Being Born of Non-Being: The Logical Beginning of *Capital*

Introduction

引言

The historical dialectic in *Capital* is the key theoretical basis for mastering capital. However, Marx did not systematically expound the historical dialectic, and constructing its “rational form” (Rationellen Gestalt) has always been a fundamental problem in Marxist philosophical research. The traditional view, deeply influenced by Soviet textbooks, regards the “historical dialectic” as an essential “law.” This interpretation clearly overlooks the fact that the subject of dialectical movement lies in human “perceptual activity.” Subsequently, the quasi-phenomenological interpretation of Heideggerian Marxism acknowledged the ontological status of the subject’s perceptual activity, but this interpretation incorporates the dialectic into the horizon of existential theory. It either overemphasizes the “identity” of various elements in concrete existential situations, thus making it difficult to escape ideological “illusion”; or it completely abandons “alienation” and returns to a “primordial being,” thereby violating the historical continuity confirmed by Marx’s “sublating” dialectic. Therefore, in order to critique the “relatively mechanical” interpretation of Soviet-style Marxism and examine the existential interpretation of phenomenological Marxism, we need to return to an investigation of the historical dialectic in *Capital*, paying particular attention to the problem of the beginning that determines the quality of the historical dialectic.

《资本论》中的历史辩证法是驾驭资本的关键理论依据。然而，马克思并未系统论述历史辩证法，构建其“合理形态”（Rationellen Gestalt）一直是马克思主义哲学研究的基本问题。传统的观点深受苏联教科书的影响，视“历史辩证法”为一种本质性“规律”。这种解读显然忽视了辩证运动的主体在于人的“感性活动”。其后，海德格尔式马克思主义的近现象学解读承认了主体感性活动的本体论地位，但是这种解读把辩证法纳入生存论的视域内，要么过于看重具体生存情境中各要素的“同一”，因而难以走出意识形态“幻象”；要么彻底抛弃“异化”，回到一种“本源性存在”，从而违背了马克思“扬弃”式辩证法确认的历史连续性。所以，为了批判苏联式马克思主义“较为机械”的解读，检视现象学马克思主义的生存论解读，我们需要回到对《资本论》的历史辩证法的考察，特别要关注决定历史辩证法质性的开端问题。

Marx attached great importance to the problem of the beginning of *Capital*. He pointed out that “everything begins with difficulty, and this is true of every science” and emphasized that the dialectic inherent in the problem of the beginning is “very difficult to understand.” From the perspective of interpreters, although classical economists such as Schumpeter believed that the dialectical implications contained in the beginning could be ignored or dissolved, mainstream Marxist philosophy researchers remain quite certain of the importance of the problem of the beginning. As the Soviet Marxist Rosenthal emphasized: “The capitalist mode of production begins with simple commodity production. The commodity is not only the historical starting point but also the logical starting point.” The inherent contradiction is that commodities are unified in terms of the quantity of money but opposed in terms of the space of existence. However, this interpretation faces criticism: simple commodity production is a position that begins analysis from pre-capitalist society, whereas Marx, at the very beginning of *Capital*, asserts that analysis should begin from the “immense accumulation of commodities” in capitalist society. Moreover, differences in the space of existence do not imply genuine antagonism; they are discontinuous with the contradiction between capital and labor in capitalist society. The difficulties of the traditional interpretation reveal the complexity of the problem of the beginning. This article begins with the academic history of the problem of the beginning in *Capital*, points out the defects in the interpretation of the problem of the beginning by the value-form school, then reinterprets Marx’s critical method of political economy, and explains the significance of this interpretation for elucidating Marx’s historical dialectic.

马克思对《资本论》的开端问题极为重视，他指出“万事开头难，每门科学都是如此”，并强调开端问题内在的辩证法是“很难理解的”。从诠释者的视角来看，虽然熊彼特等古典经济学家认为可以无视或消解开端蕴含的辩证法意蕴，但是主流的马克思主义哲学研究者仍然十分确定开端问题的重要性，正如苏联马克思主义者罗森塔尔所强调的：“资本主义生产方式是从简单的商品生产开始的。商品不仅在历史上是出发点，而且在逻辑上也是出发点。”其内在的矛盾是，商品之间在货币的量上是统一的，而在存在空间上是对立的。但是这种解释面临诘难：简单商品生产是一种从前资本主义社会开始分析的立场，而马克思在《资本论》的开篇便认定要从资本主义社会的“庞大的商品堆积”开始分析。另外，存在空间上的差异并不蕴含真正的对抗，其与资本主义社会的资本与劳动的矛盾存在不连续性。传统解释的困难显示了开端问题的难度，本文从《资本论》开端问题的学术史入手，指明价值形式学派关于开端问题的解释缺陷，然后重释马克思的政治经济学的批判方法，并说明这种解释对于阐释马克思历史辩证法的意义。

I. Non-Being Born of Being: The New Dialectical Interpretation of the Value-Form School and Its Controversy

一、无生于有：价值形式学派的新辩证法阐释及其争论

Regarding the problem of the logical beginning of *Capital*, the realist interpretation given by Rosenthal’s student Ilyenkov is more detailed than that of his teacher. He believes that Marx’s discourse on the beginning is the result of abstraction from the concrete. The so-called concrete not only has “general” objects independent of human will but is also a “unity in diversity,” that is, viewing capitalist society as a universally connected unified whole, within which there are differences. This abstraction starting from the whole requires proceeding from the capitalist mode of production, grasping the core categories and their inherent contradictions. However, Ilyenkov’s understanding falls into a contradictory situation regarding the problem of the beginning: on the one hand, he insists on taking the concrete commodity as the beginning; on the other hand, he believes that “it is not the concept of the commodity, nor the concept of value, that contains within itself all the other rich theoretical determinations of capitalism.” The reason is that “the actual commodity form of the connection between producers, represented by value, is the germ from which all ‘richness,’ including the poverty of the working class, must necessarily develop.” This contradiction raises a question: if the concept of value is richer and more specific, why cannot value serve as the beginning?

对于《资本论》的逻辑开端问题，罗森塔尔的学生伊利延科夫给出的实在论解释比他的老师做得更为翔实。他认为，马克思关于开端的话语是从具体中抽象出来的结果。所谓具体不但具有不以人的意志为转移的“一般”客体，而且还是“多样性中的统一”，即把资本主义社会看作一个普遍联系的统一整体，整体中又有着差异。这种从总体出发的抽象需要从资本主义生产方式出发，抓取核心的范畴及其内在矛盾。但是，伊利延科夫的这种理解在开端问题上陷入了矛盾境地：一方面，他坚持以具体的商品作为开端；另一方面，他又认为“不是商品的概念，不是价值的概念在自身中包含着资本主义全部其他丰富的理论规定”，原因在于，价值代表的“生产者之间的联系的现实的商品形式才是包括雇佣工人阶级的贫困在内的全部‘丰富性’必然从中发展起来的胚芽”。这个矛盾带来一个疑问：如果价值概念更为丰富和特殊，那么价值为什么不能作为开端？

Regarding the above contradiction, some scholars have proposed a compromise: “the dialectical beginning of *Capital* contains two dimensions: the (concrete) dimension of immediacy and the dimension of universality (but this universality appears as an abstract form).” Since analysis begins with the commodity, the commodity is the analytical or immediate beginning. Value, as the mediation of capitalist society, is the synthetic beginning of *Capital*. However, the value-form school more radically takes value, this synthetic category, as the logical beginning and attempts to break through the traditional definition of the commodity as the beginning. Backhaus, the founder of this school, takes the question of how the value-form, as the “third thing” of commodity exchange, is possible as the core issue and gives this “third thing” a dialectical interpretation. He firmly grasps Marx’s important statement: “the internal opposition between use-value and value, latent in the commodity, is thus expressed through an external opposition, i.e., through the relation of two commodities.” He interprets the commodity with this “internal opposition” as “not a motionless entity in characterless rigidity, but something that unfolds itself in difference: the subject.” That is to say, the contradictory relationship between value and use-value is the relationship in which the production of use-value potentially tends toward the exchange of value. The textual basis for this lies in Marx’s argument in Chapter 1, Section 3 of *Capital* regarding the value-form as the “third thing” of commodity exchange. This Hegelian dialectical interpretation of the “third thing argument” leads Backhaus to firmly believe that the beginning of *Capital* is “starting from the ‘empirical’ fact of the appearance of exchange-value.”

对于上述矛盾，有学者给出了一种折中的方案：《资本论》的“辩证的开端包含两个维度：（具体的）直接性的维度和普遍性的维度（但这种普遍性表现为抽象形式）”。既然从分析商品开始，那么商品就是分析性的或直接性的开端。价值作为资本社会的中介，就是《资本论》的综合性的开端。然而，价值形式学派更为激进地把价值这一综合性的范畴作为逻辑开端，并试图突破商品作为开端的传统界定。其学派的开创者巴克豪斯把价值形式作为商品交换的“第三物”何以可能的问题作为核心问题来对待，并给予这种“第三物”以辩证法的解释。他紧紧抓住马克思的重要话语“潜藏在商品中的使用价值和价值的内部对立，就通过外部对立，即通过两个商品的关系表现出来了”，把其中的“内部对立”的商品解释为“不是一个在毫无特点的僵死性中的一个无运动的实体，而是一个自身在差异性中展开的东西：主体”。也就是说，价值和使用价值的矛盾关系就是使用价值生产潜在地朝向价值交换的关系。其文本依据在于，马克思在《资本论》第一章第三节关于价值形式作为商品交换的“第三物”论证。这种对“第三物论证”的黑格尔式辩证法解读，使得巴克豪斯坚信《资本论》的开端是“从交换价值显现的‘经验的’事实出发”。

Backhaus’s bias toward value and its forms of expression influenced Arthur, a representative scholar of the new dialectics. Arthur provided an interpretation of the problem of the beginning that is even more colored by Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. He first opposes the traditional Soviet-style Marxist practice of taking the commodity as the beginning. Taking the commodity as the beginning not only presupposes a historically non-existent simple labor, but also “it cannot satisfy the two major criteria proposed below, namely simplicity and historical determinacy; on this basis, the commodity is also disqualified as a starting point.” Hegel’s *Science of Logic* establishes the criteria for a starting point as immediacy and universality. Therefore, Arthur’s interpretation completely imitates the method of beginning in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, establishing value and its exchange form as the logical beginning. This interpretation by Arthur places the relationship between Hegel and Marx within the horizon of the critique of political economy, seeking common ground within.

巴克豪斯对价值及其表现形式的偏向影响了新辩证法的代表学者阿瑟。阿瑟对开端问题进行了更具黑格尔《逻辑学》色彩的阐释。他首先反对传统苏联式马克思主义把商品作为开端的做法。商品作为开端不但预设了一种历史上并不存在的简单劳动，而且“它不能满足下面所提出的两大判断标准，即简单性和历史规定性，基于此，商品也就被取消作为起点的资格”。黑格尔的《逻辑学》确立起点的标准就是直接性和普遍性，所以阿瑟的此种诠释完全模仿了黑格尔《逻辑学》的开端方式，确立了价值及其交换形式作为逻辑开端。阿瑟的此种解读将黑格尔与马克思的关系置于政治经济学批判的视域下，寻找内在的共同点。

Drawing on Bhaskar’s interpretation of Hegel, Arthur unfolds the dialectical implications of the beginning of *Capital*. Bhaskar interprets Hegel’s negation as “absence,” endowing it with the power to drive the movement of things. Bhaskar believes that “real negation or absence drives Hegel’s dialectic forward.” This “absence,” as a non-being (“non-being”), has important ontological significance. Bhaskar further explains “absence” (non-being): “Undoubtedly, compared with zero-level being that has no negative dimension, non-being has ontological priority.”

借鉴巴斯卡对黑格尔的诠释，阿瑟展开了《资本论》开端的辩证法意蕴。巴斯卡把黑格尔的否定解释为“缺失”，赋予其推动事物运动的力量。巴斯卡认为，“真正的否定或者缺失推动着黑格尔的辩证法前进”。这种“缺失”作为一种非存在（“无”）在本体论意义上具有重要意义。巴斯卡进一步解释“缺失”（非存在），“毋庸置疑，与没有否定维度的存在（zero-level being）相比，非存在性的存在更具有本体论上的优先性”。

By means of this reading of Bhaskar, Arthur provides a relatively thorough dialectical interpretation of the section on “The Value-Form” in Chapter 1, Section 3 of *Capital* (see Table 1). In it, Row A represents the “simple value-form” in accidental commodity exchange; production and consumption constitute a “real existence,” while value in the exchange sphere is “presupposed as the absence (of use-value),” becoming “complete non-being.” Row B in fact represents the “general value-form” or money-form developed from the “simple value-form.” The non-being in Row A is the first negation of real existence, but the lack of continuity in the exchange of things for things leads to the emergence of money; in Row B the real form of exchange gradually becomes fixed, and non-being is negated once again. The result of this negation is that “value makes itself manifest to us as being by displacing the real existence of commodities.” Here Arthur focuses on Marx’s important term “*Ver-rückung*” (displacement), which expresses the substitutional relation whereby private labor is appropriated by social labor, and vividly conveys the relation of “potentiality and actualization” that must obtain between the labor of producing use-value and the production of value—a relation of “realizing itself in immanent development.” In this process of appropriation and orientation, production and consumption instead become non-being, and their own substantive attributes are “absent” in the process. The real existence of production and consumption in Row A becomes non-being in Row B, while the exchange that was non-being in Row A becomes being; the inversion from Row A to Row B can explain how production and exchange are turned upside down in the world of capital.

阿瑟借助巴斯卡的这种解读，对《资本论》第一章第三节“价值形式”部分作出了较为深入的辩证法式阐释（见表1）。其中，A行代表了作为偶然商品交换中的“简单价值形式”，生产和消费是一种“真实存在”，交换空间中的价值被“假定为（使用价值的）缺失”，成为“完全的非存在”。B行其实代表了“简单价值形式”发展出的“一般价值形式”或货币形式。A行中的非存在是对真实存在的第一次否定，但是物与物交换中连续性的缺失导致货币的出现；B行中真实的交换形式逐步固定，非存在再次受到了否定，否定的结果是，“价值通过置换商品的真实存在而使其自身向我们显现为存在”。阿瑟在此关注到马克思的重要语词“交替”（verrückung），该词显示了私人劳动被社会劳动占有的替代关系，形象地表达了使用价值的生产劳动必须朝向价值生产的“潜在和实现”关系，这是一种“内在发展中实现自身”的关系。在这一占有和朝向过程中，生产和消费反而成为了非存在，自身的实体属性在这个过程中反而“缺失”了。A行中真实存在的生产和消费在B行中成为非存在，A行中作为非存在的交换也成为存在，从A行到B行的翻转可以解释资本世界中生产与交换如何颠倒的过程。

What is commendable is that the interpretation of the value-form school, from Backhaus to Arthur, penetrates to the most central problem of “being/non-being” in Marx’s historical dialectics. Methodologically, Arthur’s approach is a systematic method of “retroactive confirmation,” which is not entirely identical to the method of historical materialism. In Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, Being is the beginning of philosophy; Being is a pure thought of immediacy and universality. “Only insofar as Being, as pure indeterminateness, is nothing, is Being nothing.” Hence Nothing is the “absence” of the specific determinateness of Being. At the same time, the transition from Being to Nothing also has a relation of reflection: Nothing, which presupposes Being, is the result of reflection. Similar to Hegel, Arthur posits Being as the beginning and asserts its legitimacy: “When the ‘Being’ of value—which is borne by the commodity—is conceived as an element of the capitalist totality, it is determined as legitimate only in a retroactive sense.”

值得肯定的是，从巴克豪斯到阿瑟的价值形式学派的诠释深入马克思的历史辩证法中最为核心的“存在/非存在”问题。从方法论上看，阿瑟的方法是一种“回溯性确证”的体系方法，与历史唯物主义的方法并不完全相同。在黑格尔的《逻辑学》中，存在或“有”（Being）是哲学的开端，“有”是一种直接性和普遍性的纯思，“只有就‘有’作为纯粹无规定性来说，‘有’才是无”，因此“无”是“有”具体规定性的“缺失”。同时，从“有”到“无”的过渡也有一种反思的关系，以“有”为前提的“无”是反思的结果。与黑格尔相似，阿瑟也设定了存在（有）作为开端，并断言其合法性：“当价值的‘存在’（Being）——它由商品所承载——被设想为资本主义总体的要素时，它才在回朔的意义上被确定为合法的。”

Although Arthur’s interpretation is influenced by the critical realist Bhaskar, it has also been criticized by other critical realists. They argue that “dialectical critical realism is more applicable to reading Marx’s texts than Hegelian philosophy.” The method adopted by this kind of critical realist is “to move from the empirical and factual domain and the corresponding patterns of observed (or hypothesized) events to the deeper domains and mechanisms that govern these events”—that is, to ask how historical facts or actual behaviors are possible. The critical realist explanation employs this Kantian-style questioning to examine Marx’s important statement at the beginning of *Capital*, namely that the wealth created by the “capitalist mode of production” appears as an “immense accumulation of commodities.” The result of asking “how is it possible” is the view that the capitalist mode of production comprises two levels: the core sphere of production and the surface sphere of the market. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 1 of *Capital* constitute an inquiry from the surface (analysis of the dual character of the commodity from commodity exchange) to the core (production), while Section 3 on the value-form is an inquiry into how the core transmits to the surface. The critical realist interpretation thus contrasts sharply with the neo-Hegelian interpretation above: in the neo-Hegelian reading, the exchange-form “appropriates” productive labor, whereas the critical realists establish the core position of productive labor. However, the critical realist interpretation focuses on analyzing hierarchical structures, and the dialectical character of the commodity chapter of *Capital* is somewhat lost; Bhaskar (the founder of critical realism), whose dialectic centered on “absence,” did not carry through his dialectical reading in the interpretation of *Capital*.

阿瑟的解读虽然受到批判实在论者巴斯卡的影响，但是也遭到其他批判实在论者的批评。他们认为，“辩证的批判实在论比黑格尔的哲学更适用于解读马克思的文本”。这种批判实在论者采用的方法是“从经验的和事实的领域以及与之相应的被观察到的（或被假设的）事件的模式转换到支配这些事件的深层的领域和机制”，即追问历史事实或现实行为何以可能。批判实在论的解释用此种康德式的追问审视马克思在《资本论》开头的重要话语，即“资本主义的生产方式”创造的财富表现为“庞大的商品堆积”。追问“何以可能”的结果是认为资本主义生产方式包含两个层面：作为核心的生产领域和作为表层的市场领域。《资本论》第一章的第一、二节是一种从商品交换分析商品的二重性的表层到核心（生产）的追问，第三节价值形式部分则是从核心如何传递到表层的追问。批判实在论的解释正好与上述新黑格尔式的解释形成反差，新黑格尔式解读中交换形式“占有”了生产劳动，而批判实在论者则确立了生产劳动的核心地位。但是，批判实在论解读侧重分析层级性的结构，《资本论》商品章的辩证法色彩有所缺失，巴斯卡（批判实在论的开创者）以“缺失”为核心的辩证法解读并没有在《资本论》的解读中贯彻。

Although the neo-Hegelian interpretation of the value-form school has some textual basis, it must face the counterattack from critical realism at the methodological level. The critical realist counterattack shifts the beginning from the methodological level to a stratified structure, without reconstructing it at the dialectical level. How, then, should we respond to the theoretical construction of the value-form school and explicate a new historical dialectics?

虽然价值形式学派的新黑格尔式解读有一定的文本依据，但它不得不面对批判实在论在方法论层面的反击。批判实在论的反击将开端从方法论层面移到分层结构，没有在辩证法层面给予重建。那么，我们应当如何回应价值形式学派的理论构建，阐释出一种新的历史辩证法？

II. Method: The Critique of Method and the Unconcealment of the Problem of the Beginning

二、方法：批判方法与开端问题的解蔽

To respond to the above debates and examine the value-form school’s construction of the problem of the beginning, we need to return to the critique of political economy, for two reasons. First, from the perspective of the object of examination: since the value-form school begins its interpretation of the problem of the beginning from the method of Marx’s critique of political economy, the critique of it should also begin from this method. In his famous work *The Dialectic of the Value-Form*, Backhaus explicitly opposes Böhm-Bawerk’s purely economicist reading of *Capital*, adopting an intermediate position “‘between’ the two poles of philosophy and science” to explain Marx’s critical method, and asserts that “Marx’s *Critique of Political Economy* is primarily a critique of the existing system of categories”—that is, a critique of classical economists such as Ricardo. Of course, Backhaus also maintains that the positive construction of Marx’s critique of political economy lies in constructing a distinctive theory of the beginning, namely the theory that value and its form are prior to the material substance of value. On this point, he argues: “If categories are not only a form but equally real, then there may exist a form that exists as value-form, a form that drives individuals and the generation of capital, a form that confronts and appropriates individuals.” Second, from the perspective of examining the history of scholarship: the impetus for establishing the problem of the beginning is precisely the result of the progression of Marx’s critique of political economy from critique to construction. On February 22, 1858, in the late period of composing the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), Marx described his ongoing work in a letter to Lassalle as follows: “The work that should first be published is a critique of the economic categories, or, if you like, a critique of the bourgeois economic system.” It can be seen that Marx not only confirms that the critique of political economy is an important premise for the creation of *Capital*, but also explains this method as comprising two parts: the critique of bourgeois economics and the critique of basic economic categories. This explanation must necessarily be reflected in the problem of the beginning. On April 2 of the same year, in a letter to Engels, Marx criticized Ricardo’s theory of value for taking “relatively undeveloped relations of production as its starting point,” which in effect means opposing Ricardo’s view that value is labor cost. Marx’s basis for this critique is that the value-form is the mediation of mature capitalist relations of production. On this foundation, he proposed that this critique would be developed in six books, the first being “Capital,” which is further divided into four parts: Part 1 is “Capital in General,” Part 2 is “Competition.” The first category of the “Capital in General” part is “Value.”

为了回应以上论争，检视价值形式学派对于开端问题的构建，我们需要回到政治经济学批判，因为：其一，从检视的对象来看，既然价值形式学派从马克思政治经济学批判的方法入手解释开端问题，对它的批判也应从这一方法开始。巴克豪斯在其名著《价值形式辩证法》中明确反对庞巴维克对《资本论》的纯粹经济主义解读，用“‘介于’哲学和科学这两极之间”的中间立场解释马克思的批判方法，认定“马克思的《政治经济学批判》主要是对现有范畴体系的批判”，即对李嘉图等古典经济学家的批判。当然，巴克豪斯同时认定马克思的政治经济学批判的正面建构在于建构出一种独特的开端理论，即价值及其形式优于价值的物质实体的理论。对此，他认为，“假如范畴不仅是一种形式而且同样是现实的，那么可能存在一种以价值形式存在的、驱动个体和资本生成的形式，这种形式对抗和占有个体”。其二，从检视学术史的角度来看，确立开端问题的动因正是马克思政治经济学批判从批判向建构进展的结果。1858年2月22日，在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》（以下简称《大纲》）的创作晚期，马克思在给拉萨尔的信中对自己正在进行的工作如此形容：“应当首先出版的著作是对经济学范畴的批判，或者，也可以说是对资产阶级经济学体系的批判。”可见，马克思不但确认政治经济学批判是《资本论》创作的重要前提，而且把这种方法解释为资本主义经济学批判和基本经济范畴批判两个部分。这种解释也必然反映到开端问题上。同年4月2日，在给恩格斯的信中，马克思批判李嘉图的价值学说的问题在于以“比较不发达的生产关系为出发点”，其实就意味着反对李嘉图所认定的价值是劳动费用的观点，马克思的批判依据在于价值形式是成熟的资本主义生产关系的中介。在此基础上，他提出这一批判将分为六册展开，第一册是“资本”，其又分为四个部分，第一部分是“资本一般”，第二部分是“竞争”。“资本一般”部分的第一个范畴是“价值”。

Since the value-form school examines the question of the beginning from the perspective of the critique of political economy, we can assess the rationality of its thought by starting from the source of the value-form school, namely the definition of the method of the critique of political economy, and then verify it against Marx’s relevant texts, thereby establishing a methodological horizon for critiquing the value-form school’s question of the beginning. The source of the value-form school can be traced back to the new reading of Marx movement. The standard-bearer of this movement, Backhaus, was a student of the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer, as an inheritor of Marx’s critical method and dialectics, gave a two-dimensional definition of critique in his essay “On Truth”: first, the basic concepts of classical British political economy should be transformed in the practical life of reality, endowing static, isolated categories with dynamic and functional movement. Second, the establishment of concepts themselves must be based on reality itself; to avoid the ossification of concepts, it is necessary to establish an open dialectics oriented toward reality. Horkheimer believed that “critique includes not only the dimension of negation and doubt, but also an inner independence that does not displace truth,” and this is the posture of truth in the face of reality. Therefore, Horkheimer held that critiquing classical political economy requires constructing an open dialectics based on reality: “the aspects of the system of knowledge abstracted from past eras… must by no means be equated with reality.”

既然价值形式学派从政治经济学批判的角度来审视开端问题，那么我们可以从价值形式学派的源头即关于政治经济学批判方法的界定来审视其思想合理性，再以马克思的相关文本加以校验，以此确立一种批判价值形式学派开端问题的方法论视域。价值形式学派的源头可追溯到新马克思阅读运动。该运动的旗手巴克豪斯就师承法兰克福学派。作为马克思批判方法和辩证法继承者的霍克海默在《论真理》一文中，给予批判两个维度的定义：其一，英国古典政治经济学的基本概念应当在现实的生活实践中加以改造，赋予静态的、孤立的范畴以动力性和动态的功能。其二，概念本身的建立要基于现实本身，避免概念僵化，需要建立一种面向现实的开放性的辩证法。霍克海默认为，“批判不仅包括否定和怀疑的维度，还包括不与真理错位的内在独立性”，这就是真理面对现实的姿态。因此，霍克海默认为批判古典政治经济学需要构建基于现实的开放辩证法，“从过去的时代抽象出的知识体系的诸方面……绝不能等同于现实”。

Horkheimer’s important collaborator Adorno more directly applied the dialectics oriented toward reality to the critique of ideology. The critique of ideology targets the falsity of reification, defending against the empirical methods and sociology of knowledge that protect “reification.” The problem with such empirical methods is that method always stands outside the object. Yet “theory (including Marx’s theory), as something dialectical, must be immanent.” That is, a dialectics that penetrates into the interior of things is the critical method. Following this path, Adorno believed that Marx’s critique of political economy has two important dimensions. The first dimension is to clarify how capitalist society generates a new form of objectivity (Critique I). That is, the self-consciousness of individual action, through mediation, constructs a fetishistic world, a “second nature.” Although constructed by acting subjects, it exhibits an objectivity independent of human will. The original subject-object dichotomy of individuals is transformed into a dichotomy between the object as “second nature” and the individual subject. The second dimension of critique is to identify the object as “second nature” as a false ideology (Critique II). Adorno criticized Hegel and Fichte’s idealism for overemphasizing self-consciousness and “subjectivism,” which led to the uncritical acceptance of the reified “appearance” of fetishism. The core thrust of Marx’s critique of political economy lies precisely in critically exposing this falsity to achieve social emancipation. Adorno asserted: “In Marx, the difference between the priority of the object as a product of critique and the mask of distorted reality through the character of the commodity has already been expressed.”

霍克海默的重要合作伙伴阿多诺更为直接地把面向现实的辩证法贯彻到意识形态批判中。意识形态批判指向物象化的虚假性，批判保卫“物化”的实证方法与知识社会学，这种实证方法的问题是，方法总是在对象之外。而“理论（包括马克思理论）作为辩证的东西必定是内在的”。也就是说，深入事物内部的辩证法才是批判方法。沿着这一路径，阿多诺认为马克思的政治经济学批判有两个重要的向度。第一个向度是澄清资本主义社会生成为一种新的客体形式（批判Ⅰ）。也就是说，个体行动的自我意识经过中介自我构建出了一个拜物的世界，即“第二自然”。这虽然由行动的主体构建，但是表现出一种不以人为转移的客观性。原来个体化的主客二分转化为作为“第二自然”的客体与个体主体的二分。批判的第二个向度是认定作为客体的“第二自然”是虚假的意识形态（批判Ⅱ）。阿多诺批判黑格尔和费希特的观念论过于强调自我意识和“主体主义”，使得拜物教的物化“表象”被不加批判地接受。而马克思政治经济学批判的核心要旨就在于批判地揭露这种虚假性，实现社会的解放。阿多诺认定：“在马克思那里，已经表达了作为批判产物的客观的优先性与通过商品特征而歪曲的现实事物的假面具之间的差异。”

It should be noted that the Critique II identified by Adorno is based on the penetration of the false object through reality. Academia generally defines Marx’s critique of political economy as “revealing the essence and limits of capital as a relation of expropriation,” but Adorno’s Critique II more deeply reveals that the critique of “expropriation” must be completed through the penetration of the false object. The ideological critique of Critique II does not merely reduce people’s subjective consciousness to false consciousness, but demonstrates the objective reality of the false object by showing how commodity fetishism is “objectively deduced from the exchange process.” Adorno believed that Marx intended to show that “reification” possesses a “false objectivity” facing reality and cannot be arbitrarily eliminated. Adorno further used metaphysical experience to speak of the “false objectivity” of the object: metaphysical experience is “an antinomic structure: thesis, the subject directly receives metaphysical experience; antithesis, the subject must see the ‘fallibility’ of metaphysical experience.” That is, the experiential “falsity” presented by the object is a transcendental illusion in the Kantian sense; the subject must acknowledge the priority of the object itself within the “fallibility” of experience. This is an expression of “near materialism.” Zhang Liang points out that “the foundation and root of negative dialectics is Marxist philosophical materialism.” From the above discussion, it can be seen that Adorno’s in-depth interpretation of Marx’s critique of political economy echoes, to a certain extent, Horkheimer’s open dialectics oriented toward reality.

需要指出的是，阿多诺认定的批判Ⅱ是基于现实对于虚假客体的穿透。学术界一般把马克思的政治经济学批判界定为“揭示资本作为剥夺性关系的实质与界限”而阿多诺认定的批判Ⅱ更为深入地揭示了“剥夺性”批判需要通过对虚假客体的穿透来，完成。批判Ⅱ的意识形态批判并不仅仅把人们的主体意识归结为错误意识，而是通过展示商品的拜物教如何从“交换过程中客观地演绎出来”，论证虚假客体的客观现实性。阿多诺认为，马克思要说明的是“物化”具有面对现实的“虚假客观性”，不可能随意地消除。阿多诺进一步用形而上学经验来言说对象的“虚假客体性”，形而上学经验是“一种二律背反式的结构：正题，主体直接接受形而上学经验；反题，主体要看到形而上学经验的‘易误性’”。也就是说，对象呈现的经验“虚假性”是一种康德意义上的先验幻象，主体需要在经验的“易误性”中承认对象本身的优先性。这是一种“近唯物主义”的表达，张亮指出，否定辩证法的“基础与根本则是马克思主义的哲学唯物主义”。从以上论述可以看出，阿多诺对马克思政治经济学批判的深入解释在一定程度上呼应了霍克海默关于向现实敞开的开放辩证法。

Does the distinction between Critique I and Critique II made by the Frankfurt School conform to the basic spirit of Marx’s texts? Our verification shows that the two critiques align with Marx’s research method in terms of their object and direction of critique. It is generally believed that, from the perspective of research method, Marx’s purpose in studying political economy was to critique capitalist society. In fact, a more accurate statement is that Marx’s political economy is a deep penetration of capitalist crisis, aimed at predicting the trends of social formations. In July 1857, before the writing of the *Grundrisse*, Marx wrote to Engels: “I am working like mad all night at putting my economic studies together, so that I’ll at least have the outlines clear before the deluge.” The “deluge” here refers to the financial crisis then unfolding. For this reason, in the first half of the *Grundrisse*, Marx opposed Bastiat’s theory of economic harmony, which held that “establishing harmonious cooperation between city and countryside, industry and agriculture” would solve the problem. Then, at the beginning of the first chapter of Notebook “M” of the *Grundrisse*, Marx traced the root of the problem to Ricardo’s assumption of the “hunter and fisherman” as the beginning of economics, attempting to destroy the foundation of capitalist ideology and reconstruct it around the value of the commodity.

法兰克福学派所划分的批判Ⅰ和批判Ⅱ是否符合马克思文本的基本精神？我们校验的结果是，两种批判在批判对象上和批判的指向上契合了马克思的研究方法。一般认为，从研究方法上来看，马克思研究政治经济学的目的是对资本主义社会进行批判。其实，更为准确的说法是，马克思的政治经济学是对资本主义危机的深入透视，以预测社会形态发生的趋势。在《大纲》写作前期的1857年7月，马克思在写给恩格斯的信中提及：“我现在发狂似地通宵总结我的经济学研究，为的是在洪水之前至少把一些基本问题搞清楚。”这里的“洪水”就是指当时正在发生的金融危机。为此，马克思在《大纲》的前半部分反对巴师夏的经济和谐论。巴师夏认为“建立城市和乡村，工业和农业的和谐合作”就能解决问题。然后，马克思在《大纲》的笔记本“M”的第一章开头就把问题的根源指向了李嘉图关于经济学开端的“猎人和渔夫”的设定，试图摧毁资本主义意识形态的根基，并以商品的价值为中心进行了重建。

Therefore, the direction of Marx’s research is that the “second nature” derived from Critique I must inevitably “collapse”; the “second nature” is not as “harmonious” as its appearance suggests, and its crises and anti-“harmony” both prove that the Frankfurt School’s Critique II is the goal Marx’s research sought to achieve. Reflected in the question of the beginning of *Capital*, similar to the views of Horkheimer and Adorno, Marx attempted through Critique II to prove the non-eternity of the foundation of Critique I’s “second nature,” namely the “value-form.” This can be demonstrated in the note to the section on “The Fetishism of Commodities” in *Capital*. There, Marx argues that classical economics, starting from the magnitude of value, treats capitalism as an eternal social form without analyzing the historicity of the commodity’s value-form. In this context, “if the bourgeois mode of production is mistaken for the eternal natural form of social production, then the specificity of the value-form is necessarily overlooked, and consequently the specificity of the commodity form and its further developments—the money form, the capital form, etc.”

因此，马克思的研究指向是批判Ⅰ得出的“第二自然”必然“崩溃”，“第二自然”没有表象表现出的那么“和谐”，其危机和反“和谐”都证明了法兰克福学派的批判Ⅱ是马克思的研究想达到的目的。反映到《资本论》的开端问题上，与霍克海默和阿多诺的观点类似，马克思是试图通过批判Ⅱ证明批判Ⅰ的“第二自然”的根基“价值形式”的非永恒性。这在《资本论》的“商品拜物教”一节的注释中可以得到证明。其中，马克思认为，古典经济学从价值量出发，把资本主义论证为一种永恒的社会形式，没有分析商品的价值形式的历史性。在这一语境下，“如果把资产阶级生产方式误认为是社会生产的永恒的自然形式，那就必然会忽略价值形式的特殊性，从而忽略商品形式及其进一步发展——货币形式、资本形式等等的特殊性”。

The problem is that Backhaus, a student of Adorno, adhered to Adorno’s Critique I when interpreting the dialectic of *Capital*, while neglecting Critique II. Backhaus, starting from the Hegelian categories of the *Grundrisse* (such as “in and for itself” [an und für sich]), explained the construction of the object “second nature” in *Capital*. Regarding the problem of the beginning, Backhaus discovered a rupture between the first two sections of Chapter One of *Capital* (the analysis of the commodity and the twofold character of labor) and the third section (the value-form) in terms of value substance and form, which “creates a problem in the methodological structure of the doctrine.” The “is” of the commodity analysis in the first two sections cannot transition deductively to the analysis of the “essence” of the value-form; one should Hegelianly trace back from the “is” to the “essence” of the value-form, establishing value and its form as the premise of the commodity analysis (especially of use-value). Therefore, the value-form as a “universal existence” becomes the beginning, and “second nature” is built on the foundation of the value-form. Arthur later followed this path by vehemently criticizing Engels’ interpretation that “simple labor” is the beginning of *Capital*, further explaining the problem of the beginning through being and non-being. However, Backhaus and Arthur forgot Adorno’s Critique of Political Economy II; their critical method aimed to critique the object “second nature” as “false consciousness.” Thus, the problem with Backhaus and the value-form school is that they treated value substance and value-form as a relationship of potentiality and actualization, leaving no space for Critique II.

问题在于，阿多诺的学生巴克豪斯在对《资本论》辩证法进行解读时坚持了阿多诺的批判I，忽略了批判Ⅱ。巴克豪斯从《大纲》的黑格尔式范畴（如“自在自为”等）出发来阐释《资本论》中“第二自然”这一客体的建构过程。对于开端问题，巴克豪斯发现《资本论》第一章的第一、二节（商品和劳动二重性分析）与第三节（价值形式）在价值实体和形式之间存在断裂，“造成了学说方法论结构上的问题”。前两节的商品分析之“是”并不能通过演绎方式过渡到价值形式的“本质”分析，应该从“是”黑格尔式地回溯到价值形式这一“本质”，将价值及其形式确立为商品分析（特别是使用价值）的前提，因此，价值形式这一“普遍性存在”就成为开端，“第二自然”就以价值形式为根基建立起来。阿瑟后来沿着这一路径极力批判恩格斯将“简单劳动”视作《资本论》的开端的阐释，用存在和非存在进一步阐释开端问题。然而，巴克豪斯和阿瑟遗忘了阿多诺的政治经济学批判Ⅱ，他们的批判方法旨在把“第二自然”这一客体作为“虚假意识”加以批判。因此，巴克豪斯等价值形式学派的问题在于，把价值实体和价值形式当作了潜在和实现关系，没有给批判Ⅱ留下空间。

The value-form school surreptitiously replaced Marx’s labor theory of value with a value-form determinism, highlighting the subjective-level driving force of the rule of the value-form, and thereby transformed Marx’s most central concept of socially necessary labor time into “socially critical exploitation time.” Consequently, the scientific labor theory of value was distorted into “the necessary time for capital to extract from the labor it exploits… exploitation time is constituted by the entire working day.” Moreover, the self-actualizing theory of the beginning of the value-form, because it upholds capitalist ideology, cannot complete the task of the political-economic critique of classical economics. Therefore, only by returning to Critique II and re-examining Marx’s method of piercing through “false consciousness” on the problem of the beginning can we deeply understand the problem of the beginning of *Capital*.

价值形式学派把马克思的劳动价值论偷换为价值形式决定论，突出了价值形式统治的主体层面的动因，进而把马克思最为核心的社会必要劳动时间转化为“社会批判剥削时间”，由此科学的劳动价值论被曲解为“资本对被其剥削的劳动进行榨取的必要时间……剥削时间是由整个工作日构成的”。另外，价值形式的自我实现式的开端学说因为维护了资本主义意识形态，所以不能完成对古典经济学的政治经济批判任务。因此，只有回到批判Ⅱ，重新审视马克思在开端问题上刺穿“虚假意识”的方法，我们才能深入理解《资本论》的开端问题。

III. Being Is Born from Non-Being: The Dialectical Implications of *verschwindet* and *Verrücktheit*

三、有生于无：verschwindet和Verrücktheit的辩证法意蕴

Critique II, as the basic method of Marx’s political economy, aims to reveal the “falsity” of the world of commodity exchange based on equivalents. Although the value-form school opened up a new line of dialectical research, the actualizing relationship between use-value and value as understood by this school eternalizes the “false illusion” of the value-form, thereby leading the value-form school to the opposite of Marx’s position. Our next task is to use Critique II to penetrate the problem of the beginning, re-understanding the internal relationships among the elements of the beginning through ideological critique. Among these, the dialectical category of negation is the key category for revealing the specific character of the dialectic; only by examining the categories related to “negation” can we realize Marx’s Critique II.

作为马克思政治经济学基本方法的批判Ⅱ旨在揭示等价交换的商品世界的“虚假性”，而价值形式学派虽然开启了一种新辩证法的研究理路，但是该学派所理解的使用价值和价值之间的实现式关系使得价值形式的“虚假幻境”永恒化，从而使价值形式学派走向了马克思立场的反面。我们接下来的工作是用批判Ⅱ贯通开端问题，用意识形态批判重新理解开端诸要素的内在关系。其中，辩证法的否定范畴是显示辩证法特质的关键范畴，审视“否定”相关的范畴才能实现马克思批判Ⅱ。

The key to the value-form school’s argument on the problem of the beginning is to interpret *Capital* from the Hegelian language and method of the *Grundrisse* text. Juan Iñigo Carrera believes that the Hegelian “method of investigation is clearly visible in the *Grundrisse*, but is deliberately hidden in *Capital*.” This view of his is also put forward in agreement with two other famous Marxist researchers, Martin Nicolaus and Helmut Reichelt. Sublating this also requires returning to a text-interpretive strategy based on the *Grundrisse*. In the first half of the *Grundrisse*, regarding the problem of the beginning, Marx had not yet established the commodity as the beginning and was still hesitating over the relationship between the two attributes of the commodity. However, he raised a fundamental question: “whether value should be understood as the unity of use-value and exchange-value.” On the basis of opposing Ricardo and Say’s view of establishing the quantity of commodity value and the usefulness of the commodity as the logical beginning, Marx identified that the exchange form of value should enter into the study of political economy, but also believed that the value-form should “take some use-value as its substance.” On the issue of the relationship between value-form and value substance, Marx did indeed use the discourse of use-value being “actualized” into exchange-value at the level of circulation, such as “use-value is generated as use-value through exchange-value, and exchange-value takes use-value as its mediation.” Marx also gave the example of agricultural surplus products causing the farmer to produce for exchange. These narratives led the value-form school to mistakenly believe that Marx’s understanding of the value-form was a Hegelian self-actualization. However, the problem with this interpretation is that between the categories associated with “self-actualization” (use-value and value, as well as the value-form) there is only identity, no heterogeneity. The basis for this is that, on the issue of commodity and money exchange, Marx constantly emphasizes “losing itself and opposing the other.” This is opposition at the level of heterogeneity; the value represented by money cannot completely subsume use-value. It is precisely the non-objectification of value that brings about the difference between value and use-value. In Marx’s texts, explicit discussions of this difference are relatively rare, requiring a return to the German categories Marx used to reveal the “negative” implication of the dialectic.

价值形式学派关于开端问题立论的关键是从《大纲》文本的黑格尔式语言和方法出发阐释《资本论》。胡安·伊尼戈·卡雷拉（Juan Iñigo Carrera）认为：黑格尔式的“研究方法在《大纲》中清晰可见，但是在《资本论》中被故意隐藏了”。他的这一观点还是在认同另外两个著名的马克思主义研究者马丁·尼古劳斯（Martin Nicolaus）和赫尔穆特·莱希尔特（Helmut Reichelt）的语境下提出的。对此的扬弃也需要回到《大纲》为基点的文本诠释策略。在《大纲》的上半部分，关于开端问题，马克思没有确立商品为开端，尚在商品的两个属性的关系问题上徘徊。但是，他提出了一个根本问题，即“是否应把价值理解为使用价值和交换价值的统一”。在反对李嘉图和萨伊把商品价值量和商品的有用性确立为逻辑开端的观点基础上，马克思指认了价值的交换形式应该进入政治经济学的研究，但是又认为价值形式应“以某种使用价值为实体”。在价值形式和价值实体关系问题上，马克思确实在流通层面使用了使用价值“实现”为交换价值的话语，如“使用价值通过交换价值而生成为使用价值，交换价值以使用价值作为自己的中介”，马克思也给出了农业出现剩余产品使得农场主向着交换而生产的例子。这些叙述使得价值形式学派误认为马克思对价值形式的理解就是黑格尔式的自我实现。但是，这种解释的问题在于，“自我实现”关联的范畴之间（使用价值与价值以及价值形式）只有同一性，没有异质性，其根据在于，在商品和货币交换问题上，马克思不断强调“失去自己和另一方相对立”。这是异质性层面的对立，货币代表的价值并不能完全统摄使用价值，正是价值的非对象化带来价值与使用价值的差异。在马克思的文本中，此种差异的显性论述较少，需要重新回到马克思使用的德语范畴，来开显辩证法的“否定”意蕴。

Overall, from the original text of the *Grundrisse*, the problem of the beginning is directly related to “being (有)/non-being (无),” and among the related group of categories, there are two key categories: *verschwindet* and *Verrücktheit*. First, the opposition of heterogeneity within the commodity is manifested in Marx’s important term *verschwindet*. In Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, a similar term “absence” is explicitly used: “Nothing is merely the absence (Abwesenheit) of being, just as darkness is merely the absence of light, cold is merely the absence of heat, and so on.” Arthur uses the term “absence” to argue that the beginning of *Capital* is value and its form of appearance, but this is a forced interpretation of the text. In fact, the *Grundrisse* uses “disappear” (*verschwindet*) and “non-being” (Nichtsein). “Disappear” means that when exchange-value is realized, use-value temporarily disappears. Non-being is used in the sense that labor, as a use-value, “disappears”; when labor is appropriated by capital, the laborer is abstracted into labor capacity, and the laborer “posits himself as the object of his own non-being (Nichtsein) or being of non-being.”

总体来说，从《大纲》的原文来看，开端问题直接相关着“存在（有）/非存在（无）”，而与之相关的范畴群中有两个关键的范畴，即verschwindet和Verrücktheit。首先，商品内部异质性的对立在马克思的重要语词verschwindet中得以显现。在黑格尔的《逻辑学》中明确使用过类似的语词“缺失”，“无仅仅是存在的缺失（Abwesenheit），正如黑暗仅仅是光明的缺失，冷仅仅是热的缺失，如此等等”。阿瑟以“缺失”（absence）一词来论证《资本论》的开端为价值及其表现形式，但这是对文本的强制诠释。其实，《大纲》使用的是“消失”（verschwindet）和非存在（Nichtsein），“消失”意指在实现交换价值之时，使用价值暂时消失。非存在是在劳动这一使用价值“消失”的意义上使用的，当劳动被资本占有后，劳动者被抽象为劳动能力，劳动者“把自己设定为，作为他自身非存在（Nichtsein）或者非存在的存在的对象”。

Regarding how to deduce exchange-value from use-value, Marx holds that “a commodity becomes exchange-value only when it disappears in circulation.” The “commodity” here refers specifically to the commodity body, i.e., use-value and the concrete labor behind it. The result of “disappearance” in the verbal sense is the nominal “absence” or “non-being.” However, the value-form school’s interpretation mainly uses “absence” or “non-being” in the nominal sense. Arthur supports and cites Bhaskar’s explanation of “absence,” but Bhaskar’s formulation of absence is: “Absence is as real as presence… what is absent is not pure ‘nothing,’ but a ‘determinate nothing’ formed by the specific process that produces it.” In contrast, Marx uses “disappearance” in the verbal sense. The verbalization of “disappearance” not only explains the emergence of “non-being” but also reveals a negating force against being. Since “disappearance” is the condition for the emergence of exchange-value, the absence of use-value or the commodity body becomes non-being or “nothing,” and non-being manifests as being (exchange-value). On this, Marx also states, “Use-value becomes use-value through exchange-value.” On the surface, this seems like a Hegelian expression; however, in a clearer formulation of the relationship between use-value and value, he explicitly points out: “It is not that use-value confronts exchange-value as determined by exchange-value itself; on the contrary, use-value does not enter into a relation with exchange-value at all, but only becomes a definite exchange-value because various use-values are measured by their commonality—all being labor-time—as an external standard. Their unity is still directly separated.” Thus, while Marx expresses that use-value manifests as value, he simultaneously affirms their “separated” relationship. Marx repeatedly expresses the “alternating” relationship of disappearance and transformation in “C-M-C,” where the non-being formed by the disappearance of the commodity’s use-value enables exchange-value to negate use-value, thereby opposing the two. He therefore holds that exchange-value is “the direct opposite of use-value, because it is use-value for others, and thus a negated, direct, individual use-value.” From this perspective, “disappearance” is the cause of the opposition between use-value and value; the “nothing” formed by the disappearance of use-value accomplishes exchange-value as being and also endows it with a negating force. In *Capital*, Marx again uses “disappearance” and “spectral” to illustrate the opposition between private labor and social labor: in exchange, “the various concrete forms of labor also disappear… what remains is only the same spectral objectivity.” This “disappeared” use-value and concrete labor are not fully objectified by value as a “specter”; instead, they form a negating force against the value-form and capital.

对于如何从使用价值推演出交换价值，马克思认为，“商品只有当它在流通中消失的时候才成为交换价值”。这里的商品具体指商品实体，即使用价值及其背后的具体劳动。动词意义上的“消失”的结果才是名词性的“缺失”或“无”。然而，价值形式学派的解读却主要在名词的意义上使用“缺失”或“无”。阿瑟支持并引用了巴斯卡关于“缺失”的阐释，但是巴斯卡对于缺失的表述是，“缺失（absence）与存在（presence）一样都是现实（reality）……缺失的东西就不是纯粹的‘无’（nothing），而是由产生它的特定过程所形成的‘有规定性的无’”。与之不同的是，马克思在动词意义上使用了“消失”。“消失”的动词化不但解释了“非存在”的出现，而且显示了一种对于存在的否定力量。既然“消失”是交换价值出现的条件，那么使用价值或商品实体的缺失就成为非存在或“无”，非存在表现为存在（交换价值）。对此，马克思也认为，“使用价值通过交换价值而生成为使用价值”。从表面上看，此种说法看似黑格尔式表达，然而，在使用价值和价值二者关系更为明确的表述中，他明确指出，“不是作为由交换价值本身决定的使用价值而同交换价值相对立；相反，使用价值本身不是同交换价值发生关系，而只是由于各种使用价值都用它们的共同性——都是劳动时间——作为外在的尺度来计量，所以才成为一定的交换价值。两者的统一还是直接相分离的”。可见，马克思在表达使用价值表现为价值的同时，肯定了二者是“分离”关系。马克思多次表达了“W-G-W”之间消失和转化的“交替”关系，其中商品使用价值的“消失”形成的非存在使得交换价值否定了使用价值，以致二者对立起来，他因此认为，交换价值“即直接使用价值的对立物，因为它对他人来说是使用价值，从而是被否定的直接的、个人的使用价值”。以此来看，“消失”是使用价值和价值之间对立的原因，使用价值的消失形成的“无”成就了作为存在的交换价值，也赋予了否定性的力量。在《资本论》中，马克思再次用“消失”和“幽灵”说明了私人劳动和社会劳动的对立：交换中“劳动的各种具体形式也消失了……剩下的只是同一的幽灵般的对象性”。这种“消失”的使用价值和具体劳动并未被价值这一“幽灵”完全对象化，反而形成了对于价值形式和资本的否定力量。

The term “disappearance” indicates that use-value and concrete labor, which are not objectified by value (the form), transform into “non-being.” Non-being is not non-existence but absence, yet it still maintains a negating relation with being (value and its form). Marx’s other category, “derangement” (Verrücktheit), better illustrates the specific mechanism of this negating relation. Arthur finds that Hegel’s “nothing” is merely nothing at the level of determinacy, whereas Marx’s “nothing” is “a starting point that abstracts more fundamentally from being itself as a genus so that nothing remains.” Arthur calls this abstraction “the self-presence of Nothing.” Although he believes non-being should be on equal footing with being, the function of this non-being is merely to “confirm” being. Arthur asserts, “If this ‘non-being’ cannot confirm itself as the ‘being’ of exchange, it will lose any ontological status.” In contrast, Marx’s non-being and being have a heterogeneous relationship, which is concentrated in his use of the category “derangement.” In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel uses “derangement” to describe the contradictory relation between individual consciousness and actual necessity when self-consciousness transitions to the moment of “the heart.” In “the heart,” there are two kinds of consciousness: one takes actual necessity as its object, the other takes non-actual necessity (the individual consciousness of the subject) as its object. Actual necessity suppresses non-actual necessity, generating antagonism. “Individual consciousness wants to become a universal directly, but in fact this endeavor of consciousness is a deranged and inverted thing, and its action only prompts it to become aware of this contradiction.” Regarding the antagonism between individual consciousness and necessity, Hegel holds that for the sake of necessity, consciousness must abandon individuality. Similarly, Marx also holds that the “rule of money appears as pure derangement,” meaning that while use-value manifests as the value-form, its own richness is suppressed. But Marx directly points out, “Use-value confronts exchange-value only as abstract chaos.” Abstract chaos is the state of use-value as non-being; in this state, use-value and value become opposed. Thus, Marx’s opposition between non-being and being is not merely Arthur’s “difference in determinacy” but a driving force of contradiction in reality.

“消失”一词显示了未被价值（形式）对象化的使用价值和私人劳动转化成了“非存在”，非存在不是不存在，而是不在场，依然与存在（价值及其形式）发生否定性关联。马克思的另一个范畴“错乱”（Verrücktheit）更能说明这种否定性关联的具体机制。阿瑟发现黑格尔的“无”只是规定性层面的无，而马克思的“无”是“从作为属（genus）的存在自身（being itself）中更根本的抽象以至于什么都没有剩下的那种起点”。对于这种抽象，阿瑟称之为“非存在的自我存在（self-presence of Nothing）”。虽然他认为非存在应该和存在处于同等地位，但是这种非存在的功能仅仅在于“确认”存在，阿瑟指认，“如果这种‘非存在’不能将自身确认为交换的‘存在’（'Being'of exchange），那么它将失去任何本体论地位”。与之不同，马克思所说的非存在与存在关系是一种异质关系，这集中体现在马克思对“错乱”这一范畴的使用上。在《精神现象学》中黑格尔使用了“错乱”一词说明自我意识过渡到“心”这个环节时个别意识与现实必然性之间的矛盾关系。“心”中存在着两种意识：一种意识以现实必然性为对象，另一种以非现实必然性为对象（主体的个体意识），现实的必然性对非现实的必然性形成了压制，并产生对抗。“个别意识想要直接成为一个普遍者，但实际上，意识的这个用心才是一种错乱而颠倒的东西，而且它的行动只会促使它意识到这个矛盾”。对于个体意识与必然性之间的对抗，黑格尔认为，为了必然性，意识必须舍弃个别性。同样，马克思也认为货币的“统治表现为纯粹的错乱”，意指使用价值表现为价值形式的同时，自身的丰富性被压制。但是马克思直接指出，“使用价值就只是作为抽象的混沌与交换价值相对立”。抽象的混沌是使用价值作为非存在的状态，在此状态下使用价值和价值产生了对立，可见，马克思的非存在与存在的对立并不仅仅是阿瑟所说的“规定性的不同”，而是现实中矛盾推动的动力。

The negating force of “nothing” revealed by “derangement” can pierce the superficial “semblance” of the sphere of circulation, completing the task of the Critique of Political Economy II. When Marx discusses the relationship between commodities and money, he repeatedly mentions that while commodities realize themselves as money, he also constantly emphasizes that “the direct existence of circulation is pure semblance. Circulation is the surface phenomenon of a process taking place behind it.” This seemingly contradictory formulation is puzzling; in fact, in the following passage, Marx clearly explains that circulation itself has no self-sustaining motive force: “Commodities must constantly be thrown into circulation anew from outside, like fuel thrown into a fire. Otherwise, circulation would lose its effect and disappear.” Thus, it is the heterogeneity between commodities and money themselves that constitutes the relation through which circulation unfolds, and the deep structure of this heterogeneous relation is that while commodities manifest as money, the concreteness of commodities and private labor is “absent,” transforming into “nothing.”

“错乱”所彰显的“无”的否定力量可以刺破流通领域表面的“假象”，完成政治经济学批判Ⅱ的任务。当马克思谈及商品和货币的关系时，反复提到商品实现为货币的同时，也在不断强调“流通的直接存在是纯粹的假象。流通是在流通背后进行的一种过程的表面现象”。这种看似矛盾的表述让人费解，实际上，在接下来的段落中，马克思清晰地说明，流通本身没有自我持存的原动力，“商品必须不断地从外面重新投入流通，就像燃料被投入火中一样。否则，流通就会失去作用而消失”。可见，商品和货币本身的异质性才是流通运行展开的关系，而异质关系的深层结构是商品表现货币的同时，商品和私人劳动的具体性“缺失”了，转化为“无”。

Not only that, but in *Capital*, “non-being,” as a negative force, continuously emerges and intensifies itself in the subsequent logical developmental moments. At the stage of use-value and value, the absence and opposition of the two are still latent, and the language is still relatively obscure; after the value-form transforms into capital, the role of non-being manifests more directly. In the relationship between capital and labor, Marx explicitly points out that concrete labor itself is excluded, its own substance disappears, it transforms into non-being, becomes the impoverished, and is itself abstracted into a single labor capacity. “The process of realization is also the process of the non-realization of labor; labor posits itself as an object, and also posits the object as its own non-being or the being of non-being, i.e., capital.” In this sentence, Marx describes the process of labor’s objectification into capital as a process of “losing” the richness of original labor; the unappropriated object becomes non-being. This is not entirely a relationship of “realization,” but rather a relationship of opposition. Regarding this, Marx believes, “The production process, as a realizing being, lies outside labor, but this realization is for labor the realization of another; it constitutes wealth opposed to labor.” That is to say, Marx affirms that this non-being lies outside the capital realized by labor, and forms an opposition with the realized being (capital). It should be noted that although Marx does not use the term “non-being” in the text of *Capital*, the meaning is still present. Specifically, he further distinguishes between labor and the use of labor-power. In the process where labor is abstracted into labor-power, the concrete living labor that is not abstracted, as a kind of non-being, stands opposed to objectified labor.

不但如此，在《资本论》中，“非存在”作为否定性的力量在其后的逻辑发展环节中不断出现并自我增强。在使用价值和价值阶段，二者的缺失和对立还是潜在的，语言还较为隐晦，在价值形式转化为资本后，非存在的作用有着更直接的显现。在资本和劳动的关系中，马克思明确指出，具体劳动本身被排斥，自身的实体消失，转化为非存在，变成了贫穷者，自身被抽象为单一的劳动能力，“实现的过程也是劳动的非实现过程，劳动把自己设定为对象，也将对象设定为他自身的非存在或非存在的存在，即资本”。在这句话中，马克思把劳动对象化为资本的过程描述为“丧失”本源性劳动丰富性的过程，未被占有的对象变成了非存在。这并不完全是“实现”关系，而是对立关系。对此，马克思认为，“生产过程作为实现性存在处于劳动之外，但这种实现性对于劳动来说是他人的实现性，它构成同劳动相对立的财富”。也就是说，马克思认定这种非存在处于劳动实现出来的资本之外，与实现出来的存在（资本）形成对立。需要说明的是，虽然《资本论》的文本中马克思没有使用非存在这一语词，但是依然有这一意涵，具体而言，他进一步区分了劳动和劳动力的使用，劳动抽象为劳动力的过程中，未被抽象的具体活劳动作为一种非存在与对象化劳动对立。

The above argument for the fundamental status of “non-being” (nothing) aims to show that the beginning of *Capital* is not the value-form with its overarching and synthesizing capacity, but rather the immanent contradictory nature of the commodity. In his later *Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner*, Marx once again mentions the immanent heterogeneous contradiction of the commodity, repeatedly emphasizing that his starting point is not the abstraction “value,” but the “concrete social form” of the commodity. “‘The commodity’ is, on the one hand, use-value, and on the other hand, ‘value’—not exchange-value, for the mere form of appearance does not constitute its own content.” That is to say, the form of appearance cannot completely “dominate” use-value; the “nothing” that use-value manifests as value has not been entirely discarded, but rather generates an immanent negation. The negative power of “nothing” as the entity of production also echoes and affirms, at the dialectical level, the critical realist confirmation of the foundational status of production: “The concept of use-value does not merely represent the natural attribute of the commodity; it itself possesses a rich content of social critique.” Finally, we revise Arthur’s table of the relationship of the beginning of *Capital* (see Table 2). In row A, the accidental exchange of commodities already potentially contains the causal relationship between production (being) and exchange. In row B, the equivalent form and the money-form become universal forms, and the relationship between non-being (production or use-value) and being (exchange) is inverted. On the surface, the relationship between non-being and being is a potential, realizing relationship, but on a substantive level, the two are a relationship of negation and heterogeneity.

以上对“非存在”（无）的根本地位的论证旨在说明《资本论》的开端并不是有着统摄和综合能力的价值形式，而是商品的内在矛盾性。马克思在晚年的《评瓦格纳手稿》中再次提及商品的内在异质性矛盾，他反复强调自己的出发点不是价值这个抽象，而是“具体的社会形式”商品。“‘商品’，一方面是使用价值，另一方面是‘价值’——不是交换价值，因为单是表现形式不构成其本身的内容。”也就是说，表现形式并不能完全“统治”使用价值，使用价值表现为价值所呈现的“无”并没有被完全舍弃，而是生成了一种内在的否定。作为生产实体的“无”的否定力量也在辩证法层面呼应和肯定了批判实在论对生产的根基性地位的确认，“使用价值概念并不仅仅表征商品的自然属性，其本身就具有丰富的社会批判内涵”。最后，我们对阿瑟的《资本论》开端的关系表进行修正（见表2），A行中的偶然的商品交换已经潜在着生产（存在）和交换的因果关系，B行是等价形式和货币形式成为普遍形式，非存在（生产或使用价值）与存在（交换）的关系发生了颠倒。表面上，非存在与存在的关系是一种潜在的、实现的关系，但是在实质层面上，二者是否定和异质关系。

Note: The two columns “Production” and “Exchange” are the theoretical insights of the value-form school (mainly located in Arthur’s *The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’*, Chapter 8). The “Relationship” part is the author’s analysis of the inner substance of the value-form school. The “Revision of the Relationship” part is the author’s critical reconstruction.

注：“生产”和“交换”两列是价值形式学派的理论洞见（主要位于阿瑟《新辩证法与马克思的〈资本论〉》第八章），关系部分则是笔者对价值形式学派内在实质的分析，“关系的修正”部分是笔者的批判性重建。

Conclusion

结语

The value-form school’s interpretation of the beginning of *Capital* delves the reading of historical dialectics into the “realm of being and non-being” constructed by the “being/non-being” structure. However, because the intervention of the method of critique of political economy fundamentally sublates the value-form and establishes a world of “being” (existence), “nothing is born from being” is reversed into “being is born from nothing.” This conclusion is beneficial for deepening our understanding of the “rational form” of Marx’s historical dialectics. In contrast, the post-structuralist reading of Hardt and Negri merely interprets historical dialectics as a structure built upon a cross-section, without penetrating into the flux of history itself. The praxis-theoretical and phenomenological readings hold that the subject of practical activity itself is the source of dynamism, and the dialectical movement of *Capital* is “an Odyssey of a specific historical form of praxis.” The “rupture” or “gap” in this thesis lies in its failure to resolve, at the level of meta-philosophy, how the practical subject achieves historical flux. Therefore, it cannot fundamentally solve the mechanism of dialectical movement, and it is also weak in piercing the ideological illusion. From the perspective of the negative relationship between non-being and being, the driving force of dialectical movement lies in the fact that the non-being (nothing) absent from the life situation in which the practical subject is located negates being (existence). The dialectical “drifting” presents the practical subject achieving continuous flux in the historically unstable field of praxis.

价值形式学派对《资本论》开端问题的阐释将历史辩证法的解读深入到“存在/非存在”构造的“有无之境”，但是由于政治经济学批判方法的介入从根本上扬弃价值形式而建立的“有”（存在）的世界，使“无生于有”反转为“有生于无”。这一结论对于我们深化有关马克思历史辩证法“合理形态”的认识有所裨益。相比之下，哈特和奈格里的后结构主义式解读仅仅把历史辩证法解释为一种建立在横截面之上的结构，没有深入到历史的流变本身。实践论和现象学解读认为，作为实践活动的主体本身就是动力之源，《资本论》的辩证运动是“实践的一种具体历史形式的奥德赛之旅”。这种论断的“断裂”或“空白”在于，其未能在元哲学层面解决实践主体如何实现历史流变，所以不能从根本上解决辩证运动的机制问题，也在刺破意识形态幻象问题上乏力。从非存在和存在的否定关系来看，辩证运动的动力在于，实践主体所处的生活情境中不在场的非存在（无）否定着存在（有）；辩证的“漂流”呈现出实践主体在历史的不稳定的实践场域中实现着连续性的流变。

Online Editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗