Sandel’s Critique and Reconstruction of the Rawlsian Conception of the Self

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls clearly states: “Since the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it, … we should reverse the relation between the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior.” [1]1 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 560. The English text is cited from the original; the Chinese translation is from the author’s rendering. On the basis of this assertion, Rawls constructs his entire system of justice. Sandel, in turn, takes the self and its relationship to ends as the logical starting point of Rawls’s theory of justice and, from this very foundation, launches a challenge to Rawls’s theory. It can be said that Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self is the most distinctive and theoretically weighty part of his political philosophy. This critique opened up a rethinking and re-examination of the Rawlsian conception of the self within Western political philosophy, both opening a new dimension for evaluating Rawls’s theory of justice and provoking reflection on the relationship between the self and others, and between the self and society or community.

罗尔斯在《正义论》中明确指出：“由于自我优先于目的，目的由自我确认……因此我们应当把目的论学说提出的正当与善的关系颠倒过来，把正当看作是优先的。”在这一论断基础之上，罗尔斯建构起整个正义论体系。桑德尔也正是将自我及其与目的的关系看作罗尔斯正义理论的逻辑起点，并从这一根基之处，对罗尔斯的理论发起挑战。可以说，桑德尔对罗尔斯自我观念的批判是他政治哲学中最具特色和理论分量的部分。他的这一批判开启了西方政治哲学界对罗尔斯自我观念的重新思考和审视，既开辟了一个考量罗尔斯正义理论的新维度，又引发了人们对自我与他人、自我与社会或共同体之间关系的反思。

In summary, Sandel criticizes Rawls’s conception of the self and its implied claim that “the self is prior to its ends” from two aspects contained in the conception of the self: the moral subject and the agent of action. He separately discusses Rawls’s arguments in the original position concerning the self and its attributes and capacities, and further points out that the Rawlsian conception of the original position fails to reconstruct Kantian moral and political claims within the scope of empirical theory, that his effort to find an Archimedean point ends in failure, and that this leads to errors in the conception of the self.

概括来说，桑德尔从自我观念所包含的道德主体和行为主体两个方面对罗尔斯的自我观念及其蕴含的“自我优先于目的”的主张进行了批评。他分别讨论了罗尔斯在原初状态中对自我及其属性和能力所做的论证，并进一步指出，罗尔斯的原初状态的构想并没有能够在经验理论的范围之内重建康德式的道德主张和政治主张，他寻求阿基米德点的努力也以失败告终，进而导致了自我观念的谬误。

I. Defects in the Nature of the Deontological Moral Subject

一、道义论道德主体在性质上的缺陷

Sandel deeply analyzes Rawls’s conception of the self and discovers that it implicitly contains two parallel dimensions: first, the plurality of the self; second, the relationship between the self and its ends. Through an analysis of these two dimensions, Sandel reveals the essence of Rawls’s moral subject.

桑德尔深入分析了罗尔斯的自我观念，发现其中暗含着两个平行的层面：一是自我的多样性；一是自我与其目的的关系问题。通过对这两个层面的分析，桑德尔揭示出罗尔斯的道德主体的本质。

(A) The Impoverished, Unencumbered Self

（一）贫瘠的无约束的自我

The plurality and complexity of the moral subject is one of the assumptions Rawls makes in designing the original position. Sandel further infers from this that, for Rawls, the plurality of individuals is a necessary presupposition for the possibility of justice: “Rawls’s view of the moral subject is that each individual person is a moral subject, and each moral subject is an individual person.” [2]2 Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 50. Therefore, the plurality of moral subjects must be prior to the unity of moral subjects; we cannot give equal priority to unity and plurality, and unity is not grounded in our nature. Because we are first distinct individuals, and only then, when circumstances permit and practical needs impel us, do we enter into relations or cooperate with others. That is, we first recognize the plurality of subjects a priori, and only then, based on actual experience, do we come to understand unity and the basis of cooperation. Hence, Sandel believes that, for Rawls, the priority of the plurality of the self over the unity of the self is a precondition for the primacy of justice.

道德主体的多样性和复杂性是罗尔斯设计原初状态时的假设之一。桑德尔据此进一步推断，在罗尔斯那里，个体的多样性是正义可能性的一个必要预设，“罗尔斯对道德主体的看法是，每一个体的人都是一个道德主体，而且每一道德主体都是一个个体的人”。因此，道德主体的多样性要优先于道德主体的统一性，我们不能给予统一性和多样性以同等的优先性，统一性并不基于我们的本性。因为我们首先是不同的个体，然后在环境允许的情况下、在现实需要的促动下，我们才与他人发生联系或进行合作。也就是说，我们先在地认识到了主体的多样性，然后根据实际经验才对统一性与合作基础有所了解。因此，桑德尔认为，对罗尔斯来说，自我的多样性相对于自我的统一性所具有的优先性，是正义具有首要性的一个前提。

Sandel believes that Rawls’s theory is not the “narrow individualistic doctrine” that empiricism speaks of. [3]3 Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 584. The assumption of mutual disinterest does not sacrifice the value of community so that principles of justice favor individual values in their selection. However, through further reasoning, Sandel concludes that Rawls’s conception is essentially individualistic. “The Rawlsian self is not only a subject of possession but a subject antecedently individuated, always distanced from the interests it possesses. … This distance … sets the self beyond the reach of experience, makes it invulnerable, fixes its identity once and for all. No commitment could grip me so deeply that I could not understand myself without it. No transformation of life plans and projects could be so unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my identity. No project could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am. Given my independence from the values I have, I can always stand apart from them; my public identity as a moral person is not affected by changes in my conception of the good over time or by changes in external circumstances.” [4]4 Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, p. 62. In Sandel’s view, the self that Rawls posits in the original position is an atomized, unencumbered self, a self independent of and prior to all ends, goals, and attachments. For the unencumbered self, what is most important and substantively meaningful for our nature is not the various goals we choose, but our capacity to choose them. This “priority of the self over its ends means that I am not merely the passive receptacle of the accumulated aims, attributes, and pursuits thrown up by experience, not simply a product of the vagaries of circumstance, but always, irreducibly, an active, willing agent, distinguishable from my surroundings, capable of choice. To identify any qualities as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is always to imply a subject ‘I’ standing behind them, and the shape of this ‘I’ must be prior to any of the aims or attributes I have. … Before any end is chosen, there must be a self capable of choosing.” [5]5 Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, p. 19.

桑德尔认为罗尔斯的理论并不是经验主义所说的那种“狭隘的个人主义学说”。毫无利益关涉的假设并不会牺牲共同体的价值而使得正义原则在选择时偏袒个人的价值。然而，桑德尔通过进一步的推理得出，罗尔斯的观念在本质上是个人主义的。“罗尔斯式的自我不仅是一个占有的主体，而且是一个先在个体化的主体，并总是与它所拥有的利益具有某种距离……这种距离的后果就是将自我置于超越经验极限的地位，使之变得无懈可击，从而一劳永逸地将其身份固定下来。没有任何承诺能够如此深刻地抓住我，以至于没有它我就不能理解我自己；没有任何生活追求和计划的变化能够如此烦人而扰乱我的身份界线；没有任何谋划是如此重要，以至于避开它将使‘我是谁’成为一个问题。既然我独立于我所拥有的价值之外，那么我就总是能离开它们；我作为道德个人的公共身份在我的善观念中并不会随着时间和外在环境的变化而受到影响。”在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯在原初状态当中所设定的自我，是一种原子化的、无约束的自我（unencumbered self），这种自我独立于并先在于各种目的、目标和纽带。对于无约束的自我而言，最重要的、对我们的本性具有实质性意义的，并不是我们所选择的各种目标，而是我们选择各种目标的能力。这种“自我相对于其目的的优先性意味着，我不仅仅是经验所抛出的一连串目标、属性和追求的一个被动容器，并不简单地是环境之怪异的产物，而总是一个不可还原的、积极的、有意志的行为者，能从我的环境中分别出来，且具有选择能力。任何品质认同为我的目标、志向、欲望等等，总是暗含着一个站立于其后的主体的‘我’，而且这个‘我’的形象必须优先于我所具有的任何目的与属性。……在某一目的被选择之前，必然有一个具备选择能力的自我”。

What Sandel rejects is precisely this nature of the self. In his view, such a thoroughly independent, unencumbered self excludes all conceptions of good and evil that are constitutive of the self’s identity; it also excludes any possibility of attachment that could surpass our values and emotions and become part of our identity itself; this conception of the self also excludes the possibility of a public life in which the various identities, bonds, and interests of participants are crucial; it even excludes another possibility, namely, that public intentions and purposes could, to a greater or lesser extent, inspire and expand the understanding of the self, and thereby define a community in a constitutive sense.

桑德尔所排斥的正是自我的这一性质，在他看来，这样彻底独立的、无约束的自我，排除了各种善恶观念，而这些善恶观念对于自我的身份而言具有构成性的意义；这样的自我也排除了任何依附的可能性，而这种依附能够超过我们的价值和情感，成为我们的身份本身；这种自我观念还排除了一种公共生活的可能性，在这种生活中，参与者的各种身份、纽带与利益都至关重要；它甚至还排除了另一种可能性，即公共意图和目的能够或多或少地激发和扩展有关自我的理解，并因此在一种构成性的意义上界定一个共同体。

More generally, in Sandel’s view, Rawls’s account excludes another possibility of self-understanding, namely, “intersubjective” or “intrasubjective” forms. “The intersubjective conception does not presuppose an antecedently individuated self.” [6]6 Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, p. 50. On the one hand, this intersubjective conception allows, in certain moral contexts, the relevant description of the self to encompass dimensions such as family, community, class, and nation, rather than being limited to a single, individual person; on the other hand, for certain specific purposes, the intersubjective conception also allows the description of the moral subject to refer to the plurality of selves within the individual. Sandel asserts that although Rawls does not explicitly oppose the intersubjective conception, he implicitly does so, because he assumes that each individual corresponds to a single system of desires and believes that the error of utilitarianism lies in applying principles suitable only for individuals to society as a whole. If each individual has a complete system of desires, then there is no need to aggregate desires within individuals; only when society is composed of diverse individuals do we need principles of justice to coordinate them. Thus, Rawls excludes or fails to recognize the intersubjective way of understanding the self. However, this exclusion is not thoroughgoing; sometimes his theory relies on a similar conception. This is mainly evident in his argument for the difference principle.

从更一般的意义上来说，在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯的解释排除了另一种自我理解的可能性，即“主体间的”或“主体内的”形式。“主体间的观念并不假定在先的、理解自我的方式。”这种主体间的观念，一方面，允许在某种道德环境中，对自我的相关描述容纳家庭、共同体、阶级、民族等维度，而并非局限于一个并非单一的、个体的人；另一方面，为了某些特定的目的，主体间的观念还允许对道德主体的描述可以指涉个体内部的自我的多元性。桑德尔断定，罗尔斯虽然没有明确反对主体间的观念，然而他却已经隐性地加以反对，因为他假定每一个体都对应于某种单一的欲望体系，并认为功利主义的错误就在于它将那些只适合于个人的原则应用于整个社会。如果每一个体都具有一整套系统的欲望，那么就不需要在个体中合并各种欲望；只有当社会是由多样化的个体组成时，我们才需要正义原则加以协调。可见，罗尔斯排除了或没有认识到主体间理解自我的方式。不过，他的这种排除并不彻底，有时他的理论又会依赖于一种类似的观念。这主要体现在他对差异原则的论证当中。

Therefore, overall, in Sandel’s view, the conception of the self on which Rawls and his theory of justice depend is essentially impoverished, stripped of all constitutive attachments and bonds, excluding fuller understandings of the self, and unable to recognize the essential value of community in the constitution of personal identity and even in the ideals of personal life.

因此，总的来说，在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯及其正义理论所依赖的自我观念在本质上是贫瘠的，摆脱了各种构成性依附和联结，也排除了各种更加充分的有关自我的理解，更无法认识到共同体在个人身份构成当中乃至个人生活理想当中所具有的本质性价值。

(B) The Possessive Subject Cannot Sustain Legitimate Expectations

（二）占有主体无法支撑合法性期待

In Sandel’s view, when Rawls opposes the principles of liberal freedom and fair equality of opportunity, he combines the possessive self and the notion of desert. According to the conception of the possessive subject, there is a certain distance between me and the talents and abilities I possess; as far as I myself am concerned, the self possesses nothing, having no substantive characteristics or qualities that can be attributed as the basis of desert. The characteristics and qualities I have are mine, but they are not me; they are appendages I possess, but they do not constitute my existence. For this reason, Rawls further holds that people have no intrinsic value, that no value is inherently intrinsic, nor is it my existence itself. Hence, the principles of justice should not involve moral desert either. Thus, by treating the conception of the self as a pure, essentially unencumbered possessive subject, Rawls denies desert and the basis of desert, opposes the principles of liberal freedom and fair equality of opportunity, and consequently regards the difference principle as an unavoidable principle.

在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯在反对天赋自由和自由平等原则的时候，将占有的自我和应得这两个方面结合了起来。根据占有主体的观念，我与我所拥有的天赋和才能之间存在着一定的间距性；就我本身而言，自我一无所有，没有任何实质性的特征和品质可被归为应得的基础。我所具有的特征与品质是我的，但不是我本人；是我所拥有的附属物，但并不构成我的存在。也正因为如此，罗尔斯进一步认为人没有内在的价值，任何价值都不是内在固有的，也并不是我的存在本身。因而，正义原则也不应当涉及道德应得。由此，罗尔斯通过将自我观念看作是一个纯粹的、本质上无约束的占有主体，而否定应得和应得的基础，并反对天赋自由和自由平等原则，进而认为差异原则是不可避免的原则。

However, in Sandel’s view, if the principles of justice and the theory of justice are built upon a conception of the self that lacks essential value and is stripped of all endowments, talents, and purposes, this will encounter even greater difficulties. He argues that the pure conception of the self implicit in Rawls’s theory is a possessive subject stripped of all contingency, bound by no prior moral ties or purposes, and thus a “thin” subject. Sandel points out that this independent self of deontology, essentially deprived of all intrinsic value, talents, and endowments, is too thin to obtain desert in its everyday sense.

然而，在桑德尔看来，如果将正义原则和正义理论建立在一种没有本质性价值，被剥夺了各种禀性、天赋与目的的自我观念之上，那将会面临更多的困难。他认为，罗尔斯的理论中所暗含的这种纯粹的自我观念，是被剥夺了所有偶然性的、没有任何先在的道德纽带和目的所约束的占有主体，因而是一个“薄的”主体。桑德尔指出，道义论的这种独立的自我，在本质上被剥夺了所有的内在价值、天赋和禀性，他过于单薄而难以获得其日常意义上的应得。

Hence, Sandel challenges Rawls’s notion of desert: Rawls, starting from arbitrariness, denies desert and allows society as a whole to acquire and distribute the natural assets of its members and the benefits arising from them. This requires us to assume, in theory, that society has characteristics that are prior to institutions. For only such a society can, in a strong, constitutive sense, possess the property of its members. However, this view would conflict with the theory of the individual that Rawls assumes, especially with his view that society is not a living organic whole and is not prior to individuals. At this point, Rawls’s notion of desert would implicitly rely on a broader possessive subject. Thus, an intersubjective dimension may once again forcibly intrude into Rawls’s individualist project.

由此，桑德尔对罗尔斯的应得观念提出诘难：罗尔斯从任意性出发而否定应得，并允许作为整体的社会得到并分配社会成员的天赋财产和由此而来的利益。这就需要我们在理论上假设，社会具有先于制度的特性。因为只有这样的社会才在强的、构成性的意义上占有其成员的财产。然而，这样的观点又会与罗尔斯所假设的个体理论相冲突，尤其与他的社会不是一个生命有机整体并优先于个人的观点相对立。此时，罗尔斯的应得观念就会隐晦地依赖于一个更为广泛的占有主体。由此，一个交互主体性的维度可能会再次强行闯入罗尔斯的个人主义谋划。

So why does Sandel point out Rawls’s reliance on an intersubjective conception of the self? Is this important? In fact, this is precisely the strength of Sandel’s critical theory. What Sandel attacks is the fundamental claim of Rawls (and liberalism) that a community is an association formed by independent individuals, and therefore the value of the community should be evaluated and measured by the terms related to justice formed by these individuals. Sandel insists, however, that we cannot understand community in this way, because the existence of individuals who can reach agreement and form associations presupposes the existence of the community. Rawls’s reliance on intersubjectivity also confirms this view, and this reliance directly threatens his own theory. In Sandel’s view, Rawls attempts to define the association of a just society as the product of a contract among free and equal individuals, but this project actually fails. For such individuals are selves without motivation, without the capacity for choice or reflection. Such individuals cannot reach substantive conclusions either. To arrive at substantive conclusions, Rawls has to invoke an assumption inconsistent with his own theory, namely, that there indeed exists a community in whose life individuals are completely encompassed.

那么，桑德尔为什么要指出罗尔斯对交互主体性自我观念的依赖呢？这一点很重要吗？其实，这恰恰是桑德尔的批评理论所具有的过人之处。桑德尔所攻击的正是罗尔斯（以及自由主义）的根本主张，即一个共同体是由独立的个体所形成的联合体，因此共同体的价值就应当由这些个体所形成的与正义相关的术语来加以评价和衡量。而桑德尔则坚持认为，我们不能这样去理解共同体，因为那些能够达成一致并形成联盟的个体的存在，正预设了共同体的存在，罗尔斯对交互主体性的依赖也证实了这一观点，而这种依赖又直接威胁到了自身的理论。在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯企图将一个正义社会的联合体界定为自由、平等的个体之间签订契约的产物，但他的这一谋划实际上失败了。因为，这样的个体是没有动机，没有选择能力、反思能力的自我。这样的个人也不能得出实质性的结论。而为了达到实质性的结论，罗尔斯就不得不援引一种与自己理论不一致的假设，即确实存在着一个共同体，在这种共同体的生活中，个体完全被囊括其中。

II. Deficiencies in the Capacities of the Deontological Agent

二、道义论行为主体在能力方面的不足

Sandel proceeds from the perspective of agency and the agent, then returns to Rawls’s contract theory and the veil of ignorance, discussing respectively the agent’s capacity for choice, capacity for reflection, and other levels. He critiques Rawls’s conception of the self and his argumentation concerning the capacities of the agent, while further criticizing the deontological liberalism and theory of justice built upon this foundation.

桑德尔从主体能力（agency）、行为主体（agent）的角度着手，进而又返回到罗尔斯的契约论和无知之幕之中，分别从主体的选择能力、反思能力等几个层面讨论，并批判了罗尔斯的自我观念以及关于主体能力的论证，同时进一步批判了建立在此基础之上的道义论自由主义及正义理论。

(1) The Loss of “Possession”

（一）丧失“占有”

Sandel first starts from the concept of possession, drawing out the issue of the agent’s capacities from the relationship between the self and its various ends. Through an in-depth analysis of Rawls’s conception of the self and the moral agent, he concludes: Rawls expends considerable effort in distinguishing between the self and its various possessions; this is a necessary component of the entire deontological system. It lays the foundation for the priority of the self over its ends, which in turn supports the priority of the right and the primacy of justice. However, in Sandel’s view, “one consequence of the dual aspect of possession is that possession can disappear or diminish in two different ways. Not only do I gradually lose possession of something when a distance arises between my person and that thing, but I also gradually lose possession of it when the distance between my self and that thing gradually shortens to the point of near disappearance. I lose possession of a desire or aspiration not only when my commitment to it disappears, when I no longer adhere to it, but also, beyond a certain point, as I grasp it, as I gradually obtain it, I lose possession of it. When the desire or aspiration gradually becomes constitutive of my identity, it will increasingly become me, and decreasingly become mine. … The less I possess it, the more I am possessed by it.” [7]7 Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 56. [Translator’s note: The English original reads: “One consequence of the dual aspect of possession is that possession can be lost or diminished in two different ways. Not only do I lose possession of an object when the distance between my person and the object grows, but I also lose possession of it when the distance between my self and the object shrinks to the vanishing point. I lose possession of a desire or aspiration not only when I cease to hold it, but also, at the limit, when I come to hold it so closely that it becomes constitutive of my identity. … The less I possess it, the more I am possessed by it.”] In Sandel’s view, possession is necessarily related to human agency and self-command. From the two ways in which possession can disappear, the deprivation of possession can be understood as a deprivation of power. When I lose possession of something—whether because it is beyond my control, or because it is so powerful that it controls me, thereby depriving me of power over it—my agency over that object also disappears. Each of these challenges is related to a conception of agency, which in turn reflects a different interpretation of the relationship between the self and its ends.

桑德尔首先由占有观念入手，从自我与其各种目的之间的关系而引出主体的能力问题。他通过深入分析罗尔斯的自我观念以及道德主体而得出：罗尔斯耗费大量笔墨在自我和自我的诸种占有之间作出区分，这是整个道义论体系的必需成分，它为自我相对于其目的的优先性奠定基础，而后者则进一步支持了正当的优先性以及正义的首要性。然而，在桑德尔看来，“占有双重性的一个后果是，占有可能会以两种不同方式消失或缩小。不仅是在我的人格与某一事物之间产生了距离时，我才渐渐地失去对该事物的占有，而且在我的自我与该事物之间的距离逐渐缩短以至快要消失时，我也会渐渐失去对该事物的占有。我不仅在我对某一欲望或抱负的承诺消失时，在我不再坚持这种承诺时，会失去对这一欲望或抱负的占有，而且，在某一点之后，随着我对它的把握，随着我渐渐地得到它，我也会失去对它的占有。当该欲望或抱负逐渐成为我的身份之构成，它就将越来越多地变成我，而越来越少地成为我的。……我越少占有它，我就越多地被它所占有”。在桑德尔看来，占有必定与人的能动作用以及自制（self-command）相关。从占有所可能消失的两种途径来看，对占有的剥夺可以理解为一种对权力的剥夺。当我失去对某物的占有时——无论是因为它不在我的掌握之中，还是因为它过于强大使我被它所掌控，从而使我在它面前失去了权力——我对这一物体所具有的能动作用也便消失了。这每一种挑战都与一种能动作用的观念相关，而这反过来又体现出一种不同的、对自我与目的的关系的解释。

When the self, as Rawls holds, is prior to its ends, then self-knowledge is impossible in this sense, because the boundaries of the self are fixed, and within these boundaries everything is transparent. The moral question related to this is not “who am I,” for the answer to this question is given in advance; rather, it is the question “what ends should I choose,” which is actually a question referring to the will. Hence, the voluntarist conception of agency is a key component in Rawls’s thought and plays an important role in deontological ethics. As Rawls points out: “What reveals our nature is not our various goals; it is our capacity to choose our goals, and this capacity is also embodied in the principles of justice. Therefore, a moral person is a subject with the ends it has chosen.” [8]8 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 561. [Translator’s note: The English original reads: “What we are is not our ends; it is our capacity to choose our ends, and this capacity is also reflected in the principles of justice. Thus a moral person is a subject with ends he has chosen.”]

当自我像罗尔斯所认为的那样，优先于其目的时，那么，自我知识在此意义上就是不可能的，因为自我的界线是固定的，并且在此界线之内，一切都是一目了然的。与此相关的道德问题就不是“我是谁”，因为这个问题的答案已经事先给定了；而是“我应当选择什么样的目的”这一问题，实际上是一个指涉意志的问题。因而，意志论的能动观念是罗尔斯理念中的一个关键成分，并在道义论伦理中起着重要的作用。正如罗尔斯所指出的：“那揭示我们本性的，并非我们的各种目标；而是我们选择各种目标的能力，并且这一能力也体现于正义原则之中。因此，一个道德的人就是一个带有它所选择的各种目的的主体。”

Yet this is precisely what Sandel opposes. In his view, the danger of losing “possession” cannot be resolved through Rawls’s volitional capacity of the subject and the associated priority of the self over its ends. When the self loses power because it is detached from its ends, this volitional capacity can, through choice, bridge the distance between the subject and its objects. However, when the self loses power because it is unable to distinguish its ends, the volitional capacity of the subject ceases to function and must be addressed through an epistemological dimension. Yet the Rawlsian self does not possess this epistemological capacity of the subject. Only when the self’s ends are antecedently given is the subject’s capacity not volitional but cognitive. For such a subject does not achieve self-mastery by choosing what is already given; rather, it achieves self-mastery by reflecting on itself, probing its constitutive nature, discerning its laws and principles, and accepting its ends as its own.

然而，这正是桑德尔所反对的。在他看来，丧失“占有”的危险，并不能通过罗尔斯的这种意志论的主体能力以及与此相关联的自我对其目的的优先性观念而得到解决。当自我是由于脱离其目的而丧失权力的时候，这种意志论的能力能够通过选择，而超越主体及其对象之间的距离。然而，当自我由于无法区分其目的而丧失权力的时候，意志论的主体能力就不起作用了，而必须通过认识论的维度而加以解决。然而，罗尔斯式的自我并不具备这种认知论的主体能力。只有当自我的目的是在先给定的时候，主体的能力才不是意志论的，而是认知型的。因为，这种主体并不是通过选择那些已经给定的东西而达到自制，相反，它是通过反省自身、窥探其构成性的本性、辨别其法则和定律，并将其目的接受为自己的目的，而达到自制的。

In Sandel’s view, this latter capacity is a capacity for reflection. While the volitional capacity seeks to preserve the relationship between the self and its ends by establishing continuity between them, the reflective capacity is a capacity for distancing. In the process of reflection, the self examines its interior, making the self an object of its own scrutiny and reflection; and when I can reflect on my possessions, picking them out as objects of my reflection, I establish a certain distance between myself and them. Thus, they become more my attributes and less constitutive of my identity. Moreover, when the self’s identity is constituted by various antecedently given ends, the subject’s capacity no longer appeals to the will but instead seeks self-understanding. Consequently, the relevant question is no longer “What ends shall I choose?”—since the answer to this question is already given—but rather “Who am I?” and “How do I discern which are ends and which are myself?” Here, the boundaries of the self are not fixed but full of possibilities; its contours are no longer clear and distinct but, at least in part, yet to be formed. Thus, in Sandel’s view, the relationship between the self and its ends also affects the subject’s capacity: when the self is prior to its ends, the dominant capacity of the subject is choice, appealing to a kind of voluntarism; when the ends are antecedently given to the self, the dominant capacity of the subject is reflection. In fact, Rawls also emphasizes the subject’s capacity for reflection, even emphasizing the achievement of principles of justice through “reflective equilibrium.” However, in Sandel’s view, because Rawls inverts the relationship between the self and its ends, the capacity for choice he emphasizes cannot truly choose anything, and the reflection he emphasizes cannot truly reflect effectively.

在桑德尔看来，这后一种能力就是一种反思的能力。当意志能力企图通过使自我及其目的之间获得连续性而保存自我与目的之间的关系时，反思的能力则是一种疏远性的能力。在反思过程中，自我探视其内部，使得自我成为自身检验和反思的对象；而当我能够反思自己的占有，能够将其挑选出来作为我反思的对象时，我就在它和我之间确立了某种间距。于是，它也就更多地是我的属性，而较少地构成我的身份。此外，当自我的身份是由那些在先给定的各种目的所构成时，主体能力就不再诉诸意志，而更多地是寻求自我的理解。由此，与之相关的问题就不是“我要选择什么样的目的”，因为这一问题的答案已经给定了；而是“我是谁”“我如何辨别出哪些是目的、哪些是我本身”。这里，自我的界线并不是固定的，而是充满了各种可能性；其轮廓不再是清晰明了的，而至少在部分程度上是尚待形成的。由此可见，在桑德尔看来，自我与目的的关系，也影响了主体的能力：当自我优先于目的时，主体的主导能力即为选择，并诉诸一种意志论；当目的优先于自我而给定时，主体的主导能力即为反思。其实，罗尔斯也强调主体的反思能力，甚至强调通过“反思的平衡”而达到正义原则。不过，在桑德尔看来，由于罗尔斯颠倒了自我与目的的关系，因此，他所强调的选择能力并不能真正地选择什么，他所强调的反思也并不能真正有效地反思。

(2) Inventory Rather Than Choice

（二）清点而非选择

As Rawls states, because the self is antecedently existing, it needs to acquire various ends by exercising its capacity for choice. If our fundamental ends, values, and conceptions of the good are all to be chosen by ourselves, then in this process, the subject is indeed exercising its own capacity. In Rawls, the subject’s choice often depends on our clear knowledge of our own desires and the intensity of those desires. However, in Sandel’s view, the kind of choice Rawls describes, based on my current preferences, is merely a choice in a special sense. For Rawls himself holds that the expectations and desires on which my choice depends are not themselves chosen; rather, they are products of circumstances. Therefore, the choice that depends on these desires is not an act of will but merely a description of the content of these expectations and desires. Hence, Sandel points out that what the agent does here is merely to evaluate and take inventory of the various expectations and preferences it already possesses, not to choose values or pursue ends. At the same time, “simply to arrive at a life plan or conception of the good by heeding my existing expectations and desires is not to choose that plan, nor to choose the desires; it is merely to match the various ends I already have with the means that best satisfy them. In this description, my goals, values, and conception of the good are not the product of choice but the object of a superficial introspection, a mere uncritical inward observation of the motives and desires that circumstances have left me with.”

如罗尔斯所说，由于自我是在先存在的，因此自我就需要通过运用选择能力而获得各种目的。如果我们根本的目的、价值以及善观念都有待我们自己选择，那么，在此过程中，主体所实施的正是自己的能力。在罗尔斯这里，主体的选择经常依赖于我们清楚地了解自己的欲望，以及这种欲望的强烈程度。然而，在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯所说的这样一种基于我当下偏好的选择，仅仅是一种特殊意义上的选择。因为罗尔斯自己便认为，我的选择所依赖的那些期望和欲望本身并不是通过选择而来的，相反，它们是环境的产物。因此，依赖于这些欲望的那种选择并非一种意志的行为，而只不过是对这些期望和欲望的内容的一种说明。由此，桑德尔指出，行动主体在这里所做的决定，只不过是在对自己已经拥有的各种期望和偏好进行评估和清点，而并不是在选择各种价值、追求各种目的。同时，“仅仅靠听从于我现有的各种期望和欲望来达成一种人生计划或善观念，这并不是在选择这一计划，也并没有选择各种欲望；而只是将我所拥有的各种目的与那些能够最佳满足他们的手段相匹配。在这种描述中，我的各种目标、价值以及善观念，就并不是选择的产物，而是某种肤浅内省的对象，只是毫不批判地向内观察研究环境所留给我的那些动机和欲望而已”。

Therefore, in Sandel’s view, although Rawls wishes to endow the agent with a capacity for choice and to rely on this capacity to choose its own ends, values, conceptions of the good, and ways of life, in fact, the agent does not truly choose its own ends, values, and so on; this capacity does not play the role Rawls expected in the relationship between the self and its ends. Furthermore, Sandel argues that the agent in the veil of ignorance and the original position also does not choose principles of justice and reach a corresponding contract. In his view, the purpose of setting up the veil of ignorance is to place the parties in the original position in similar circumstances, eliminating differences in their abilities and knowledge, thereby removing possible sources of unfairness. Once this is done, any contract reached by the parties is purely procedural justice, and whatever the outcome of such a contract, it is fair. However, because various differences in interests, preferences, power, or knowledge are screened off, all the individuating features of the parties in the original position are also eliminated, and the parties are placed in identical circumstances. The “priority of plurality over unity” that Rawls initially set up no longer exists. And once plurality disappears, the parties in the original position lose the possibility of bargaining necessary for making a contract; they are merely subjects with the same circumstances and the same rationality, accepting or understanding the same content. Thus, what Rawls began as a matter of choice and identification through the will ends up as a matter of insight and self-understanding; choice and will are replaced by understanding and perception. The people behind the veil of ignorance do not choose principles of justice but merely recognize them. Therefore, Sandel concludes: “The secret of the original position and the key to its justification lies not in what people do there but in what they understand there. What matters is not what they choose but what they see; not what they decide but what they discover. What is formed in the original position is not a contract at all but an intersubjective self-identification.”

因此，在桑德尔看来，虽然罗尔斯希望赋予行动主体以一种选择能力，并企图依赖这种主体能力去选择自己的各种目的、价值、善观念以及生活方式。可是，事实上，行动主体并没有真正选择自己的各种目的、价值和善观念等，这种能力并没有在自我与目的的关系中起到罗尔斯所预期的那种作用。此外，桑德尔认为，行动主体在无知之幕和原初状态中，也并没有选择出正义原则并达成相应的契约。在他看来，设置无知之幕的初衷就是为了使原初状态中的各方处于类似的境况之中，使各方的能力和知识上的差异性消失，以此来根除可能的不公平的根源。一旦如此，各方所达成的任何契约就是纯程序的正义，无论这类契约的结果是什么，都是公平的。然而，由于被屏蔽了各种利益、偏好、权力或知识上的某种差异，原初状态中的各方所具有的所有个性化特征也都被排除了，其中各方就是处于相同的境遇之中。罗尔斯最初所设置的“多样性对于统一性的优先性”也就不复存在了。而一旦多样性消失，原初状态中的各方也就失去了订立契约所必需的讨价还价的可能性，他们不过是具有相同境况相同理性的主体，在接受或理解同样的内容。因此，罗尔斯一开始依靠意志而进行选择和认同，而到最后却变成了一种洞察与自我理解，选择和意志被理解与知觉所代替。无知之幕中的人们不是选择了正义原则，而只是认识了正义原则。因此，桑德尔总结道：“原初状态的秘密及其正当性证明的关键，并不在于人们在其中做了什么，而在于他们在那里理解了什么。重要的不是他们选择了什么，而是他们看到了什么；不是他们决定了什么，而是他们发现了什么。在原初状态中所形成的也根本不是一项契约，而是对交互主体性的自我认同。”

Thus, starting from the capacity of the agent and through an examination of the veil of ignorance and the original position, Sandel not only denies Rawls’s initial assumption of the plurality of selves and the priority of plurality over unity but also, on the basis of the disappearance of plurality, denies the agent’s capacity for choice on which Rawls relies, ultimately denying the contract and principles of justice founded on this specious capacity for choice, and once again highlights the dependence of Rawls’s conception of the self, the original position, and his theory of justice on the very intersubjectivity he seeks to reject.

由此，桑德尔从行为主体的能力入手，又通过对无知之幕和原初状态的考察，既否定了罗尔斯最初设定的自我的多样性以及多样性优先于统一性的论点，也进而在多样性消失的基础上否定了罗尔斯所依赖的行为主体的选择能力，最终否定了建立在这种似是而非的选择能力基础之上的契约和正义原则，并再一次凸显出罗尔斯的自我观念、原初状态及正义理论对他自己所要排斥的那种交互主体性的依赖。

(3) Outward, Limited Reflection

（三）向外的、有限的反思

Sandel further questions the reflective capacity of the agent as described by Rawls. In Rawls’s view, the agent needs the capacity to reflect in order to determine what we want and the extent to which we desire it; the agent’s life plan or conception of the good is the result of reflection. However, in Sandel’s view, Rawls’s conception of the self and the relationship between the self and its ends restricts the object of reflection to the following two types: first, various alternative plans and the possible outcomes that would result from the realization of the agent’s desires; second, the agent’s various expectations and desires themselves, along with the intensity with which the agent wants them. In both cases, the object of the agent’s reflection is limited to desires, without taking the self that is the subject of these desires as an object of reflection. In the first case, the weighing of various alternative plans and their consequences is not reflection at all; here reflection is outward, not inward, and amounts only to a kind of prudential reasoning, which could in principle be carried out by an external expert who knows little about the agent but is thoroughly familiar with the alternatives and the various interests and desires they are meant to satisfy. In the second case, the assessment of the intensity of various desires is in a certain sense inward, but it is not thoroughgoing. It takes the agent’s contingent desires and preferences, rather than the self itself, as the object of reflection; it does not touch upon the subject behind these expectations and desires, nor can it reach the self that is the subject of these desires. Because Rawls’s reflective capacity is merely a matter of measuring the intensity of existing expectations and desires, the deliberation it involves cannot peer into the interior of the agent’s identity to ask “who am I,” but can only enter the agent’s perceptual level to ask “what do I really like.” Since such deliberation is limited to evaluating the desires of a moral agent whose identity is antecedently and unreflectively given, it cannot generate that strong sense of self-understanding that would enable the agent to participate in the constitution of its own identity. Sandel further analyzes in depth why the object of Rawlsian reflection cannot be the being that we are, but can only be various desires: first, the being that we are is antecedently given and is not altered by reflection or the influence of the agent; second, because the Rawlsian self carries no constitutive components but merely possesses some contingent attributes at a certain distance, there is nothing in this self available for reflection or understanding.

桑德尔进一步质疑了罗尔斯所说的行为主体的反思能力。在罗尔斯看来，主体需要反思的能力以便决定我们想要的东西以及我们在多大程度上渴望它们，主体的人生计划或善观念都是反思的结果。然而，在桑德尔看来，罗尔斯的自我观念以及关于自我与目的之关系的设定，使得主体的反思对象仅仅局限于以下两种：第一，各种待选计划以及主体的欲望得到实现后所产生的各种可能的结果；第二，主体的各种期望和欲望本身，以及主体想要它们的强烈程度。在这两种情形中，行为主体的反思对象都局限于欲望，而没有将作为各种欲望之主体的自我作为对象而加以反思。第一种情形中对各种可选计划及其后果的衡量，根本就不是反思，这里的反思是向外的，而不是向内的，而且只是达到一种审慎的推理，这种推理在原则上可以由一个外在的、对行动主体知之甚少而对各种备选项及其要满足的各种利益和欲望了如指掌的专家来完成。第二种情形中对各种欲望之强度的评估，在某种意义上确实是向内的，不过也并不彻底。它将自我的各种偶然性欲望和偏好，而不是自我本身，作为对象加以反思，它并没有涉及各种期望和欲望背后的主体，它也不能达到作为各种欲望之主体的自我。由于罗尔斯所说的反思能力不过是衡量现有各种期望和欲望的强度，因此，它所包含的慎思就不能窥视到行为主体的身份内部以追问“我是谁”，而只能进入行为主体的感知层面以追问“我真正喜欢的是什么”。由于这样的慎思局限于评价道德主体的各种欲望，而这一道德主体的身份是在先地、不加反思地给定的，因而，这种慎思就不能形成那种强意义上的、使行动主体能够参与其身份构成的自我理解。桑德尔进一步深入分析了罗尔斯的反思对象不可能是我们所是的存在，而只能是各种欲望的原因：第一，我们所是的存在是在先给定的，并不受反思或行为主体的影响而改变；第二，由于罗尔斯的自我不带有任何构成性的成分，而只是在某种距离上拥有一些偶然的属性。因此，在这种自我中没有任何东西可供反思或理解。

III. The Constitutive Self

三、构成性的自我

In Sandel’s view, the account of the subject cannot be merely empirical; to some extent, it also constitutes part of what we are. He advocates understanding the self from an intersubjective perspective, emphasizing the constitutive self.

在桑德尔看来，对主体所进行的论述不能仅仅是经验性的，在某种程度上，它更构成了我们之所是的一部分。他主张从一种主体间性（intersubjective）的角度来理解自我，强调构成性的自我观念（constitutive-self）。

Unlike the “unencumbered self” on which Rawls relies—a self whose boundaries are taken as antecedently fixed and which relates the self to its ends in a voluntarist sense through the subject—the constitutive self holds that the self and its identity are largely constituted by the society and ends in which it is situated. The relationships and attachments it has in society are not antecedently chosen but have a constitutive influence on its identity. “We are partly constituted by our major expectations and attributes, and are always open to change according to transformations in self-understanding.” In the “constitutive self,” it is not the self that is prior to its ends, but ends that are prior to the self; the self does not acquire its ends through choice but through reflection. This “constitutive self” takes the boundaries of the self as open and treats the identity of the subject as a product of the agent’s activity rather than as a premise. In summary, the identity of the constitutive self is partly constituted by ends that exist prior to it. Thus, Sandel understands the self and the relationship between the self and society from an intersubjective perspective; he also acknowledges that his “constitutive self” is essentially no different from MacIntyre’s “narrative self,” in that both emphasize the influence of antecedent ends on self-identity and both oppose the “unencumbered self” on which deontology relies. The difference is merely that the “constitutive self” places greater emphasis on the role and status of communal bonds and attributes in the constitution of self-identity, while the “narrative self” focuses more on the influence of history on self-identity.

与罗尔斯所依赖的那种将自我的界线看作是先行既定的，并通过主体把自我与目的在唯意志论的意义上联系起来的“无约束的自我观念”不同，构成性的自我观念认为，自我及其身份在很大程度上是由它所处的社会及其目的所构成的，它在社会中所处的关系和依附并不是它在先选择的，而是对它的身份有着构成性的影响。“我们是部分地由自己的那些主要期望和属性所构成的，并且总是开放的，根据自我理解的转变而发生变化。”在“构成性的自我观念”中，不是自我优先于目的，而是目的优先于自我；自我获得目的的方式并非通过选择，而是通过反思。这种“构成性的自我观念”将自我的界线看作是开放性的，并把主体的认同看作是其行为主体的产物而非前提。概而言之，构成性自我的身份部分地是由那些在它之前就已经存在的目的所构成。由此可见，桑德尔从主体间性的角度来理解自我以及自我与社会之间的关系；同时也承认自己所说的这种“构成性的自我”与麦金泰尔的“叙述性的自我”（narrative self）其实没有本质上的区别，二者都强调那些在先的目的对自我身份的影响，都反对道义论所依赖的那种“无约束的自我”；只不过“构成性的自我”更加侧重强调共同体的纽带和属性在自我身份构成中的地位和作用，而“叙述性的自我”则更加侧重于历史对自我身份的影响。

From the perspective of the agent’s capacities, the “constitutive self” is more concerned with seeking self-understanding than with exercising will; it does not rely on the capacity for choice but instead depends on the capacity for reflection to look back upon itself, to explore its constitutive nature and its various attachments, to acknowledge their respective claims, and thereby to draw boundaries between self and others and achieve a self-understanding that partly constitutes the subject’s identity and partly defines who it is. In Sandel’s view, the capacity for reflection is the essential capacity of this constitutive self and the fundamental factor distinguishing it from the deontological self; moreover, the reflective capacity possessed by the constitutive self is reflection in the true sense. As mentioned earlier, Sandel holds that because the deontological self is entirely without character, unencumbered, and in essence stripped bare, it cannot take itself as an object of reflection. In contrast, the constitutive self takes ends as antecedent, and its identity is constructed on the basis of antecedent ends. Therefore, it can turn inward, attend to itself, and make the self an object of reflection, thereby overcoming the two dangers inherent in the possessive relationship between the self and its attributes. For when I can reflect on my attributes, I create a certain space between them and myself, weakening their force; they thereby become more a property of mine rather than a constituent of my identity. At the same time, the capacity for reflection also establishes a connection between attributes and the self. Relatedly, the constitutive self does not, like the deontological self, seek to choose some end; rather, it seeks to understand who I am and how I can distinguish myself from various ends.

从主体能力的角度而言，“构成性的自我”更多地是在寻求自我理解，而不是寻求于意志；它并不依赖于选择能力，相反，它依靠反思能力而反观自己以探求它的构成本质以及各种不同依附，并承认他们各自不同的要求，从而在自我与他人之间划出界线并达到一种自我理解，而这种自我理解部分地构成了主体的认同，并部分地规定了他是谁。在桑德尔看来，反思能力是这种构成性的自我的本质性的能力，也是它区别于道义论的自我的根本性因素，而且构成性自我所具有的反思能力才是真正意义上的反思。正如前文所提到的，桑德尔认为，因为道义论的自我完全没有品格，它不受任何约束，并且在本质上被剥离一空，因此，道义论的自我无法将自己作为对象而加以反思。与之相对，构成性的自我将目的看作是在先的，其身份是根据在先的目的而建构起来的。因此，它能够向内关注自身，并使自我成为反思的对象，进而突破自我及其附属之间在占有关系上所存在的两种危险。因为，当我能够反思我的属性时，就在它与我之间制造了某种空间，并减弱了它的力量，它由此也就更多地成为我的一种属性，而并非我的身份的构成；同时，反思能力也在属性与自我之间建立了连接。与此相关，构成性自我并非像道义论的自我那样要选择某种目的，而是要弄明白我是谁，我如何能将自己与各种目的区分开来。

Sandel also finds points of connection in the Chinese Confucian tradition and attempts to integrate the Confucian conception of the self when articulating the idea of the constitutive self: “More than thirty years ago, before I encountered Chinese philosophy, I tried to articulate this narrative conception of the self. At that time, my target was the unencumbered self championed by Kantian and Rawlsian liberalism. Now, when I look to the East, I see that my theory resonates with the Confucian tradition in some respects, even as it differs in others.” In Sandel’s view, the continuity of identity in the course of our lives does not derive from an “essential” self that is the core of our existence, with fixed contours unaffected by life’s changes. Yet he also does not hold that a person is merely a “collection” of his various roles and situations. What is missing from that purely aggregative picture is the role of narrativity and reflection (including critical reflection). Not only social roles and relationships, but also the interpretations of these roles and relationships, constitute the person. But narration and interpretation presuppose a narrator and an interpreter, that is, a self that tells stories and tries to understand its own circumstances, in order to evaluate and assess the various goals and bonds that make claims upon it. This interpretive act, this understanding, constitutes the moral subject. Therefore, Sandel opposes the peach metaphor mentioned in Rosemont’s *Against Individualism*. He retorts: “Who is the (real) person undertaking the various social roles?” He does not accept the essentialist implication of the peach pit; if our identity is partly constituted by our goals and bonds, it is wrong to think they do not change as life circumstances change. He also opposes the onion analogy used to explain the anti-essentialist conception of the person who assumes roles, which views the person as an onion: when we peel away all the roles—son, daughter, husband, wife, parent, grandparent, friend, teacher, neighbor, etc.—nothing remains. To this, he asks: Who is doing the peeling, layer by layer? And why peel at all? This matters because our identity is constituted by our self-interpretations. Changes in our roles and relationships do not merely happen to us; they also reflect and affect the narrative changes through which we understand our lives.

桑德尔还在中国儒家传统当中找到了一些联结点，并试图在表达构成性自我观念的时候结合儒家的自我观念：“30多年前，在我接触中国哲学之前，我就试着明确地表达这种叙事性的自我观念。当时，我反对的目标是康德式和罗尔斯式自由主义所主张的那种无约束的自我。如今，当我放眼东方的时候，我看到自己的理论在某些方面与儒家传统产生了共鸣，即便在其他方面有所不同。”在桑德尔看来，我们生命历程中在身份上的延续性并非来自一种“本质性”的自我，这种自我是我们存在的核心，其轮廓既定不变，不会受到生活变迁的影响。但同时他也并不认为，人只是他的各种角色和情景的“集合”。那种完全集合性的图景所缺失的，是叙事性和反思性（包括批判性反思）的角色。不仅仅是社会角色和关系，而且关于这些角色和关系的解释，都构成了人格。但叙述和解释需要预设叙事者和阐释者，也就是那些试图理解自身境况的、讲故事的自我，来评价和评估那些对他们有所要求的各种目标和纽带。这种解释性的行为，这种理解，构成了道德主体。因此，桑德尔反对罗思文《反对个人主义》（Again Individualism）一书所提及的桃子的比喻。他反诘道：“谁是那个（真正的）人在承担各种各样的社会角色？”他不接受桃核所具有的那种本质主义的暗示，如果我们的身份部分地由我们的目标和纽带所构成，那么，它们不会随着生活状况的改变而改变，就是一种错误。他也反对用洋葱的类比来解释那种反本质主义的、承担角色的人的观念，这种类比将人格看作是一个洋葱：当我们把各种角色——儿子、女儿、丈夫、妻子、父母、祖父母、朋友、教师、邻居等——都剥除之后，就什么都没有了。对此，他追问的是，谁在一层一层地剥开？为什么要剥呢？这很重要，因为我们的身份就是由我们的自我阐释构成的。我们的各种角色和关系的改变并不仅仅发生在我们身上，它们还反映出并影响了叙事上的改变，而我们正是通过这些叙事来理解我们的生活。

Thus, Sandel attempts to combine the civic republican tradition with relevant Confucian ideas to reconstruct the conception of the self in contemporary political philosophical discourse, replacing Rawls’s unencumbered self with a constitutive conception of the self. What then deserves our inquiry is: what are the nature and capacities of Sandel’s constitutive self? Is it more reasonable and superior to Rawls’s conception of the self?

可见，桑德尔试图结合公民共和主义传统和儒家的相关理念，重构当代政治哲学话语中的自我观念，用构成性的自我观念来替代罗尔斯的无约束的自我观念。那么，值得我们追究的是，桑德尔的这种构成性的自我到底具有什么样的性质和能力？它是否比罗尔斯的自我观念更为合理和优越？

First, how exactly is the constitutive self constituted?

第一，构成性的自我到底是如何构成的？

In Sandel’s view, the self is not unencumbered, devoid of any prior ends and conceptions of the good, but is constituted by the ends and conceptions of the good of the community in which it exists. The self cannot be a bare self detached from all ends and conceptions of the good, without motivation, without the capacity for choice or reflection; such a self does not exist in reality, nor is it persuasive as a theoretical assumption. Hence, the foundation on which Rawls’s theory of justice rests is a fallacy, and Rawls’s reliance on intersubjectivity behind the original position and the veil of ignorance also demonstrates the limitations of his theory of the self. It must be admitted that Sandel’s emphasis on the role of the community’s ends and conceptions of the good in the constitution of the self is persuasive. We cannot imagine ourselves completely free from the constraints of various ends and bonds of the family or community to reach some contract; nor can we truly set aside our private moral and religious convictions when entering the public sphere to discuss various social institutions. Although some defenders say that Rawls’s conception of the self is a theoretical abstraction, not concerning actual persons in society, this theoretical assumption that discards the ends, values, and influences of the community may not be desirable. Moreover, even retreating to what Rawls calls the political sphere, those who deliberate on public affairs in the public realm are living individuals; thus, even here, one cannot use theoretical abstractions to refute Sandel’s critique of Rawls’s conception of the self.

在桑德尔看来，自我不是毫无约束的、不带任何先在目的和善观念的，而是由它所存在的那个共同体的目的和善观念所构成。自我不可能是脱离于各种目的和善观念的光秃秃的，没有动机、没有选择能力和反思能力的自我，在现实中不可能如此，作为一种理论假设也没有说服力。因而，罗尔斯的正义理论体系所依赖的基础就是一种谬误，而且罗尔斯在原初状态和无知之幕背后对那种交互主体性的依赖也证明了其自我理论的局限。不得不承认，桑德尔对共同体的目的和善观念在自我构成中的作用的强调，是具有说服力的。我们没有办法想象自己完全脱离家庭或共同体的各种目的和纽带束缚，而去达成某种契约；我们也确实没有办法在进入公共领域讨论各种社会制度时，完全抛开自己私人性的道德和宗教信念。尽管有维护者说，罗尔斯的这种自我观念是一种理论上的抽象假设，并不关乎社会现实中的人。然而，这种抛弃了共同体的目的、价值和影响的理论假设未必就是可取的，而且，即使退回到罗尔斯所说的政治领域而言，在公共领域中商议各种公共事务的人，也都是活生生的个体，因此，就是在这里也不可能以理论上的抽象假设来反驳桑德尔对罗尔斯自我观念的批判。

However, we must further ask: How do the community’s ends, bonds, and conceptions of the good constitute the self? Or what weight and proportion do they occupy in the constitution of the self? If the self is entirely constituted by these communal values and ends, then such a self is indeterminate, varying with changes in the community. This relativistic self is not the self Sandel endorses. Therefore, Sandel clearly states that the self is partly constituted by the community’s ends and conceptions of the good, and that the self can participate in defining its identity through its capacity for reflection. Yet, if Sandel makes this concession, then, as Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit point out, he also acknowledges that the “subject” can participate in the constitution of its identity, that the subject can judge which ends constitute itself and which do not. Thus, Sandel’s critics argue that this constitutive self is essentially no different from Rawls’s self: “Sandel’s insistence that ‘the self is constituted by its ends’ and ‘the boundaries of the self are fluid’ is fundamentally consistent with Rawls’s insistence that ‘the self is prior to its ends’ and ‘the boundaries of the self are fixed in advance.’” Both sides admit that the self is prior to its ends. Their disagreement lies in where the “boundaries” of the self are drawn. Kymlicka’s critique of Sandel’s conception of the self has been endorsed by many thinkers, including Richard Dagger, Amy Gutmann, and Philip Pettit. “If Sandel admits that a self constituted by ends can be reconstituted, then it is unclear how his view differs from the Rawlsian liberal view.” These opponents thus argue that Sandel’s conception of the self is not fundamentally different from Rawls’s, and that Sandel’s greatest theoretical contribution lies merely in emphasizing the role and status of the community.

然而，我们也不得不进一步发问，共同体的目的、纽带和善观念是如何构成自我的呢？或是它们在自我的构成中占有多大的分量和比重呢？如果完全由这些共同体的价值和目的构成，这样的自我就是不定性的、随共同体的变化而有所不同的自我。这种相对主义的自我，也不是桑德尔所认可的自我。因此，桑德尔明确指出，自我是部分地由共同体的目的和善观念所构成的，自我可以通过反思能力而参与其身份的界定。然而，如果桑德尔作出这样的让步的话，那么他也就像詹德兰·库卡塔斯和菲利浦·佩迪特所指出的那样，承认“主体”能够参与其身份的构成，主体能够判断出哪些目的构成了自身，而哪些并没有。由此，桑德尔的批评者们认为，这种构成性的自我在本质上与罗尔斯的自我并无二致：“桑德尔所坚持的‘自我其目的所构成’、‘自我的界线是变动不居的’的主张，与罗尔斯所坚持的‘自我优先于目的’、‘自我的界线是先在地固定的’的主张，在根本上存在着一致性。” 双方都承认自我先于目的。他们的分歧在于人的“自我”界限划在什么地方。金里卡对桑德尔自我观念的这种批评，得到了理查德·达戈尔、艾米·古特曼以及菲利普·佩迪特等诸多思想家的认可。“如果桑德尔承认，一个由目的构成的自我，能够被重组的话，那么我们就不清楚，他的观点如何区别于罗尔斯式的自由主义观点。”这些反对者们据此认为，桑德尔的自我观念与罗尔斯的自我观念并没有本质上的不同，桑德尔最大的理论贡献就在于他强调了共同体的作用和地位。

I disagree with these critics. Although superficially the two conceptions of the self arise in similar ways—Rawls emphasizes that the self constitutes its identity through choice, while Sandel emphasizes participation in identity constitution through reflection—it might appear that the only difference lies in the use of different subjective capacities, with the nature of the subject being essentially the same. However, this claim is merely a liberal attempt to deconstruct Sandel’s critique of Rawls’s conception of the self; it highlights differences in subjective capacity while obscuring differences in the nature of the subject. In fact, even if both Sandel and Rawls admit that the boundaries of the subject are open and that subjective identity can be reconstituted, this does not prove that the nature of the subject that chooses or reflects is homogeneous. On the contrary, it is precisely because some subjects that choose or reflect are prior to all ends, while others are constituted by ends, that different results of choice and reflection arise. Subjective capacity itself is neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous; what is decisive is the nature of the subject itself.

笔者并不同意这些批评者的观点。虽然表面上看来，这两种自我的产生方式雷同，只不过是罗尔斯强调自我是通过选择而构成自己的身份，桑德尔则强调通过反思而参与自己身份的构成，貌似这两种自我的不同之处仅在于运用了不同的主体能力，主体本质并无差别。然而，这种说法不过是自由主义者企图解构桑德尔对罗尔斯自我观念之批判的辩驳，它强调主体能力的不同而掩饰了主体本质的不同。实际上，即使桑德尔和罗尔斯都承认主体的界线是开放的，主体身份是可以重构的，那也并不能说明，进行选择或反思的主体本性是同质的。反而正是由于有些进行选择或反思的主体在先于各种目的，有些主体是由目的所构成，所以才会有不同的选择和反思结果。主体能力本身无所谓同质还是异质，具有决定性作用的还是主体的性质本身。

However, Sandel indeed cannot explain to what extent the purposes and conceptions of the good of the community constitute the self; nor can he explain that, if the self is defined by the prior purposes of the community, how does one self distinguish itself from other selves constituted by the same content? Another, more important question, which Sandel himself finds difficult to answer, is: if part of a person’s life and part of their self-definition are presupposed by the values of the community, does that person still possess free will? If a person is free, can that person then abandon those purposes or bonds in life that make life more meaningful and more intimate? Can they abandon those socialities in life that make life more meaningful? Some critics even question the possibility of Sandel’s constitutive conception of the self. For instance, Kukathas and Pettit argue that the claim “my social background constitutes my identity” seems somewhat exaggerated. I may be consistent with my community, and I may be defined by my position within that community. But this does not mean that my background defines who I am. Sandel never holds that the self is a self without free will; what he opposes is merely the bare self without any prior purposes and bonds. However, he indeed does not further clarify how free will within the self and the imprints pre-given to us by the community can be harmoniously unified within the same self. Can we be both a self with free will and at the same time be constituted by our nation, ethnicity, social customs, or community? In Sandel’s view, the answer is vaguely affirmative. This easily leads some critics to conclude that Sandel and Rawls, along with the liberal self he represents, are essentially the same. However, in the author’s view, this superficial consistency in answers cannot conceal the divergence in their conceptions of the subject’s nature. In this sense, Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self on the issue of the self is meaningful; it makes people both outside and inside liberalism recognize the dimension of community and recognize the influence of community on the self and the subject.

然而，桑德尔确实无法说明，共同体的目的和善观念在多大程度上构成了自我，他也不能解释，如果自我是由共同体的先在目的所界定的，那么，一个自我如何区别于其他由同一内容所构成的自我呢？另一个更为重要的问题，也是桑德尔自己难以解答的，即如果一个人的部分生活、部分自我定义被共同体价值所预设，那么这个人还具有意志自由吗？如果一个人是自由的，那么这个人是否能够抛弃生活中的那些使生活更有意义、更加亲密的目的或纽带呢？是否能够抛弃生活中的那些使生活更有意义的社会性呢？甚至有批评者们质疑桑德尔构成性自我观念的可能性。如库卡塔斯与佩迪特认为，“我的社会背景构成了我的身份”的这种说法似乎有些夸大其词了。我可能与我的共同体一致，也可能被我在该共同体中的地位而界定。但是，这并不意味着，我的背景界定了我是谁。桑德尔从来不认为自我是无自由意志的自我，他所反对的只是没有任何先在目的和纽带的光秃秃的自我。然而，他确实没有进一步阐明，自我当中的这种自由意志与共同体所先在地赋予我们的烙印，怎样和谐统一于同一个自我。我们是否能够既是意志自由的自我，同时又由我们的民族、种族、社会习俗或共同体所构成呢？在桑德尔那里，答案隐约是肯定的。这便容易让一些批评者们据此认为，桑德尔与罗尔斯及其代表的自由主义的自我在本质上是相同的。然而，在笔者看来，这种答案上的表面一致，并不能掩盖其主体本性上的分歧。从这一意义上来说，桑德尔在自我问题上对罗尔斯自我观念的批判是有意义的，他让自由主义之外以及自由主义内部的人都认识到共同体的维度，认识到共同体对自我、主体的影响。

Second, how exactly does the constitutive self engage in reflection?

第二，构成性的自我到底是如何反思的？

According to Sandel, an essential difference between the constitutive self and the unencumbered self lies in the difference in their capacity for reflection. As discussed above, Sandel holds that the unencumbered self cannot truly reflect; it either engages in a kind of prudential reasoning outward about various interests and desires, or it takes the self’s various contingent desires and preferences, rather than the self itself, as the object of reflection. In contrast, the constitutive self can turn inward to focus on itself and make the self the object of reflection, that is, to see through the subject itself through reflection and reconstruct the subject’s identity. However, in the author’s view, this difference, which Sandel regards as fundamental, is not actually so. Since the constitutive self is partly constituted by the values and purposes of the community to which it belongs, these purposes are prior to the self, and Sandel opposes reflection that separates the subject from its purposes. Then it is difficult for us to imagine how this self, which is partly imbued with the purposes and attributes of the community, can carry out the thorough reflection it originally envisioned. As Jack Crittenden points out: “If, as Sandel says, the self is inseparable from its purposes and from what is associated with those purposes, then how, or to what extent, is the self an ‘independent self’? Who, then, is reflecting? How does the self choose?”

依桑德尔之见，构成性自我与无约束的自我的一个本质性的差别就在于其反思能力的差别。如前文所述，桑德尔认为无约束的自我并不能真正地进行反思，它要么是向外进行的对各种利益和欲望的一种审慎的推理，要么是将自我的各种偶然性欲望和偏好，而不是将自我本身作为对象加以反思。与此不同，构成性的自我能够向内关注自身，并使自我成为反思的对象，也就是通过反思来透视主体自身，并重构主体的身份。然而，在笔者看来，这种被桑德尔看作是根本性的区别，实际上并非如此。由于构成性的自我是部分地由其所归属的那个共同体的价值和目的所构成的，这些目的在先于自我，而且桑德尔又反对那种将主体与目的剥离开来而进行的反思。那么，我们就难以想象，这种部分地带有共同体之目的和属性的自我，能够进行那种它原本设想的彻底的反思。正如杰克·克里滕登所指出的：“如果如桑德尔所说，自我与目的以及与目的相关联的那些东西密不可分，那么自我又如何或在何种程度上是一个‘独立的自我’？又是谁在反思？自我如何选择呢？”

If the self, as Sandel believes, can penetrate into the interior of the subject for introspective examination and accordingly reflect on and sift through the various purposes and attributes it possesses to reconstruct the subject’s identity, then the distance required at this very moment is precisely what Sandel criticizes in the Rawlsian self. On another level, if the self can discriminate among its various purposes and attributes and can reconstruct the subject’s identity, then to what extent can we consider these purposes and conceptions of the community as indispensable to the subject’s identity? In the sifting that the subject undertakes after reflecting on various purposes and attributes, does it happen to sift out precisely those purposes and attributes that have the essential characteristics of the community? If this possibility exists, then can the self reconstituted after such reflection still be regarded as a “constitutive self” constituted by the purposes, attributes, and conceptions of the good of the community? At the same time, does Sandel’s constitutive self possess the nature and capacity he expects? As Jack Crittenden questions, does this constitutive self have the reflective capacity that Sandel emphasizes? “How does the self discover? How do I know that it is these possible purposes that constitute me, and not those?” If, as Sandel says, the self is inseparable from its purposes and from what is associated with those purposes, then how, or to what extent, is the self an “independent self”? Who, then, is reflecting? How does the self choose? Therefore, he believes Sandel faces a dilemma: if the self is within the framework of the community and its purposes, then the self cannot reflect on this framework and these purposes; if the self can reflect on these purposes, then these purposes cannot constitute the self.

如果自我如桑德尔所认为的那样，能够深入到主体内部进行反观透视，并相应地对自身所具有的各种目的和属性进行反思和筛选以重构主体的身份，那么，此时此刻所需要的间距性，恰恰是桑德尔对罗尔斯式的自我所进行的批判之处。从另一个层面上来说，如果自我能够对自身的各种目的和属性进行甄别，并能够重构主体身份的话，那么，我们又能在多大程度上认为这些共同体的目的和观念对于主体身份而言是必不可少的？主体在对各种目的和属性反思之后所进行的筛选，是否恰好筛除了那些具有共同体之本质特性的目的和属性？如果有这种可能性的话，那么，如此反思过后所重新构成的自我，是否依然能被看作是由共同体的目的、属性和善观念所构成的“构成性的自我”？同时，桑德尔的这种构成性自我是否具有他所期望的那种性质与能力呢？正如杰克·克里滕登所质疑的，这种构成性的自我是否具有桑德尔所强调的反思能力呢？“自我如何发现呢？我如何知道，是这些可能的目的构成了我，而不是那一些目的呢？”如果如桑德尔所说，自我与目的以及与目的相关联的那些东西密不可分，那么自我又如何或在何种程度上是一个“独立的自我”？又是谁在反思？自我如何选择呢？因此，他认为桑德尔面临着一个两难的境地：如果自我是在共同体及其目的的框架之内的，那么自我就不能反思这一框架和目的；如果自我能够反思这些目的，那么这些目的就不能构成自我。

Thus, Sandel’s advocated constitutive conception of the self has been criticized and questioned in terms of both the nature of the subject and the capacity of the subject. The reflective capacity of this constitutive self cannot reflect and exercise this capacity as Sandel wishes, and therefore it does not fundamentally resolve the problems with the reflective capacity of the “unencumbered self.” Hence, it can be said that his critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self on this issue is not successful.

可见，桑德尔所主张的构成性的自我观念，在主体性质和主体能力上都遭到了批评与质疑。这种构成性自我的反思能力并不能如桑德尔所愿地那样去反思、去行使这一能力，因而并没有从根本上解决“无约束的自我”的反思能力所存在的问题。因此，可以说，他在这一问题上对罗尔斯自我观念的批评并不成功。

Conclusion

结语

In many respects, Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self is not thorough, and the constitutive self he reconstructs may also be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, this effort still has extremely important significance for political philosophy; it not only prompts people to re-examine the relationship between the individual and the community but also lays a theoretical foundation for Sandel’s later revival of civic republicanism and his proposal of other political philosophical ideas.

从很多方面看来，桑德尔对罗尔斯式自我观念所进行的批评并不彻底，他所重构的构成性的自我，可能也并不成功。尽管如此，他的这一努力仍然具有极为重要的政治哲学意义，它不仅让人重新审视个体与共同体的关系，也为桑德尔后期复兴公民共和主义以及提出其他政治哲学思想奠定了理论基础。

First, Sandel’s definition of the conception of the self prompts people to rethink the community and its values. Rawls and his principles of justice confront a historical background that emphasizes individualism, where individual value and individual uniqueness are exalted, and the value and role of the community to which the individual belongs are ignored or devalued, even treated with hostility. Sandel’s critique highlights the value of the community and its constitutive significance for the self, a point that has already been discussed by many contemporary political philosophers, and the author will not elaborate further here. However, it is necessary to point out specifically that Sandel’s emphasis on community is not an advocacy of communitarianism; the latter is a label imposed on Sandel by liberals out of misunderstanding or deliberate distortion, intended to mock him as a “majoritarian,” which could potentially lead to the tyranny of the majority and neglect or even infringe upon individual rights. In fact, Sandel himself is aware of the possible dangers of communitarianism; therefore, the values and conceptions of the community he emphasizes are not the values that happen to be popular in that community. The public good he seeks to advance is not the desires of the majority, but a public good formed through reflection. His emphasis on the relationship between community and the self is intended to make people set aside the established influence of individualism on us, re-examine and understand the self, and rethink the foundational significance of community for virtues such as solidarity, loyalty, and patriotism. Without community, these important virtues would lose their theoretical foundation and practical support.

首先，桑德尔对自我观念的界定让人重新思考共同体及其价值。罗尔斯及其正义原则所要面对的是一个强调个人主义的时代背景，个体价值和个体独特性得到高扬，个体所处的共同体的价值和作用被忽视或贬低，甚至遭到敌视。桑德尔的批评凸显出共同体的价值及其对自我所具有的构成性意义，这一点已经被诸多当代政治哲学家讨论过，笔者此处不再赘述。然而，需要特别指出的是，桑德尔对共同体的重视，并非就是在主张社群主义或共同体主义，后者是自由主义者出于误解或故意曲解而强加给桑德尔的一个标签，意在讥讽他就是“大多数主义者”，很可能会导致大多数人的暴政而忽略甚至侵害个人的权利。实际上，桑德尔本人注意到了共同体主义可能具有这样的危险，因此他所强调的共同体的价值和观念，并非共同体恰好所流行的那种价值观，他所要推进的公共善并非大多数人的欲求，而是一种经过反思而形成的公共善。他对于共同体与自我之间关系的强调，意在让人们抛开个人主义对我们的既定影响，重新审视和理解自我，重新思考共同体对于团结、忠诚、爱国等德性而言所具有的基础性意义。离开了共同体，这些重要德性也就是失去了理论基石与现实支撑。

Second, the constitutive self is a necessary condition for the formation of the common good and also the foundation for realizing civic republicanism. The tradition of civic republicanism emphasizes the common good, focuses on civic virtue, and holds that participation in public affairs is crucial for citizens; in the view of proponents of a strong version of civic republicanism, public participation has an essential value for citizens. These core elements of civic republicanism are inseparable from the conception of the self. Only when we regard ourselves as a “constitutive self,” as a “storytelling existence” [17]17 “Storytelling existence” (讲故事的存在) refers to Sandel’s idea, drawing on the narrative conception of the self from philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, that the self is constituted by the stories and traditions of the communities to which it belongs. connected with others, can we rely on shared values to form the common good. Only when citizens recognize the connection between themselves and the community, and the close relationship between their own rights and interests and the common good, will they strive to promote and realize the common good. Moreover, under the guidance of the common good, citizens are better able to recognize their binding relationship with the republic, more fully appreciate the importance of citizenship, and care more about the republic. Active citizenship promotes social practice and fosters civic virtue in citizens, requiring that people’s actions advance the common good and that, in their mode of conduct, they consciously place the common good above personal interests. Civic virtue also helps citizens better discuss the nature of justice and the good life, better reflect on the basic institutions of society, and advance and realize the common good as far as possible, thereby avoiding coercion and “the tyranny of the majority over the minority.” [18]18 “Tyranny of the majority over the minority” is a phrase associated with Alexis de Tocqueville’s critique of democracy, warning that majority rule can suppress minority rights and opinions. Thus, Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self is not the theoretical endpoint; the constitutive conception of the self he advocates is the starting point for his call to revive civic republicanism. This conception of the self and the relationship between the self and the community it represents are also reflected in his later critiques of market society and meritocracy.

其次，构成性的自我是形成公共善的必要条件，也是实现公民共和主义的基础。公民共和主义传统强调公共善、注重公民德性，并认为参与公共事务对于公民而言至关重要，甚至在主张强势版本的公民共和主义者看来，公共参与对于公民而言具有本质性的价值。公民共和主义的这些核心要素，与自我观念密不可分。只有当我们将自己看作是“构成性的自我”、是与他人联结在一起的“讲故事的存在”的时候，我们才能依赖于共享的价值观形成公共善。只有当公民认识到自己与共同体之间的关联、认识到自己的权益与公共善之间的紧密关系时，才会努力推动和实现公共善。并且在公共善的引领下，公民才更能认识到自己与共和国之间的绑定关系，才更加体认到公民身份的重要性，更加关心共和国。积极的公民身份会促进社会实践、促进公民培养公民德性，要求人们的行为能够促进公共善，在行为方式上要有意识地将公共善放在比个人利益更高的位置。公民德性也帮助公民更好地讨论正义和良善生活的本质，更好地反思社会基本制度，尽可能推进和实现公共善，从而避免强制性和“多数人对少数人的暴政”。可见，桑德尔对罗尔斯自我观念所给出的批评并不是理论终点，他所主张的构成性的自我观念是他倡导复兴公民共和主义的起点，这种自我观念及其所表征的自我与共同体之间的关系，也体现在他后来有关市场社会和优绩主义的批评当中。

Finally, Sandel’s constitutive self, especially his recent reconstruction of the self in conjunction with Confucian thought, is worthy of our rethinking some traditional Confucian ideas about the self and society, and the self and the state. Based on the model of the isomorphism of family and state, [19]19 “Isomorphism of family and state” (家国同构) is a traditional Chinese concept in which the family and the state are seen as structurally analogous, with the ruler’s authority modeled on the father’s authority in the family, and personal cultivation seen as the foundation for ordering the state. discussions and understandings of the self in China’s traditional society were closely related to society and the state; even the realization of self-worth and the completion of the personality ideal depended on society and the state. The individual was never isolated, nor was there the distinction between the private sphere and the public sphere, or the distinction between personal virtue and public virtue, as advocated by contemporary liberals. Therefore, when we face these dichotomies and difficulties in the field of contemporary political philosophy, we may draw on Sandel’s approach to resolution, recognizing that the problems and debates emerging in these contemporary Western social and political philosophies are not universal and have no once-and-for-all answers. The problems and approaches to resolution of each society and each community are not the same; we must deeply reflect on the actual conditions of the society in which we find ourselves, combine this with traditional Chinese classical thought, and find problems and solutions that truly belong to us. (Author’s affiliation: Capital Normal University)

最后，桑德尔的构成性自我，尤其是他近些年结合儒家思想对自我进行的重构，值得我们重新思考传统儒家的一些有关自我与社会、自我与国家的思想。基于家国同构的模式，我国传统社会中有关自我的认识和讨论都与社会和国家紧密相关，甚至自我价值的实现和人格理想的完成也都依赖于社会和国家。个人从来都不是孤立的，也没有当代自由主义者所倡导的私人领域与公共领域的划分以及个人德性与公共德性的区分。因此，在我们面对当代政治哲学领域中的这些二分及难题时，不妨借鉴桑德尔的解决进路，认识到这些当代西方社会和政治哲学领域中出现的问题和争论并不具有普遍性，也没有一劳永逸的答案。每个社会、每个共同体的问题和解决进路都不尽相同，我们要深入反观自身所处社会的现实状况，结合中国传统经典思想，找到真正属于我们自己的问题和解决之道。（作者单位：首都师范大学）

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗