A Re-examination of Marx’s “Method of Inquiry” and “Method of Presentation” in *Capital*

Since the birth of *Capital*, the question of how to understand its “method” has been a matter of constant debate. Although Althusser undertook an early “epistemological” methodological interpretation of *Capital*, he did so mainly in the sense of “theoretical practice” and did not develop a holistic structural analysis of capitalist society. To correctly understand the method of *Capital*, adopting a single interpretive approach that merely follows the method of inquiry of “rising from the concrete to the abstract” or the method of presentation of “rising from the abstract to the concrete” can easily lead, to a certain extent, to a narrowing of the connotation of Marx’s dialectical method and its materialist perspective. Therefore, to grasp the method of *Capital* holistically, it is only by unifying the “method of inquiry” and the “method of presentation” and understanding them together that one can truly grasp the “critical and revolutionary” methodological essence of *Capital*.

自《资本论》诞生以来，关于如何理解其“方法”就一直是争论不休的问题。阿尔都塞虽然较早地对《资本论》进行了“认识论”的方法论解读，但他主要是在“理论实践”的意义上解读的，并没有形成一种对资本主义社会的整体性的结构分析。要想正确理解《资本论》的方法，仅仅采用从“具体上升到抽象”的研究方法或从“抽象上升到具体”的叙述方法层面的单一解读思路，很容易导致在一定程度上窄化马克思辩证方法的内涵及其唯物主义视野。因此，要想对《资本论》的方法进行整体性的把握，只有将“研究方法”与“叙述方法”二者统一起来加以理解，才能真正把握《资本论》“批判的和革命的”方法论本质。

I. The Two Paths of Political Economy Research: “Method of Inquiry” and “Method of Presentation”

一、政治经济学研究的两条道路：“研究方法”与“叙述方法”

When Marx specifically discussed the method of political economy in the “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,” he clearly proposed and demarcated the “two paths” of political economy research. The first path refers to the method of inquiry that moves from the sensuous concrete to the rational abstract, penetrating the appearance of things to grasp the laws of inner identity. Marx took the population of a particular country as an object of study and pointed out that when political economy confronts this chaotic appearance of population, it first begins by studying more detailed determinations such as the classes constituting the population, production and consumption, commodity prices, and so on. “Thought seeks, behind the ever-changing external phenomena that differ from one another, to find the common, identical, and principal thing that makes them manifestations of the same essence.” [1]1 Marx, “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 28 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 37. [The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; this note provides the standard English source.] Hence Marx pointed out: “Through closer determination I would arrive in analysis at ever simpler concepts; from the imagined concrete I would move to ever thinner abstractions until I arrived at the simplest determinations.” [2]2 Ibid., p. 37. By penetrating behind the ever-changing phenomena, analyzing all the constituent elements of the object and their forms of development, and exploring the inner connections of these forms, one can thereby obtain the universal essence of the object. Marx characterized this first path as “the path historically followed by economics at the time of its origin,” [3]3 Ibid., p. 37. which manifests as starting from “the living whole, from population, nation, state, several states, etc.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 37. and then analyzing out “decisive abstract general relations, such as division of labor, money, value, etc.” [5]5 Ibid., p. 37. Marx also vividly used the term “evaporation,” [6]6 Ibid., p. 38. [Marx uses the metaphor of “evaporation” to describe the process of abstraction.] employing the method of abstraction to “evaporate” the inner identical elements of the object, explore their forms of development and their connections with other objects, and thereby obtain the simple determinations that make them the essence of the object.

马克思在《〈政治经济学批判〉导言》中专门谈到政治经济学方法的时候，明确提出并界划了政治经济学研究的“两条道路”。第一条道路是指透过事物的表象把握内在同一性规律的、从感性具体到理性抽象的研究方法。马克思举例把某一特定的国家人口作为研究对象，指出政治经济学在面对该国的人口这一混沌的表象时，首先会从构成人口的阶级、生产和消费、商品价格等更为细致的规定开始研究。“思维要在彼此不同的千变万化的外部现象后面，找到那使它们成为同一个本质的表现的共同的同一的、主要的东西。”因此马克思指出：“通过更切近的规定我就会在分析中达到越来越简单的概念；从表象中的具体达到越来越稀薄的抽象，直到我达到一些最简单的规定。”透过千变万化的现象背后，对构成对象的全部要素及其发展形式进行分析，探索这些形式的内在联系，从而可以得到该对象的普遍性本质。马克思把这第一条道路归结为“经济学在它产生时期在历史上走过的道路”,其表现为从“生动的整体，从人口、民族、国家、若干国家等等开始”,可分析出“具有决定性意义的抽象的一般关系，如分工、货币、价值等等”。马克思还形象地使用了“蒸发”一词，通过抽象法把对象内在的同一性元素“蒸发”出来，并探究它的发展形式以及与其他对象之间的联系，从而得到使其成为该对象本质的简单规定。

However, the real object, as a concrete totality, is composed of many categories synthesized together; relying solely on a single abstract determination cannot yield a holistic understanding of that object. In other words, grasping the object merely through the method of inquiry will inevitably treat the essential determinations of the object as an immutable “universal formula” to be mechanically applied, while the specific determinations that constitute the object are discarded as “false appearances.” This undoubtedly leads to a “shortsightedness” in thought and cognition, thereby obscuring what is “wrapped up” within the object’s internal elements and connections—what is “dynamically generated” in the historical development of the object. In this way, the object’s inner rich determinations are cancelled, and even the object itself and its historical specificity are cancelled. Therefore, thought must penetrate into the historical specificity of the object from a holistic perspective, gradually mediating through abstract determinations all the determinations of the object’s totality and their connections, thereby discovering the movement process of the object’s essence undergoing “self-creation” and “dynamic generation” in history. The object of cognition is not a static abstract determination, but rather a specific concrete totality that achieves “self-reproduction” on this basis.

不过，现实对象作为具体的总体，是由诸多范畴综合而成的，仅凭单个的抽象规定并不能获得对该对象的整体性认识。换言之，仅仅通过研究方法把握对象，势必会把对象的本质规定当作是一成不变的“万能公式”加以套用，而造就该事物的特殊规定却被视为“虚假表象”加以抛弃。这无疑会造成思维和认识的“短视”,因而遮蔽了对象的内部要素和联系中被“包裹”起来的、在对象的历史发展中“动态生成”的东西。这样一来，对象内在的丰富规定会被取消，甚至对象本身及其历史特殊性也会被取消。因此，思维必须从整体性视角深入对象的历史特殊性之中，通过抽象规定逐级中介对象总体的全部规定及其联系，从而发现对象本质在历史中经历着“自我创造”和“动态生成”的运动过程，认识的对象并非静态的抽象规定，而是在此基础上实现“自我繁殖”的特殊的具体总体。

Hence, on the question of the order in which all the categories of the object are presented, Marx pointed out that “to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition” [7]7 Ibid., p. 37. “seems to be correct. But on closer examination this proves to be false.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 37. Continuing with the example of population, Marx noted: “Population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest, e.g., wage labor, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labor, without value, money, price, etc.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 37. Capital, as a complex totality of relations, manifests itself through various phenomena; without analysis, one cannot understand capital itself through value, money, price, and so on. On this basis, Marx characterized the second path as the method of presentation, which starts from abstract laws of identity and gradually “rises” to the rich totality possessing many determinations and relations, penetrating into the historical specificity of the object. In “political economy research,” it is divided as follows: (1) general abstract determinations, which therefore belong more or less to all social forms; (2) the categories that form the internal structure of bourgeois society and serve as the basis for the fundamental classes; (3) the summary of bourgeois society in the form of the state; (4) the international relations of production, international division of labor, international exchange; (5) the world market and crises. [10]10 Ibid., p. 45. [Marx outlines the plan for the structure of his critique of political economy.] Therefore, in the order of presenting the specific categories of the object, “from the abstract to the concrete” is the correct method of presentation in political economy research.

因此，在叙述对象全部范畴的顺序问题上马克思指出，“从实在和具体开始，从现实的前提开始”,“似乎是正确的。但是，更仔细地考察起来，这是错误的”。马克思继续以人口为例指出：“抛开构成人口的阶级，人口就是一个抽象。如果我不知道这些阶级所依据的因素，如雇佣劳动、资本等等，阶级又是一句空话。而这些因素是以交换、分工、价格等等为前提的。比如资本，如果没有雇佣劳动、价值、货币、价格等等，它就什么也不是。”资本作为复杂的关系总体，其自身诸要素通过各种现象表现出来，如果不通过分析，那么像价值、货币、价格等等也无法了解资本本身。在此基础上，马克思把第二条道路概括为从抽象的同一性规律出发，逐渐“上升”至具有许多规定和关系的丰富的总体并深入到该对象的历史特殊性之中的叙述方法。它在“政治经济学研究”中是这样分篇的：(1)一般的抽象规定，因此它们或多或少属于一切社会形式；(2)形成资产阶级社会内部结构并且成为基本阶级的依据的范畴；(3)资产阶级社会在国家形式上的概括；(4)生产的国际关系、国际分工、国际交换；(5)世界市场和危机。因此，在叙述对象具体范畴的先后顺序上，“从抽象到具体”是政治经济学研究中正确的叙述方法。

Although “from the abstract to the concrete” as a form of expression of the method of presentation is not a transcendental method of logical deduction, it is itself a logical method, or rather the object itself is presented in a logical form. In Marx’s view, Hegel can be said to be “the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.” [11]11 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition. The phrase refers to Hegel’s dialectic. In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel explains the method of presentation: “It begins with simple determinateness; the succeeding determinations become ever richer and more concrete. For the result contains its beginning, and the course of the beginning has enriched it with a new determinateness”; the universal, as the foundation, “preserves itself in its particularization, in judgment and reality,” and “at every subsequent stage it raises the entire content of its preceding stage; it not only loses nothing and leaves nothing behind through its dialectical advance, but carries along with it everything it has gained, enriching and consolidating itself”; “in the subsequent determination, every step forward away from the indeterminate beginning is also a step backward toward it, so that what at first appears to be different—the backward grounding of the beginning and the forward further determination of it—coincides and is the same thing.” [12]12 G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), pp. 840–841. Paraphrased and condensed from Hegel’s discussion of the method of the concept. From this we can distinguish two approaches to presentation. One is the approach championed by empiricism, which takes some natural attribute of a “thing” as a universal axiom, thereby treating the universal and the particular as a relationship of “genus” and “species,” so that from the abstract to the concrete is merely a unidirectional progression from “genus-determination” to “species-determination.” This empiricist mode of thinking “conceives of economic phenomena as arising from a planar space in which direct mechanical causality reigns, so that a particular result is linked to another phenomenon as a causal object, and the inner necessity of this result can only be understood within a sequence of given existences.” [13]13 This is a paraphrase of a critique of empiricism in structuralist Marxism, likely drawing on Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*. However, due to the incompleteness of empiricism’s determination of categories, it fails to touch upon the level of historical specificity of the object. As Lenin pointed out: “Human cognition is not a straight line (nor does it proceed along a straight line), but is an infinite approximation to a series of circles, to a spiral curve. Any fragment, segment, or piece of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete straight line, and this straight line can lead people (if they see only the trees and not the forest) into the swamp, into clericalism (where the class interests of the ruling class consolidate it).” [14]14 V. I. Lenin, “On the Question of Dialectics,” in *Collected Works*, vol. 38 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 361. The phrase “seeing only the trees and not the forest” (只见树木不见森林) is a Chinese idiom for focusing on details while missing the bigger picture. The other approach is the abstract-to-concrete in the Hegelian dialectical sense, which is a transition and progression from the simplest categories, lacking content determinations and constituting the cellular form of the object, to more concrete categories with more complex structures and richer content determinations; it is a process of “stepwise” leap of things from the quantitative to the qualitative level, from universality to historical specificity, from lower to higher forms; it is also a “spiral” upward movement of the gradual unfolding and periodic resolution of the inner contradictions of things, possessing a dialectical character of ascending step by step. This dialectical mode of thinking synthesizes all categories into a dynamic structure through connections. Althusser regards this “connection” as the “force” of the structural whole on the categories, holding that “the whole structure exists in its effects; in short, the structure is nothing other than the specific combination of its own elements; it is nothing apart from its effects.” [15]15 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1970), p. 188. The concept of “structural causality” is central to Althusser’s reading of Marx. In the process of generating the “dynamic structure” from the abstract to the concrete, the former constitutes the foundation of the latter, while the latter, as a form of “difference” from the former, is not deduced “transcendentally” from the former, but rather endows the former with new qualitative determinations by penetrating into historical specificity. From this perspective, the dialectical method of presentation is not a unidirectional evolutionary process. On the one hand, cognition attains an essential understanding of the totality of the object through abstract determinations; on the other hand, abstract determinations can only achieve completeness and be fully explained within a concrete, total structure. What appears logically as a process of “advance” is also a process of “retreat,” a “two-way” path of cognition reaching truth through reflection.

“从抽象到具体”作为叙述方法的表现形式，虽不是逻辑演绎的先验方法，但本身是一种逻辑的方法，或者说对象本身就是以逻辑的形式呈现出来的。在马克思看来，黑格尔可以说是“第一个全面地有意识地叙述了辩证法的一般运动形式”。在《逻辑学》中黑格尔对叙述方法作出了解释：“它从单纯的规定性开始，而后继的总是愈加丰富和愈加具体。因为结果包含它的开端，而开端的过程以新的规定丰富了结果”;普遍的东西作为基础，“在它的特殊化中、在判断和实在中，保持自身”,并且“在以后的规定的每一个阶段，都提高了它以前的全部内容，它不仅没有因为它的辩证的前进而丧失什么，丢下什么，而且还带着一切收获和自己一起，使自身更丰富、更密实”;“在以后的规定中，每前进一步离开不曾规定的开端时，也是后退一步靠近开端，以致那后退论证开端和前进往下规定开端初看好像是差异的东西，都相互汇合了，并且是同一回事了”。借此我们可以区分出两种叙述进路。一种是经验主义所推崇的把“物”的某种天然属性当作普遍性公理，从而将普遍和特殊视为“属”和“种”的关系，从抽象到具体不过是从“属规定”到“种规定”的单向递进的过程。这种经验主义思维方式“把经济现象思考为从平面空间产生的，在这个空间里，直接的机械因果关系居统治地位，因此某种特定的结果是同原因客体即另一个现象联系在一起的，而这种结果的内在必然性只能在一种既定存在的序列中得到理解”。然而，由于经验主义对范畴规定的不彻底性，以至于它没能触及对象的历史特殊性层面。正如列宁所指出的：“人的认识不是直线(也就是说，不是沿着直线进行的),而是无限地近似于一串圆圈、近似于螺旋的曲线。这一曲线的任何一个片段、碎片、小段都能被变成(被片面地变成)独立地完整的曲线，而这条直线能把人们(如果只见树木不见森林的话)引到泥坑里去，引到僧侣主义那里去(在那里统治阶级的阶级利益就会把它巩固起来)。”另一种是黑格尔辩证法意义上的抽象到具体，是从构成该对象细胞形式的最简单、缺乏内容规定的范畴，向结构更复杂、内容规定越来越丰富的具体范畴过渡和递进；是事物从量的层面向质的层面、从普遍性向历史特殊性、从低阶形式向高阶形式的“阶梯式”跃迁的过程；同时也是事物内在矛盾的逐级展开和周期性解决的“螺旋式”上升运动，具有拾级而上的辩证色彩。这种辩证的思维方式通过联系把所有范畴综合成为一种动态结构。阿尔都塞把这种“联系”视为结构整体对诸范畴的“作用力”,认为“全部结构的存在在于它的作用，总之，结构只是它自己的要素的特殊的结合，除了结构的作用，它什么也不是”。在抽象到具体这一“动态结构”的生成过程中，前者构成后者的基础，而后者作为前者的“差别”形式，并不是由前者“先验地”演绎而来，而是通过深入到历史特殊性之中赋予前者新的质性规定。由此看来，辩证法的叙述方式并非单向的演进过程。一方面，认识凭借抽象规定达到对象总体的本质认识；另一方面，抽象规定只有在具体的、总体的结构中才能赋予自身以完整性，使自身得到完整的说明。在逻辑上表现为“前进”过程的同时也是“后退”的过程，是认识通过反思达致真理的“双向”进路。

The reason Marx proposed the “two roads” in the “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy” and emphasized the second road as the “scientifically correct method” was precisely to make a formal distinction between the method of inquiry and the method of presentation referred to by the “two roads.” First, the method of inquiry differs from the method of presentation: “Inquiry has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, and to track down their inner connection. Only after this work is done can the actual movement be presented accordingly. If this is accomplished successfully, if the life of the material is reflected ideally, then what confronts us may appear to be an a priori construction.” [16]16 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition. In the method of inquiry, the “concrete” is the concrete appearance of the real object at the level of perceptual intuition; it is the starting point of reality and of cognition, and thus also a given “empirical concrete.” In the method of presentation, by contrast, the “concrete” is a reorganization of the “empirical concrete” at the rational level; it is the endpoint of cognition, and thus also a “rational concrete.” Therefore, “on the first road, the full conception evaporates to yield abstract determinations; on the second road, the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought.” [17]17 Karl Marx, “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,” in *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 101. Second, the “second road” that Marx emphasizes as the “scientifically correct method” has its “scientificity” embodied in the order in which categories appear in the process of presentation. One must not, on the grounds that Marx regards the “second road” as “scientific,” conclude that the method of inquiry of the “first road” is “unscientific,” or that *Capital* employs only the method of presentation “from the abstract to the concrete.” Such an understanding undoubtedly obscures the materialist perspective in Marx’s dialectics in *Capital*.

马克思之所以在《〈政治经济学批判〉导言》中提出“两条道路”并强调第二条道路是“科学上正确的方法”,其本意是对“两条道路”所指涉的研究方法和叙述方法做出形式上的区分。首先，研究方法不同于叙述方法，“研究必须充分地占有材料，分析它的各种发展形式，探寻这些形式的内在联系。只有这项工作完成以后，现实的运动才能适当地叙述出来。这点一旦做到，材料的生命一旦在观念上反映出来，呈现在我们面前的就好像是一个先验的结构了”。其中研究方法中的“具体”是现实对象在感性直观层面上呈现出来的表象具体，它是现实的起点和认识的起点，从而也是一种既定的“经验具体”;而叙述方法中的“具体”则是在理性层面上对“经验具体”的重组，它是认识的终点，从而也是一种“理性具体”。因此，“在第一条道路上，完整的表象蒸发为抽象的规定；在第二条道路上，抽象的规定在思维行程中导致具体的再现”。其次，马克思所强调的“第二条道路”是“科学上正确的方法”,其“科学性”体现在叙述过程中范畴出现的先后顺序。决不能凭借马克思把“第二条道路”视为“科学的”这一观点，从而得出“第一条道路”的研究方法是“不科学的”,认为《资本论》仅仅运用了“抽象到具体”的叙述方法，这种理解无疑遮蔽了马克思《资本论》辩证法中的唯物主义视野。

Thus, when Marx invokes the “two roads” traversed by political economy research, his intention is essentially to distinguish between the method of inquiry and the method of presentation, and to further emphasize the methods and rules that inquiry and presentation should follow, so as to avoid confusing the two methods in the order of presenting categories in political economy research.

由此可见，马克思援引政治经济学研究走过的“两条道路”,实质是在区分研究方法与叙述方法，是进一步强调研究工作与叙述工作应该遵循的方法和规则，避免政治经济学研究在叙述范畴的顺序上将两种方法混为一谈。

II. The Dialectics of *Capital*: The Unity of the “Method of Inquiry” and the “Method of Presentation”

二、《资本论》的辩证法：“研究方法”与“叙述方法”的统一

To grasp Marx’s method of inquiry and method of presentation at the overall level and avoid a one-sided understanding of the two, it is necessary to return to the specific context of *Capital*. The Russian economist Kaufman once accused Marx’s method of inquiry of being “strictly realist,” while his method of presentation was “German dialectics,” and that “judging from the external form of presentation,” Marx was “the greatest idealist philosopher, and indeed a German ‘bad’ idealist philosopher.” [18]18 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, Afterword to the Second German Edition. Kaufman’s review was published in 1872; Marx quotes and responds to it. Marx subsequently responded, arguing that Kaufman had not accurately grasped the dialectics used in *Capital* and therefore failed to understand the method of inquiry and the method of presentation from a holistic perspective. In other words, Marx’s original intention was not to actively divide his dialectical method into a method of inquiry and a method of presentation in order to explain the method of *Capital*; rather, it was only because Kaufman misread the division of the two methods that Marx formally distinguished and explained them.

要在整体层面上掌握马克思的研究方法和叙述方法，避免对二者做出片面理解，需重新回到《资本论》的具体语境中。俄国经济学家考夫曼曾指责马克思的研究方法是“严格的实在论”,而叙述方法却是“德国辩证法”“从外在的叙述形式来判断”,“马克思是最大的唯心主义哲学家，而且是德国‘极坏的’唯心主义哲学家”。马克思随后进行了回应，认为考夫曼没有准确把握《资本论》所使用的辩证法，因而没能从总体性视角理解研究方法和叙述方法。换言之，马克思本意并非为了对《资本论》的方法作出说明而主动将他的辩证方法划分为研究方法和叙述方法的，只不过由于考夫曼对两种方法的划分产生了误读，马克思才会在形式上将两种方法区分并加以解释。

The reason Kaufmann failed to accurately understand the dialectics of *Capital* is primarily that he did not grasp the essential distinction between Marx’s dialectics and Hegel’s dialectics, mistakenly regarding *Capital* as a “replica of Hegel’s *Logic*.” In his view, “the most important thing is the law of these phenomena’s changes,” that is, “the law of their transition from one form to another, from one order of connection to another order of connection.” Following Kaufmann’s line of thought, it is nothing more than saying that the method of presentation is “this system of organizing categories in a definite sequence, so that one category can be logically deduced from another.” In other words, the textual structure of *Capital* is a chain built up from pure concepts, like Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. This line of thought can be understood as: “economic categories, within a certain scope, possess an inherent upward force and spontaneously unfold concrete categories—this is the correct method of economics.” [19]19 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Postface to the Second Edition, MECW, Vol. 35, p. 18. The phrase “inherent upward force” paraphrases Kaufmann’s review, as cited by Marx. In it, capitalist social relations are merely abstract logical relations composed of commodities, money, capital, and surplus value, rather than the real relations between wage labor and capital.

考夫曼之所以没能准确理解《资本论》的辩证法，主要是因为他没能把握到马克思辩证法与黑格尔辩证法的本质区别，误把《资本论》看作是“复刻了黑格尔的逻辑学”。在他看来，“最重要的是这些现象变化的规律”,“即它们由一种形式过渡到另一种形式，由一种联系秩序过渡到另一种联系秩序的规律”。按考夫曼的理解思路，无非是说，叙述方法是“在确定的序列中组织诸范畴的这种体系，使一范畴能逻辑地推演出另一范畴”。换言之，《资本论》的文本结构是一个像黑格尔《逻辑学》那样用纯粹概念建立起来的链条。这种思路可以理解为，“经济学的范畴在一定范围里有着固有的上升力，而且自己展开具体的范畴——这是经济学的正确方法”。其中资本主义社会关系不过是由商品、货币、资本和剩余价值组成的抽象逻辑关系，而非真实的雇佣劳动与资本之间的关系。

In reality, Hegel focused on the logical structure of transitions between categories rather than the material structure, and his logic became a pure rule that excluded material content and locked itself in an ivory tower, reducing the logic of matter to the conceptual logic produced by spirit itself. “Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* begins with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ends with absolute knowledge, with the self-conscious, self-understanding philosophical or absolute, i.e., superhuman, abstract spirit.” [20]20 Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, MECW, Vol. 3, p. 332. In other words, Hegel started from spirit, using abstract concepts to replace real concrete conditions, and using the movement of ideas to explain the development of real history. He “treated the entire process from the abstract to the concrete as the self-generation of the concept, as the original in-itself developing through the form of alienation into its future result, and this result is nothing but its beginning.” [21]21 Marx, *Grundrisse*, MECW, Vol. 28, p. 38. In Marx’s view, “philosophical spirit is nothing but the alienated world spirit comprehending itself, within its self-alienation, by way of the mode of thought, i.e., the abstract mode.” [22]22 Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, MECW, Vol. 3, p. 332. Hegel’s logic, by means of which he mediated real history to obtain pure truth, was merely “the money of the spirit”; [23]23 Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, MECW, Vol. 3, p. 332. he failed to realize that the logical structure itself is merely the theoretical expression of real society. “What is philosophically significant here is not the logic of the thing, but the thing of logic. It is not logic that is used to demonstrate the state, but the state that is used to demonstrate logic.” [24]24 Marx, *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, MECW, Vol. 3, p. 18. Hegel fell into a “speculative illusion,” thereby “reversing the order of things through abstraction, taking the self-generation of abstract concepts as the self-generation of concrete reality.” [25]25 Marx, *The Holy Family*, MECW, Vol. 4, p. 63. On this basis, Marx figuratively called Hegel’s philosophy “the logical pantheistic mysticism.” [26]26 Marx, *The Holy Family*, MECW, Vol. 4, p. 63. Similarly, Proudhon, “the Quesnay of the metaphysics of political economy,” [27]27 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, MECW, Vol. 6, p. 170. Quesnay was the founder of the Physiocratic school. wanted to apply Hegel’s system of logic to his own political economy. Yet in Marx’s view, Proudhon reduced Hegel’s dialectics “to the most miserable level.” [28]28 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, MECW, Vol. 6, p. 170. Marx held: “Economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstractions, of the social relations of production. Monsieur Proudhon, the true philosopher, turns things upside down; he sees in real relations only the incarnations of these principles and categories.” [29]29 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, MECW, Vol. 6, p. 165. Proudhon’s “building some ideological system out of the categories of political economy” [30]30 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, MECW, Vol. 6, p. 170. was undoubtedly “to cut the different elements of society apart, to turn the different elements of society into so many separate societies appearing one after another.” [31]31 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, MECW, Vol. 6, p. 166. In this sense, we can fully say that Kaufmann’s understanding of the “dialectics” of *Capital* is built on the theoretical foundation of “the metaphysics of political economy”; Kaufmann is “the Russian Proudhon.”

实际上，黑格尔关注的是范畴之间过渡的逻辑结构而非物质结构，其逻辑学也成为排斥物质内容而将自己束之高阁的纯粹规则，把物质的逻辑归结为精神自身所生产的概念逻辑。“黑格尔的《哲学全书》以逻辑学，以纯粹的思辨的思想开始，而以绝对知识，以自我意识的、理解自身的哲学的或绝对的即超人的抽象精神结束。”换言之，黑格尔从精神出发，用抽象概念去代替现实的具体条件，用观念的运动去解释现实历史的发展。他“把从抽象到具体的整个过程当作是概念的自生，当作原始的自在通过异化的形式发展到它未来的结果，而这个结果无非就是它的开端”。在马克思看来，“哲学精神不过是在它的自我异化内部通过思维方式即通过抽象方式来理解自身的、异化的世界精神”。黑格尔借以中介现实历史从而获得纯粹真理的逻辑学不过是“精神的货币”,他没能意识到逻辑结构本身不过是现实社会的理论表达而已。“在这里具有哲学意义的不是事物本身的逻辑，而是逻辑本身的事物。不是用逻辑来论证国家，而是用国家来论证逻辑。”黑格尔陷入“思辨幻觉”,从而“通过抽象颠倒了事物的顺序，把抽象概念的自生过程当成了具体实在的自生过程”。在此基础上，马克思形象地称黑格尔哲学为“逻辑的泛神论的神秘主义”。同样，作为“政治经济学的形而上学方面的魁奈”的蒲鲁东想把黑格尔的逻辑学体系应用到自己的政治经济学上去。然而在马克思看来，蒲鲁东把黑格尔的辩证法“降低到极可怜的程度”。马克思认为：“经济范畴只不过是生产的社会关系的理论表现，即其抽象。真正的哲学家蒲鲁东先生把事物颠倒了，他认为现实关系只是一些原理和范畴的化身。”蒲鲁东这种“用政治经济学的范畴构筑某种意识形态体系的大厦”,无疑是“把社会体系的各个环节割裂开来，就是把社会的各个环节变成同等数量依次出现的单个社会”。在此意义上，我们完全可以说，考夫曼对《资本论》“辩证法”的理解，就是建立在“政治经济学的形而上学”的理论基础上的，考夫曼就是“俄国的蒲鲁东”。

In the Postface to the Second Edition of Volume I of *Capital*, Marx emphasized: “My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an independent subject under the name of ‘the Idea,’ is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only its external appearance. With me, the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the human mind and translated into forms of thought.” [32]32 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Postface to the Second Edition, MECW, Vol. 35, p. 19. Here Marx clearly states the essential distinction between his own dialectics and Hegel’s—it is not the thing of logic, but the logic of the thing; dialectics is merely a mode of thought that reproduces the logic of the thing itself in the mind, not the process of spirit’s own generation. Marx’s “method of analysis, which proceeds from a definite socio-economic period, has nothing in common with the method of the German professors, who lump concepts together (‘juggling with words and constructing a system out of words’).” [33]33 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Postface to the Second Edition, MECW, Vol. 35, p. 19. Marx pointed out: “I do not proceed from ‘concepts,’ hence neither from the ‘concept of value,’ and therefore I have no need to ‘divide’ it. What I proceed from is the simplest social form in which the product of labor is presented in contemporary society, and this is the ‘commodity.’” [34]34 Marx, *Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner’s “Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie,”* MECW, Vol. 24, p. 544. On this, Marx also stressed: “This investigation proceeds from the analysis of a definite economic structure, and not from empty talk about the concepts ‘use value’ and ‘value.’” [35]35 Marx, *Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner’s “Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie,”* MECW, Vol. 24, p. 544. In a letter to Kugelmann, Marx noted: “Lange is naive enough to say that I ‘move with rare freedom’ in empirical material. He has not the slightest idea that this ‘free movement in the material’ is nothing but a paraphrase for the method of dealing with the material—the dialectical method.” [36]36 Marx, Letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, 27 June 1870, MECW, Vol. 43, p. 529. In other words, only after the research work on the “structure of the material” is completed can the work of presentation reflect the “life of the material” in thought. Therefore, all this “appears before us as if it were a *priori* construction.” [37]37 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Postface to the Second Edition, MECW, Vol. 35, p. 19.

马克思在《资本论》第一卷第二版跋中强调：“我的辩证方法，从根本上来说，不仅和黑格尔的辩证方法不同，而且和它截然相反。在黑格尔看来，思维过程，即甚至被他在观念这一名称下转化为独立主体的思维过程，是现实事物的造物主，而现实事物只是思维过程的外部表现。我的看法则相反，观念的东西不外是移入人脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已。”马克思在此明确说明自己与黑格尔辩证法的本质区别——不是逻辑本身的事物，而是事物本身的逻辑，辩证法不过是把事物本身的逻辑在精神上再现出来的思维方式，而不是精神自身的产生过程。马克思“从一定的社会经济时期出发的分析方法，同德国教授们把概念归并在一起(‘以言语掉弄舌锋，以言语构成一个系统’)的方法毫无共同之点”。马克思指出：“我不是从‘概念’出发，因而也不是从‘价值概念’出发，所以没有任何必要把它‘分裂开来’。我的出发点是劳动产品在现代社会所表现的最简单的社会形式，这就是‘商品’。”对此马克思还强调：“这种研究是从分析一定的经济结构得出的，而不是从空谈‘使用价值’和‘价值’这些概念和词得出的。”马克思在致库格曼的书信中指出：“朗格极其天真地说，我在经验材料中‘以罕见的自由运动着’。他根本没有想到，这种‘材料中的自由运动’只不过是对一种处理材料的方法——即辩证方法——的描述而已。”换言之，只有在“材料的结构”的研究工作完成以后，叙述工作才能将“材料的生命”在观念中反映出来。因此，这一切“呈现在我们面前的就好像是一个先验的结构了”。

In *Karl Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Engels regarded Marx’s dialectics as the method of “the unity of the logical and the historical,” holding that the logical method “is nothing but the historical method,” and “where history begins, the course of thought must also begin, and its further development will be nothing but the reflection of the historical process in an abstract and theoretically consistent form; a reflection corrected, but corrected according to the laws that the real historical process itself provides.” [38]38 Engels, *Karl Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, MECW, Vol. 16, p. 475. Rosenthal called the method described by Engels “the logical method of investigation,” considering it “a concrete expression of the dialectical method in solving the important question of how the process of scientific research on objective reality should be conducted and by what method,” [39]39 M. M. Rosenthal, *The Dialectical Method of Marx’s “Capital”* (in Russian), Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1939, p. 15. and the inner unity of the method of investigation and the method of presentation, forming an “artistic whole.” [40]40 Rosenthal, *The Dialectical Method of Marx’s “Capital,”* p. 15. The method of investigation and the method of presentation are the forms in which Marx’s dialectics manifests itself in the overall structure of *Capital*; any approach that separates the two methods and studies the methodology of *Capital* in isolation will, to a certain extent, obscure the holistic perspective of Marx’s dialectics. In *Capital*, the two methods are generally manifested as: appropriating the material—analyzing historical forms; exploring the inner connections of the forms—fixing the decisive general abstract relations, establishing connections between categories, and reflecting the structure and life of the material in thought. The most important task among these is to establish, in the process of dealing with chaotic and disordered material, an “*a priori* structure,” that is, the structure of the material itself.

恩格斯在《卡尔·马克思〈政治经济学批判〉》中，把马克思的辩证法视为“逻辑与历史相一致”的方法，认为逻辑的方式“无非是历史的方式”,“历史从哪里开始，思想的进程也应当从哪里开始，而思想进程的进一步发展不过是历史过程在抽象的、理论上前后一贯的形式上的反映；这种反映是经过修正的，然而是按照现实的历史过程本身的规律修正的”。罗森塔尔把恩格斯所描述的方法称为“逻辑的考察方法”,认为它是“辩证的方法在解决对客观现实的科学研究过程应该怎样进行和以怎样的方法进行这个重要问题时的一种具体表现”,是研究方法和叙述方法的内在统一，是一个“艺术的整体”。研究方法和叙述方法是马克思辩证法在《资本论》整体结构的表现形式，任何将两种方法拆分开并单独研究《资本论》方法论的思路，都会在一定程度上遮蔽马克思辩证法的整体性视野。两种方法在《资本论》中总体表现为：占有材料——分析历史形式；探究形式的内在联系——将具有决定意义的一般的抽象关系确定下来，建立范畴之间的联系，使材料的结构和生命在观念上反映出来。其中最重要的工作就是在对混沌无序的材料的处理中建立一个“先验的结构”,即材料自身的结构。

In *Capital*, the object of investigation is not Hegel’s “reason without a body” — the abstract conceptual system itself — but rather the capitalist mode of production itself, that is, “what I am to investigate in this work is the capitalist mode of production and the relations of production and exchange corresponding to it.” Unlike Hegel, whose aim was to obtain pure absolute truth, Marx’s “critique of political economy” has as its ultimate goal “to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society.” And this law can be revealed only through a concrete analysis of the necessity of the differences within a unity constituted by the various links that make up the totality of capital — production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. That is to say, the ultimate aim of the creation of *Capital* is to reproduce the “concrete of reason” of capital in thought. Therefore, the capitalist mode of production, as a “concrete of reason,” must necessarily be attained “through the establishment of its own concept, and the establishment of its own concept presupposes the specific existence and relational determinations of the various levels of the overall structure.” In other words, “to establish an economic concept is to strictly define it as a level, element, or sphere of the structure of a mode of production.” What structure, then, is used to express the effect of the totality on the various elements? Or, how is the causal concept of the structure of capital to be explained? Marx figuratively used the metaphors of “a general illumination” and “ether” to point out: “In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others.” And capital, as the “general illumination,” influences and determines the color and specific gravity of all other things. Therefore, “it would be inexpedient and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the order in which they were the determining factors in the course of history. Their order is determined, rather, by their mutual relation in modern bourgeois society.” The factor that determines “what place the various economic relations occupy in the historical sequence of the successive forms of society” lies in “their inner structure in modern bourgeois society.” [41]41 This passage is a paraphrase of Marx’s discussion in the *Grundrisse* (Introduction) on the method of political economy, where he argues that the order of economic categories is determined by their structural relations in modern bourgeois society, not by their historical sequence. From this it can be seen that the order of the categories, the logical progression, and the causal relations in the system of political economy are determined by the overall structure subsumed under the relations of capital, and the structure of thought is the theoretical structure in thought that presents the economic categories and their process of motion in conceptual form. The structure of the material, as the organic structure of the capitalist mode of production itself, is a “structure-in-itself”; the “a priori structure” in thought is the reproduction of the “structure-in-itself” in thought, a dynamic “structure-for-itself” presented in the form of establishing a system of concepts. This process is both a rational application of the dialectical mode of thinking and an external manifestation of the unity of the method of investigation and the method of presentation.

在《资本论》这里，研究对象并不是黑格尔“无人身的理性”——抽象的概念体系本身，而是资本主义生产方式本身，即“我要在本书研究的，是资本主义生产方式以及和它相适应的生产关系和交换关系”。与黑格尔为了获得纯粹的绝对真理的目的不同，马克思的“政治经济学批判”的最终目的在于“揭示现代社会的经济运动规律”。而这一规律，只有具体分析构成资本总体的各个环节——生产、分配、交换、消费，一个统一体内部的差别的必然性才能被揭示出来。也就是说，《资本论》创作的最终目的在于观念中重现资本的“理性具体”。因此，作为“理性具体”的资本主义生产方式，必然是通过“自身概念的建立来达到的，而自身概念的建立又以整体结构的各个层次的特殊存在和联系的规定为前提”。换言之，“建立经济的概念就是把它作为一种生产方式的结构的层次、要素或领域严格地规定下来”。那么用何种结构来表现总体对诸要素的作用关系?或者说，如何说明资本结构的因果性概念?马克思形象地用“普照光”“以太”做比喻指出：“在一切社会形式中都有一种一定的生产决定其他一切生产的地位和影响，因而它的关系也决定其他一切关系的地位和影响。”而资本作为“普照光”,影响并决定着其他一切物体的色彩和比重。因此，“把经济范畴按它们在历史上起决定作用的先后次序来排列是不行的，错误的。它们的次序倒是由它们在现代资产阶级社会中的相互关系决定的”。而决定“各种经济关系在不同社会形式的相继更替的序列中在历史上占有什么地位”的因素，在于“它们在现代资产阶级社会内部的结构”。由此可见，政治经济学体系中范畴的次序、逻辑的进展以及因果关系是由它们的资本关系所统摄的整体结构决定的，而思维的结构就是以概念的方式呈现出经济范畴及其运动过程在观念中的理论结构。材料的结构作为资本主义生产方式本身的有机结构是“自在结构”,思维中“先验地结构”则是“自在结构”在观念中的再现，是以建立概念体系的方式所呈现出来的动态的“自为结构”。这一过程既是辩证法思维方式的合理运用，也是研究方法和叙述方法统一性结构的外在表现。

Lenin once pointed out: “Although Marx did not leave us a ‘Logic’ (with a capital letter), he did leave us the logic of *Capital*.” Logic is not the doctrine of the laws of thought itself, but the doctrine of the “laws of development of ‘all material, natural, and spiritual things’,” the doctrine of “the entire concrete content of the world and the laws of development of the cognition of it.” Any attempt to construct an edifice of an ideological system through the categories of political economy will sink deeply into the quagmire of metaphysics. The German poet Heine once said that Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* was “the sword that cut off the head of deism”; we can also say that Marx’s critique of political economy in *Capital* is “the sword that cut off the head of Hegel’s logical pantheism.” Although Marx borrowed from Hegel’s logic, he also deconstructed it to a certain extent; what runs through *Capital* is a de-transcendentalized materialist logic. In this sense, the subtitle of *Capital* — A Critique of Political Economy — could be entirely replaced with “A Critique of Hegel’s Logic”; Hegel’s logic gains new life and complete practical significance in *Capital*.

列宁曾经指出：“虽说马克思没有遗留下‘逻辑’(大写字母的),但他遗留下《资本论》的逻辑。”逻辑并不是思维自身规律的学说，而是关于“‘一切物质的、自然的和精神的事物’发展规律的学说”,是世界“全部具体内容的以及对它的认识发展规律的学说”。任何通过政治经济学的范畴构筑某种意识形态思想体系的大厦都将深陷于形而上学的泥淖。德国诗人海涅曾说过，康德的纯粹理性批判是“砍掉自然神论头颅的大刀”,我们也可以说，马克思《资本论》的政治经济学批判就是“砍掉黑格尔逻辑泛神论头颅的大刀”。虽说马克思借用了黑格尔的逻辑学，但也在一定程度上解构了黑格尔的逻辑学，贯穿《资本论》的是一种去先验化的唯物主义的逻辑。在此意义上，《资本论》的副标题——政治经济学批判，完全可以更换为“黑格尔逻辑学批判”,黑格尔的逻辑学在《资本论》中获得了新生和完全的现实意义。

III. The Methodological Revolution of *Capital*: From “Abstraction” to “Power of Abstraction”

三、《资本论》的方法论革命：从“抽象”到“抽象力”

The reason Marx was able to realize the “critique” of political economy in the sense of dialectics is that he emphasized: “In the analysis of economic forms, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.” In the sense of methodological critique, the “power of abstraction” in the method of *Capital* is neither equivalent to the “real” — intuitive abstraction — of classical political economy, nor to “abstraction” itself — speculative abstraction — of classical German philosophy. As a kind of “real abstraction,” its significance directly points to the logic of the real object. As the neo-dialectical school scholar Arthur said: “If *Capital* is the true wealth of dialectics, this is not due to the application of some abstract universal method, but because the movement of matter itself demands the expression of corresponding logical categories.” This is precisely the essence of *Capital* as dialectics, and also the point at which Marx achieved his methodological revolution.

马克思之所以在辩证法的意义上实现了政治经济学的“批判”,是因为他所强调的“分析经济形式，既不能用显微镜，也不能用化学试剂，二者都必须用抽象力来代替”。在方法论批判的意义上，《资本论》方法中的“抽象力”既不等同于古典政治经济学中的“实在”——直观抽象，也不等同于德国古典哲学中的“抽象”本身——思辨抽象。它作为一种“现实抽象”,其意义直指现实对象的逻辑。正如新辩证法学派阿瑟所言：“如果说《资本论》是辩证法的真正财富，那么这并不是由于某种抽象普遍方法的应用，而是因为物质自身的运动要求相应逻辑范畴的表达。”这正是《资本论》作为辩证法的本质所在，也是马克思为实现方法论革命之所在。

As early as in the *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx criticized the respective theoretical defects of old materialism and idealism. In his view, the problem with old materialism lies in “conceiving the object, reality, sensuousness only under the form of object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.” The problem with idealism lies in “developing the active side abstractly, in opposition to materialism, but, of course, not knowing real, sensuous activity as such.” Here Marx points out the methodological characteristics of the two — examining the object from the perspective of the object’s contemplation and from the perspective of the subject’s abstraction — and distinguishes and determines his own methodology based on the practice of the unity of subject and object.

早在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中马克思就对旧唯物主义和唯心主义各自的理论缺陷进行了批判。在他看来，旧唯物主义的问题在于“对对象、现实、感性，只是从客体的或者直观的形式去理解，而不是把它们当做感性的人的活动，当做实践去理解，不是从主体方面去理解”。唯心主义的问题在于“把能动的方面抽象地发展了，当然，唯心主义是不知道现实的、感性的活动本身的”。马克思在此点明了二者从客体的直观角度出发和从主体的抽象角度出发考察对象的方法论特征，区分并确定了自己基于主客体统一的实践角度出发的方法论。

Specifically, the movement from “the concrete to the abstract” and then from “the abstract to the concrete” is a process of the development and ascent of cognition, in which “abstraction” plays the pivotal role of transforming “sensuous concrete” into “concrete of reason.” Classical political economists failed to understand the true meaning of “abstraction,” treating “abstraction” and “the concrete” as spatially homogeneous things, focusing their attention on the level of the natural properties of things, thereby severing the connections between things, so that “all concrete historical determinations of the object disappeared.” Hence the “abstraction” of classical political economy is “extremely incomplete,” “formal,” and “false.” Although the classical German philosopher Hegel regarded “abstraction” and “the concrete” as spatially heterogeneous things, he “inverted” their relationship, setting them in opposition. For him, “abstraction” gained an independent status, “as if the essence of things existed outside their manifestation, the common existed outside the individual, and the law existed without its concrete manifestation.” Therefore, Hegel “falls into the illusion of conceiving the real as the result of self-synthesizing, self-deepening, and self-moving thought, while in fact the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete and reproduces it as a mental concrete. But this is by no means the process of the genesis of the concrete itself.” In reality, “abstraction” is a means to achieve the goal of thought’s cognition of “the concrete,” not the goal of cognition itself. “The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.” Classical political economy and classical German philosophy failed to realize this; the former obscured the dialectical perspective of the method of presentation with the method of investigation, while the latter obscured the materialist perspective of the method of investigation with the method of presentation. Neither was able to read the essence of “abstraction” through the “concrete” existence of the essence from the totalizing perspective of the method of investigation and the method of presentation.

具体来说，从“具体到抽象”再到从“抽象到具体”,是认识的发展和上升过程，其中“抽象”承担着将“感性具体”转化为“理性具体”的枢纽作用。古典政治经济学家没能理解“抽象”的真实意义，把“抽象”和“具体”视为空间上同质的东西，将注意力集中在物的天然属性层面，从而割断了事物彼此之间的联系，使得“对象的一切具体历史规定性都消失了”。因此古典政治经济学的“抽象”是“极不完全的”“形式的”和“虚假的”。德国古典哲学家黑格尔虽然把“抽象”和“具体”看作是空间上的异质东西，可他却把二者的关系“颠倒”了，将二者对立了起来。在他这里，“抽象”获得了独立的地位，“似乎事物的本质在其表现之外存在着，共同的东西在个别的东西之外存在着，规律没有其具体的表现而存在着”。因此，黑格尔“陷入幻觉，把实在理解为自我综合、自我深化和自我运动的思维的结果，其实从抽象上升到具体的方法，只是思维用来掌握具体、把它当作一个精神上的具体再现出来的方式。但绝不是具体本身的产生过程”。实际上，“抽象”是实现思维认识“具体”的目的的手段，而不是认识的目的。“观念的东西不外是移入人脑并在人的头脑中改造过的物质的东西而已。”古典政治经济学和德国古典哲学没有意识到这一点，要么用研究方法遮蔽了叙述方法的辩证视野，要么用叙述方法遮蔽了研究方法的唯物主义视野，没能从研究方法和叙述方法的总体性视野中透过本质的“具体”存在读出“抽象”的本质。

In contrast to the objective domain that old materialism focuses on and the subjective domain that idealism focuses on, Marx turned his vision toward the domain of human social practice within the entire scope of history. In *The German Ideology*, he points out: “In the face of real life, it is precisely where the true positive science begins that describes people’s practical activities and actual developmental processes.” [42]42 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845-1846), in *Marx Engels Collected Works* (MECW), vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 37. Only the social totality of the historical forms of development arising from the interaction between humans and nature constitutes the foundation and standard for theoretical investigation and presentation. In other words, “whether human thinking possesses objective truth is not a theoretical question but a practical question. Humans should prove the truth of their thinking, that is, the reality and power of their thinking, in practice.” [43]43 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Thesis II, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 3. Cognition is “completed outside the object, because it is the result of the acting subject. The embodiment of cognition, in the form of the difference between essence and non-essence, surface and depth, immanence and transcendence, is fully manifested in the structure of the real object.” [44]44 This appears to be a paraphrase or citation from a secondary source on Marx’s epistemology; the original source is not immediately identifiable in Marx’s own works. Therefore, real abstraction originates neither from the transcendental form of thinking itself nor from the intuitive form of things. “It is directly a social nature, whose origin lies in the spatiotemporal domain of interaction among people. It is not people, but people’s actions, the mutual actions among people, that produce this abstraction.” [45]45 This appears to be a paraphrase or citation from a secondary source discussing the social nature of abstraction; the original source is not immediately identifiable. From an epistemological perspective, “this practice has its objective structural premises, its other side, which is the view that reality is a ‘totality of processes’.” [46]46 This appears to be a paraphrase or citation from a secondary source on practice and reality; the original source is not immediately identifiable. Although the essence of truth lies in representing reality, this “reality” does not remain at the intuitive level of empirical facts. In other words, this “reality” is not a ready-made fact but a dynamically generated, deeper-level “thing.” This “thing,” generated in history through human practice, possesses an epistemological “transcendental” premise.

区别于旧唯物主义关注的客观领域与唯心主义关注的主观领域，马克思把视野转向了人在整个历史范围内的社会实践领域。他在《德意志意识形态》中指出：“在现实生活面前，正是描述人们实践活动和实际发展过程的真正的实证科学开始的地方。”只有人和自然界相互作用的历史发展形式的社会总和，才是理论研究和叙述的基础和标准。换言之，“人的思维是否具有客观的真理性，这不是一个理论的问题，而是一个实践的问题。人应该在实践中证明自己思维的真理性，即自己思维的现实性和力量”。认识是在“客体之外完成的，因为它是行动主体的结果。认识的体现以本质和非本质，表层和深层，内在和外在的差别形式完全表现在现实对象的结构中”。因此，真实的抽象既不是源自思维自身的先验形式，也不是来自物的直观形式。“它直接地是一种社会本性，其起源存在于人与人之间交往的时空领域之中。不是人，而是人的行为、人们之间的相互行为产生了这一抽象。”从认识论的角度看，“这实践具有它的客观的结构上的前提，具有它的另一面，那就是认为现实是‘过程的集合体’”。真理的本质虽然在于表征现实，然而这种“现实”并不停留于经验事实的直观层面。换句话说，这种“现实”并不是既成的事实，而是动态生成的、更深层次的“物”。这种作为人的实践在历史中生成的“物”具有认识论意义上的“先验性”前提。

This deeper-level “thing,” as a product of human practical activity and social relations, is the “being-as-being” of real society. The object it refers to is an entity as substance, and at the same time a subject. Hegel points out: “Not only to comprehend and express the true or the real as substance, but equally to comprehend and express it as subject.” [47]47 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 10. “Being-as-being,” as the “subject” of real society, is essentially a complex relation. Any other “being” only acquires the specific concrete form of “being-as-being” when enveloped in the relation of this “subject.” Just as “a Negro is a Negro. Only under certain relations does he become a slave. A spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain relations does it become capital. Torn from these relations, it is no longer capital.” [48]48 Karl Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital* (1849), in MECW, vol. 9 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 211. Undoubtedly, Marx’s cognitive shift, achieved through “the power of abstraction,” from the level of “things” to the level of “relations,” from surface issues to deep issues, and reaching the depths of history, is the prerequisite for grasping “being-as-being.”

这种深层次的“物”作为人的实践活动和社会关系的产物，是现实社会的“存在之为存在”,其所指涉的对象是作为本体的实体，同时也是主体。黑格尔指出：“不仅把真实的东西或真理理解和表述为实体，而且同样理解和表述为主体。”“存在之为存在”作为现实社会的“主体”,本质是一种复杂的关系，任何其他的“存在”只有笼罩在“主体”的关系中才具有“存在之为存在”的特殊的具体样态。正如“黑人就是黑人。只有在一定的关系下，他才成为奴隶。纺纱机是纺棉花的机器。只有在一定的关系下，它才成为资本。脱离了这种关系，它也就不是资本了”。毫无疑问，马克思通过“抽象力”在认识上所实现的由“物”的层面到“关系”的层面、由表层问题到深层问题并达及历史深处的转化，是把握“存在之为存在”的先决条件。

Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism in *Capital* is key to understanding the above issue. In Marx’s view, this “simple and trivial” thing, the commodity, “is nevertheless a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.” [49]49 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867), trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 163. The “queerness” of the commodity actually stems from its fetishistic character. “The commodity form reflects before people the social character of their own labor as the objective character of the labor products themselves, as the natural social attributes of these things; hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labor as a social relation between objects, existing outside the producers. Through this conversion, the products of labor become commodities, things which are both perceptible and imperceptible, or social things.” [50]50 Ibid., pp. 164-165. Among these, the “perceptibility” of the commodity is its inherent natural attribute, while the “imperceptibility” of the commodity is its social attribute. If the “perceptibility” (natural attribute) of the commodity is regarded as “being,” then its “imperceptibility” (social attribute) is “being-as-being,” except that “the commodity form and the value relation of the labor products in which it is expressed have absolutely nothing to do with the physical nature of the labor products and the material relations arising therefrom. It is nothing but the definite social relation between people themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things.” [51]51 Ibid., p. 165. The natural and social attributes of the commodity are inverted in reality, and the relation between people becomes a relation between things. By virtue of “the power of abstraction,” Marx thoroughly tore away this “mysterious veil” shrouding the commodity, discovering within it the mediating link connecting capitalist relations of production and reification. The capitalist relations of production, as “being-as-being,” mediate the material production process, endowing the capitalist mode of production with the dual determination of material content and social form. On the one hand, through productive labor, the process of satisfying consumption is realized—the production of use-value; on the other hand, through relations of production, the process of value augmentation through productive labor is prescribed—the production of value itself. Capital, by mediating a series of links such as commodities, labor, and money, realizes the shift from material production to value production, causing abstract value to manifest as exchange-value, concrete labor to manifest as abstract labor, and the labor process of production to manifest as the process of value augmentation. Thus, at the overall social level, it presents two “faces”: the production activity of material content (appearance) and the “self-reproduction” of social form (essence). Therefore, the dual determination within the commodity exists from beginning to end in a state of contradiction: on the one hand, it must meet the needs of individual particular consumption; on the other hand, it must meet the needs of the total social value augmentation. These two aspects manifest as a contradictory unity of opposites in the process where value augmentation, mediated by the capital relation, dominates labor production. Consequently, while producing vast social material wealth, it also produces the negating factors that limit itself. In other words, as the “real abstraction” of “the power of abstraction,” the more it unfolds on a grand scale within the expanding organic composition of capital, the more powerful the real forces become that undermine it. Therefore, Marx, using “the power of abstraction,” dialectically presents the synchronic structure of the totality of capitalist society as “real abstraction.” Through the antagonistic dynamic development process between the material content of social production and the social form of capitalist relations of production, he endows “the power of abstraction” with a reflective dimension of “dialectics,” thereby carrying out a critique of the presuppositions of the capitalist system from a diachronic perspective.

马克思在《资本论》中对商品拜物教的分析是理解上述问题的关键。在马克思看来，商品这种“简单而平凡”的东西“却是一种很古怪的东西，充满形而上学的微妙和神学的怪诞”。而商品的“古怪”实际上来自它的拜物教性质。“商品形式在人们面前把人们本身劳动的社会性质反映成劳动产品本身的物的性质，反映成这些物的天然的社会属性，从而把生产者同劳动的社会关系反映成存在于生产者之外的物与物之间的社会关系。由于这种转换，劳动产品成了商品，成了可感觉而又超感觉的物或社会的物。”其中商品的“可感觉性”是它固有的自然属性，而商品的“超感觉性”是商品的社会属性。如果把商品的“可感觉性”(自然属性)视为“存在”,那么它的“超感觉性”(社会属性)便是“存在之为存在”,只不过“商品形式和它借以得到表现的劳动产品的价值关系，是同劳动产品的物理性质以及由此产生的物的关系完全无关的。这只是人们自己的一定的社会关系，但它在人们面前采取了物与物的关系的虚幻形式”。商品的自然属性与社会属性在现实中被颠倒了过来，人和人的关系变成了物与物的关系。马克思凭借“抽象力”彻底揭开了笼罩在商品身上的这层“神秘的外衣”,从中发现了资本主义生产关系与物化之间彼此联系着的中介环节。资本的生产关系作为“存在之为存在”中介着物质生产过程，使得资本主义生产方式具有了生产物质内容和社会形式的二重规定。一方面通过生产劳动实现满足消费的过程——生产使用价值；另一方面通过生产关系规定生产劳动实现价值增殖的过程——生产价值本身。资本通过中介商品、劳动、货币等一系列环节，实现了从物质生产到价值生产的转向，使得抽象价值表现为交换价值，具体劳动表现为抽象劳动，劳动的生产过程表现为价值的增殖过程，从而在社会整体层面上呈现出物质内容的生产活动(表象)和社会形式的“自我繁殖”(本质)的两副“面孔”。因此，商品内部的二重规定自始至终是以矛盾的状态存在着，一方面在于满足个人的特殊消费的需要，另一方面在于满足社会层面的全部的价值增殖的需要，二者在资本关系所中介的价值增殖支配劳动生产的过程中表现为矛盾的对立统一，从而在生产着大量的社会物质财富的同时也生产着限制自身的否定性因素。换言之，作为“抽象力”的“现实抽象”,在资本生产不断扩大的有机构成当中越是以宏大的规模展现出来，其瓦解自身的现实力量就越是强大。因此，马克思以“抽象力”对“现实抽象”这一资本主义社会总体的共时性结构进行辩证呈现，通过社会生产的物质内容与资本主义生产关系的社会形式二者之间对抗性的动态发展过程，赋予“抽象力”以“辩证性”的反思向度，从而在历时性视野中对资本主义制度进行前提性批判。

Marx’s “power of abstraction,” as a dialectical power of abstraction, not only elevates the study of political economy to a new level—a critical domain where the inner unity of Marx’s historical materialism and dialectics, and the consistency of the logical process with the historical process, are fully demonstrated—but also reveals the real existential condition of people under the capitalist system. In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx points out: “If one Englishman turns people into hats, then one German turns hats into ideas. This Englishman is Ricardo… This German is Hegel.” [52]52 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), in MECW, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 163. Specifically, Ricardo reflects the relation between people as a relation between things, replacing the social attributes of people with the natural attributes of things; Hegel, on the other hand, deduces the logical relation between things and things as a logical relation between ideas and ideas, turning the theoretical system constructed by reason into a metaphysical system of the subject detached from people’s real life, thereby violating the original value intention of rationalism to “discover people” and becoming something that “binds people” or even “obscures people.” Classical political economy and classical German philosophy reflected the “real abstraction” of people’s social relations as “objective abstraction” and “subjective abstraction,” thereby turning people into abstract “rational beings” within an idealized picture, neglecting the existential state and real life experience of people in actual history.

马克思的“抽象力”作为一种辩证的抽象力量，不仅将政治经济学研究提高到新的层面——使马克思唯物史观与辩证法的内在统一、逻辑的进程和历史的进程相一致的理论得到充分展现的批判领域,同时揭示了资本主义制度下人的真实的生存境遇。马克思在《哲学的贫困》中指出：“如果说有一个英国人把人变成帽子，那么，有一个德国人就把帽子变成了观念。这个英国人就是李嘉图……这个德国人就是黑格尔。”具体而言，李嘉图把人与人的关系反映为物与物的关系，用物的天然属性取代了人的社会属性；黑格尔则把物和物之间的逻辑关系演绎为观念与观念之间的逻辑关系，把理性所构建的理论体系变成了脱离人的现实生活的主体形而上学体系，从而违背了理性主义“发现人”的价值初衷，变成了“束缚人”甚至“遮蔽人”。古典政治经济学与德国古典哲学把人的社会关系的“现实抽象”反映成“客观抽象”和“主观抽象”,从而把人变成了理想性图景中抽象的“理性人”,忽视了现实历史中人的生存状态和真实生命体验。

Standing on the thoroughgoing materialist standpoint, Marx reduced Hegel’s “internal logic of thought” to the “internal logic of history,” thereby historically explaining the logic of social development — “always standing on the basis of real history, not explaining practice from ideas, but explaining various ideological forms from material practice” [53]53 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 53., interpreting the “history of ideas” as the history of human material practice. In Marx’s view, history is no longer the self-consciousness that recedes into reason, but rather the practical activities of generations of people, through productive forces and relations of production, that change real society. And “the sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which each individual and each generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as ‘substance’ and ‘essence of man’” [54]54 Ibid., p. 54.. Therefore, it is not from the abstract “rational man” of an ideal picture that one proceeds, but from concrete material production activities that one examines the essence of man. Although classical political economy proceeds from reality, it only sees “things” and fails to see the real “social relations” behind things — “Political economy deals not with things, but with relations between persons, and, in the last resort, between classes; these relations are, however, always bound to things and appear as things” [55]55 Frederick Engels, “Review of Marx’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,” in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 16 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 469.. Classical political economy essentially served as a propaganda tool for capitalist ideology and concealed the fact of class contradictions. Through the superficial “equal” activities of capitalist commodity exchange, Marx discovered the contradictory relations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat hidden within, as well as the existential predicament of man in contemporary society suffering from the “abstract domination” of capital.

马克思站在彻底的唯物主义的立场上，把黑格尔“思想的内涵逻辑”归结为“历史的内涵逻辑”,从而历史地解释了社会发展的逻辑——“始终站在现实历史的基础上，不是从观念出发来解释实践，而是从物质实践出发来解释各种观念形态”,把“观念的历史”解释为人类的物质实践史。在马克思看来，历史不再是隐入理性的自我意识，而是人类凭借生产力和生产关系所经历的一代代改变现实社会的实践活动。而“生产力、资金和社会交往形式的总和，是哲学家们想象为‘实体’和‘人的本质’的东西的现实基础”。因此，不是从理想图景中抽象的“理性人”出发，而是立足于具体的物质生产活动考察人的本质。古典政治经济学虽然从现实出发，但它只是看到了“物”而没能看到“物”背后真实的“社会关系”——“经济学研究的不是物，而是人和人之间的关系，归根到底是阶级和阶级之间的关系；可是这些关系总是同物结合着，并且作为物出现”。古典政治经济学实质上充当了资本主义意识形态的宣传工具并掩盖了阶级矛盾的事实。马克思透过资本主义商品交换的表面的“平等”活动，发现了隐藏其中的资产阶级和无产阶级之间的矛盾关系，以及人在当代社会中正在遭受资本“抽象统治”的生存困境。

Thus it can be seen that, as a work of “critique of political economy,” the revolutionary significance of the methodology of *Capital* lies neither in proceeding from the intuitive form of the object to view empirical facts, as classical political economy does, nor in proceeding from the active form of the subject to abstractly narrate the general forms of movement of dialectics, as Hegel does, but rather in critically inheriting the “power of abstraction” of both, thereby enabling Marx to ascend to the commanding height for examining the real world of capitalism, “to see the whole field of modern social relations clearly and distinctly” [56]56 Karl Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition of *Capital*, Volume One,” in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 35 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996), p. 19., so that the axis around which the entire modern social system revolves — the relation between capital and labor — was for the first time given a scientific explanation [57]57 Ibid., thus truly turning dialectics into Marx’s most powerful revolutionary weapon for criticizing capitalist society.

由此可见，作为“政治经济学批判”的《资本论》,其方法论的革命意义，既不在于像古典政治经济学一样从客体的直观形式出发看待经验事实，也不在于像黑格尔一样从主体的能动形式出发抽象地叙述辩证法的一般运动形式，而是在于批判性继承二者的“抽象力”,从而使马克思攀登到了审视资本主义现实世界的制高点，“把现代社会关系的全部领域看得明白而清楚”,使全部现代社会体系所围绕的旋转的轴心——资本和劳动的关系——第一次得到了科学的说明,从而使辩证法真正变成了马克思批判资本主义社会的最强有力的革命武器。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗