲁派和怀疑主义……抽象的、纯属形式的普遍性。（5）全体性的思想、灵明的世界、作为思想世界的世界，就是我们在新柏拉图派那里所看见的具体的理念。……（6）从能知的理念进展到自知的理念……理念达到了意识到它自身的绝对的分裂……在笛卡尔那里纯粹思维曾经作出了这种分裂或分而为二……思维与现在在斯宾诺莎那里既是相反的义是同一的……从思维本身开始的和解原则，扬弃了思维的主观性，这就是莱布尼茨具有表象力的单子。（7）自我意识意识到自己是自我意识……主观性最初［在康德那里］作为思维的批判，其次［在费希特那里］作为寻求具体者的倾向或冲动。……（8）绝对的内容和绝对的形式是同一的——实体本身与认识是同一的。

In the “Remarks” to the *Science of Logic*, Hegel likewise reveals the mirror-relation between the history of philosophy and logic through the correspondence of given logical categories with intellectual history. For example, the first moment of the doctrine of Being — Being—Nothing—Becoming — corresponds to Parmenides—Buddhism—Heraclitus:

在《逻辑学》的“附释”中，黑格尔通过既定逻辑范畴的思想史对应，同样揭示了哲学史—逻辑学的镜像关系。比如，存在论的第一环节：存在—无—变易，对应于巴门尼德—佛教—赫拉克利特：

The Eleatic school — especially Parmenides … had already first expressed the simple thought of “pure Being”: “Only Being is, Nothing is not.” — In various Eastern systems, fundamentally in Buddhism, “Nothing” or “Emptiness” is the well-known absolute principle. — Against that simple, one-sided abstraction, the profound Heraclitus put forward the higher-level totality of “Becoming,” declaring that “Being and Nothing alike are not” or “everything flows,” that is, “everything is Becoming.”

埃利亚学派——尤其是巴门尼德……已经首先表述了“纯粹存在”这一单纯的思想:“只有存在存在，无根本不存在。”——在东方各种体系里，从根本上来说在佛教那里,“无”或“空”是众所周知的绝对本原。——针对那个单纯而片面的抽象，深奥的赫拉克利特提出“转变”这一更高层次上的总体性概念，宣称“存在和无都同样不存在”或“万物流动”，也就是说，“万物都是转变”。

Again, for example, the third section of the Doctrine of Essence, “Actuality,” relates the Absolute to Spinoza’s doctrine of substance: “What has here emerged, the Absolute and the relation of reflection and the Absolute to it, coincides with Spinoza’s concept of ‘substance.’” The subsequent moment of “Actuality” is connected with Leibniz’s modal doctrine, while the “categories of relation” continue the basic framework of the “categories of relation” in Kant’s first *Critique*. Hegel, however, does not develop this systematically.

再比如，本质论第三篇“现实性”，绝对者关联于斯宾诺莎的实体学说：“这里已经呈现出来的，与绝对者及反映和绝对者的对比关系相吻合的是斯宾诺莎的‘实体’概念。”随后的“现实性”环节与莱布尼茨的模态学说相关，而“关系的范畴”延续了康德第一批判中“关系的范畴”的基本架构。不过黑格尔对此没有系统展开。

In contemporary research, K. Vieweg’s new book *Multiple Beginnings: Another History of Philosophy* proposes a framework in which “ideal types” (Idealtyp) of the history of philosophy correspond to the categories of logic, concretely illustrating how the triad of the Doctrine of Being—Doctrine of Essence—Doctrine of the Concept structured in Hegel’s logic corresponds to the ontology of the ancient world—the reflective philosophy of antiquity and modernity—the philosophy of subjectivity of the modern world. Vieweg’s study relatively completely reconstructs Hegel’s intellectual map of the history of philosophy and logical categories, not only restoring Hegel’s classic model of Being—Parmenides, Nothing—Buddhism, Becoming—Heraclitus, but also outlining the corresponding frameworks of Spinoza—substance, Kant—the general doctrine of the concept, Fichte—subjectivity, and so on. Regarding the most difficult part, the Doctrine of Essence, Vieweg’s assignment of Plato to the model of dialectic, Aristotle to actuality, Neoplatonism to the tripartite structure, and Scepticism to absolute negativity, among others, is quite insightful.

在当代研究中，费维克（K. Vieweg）的新书《多重开端：另一种哲学史》提出了哲学史“理想型”（Idealtyp）与逻辑学范畴相对应的框架，以具体说明黑格尔在逻辑学中架构的存在论—本质论—概念论，如何对应于古代世界的本体论—古代与现代的反思哲学—现代世界的主体哲学。费维克的研究相对完整地重构了黑格尔哲学史—逻辑范畴的思想图谱，不仅还原了黑格尔关于存在—巴门尼德、无—佛教、变易—赫拉克利特的经典模型，还勾勒了斯宾诺莎—实体、康德—概念通论、费希特—主观性等对应框架。有关最困难的本质论部分，费维克将柏拉图归于辩证法模型、亚里士多德归于现实性、新柏拉图主义归于三分结构、怀疑论归于绝对否定性等，都颇有创见。

Yet Vieweg’s positive attempt also partly exposes the embarrassment involved. For instance, the dialectic of Plato that Vieweg describes does not correspond to any specific category in the Doctrine of Essence; Descartes’ “cogito” is characterized as the identity of thinking and being, which is closer to the beginning of logic than to the stage of the Doctrine of Essence; both Aristotle and Spinoza are assigned to the moment of actuality, though the two are far apart historically, and so on. The difficulty here stems partly from the character of the *Science of Logic* itself. On the one hand, the core of this text does not lie in presenting a complete conceptual map of logic and the history of philosophy. On the other hand, Hegel did not complete the revision of the “Doctrine of Essence” and “Doctrine of the Concept” during his lifetime; compared with a more ideal version, it is difficult to fully discern Hegel’s systematic construction of this issue from the existing text.

然而，费维克的正面尝试也部分地暴露了其中的窘迫。比如，费维克描述的柏拉图的辩证法，并不对应于特定本质论中的范畴；笛卡尔的“我思”被刻画为思与存在的同一，更接近逻辑学的开端，而不是本质论的阶段；亚里士多德与斯宾诺莎都被归于现实性的环节，而两人在历史上相距甚远，等等。这里的困难部分来自《逻辑学》一书的特点。一方面，这一文本的核心不在于呈现完整的逻辑学—哲学史概念地图。另一方面，黑格尔生前并未完成对“本质论”“概念论”的修订，相比于一个更为理想的版本而言，人们难以通过现有文本来全面地窥探黑格尔对这一问题的系统建构。

2. The Identity of History and Logic: Principle and Clarification Although at the level of content Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy leaves quite a number of unresolved themes, on the level of its theoretical principle Hegel’s position is clear, namely, “the order of the systems of philosophy in history is identical with the order of the logical determinations in the development of thought.” Under the principle of “the identity of history and logic,” we can see how the progression from the Doctrine of Being, through the Doctrine of Essence, to the Doctrine of the Concept corresponds to the evolution in the history of Western philosophy from traditional metaphysics to transcendental philosophy, the philosophy of subjectivity, and finally to absolute idealism.

2.历史与逻辑的一致：原则与澄清虽然在内容层面，黑格尔的哲学史理论留下来相当多悬而未决的主题，在其理论原则上，黑格尔的立场是清晰的，即“历史上哲学体系的顺序与思想发展中逻辑规定的顺序是一致的。”在“历史与逻辑的一致”原则之下，我们能够透视从存在论、本质论到概念论的进展，如何对应于西方哲学史中从传统形而上学到先验哲学、主体性哲学，直至绝对唯心论的演进。

In terms of theoretical intention, this principle aims to resolve the thorny problem of “how philosophy can have a history.” Hegel breaks out of the mode of thinking that opposes philosophy and history, and instead grasps the “multiplicity of philosophical doctrines” itself as a philosophical problem. By providing a systematic account of the historicity of philosophy itself, Hegel internalizes the historical-experiential dimension of thought into the systematic-conceptual structure of philosophy. That is to say, the plurality of philosophies is not a challenge to the one philosophy, but precisely the most fundamental characteristic of the one philosophy. The flux of history is dissolved into the necessary process of logic. The external progression from system to system is incorporated into the self-development of a larger system. Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy constitutes what K. Fischer called a “system of systems” (System von Systemen), and this higher-order system takes “the identity of history and logic” as its basic principle.

从理论意图来说，这一原则旨在解决“哲学如何拥有一个历史”这一棘手的问题。黑格尔跳出了将哲学与历史对立的思考模式，而将“哲学学说的多样性”本身把握为一个哲学问题。黑格尔通过对哲学自身的历史性给出系统性说明，让思想的历史—经验维度内化为哲学的系统性—概念性结构。也就是说，复数性的哲学不是对作为唯一的哲学的挑战，而恰恰是作为唯一的哲学最根本性的特点。历史的流变，被融于逻辑学的必然进程中。从体系到体系的外在演进，被纳入到更大的体系的自身发展进程中。黑格尔的哲学史理论构成了费舍尔（K. Fischer）所说的“诸体系的体系”(System von Systemen)，而这一高阶的体系以“历史与逻辑之一致”为基本原则。

From the perspective of its intellectual foundation, the principle of “the identity of history and logic” is Hegel’s advancement of the Jena-period view of the historicity of spirit. In his view, behind the diverse systems of philosophy in the history of philosophy lies the dialectical movement of spirit’s self-knowledge as it unfolds. “[The history of philosophy] is not a collection of opinions, not a collection of contingencies; it is thinking reason (denkende Vernunft), the self-manifestation of thinking spirit in the world.” “Philosophy is always only one, namely the self-knowledge of spirit.” From its temporal-historical dimension, the historical progression of spirit appears as the evolution of the systems of philosophy in the history of philosophy; as the manifestation of reason in time, they constitute moments of truth and belong to the totality of spirit. From its conceptual dimension, the historical structure of spirit is depicted in logic, because they all correspond to the conceptual process of “thinking reason.”

从思想基础来看，历史与逻辑之一致”的原则是黑格尔对耶拿时期关于精神的历史性观点之推进。在他看来，哲学史中多样的哲学体系背后是精神所展开的自身认识的辩证运动。“［哲学史］不是诸种观点、不是诸多偶然性；它是思维的理性（denkende Vernunft）、思维的精神在世界中的自身显现”“哲学始终只有一个，那就是精神的自我认识。”从其时间—历史维度来看，精神的历史进展表现为哲学史中诸体系的演进，它们作为理性在时间中的显现，构成了真理的环节而从属于精神之大全。从其概念性要素来看，精神的历史性结构在逻辑学中得到了刻画，因为它们都对应于“思维的理性”的概念性进程。

It should be noted that although people often claim that Hegel advocates the “unity” of history and logic, from the text what he emphasizes is rather their “identity” (dasselbe/dieselbe). In his writing, Hegel also uses expressions such as “parallel,” “correspondence,” “conformity,” and “agreement,” but never speaks of the “unity” (Einheit) of history and logic, or of the history of philosophy and philosophy. Even when Hegel mentions “unity” in the introduction to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, what he discusses is not the relationship between the historical evolution of philosophy and logical determinations, but the dynamic process of the development of the Idea, that is, from undifferentiated immediacy toward the concrete unity that contains difference.

需要注意的是，虽然人们常认为黑格尔主张历史与逻辑的“统一”，但从文本来看，他强调的毋宁是两者的“等同”（dasselbe/dieselbe）。在行文中，黑格尔也使用“平行”“对应”“符合”“一致”这样的表述，却从未谈论过历史与逻辑、哲学史与哲学的“统一”（Einheit）。即使黑格尔在《哲学史讲演录》导论部分提到了“统一性”，他谈论的也不是哲学的历史演进与逻辑规定之间的关系，而是理念发展的动态过程，即从未分化的直接性朝向具体的、包含了差异的统一。

This distinction is particularly important. In Hegel’s terminological system, unity means the result of dialectical movement, i.e., the self-relation finally returned to through the moment of difference. Unity both contains difference and signifies the overcoming of difference. For instance, Hegel states that “in measure … quality and quantity have attained unity” and that “the concept presents itself as the unity of being and essence.” But Hegel does not argue that the history of philosophy has achieved the unity of history and logic. For if that were the case, the two sides would have undergone mutual differentiation and finally returned to mutual agreement. Rather, Hegel holds that the history of philosophy and the logical process are in themselves identical—they are different manifestations of the same spirit’s self-development. Hegel maintains that “the history of philosophy and the system of philosophy are one and the same … philosophy is the presentation of the development of thought in the form of simple thinking, without any additional meaning; the history of philosophy is the temporal process of this development”; “what is presented in the history of philosophy is the same as what is presented in philosophy, only with different appendages such as time, region, country, etc.” For this reason, scholars usually characterize Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy as a “theory of agreement” or “theory of parallelism.”

这一辨析尤为重要。在黑格尔的术语系统中，统一性意味着辩证运动的结果，即在差异的环节而最终回复到的自身关联。统一性既包含差异，又意味着对差异的克服。比如黑格尔表示，“在尺度里……量和质达到了统一”“概念表现为存在和本质的统一体”。但黑格尔并不主张，哲学史实现了历史与逻辑的统一。因为如果是这样，那么两方经历了相互区别而最终回到了相互一致。毋宁说，黑格尔认为哲学的历史与逻辑学进程就其自身是同一的，它们是同一个精神的自身开展的不同表现。黑格尔主张，“哲学史与哲学体系是同一个东西……哲学是以简单思维的形式，在没有任何附加的意义上对思想发展的呈现；哲学史则是这种发展的时间过程”；“在哲学史中，呈现的是与哲学相同的东西，只是有时间、地区、国家等不同的附属物”。正因如此，学者通常将黑格尔的哲学史理论表述为“一致论”或“平行论”。

3. The Unity of History and Logic: Criticisms and Responses Having explained the basic principles of Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy, let us now discuss the relevant criticisms. A common view holds that Hegel’s use of logic to explain the history of philosophy sacrifices history for the sake of the system—that is, it imposes the violence of philosophy upon empirical things that do not necessarily obey the rational order. Since the publication of Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy, the principle of the unity of logic and history has provoked great controversy. For critics, Hegel’s doctrine is untenable from the start: the beginning of Hegel’s logic consists of the three thought-categories of being, nothing, and becoming; but in the history of philosophy, Heraclitus’s doctrine of becoming precedes Parmenides’s doctrine of being. The order of logic and the order of the history of philosophy are reversed.

3.历史与逻辑的一致：批评与回应在说明了黑格尔哲学史理论的基本原则之后，让我们来讨论相关的批评。一种常见的观点主张，黑格尔通过逻辑学来说明哲学史，是为了体系而牺牲了历史，也就是把哲学的暴力加诸于不必然服从于理性秩序的经验事物之上。自黑格尔哲学史讲演录面世之后，逻辑与历史之一致性原则招致了巨大争论。对批评者来说，黑格尔的学说从一开始就难以成立：黑格尔逻辑学的开端是存在、无和变易这三个思想范畴；但在哲学史中，赫拉克利特的变易学先于巴门尼德的存在学说。逻辑的顺序与哲学史的顺序是颠倒的。

Does Hegel here confuse the historical order with the logical order? Here we need to see that Hegel’s principle of the unity of history and logic cannot be simplistically read as a “one-to-one correspondence.” Hegel is very clear on this point: the progress of the concept’s self-movement does not radiate in a perfectly seamless way into the changes of thought that appear in space and time. After all, development arising from historical causes and evolution stemming from the concept itself represent different orders. The forms of thought that exist in space and time bear the imprint of a given socio-political environment and are also permeated by the personal traits of the philosopher himself; these elements are all unrelated to the logical determinations of thought. In his “Lectures on Logic,” he points out that “the unfolding of the content of the history of philosophy in this process is … on the one hand consistent with, and on the other hand divergent from, the dialectical unfolding of the pure logical Idea.” The “unity” that Hegel emphasizes remains open to a certain degree of “discrepancy” between the history of philosophy and logic.

黑格尔是否在此混淆了历史的与逻辑的顺序呢？在此我们需要看到，黑格尔的历史—逻辑一致原则，不能被简单地解读为“一一对应”。黑格尔对此非常清楚，概念之自身运动的进展，并不严丝合缝地辐射在时空之中出现的思想变迁之中。毕竟，出于历史原因的发展与来自概念自身的演进代表着不同的秩序。在时空之中存在着的思想形态带有既定的社会政治环境的烙印，也渗透了哲学家本人的人格特质；这些要素都与逻辑之思想规定无关。在“逻辑学讲演录”中他指出，“哲学史的内容在这个过程中的展开与纯粹的逻辑理念的辩证展开……一方面是一致的，另一方面又是偏移的”。黑格尔所强调的“一致”关系，仍然向一定程度的哲学史与逻辑学的“出入”开放。

On this point, it is worth consulting the analysis of H. F. Fulda. He points out that Hegel’s thesis of the unity of history and logic merely proposes a relationship of agreement between the development of philosophical systems and the evolution of logical categories, but makes no stipulation about the specific content of this evolution. This means that Hegel does not explicitly state what logical categories correspond to the history of philosophy, nor does he specify whether it is all logical categories or only some logical categories that have a corresponding relationship with the history of philosophy. In Fulda’s view, this ambiguity guarantees the openness of Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy: “The emphasis of this thesis [the unity of the order of history and logic] seems to lie not in a single, quasi-linear sequence of logical determinations running through the entire history of philosophy, but rather in the level and developmental dynamics of the basic systematic concepts (and the logical determinations of the Idea) at the nodal points of the history of philosophy’s development, which represent important paradigms of philosophy.” The core of Hegel’s exposition lies in the characterization of the principal moments (Hauptmomente) in the history of philosophy, moments that paradigmatically condense the thought-determinations of the developmental process of philosophical history.

有关这一点，值得参考富尔达(H. F. Fulda)的分析。他指出，黑格尔的历史—逻辑一致性主张仅仅是提出了哲学诸体系发展与逻辑范畴演进的一致关系，但对于具体演进的内容没有作出规定。这意味着，黑格尔没有明确提出与哲学史对应的逻辑学范畴究竟是什么，也没有说明究竟是全部逻辑学范畴，还是部分逻辑学范畴与哲学史具有对应关系。在富尔达看来，这一模糊性保证了黑格尔哲学史理论的开放性：“这一论点［历史与逻辑顺序之一致性］的重点似乎不在于贯穿整个哲学史的单一、准线性的逻辑规定序列，而在于哲学史发展节点上的基本体系概念（以及理念的逻辑规定）的层次和发展动态，这些节点代表着哲学的重要典范。”黑格尔论述之核心在于对哲学史中主要环节（Hauptmoment）的刻画，这些环节典范性地凝结了哲学历史之发展进程的思想规定。

In other words, within the scheme of the unity of history and logic, Hegel does not promise that the thought-determinations of logic can characterize every specific claim in the history of philosophy, for such an approach would inevitably fall into Krug’s mockery of the idealist: deducing the entire world from a quill pen. Rather, what he maintains is that “at the principal moments, the nodal points, the development of logic and the development of history are one.” The logical determinations displayed in the history of philosophy are not the negative of a photograph or the script of a drama, as if the historical process were merely a puppet manipulated by reason. On the contrary, the relationship between the two can be compared to that between a fabric and its stitching points, or between a building and its supporting structure. These supporting points connect the overall framework of the building, but they do not provide or interfere with the various materials that constitute it.

换言之，在历史—逻辑之一致性方案中，黑格尔并不许诺逻辑学的思想规定能够刻画哲学史中全部的具体主张，因为这样的思路必然落入克鲁格对唯心论者的戏谑：从鹅毛笔中演绎出全世界。毋宁说，他主张的是，“在主要环节、节点上，逻辑的发展和历史的发展是一体的”。哲学史中展现的逻辑规定不是相片的底片或戏剧的台本，就好像历史的进程仅仅是理性所操纵的傀儡一般。相反，两者之间可类比于织物与其缝合点、大厦与其支撑结构的关系。这些支撑点关联起建筑的整体架构，但并不提供、也不干涉构成建筑的多种材料。

The “key nodal points” of philosophical history that Hegel delineates do not extend to the specific positions of different philosophers, nor are they confined to a linear, unidirectional progression. This is why Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy, on the one hand, intersperse a large amount of biographical material about the philosophers themselves, and on the other hand, rely heavily on the philosophers’ own frameworks of thought, rather than on Hegel’s own logical categories. Hegel’s theory of the history of philosophy carries out his rationalist project: the history of philosophy is meaningful only insofar as it is attributed to philosophy at its key nodal moments. At the same time, the way he carries out this task is also empirical: the existing positions and doctrines in the history of philosophy are not materials to be arbitrarily shaped and written, but rather the basis from which he grasps and presents the actualization of philosophy in history. This is also the original meaning of the unity of history and logic: neither constructing the meaning of the history of philosophy from a particular standpoint of thought, nor being satisfied with the induction and refinement of existing historical texts. What is essential lies rather in spirit’s self-manifestation (sich manifestieren); it does not permeate every detail of reality, but on a large scale, its historical process becomes transparent in logical determinations.

黑格尔所刻画的哲学历史之“关键节点”，并不延伸到不同哲学家的特定立场，也不限定于线性的、单方向进展。这也就是为何黑格尔的哲学史讲演录一方面穿插了大量哲学家本人的传记，另一方面高度依赖于哲学家的自身思考框架，而非基于黑格尔自己的逻辑范畴。黑格尔的哲学史理论贯彻了他的理性主义事业：哲学史只有在关键环节部分被归于哲学才有意义。与此同时，他落实这一任务的方式也是经验主义的，哲学史中现有的立场和学说并非任由塑造和书写的材料，而是他由以把捉和呈现哲学在历史之中当下化的基点。这也是历史与逻辑之一致性的本义：既不是从特定思想立场出发建构哲学史的意义，也不满足于对既有之历史文本的归纳和提炼。事关本质的毋宁在于精神之自身展现（sich manifestieren）；它不渗透于实在的每一个细节，但在大的尺度之中，其历史进程在逻辑规定中变得透明。

IV. Concluding Remarks

四、余论

Between documentary materials and speculative determinations, concrete multiplicity and total singularity, the process of historical flux and the eternal order of reason, Hegel, through the “unity of history and logic,” constructed his doctrine of the history of philosophy as philosophy and as science. Hegel maintained an interest in returning to the past and tracing back to origins, but without turning it into an antiquarian mania for collecting. Hegel practiced the philosophical enterprise modeled on science, while at the same time not allowing the principle of rationalism to fall into the arrogance of “I alone am true.” Hegel is the founder of the history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline. The historian of philosophy L. Braun evaluates his contribution thus: “Hegel’s originality lies in the fact that he does not treat all philosophies as museum pieces, but preserves them in the principle that gives them form and reality … Now the historian has placed himself within philosophy itself.” Through Hegel’s development, the history of philosophy is not a category of intellectual history juxtaposed with the history of political thought, social history, art history, etc., but constitutes the theoretical enterprise of philosophy itself.

在文献材料与思辨规定、具体的多样性与总体的单一性、历史流变进程与永恒的理性秩序之间，黑格尔通过“历史与逻辑的一致”构架了他作为哲学与科学的哲学史学说。黑格尔保持了回到过去、返回源流的兴趣，但又不使之变成恋旧的博物癖。黑格尔践行以科学为典范的哲学事业，同时也不至于让理性主义原则堕入“唯我独真”的僭妄。黑格尔是哲学意义上的哲学史学科的奠基人。哲学史学家布劳恩（L. Braun）这样评价他的贡献：“黑格尔的独创性在于，他不是将所有哲学作为博物馆藏品，而是将其保存在赋予它们形式和现实的原则之中……现在，历史学家已经置身于哲学本身之中”。经过黑格尔的发展，哲学史不是与政治思想史、社会史、艺术史等并列的一种思想史类别，而构成了哲学自身的理论事业。

Only, the historicity of philosophy as unfolded by Hegel, even if it constitutes a living present, has nothing to do with the future of philosophical history. Faced with the history of philosophy after Hegel, if one still insists on the principle of the unity of history and logic, then we will face an intellectual dilemma: Hegel’s logic is completed, but the history of philosophy can never be terminated. The further question is: after Hegel, will the history of philosophy in the philosophical sense continue and develop? If not, then is Hegel not proclaiming that philosophy itself has exhausted its own intellectual possibilities? If so, then is Hegel not implying that his logic is itself merely a product of history, and that every rational effort must necessarily be degraded to a particular moment within historical evolution? Between the closure of the logical system and the openness of intellectual history itself, since Hegel affirmed both, he had to pay the theoretical price for their fundamental conflict.

只不过，黑格尔展开的哲学之历史性即使构成活生生的当下，却与哲学历史之未来无涉。面对黑格尔之后的哲学历史，如果仍坚持历史—逻辑一致性原则，那么我们将面对一个思想窘境：黑格尔的逻辑学完成了，但是哲学的历史却永远不可能终结。进一步的问题是：在黑格尔之后，哲学意义上的哲学史是否仍然会延续和发展？如果不是，那么黑格尔岂不是在宣告，哲学本身已经穷尽了自身的思想可能性？如果是，那么黑格尔难道不在暗示，其逻辑学也只是历史的产物，进而任何理性的努力都必然被降格为历史演进之中的特殊环节？在逻辑学体系的封闭性与思想历史本身的开放性之间，黑格尔既然肯定了两者，就不得不为两者的根本性冲突付出理论代价。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗