Critique of Positive Philosophy: Feuerbach and Marx

Feuerbach’s 1838 essay “Critique of Positive Philosophy” has received scant scholarly attention in the past. Yet it was the first essay by a member of the Young Hegelians to comment on the late Schelling’s positive philosophy. Considering that the late Schelling criticized all philosophy from Kant to Hegel as negative philosophy, which had not yet turned to a positive philosophy emphasizing sensibility, experience, becoming, and actuality; that the Young Hegelians later generally accepted this critique; that Feuerbach subsequently used “open and aboveboard philosophy of sensibility” and “the new, sole positive philosophy” (Feuerbach, 1975b, S.302, 240) to designate his own philosophy and to indicate the future of philosophy; and that this exerted a positive and direct influence on Marx and Engels—especially that Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* praised this essay highly, saying it “exposed the entire mystery of Bruno Bauer’s ‘self-consciousness’” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 92)—this essay possesses a unique value. Whether in terms of its connections in the history of thought and its contribution to Feuerbach’s own intellectual transformation, or in terms of its influence on the future of German philosophy at the time (especially Marxist philosophy), this essay is of great significance.

费尔巴哈1838年发表的《肯定哲学批判》一文，过去学界极少关注。但这是后来青年黑格尔派成员第一篇评论晚期谢林肯定哲学的论文。考虑到晚期谢林批评自康德到黑格尔的哲学都是否定哲学，还没有转变到注重感性、经验、生成、实在的肯定哲学，并且青年黑格尔派后来对这种批评较为普遍认同，以及费尔巴哈日后就用“光明正大的感性哲学”“新的唯一的肯定哲学”(Feuerbach, 1975b,S.302,240)来称呼自己的哲学并指称未来哲学，而且还对马克思、恩格斯产生了积极和正面的影响，特别是马克思、恩格斯在《德意志意识形态》中对此文评价甚高，称其把布鲁诺·鲍威尔“‘自我意识’的全部奥秘都揭穿了”(《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷，第92页),这篇论文就具有独特的价值。无论从思想史的前后联系及对费尔巴哈思想转变的促成来说，还是对当时德国未来哲学(特别是马克思主义哲学)的影响来说，这篇论文都具有十分重要的意义。

I. Positive Philosophy: Between Two Kinds of “Philosophy” and “Speculation”

一、肯定哲学：两种“哲学”与“思辨”之间

At the very beginning of his essay, Feuerbach discusses positive philosophy in the sense of inquiring into the latest developments in German philosophy and reflecting on the future direction of philosophy, regarding it as the newest philosophy. Given that Marx and Engels first positively evaluated and later criticized the “new, sole positive philosophy” thus established by Feuerbach, and were clearly influenced by it, the origins, content, and defects of this positive philosophy, as well as its negative and positive effects on Feuerbach, are all worth careful investigation.

费尔巴哈在文章开始就在探寻德国哲学最新进展、思考未来哲学发展方向的意义上，谈及肯定哲学，视之为最新的哲学。鉴于马克思、恩格斯曾对费尔巴哈由此确立的“新的唯一的肯定哲学”先积极评价后予以批评并明显受其影响，这种肯定哲学的来源、内涵、缺陷，对费尔巴哈的消极和积极影响，都值得仔细追寻。

In two senses, this positive philosophy lies between “philosophy” and “speculation.” The first is between “philosophy” as negative and “speculation” as positive; the second is between “philosophy” as positive and “speculation” as negative. Correspondingly, there are two different kinds of “between.” As for the former, Feuerbach inherits Schelling’s interpretation of positive philosophy, holding that “speculation” is directed not at the realm of necessity but at the realm of freedom: “‘Speculation’ as an expression is reserved for positive philosophy… Speculation means surveying various possibilities through which a specific purpose in science can be achieved” (Schelling, p. 12). Just as Engels used the relationship between elementary mathematics and higher mathematics to describe the relationship between metaphysics and dialectics, Schelling also used the relationship between elementary mathematics and higher mathematics to describe the relationship between philosophy and speculation, arguing that “elementary mathematics cannot be called speculative; speculative mathematics is higher mathematics” (ibid.). The realm associated with potentiality, transcendence, and possibility is the realm of “speculation,” the world opened up by positive philosophy. The realm opposed to “speculation” is the conceptual world of strict necessity, i.e., the realm dealt with by negative “philosophy.” Feuerbach uses “positive philosophy, or more precisely, speculation” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.180) to express his affirmation of the free world of “speculation.” For Schelling, this “speculation” is the opposite of negative philosophy.

在两种意义上，这种肯定哲学都处在“哲学”与“思辨”之间。第一种是作为否定意义的“哲学”与肯定意义的“思辨”;第二种是作为肯定意义的“哲学”与否定意义的“思辨”。相应地，也就存在两种不同的“之间”。就前者而言，费尔巴哈继承了谢林对肯定哲学的解释，认为“思辨”针对的不是必然性而是自由的领域，“‘思辨’这个表达就是为肯定哲学预留的……思辨乃指，环顾各种可能性，通过它们，科学中的某个特定目的能被达成”(谢林，第12页)。就像恩格斯曾用初等数学与高等数学的关系形容形而上学与辩证法的关系，谢林也用初等数学与高等数学的关系形容哲学与思辨的关系，认为“初等数学就不能被称作思辨性的，思辨性的数学是高等数学”(同上)。跟能在、超越、潜能联系在一起的领域，是“思辨”的领域，是肯定哲学打开的世界。而与“思辨”对立的领域则是具有严格必然性的观念世界，即否定“哲学”处理的领域。费尔巴哈用“肯定哲学，或更准确地说是思辨”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.180)来表达对“思辨”的自由世界的肯定。这种“思辨”在谢林那里是否定哲学的对立面。

Proposing that philosophy should turn from negative philosophy to positive philosophy is a major achievement of the late Schelling’s philosophy. Schelling expressed the importance of distinguishing positive philosophy from negative philosophy by saying, “Apart from the distinction between negative and positive philosophy, the difference between Hegel and me is negligible” (Schelling, p. 128). In the late Schelling’s view, modern philosophy had always proceeded from “reason” to explain all beings, taking “reason,” “thought,” and “logic” as the highest essence and origin, without asking why existence is reason rather than non-reason, or why there is being rather than nothing. Thus it failed to reveal the premise of the “unprethinkable being” [1]1 “Unprethinkable being” (*das unvordenkliche Sein*): Schelling’s term for a being that cannot be thought or deduced a priori, serving as the irreducible, positive ground of existence. that necessarily confronts thought. The positivity of this premise thereby gained affirmation: a new philosophy was born that does not proceed from reason and logic to criticize positivity, forcing all beings into a predetermined and perfect rational-logical system, but rather affirms and values the independent status and value of positive being, interpreting the world in terms of sensibility, becoming, and emotion before elevating it to reason. This philosophy, called *positive Philosophie*, was formerly translated as “empirical philosophy” (*shizheng zhexue*); scholars now tend to translate it as “positive philosophy” (*kending zhexue*) or “determinate philosophy” (*shiding zhexue*). In this essay we adopt the translation “positive philosophy.”

提出哲学应该从否定哲学转向肯定哲学是晚期谢林哲学的一大成就。区分肯定哲学与否定哲学的重要性，谢林曾用“除了区分了否定哲学与肯定哲学这一点，黑格尔跟我之间的差别微乎其微”(谢林，第128页)来表达。在晚期谢林看来，近代哲学一直从“理性”出发去解释一切存在者，把“理性”“思维”“逻辑”当作最高本质、本原，而没有去询问存在的为什么是理性而不是非理性?为什么是存在而不是无?从而把思维之先必然面临的“不可预思之在”这个前提揭示了出来。这种前提的实定性由此获得了肯定，一种不是从理性、逻辑出发批判实证性，把一切存在者都装进预定而完美的理性、逻辑系统中去，而是更加肯定、重视实证性存在的独立性地位与价值，对世界做一种感性、生成、情感解释进而再提升至理性的新哲学由此诞生。这种被称为positivie Philosophie的哲学过去译为“实证哲学”,现在学界更倾向于译为“肯定哲学”或“实定哲学”,我们在本文中采用“肯定哲学”的译法。

The requirement not to confine oneself to rational deduction, analysis, and proof, but to go further and implement them at the positive level, had by then become a universal demand covering the natural sciences, social sciences, and even the humanities—one could say it was a new spirit of the times. (See Liu Senlin, 2024b) The late Schelling, by presenting the priority of positivity only in the realms of religion, myth, and art rather than proceeding from the natural and social sciences, constructed a positive (empirical) philosophy that, while philosophically novel, was heavily tied to religion and myth, which clearly hindered its proper dissemination and acceptance. Comte’s contemporaneous “positive philosophy” (*shizheng zhexue*) in France, though philosophically full of loopholes and untenable, had a much greater influence. So much so that later generations, when speaking of “positive philosophy,” mostly associate it with Comte. As Xian Gang points out, “Schelling’s own interpretation of the affirmative ‘unprethinkable being’—for instance, that God’s free act of creating the world is a ‘fact’ (Tatsache) in the highest sense, and the ‘positive philosophy’ he built on this basis—was not widely accepted except among a few Christian theologians. On the contrary, his critique of purely rationalist philosophy or ‘negative philosophy’ became highly influential” (Xian Gang, p. 168). Feuerbach’s commentary on Schelling’s positive philosophy is likewise entangled with the realms of religion and myth, and with the relationship between philosophy and religion.

不能仅仅致力于理性的推演、分析和证明，还必须进一步落实到实证性层面来，当时已成为涵盖自然科学、社会科学甚至人文科学的普遍要求，可以说是一种新的时代精神诉求。(参见刘森林，2024年b)晚期谢林不从自然、社会科学领域出发而仅在宗教、神话、艺术领域呈现实证性的优先地位，建构肯定(实证)哲学，固然在哲学上富有新颖性，但跟宗教、神话的高度捆绑，明显影响了正当的传播和认同。孔德同时期在法国建构的同名“实证哲学”,固然在哲学上多有漏洞，经不起推敲，却影响更大。以至于后人一谈“实证哲学”,大都跟孔德联系起来。恰如先刚指出，“谢林本人对于那个肯定的‘不可预思的存在’的解释，比如上帝自由创造世界的行动是一个最高意义上的‘事实’(Tatsache),以及他在这个基础上提出的‘肯定哲学’,除了在少数基督教神学家那里，并没有被广泛接受。但与此相反，他对于纯粹唯理论哲学或‘否定哲学’的批判却大行其道。”(先刚，第168页)费尔巴哈评论谢林肯定哲学，也是纠结于宗教、神话领域，纠结于哲学与宗教的关系方面。

As can be seen from the subtitle of the essay, “On the Nature and Meaning of Speculative Philosophy and Theology in the Present Age, with Special Consideration of the Philosophy of Religion — A Special Introduction to Philosophy and Speculative Theology,” Feuerbach’s focus in this essay remains the relationship between speculative philosophy and theology. This is not only the central point of Feuerbach’s critique of the late Schelling, but also a key point of Schelling’s critique of Hegel, and even more so the focus of Schelling’s own development of positive philosophy. Hegel viewed philosophy and religion from a rationalist perspective, holding that the object of both religion and philosophy is the so-called “absolute essence” of the world: “This absolute essence is generally speaking the self-subsistent reason, the universal concrete substance, the spirit that is objectively conscious of its own origin… it must be confirmed and recognized that religion is rational. For religion is the work of reason’s self-revelation, the highest and most rational work of reason” (Hegel, p. 63). That the Absolute constitutes the object of both philosophy and religion is also Schelling’s view. Only Schelling’s interpretation of reason is different; reason is intrinsically related not only to necessity but also to possibility. Immediate actuality, as the “unprethinkable being” [das unvordenkliche Sein], lies prior to reason and constitutes the starting point and focus of positive philosophy. But because positive philosophy is not a replacement for negative philosophy, only a supplement, completion, and advancement, negative philosophy still pursues the Absolute, the ultimate ground, and still watches over and awaits absolute perfection. Although he criticized Hegel for treating the relationship between philosophy and theology too rationalistically, and sought to give religion and mythology a more empirical explanation, Schelling nevertheless remained consistently committed to the “eternal alliance of philosophy and religion,” which clearly dissatisfied Feuerbach, who transformed religion into anthropology. Driven by the emphasis on empirical factors in French materialism, the achievements of natural science, and religious experience, Feuerbach found in the late Schelling’s positive philosophy further support for moving toward empirical and actual thought. Setting aside the constraints of negative philosophy and directly following the priority and starting position of positivity and sensuous existence in the whole of philosophy (not just positive philosophy) — this appealed to Feuerbach and accelerated the pace of his intellectual transformation, because Feuerbach was constantly searching for intellectual resources that could reduce theology to anthropology and God to man, seeking various aids everywhere that could contribute to this.

从论文的副标题“论当今时代之思辨哲学与神学的本质与意涵，尤其要考察宗教哲学。——对哲学和思辨神学的专门导论”可以看得出来，费尔巴哈这篇论文的着眼点还是思辨哲学与神学的关系。这不单是费尔巴哈批评晚期谢林的重点所在，也是谢林批判黑格尔的一个重点，更是谢林展开自己的肯定哲学的重点。黑格尔从唯理主义角度看待哲学与宗教，认为宗教与哲学的对象都是所谓世界的“绝对本质”,“这个绝对本质一般说来就是那独立自存的理性，那普遍具体的实体，那客观地意识到他自己的根源的精神……必须确认并承认宗教是合理性的。因为宗教是理性自身启示的作品，是理性最高和最合理的作品”(黑格尔，第63页)。绝对者构成哲学和宗教的对象，也是谢林的观点。只是谢林对理性的阐释不一样，理性不仅与必然性更与可能性内在相关。直接性的实在作为“不可预思之在”处于理性之先，构成肯定哲学的起点与重点，但因为肯定哲学不是否定哲学的替代，只是补充、完善和推进，否定哲学仍然追求绝对者、最终的本原，仍然守望和期待绝对的完满。尽管批评黑格尔过于唯理主义地看待哲学与神学的关系，力图给予宗教、神话一种更实证性的解释，但谢林仍然自始至终地致力于“哲学与宗教的永恒同盟”,这明显令把宗教转化为人类学的费尔巴哈不满。在法国唯物主义、自然科学成就、宗教经验等强调实证性因素的促动下，费尔巴哈在晚期谢林的肯定哲学这里进一步增加了通往实证性、实在性思想的助力。撇开否定哲学的限制，径直沿着肯定实证性、感性存在于整个哲学(而不只是肯定哲学)中的优先地位和起始地位，这受到费尔巴哈的喜欢，让费尔巴哈的思想转变加大了步伐，因为费尔巴哈不断地探寻能把神学还原为人学，把上帝还原为人的思想资源，四处寻找有助于此的各种助力。

In *Critique of Positive Philosophy*, influenced by the late Schelling’s emphasis on positive philosophical principles such as sensibility and becoming, Feuerbach pays close attention to the contrast between God as sensuous and God as rational. He criticizes the position that argues for God on the basis of the universality of reason, emphasizing that “God thinks all things by thinking himself, but he does not think all things in their decomposed diversity and individuality — otherwise, God’s knowledge would itself be sensuous, knowledge of something external to another — but in their universal idea, in which the sensuous, diverse element is discarded” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.196). Feuerbach is here reducing God to man by reducing the universal and general to difference and diversity, in order to clearly expose that “the speculation on the absolute essence is nothing other than the speculation on one’s own subjectivity” (ibid., S.197).

在《肯定哲学批判》中，受到晚期谢林强调感性、生成等肯定哲学原则的影响，费尔巴哈很关注关于神是感性的和理性的对比，批评基于理性的普遍性而论神的立场，强调“神通过思考自身而思考一切，但他不是在其分解了的多样性和个别性中思考一切——否则，神的知识本身就是感性的，是外在于他者的某物的知识——,而是在其普遍的理念中思考一切，在其中感性的、多样的东西被摒弃”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.196)。费尔巴哈是在借助于将普遍、一般还原为差异和多样而将神还原为人，以便清晰地暴露“对绝对本质的思辨不过是其对自身主体性的思辨”(ibid.,S.197)。

Benefiting from positive philosophy’s emphasis on the principle of sensibility and empirical existence, Feuerbach sensed in positive philosophy a possible new philosophical tendency, one different from the positive philosophy that ultimately still belongs to negative philosophy. The positive philosophy that still belongs to negative philosophy is, in the end, still traditional speculative philosophy. The new positive philosophy that can in the future shake off the constraints of negative philosophy is the future “philosophy” that Feuerbach anticipates. This is “philosophy” and “speculation” in a second sense. This “philosophy” refers to a new “philosophy” with future developmental prospects, one that is a further critique and transcendence of speculative philosophy. The relationship between this new “philosophy” and speculative philosophy creates the space between the second “philosophy” and “speculation” in this essay. This space has greater developmental potential than the space between the first “philosophy” and “speculation”; it is a more promising space. In this regard, Feuerbach emphasizes that “philosophy” reveals the truth, and thus calmly reveals things that may be unpleasant or unsightly but are very real; while “speculation” often subjectively conceives of beautiful, comfortable things that are nevertheless unrealistic illusions, a form of self-deception. Although “speculation” implies a free world of possibility, first, the investigation of this world still ultimately belongs to the investigation of the world of necessity of the Idea, i.e., positive philosophy belongs to negative philosophy; second, positive philosophy, following its critique of rationalist philosophy, moves toward an arbitrary freedom that deviates from reason and is based on imagination, becoming “a philosophy of absolute arbitrariness [absoluten Willkür], which scorns all laws of thought and unhesitatingly connects the most contradictory things” (ibid., S.188). In this way, “speculation” approaches “arbitrariness” through “freedom,” and the positive philosophy of “speculation” thus moves toward the world of the “poet” in the Platonic sense. Classifying the speculator together with the poet is a new insight that Feuerbach expresses in more than one place in this essay. Plato once regarded the traditional philosopher as calm and sober, while regarding the poet as drunken and unsober. Since the traditional philosopher is similar to the poet, traditional speculative philosophy is also unsober, having lost the qualification and capacity for sobriety that Plato granted. And re-granting the status of “sober one” to the “positive philosophy” that has shaken off speculative philosophy implies an expectation and affirmation of a new positive philosophy different from traditional speculative philosophy.

得益于肯定哲学对感性原则、实证性存在的注重，费尔巴哈在肯定哲学中感受到了一种可能的新哲学倾向，一种跟终归隶属于否定哲学的肯定哲学不一样的倾向。仍隶属于否定哲学的肯定哲学，终归仍是传统思辨哲学，未来能够摆脱掉否定哲学牵制的新肯定哲学才是费尔巴哈期待的未来“哲学”。这就是第二种意义上的“哲学”与“思辨”。这种“哲学”系指新的、未来有发展前景的“哲学”,它是对思辨哲学的进一步批判和超越。这种新“哲学”与思辨哲学之间的关系缔造了本文中第二个“哲学”与“思辨”之间的空间。这个空间比第一个“哲学”与“思辨”之间的空间更有发展潜力，是一个更有希望的空间。对此，费尔巴哈强调，“哲学”揭示真相，因而冷静揭示出一些可能不好看、不好听但却很实在的东西；而“思辨”往往主观地设想出一些美好的、让人觉得很舒服的东西但却是不切实际的幻觉，是一种自欺。“思辨”虽然意味着可能性的自由世界，但是第一，对这个世界的探究仍然归根结底隶属于对理念的必然性世界的探究，即肯定哲学隶属于否定哲学；第二，肯定哲学沿着对唯理论哲学的批判走向偏离理性、基于想象力的任意自由，成为“一种绝对任意(absoluten Willkür)的哲学，它藐视一切思维法则，毫无顾忌地将最矛盾的事物联系在一起”(ibid.,S.188)。这样，“思辨”通过“自由”走近“任意”,“思辨”的肯定哲学由此就走向了柏拉图意义上“诗人”的世界。将思辨者与诗人归于一类，是费尔巴哈在这篇文章不止一处表达出的一种新见解。柏拉图曾经把传统哲人视为冷静和清醒者，而把诗人视为醉熏熏的不清醒者。既然传统哲人跟诗人类似，传统的思辨哲学也就是不清醒的，失去了柏拉图赋予的清醒资格与能力。而把“清醒者”重新赋予了摆脱思辨哲学的“肯定哲学”,这就意味着对一种不同于传统思辨哲学的另一种新肯定哲学的期盼和肯定。

II. “The New and Only Positive Philosophy”: Marx’s Affirmation

二、“新的唯一的肯定哲学”:马克思的肯定

Although Feuerbach, at the very beginning of the article, considers “positive philosophy, or more precisely speculative philosophy” (ibid., S.180) and classifies positive philosophy within the scope of speculative philosophy, positive philosophy still has not cast off negative philosophy; it still pursues the Absolute, God, and “absolute self-grounding.” The new philosophy that has cast off negative philosophy and no longer pursues the Absolute, God, and “absolute self-grounding” should instead place greater emphasis on existence such as sensibility, reality, and emotion, reduce the Absolute to the finite being of sensibility, allow the absolute and the universal to be internally generated within the finite being, and let sensibility and the finite being replace the traditional position of that Absolute. This should roughly be the general outline of the “new and only positive philosophy” that Feuerbach expected. Schelling’s positive philosophy is merely a further supplement, perfection, and advancement of negative philosophy; in the final analysis, it still belongs to negative philosophy. For the late Schelling, what is called “the prius in purely rationalist philosophy becomes the posterius in positive philosophy” (Schelling, p. 142) is applicable only to positive philosophy and cannot overturn or replace negative philosophy. That is to say, negative philosophy grounds positive philosophy; negative philosophy assigns tasks to positive philosophy, but the converse cannot be said. Therefore, positive philosophy cannot replace negative philosophy but must take negative philosophy as its foundation; “if corresponding progress had not been made in negative philosophy, positive philosophy could not have been discovered and developed.” Hence, positive philosophy and negative philosophy are not two philosophies, but “two aspects of the one and only philosophy, and this one and only philosophy resides in two different but necessarily co-belonging philosophical sciences” (ibid., pp. 139, 144). If positive philosophy does not constitute the entirety of the late Schelling’s philosophy, and if the starting point of positive philosophy is not the starting point of the late Schelling’s entire philosophy, then Feuerbach is clearly dissatisfied with this Schellingian positive philosophy. In this article, he merely states his position; he has not yet concretely unfolded the construction of an “aboveboard philosophy of sensibility” or a “new and only positive philosophy.” The late Schelling’s “philosophy of sensibility,” because it lies in the shadow of negative philosophy, appears furtive and not “aboveboard”; because it is constrained by negative philosophy and ultimately belongs to negative philosophy rather than being “the only one,” it will no longer be “new” compared with a further developed philosophy. Only a positive philosophy that completely casts off the constraint of negative philosophy and proceeds entirely from sensibility, nature, and becoming can be more “new” and “the only one,” and can also be “aboveboard.” Although this meaning is not yet sufficiently clear in the article “Critique of Positive Philosophy,” the basic position is already present. At the end of the article, Feuerbach proposes a new “philosophy” opposed to “speculative philosophy”: “Philosophy should become free and independent, but also simple and natural. The simplest intuition and ground are the true intuition and ground… German speculative philosophy should discard the qualifier ‘speculative’ and in the future directly become and call itself philosophy—a philosophy without any qualification or modification. Speculative philosophy is a drunken philosophy. Therefore, philosophy should once again become sober. Thus, philosophy is to the spirit what clean spring water is to the body” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.204-205). Schellingian positive philosophy strongly emphasizes freedom and action, yet it is not independent, still less is it simple. A speculative philosophy that is not simple or intuitive is drunken; the “philosophy” that “should once again become sober” is certainly a new philosophy different from speculative philosophy. Clearly, Feuerbach hopes that the “new and only positive philosophy” will completely cast off the limitations of negative philosophy.

虽然费尔巴哈在文章一开头就认为“肯定哲学，或更准确地说是思辨”(ibid.,S.180),把肯定哲学判归入思辨范围，但肯定哲学仍未摆脱否定哲学，仍追求绝对者、神和“绝对的自身建基”。而摆脱掉否定哲学，不再追求绝对者、神和“绝对的自身建基”的新哲学应该是更加强调感性、实在性、情感等存在，把绝对者还原为感性的有限者，让绝对和普遍内生于有限者之内，让感性、有限者替代传统那个绝对者的地位。这应该大致就是费尔巴哈期望的“新的唯一的肯定哲学”之大致面貌。谢林的肯定哲学只是对否定哲学的进一步补充、完善和推进，归根结底仍然隶属于否定哲学。对于晚期谢林来说，所谓“纯粹唯理论哲学中的在先者，在肯定哲学中成了后来者”(谢林，第142页),仅对肯定哲学才是适用的，并不能推翻、替代否定哲学。也就是说，否定哲学为肯定哲学奠基，否定哲学给肯定哲学递交任务，但不能反过来说。所以，肯定哲学不能取代否定哲学，而必须以否定哲学为根基；“倘若没有在否定哲学中取得相应的进展，肯定哲学也不可能被发现和展开”,因此，肯定哲学与否定哲学不是两种哲学，而是“唯一的哲学的两个方面，而这唯一的哲学处在两种不同但必然共属一体的哲学的科学中”。(同上，第139、144页)如果说，肯定哲学并不构成晚期谢林哲学的全部，肯定哲学的起点并不是晚期谢林整个哲学的起点，那么，费尔巴哈对这种谢林式肯定哲学显然不满。他在此文中只是表明了立场，还没有具体展开去建构一种“光明正大的感性哲学”“新的唯一的肯定哲学”。晚期谢林的“感性哲学”因为处在否定哲学的阴影下而显得遮遮掩掩，并不“光明正大”,因为受否定哲学牵制且终归隶属于否定哲学而不是“唯一的”,跟进一步发展的哲学相比将不再是“新的”。只有摆脱否定哲学的牵制，完全从感性、自然、生成出发的肯定哲学才能是更“新的”和“唯一的”,也才能是“光明正大”的。这个意思，虽然在《肯定哲学批判》一文中还不够明确，却有了基本立场。在该文最后，费尔巴哈提出了与“思辨”对立的新“哲学”:“哲学应当变得自由与独立，但也变得朴素与自然。最朴素的直观和根据才是真正的直观和根据……德意志的思辨哲学应舍弃‘思辨的’这一限定词，将来直接地成为并自称为哲学——一种不带任何限定和修饰的哲学。思辨是一种醉熏熏的哲学。因此，哲学应再次变得清醒。这样，哲学之于精神就好比洁净的泉水之于身体。”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.204-205)谢林式肯定哲学非常强调自由、行动，却不独立，更不够素朴。不够素朴、直观的思辨哲学是醉熏熏的，“应再次变得清醒”的“哲学”肯定是与思辨哲学不一样的新哲学。显然，费尔巴哈希望“新的唯一的肯定哲学”彻底摆脱否定哲学的限制。

It seems that the reason there are two different senses of “philosophy” and “speculative philosophy” is that Feuerbach is dissatisfied with Schelling’s positive philosophy, which endows “speculative philosophy” with a positive meaning, and feels the necessity of further developing and transforming it. Thus, what Feuerbach calls “philosophy” opposed to speculative philosophy is the “aboveboard philosophy of sensibility” or the “new and only positive philosophy” that results from further transforming Schelling’s positive philosophy. This new philosophy should more thoroughly implement the principles of sensibility, becoming, and experience that positive philosophy emphasizes, so that positive philosophy no longer belongs to negative philosophy—that is, it should further transform and advance Schelling’s positive philosophy. It can be seen that Feuerbach’s attitude toward Schelling’s positive philosophy includes both affirmation and expectation as well as dissatisfaction and criticism. What he affirms is that it contains a critique and supplement of speculative philosophy and the gestation of a new philosophy different from speculative philosophy; what he expects is that this insufficiently mature new philosophy will continue to be perfected and advanced; what he criticizes is that this philosophy still bears a strong color of traditional speculative philosophy, has still not truly stepped out of traditional speculative philosophy, still belongs to speculative philosophy, still stubbornly maintains a unity of philosophy and religion, and still confines itself to the realm of religion and myth in emphasizing positivity without further expansion.

看来，之所以有两种不同意义上的“哲学”与“思辨”,是因为费尔巴哈对谢林赋予“思辨”以肯定意义的肯定哲学不满，感受到了更进一步发展和改造它的必要。由此，费尔巴哈所谓与思辨对立的“哲学”,就是对谢林肯定哲学的进一步改造后的“光明正大的感性哲学”或“新的唯一的肯定哲学”。这种新哲学应该就是更彻底地贯彻肯定哲学强调的感性、生成、经验等原则，让肯定哲学不再隶属于否定哲学，也就是要对谢林肯定哲学进一步改造与推进。可见，费尔巴哈对谢林肯定哲学是既有肯定、期待也有不满和批评的。肯定的是其中包含着对思辨哲学的批评、补充和不同于思辨哲学的新哲学的孕育；期待的是这种不够成熟的新哲学继续完善和推进；批判的是这种哲学还带有浓重的传统思辨哲学色彩，仍然没有真正走出传统思辨哲学，仍然隶属于思辨哲学，仍然固守一种哲学与宗教的统一，仍然局限在宗教与神话领域强调实证性而没有进一步扩展。

We know that Marx and Engels later, in *The Holy Family*, inherited this view that “speculative philosophy is a drunken philosophy. Therefore, philosophy should once again become sober,” emphasizing that “people use philosophy to oppose metaphysics, just as Feuerbach, in his first resolute attack on Hegel, opposed drunken speculation with sober philosophy” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 159). Considering that Marx and Engels, shortly afterward in *The German Ideology*, highly praised Feuerbach’s article “Critique of Positive Philosophy,” accusing Bruno Bauer of “jumping directly from Feuerbach’s treatise on Leibniz and Bayle to ‘The Essence of Christianity’” and deliberately skipping over this essay, and that this “well-timed omission” occurred because “Feuerbach, in this essay, while Saint Bruno was still speculating on the Immaculate Conception, had, in contrast to the positive representatives of ‘substance,’ completely exposed the whole mystery of ‘self-consciousness’” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 92), we can say that this evaluation is very high. From this, we can determine that the passage in *The Holy Family* referring to “Feuerbach, in his first resolute attack on Hegel” points precisely to this article, “Critique of Positive Philosophy,” and not to the following year’s “Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy.”

我们知道，马克思、恩格斯后来在《神圣家族》中继承了“思辨是一种醉熏熏的哲学。因此，哲学应再次变得清醒”这个观点，强调“人们用哲学来对抗形而上学,这正像费尔巴哈在他向黑格尔作第一次坚决进攻时以清醒的哲学来对抗醉熏熏的思辨一样”(马克思恩格斯全集》第2卷，第159页)。考虑到马克思、恩格斯随后不久在《德意志意识形态》中对费尔巴哈《肯定哲学批判》一文大加赞赏，指责布鲁诺·鲍威尔“从费尔巴哈论莱布尼茨和培尔的著作一下就跳到了‘基督教的本质’”,故意跳过这篇论文，这种“恰到好处”的遗漏是因为“原来费尔巴哈在这篇论文中是在圣布鲁诺还思辨着无垢受孕的时候就和‘实体’的实证代表们相反，把‘自我意识’的全部奥秘都揭穿了”(《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷，第92页),可以说这一评价甚高。我们由此断定《神圣家族》中这段话所说的“费尔巴哈在他向黑格尔作第一次坚决进攻”的文章就是指这篇《肯定哲学批判》,而不是第二年的《黑格尔哲学批判》。

The reason is, first, that Feuerbach had already pointed out in *Critique of Positive Philosophy* the stance of constructing a new positive philosophy different from late Schelling’s positive philosophy. Second, the phrase “to counter drunken speculation with sober philosophy” was said by Feuerbach only in *Critique of Positive Philosophy*; it does not appear explicitly in *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy*, published the following year. In *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy*, there is only one occasion where sobriety and drunkenness are mentioned: Feuerbach notes that someone applied Aristotle’s comment on Anaxagoras to Hegel, saying that “among the natural philosophers, he is like the only sober man in a crowd of drunkards” (Feuerbach, 1984a, p. 75). This means that Hegelian philosophy has a sober significance relative to, for example, Böhme’s theological view of nature; but it certainly does not have such significance relative to late Schelling’s positive philosophy. That is to say, *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy* emphasizes the sobriety of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, which is clearly not a critique of speculative (negative) philosophy but an endorsement of it. Compared with the intention in *Critique of Positive Philosophy* to criticize late Schelling’s positive philosophy as insufficiently progressive, this is evidently a lower stance. After all, Hegel’s sobriety relative to Böhme cannot be overestimated, because it merely replaces theosophical expression with philosophical expression, with no fundamental improvement in substance. As Schelling pointed out, their “only difference is that in Böhme this pantheistic element is something primordial, truly borne by a grand intuition, whereas in Hegel it is linked to philosophy” (Schelling, p. 176). In *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy*, when discussing the difference between Schelling and Hegel, Feuerbach says that Schelling posits the unity of subject and object and makes it the apex of philosophy, while “Hegel only formally places it in the correct position”; in fact, “he takes what is extremely dubious upon closer inspection as true, takes the secondary as primary, and either ignores what is truly primary or casts it aside as subordinate; he proves what is individually and relatively rational as rational in and for itself” (Feuerbach, 1984a, p. 77). This is consistent with Feuerbach’s judgment that “Hegel’s philosophy is the apex of speculative systematic philosophy” (ibid., p. 60), while late Schelling’s philosophy, though still speculative, “in that yet-to-be-matured system of ‘immanence of action,’ reaches its scientific final completion” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.180). The apex of speculative philosophy is more abstract and more “speculative” than late Schelling’s philosophy, which dilutes speculation by incorporating more sensuous and empirical elements within the scope of speculative philosophy and thus “reaches its scientific final completion” within it; it is further from the new philosophy Feuerbach anticipated. Feuerbach’s intention to criticize Hegel through late Schelling is very clear. Thus, with regard to late Schelling, Hegelian philosophy is not at all sober. Consequently, when Marx and Engels say that “Feuerbach’s first decisive attack on Hegel” was this “first,” it cannot refer to *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy*, which endorses Hegel as soberer than Böhme, but only to *Critique of Positive Philosophy*, which affirms late Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s negative philosophy through positive philosophy, yet still does not fully liberate positive philosophy from negative philosophy—only completing this liberation can allow sober philosophy to counter drunken speculation. Speculative (negative) philosophy is soberer relative to Böhme’s theology; late Schelling’s positive philosophy is soberer relative to Hegel’s speculative philosophy; and the “new, only positive philosophy” Feuerbach hopes for, freed from the constraints of negative philosophy, is soberer than Schelling’s positive philosophy—this is clearly the logical thread here. Of course, Marx later further revealed that Feuerbach’s “new, only positive philosophy” was not sober enough, and Stirner, who along Feuerbach’s path elevated sensuous immediate existence to the heavens, was even less sober. Although Stirner did not abandon the stance of subjective philosophy, subjectivity lacking the support of universality (i.e., the principle of negative philosophy) is severely ungrounded and inevitably falls into more troublesome nihilism. The errors of Feuerbach and Stirner remind us that the relationship between positive philosophy and negative philosophy, between reason and existence, between metaphysics and positivity—this key issue of the Schelling-Hegel debate—is very important, and neither Feuerbach nor Stirner handled it well. Marxist philosophy was born in the innovative treatment of this key issue.

原因在于，第一，费尔巴哈在《肯定哲学批判》中已经指出建构一种不同于晚期谢林肯定哲学的新肯定哲学立场了。第二，“以清醒的哲学来对抗醉熏熏的思辨一样”这句话，费尔巴哈只是在《肯定哲学批判》中说过，在第二年发表的《黑格尔哲学批判》中没有明确出现。在《黑格尔哲学批判》中谈到清醒与醉汉只有一个场合，就是费尔巴哈曾提到有人把亚里士多德评论阿那克萨哥拉的一句话用在黑格尔身上，说“他在自然哲学家中，好像一群醉汉中唯一清醒的人”(费尔巴哈，1984年a, 第75页)。这是说，黑格尔哲学相对于(比如波墨的)神学自然观具有清醒的意义；但如果相对于晚期谢林的肯定哲学必不具备这样的意义。也就是说，《黑格尔哲学批判》强调黑格尔思辨哲学的清醒性显然不是在批判思辨(否定)哲学，而是在赞许思辨(否定)哲学。这与《肯定哲学批判》中批判晚期谢林肯定哲学不够进步的立意相比，显然更为低下。毕竟，黑格尔相对于波墨的清醒不能评价过高，因为那只是用哲学表达替代了神智学的表达，实质并无根本改进。就像谢林指出的，他们两个“唯一的区别在于，波墨那里的这种泛神论性质的东西乃是某种源初性的东西，是由某种宏大的直观真切地承载的，但在黑格尔这里，这些泛神论性质的东西跟哲学联结在一起了”(谢林，第176页)。在《黑格尔哲学批判》中，在谈到谢林与黑格尔的区别时，费尔巴哈说谢林提出主观与客观的统一并把它定为哲学的顶点，而“黑格尔只是形式地把它放在正确的地位上”,实际上，“他把细看起来极度可疑的东西当作真的，把第二性的东西当作第一性的东西，而对真正第一性的东西或者不予理会，或者当做从属的东西抛在一边；他把个别地、相对地合理的东西证明成自在自为地合理的东西。”(费尔巴哈，1984年a, 第77页)这跟费尔巴哈判定“黑格尔的哲学是思辨的系统哲学的顶峰”(同上，第60页),而晚期谢林哲学虽仍是思辨、但却在“那个有待成熟的‘行动内在性’体系中，达到其科学上的最终完成”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.180)的判断是一致的。思辨哲学的顶峰比在思辨哲学中进一步融入更多感性、实证因素稀释了思辨性因而在思辨哲学范围内“达到其科学上的最终完成”的晚期谢林哲学更抽象更“思辨”,离费尔巴哈期待的新哲学更远。费尔巴哈借晚期谢林批评黑格尔的用意非常明显。这样一来，针对晚期谢林，黑格尔哲学根本不具清醒性。由此，马克思、恩格斯所说的“费尔巴哈在他向黑格尔作第一次坚决进攻”的这个“第一次”就不能是指赞许黑格尔比波墨清醒的《黑格尔哲学批判》,而只能是肯定晚期谢林以肯定哲学批判黑格尔否定哲学、但仍未把肯定哲学从否定哲学中完全解放出来、只有完成这种解放才能让清醒的哲学对抗醉熏熏思辨的《肯定哲学批判》。思辨(否定)哲学针对波墨神学更具清醒性，晚期谢林肯定哲学针对黑格尔思辨哲学更具清醒性，费尔巴哈期盼的摆脱掉否定哲学约束的“新的唯一的肯定哲学”比谢林肯定哲学更具清醒性，显然就是这里的逻辑线索。当然，后来马克思进一步揭示了费尔巴哈“新的唯一的肯定哲学”还不够清醒，沿费尔巴哈之路把感性的当下即是存在捧上天的施蒂纳更不清醒。固然施蒂纳没有丢弃主体性哲学立场，但没有普遍性(即否定哲学原则)支撑的主体性严重缺乏根基，势必陷入更麻烦的虚无。费尔巴哈和施蒂纳的失误提醒人们，肯定哲学与否定哲学的关系，理性与实存的关系，形而上学与实证性的关系，这个谢林-黑格尔争论的关键问题非常重要，费尔巴哈和施蒂纳都没能处理好。马克思主义哲学就是在对这个关键问题的创新性处理中诞生的。

III. The Insufficiencies and Defects of the Two Positive Philosophies

三、两种肯定哲学的不足与缺陷

In this *Critique of Positive Philosophy*, Feuerbach consistently criticizes Schelling-style positive philosophy as both incomplete and fraught with danger. This incompleteness is manifested in the failure to construct a new philosophy based on the principles and spirit promoted by positive philosophy, instead subordinating positive philosophy to negative philosophy; the main danger is the tendency toward subjective arbitrariness.

在这篇《肯定哲学批判》中，费尔巴哈一直在批评谢林式肯定哲学既不彻底，又面临危险。这种不彻底表现在没有从肯定哲学弘扬的原则、精神出发建构一种新哲学，而让肯定哲学隶属于否定哲学；而面临的主要危险是容易走向主观任意。

First, reconciling religion and philosophy, rather than using philosophy to reveal the secret of religion.

第一，调和宗教和哲学，而不是以哲学揭示宗教的秘密。

“Because positive philosophy attempts to be both religion and philosophy at the same time: ‘religious philosophy’ (as it calls itself), it is therefore neither of the two, neither religion nor philosophy. … But precisely because of this attempt, its situation is like Molière’s ‘hypocrite/bourgeois gentleman,’ who presents us with neither a pure citizen nor a true nobleman, but a comical contradiction” (ibid., S.183-184). Positive philosophy, “lacking distinct characteristics,” wants to be both religion and philosophy; both divine personhood and human personality; both reason and faith; both idea and sensibility; in the end, it becomes nothing. Clearly, Feuerbach hopes to radicalize positive philosophy, in the direction of reducing reason to sensibility and theology to anthropology, further revealing that divine thought “is nothing but objectified human thought,” and divine personhood “is merely mystified human personality” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.195, 198).

“由于肯定哲学试图同时成为宗教和哲学：即‘宗教性的哲学’(如它自称的那样),因此它不是两者中的任何一个，既不是宗教，也不是哲学。……但正是由于这种企图，它的境况如同莫里哀笔下的‘伪君子/市侩的贵族’,他向我们呈现的既非纯粹的市民，也非真正的贵族，而是一个滑稽的矛盾体。”(ibid.,S.183-184)“缺乏鲜明特征”的肯定哲学既想成为宗教，又想成为哲学；既想成就神的位格，又想成就人的人格；既想成为理性，又想成为信仰；既想成为理念，又想成为感性；结果什么都没有成为。显然，费尔巴哈希望把肯定哲学彻底化，向着把理性还原为感性、把神学还原为人学的方向，进一步揭示神的思维“不过是被客观化了的人的思维”,而神的位格“仅仅是被神秘化的人的人格”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.195,198)。

Second, positive philosophy does not carry the principle of sensibility through to the end.

第二，肯定哲学没把感性原则贯彻到底。

The positive philosophy Feuerbach hopes for is one that reconstructs philosophy on the basis of principles such as sensibility, experience, becoming, body, and nature, rather than confining them within the traditional framework of reason. Following this line of thought, compared with the “being” of logic, he emphasizes sensuous “determinate being,” asserting that “the certainty of determinate being does not derive from any demonstration; this is simply because determinate being is not a matter of thought, but a matter of feeling. The same is true of personhood. Personhood appears to me only as an object of individual feeling. Love is the knowledge of personhood” (ibid., S.181). Even when discussing divine personhood, he emphasizes its emotional and sensuous character, rather than its rationality and transcendence, stressing that “the determinations of a real, personal essence are not determinations of thought, but affections freed from the immediate personality of thought. All speculation about personal essence is neither philosophy nor wisdom, but foolish arrogance” (ibid., S.182).

费尔巴哈希望的肯定哲学是基于感性、经验、生成、身体、自然等原则重构哲学，而不是把它们限制在传统理性框架之内。沿着这个思路，与逻辑学的“存在”相比，更强调感性的“定在”,认定“定在的确定性不是源自任何演证，这只是因为定在并非思维之事，而是感觉之事。位格的情形同样如此。位格仅仅向我显现为一种个体性的感觉的对象。爱便是对位格的知识”(ibid.,S.181)。甚至在谈到神的位格时，他也强调其情感、感觉性，而不是理性和超验性，强调“一个现实的、位格性的本质的规定性并非思想的规定性，而是摆脱了思维的直接个人性的情感(Affektionen)。所有关于位格性本质的思辨既不是哲学，亦不是智慧，而是愚蠢的自负”(ibid.,S.182)。

It was precisely through the absorption and transformation of the principle of sensuousness contained in Schelling’s positive philosophy that Feuerbach gradually elevated the status of the principle of sensuousness, to the point of defining it as the “origin.” He admitted that he initially held “sensuousness” in low regard; only in the year after writing this article, in his essay “On Philosophy and Christianity,” did he emphasize that religion involves not only feeling but also an “origin” distinct from thought. This origin is “sensuousness,” and “sensuousness is nothing other than the real, non-fabricated, actually existing unity of the material thing and the spiritual thing; therefore, in my view, sensuousness is also reality” (Feuerbach, 1984b, p. 514). “Replace philosophy’s rational essence that is divorced from human beings and lacks feeling with the rational, real, sensuous human being” (ibid., p. 515). Although “sensuousness” occupied a higher status in late Schellingian philosophy than in Hegelian philosophy, it was ultimately not a truly fundamental existence, but merely an existence that supplemented and perfected reason. Only later, with Feuerbach, did sensuousness become a self-evident existence independent of and self-subsisting in reason. Sensuous things are non-derived, self-reliant existences, things that require neither proof nor doubt, things that affirm themselves and prove themselves, things directly connected with feeling, endurance, sensation, and love. (Cf. Li Yuzhang, p. 3)

正是通过对谢林肯定哲学包含的感性原则的吸收、转化，费尔巴哈才逐渐提升感性原则的地位，以至于把它界定为“本原”。他承认自己开始对“感性”评价不高，只有到了写这篇文章的第二年，在《论哲学和基督教》一文中，才强调宗教不仅涉及情感，更涉及与思维不同的“本原”,这个本原就是“感性”,而“感性不是别的，正是物质的东西和精神的东西的真实的、非臆造的、现实存在的统一；因此，在我看来，感性也就是现实”(费尔巴哈，1984年b, 第514页)。“用具有理性的、实在的、感性的人，来代替哲学的那个离开人的、没有感觉的理性本质”。(同上，第515页)“感性”在晚期谢林哲学中虽比在黑格尔哲学中地位高，终归也不是真正根本性的存在，只是补充、完善理性的存在。只有在后来的费尔巴哈这里，感性才是独立于理性自存的自明性存在。感性事物才是非派生的、依靠自身存在的东西，是既不需要证明也不可怀疑的东西，是自己肯定自己、自己证明自己的东西，是与感受、承受、感觉、爱直接联系在一起的东西。(参见李毓章，第3页)

Third, positive philosophy also faces the danger of easily sliding into subjective arbitrariness.

第三，肯定哲学还面临容易走向主观任意的危险。

Deviating from or even abandoning reason leads positive philosophy toward a subjective or even fantastical world. The principles emphasized by positive philosophy—sensuousness, experience, becoming, feeling, desire—are often associated with subjectivity, and there exists a danger of moving toward a subjective, fantastical world. Feuerbach was quite concerned about this subjective tendency. To guard against this danger, he placed even greater emphasis on sensuousness and nature, hoping to constrain and prevent such subjective arbitrariness through reality. As a result, in order to prevent and correct Schopenhauer’s tendency to interpret the “thing-in-itself” as “will” and then “will” as “arbitrariness” (cf. Shang Jie), he strained to interpret “sensuousness” in the direction of nature, intuition, and contemplation. The outcome was overcorrection: he moved toward excessive contemplation and intuition, toward an alienation from and negation of the inner nature of will and action, losing the spirit of subjectivity, for which he was later severely criticized by Marx.

偏离甚或脱离理性，导致肯定哲学走向主观甚至幻想的世界。肯定哲学注重的感性、经验、生成、情感、欲望等原则往往与主观性关联在一起，存在走向主观、幻想世界的危险。费尔巴哈对这种主观倾向颇为担忧，为了防范这种危险，费尔巴哈更加强调感性、自然，希望通过实在性来约束和防止这种主观任意。结果，为了防止和纠正叔本华将“自在之物”理解为“意志”、再把“意志”理解为“任意性”(参见尚杰)的倾向，拼命往自然、直观、静观方向解释“感性”。结果是防范过度，走向了过分的静观、直观，走向了对意志、行动内在性的疏远和否定，丧失了主体性精神，后来受到马克思的严厉批评。

Feuerbach’s critique of positive philosophy, by influencing Marx, gave rise to further results. Marx, who had studied this “Critique of Positive Philosophy” and grasped its spiritual essence, once wrote in a letter to Feuerbach that “Schelling is your prefigured simulacrum,” and that “Schelling’s sincere youthful thought ended up with him as nothing but a youthful dream, whereas with you it has become truth, reality, a man’s undertaking” (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 27, p. 445). Frank believes that when Marx wrote to invite Feuerbach to write a critique of Schelling, Feuerbach, who had long been familiar with Schelling’s positive philosophy, found it “tricky and delicate.” Feuerbach repeatedly revised his reply to Marx, changing the draft three times, which fully “reflected Feuerbach’s embarrassment at the time: he hastily excerpted fragments from the pirated notes of Schelling’s lectures on the ‘Philosophy of Revelation’ circulating on the market, agonized over Marx’s request for several weeks, and finally admitted that Marx had made him ‘engage in a fierce inner struggle with himself.’ So Marx had clearly touched a wound in Feuerbach’s heart: Feuerbach had always tried to show that he himself was the first to critique Hegel, and that Schelling’s obvious ‘predecessor qualification’ in this regard came only from his arrogant ‘fantasy’… Moreover, Feuerbach could not think of a better name to label his own position than the name ‘positive philosophy,’ which Schelling had used to characterize his own philosophical peculiarity” (Frank, p. 29). It was Schelling, who proposed positive philosophy, who was the first to critique Hegel; Feuerbach further critiqued Hegel on the basis of Schelling. Moreover, the direction taken after rejecting Hegelian philosophy was also a further transformation on the basis of Schelling, even retaining the name “positive philosophy,” albeit with the modifiers “new” and “unique” to further regulate, correct, and elevate it.

费尔巴哈的肯定哲学批判通过影响马克思促生了更进一步的成果。研读过这篇《肯定哲学批判》并且理解其精神实质的马克思曾在致费尔巴哈的信中称“谢林是您的预先出现的模拟像”,认为“谢林的这种真诚的青春思想，在他那里只落得一场青春幻梦，而在您那里却成了真理、现实、男子汉的事业”。(《马克思恩格斯全集》第27卷，第445页)弗兰克认为，当马克思致信邀请费尔巴哈撰写批判谢林的文章时，了解谢林肯定哲学思想较久的费尔巴哈却感到“棘手又微妙”,费尔巴哈反复修改给马克思的回信，三易其稿，充分“反映了费尔巴哈当时的尴尬：当时他从市面上流传的保卢斯对谢林‘启示哲学’讲座的盗印笔记里迅速摘录了一些片段，花了好几个星期纠结马克思的要求，最后承认马克思让他‘与自己进行了激烈的内心斗争’。所以马克思显然触到了费尔巴哈内心中的一处伤口：费尔巴哈一直试图表明，自己才是黑格尔批判的第一人，谢林在这一点上明明白白的‘前辈资格’只不过来自他虚骄的‘幻想’……而且费尔巴哈其实想不出比谢林用来刻画自己的哲学特质的那个名称‘肯定哲学’更好的名称，来标识他自己的立场”(Frank, S.29)。提出肯定哲学的谢林才是批判黑格尔哲学的第一人，费尔巴哈是在谢林的基础上进一步批判黑格尔的。而且，拒斥黑格尔哲学后的走向也是在谢林基础上的进一步改造，名称都沿用谢林的“肯定哲学”,只不过用“新的”“唯一的”修饰词来进一步规范、修正和提升而已。

Even the concept of “nature,” which Feuerbach greatly esteemed, was intrinsically related to Schelling’s consistently emphasized philosophy of nature, manifesting both inheritance and absorption as well as separation and transformation. Admittedly, the sources of Feuerbach’s esteem for sensuousness and nature were multiple: French materialism, the progress of natural science at the time, and the analysis and emphasis on religious experience were all important factors that cannot be ignored; drawing relevant ideas from the lectures of late Schellingian philosophy is also a source that has received insufficient attention in the past. As Frank points out, “Schelling at least recognized that ‘nature’ and ‘reality’ mean the same thing; fundamentally, a philosophical system can only grow into something ‘more’ than a merely logical (i.e., virtual) reality through the reality of nature” (ibid., p. 42). Feuerbach affirmed Schelling’s concept of nature as “precisely the concept of nature as subject-object, and thus the restoration of the whole of nature” (Feuerbach, 1984a, p. 74), but Schelling’s stance of remaining neutral between materialism and idealism, hoping that his philosophy would encompass nature, humanity, and God, dissatisfied Feuerbach. He strove to strip away God and to refer everything to nature. In his later words, “reduce everything supernatural to nature, and then, through nature, reduce everything superhuman to the human” (ibid., p. 249). He placed all hope for solving problems in nature’s calmness, objectivity, self-subsistence, miracles, and power, shifting from appealing to religious miracles to appealing to natural miracles, asserting that “whoever no longer believes in natural miracles no longer believes in religious miracles. Without exception. The basis of all miracles is nature.” From this, he expected the secrets of religion to be solved in natural science, and even attributed the pursuit of communism to nature, declaring that “nature is the source of the communist, anti-state, and anti-law mode of thinking” (Feuerbach, 2025, pp. 68, 66). Finally, he directed the object of philosophical reflection solely at the natural world, asserting that “philosophy is the science of the real, entire world of reality; and the sum total of reality is nature (nature in the universal sense)” (Feuerbach, 1984a, p. 84). In this way, within the internal unity of transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature, negative philosophy and positive philosophy in Schelling, Feuerbach chose to set aside transcendental philosophy and take up the philosophy of nature, declaring that “the positive significance of Schelling’s philosophy lies only in the philosophy of nature” (Feuerbach, 1984a, p. 74). Similarly, with regard to the relationship between negative philosophy and positive philosophy, the positive significance of Schelling’s philosophy lies only in positive philosophy. This attitude of placing all hope in nature clearly lost the standpoint of the philosophy of subjectivity, which Marx regarded as an important achievement of classical German philosophy. From the standpoint of materialism, this was a progress; but from the standpoint of practical materialism, it was a regression. In terms of Marx’s intellectual development, the validity of this judgment of progress could at most be maintained up to the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Beginning with the *Theses on Feuerbach*, the loss of the standpoint of the philosophy of subjectivity was explicitly criticized by Marx.

即便费尔巴哈非常推崇的“自然”概念，也与谢林一直重视的自然哲学内在相关，表现为对其既有继承与吸收，又有剥离与改造。诚然，费尔巴哈推崇感性、自然的思想来源是多重的，法国唯物主义、当时自然科学的进展、对宗教经验的剖析与重视等都是其中不可忽视的重要因素，从晚期谢林哲学讲座中汲取相关思想也是过去不够重视的一个来源。恰如弗兰克指出的，“谢林起码已认识到，‘自然’和‘现实性’是同一个意思，根本上来说，哲学体系唯有通过自然的现实性，才能成长为一个比仅仅逻辑性的(也就是虚拟的)实在性‘更多’的东西。”(ibid.,S.42)费尔巴哈肯定谢林的自然概念“正是作为主体兼客体的自然的概念，因而也就是整个自然的恢复”(费尔巴哈，1984年a, 第74页),但谢林在唯物主义和唯心主义之间保持中立，希望自己的哲学包容自然、人与上帝的态度，又让费尔巴哈不满。他力图把上帝剥离出来，把一切都诉诸自然。用他后来的话说就是，“把一切超自然的东西归结为自然，又借助自然，把一切超人的东西归结为人”。(同上，第249页)把一切问题的解决都寄希望于自然的冷静、客观、自在、奇迹、威力，从诉诸宗教的奇迹转向诉诸自然的奇迹，认为“谁不再相信自然奇迹，谁就不再相信宗教奇迹。无一例外。所有奇迹的基础都是自然”,由此指望宗教的秘密在自然科学中获得求解，甚至把共产主义追求也归于自然，认定“自然才是共产主义的、反国家与法的思维方式的源头”。(费尔巴哈，2025年，第68、66页)最后他把哲学思考的对象仅对准自然世界，断言“哲学是关于真实的、整个的现实界的科学；而现实的总和就是自然(普遍意义的自然)”(费尔巴哈，1984年a, 第84页)。如此一来，在谢林那先验哲学与自然哲学、否定哲学与肯定哲学的内在统一中，费尔巴哈选择了撇开先验哲学的自然哲学，声言“谢林哲学的积极意义只是在自然哲学中”(费尔巴哈，1984年a, 第74页)。同理，就否定哲学与肯定哲学的关系而言，谢林哲学的积极意义也只在肯定哲学中。这种一切都寄希望于自然的态度，显然丧失了被马克思视为德国古典哲学重要成就的主体性哲学立场。就唯物主义立场而言，这是一种进步；但就实践唯物主义立场来说，又是一种退步。就马克思的思想发展历程来说，这种进步判断的有效性至多能维持到《1844年经济学哲学手稿》。从《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》开始，丧失主体性哲学立场就受到马克思的明确批评了。

In Feuerbach’s eyes, Schelling’s positive philosophy was full of defects and dangers, requiring correction and adjustment; in Marx’s eyes, Feuerbach’s positive philosophy was likewise. In Feuerbach’s correction of Schelling and Marx’s re-correction of Feuerbach, the principles of positive philosophy received more reasonable treatment.

在费尔巴哈眼里，谢林的肯定哲学富有缺陷和危险，需要予以纠正和调整；而在马克思的眼里，费尔巴哈的肯定哲学同样如此。在费尔巴哈对谢林的纠正和马克思对费尔巴哈的再纠正中，肯定哲学的原则得到更合理的处理。

IV. Critique of Feuerbach’s Critique of Positive Philosophy and Conclusion

四、对费尔巴哈肯定哲学批判的批判及结论

The late Schelling sought to unify negative philosophy and affirmative philosophy, making reason a creative freedom rather than a system of conceptual deduction, in order to open up a new realm for future philosophy. Affirmative philosophy is committed to liberating philosophy from the rationalist Logos system, where reason is powerful, mysterious, and oppressively overwhelming for sensuous reality, so that reason becomes closer to practical possibility and freedom, and subjectivity becomes more prominent. “Thus only by allowing reason to become the true origin in a primordial state, and by allowing reason as possibility itself to gain its own legitimacy in the face of unprethinkable immediacy, can it obtain ultimate justification before reality. And reason that has obtained this justification will take ‘creation’ as its fundamental mode of existence, but this is only possible on the basis of the identity of its own dual existence in otherness.” (Wang Ding, 2024, p. 18) And “Schelling’s revelation of the finitude of reason is actually a practical grounding of reason, a search for a historical-temporal-practical basis for the rational system that could no longer explain its own legitimacy in Hegel, precisely by revealing the other of reason.” (Wang Ding, 2022, p. 105) Feuerbach could not grasp this point. While criticizing and negating the defects of late Schelling’s affirmative philosophy, he returned to a traditional one-dimensional position by further emphasizing sensibility and nature, regressing to a natural intuition opposed to the concept. Although he knew that criticizing the affirmative philosophy of the rationalist position constrains necessity and emphasizes possibility, thereby necessarily opening up greater space for a kind of “immanence of action,” and affirmed that “affirmative philosophy … in Herr von Schelling, that system of ‘immanence of action’ still awaiting maturity” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.180), and thus possesses a more subjective spirit than Hegel’s speculative philosophy, he nevertheless weakened or even abandoned the subjective stance by emphasizing positivity and reality. For Marx, only by internally combining the subjective stance with the positive stance, and thereby further unifying theoretical philosophy with practical philosophy, could a new practical materialism be formed. Although Schelling’s philosophy had various defects, it did after all integrate subjective philosophy with affirmative (positive) philosophy. Stirner, though overly extreme, opposed all universal essences while emphasizing the unique individual’s unrestrained free creation, also striving for some combination of subjectivity and reality; the general direction was still correct. In comparison, Feuerbach stubbornly adhered to an overly intuitive, simple materialist position, a typical case of attending to one thing and losing sight of another: emphasizing positivity while discarding subjectivity; emphasizing nature while discarding the initiative of action; restoring the origin of theory while discarding the practical spirit. For this he was criticized by Marx.

晚期谢林力图把否定哲学和肯定哲学统一起来，让理性成为一种创造性的自由，而不是概念演绎体系，以便开辟未来哲学的新境界。肯定哲学致力于把哲学从唯理主义的那种理性强大、神秘、压得感性实在透不过气来的逻各斯系统中解放出来，让理性更切近实践可能性与自由，让主体性更加凸显。“所以唯有让理性在一种原初状态中成为真正的本原，让作为可能性的理性自身在不可预思的直接性面前获得自身的合法性，它才能在现实面前获得最终的正当性。而获得了这种正当性的理性将会以‘创造’作为其根本的存在方式，但这只有建立在它自身二重存在的他异性的同一中才有可能。”(王丁，2024年，第18页)而“谢林对于理性有限性的揭示实际上是一种对理性的实践性奠基，是在揭示理性的他者之际为已然在黑格尔那里无法说明自身正当性的理性体系寻找一种历史-时间-实践性的根据”。(王丁，2022年，第105页)费尔巴哈不能把握这一点，在批判、否定晚期谢林肯定哲学的弊端时，沿着进一步强调感性、自然的方向再度回归到传统的一重性立场，回到与概念对立的自然直观去了。虽然他知晓批评唯理主义立场的肯定哲学约束必然性、强调可能性而势必为一种“行动的内在性”开辟更大空间，肯定“肯定哲学……在冯·谢林先生那里，即那个有待成熟的“行动内在性”体系”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.180),因而比黑格尔思辨哲学更具有主体性精神，但他还是因为强调实证性、实在性而弱化甚至放弃了主体性立场。对于马克思来说，只有把主体性立场和实证性立场内在结合起来，从而进一步把理论哲学与实践哲学统一起来，才能形成新的实践唯物主义。谢林的哲学固然有种种缺陷，但毕竟融合了主体性哲学与肯定(实证)哲学。施蒂纳虽过于极端，但他既反对一切普遍性本质，又强调唯一者不顾一切的自由创造，同样致力于主体性和实在性的某种结合，大方向毕竟还对。相比之下，费尔巴哈固守一种过于直观、简单的唯物主义立场，是典型的顾此失彼：为强调实证性而丢弃了主体性；为强调自然而丢弃了行动的主动性；为还原理论的本源而丢弃了实践精神。由此受到马克思批评。

Closely related to this, Feuerbach’s affirmative philosophy is committed to reducing spirit to body, the subjective to the objective, and the subject to the object, yet it has only the significance of theoretical philosophy. What he calls casting affirmative philosophy “into the most deadly light,” revealing that “the original idol of positive philosophy is man; personality is essentially connected with flesh and blood,” or wanting to “analyze and dissect the riddle of Christianity empirically-philosophically or historically-philosophically,” “unconditionally rejecting all absolute, non-material, self-satisfied speculation that draws its material from itself,” using the sensuous body to process positive materials and thereby derive thoughts, rather than conceiving objects from thought—this is “in the realm of pure theoretical philosophy, I … consider only realism and materialism in the above sense to be important.” (Feuerbach, 1997, pp. 9, 13, 14) But in practical philosophy, he still advocated idealist principles, fully confident in the future victory of truth and morality. The opposition between Feuerbach’s theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy is even less conducive to unifying theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy than Schelling’s affirmative philosophy. His affirmative philosophy is neither reasonable nor effective, and requires further critique.

与此密切相关，费尔巴哈的肯定哲学致力于把精神归为身体，把主观归于客观，把主体归为客体，却只有理论哲学的意义。所谓他将肯定哲学“投入最最致命的光线之中”,道出“实证哲学的偶像之原本，乃是人；人格性是跟血肉有着本质的联系的”,或者要“对基督教的谜语作经验哲学的或历史哲学的分析、剖解”,“无条件地弃绝一切绝对的、非物质的、自我满足的、由自身汲取素材的思辨”,用肉身的感官去处理实证的材料从而得出思想，而不是从思想去构想对象，这就是“在纯粹理论哲学的领域内，我……认为只有上述意义下的实在论、唯物主义才是重要的”。(费尔巴哈，1997年，第9、13、14页)但在实践哲学上，他还是主张唯心主义的理想原则，对真理和道德在未来取得胜利抱有充分信心。费尔巴哈理论哲学与实践哲学的对立尚不如谢林的肯定哲学更有助于统一理论哲学与实践哲学，其肯定哲学既不合理也成效甚低，需要再批判。

Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels all criticized Schelling’s affirmative (positive) philosophy, but Feuerbach’s critique began as a philosophical critique and later turned into a political critique of Schelling; whereas Marx and Engels began first with a political critique and later turned to a philosophical critique. (See Liu Senlin, 2023, 2024a) However, Feuerbach’s critique of affirmative (positive) philosophy clearly involved both affirmation and negation of Schelling’s affirmative (positive) philosophy. Moreover, Feuerbach’s affirmation of Schelling’s affirmative (positive) philosophy was once explicitly affirmed by Marx and Engels, and subsequently explicitly criticized by them. For Marx and Engels, the critique and advancement of Feuerbach’s affirmative philosophy mainly consisted of the following points: First, on Feuerbach’s basis, further transform and transcend speculative philosophy according to new requirements and patterns, even abandoning the term “positive philosophy” altogether and using “positive science” to designate the new theory. Second, positivity and sensuousness are not inherently legitimate; they can also have limitations or even negativity—if treated in an extreme manner, as Stirner did. For this reason, Marx began emphasizing the necessity of reflecting on and criticizing positivity as early as 1844, and fully developed this in *The German Ideology*. This critique is as important as the critique of speculative philosophy. Third, appreciation of sensuousness and becoming must be premised on understanding them as “practice”; not just any “sensuousness” or “experience” can naturally obtain legitimacy and positivity. For Marx and Engels, who were constructing “real positive science” (*Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 526), this implied a corresponding new philosophy, which is a critical sublation not only of “affirmative philosophy” but also of “negative philosophy.” Fourth, sensuousness and rationality, positivity and essentiality complement each other; the key is the mechanism of their combination, not the mechanism of their separation and mutual exclusion. These were things Feuerbach could not achieve and could only look up to.

费尔巴哈与马克思、恩格斯都批判过谢林的肯定(实证)哲学，但费尔巴哈的批判一开始是哲学批判，尔后转向对谢林的政治批判；而马克思、恩格斯一开始先是政治批判，尔后转向哲学批判。(参见刘森林，2023年，2024年a)不过，费尔巴哈的肯定(实证)哲学批判显然对谢林肯定(实证)哲学既有肯定又有否定。而且，费尔巴哈对谢林肯定(实证)哲学的肯定，一度得到马克思、恩格斯的明确肯定，随后又得到明确的批判。对马克思、恩格斯来说，对费尔巴哈肯定哲学的批判与推进主要有以下几点：第一，在费尔巴哈基础上，按照新的要求和样式进一步改造和超越思辨哲学，甚至干脆不用“实证哲学”而用“实证科学”来称呼新的理论。第二，实证性、感性并不天然具有正当性，而同样可能具有局限性甚至负面性——如果以极端方式予以对待的话，就像施蒂纳所做的那样。为此，马克思在1844年就开始强调对实证性予以反思批判的必要性，并在《德意志意识形态》中充分展开。这种批判与对思辨哲学的批判具有同等重要性。第三，对感性、生成的赞赏必须以把它们理解为“实践”为前提，不是任何一种“感性”“经验”都能自然获得正当性和肯定性的。对于建构“真正的实证科学”(《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第526页)的马克思、恩格斯来说，其中蕴含着与之相对应的新哲学，不但是对“肯定哲学”而且也是对“否定哲学”的批判性扬弃。第四，感性与理性、实证性与本质性相辅相成，关键是两者结合的机制，而不是两者分离和相互排斥的机制。这些都是费尔巴哈无法做到而只能望其项背的了。

In this sense, Marx and Engels’ critique of Feuerbach’s critique of affirmative philosophy was not accomplished all at once, but was a relatively long process, one that involved not only criticizing and transcending Feuerbach but also Stirner, because Stirner rejected the universal principles of negative philosophy more radically than Feuerbach and further radicalized the principle of sensuous immediacy. Indeed, Stirner’s three key concepts—“Nothing (Nichts),” “the Unique One (Einzige),” and “ownness (Eigenheit)”—are all reverse borrowings of three concepts of the same name from Schelling’s *Philosophy of Revelation* (see Liu Senlin, 2024c). Stirner’s philosophy is a further radicalization of late Schelling’s affirmative philosophy, going beyond Feuerbach, an “affirmative philosophy” that completely discards the dimension of universality and essentiality and exalts individuality and uniqueness to the utmost. Marx and Engels’ reflective critique of Feuerbach and Stirner is, in a sense, a further extension of late Schelling’s critique of Hegel, a further reflection on the question of what reasonable relationship should be maintained between negative philosophy and affirmative philosophy, reason and sensibility or positivity, the Idea and nature, metaphysics and experience—a question at the heart of the Hegel-Schelling debate. Marx and Engels’ handling of the Feuerbach-Stirner problem is also a further treatment and deepening of the Hegel-Schelling debate.

在此意义上，马克思、恩格斯对费尔巴哈肯定哲学批判的批判并非一下子完成，而是一个较长期的过程，一个不仅包含对费尔巴哈而且也包含对施蒂纳批判超越的过程，因为施蒂纳比费尔巴哈更激进地拒斥否定哲学的普遍性原则并把感性的当下即是原则进一步激进化了。甚至施蒂纳哲学的三个关键概念“无(Nichts)”“唯一者(Einzige)”“独自性(Eigenheit)”都是对谢林《启示哲学》中三个同名概念的反向借用(参见刘森林，2024年c),施蒂纳哲学就是对晚期谢林肯定哲学的一种比费尔巴哈更进一步的激进化，一种彻底摈弃普遍性与本质性维度、把个性与唯一性进一步推崇备至的“肯定哲学”。马克思、恩格斯对费尔巴哈、施蒂纳的反思批判，某种意义上也是晚期谢林的黑格尔批判基础上的进一步拓展，是对黑格尔-谢林关于否定哲学与肯定哲学、理性与感性或实证性、理念与自然、形而上学与经验应保持何种合理关系这个问题的进一步思考。马克思、恩格斯对费尔巴哈、施蒂纳问题的处理，也是对黑格尔-谢林争论问题的进一步处理和深化。

From this, we can draw the following brief conclusions.

由此，我们就可以得到以下几个简要结论。

First, this important essay by Feuerbach not only reveals a key reason for Feuerbach’s intellectual turn, but also commendably incorporates the late Schelling into the framework of the transition from Hegel to Marx, thereby bringing the Hegel–late Schelling debate and its key issues into the evolutionary thread from German classical philosophy, through the Young Hegelians, to Marxist philosophy. This further links Hegel, the late Schelling, and Marx and Engels together, forming a new clue that enriches and perfects the relationship between Marx and German classical philosophy. The historical status and value of this essay are further confirmed by Marx and Engels’ affirmation of it in *The German Ideology*, making its worth especially precious.

第一，费尔巴哈的这篇重要论文不但昭示了费尔巴哈思想转变的一个重要缘由，而且难能可贵地把晚期谢林纳入到从黑格尔到马克思思想转变的框架结构之中，使得黑格尔-晚期谢林的争论及其关键问题进入从德国古典哲学经青年黑格尔派到马克思主义哲学的演变脉络之中，从而进一步把黑格尔、晚期谢林与马克思、恩格斯串联起来，构成丰富和完善马克思与德国古典哲学关系的新线索。这篇文章的思想史地位与价值因为马克思、恩格斯在《德意志意识形态》中对它的肯定而更加确定，其价值显得尤其宝贵。

Second, because Schelling’s positive philosophy still did not break free from negative philosophy, Feuerbach’s “Critique of Positive Philosophy” not only criticizes Schelling’s positive philosophy, but also criticizes the negative (speculative) philosophy that encompasses and restricts positive philosophy, namely Hegel’s philosophy. Feuerbach’s critique thus also signals an anticipation of a “new, sole positive philosophy” that has shed negative (speculative) philosophy. And this is the future philosophy that Feuerbach later strove to construct. Therefore, in a certain sense, this essay by Feuerbach should not be seen as merely a critique of the late Schelling’s positive philosophy, but as a critique of all traditional philosophy. Its critical focus is less “positive philosophy” than “negative philosophy”; less negation than the construction of a “new, sole positive philosophy.” “Critique” here is not only negation, but also signifies clarification and affirmation, pointing toward the new construction that is anticipated.

第二，因为谢林式肯定哲学仍没有摆脱否定哲学，所以费尔巴哈《肯定哲学批判》不仅批判谢林的肯定哲学，也批判涵盖、限制肯定哲学的否定(思辨)哲学，即包括黑格尔哲学。费尔巴哈的批判也就喻示着对摆脱掉否定(思辨)哲学的“新的唯一的肯定哲学”的期盼。而这就是费尔巴哈日后努力建构的未来哲学。所以，在某种意义上，不能把费尔巴哈这篇文章看作仅批判晚期谢林式肯定哲学，而应视为对一切传统哲学的批判。它批判的重点与其说是“肯定哲学”,不如说是“否定哲学”;与其说是否定，不如说是“新的唯一的肯定哲学”的建构。“批判”在这里不只是否定，也意味着澄清和肯定，喻示着期待中的新建构。

Third, Kant’s Copernican revolution and the turn from negative to positive philosophy manifested in the late Schelling–Hegel controversy are two important philosophical turns or transformations in German classical philosophy. Feuerbach’s essay deals precisely with how to view this second philosophical turn and its key issues. At that time, Feuerbach still stood on the simple Enlightenment position of the stark opposition between theology and philosophy, reason and revelation. In the words of the essay’s editor, “Whenever certain questions exceeded his range of understanding, he appealed to ‘sacred naivety,’ attempting to explain complex philosophical problems through simplified methods” (Feuerbach, 1975a, S.362). Although it had such-and-such defects, even extreme biases, Hegel, the late Schelling, and Stirner all both adhered to a clear subjectivist standpoint and, in their own ways, dealt with positivity [das Positive]; in a certain sense, they represented a kind of combination of subjectivist and positivity standpoints. Feuerbach, while emphasizing the positivity standpoint more than they did, discarded the valuable subjectivist standpoint and failed to absorb the achievements of subjectivist philosophy. The errors of Feuerbach and Stirner prompted Marx and Engels to more actively absorb the positive results of the two philosophical transformations in German classical philosophy. Marxist philosophy was born precisely from the creative transformation and innovative development of the achievements of these two philosophical transformations.

第三，康德的哥白尼式革命、晚期谢林与黑格尔论争中呈现的从否定哲学向肯定哲学的转折，是德国古典哲学的两个重要哲学转向或变革。费尔巴哈这篇文章就是在处理如何看待第二个哲学转向及其关键问题。费尔巴哈当时还是站在神学与哲学、理性与启示截然对立的简单启蒙立场上，用文章编者的话说就是，“每当某些问题超出了他的理解范围时，他便诉诸‘神圣的天真’,试图通过简化的方法来解释复杂的哲学问题”(Feuerbach, 1975a,S.362)。虽然有这样那样的缺陷，甚至极端偏颇，黑格尔、晚期谢林、施蒂纳都既坚持了明显的主体性立场，又以自己的方式处理了实证性存在，某种意义上算是主体性立场和实证性立场的某种结合，而费尔巴哈固然比他们更强调实证性立场，却丢弃了宝贵的主体性立场，没有吸取主体性哲学的成就。费尔巴哈、施蒂纳的失误促使马克思、恩格斯更积极地吸取德国古典哲学两种哲学变革的积极成果。马克思主义哲学就是在对这两种哲学变革成就的创造性转化、创新性发展中诞生的。

Marx and Engels later used Hegel’s profundity to set off Feuerbach’s shallowness. This profound “Hegel” is the Hegel criticized by Schelling, and thus contains elements of the late Schelling. Marx and Engels devoted their lives to breaking through the “form” of Hegel’s philosophy and revealing its profound, rich content—that is, to inheriting and surpassing the critical work on Hegel initiated by the late Schelling. The Hegel with whom Marx engaged in lifelong dialogue was the Hegel who had been criticized by the late Schelling and Feuerbach. Marx’s dialogue with Hegel contains the dialogues of Schelling and Feuerbach with Hegel; it is a critical expansion and elevation of the latter two dialogues, and also a correction of the errors of both. Through their critique of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels sought a new path of integration between the principles emphasized by positive philosophy—sensuousness, experience, emotion, desire—and those emphasized by negative philosophy—universal essence, necessary law—and thereby founded the new theory of historical materialism.

马克思、恩格斯后来以黑格尔的深邃映衬费尔巴哈的浅薄。这个深邃的“黑格尔”是谢林批判过的黑格尔，因而其中包含着晚期谢林因素在内。马克思、恩格斯终生致力于突破黑格尔哲学的“形式”并把其中深刻、丰富的内容揭示出来，也就是对晚期谢林开创的黑格尔批判工作的继承和超越。马克思终生与之对话的黑格尔，是经晚期谢林和费尔巴哈批判过的那个黑格尔。马克思与黑格尔的对话包含着谢林、费尔巴哈与黑格尔的对话，是对后两种对话的批判性拓展与提升，也是对后两者失误的纠正。通过批判费尔巴哈，马克思恩格斯在肯定哲学强调的感性、经验、情感、欲望等原则与否定哲学强调的普遍本质、必然规律之间的结合中探寻新的融合之道，创立了历史唯物主义新理论。