The Epochal Yardstick of Marxist Ethics

Marxist ethics is a grand theoretical enterprise. This is not only because Marxism itself focuses on the historical structure and general laws of human society, so that ethical research conducted from Marxist positions, viewpoints, and methods often possesses this grand perspective and characteristic, but also because, over nearly two centuries of development, the global dissemination of Marxism has exhibited sufficient richness and complexity, leading Marxist ethics to undergo many changes and assume different forms. When Marxism is not confined to the speculation of the study but is integrated with practical revolutionary activities and social construction, Marxist ethics breaks through the form of purely theoretical knowledge and manifests as more pragmatic and pluralistic practical concepts.

马克思主义伦理学是一项宏大的理论事业。这不仅因为马克思主义本身关注人类社会的历史结构与总体规律，使得基于马克思主义立场、观点和方法而展开的伦理学研究往往也有这种宏大视野和特征，而且因为在近两百年的发展过程中，马克思主义的世界传播表现出十足的丰富性与复杂性，导致马克思主义伦理学也发生诸多变化，呈现不同形态。当马克思主义并不拘泥于书斋的思辨，而是与现实的革命活动和社会建设结合起来时，马克思主义伦理学会突破单纯的理论知识形式而表现为更加务实、更加多元的实践观念。

“Large Scale” and “Large Scope”

“大尺度”与“大规模”

Strictly speaking, Marx and Engels did not write specialized works on ethics. In discussions of Marxist ethics, the frequently excerpted or cited *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), and the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* are all manuscript works that were neither published nor even brought to light during Marx’s lifetime. Although Engels’s *Anti-Dühring* can be regarded as the most concentrated expression of his ethical thought, this content occupies only three sections of the work and is presented in a refutational form, together with other content (natural philosophy, dialectics, etc.), aimed at constituting an overall objection to Dühring’s entire philosophy. As for the moral discussions scattered in works such as *The German Ideology*, the *Communist Manifesto*, and *Capital*, they often provoke more controversy because they are constrained by the writing’s main purpose or the context of expression.

严格说来，马克思恩格斯并没有撰写专门的伦理学著作。在马克思主义伦理学的讨论中，常常被摘录或征引的《1844年经济学哲学手稿》《1857—1858年经济学手稿》《哥达纲领批判》，均是马克思生前并未出版甚至从未面世的手稿类作品，而恩格斯的《反杜林论》虽然可被视作其伦理思想最集中的表达，但这方面的内容也仅占其中三节篇幅，而且是以驳论的形式，连同其他内容（自然哲学、辩证法等）一起，旨在构成针对杜林全部哲学的反对意见。至于那些散落在《德意志意识形态》《共产党宣言》《资本论》等作品中的道德论述，则因为受制于写作主旨或表达语境，往往引起更多争议。

Whether Marxist ethics possesses intellectual legitimacy is actually related to whether the classical Marxist writers systematically discussed and reflected on moral phenomena or moral issues, and also to whether Marxist theory contains or points to ethical normativity. Even if we consider only the writings of Marx and Engels themselves, we can still argue and affirm that they meet these two criteria, thereby acknowledging the existence of a strict or narrow Marxist ethics. Moreover, if we further look to a broader theoretical perspective and practical standards, then the existence of Marxist ethics is even more closely related to whether moral problems exist in real life and whether Marxists intend to use Marxist theory to deal with these problems. Therefore, what truly determines the existence of Marxist ethics has never been a “small standard” such as “whether specialized ethical works were written,” but rather a “large scale” of “whether it responds to real ethical issues.”

马克思主义伦理学是否具有知识合法性，实际上与马克思主义经典作家是否系统地谈论和思考道德现象或道德问题有关，也与马克思主义理论是否蕴含或指向伦理规范性有关。即便仅就马克思恩格斯本人的论述而言，我们也依然可以论证和认定其符合这两条标准，从而承认存在一种严格的或狭义的马克思主义伦理学。更何况如果我们进一步着眼于更大的理论视野和实践标准，那么，是否存在马克思主义伦理学，就更加同现实生活中是否存在道德问题以及马克思主义者是否打算运用马克思主义理论去处理这些问题有关。所以，真正决定马克思主义伦理学是否存在的，从来就不是“是否撰写专门的伦理著作”这种“小标准”，而是“是否回应现实的伦理问题”的“大尺度”。

Admittedly, the moral discussions of Marx and Engels constitute the core part of Marxist ethics. However, due to the derivative and expansive nature of theoretical development itself, Marxism’s strong practical and class character inevitably leads it to intervene in the experiential processes of proletarian revolution and socialist construction. Those Marxists who face practical problems in revolutionary and construction activities will always propose different ethical understandings or solutions as historical tasks and social contexts change. Among these solutions, some may particularly emphasize the autonomy of morality and its independent function, others may mainly value the dependence of morality and its ideological nature, and still others may hold a changing view of the nature and function of morality at different stages of revolution and construction. Viewed from the overall historical process, the positions behind these solutions are not entirely accurate, but together they constitute specific links in the history of Marxist development.

诚然，马克思恩格斯的道德论述构成了马克思主义伦理学的核心部分。然而，由于理论发展本身的衍生性和拓展性，马克思主义强烈的实践性和阶级性注定使之介入无产阶级革命和社会主义建设的经验过程，那些在革命和建设活动中面临实际问题的马克思主义者们，总会随着历史任务和社会情境的变迁而提出不同的伦理学理解或方案。在这些方案中，有的可能特别强调道德的自主性及其独立功能，有的可能主要看重道德的依赖性及其意识形态性质，还有的可能会在革命与建设的不同阶段对道德的性质与作用持有一种变化的观点。从历史的总体进程看，这些方案背后的立场并不见得完全准确，但它们却共同构成了马克思主义发展史的具体环节。

“Large Ethics” and “Large Theory”

“大伦理”与“大理论”

On the basis of scientifically revealing the basic contradictions and laws of human society, Marxism proves the inevitable demise of capitalism and the inevitable realization of communism. Although this factual argument logically requires no supplement or support from a moral argument, it also does not logically eliminate the space for moral argument or its validity. Therefore, on the normative level, criticizing the failure of capitalism and justifying the success of socialism do not exceed the reasonable scope of this theory.

马克思主义在科学揭示人类社会基本矛盾与规律的基础上，证明资本主义的必然灭亡和共产主义的必然实现。尽管这种事实论证在逻辑上无需道德论证作为补充或支撑，但是，它在逻辑上也没有消解道德论证的存在空间及其有效性。因此，在规范性的层面上，批判资本主义的失败和证成社会主义的成功，并没有超出这一理论的合理范畴。

From the texts of the classical writers, we can reasonably derive three major theses — “freedom,” “equality,” and “association” — and three major antitheses — “alienation,” “exploitation,” and “division.” In capitalist society, alienation arises because workers lose control over the labor process and mastery over the fruits of labor. Thus, behind alienation lies exploitation. Exploitation implies both inequality of personhood and inequality of distribution. The root of exploitation, in turn, lies in the unequal ownership of the means of production. This unequal ownership relation brings not individual “distinction” but class “division.” Correspondingly, eliminating alienation is for the restoration of individual freedom; eliminating exploitation is for the attainment of individual equality; eliminating division is for the ultimate realization of association among free and equal individuals. It can be said that the theses and antitheses of Marxist ethics contain clear moral orientations. However, a complete grasp of them requires us to transcend the boundaries of ethics and obtain normative explanations compatible with empirical evidence within the larger scope of economics, sociology, and anthropology.

从经典作家文本中，我们可以合理地引申出“自由”“平等”“联合”三大正题，以及“异化”“剥削”“分裂”三大反题。在资本主义社会，异化之所以出现，是因为劳动者失去对劳动过程的控制和对劳动果实的主宰。所以，异化的背后是剥削。剥削既意味着人格不平等，也意味着分配不平等。而剥削的根源，又在于生产资料的不平等占有。这种不平等的占有关系带来的不是个人的“区分”，而是阶级的“分裂”。于是，与之对应，消除异化，是为了复归个体的自由；消除剥削，是为了获得个体的平等；消除分裂，是为了最终实现自由而平等的个体之间的联合。可以说，马克思主义伦理学的正题和反题蕴含着明显的道德取向。但对它们进行完整的把握却需要我们超越伦理学的边界，在经济学、社会学、人类学的更大范围中获得与实证相兼容的规范性解释。

The justification of moral propositions needs to be grounded in normativity. Yet the scope of normativity is far larger than the moral domain. Since the main work of Marx and Engels does not revolve around moral issues, their normativity actually involves some ethical categories that are related to morality but broader in meaning. For example, value and humanity. In Marxist theory, value is first an ontological or economic concept, reflecting the relationship of needs and their satisfaction between humans and things or between humans and others. Marxist ethics, while sharing this premise, further distinguishes between moral value and non-moral value. In Marxist ethics, whether “justice,” “community,” “self-realization,” etc., belong to moral value or non-moral value remains a subject to be proven. In this sense, Marxist ethics cannot stop at moral propositions themselves but needs to move toward a larger set of problems.

道德命题的证成需要奠基于规范性。然而，规范性的范围却要远大于道德领域。由于马克思恩格斯的主要工作并不围绕道德问题展开，因此，其规范性实际涉及一些与道德相关但含义更广的伦理范畴。比如，价值和人道。在马克思主义理论中，价值首先是一个存在论或经济学概念，反映的是人与物或人与他者之间的需要及其被满足关系。而马克思主义伦理学则在分享该前提的基础上，进一步区分道德价值和非道德价值。在马克思主义伦理学这里，“正义”“共同体”“自我实现”等，究竟属于道德价值还是非道德价值，仍是有待证明的课题。在此意义上，马克思主义伦理学无法停留于道德命题本身而需要迈向更大的问题集合。

The normativity of Marxist ethics both penetrates into the philosophical foundations of ethics and extends into the peripheral fields of ethics. Issues such as the state and power, the market and labor, religion and belief also enter the purview of Marxist ethics because they involve the aforementioned theses or antitheses in different dimensions. For Marxist ethics, on the one hand, it is necessary to rely on the basic principles of historical materialism to criticize and deconstruct the historical essence and ideological nature of these human activities; on the other hand, it is still necessary to interpret and construct their normative functions and normative principles (especially under socialist conditions) based on realistic judgments. Therefore, Marxist ethical theory naturally intersects and merges with political theory, economic theory, and religious theory, thus presenting a pattern of “large theory.”

马克思主义伦理学的规范性，既深入到伦理学的哲学基础，也拓展到伦理学的周边领域。国家和权力、市场与劳动、宗教与信仰等问题，也同样因为在不同维度上涉及前述正题或反题而进入马克思主义伦理学的视野。对马克思主义伦理学来说，一方面，需要依据唯物史观的基本原则，对这些人类活动的历史本质和意识形态性质予以批判和解构；但另一方面，仍需要基于现实的判断考量而对它们（特别是在社会主义条件下）的规范功能和规范原则加以阐释和建构。所以，马克思主义的伦理学理论，很自然地同政治学理论、经济学理论、宗教学理论发生交集与融合，从而呈现“大理论”的格局。

“Large History” and “Large Practice”

“大历史”与“大实践”

As a study proceeding from practice and problems, Marxist ethics cannot be confined to the speculative play of concepts of good and evil, nor does it need to be narrowed down to an artificially demarcated moral domain. For what truly endows Marxist ethics with greater theoretical advantage is its high degree of attention to actual human history and practice.

作为一项从实践和问题出发的研究，马克思主义伦理学不能拘泥于善恶观念的思辨游戏，更不必收敛于人为划分的道德领域。因为，真正赋予马克思主义伦理学更大理论优势的，是它对现实的人类历史与实践的高度关注。

The study of Marxist ethics must take historical materialism as its premise. What historical materialism provides us with is a “long-duration” picture that explains and runs through the entire history of humanity. Far from becoming narrow by adhering to historical materialism, Marxist ethics will instead gain a deeper understanding of moral phenomena and moral propositions by introducing the perspective of the “long duration.” Moreover, the knowledge genealogy of Marxist ethics itself will present rich forms and patterns when placed against the “long-duration” historical background. Researchers of Marxist ethics must answer: in the nearly two-hundred-year course of world history, what are the main characteristics of the main propositions, main events, and main changes that Marxist ethics has addressed? And what are their interconnections, underlying causes, inherent laws, and future trends? Therefore, from the perspective of “grand history,” Marxist ethics needs not only to explore moral theories that conform to historical science, but also to explore the “changes from ancient to modern times” [1]1 “Changes from ancient to modern times” (古今之变) is a classical Chinese expression referring to the fundamental transformations in society, ethics, and governance across historical epochs, often invoked in discussions of historical continuity and rupture. within Marxist ethics itself.

马克思主义伦理学研究必须以唯物史观为前提。唯物史观为我们提供的是一幅解释和贯穿人类全部历史的“长时段”图景。马克思主义伦理学非但不会因为坚持唯物史观而变得逼仄，反倒会因引入“长时段”的视野而对道德现象和道德命题有更深切的体认。不仅如此，马克思主义伦理学的知识谱系本身也会因为被置于“长时段”的历史背景而呈现丰富的形态和样式。马克思主义伦理学的研究者必须回答，在近两百年的世界历史进程中，马克思主义伦理学所涉及的主要命题、主要事件、主要变化的主要特征是什么？而它们彼此的联系、背后的原因、内在的规律以及未来的趋势又是什么？所以，在“大历史”的视野下，马克思主义伦理学既需要探究符合历史科学的道德理论，更需要探究马克思主义伦理学自身的“古今之变”。

Indeed, history is vast because of its remoteness, but it is also vast because of its depth. “Grand history” is not only a temporal concept that focuses on the long duration, but also a practical concept that places the present within the long duration. Taking a stand at the concrete moment of history, grasping the historical trend of the times, and fulfilling the mission and tasks of this historical node through great practice are likewise inherent requirements of the scientific and practical nature of Marxist ethics. Incorporating the social phenomena that occur in the course of this “great practice” into the research objectives will further contribute to the construction and improvement of the knowledge system of Marxist ethics.

诚然，历史因其久远而大，但也因其纵深而大。“大历史”不仅是关注长时段的时间概念，而且是把当下置于长时段的实践概念。立足历史的具体时刻，把握历史的时代趋势，通过伟大实践完成这个历史节点的使命与任务，同样是马克思主义伦理学的科学性与实践性所提出的内在要求。把这些在“大实践”过程中所发生的社会现象纳入研究目标，将会更加有助于马克思主义伦理学知识体系的建构与完善。

(The author is a professor at the Center for Moral Education Research, Tsinghua University, and Vice President of the Beijing Ethics Society.)

（作者系清华大学高校德育研究中心教授、北京伦理学会副会长）

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧